Gender, Development, and

the State in India

This book explores the relationship between the state, development policy,
and gender (in)equality in India. It discusses the formation of state policy on
gender and development in India in the post-1990 period through three key
organising concepts of institutions, discourse, and agency. The book pays
particular attention to whether the international policy language of gender
mainstreaming has been adopted by the Indian state, and if so, to what ex-
tent and with what results. The author examines how these issues play out
at multiple levels of governance – at both the national and the subnational
(state) levels in federal India. This comparative aspect is particularly impor-
tant in the context of increasing autonomy in development policymaking in
India in the 1990s, divergent development policy approaches and outcomes
amongst states, and the emerging importance of subnational state develop-
ment policies and programmes for women in this period.
The author argues that the state is not a monolith but a heterogeneous,
internally differentiated collection of institutions, which offers complex and
varying opportunities and consequences for feminists engaging the state.
Demonstrating that the Indian empirical case is illuminating for studies
of the gendered politics of development, and international debates on gen-
der mainstreaming, the book highlights the politics of negotiating gender
equality strategies in the contemporary context of neo-liberal development
and brings together complex issues of modernity, postcolonialism, identity
politics, federalism, and equality within the broader context of the world’s
largest democracy.
This book will be of interest to scholars interested in the politics of gender
equality, state feminism, and gender mainstreaming; federalism and multi-
level governance; and development studies and gender in South Asia.

Carole Spary is Assistant Professor in the School of Politics and Interna-

tional Relations at the University of Nottingham, UK.
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Gender, Development, and
the State in India

Carole Spary
First published 2019
by Routledge
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Names: Spary, Carole, author.
Title: Gender, development and the state in India / Carole Spary.
Description: 1 Edition. | New York: Routledge, 2019. |
Series: Routledge research on gender in Asia series |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2018050586 (print) | LCCN 2018058824 (ebook) |
ISBN 9780429022647 (ebook) | ISBN 9780429663444 (epub) |
ISBN 9780429660726 ( mobipocket) | ISBN 9780429666162 (adobe) |
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Typeset in Times New Roman
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Contents

List of figures vii

List of tables ix
Acknowledgements xi

1 Introduction 1

2 Gender, development, and the state in India:

debates and perspectives 23

3 Mapping national planning policy since 1990 58

4 Gender mainstreaming and the state in India:

national initiatives 75

5 Subnational policy in context: a profile of

two Indian states 108

6 Gendered institutional contexts: state-level machineries? 151

7 Gendered discourses of development in two Indian states 185

8 Gendered developmental subjectivities: actors, agency,

and gender mainstreaming 211

9 Conclusion 235

Index 247
List of figures

1.1 Map of India (prior to 2014 bifurcation of Andhra Pradesh) 10

1.2 District-wise maps of Tamil Nadu (right) and Andhra
Pradesh (left; prior to 2014 bifurcation) 11
5.1 Comparative sex ratios (all ages) for Tamil Nadu, Andhra
Pradesh, and all-India (1901–2011) 127
6.1 Women candidates and elected Members of Tamil Nadu
Legislative ­Assembly – AIADMK and DMK parties
(1980–2016) 155
6.2 Women candidates and elected Members of Andhra
Pradesh Legislative Assembly – Congress Party and Telugu
Desam Party (1983–2014) 156
List of tables

1.1  basic profile of the two case study states and all-India
A 12
2.1 Approach to women, gender, and development in Five-Year
Plans (1951–1997) 45
5.1 Economic indicators for Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and
all-India 110
5.2 Human and gender development, gender and
empowerment, and poverty indicators in Andhra Pradesh,
Tamil Nadu, and all-India 112
5.3 W  ork participation rates and status of workers for Andhra
Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and all-India, 2011 113
5.4 Distribution (%) of status of ‘usual’ worker
(all ages), 2011–2012 114
5.5 Distribution (%) of males and females across worker
categories for Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu,
and all-India, 2011 115
5.6 Distribution (%) of males and females within worker
categories for Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu,
and all-India, 2011 115
5.7 Daily wages (Rs.) of workers (15–59 years) and gendered
wage disparities in Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and
all-India, 2011–2012 117
5.8 Literacy rates for Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and
all-India, 2001–2011 122
5.9 Levels of educational achievement in formal education in
Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and all-India, 2011 124
5.10 Sex ratios for Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu,
and all-India, 2011 126
5.11 Attitudes towards and experiences of gender-based violence
in Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, and all-India 129
6.1 Women in Tamil Nadu Assembly and Lok Sabha elections
(1984–2016) 154
6.2 Women in Andhra Pradesh Assembly and Lok Sabha
elections (1985–2014) 156
Acknowledgements

