Case Title: Orion Savings Bank vs.

Shigekane Suzuki,respondent; GR
No. 205487 (J. Brion) (November 12, 2014)

Doctrine:

Real or immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws of the country

or state where it is located. Thus, all matters concerning the title and
disposition of real property are determined by what is known as the Lex loci
rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by which a title can pass from
one person to another, or by which an interest therein can be gained or lost.

Facts:

In the first week of August 2003, respondent Suzuki, a Japanese national,

met with Ms. Helen Soneja (Soneja) to inquire about a condominium unit and
a parking slot at Cityland Pioneer, Mandaluyong City, allegedly owned by
Yung Sam Kang (Kang), a Korean national and a Special Resident Retiree's
Visa (SRRV) holder. At the meeting, the parties agreed to reduce the price
to ₱2,800,000.00. On August 5, 2003, Suzuki issued Kang a Bank of the
Philippine Island (BPI) Check No. 83349 for ₱100,000.00 as reservation
fee. On August 21, 2003, Suzuki issued Kang another check, BPI Check No.
83350, this time for ₱2,700,000.00 representing the remaining balance of the
purchase price. Suzuki and Kang then executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
dated August 26, 2003 covering Unit No. 536 and Parking Slot No. 42. Soon
after, Suzuki took possession of the condominium unit and parking lot, and
commenced the renovation of the interior of the condominium unit.
Kang thereafter made several representations with Suzuki to deliver the titles
to the properties, which were then allegedly in possession of Alexander
Perez (Perez, Orion’s Loans Officer) for safekeeping. Despite several verbal
demands, Kang failed to deliver the documents. Suzuki later on learned that
Kang had left the country, prompting Suzuki to verify the status of the
properties with the Mandaluyong City Registry of Deeds. Suzuki learned that
CCT No. 9118 representing the title to the Parking Slot No. 42 contained no
annotations although it remained under the name of Cityland Pioneer. This
notwithstanding, Cityland Pioneer, through Assistant Vice President Rosario
D. Perez, certified that Kang had fully paid the purchase price of both the unit
and parking lot. The annotation of mortgage in favor of Orion, was
subsequently cancelled on June 16, 2000 by Entry No. 73232/T. No. 10186.
Despite the cancellation of the mortgage to Orion, the titles to the properties
remained in possession of Perez.

To protect his interests, Suzuki then executed an Affidavit of Adverse

Claim dated September 8, 2003, with the Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong
City. Suzuki then demanded the delivery of the titles. Orion, (through Perez),
however, refused to surrender the titles, and cited the need to consult Orion’s
legal counsel as its reason.

RTC ruled in favor of Suzuki and ordered Orion to deliver the CCT Nos.
18186 and 9118 to Suzuki. The court found that Suzuki was an innocent
purchaser for value whose rights over the properties prevailed over Orion’s.
CA partially granted Orion’s appeal and sustained the RTC insofar as it
upheld Suzuki’s right over the properties. It deviated from the RTC ruling,
however, by deleting the award for moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees, expenses for litigation and cost of suit. Hence, Orion then
filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 with this Court.

Issue: Will the Korean Law prevail on the conveyance of the condominium
unit and parking slot?

Held: No.

The Court denied the petition for lack of merit. Philippine Law governs the
transfer of real property

It is a universal principle that real or immovable property is exclusively

subject to the laws of the country or state where it is located. The reason is
found in the very nature of immovable property — its immobility. Immovables
are part of the country and so closely connected to it that all rights over them
have their natural center of gravity there. Thus, all matters concerning the
title and disposition of real property are determined by what is known as
the Lex loci rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by which a title
can pass from one person to another, or by which an interest therein can be
gained or lost. This general principle includes all rules governing the descent,
alienation and transfer of immovable property and the validity, effect and
construction of wills and other conveyances. This principle even governs the
capacity of the person making a deed relating to immovable property, no
matter what its nature may be. Thus, an instrument will be ineffective to
transfer title to land if the person making it is incapacitated by the Lex loci rei
sitae, even though under the law of his domicile and by the law of the place
where the instrument is actually made, his capacity is undoubted.
On the other hand, property relations between spouses are governed
principally by the national law of the spouses. However, the party invoking
the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the foreign law.
The foreign law is a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as
the judge cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know
only domestic or the law of the forum. To prove a foreign law, the party
invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25
of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Accordingly, matters concerning the title and disposition of real property shall
be governed by Philippine law while issues pertaining to the conjugal nature
of the property shall be governed by South Korean law, provided it is proven
as a fact.

In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South Korean
law on the conjugal ownership of property. It merely attached a "Certification
from the Embassy of the Republic of Korea" to prove the existence of Korean
Law. This certification, does not qualify as sufficient proof of the conjugal
nature of the property for there is no showing that it was properly
authenticated by the seal of his office, as required under Section 24 of Rule
132. Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity
approach or processual presumption comes into play, i.e., where a foreign
law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proven, the presumption is that
foreign law is the same as Philippine Law.

Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang ‘married to' Hyun Sook
Jung" is merely descriptive of the civil status of Kang. In other words, the
import from the certificates of title is that Kang is the owner of the properties
as they are registered in his name alone, and that he is married to Hyun Sook
Jung. We are not unmindful that in numerous cases we have held that
registration of the property in the name of only one spouse does not negate
the possibility of it being conjugal or community property. In those cases,
however, there was proof that the properties, though registered in the name
of only one spouse, were indeed either conjugal or community properties.
Accordingly, we see no reason to declare as invalid Kang’s conveyance in
favor of Suzuki for the supposed lack of spousal consent.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit.

Costs against petitioner Orion Savings Bank.
NMSMI VS. DND, G.R. NO. 187587 (JUNE 5, 2013)

Doctrine:

ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This
Code shall take effect one year after such publication.

Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is indispensable

to give effect to the law, unless the law itself has otherwise provided.

FACTS: On January 7, 1986, Pres. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476

which excluded barangays Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village
from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for
disposition under the provisions of RA Nos. 274 and 730. At the bottom of
Proc.No. 2476, Pres. Marcos made a handwritten addendum, which reads:
“P.S. – This includes Western Bicutan”. Proclamation No. 2476 however was
published in the Official Gazette without the handwritten addendum. On Aug
27, 1999, members of the Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc.
(NMSMI) filed a petition with the Commission on Settlement of Land
Problems (COSLAP) praying among others, for the reclassification of the
areas they occupied, covering Lot 3 of SWO-13-000-298 of Western Bicutan,
from public land to alienable and disposable land pursuant to Proclamation
No. 2476. The COSLAP granted the petition. Respondent MSS-PVAO filed
a MR with the COSLAP but was denied. It then filed a petition with the CA
which granted it. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the subject lots were not alienable and disposable by
virtue of Proc.No. 2476 on the ground that the handwritten addendum of
Pres. Marcos was not included in the publication of the said law.

HELD: Under Art. 2 of the Civil Code, the requirement of

publication is indispensable to give effect to the law, unless the law itself has
otherwise provided. The phrase “unless otherwise provided” refers to a
different effectivity date other than fifteen days following the completion of
the law’s publication in the Official Gazette, but does not imply that the
requirement of publication may be dispensed with. As held in Tañada vs.
Hon. Tuvera,

“Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its

discretion provide that the usual fifteen –day period shall be shortened or
extended. xxx We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential
decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise
of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the
legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Consitution.xxx We agree
that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose
is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.xxx
Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this Court cannot rely on a
handwritten note that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published.
Without publication, the note never had any legal force and effect.
Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative
Code, “the publication of any law, resolution or other official documents in
the Official Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority.” Thus,
whether or not President Marcos intended to include Western Bicutan is not
only irrelevant but speculative.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are hereby

DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 97925 dated 29 April 2009 is AFFIRMED in toto.
Accordingly, this Court's status quo order dated 17 June 2009 is hereby
LIFTED. Likewise, all pending motions to cite respondent in contempt is
DENIED, having been rendered moot. No costs.
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO v. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM,
GR No. 193707, 2014-12-10

Doctrine:

Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon
all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public
international law and to treaty stipulations. (Art. 14, NCC)

Facts:

Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van
Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990.[2] On
January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van
Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the... instant petition was sixteen (16)
years of age.

Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a

Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. At that time, their
son was only eighteen (18) months old. Thereafter, petitioner and her son...
came home to the Philippines.

According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly

support to their son

However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines,
respondent never gave support to the son

Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in

Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been residing thereat.
Respondent and his new wife established a business known as Paree
Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality... of Pinamungahan, Cebu
City. To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living
in Cebu City.

On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding
for support from respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the
letter.

Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit

with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation
of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter's unjust refusal
to support his minor child with petitioner.

The Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending

the filing of an information for the crime charged against herein respondent.

Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold
Departure Order against respondent. Consequently, respondent was
arrested and, subsequently, posted bail without the RTC-Cebu having
resolved the application of the protection order, respondent filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged;
and (2) prescription of the crime charged.

On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,
dismissing the instant criminal case against respondent on the ground that
the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect
to the respondent who is an alien

Issues:

Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child
under Philippine laws
Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No.
9262 for his unjustified failure to support his minor child.

Ruling:

We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not fully agree with

petitioner's contentions.

We agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 of the
New Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign
citizen, since Article 15 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of
nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned,
specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only
applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to
foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to
family rights and duties.

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family
rights and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the
Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of
his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support
to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.

This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support
petitioner's son altogether.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a
dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present
case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands,
he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to
support. While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing
his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the
same.

It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of
the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support
their child (either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce decree),
because Llorente v. Court of Appeals, has already enunciated that:

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts
are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they
must be alleged and proved.

In view of respondent's failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands

in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this
doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our
courts will presume that the foreign law is... the same as our local or domestic
or internal law. Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the
obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant
case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the
obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the non-
compliance therewith.

Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera', the Court held that a divorce

obtained in a foreign land as well as its legal effects may be recognized in
the Philippines in view of the nationality principle on the matter of status of
persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not
completely show that he is not liable to give support to his son after the
divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioner's allegation that
under the second page of the aforesaid covenant, respondent's obligation to
support his child is specifically stated, which was not disputed by respondent.

We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law
of respondent states that parents have no obligation to support their children
or that such obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still not find
applicability, in light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT and SA v. American
Realty Corporation, to wit:

Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and
established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order
shall not be applied.

Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work
undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum.

We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no

longer liable to support his former wife, in consonance with the ruling in San
Luis v. San Luis

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19,

2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the
City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
REMANDED to the same court to conduct further proceedings based on the
merits of the case.
SAUDIA vs. Rebensio, et al. (2015)

DOCTRINE:

Nevertheless, while a Philippine tribunal (acting as the forum court) is

called upon to respect the parties’ choice of governing law, such
respect must not be so permissive as to lose sight of considerations of
law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy that underlie
the contract central to the controversy. We emphasize the glaringly
discriminatory nature of Saudia’s policy. As argued by respondents,
Saudia’s policy entails the termination of employment of flight
attendants who become pregnant. At the risk of stating the obvious,
pregnancy is an occurrence that pertains specifically to women.
Saudia’s policy excludes from and restricts employment on the basis
of no other consideration but sex.

FACTS:

Respondents, who were regular flight attendants were illegally

terminated by petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines due to their pregnancy which
was alleged as a ground for termination under their employment contract.
Faced with the dilemma of resigning or totally losing their benefits,
respondents executed handwritten resignation letters. A year later,
respondents filed a complaint against Saudia for illegal dismissal; the case
was assigned to Labor Arbiter Suelo. Saudia assailed the jurisdiction of the
Labor Arbiter claiming that the complaint be dismissed on the ground of
forum non conveniens and that the respondents had no cause of action as
they resigned voluntarily. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
 Whether the case should be dismissed on the ground of forum non
conveniens.

RULING:

No. On the matter of pleading forum non conveniens, we state the rule, thus:
forum non conveniens may not only be clearly pleaded as a ground for
dismissal; it must be pleaded as such at the earliest possible opportunity.
Otherwise, it shall be deemed waived. Furthermore, forum non
conveniens finds no application and does not operate to divest Philippine
tribunals of jurisdiction and to require the application of foreign law. Saudia
invokes forum non conveniens to supposedly effectuate the stipulations of
the Cabin Attendant contracts that require the application of the laws of Saudi
Arabia.
G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,

vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.

DOCTRINE:

A divorce decree does not ipso facto clothed a divorcee with the legal
capacity to remarry. He must still adduce sufficient evidence to show
the foreign State’s personal law governing his status, or at the very
least, he should still prove his legal capacity to contract the second
marriage.

FACTS:

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian

citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.4 They lived together as
husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989,5 a decree of divorce,
purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Austrian family court.

On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a

“Certificate of Australian Citizenship” issued by the Australian government.6
Petitioner—a Filipina—and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in
Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City.7 In their application
for a marriage license, respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino.”