I accumulated many debts of gratitude over the long journey of this book,
which began as a PhD thesis researched between 2004 and 2007 and com-
pleted in 2008, but subsequently revised and updated with further research.
First, I express my gratitude to the UK Economic and Social Research
Council for providing me with a +3 studentship, without which I would not
have been able to pursue this research, particularly the fieldwork I was for-
tunate to undertake in India, and the University of Bristol for a research
assistantship which enabled me to undertake postgraduate study. My deep
gratitude to my PhD supervisors, Professor Judith Squires and Dr. Andrew
Wyatt, for their continuous support and encouragement, insight and expe-
rience, and infallible patience. Andrew generously shared his enthusiasm
for, and guided me through, the intricate and fascinating world of Indian
politics, and patiently re-read revised drafts of different book chapters long
after the PhD had finished. Judith provided immense clarity of thought,
insight, and expertise. I am extremely grateful to the many individuals who
spared time to speak with me and share their thoughts and experiences on
gender and development in India, and to the organisations in India who
granted me access to their library collections, namely, in Chennai, the
­Madras Institute of Development Studies, the MS Swaminathan Research
Foundation, the Institute for Financial Management and Research, and the
Tamil Nadu Corporation for the Development of Women; in Hyderabad,
the Anveshi Research Centre for Women’s Studies, the Centre for Economic
and Social Studies, and the National Institute of Rural Development; and in
New Delhi, the Centre for Women’s Development Studies. Their generosity
enriched the analysis presented in this book. I also benefited from an im-
mensely supportive PhD research environment at the University of B ­ ristol
and thank, in particular, Ana Jordan, Christina Rowley, Laura Shepherd,
Penny Griffin, Chanintira Na Thalang, and Anna Stavrianakis for their
support in sharing the highs and lows, and for enabling me to explore in-
tellectual worlds that I may not have otherwise encountered. Before and
after the PhD was completed, Sarah Childs provided generous support and
advice. Many colleagues at the Universities of Warwick, York, and Not-
tingham have also provided much support and encouragement for which I
xii Acknowledgements
am grateful. My deep thanks to Dorothea Schaefter and her team at Rout-
ledge for their endless patience. I am grateful to Srila Roy who kindly read
and commented on Chapter 4 and provided encouragement, to Leslie for
her editorial suggestions, to Elaine for her patience and skill in drawing
the maps, to Katharine Adeney for encouragement, and to Sydney Calkin
and K. Kalpana for stimulating conversations on gender and development.
I also thank my Gender and Development students from Warwick, York,
and Nottingham over the past ten years for their passion in the subject and
engaging conversations. It has been my great fortune to work closely with
Shirin Rai, whose scholarship inspired me to work in this field, and who has
been a fantastic mentor. Finally, to Ana who has been there from the start,
for both the first and final incarnations, shared the pain and the joy, and is
the best writing buddy anyone could have; to Neil for providing balance,
comfort, and humour; and to my family for their unending love and support.
Abbreviations

AIADMK All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (party)

DMK Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (party)
DWCRA  Development of Women and Children in Rural Areas
(SHG scheme)
GoAP Government of Andhra Pradesh
GoI Government of India
GoTN Government of Tamil Nadu
IAS Indian Administrative Service
LBSNAA Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of
Administration
MWCD/DWCD 
Ministry/Department of Women and Child
Development
NCW/SCW National/State Commission for Women
NMEW National Mission for the Empowerment of Women
NPEW National Policy for the Empowerment of Women
SC/ST Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes
SGSY Swarnajayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana (SHG scheme)
SERP Society for the Elimination of Poverty
SHG Self-Help Group
TDP Telugu Desam Party
TNCDW  Tamil Nadu Corporation for the Development of
Women
1 Introduction

This book explores the relationship between the state, development policy,
and gender (in)equality in India. It asks what development policies in In-
dia say, implicitly or explicitly, about gender relations and to what extent
state-led development initiatives recognise and seek to address gendered
inequalities. It explores whether the international policy language of gen-
der mainstreaming has been adopted by the Indian state, and if so, how
and with what results? It investigates whether efforts by governmental and
non-governmental actors to make the state more gender-responsive have
been effective. It asks these questions at both national and subnational levels
of government, in two states of India, to understand how the federal context
shapes gender, development, and the state in India. A key argument of the
book is that there has been an identifiable shift towards the language of gen-
der mainstreaming in national planning and policy discourse, but this has
been partial with limited success. The concept of women’s empowerment
and strategies of affirmative action are more influential. Evidence of a gen-
der mainstreaming approach is even more limited at subnational levels. This
introductory chapter outlines this puzzle in more detail; situates it within
Indian and international debates on gender, development, and multilevel
governance; summarises the book’s main arguments and findings; discusses
the approach to the research; and outlines the structure of the book.