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately

without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in
Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance
with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of

Marriage10 in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy—respondent
allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on
January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent’s marriage to
Editha Samson only in November, 1997.

In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed
to petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution. He contended
that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by
a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989; thus, he was legally
capacitated to many petitioner in 1994.

On July 7, 1998—or about five years after the couple’s wedding and while
the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending—respondent was able to
secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the
“marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down.”

Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the

ground that it stated no cause of action. The Office of the Solicitor General
agreed with respondent. The court marked and admitted the documentary
evidence of both parties. After they submitted their respective memoranda,
the case was submitted for resolution.

Issue: Whether a divorce decree ipso facto clothes a divorcee with the legal
capacity to remarry.
The SC ruled that it cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a
naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on
January 12, 1994. It agreed with petitioner’s contention that the court a quo
erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with
the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient
evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the
very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.

However, the Court may not declare the second marriage of a divorcee null
and void on the ground of bigamy where there is a possibility that, under the
foreign law, the divorcee was really capacitated to remarry as a result of the
divorce decree—the most judicious course is to remand the case to the trial
court to receive evidence, if any, which show the divorcee’s legal capacity to
remarry. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the
parties’ marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence
two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the
Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the
other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.

A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce

obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. In mixed
marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code
allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is
“validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.” A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective
national laws.

A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof

are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. decrees that “aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law.” Therefore, before a
foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign
law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is
a public document—a written official act of an Australian family court.
Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given
presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and
admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce
decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.
The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body
or tribunal of a foreign country.

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice,

we REMAND the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving
evidence which conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry
petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the
ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
MORETO MIRALLOSA v. CARMEL DEVELOPMENT, GR No. 194538,
2013-11-27

DOCTRINE:

An action for unlawful detainer exists when a person unlawfully withholds

possession of any land or building against or from a lessor, vendor, vendee
or other persons, after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession by virtue of any contract, express or... implied.[46] Here,
possession by a party was originally legal, as it was permitted by the other
party on account of an express or implied contract between them.[47]
However, the possession became illegal when the other party demanded...
that the possessor vacate the subject property because of the expiration or
termination of the right to possess under the contract, and the possessor
refused to heed the demand.

Facts:

Respondent Carmel Development, Inc. was the registered owner of a

Caloocan property known as the Pangarap Village located at Barrio
Makatipo, Caloocan City.

As a consequence of Tuason, respondent made several oral demands on

petitioner to vacate the premises, but to no avail.[17] A written demand letter
which was sent sometime in April 2002 also went unheeded.[18]

On 14 January 2003, respondent filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer[19]

before the MeTC. After due hearing on 9 November 2007, the trial court
rendered a Decision
Petitioner alleges that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter,
because respondent had filed the Complaint beyond the one-year
prescriptive period for ejectment cases

In this case, petitioner could not be said to have been unduly burdened by
reliance on an invalid law.

Petitioner merely anchored his right over the property to an Affidavit allegedly
issued by Pelagio M. Juan, a member of the MHIA, authorizing petitioner to
occupy the... same.[63] However, this Affidavit was executed only sometime
in 1995, or approximately seven years after the Tuason case was
promulgated.[64] At the time petitioner built the structures on the premises,
he ought to have been... aware of the binding effects of the Tuason case and
the subsequent unconstitutionality of P.D. 293. These circumstances
necessarily remove him from the ambit of the operative fact doctrine.

Issues:

Whether or not the MeTC had jurisdiction over the case;

Whether or not Tuason may be applied here, despite petitioner not being a
party to the case; and

Whether or not petitioner is a builder in good faith.

Ruling:

The MeTC rightly exercised jurisdiction, this case being... one of unlawful
detainer.

Petitioner argues that respondent has no cause of action against him,

because under the doctrine of operative fact and the doctrine of res inter
alios judicatae nullum aliis praejudicium faciunt, petitioner should not be
prejudiced by Tuason; the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. 293
should not affect the rights of other persons not party to the case

While petitioner may not have been a party to Tuason, still, the judgment is
binding on him because the declaration of P.D. 293 as a nullity partakes of
the nature of an in rem proceeding.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.