Gender mainstreaming and development in India

Gender mainstreaming, broadly speaking, is the notion that mainstream in-
stitutions, such as governments, must transform their own norms, p ­ olicies,
processes, and thinking across the whole policy spectrum to produce more
gender-responsive policies in pursuit of gender equality.1 Rather than
­expecting national machineries for women or women’s policy agencies –
­isolated, overburdened, under-resourced, or elite-captured agencies – to
act as sole champions of equality in government, gender mainstreaming
implores all institutional actors to consider the gendered impact of their
policies and practices. Gender-blind state institutions produce gender-blind
policies, on a scale and scope beyond which national machineries alone
could resolve. So to produce more gender-equitable policy, institutions
2 Introduction
themselves need to change. Such transformation would, at the very least,
help to limit gender-inequitable development and hopefully generate pros-
pects for a more gender-equitable future.
There is a vast amount of literature on gender and development and
­women’s empowerment in India, but little has been said about the concept
of gender mainstreaming in India, despite the global emergence of this con-
cept in the mid-1990s, consolidated by the UN Beijing Platform for Action
in 1995. The original aim of this research was to understand to what extent
gender mainstreaming had been attempted in India, under what conditions,
whether it had been successful, and if so/not, why/why not. Feminist scholars,
practitioners, and activists in India possess vast knowledge on gender and
development, with many leading this international field. Increasingly since
the 1970s, the Government of India has formulated and enacted policy in-
itiatives recognising the gendered character of national development, with
significant victories for feminist scholars and activists, though not without
challenges and setbacks along the way. But when at the beginning of the
1990s, the Indian state’s development policy ostensibly shifted towards a
neo-liberal economic discourse, feminist scholars and activists raised con-
cern about the anticipated adverse effects of these policies (discussed in
Chapter 2). With the international growth of gender mainstreaming strat-
egies since the mid-1990s, the puzzle was whether, and if so, how had the
Indian government adopted this new approach, and how did this interact
with the changing macroeconomic development policy discourse and exist-
ing approaches to gender and development. Had international global gender
equality norms of gender mainstreaming diffused into Indian planning dis-
course, at both national and subnational levels, or did domestic policy and
practice prioritise other approaches?
It seemed a rather optimistic place to start when my research be-
gan in 2004. International scholarly literature had already narrated
cautionary tales of gender mainstreaming, highlighting its limitations
­(Mukhopadhyay, 2004; discussed in Chapter 2). Should states abandon
‘national machineries for women’ – the specific institutions they had built
only recently to address gender equality – in favour of gender mainstream-
ing approaches? Or should these machineries remain as inside advocates
and coordinators encouraging gender-responsive policies in other govern-
ment sectors? Concerns about gender mainstreaming included the derad-
icalising of gender equality demands in the process of convincing more
mainstream agencies of the ‘business case’ for gender equality (Chant and
Sweetman, 2012; Roberts and Soederberg, 2012). Advocates had either
inadvertently reproduced or been co-opted into efficiency-oriented eco-
nomic discourses that could subordinate and undermine gender equality
goals (Verloo, 2001; Calkin, 2015). Gender mainstreaming became seen
as disappointing and unchallenging; feminist demands and agendas had
adapted to mainstream development discourse, institutions, and actors,
rather than transforming the same towards equality (Bacchi and Eveline,
2003). Simultaneously, Third World feminists and transnational feminists
 Introduction 3
lamented the deradicalisation of the concept of women’s empowerment as
it became more ubiquitous and co-opted in development policy and prac-
tice, including in India and in microcredit programmes (Batliwala, 2007;
discussed below and in Chapter 2).
In pursuit of understanding gender mainstreaming in India, my prior
question was, What were the dominant discourses of gender and development
articulated by the Indian state? To adapt a phrase from Eveline and Bacchi
(2005), what were they mainstreaming if they were mainstreaming gender?
Did particular ways of understanding gender enable or inhibit gender main-
streaming for gender-equitable development? And was there any domestic
drive to introduce gender mainstreaming? If so, which institutional actors
were involved, and were these new strategies combined with existing strate-
gies or did they replace them? Before the journey of gender mainstreaming
could be analysed, key state institutions, discourses, and actors involved in
gender and development policy had to be identified and mapped. Surveying
the paucity of literature on gender mainstreaming in India suggested that (a)
gender mainstreaming’s appeal was subordinate to other concepts such as
‘women’s empowerment’ and/or (b) analyses of gender mainstreaming in In-
dia were few or less accessible in academic scholarship. Perhaps knowledge
and experience of gender mainstreaming efforts were confined to bureau-
cratic circles and activist experience, officially undocumented, unrecorded,
or not widely available. Indian feminist economist Bina Agarwal noted in
the early 1990s that ‘[r]eports…have a tendency to gather dust, their con-
tents forgotten…’ (1994: 6), but she observed ‘the incorporation of women’s
concerns in planning and policy…[was] not as yet a characteristic feature
of government programmes in India…’ (ibid: 499). Almost 20 years later,
Agarwal would chair a working group on Disadvantaged Farmers Including
Women as an advisory group to India’s Planning Commission, in prepara-
tion for the government’s Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2012–2017), reflecting her
extensive work on this issue and the Indian government’s incorporation of
gender expertise in its planning process over time (discussed in Chapter 4).
This book offers an analysis of the discourse of national development
policy in India in selected Five-Year Plans and selected national initiatives
since the 1990s to produce more gender-responsive development policy and
outcomes. It traces dominant and subordinate-gendered discourses of de-
velopment in government policy, changes in institutional structures and
mechanisms to influence policy, and the different development subjectivi-
ties produced by policy discourse and institutional openings, which have
afforded different levels of agency to different actors, including women,
­positioning them in development in varying ways across time and space.

Gender, development, and multilevel governance

National-level policy on gender and development comprises only part of
the picture. This book also examines the subnational context for gender
and development, comparing two southern states within India – Tamil
4 Introduction
Nadu and Andhra Pradesh – and their initiatives related to gender and
development. When my research began in 2004, studies expressed g­ rowing
interest in analysing national-subnational (or centre-state) relationships
and comparing subnational state government policies (e.g. Wyatt and
Zavos, 2003; Jenkins, 2004b), interest which has increased over time (e.g.
Tillin et al., 2015). India’s federal system in the post-1990 context of eco-
nomic liberalisation was associated with increasing subnational auton-
omy of state governments to determine policy (Jenkins, 2004a: 6) and
the ­i ncreasing influence of regional parties at the subnational level and in
­national coalition politics.
What did this changing federal context mean for gender and development
policy? More than two decades ago, Indian feminist scholars K. Lalitha and
Mary John suggested in the post-1991 policy environment, where states have
more autonomy in formulating development policy, ‘there may be new oppor-
tunities at the [subnational] state level to demand more comprehensive policies
on gender and funding commitments for women’ (IDS Bridge, 1995: 4–5). Did
these new opportunities materialise? How, if at all, have new regional political
elites articulated a view on gender relations? If so, do subnational state govern-
ments adopt similar or different approaches to gender equality to the national
government and each other? If not, what determines the difference? Where do
gender equality initiatives emerge from at the national and subnational lev-
els and are these similar across states? If not, how does institutional location
matter? Do subnational governments articulate the same kinds of gendered
development discourse? Are diverse actors, such as political leaders, bureau-
crats, and women’s movement actors, afforded similar kinds of agency? If not,
what explains these differences and what are their effects? Inherent in Lalitha
and John’s observation is the important question of whether increasing sub-
national autonomy for Indian states mean more opportunities for feminist
activists to influence the state. Conversely, does multilevel governance create
multiple obstacles, more actors to persuade, and thus greater likelihood of
advocacy fatigue and failure? Does India’s strong centrist state still offer the
best opportunity for the women’s movement to advocate for gender-equitable
development? Understanding the opportunities and challenges faced by the
women’s movement to engage with national and subnational governments can
enable us to understand the relationship between gender, development, and
the state in India and the prospects for positive change.
At the subnational level, this book focuses on state-led women’s self-help
group (SHG) programmes, increasingly popular in the 1990s as a policy in-
strument of the national government and some subnational governments,
having been adopted faster in some Indian states than others. The SHG
model has been adopted either to increase access to financial credit (micro-
credit/microfinance – the focus of this study) or as a means for organising
and mobilising women for literacy and social empowerment (as in the na-
tional government’s Mahila Samakhya scheme). The proportion of wom-
en’s SHGs in India promoted by government agencies as opposed to civil
society organisations increased substantially since the 1990s, with one study
 Introduction 5
estimating government-promoted SHGs in 2005 constituted approximately
half of all SHGs in India, compared to only 11 percent in 2000 (EDA/AP-
MAS, 2006: 20). But what do these state-sponsored SHG programmes say
about gender equality? Are they effective in empowering women? Has the
popularity of the SHG model prevented adoption of gender mainstreaming
or are they compatible approaches?
These questions are explored in the second half of the book through a
focused comparison of two states (case selection discussed below). A more
extensive study across more states was beyond the scope of this book but is
an opportunity for future research (see Conclusion chapter). I argue these
two states’ flagship programmes for gender and development are not, on the
whole, consistent with a gender mainstreaming approach, though Andhra
Pradesh appears closer to this approach than Tamil Nadu in some respects.
The state SHG programmes reflect, rather, an attempt to integrate women
into existing structures with constrained ideas about gender equality. Par-
ticularly in Tamil Nadu, there is little evidence state ­governments, beyond
the selected few departments and parastatal agencies involved with the SHG
programmes, are willing to broadly reflect internally on their own practices
and policies to make them more gender-responsive.
The Indian state’s approach to gender and development, particularly
the shifting discursive and institutional context after 1990, has multiple
­i mplications for how feminist activists engage the state. This question has
motivated scholars beyond India. Globally, feminist political scientists have
asked questions about how multilevel governance affects gender equality
policies and outcomes, and the women’s movement’s effective engagement
with multiple levels of state actors (Chappell, 2002; Banaszak et al., 2003;
Haussman et al., 2010). At the outset of this project, few studies had explored
comparatively and systematically the importance of gendered development
policy at the subnational level in India. Some have analysed variations in
gender inequalities across Indian states – Agarwal’s study of gender and
land rights, with different inheritance laws across different states, is a no-
table example (Agarwal, 1994). Attempts to compare social policy across
states have increased (Tillin et al., 2015), though barring a few important
exceptions2 these are not usually interested in gender policy, subnational
­institutional structures for gender advocacy and policy, or discourses on
gender and development, especially gender mainstreaming. This book
hopes to make a modest contribution to this literature.