The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 105190 are AFFIRMED.
RAMONITO O. ACAAC v. MELQUIADES D. AZCUNA, GR No. 187378,
2013-09-30

DOCTRINE:

Section 56 of the LGC provides:

SEC. 56. Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances or

Resolutions by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. (a) Within three (3) days
after approval, the secretary to the Sangguniang Panlungsod or
Sangguniang Bayan shall forward to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for...
review, copies of approved ordinances and the resolutions approving the
local development plans and public investment programs formulated by the
local development councils.

(b) Within thirty (30) days after receipt of copies of such ordinances and
resolutions, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall examine the documents or
transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial
prosecutor for prompt examination. The provincial... attorney or provincial
prosecutor shall, within a period of ten (10) days from receipt of the
documents, inform the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in writing his comments
or recommendations, which may be considered by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan in making its decision.

(c) If the Sangguniang Panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance or

resolution is beyond the power conferred upon the Sangguniang Panlungsod
or Sangguniang Bayan concerned, it shall declare such ordinance or
resolution invalid in whole or in part. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan... shall
enter its action in the minutes and shall advise the corresponding city or
municipal authorities of the action it has taken.
(d) If no action has been taken by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan within thirty
(30) days after submission of such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall
be presumed consistent with law and therefore valid.

FACTS: PETAL Foundation is a non-governmental organization, which is

engaged in the protection and conservation of ecology, tourism, and
livelihood projects within Misamis Occidental.PETAL built some cottages on
Capayas Island which it rented out to the public and became the source of
livelihood of its beneficiaries,among whom are petitioners Hector Acaac
and Romeo Bulawin.

Respondents Mayor Azcuna and Building Official Bonalos issued Notices of

Illegal Construction against PETAL for its failure to apply for a building
permit prior to the construction of its buildings in violation of the Building
Code ordering it to stop all illegal building activities on Capayas Island. On
July 8, 2002 the Sangguniang Bayan of Jaena Lopez adopted a Municipal
Ordinance which prohibited, among others : (a) the entry of any entity,
association, corporation or organization inside the sanctuaries;and (b) the
construction of any structures, permanent or temporary, on the premises,
except if authorized by the local government.

On July 12, 2002, Azcuna approved the subject ordinance; hence, the
same was submitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Misamis
Occidental (SP), which in turn, conducted a joint hearing on the matter.
Thereafter, notices were posted at the designated areas, including
Capayas Island, declaring the premises as government property and
prohibiting ingress and egress thereto.

A Notice of Voluntary Demolition was served upon PETAL directing it to

remove the structures it built on Capayas Island.

Petitioners filed an action praying for the issuance of a TRO, injunction and
damagesagainst respondents alleging that they have prior vested rights to
occupy and utilize Capayas Island. Moreover, PETAL assailed the validity
of the subject ordinance on the following grounds : (a) it was adopted
without public consultation; (b) it was not published in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province as required by the Local Government
Code (LGC); and (c) it was not approved by the SP. Therefore, its
implementation should be enjoined.

Respondents averred that petitioners have no cause of action against them

since they are not the lawful owners or lessees of Capayas Island, which
was classified as timberland and property belonging to the public domain.

The RTC declared the ordinance as invalid/void.

On appeal, the CA held that the subject ordinance was deemed approved
upon failure of the SP to declare the same invalid within 30 days after its
submission in accordance with Section 56 of the LGC. Having enacted the
subject ordinance within its powers as a municipality and in accordance
with the procedure prescribed by law, the CA pronounced that the subject
ordinance is valid.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject ordinance is valid and enforceable
against petitioners.

HELD: The decision of the Court of Appeals is sustained.

POLITICAL LAW presumption of validity

Section 56 (d) of the LGC provides : If no action has been taken by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan within thirty (30) days after submission of such
an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be presumed consistent with law
and therefore valid.

It is noteworthy that petitioner's own evidence reveals that a public hearing

was conducted prior to the promulgation of the subject ordinance.
Moreover, other than their bare allegations, petitioners failed to present any
evidence to show that no publication or posting of the subject ordinance
was made.

While it is true that he likewise failed to submit any other evidence thereon,
still, in accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance,
its constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of any
controverting evidence that the procedure prescribed by law was not
observed in its enactment. Likewise, petitioners had the burden of proving
their own allegation, which they, however, failed to do.