Analysing gender, development, and the state: institutions,

discourse, and agency
To reiterate, the book provides insights into (a) the politics of formulating
and implementing gendered development policy in an institutional context;
(b) how the process and content of policymaking is affected by discourse; and
(c) how particular agents are positioned as more influential than ­others in
the development policymaking process. It examines multilevel governance
6 Introduction
in India by exploring these dynamics at both national government and sub-
national (state) government levels in two states, comparing between ­national
and subnational governments and between subnational state governments.
A key argument put forward in the book is that there has indeed been a
shift in national policy discourse and institutional structures and practices
towards the global language of gender mainstreaming since the 1990s. But
this has only been a partial shift; other concepts remain influential, particu-
larly women’s empowerment. Gender mainstreaming initiatives have only
been partially successful, and a multiplicity of policy discourses exists on
gender and development in India. This is unsurprising in India given its
size and variability of agencies and programmes. The state is not a uniform
actor but highly differentiated internally; it is an ‘arena of contestation, with
cooperation and conflict taking place at multiple levels’ (Agarwal, 1994:
499). Institutional differences within the state produce this multiplicity of
discourse; differences exist horizontally across policy sectors, vertically
across different levels of government, and within each of these domains,
over time. Even between two subnational states, I identify three different
policy discourses on gender and development, varyingly present: protective-­
paternalist, competitive-capability, and structural-transformative. Only the
latter is compatible with a gender mainstreaming approach (see Chapter 7).
This multiplicity poses interesting questions about whether the embedded-
ness of earlier gendered policy discourse prevents new approaches from
becoming routinised in state institutions, why newer approaches may be
­resisted, and if such resistance is necessarily problematic.
Conceptually, I distinguish between institutions, discourse, and agency
in the analysis of gender mainstreaming strategies, combining two key
­analytical approaches. First, a feminist institutionalist approach concep-
tualises institutions, combining the feminist focus on power and change
with the new institutionalist focus on informal institutional norms and
practices, including how institutional incentives and cultures shape individ-
ual behaviour such as in relation to policymaking (Goetz, 1997; Chappell,
2002; Kenny, 2007; Krook and Mackay, 2011). Second, I draw on a post-­
structural feminist approach to discourse analysis, informed broadly by the
Foucauldian concept of discourse, but specifically by Carol Lee Bacchi’s
work on discursive frames in gender equality and public policy (Bacchi,
1999). I endorse a post-structural conception of agency as contingent and
subjectivity as non-essentialist. A post-structural approach to the state is
also employed, seeing the state as fragmented and contingent rather than
monolithic ­(Weedon, 1987; Pringle and Watson, 1992). I combine feminist
institutionalism with post-structural discourse analysis, to acknowledge in-
stitutions are performative iterations of practice which sediment particular
cultures, norms, and practices over time. These performative iterations can
be both formal and informal, including not only what is explicitly stated
as institutional policy but also what is performed as institutional practice,
and how unwritten norms inform practice and policy (Kabeer, 1999: 12–13).
 Introduction 7
My approach differs slightly with Kabeer’s – I distinguish between dis-
course and institutions in how policy problems are constructed, following
Bacchi (1999). Institutions can be sites for the sedimentation of discourses,
where such discourses become crystallised, reproduced, and strengthened
over time, and thus also a site of resistance for new discourses. But I find
­Kabeer’s framework useful for providing analytical tools to understand how
institutions work both formally and informally: analysing rules, activities
(‘routinised practices’), resources, people (both included and excluded), and
power ­( priorities and rule-making) (Kabeer, 1999: 15).
The book’s approach to gender equality policies and gender mainstream-
ing is informed by international feminist comparative literature, including
the work of Squires (2007) who provides lucid distinctions between different
kinds of gender equality strategies, mechanisms, their conceptual under-
pinnings, and political dynamics and limitations, and Bacchi (1999) who
provides a method for the discursive deconstruction of gender mainstream-
ing policy and strategies. These approaches remind us that different equal-
ity strategies conceptualise gender equality and how it should be addressed
in fundamentally different ways. Multiple simultaneous yet incompatible
equality strategies can create policy confusion and contradiction.
Concepts of gender mainstreaming and gender equality policy are
­embedded within debates on ‘state feminism’, which often makes liberal fem-
inist assumptions about the positive, potentially transformative role of the
state (and, by extension, international organisations), and its c­ apacity and
willingness to intervene in securing the interests of women’s ­movements.
Lovenduski (2005: 4) defines state feminism as ‘the advocacy of women’s
movement demands inside the state’, enabled by the establishment of wom-
en’s policy agencies since the 1980s. This presented an opportunity for wom-
en’s movements ‘to influence the agenda and to further feminist goals through
public policies from inside the state apparatus’ (ibid). Like others, Lovenduski
recognises this is a contested term. Halley et al. (2018) prefer to speak of ‘gov-
ernance feminism’ which broadens the scope of engagement and reflects a
more critical assessment of the achievements and dangers of this form of en-
gaging the state. Halley defines governance ­feminism as ‘every form in which
feminists and feminist ideas exert a governing will within human affairs…
[but specifically focus] on efforts feminists have made to become incorporated
into state, state-like, and state-­affiliated power’ (2018: ix–x). Kotiswaran (2018:
80) circumscribes the original concept of state feminism to the context of
‘postindustrial democracies [and their ­response] to demands of second-wave
feminism’ in the establishment of women’s policy agencies, and her analysis
applies governance feminism in the context of the Indian state’s response to
sexual violence and rape. Others speaking of the Indian context have referred
similarly to ‘governmentalised feminism’ (Menon, 2009; Devika, 2012). De-
vika (2012) associates this with gender mainstreaming, defining this as ‘essen-
tially a version of liberal feminism that pegged liberation from patriarchy on
giving a share of the state’s cake…to women’, to which the state responded
8 Introduction
with inadequate spaces and resources, neither of which facilitated women’s
collective struggle but increased their responsibilities. Menon warns that
‘feminist politics need to be very suspicious of the domestication of gender
through state policy and the spurious clarity offered by government policies
on “women” and “women’s empowerment”’ (2009: 111). Roy (2009, 2015) also
explores narratives of the NGO-isation of the Indian women’s movement, a
technocratising, professionalising, deradicalising process which has also been
discussed in the Latin American context (Alvarez, 1999, 2009; see Chapter
2) and shows how state feminist processes and practices have affected both
states and women’s movements.
Debates on gender mainstreaming in development policy and in postco-
lonial contexts raise different issues to those in post-industrial democracies
(Kotiswaran, 2018). The research for this book is informed by and located
within debates on gender mainstreaming in development studies (e.g. Moser,
1993; Jahan, 1995; Goetz, 1997; Rai, 2003; Mukhopadhyay, 2004; Cornwall
et al., 2008) and of postcolonial states’ relationship to gender equality and
the status of women (Mohanty, 1984; Kabeer, 1994; Rai, 1996, 2001; Sunder
Rajan, 2003). This important body of feminist work reminds us that the
broader terrain of gender mainstreaming and gender-equitable development
is situated within an international arena laden with contemporary power
hierarchies and historical legacies of colonialism, and where postcolonial
state nation-building projects inform gender relations (Rai, 2001; Kapadia,
2002; Sunder Rajan, 2003). These dynamics shape the reception of inter-
national gender equality policy developments, placing Indian (and other)
feminists in a difficult position vis-à-vis the postcolonial state to prove their
‘authentic’ non-Western credentials when attempting to engage with equal-
ity and empowerment discourse, regardless of whether they are promoting
international approaches (Jayawardena, 1986; Rai, 2001). It also recognises
state capacity and state-society interaction can be different in postcolonial
states, often with large informal economies which may limit the effective-
ness of formal policy and legislation, and limited access to formal and de
facto justice and rights for the majority for women.
This research also heeds insights from intersectional3 feminism within
national and global contexts, recognising that women are not a homogene-
ous group. Gender relations between men, women, and non-binary people
are inflected by intersecting oppressions on the basis of caste, class, religion,
ethnicity, sexuality, and able-bodiedness, and produce unique experiences of
marginalisation, both within national settings and in discursive representa-
tions of women in international development (Mohanty, 1984). One main
argument of the book is that regional or subnational variations in gender
equality and empowerment, and their effect on fragmented experiences of cit-
izenship, should be paid as much attention as other forms of horizontal ine-
qualities in their intersection with gender inequality. Whilst this may increase
the complexity of gender mainstreaming and gender equality policy, it better
reflects lived experience and is essential for the achievement of true equality.
 Introduction 9
Comparing subnational states: case selection and
comparative analysis
This book compares two Indian states, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu.
Here I outline my justification for selecting these two states and provide a
brief profile (detailed further in Chapter 5).4 Comparing two states not one
enables a national-subnational comparison and a subnational-subnational
comparison; states do not exist solely in relation to the centre but also each
other. The national policy framework represents the national context within
which states are embedded, and which provide common ground for com-
paring subnational dynamics. But drawing conclusions from a single case
study state would overdetermine the relationship between state and centre
(see Tillin, 2013a). Limiting the study to two cases enables manageability,
and small-N studies can facilitate rich description, exploration, and deeper
understanding of intersubjective meaning, constitutive relationships, and
concepts (Peters, 1998). Two cases are a good starting point to develop
­insights to test across other states for wider applicability (Green, 2002; dis-
cussed in the Conclusion). The focus is not causal relationships; description
and exploration can facilitate inductive approaches to generating hypotheses
(Mackie and Marsh, 1995: 176; Peters, 1998: 69).
Tamil Nadu is a southern state in India, bordering Kerala, Andhra
Pradesh, and Karnataka (see Figures 1.1 and 1.2). During the pre-­
Independence ­period, parts of what is now Tamil Nadu State formed the
Madras Presidency, a province of British India. After Independence, the
Madras Presidency became Madras State, and incorporated areas of former
princely states whilst ceding some districts to newly forming states, with
a final reorganisation of state boundaries in 1956 according to linguistic
criteria (in Tamil Nadu, co-terminous with Tamil-speaking areas). Madras
State was later renamed Tamil Nadu (‘Tamil country’) in 1968. Tamil Nadu
is home to more than 72 million people and is the seventh most populous
state in India and the most urbanised amongst major states (see Table 1.1).
The state comprises 32 districts, including state capital Chennai located in
the north. ‘Scheduled Caste’ or Dalit communities comprise one-fifth of the
state’s population (Census 2011)5; a heterogeneous group, both in commu-
nity identity and in location across districts, the majority live in rural ar-
eas (with variation between different Scheduled Caste groups).6 ‘Scheduled
Tribes’, or Adivasis, are a much smaller minority than the national average
and are concentrated in six districts.7 Hindus form the majority religious
group, followed by Christians and Muslims.8 Tamil is the predominant
language, followed by Telugu and Kannada. Unlike in north India, Hindi
speakers are a small minority.
Andhra Pradesh is another southern state, north of Tamil Nadu, and
­bordered by Karnataka, Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh, and Orissa (see
­Figures 1.1 and 1.2). After Independence, the Nizam of Hyderabad ceded the
princely state of Hyderabad, formerly under the indirect rule of the British
10 Introduction

Figure 1.1 M
 ap of India (prior to 2014 bifurcation of Andhra Pradesh).

through the system of Paramountcy, to the newly formed Union Govern-

ment of India. Telugu-speaking districts of northern Madras State seceded
in 1953 to form Andhra State. Andhra Pradesh came into being in 1956,
when the majority Telugu-speaking area of Hyderabad State was combined
with Andhra State, as part of the linguistic reorganisation of states. Andhra
Pradesh is home to 85 million people and is the fifth most populous state in
India. Until June 2014, Andhra Pradesh comprised 23 districts. The capital,
Hyderabad, is 100 percent urban. Analysts often divide the state (prior to
2014) into three regions – coastal Andhra, Rayalseema, and Telangana –
reflecting different historical trajectories, agro-climatic characteristics, and
levels of development.9 However, in June 2014, Andhra Pradesh was bifur-
cated into Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, the result of a long-standing
 Introduction

Figure 1.2 District-wise maps of Tamil Nadu (right) and Andhra Pradesh (left; prior to 2014 bifurcation).
11
12 Introduction
Table 1.1 A basic profile of the two case study states and all-India

Andhra Pradesh Tamil Nadu All-India

Population (2011) 84.6 million 72.1 million 1,210.8 million

Decadal population growth 511.0 15.6 17.6
rate (% increase, 2001–2011)
Population density (persons 308 555 382
per sq. km)
Urban population (%) 33.36 48.4 31.1
Scheduled Caste population 16.4 20.0 16.6
(% of total population)
Scheduled Tribe population 7.0 1.0 8.6
(% of total population)
Main language(s) spoken Telugu (84%) Tamil (89%) Hindi (41%)
(three most populous)1 Urdu (9%) Telugu (6%) Bengali (8%)
Hindi (3%) Kannada (2%) Telugu (7%)
Main religious groups Hindu (88.46) Hindu (87.58) Hindu (79.80)
(%, more than 1 percent Muslim (9.56) Christian (6.12) Muslim (14.23)
of population) Christian (1.34) Muslim (5.86) Christian (2.30)
Sikh (1.72)

Source: Census of India 2011.