In the similar case of Figuerres v. CA, 364 Phil. 683(1999) citing United
States v. Cristobal, 34 Phil. 825 (1916), the Court upheld the presumptive
validity of the ordinance therein despite the lack of controverting evidence
on the part of the local government to show that public hearings were
conducted in light of : (a) the oppositors equal lack of controverting
evidence to demonstrate the local governments non-compliance with the
said public hearing; and (b) the fact that the local governments non-
compliance was a negative allegation essential to the oppositors cause of
action. Hence, as petitioner is the party asserting it, she has the burden of
proof. Since petitioner failed to rebut the presumption of validity in favor of
the subject ordinances and to discharge the burden of proving that no
public hearings were conducted prior to the enactment thereof, we are
constrained to uphold their constitutionality or legality. The PETITION is
denied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 30,

2008 and Resolution dated March 9, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 00284-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.
Quiao v. Quiao| G.R. No. 183622 | July 4, 2012

DOCTRINE:

At the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the respondent's marriage
the operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant
case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family
Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. The latter provision is
applicable because according to Article 256 of the Family Code "[t]his Code
shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested
or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other law."

Facts: Brigido Quiao (petitioner) and Rita Quiao (respondent) were married
in 1977 and had no separate properties prior to their union. The couple had
four children together. In 2000, Rita filed a complaint against Brigido for legal
separation due to his cohabitation with another woman. The Regional Trial
Court (RTC) declared the legal separation of the parties in 2005 and ordered
the equal division of their properties, with Brigido’s share of the conjugal
partnership’s net profits to be forfeited in favor of their children.

A few months later, Rita filed a motion for execution which was granted by
the trial court. Brigido paid Rita with regards to the earlier decision and the
writ was partially executed. Nine months later, Brigido filed a motion for
clarification asking the RTC to define “Net Profits Earned” which the court
held as “the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the
separate properties of each of the spouses and debts.”
Issue: Whether the regime of conjugal partnership of gains governs the
couple’s property relations.

Ruling: Yes. Brigido and Rita’s marriage took place on January 6, 1977, when
the operative law was the NCC. Since they did not agree on a marriage
settlement, their property relations is governed by the system of relative
community or the conjugal partnership of gains. Under this property relation,
all the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work and
industry are placed in a common fund and they own all the property of the
conjugal partnership of gains in common.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 1 of Butuan City is AFFIRMED. Acting on the Motion for
Clarification dated July 7, 2006 in the Regional Trial Court, the Order dated
January 8, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court is hereby CLARIFIED in
accordance with the above discussions.
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA v. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, GR No. 171914,
2014-07-23

DOCTRINE:

Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule
adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of property between the
parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a
divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks competent judicial approval, and
cannot be enforceable against the assets of the husband who contracts a
subsequent marriage.

Facts:

Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule
adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of property between the
parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a
divorce obtained in a... foreign country lacks competent judicial approval,
and cannot be enforceable against the assets of the husband who contracts
a subsequent marriage.

ATTY. LUNA... was at first a name partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip,
Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that time when
he was living with his first wife, herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia
Zaballero-Luna

(EUGENIA), whom he initially married in a civil ceremony

On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage
with EUGENIA from the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First
Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican
Republic. Also in Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the same... date,
ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD.
Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived
together as husband and wife until 1987.

After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including
the lawbooks, office furniture and equipment found therein were taken over
by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA's son of the first marriage. Gregorio Z.
Luna then leased out the 25/100 portion of the... condominium unit belonging
to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own law firm
named Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.

On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed modified

decision,[9] holding and ruling:

EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the
latter's death on July 12, 1997. The absolute divorce decree obtained by
ATTY. LUNA in the Dominican Republic did not terminate his prior marriage
with EUGENIA because foreign divorce between

Filipino citizens is not recognized in our jurisdiction. x x x[10]

Issues:

The decisive question to be resolved is who among the contending parties

should be entitled to the 25/100 pro indiviso share in the condominium unit;
and to the law books (i.e., Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American
Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports).
Ruling:

Atty. Luna's first marriage with Eugenia... subsisted up to the time of his
death

The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was
solemnized in the Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in force at the
time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the
nationality rule. The Civil Code continued to follow the nationality rule, to the
effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, although living abroad.[15] Pursuant to the... nationality rule,
Philippine laws governed this case by virtue of both Atty. Luna and Eugenio
having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997
terminated their marriage.

From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on September 10, 1947
until the present, absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been
recognized in the Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce
between Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code,[16] even if
either or both of the spouses are residing abroad.[17] Indeed, the only two
types of defective marital unions under our laws have been the void and the
voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against such... defective
marriages have been limited to the declaration of nullity of the marriage and
the annulment of the marriage.

Atty. Luna's marriage with Soledad, being bigamous was void; properties
acquired during their marriage... were governed by the rules on co-
ownership
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Luna's subsequent marriage to Soledad
on January 12, 1976 was void for being bigamous,[22] on the ground that
the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not been dissolved by the
Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI... of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican
Republic but in the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous,
or incestuous are void. Article 71 of the Civil Code clearly states:

Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance

with the laws in force in the country where they were performed, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous,
polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law.

Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or

subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means
of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.[23] A bigamous marriage
is considered void ab initio.[24]

Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife,
but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the
property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or
their wages and salaries shall be governed... by the rules on co-
ownership.(n)

SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her own
independent funds were used to buy the law office condominium and the law
books subject matter in contention in this case proof that was required for
Article 144 of the New Civil Code and Article
148 of the Family Code to apply as to cases where properties were acquired
by a man and a woman living together as husband and wife but not married,
or under a marriage which was void ab initio. Under Article 144 of the New
Civil Code, the rules on co-ownership would... govern. But this was not
readily applicable to many situations and thus it created a void at first
because it applied only if the parties were not in any way incapacitated or
were without impediment to marry each other (for it would be absurd to
create a co-ownership where there... still exists a prior conjugal partnership
or absolute community between the man and his lawful wife). This void was
filled upon adoption of the Family Code. Article 148 provided that: only the
property acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution
of... money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion
to their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding
shares were prima facie presumed to be equal. However, for this
presumption to arise, proof of actual contribution was... required. The same
rule and presumption was to apply to joint deposits of money and evidence
of credit. If one of the parties was validly married to another, his or her share
in the co-ownership accrued to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership existing in such... valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad
faith was not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in
the manner provided in the last paragraph of the Article 147. The rules on
forfeiture applied even if both parties were in bad faith.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed August 27, 2001 Decision

of the RTC of MakatiCity, Branch 138, is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
(a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit at the SIXTH
FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTEEN (517/100) (sic) SQUARE METERS is hereby adjudged to
defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-
Luna (first marriage), having been acquired from the sole funds and sole
industry of Juan Luces Luna while marriage of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia
Zaballero-Luna (first marriage) was still subsisting and valid;

(b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right as owner or under any

other concept over the condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds ofMakati with respect
to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN LUCES
LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to
Eugenia Zaballero Luna";

(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia

Zaballero-Luna(first marriage) are hereby declared to be the owner of the
books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and
Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the condominium unit.
KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA v. MINORU KITAMURA, GR No. 149177, 2007-11-
23

G.R. No. 149177, November 23, 2007

DOCTRINE:

Lex loci celebrationis relates to the "law of the place of the ceremony"63 or
the law of the place where a contract is made.64 The doctrine of lex
contractus or lex loci contractus means the "law of the place where a
contract is executed or to be performed."65 It controls the nature,
construction, and validity of the contract66 and it may pertain to the law
voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by them either
expressly or implicitly.67 Under the "state of the most significant relationship
rule," to ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute, the court should
determine which state has the most substantial connection to the occurrence
and the parties.

FACTS:

Nippon, a Japanese consultancy firm entered into a one-year ICA contract

with Kitamura, a Japanese national permanently residing in the Philippines.
On February 2000, Kitamura was informed that Nippon is no longer renewing
his ICA and his services would only be utilized until March 31, 2000.
Aggrieved, Kitamura now filed an action for specific performance and
damages with the RTC of Lipa City. Nippon filed a motion to dismiss. The
trial and appellate court ruled in favor of Kitamura, hence this petition.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC of Lipa City has jurisdiction for contracts executed
by and between two foreign nationals in foreign country wholly written in a
foreign language?

RULING:

Yes. In the judicial resolution of conflict problems, 3 consecutive phases are

involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of
judgments. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two different concepts.
Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this
state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a
substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both
parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a state
a constitutional authority to apply forum law.

The only issue is the jurisdiction, hence, choice of law rules as raised by the
petitioner is inapplicable and not yet called for. The petitioner prematurely
invoked the said rules before pointing out any conflict between the laws of
Japan and the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is

DENIED.

SO ORDERED.