Note: 1Data from Census of India 2001.

political campaign for Telangana statehood (Tillin, 2013b). Scheduled Caste

communities comprise a similar proportion of the state’s population as at
the national level, and the majority live in rural areas. Again, they are a het-
erogeneous group, but two groups predominate: the Madigas and Malas.10
Scheduled Tribe communities comprise 7 percent of the state population and
are found mostly in a few districts, especially Khammam.11 Most Scheduled
Tribes in Andhra Pradesh live in rural areas, but this varies. Hindus are the
largest religious group in the state, followed by Muslims and Christians. A
historical legacy, nearly one quarter of the state’s Muslim population, lives
in Hyderabad, comprising two fifths of the state capital’s residents. Telugu is
the predominant language in the state, followed by Urdu and Hindi.12
These states share similar status vis-à-vis New Delhi. Both states have
been labelled ‘reform-oriented’ during the period of analysis (Bajpai and
Sachs, 1999: 2; cited in Kennedy, 2004: 34n).13 Both are linguistically mar-
ginal from the Hindi-speaking North, with language having political, his-
torical, and cultural significance.14 Both are geographically marginal from
New Delhi and constitute part of the Dravidian South along with Karna-
taka and Kerala. Both states boast regional parties and have experienced
populist politics.15 However, contextual factors – different socio-economic
and socio-political features – make comparison interesting. Tamil Nadu is
wealthier and more industrialised than Andhra Pradesh, but faces its own
challenges. The Congress Party has a continued presence in Andhra Pradesh
politics, whereas in Tamil Nadu its popularity declined from the 1960s, re-
placed by regional parties since the 1980s. Later chapters show both states
were early adopters of women’s SHG models, compared to other states, but
followed different approaches, thus manifesting different features.
 Introduction 13
Finally, selecting two south Indian states enabled me to transcend north-
south comparisons of gender inequality. A common view is that women’s sta-
tus in south India is higher than in other regions, particularly north India. One
explanation is regional differences in kinship and marriage practices. Dyson
and Moore classically argued that endogamous kinship patterns – marrying
within one’s kinship group and place of birth – more common to south India,
conferred higher status on women and enabled them to remain closer to their
natal family; exogamous marriage practices – marrying outside one’s kinship
group and place of birth – were more common in north India (Dyson and
Moore, 1983: 43–45). Patrilocality – where women relocate to their husband’s
and in-laws’ home after marriage – had greater impact under exogamous kin-
ship patterns, often requiring distant relocation from a woman’s natal village
and blood relatives, increasing her dependence on her affinal family (ibid).
Additionally, control of women’s sexuality, through seclusion (purdah), was
relatively more common in the north. Political economist Pranab Bardhan
(1974, cited in Das, 1976: 140) instead suggested regional differences in gen-
dered agrarian systems as a key explanation, arguing that women’s higher
status in the south was related to the dominance of female labour-intensive
wet-rice cultivation, compared to dry cereal agriculture favouring male
ploughing labour in the north. The higher importance in south India of typ-
ically female-assigned agricultural labour, like weeding and transplanting,
gave southern women higher status (Das, 1976: 138–140). By comparing two
states from south India, I sought to control for this north-south difference.
As Dyson and Moore acknowledged, considerable differences exist within
each region. The north-south comparison, influential though it may be, is
not ­necessarily helpful to understand variations in gender inequality between
southern states or their policy differences.

Data ‘collection’: researching gender, development, and the

state in India
The research draws on my PhD fieldwork in India, between 2005 and 2006,
with subsequent follow-up visits. Most time was spent in the state capitals
of Andhra Pradesh (Hyderabad) and Tamil Nadu (Chennai), with visits
to Mahbubnagar and Visakhapatnam districts in Andhra Pradesh, the
national capital New Delhi, and Mussoorie (for the LBS National Acad-
emy of Administration). Methods included interviews, online and off-line
­archival research, non-participant observation, policy analysis, and sec-
ondary data collection. While the PhD was completed in 2008, the mate-
rial in this book was updated to reflect more recent developments, census
data, and policy changes. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with
civil servants, NGO staff, and academics with expertise in policymaking
and implementation processes. At the centre, interviews were solicited
from current and former personnel working in the Department of Women
and Child D ­ evelopment, the Planning Commission, and the LBS National
Academy of Administration (civil service training); and at the state level,
14 Introduction
from the Andhra Pradesh State Department of Women Development and
Child Welfare (and relevant organisations), the Commissionerate of Women
­Empowerment and Self Employment, the Society for the Elimination of
Rural Poverty (state-level parastatal agency administering the women’s
SHG ­programme), the Tamil Nadu State Department of Social Welfare and
­Nutritious Noon Meal Programme, the parastatal Tamil Nadu ­Corporation
for Development of Women, the Tamil Nadu State Planning Commission,
and Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu State Commissions for Women.
I also solicited interviews from the Centre for Women and Development
Studies, UN Development Programme (UNDP) Delhi, UNIFEM, and the
UK government’s Department for International Development in India (in
New Delhi and Chennai and Hyderabad regional offices), and the National
Institute for Rural Development in Hyderabad.
Most interviews were semi-structured for insights into policy discourse,
formal and informal institutional norms, processes and practices, for infor-
mation, and interpretations of successes and failures, which were difficult
to gather elsewhere. Interviews enabled snowballing for further contacts
(Arber, 1993) and access to documentary material to overcome gatekeep-
ing (Scheyvens et al., 2003). Understandably, government officials were not
always available and willing to talk, though some agreed to discuss via tele-
phone. The quality and depth of interviews varied greatly. Most interviews
were not recorded. While interviews were useful, lack of access necessitated
greater reliance on documentary analysis.
Documentary material revealed official government policy discourse, in-
stitutional mandates, functions, and objectives. Tracing elements over time
enabled understanding of multiple discourses, and their reiteration and nor-
malisation into policy and institutional processes. Documentary material
provided only some insight into institutional culture, norms, and mandates.
Internal and independent progress evaluations against the government’s
own targets were helpful as partial correctives to prescriptive policy formats.
Policy documents were not accepted uncritically as evidence of implemen-
tation, but instances of government self-representation. Official national
policy documents analysed included National Five-Year Plans from Sixth
(1980–1985), but especially Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth (2002–2007), and (in
less detail) Eleventh (2007–2011) and Twelfth (2012–2017); National Perspec-
tive Plan (1988); National Policy for the Empowerment of Women (2001);
state-level plans and policy notes; Annual Plans; Mid-Term Appraisals;
Department/Ministry of Women and Child Development Annual Reports;
subnational parastatal agency documentation (Society for Elimination of
Rural Poverty and Tamil Nadu Corporation for Development of Women
Ltd), and state-level government employee service rules and related docu-
mentation (e.g. circulars). Other official documentation included speeches,
meeting minutes, reports of parliamentary and other committees, and
World Bank and UNDP reports on India. Online government repositories
of official documents became key to sourcing documentary material, made
 Introduction 15
accessible as national and state governments increasingly digitised and ar-
chived documents online. Fortunately for the author, nearly all documents
were accessible in English. A most valuable archival collection of historical
documents relating to state feminist and gender mainstreaming efforts was
published as Changing The Terms of the Discourse: Gender Equality and the
India State (Sharma, 2011).
The book draws on official statistical data on gendered inequalities.
I ­approach these data cautiously, bearing in mind the sensitivities which
­surround its production. Foucauldian perspectives on biopolitics within lib-
eral democracies have highlighted how the production of knowledge about
populations is a technology enabling modern governments to produce,
shape, and control populations as objects of knowledge (Rose and Miller,
1992). Moreover, in India, census enumeration processes and development
data indicators carry postcolonial and historiographical significance, as a
legacy of British colonial rule (Kalpagam, 2000), with contemporary legacies
for religious and caste groups (Appadurai, 1993).16 Measurement categories
reflect the construction of policy ‘problems’ and imperfect and power-laden
processes of data collection, particularly in the field of development. On a
more reflexive level, I have sought to remain critically aware of my position
as a Western feminist researcher. This is vital as Western feminist scholar-
ship on so-called ‘Third World’ women has been guilty of ethnocentrism
and an ‘inadequate self-consciousness about the effect of Western scholar-
ship on the “third world” in the context of a world system dominated by the
West’ (Mohanty, 1984: 335).
Feminist economists and social scientists in India and elsewhere have,
however, demanded more not less statistical data, gender-disaggregated,
to persuade policymakers, whilst questioning assumptions underpinning
conventional categories and data analysis methods (Ghosh, 2009).17 The
government attempted to address these demands in the mid-1990s (GoI,
1995, 1999), and the rise in female work participation rates were partially
attributed to the ‘better capture of women’s work’ during the 2001 Census
(GoI, 2002).18 Analysing official data on gender and development remains
important because of how data perform a constitutive function in the sym-
bolic self-representation of the Indian state (Sunder Rajan, 2003: 3). Statisti-
cal data on the ‘status of women’ or ‘gender equality’ have helped construct
the state’s self-representation, in colonial and postcolonial periods, and in
relation to international pressures of accountability. Thus, ‘“women” have
served to describe the state, primarily via the index of their status. The
­“status of women” has served as a crucial signifier in different contexts…’
(Sunder Rajan, 2003: 3).
Changes in Indian development planning since the national government’s
Eighth Five-Year Plan (1992–1997) also increased demand for data because
of the self-identified shift towards more targeted planning and increasing
competition between states resulting from greater subnational autonomy
(Kennedy, 2004: 33), compelling state governments to pay greater attention
16 Introduction
to their self-representation. State governments face pressure to evidence
investment in ‘human infrastructure’ – an educated, skilled, and healthy
­workforce – to attract private investment. The introduction of UNDP-­
sponsored State Human Development Reports is an example of data
generation.19 States’ self-representations are affected by both inter-state
and intra-state inequalities. Policy has instrumentally targeted the ‘most
backward’ districts of a state or ‘weaker sections’ to raise aggregate state
indicators (see e.g. Tamil Nadu’s report, GoTN, 2003: 137). Thus, using gov-
ernment data entails risks because its production and use is not objective or
value-free and can powerfully influence those who have little oversight of its
generation. But it can also be a powerful tool to demonstrate the scope, scale,
severity, and consequences of gender inequalities (and other injustices).
The book mostly covers the period since 1990, but also contains ­historical
analysis, and incorporates recent developments where possible, omitting
others due to space constraints. Recent major changes include the abolition
of the Planning Commission in 2014 by the newly elected BJP government,
and establishment of its successor, Niti Aayog20; the bifurcation of Andhra
Pradesh in 2014 and creation of the new state of Telangana; and the deaths of
the long-standing chief ministers and rival Tamil party leaders, J. Jayalalithaa
(in December 2016) and M. Karunanidhi (in August 2018). Reports of an an-
ticipated second National Policy for the Empowerment of Women surfaced in
2016 but had not been released before this book went to press.

Outline of the book

The book is structured as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the most relevant liter-
ature on development policy in India and on gender mainstreaming, demon-
strating lack of attention to gender in classic mainstream development
studies of India, to gender mainstreaming in studies of gender and develop-
ment in India, and to India as a case in international comparative literature
on gender mainstreaming. Chapters 3 and 4 present analysis of national pol-
icies and initiatives, and Chapters 5–8 discuss subnational states. Chapter 3
analyses prominent themes and treatment of gender in selected Five-Year
Plans. Chapter 4 examines national initiatives from the 1990s undertaken to
increase the gender-responsiveness of mainstream Indian state i­ nstitutions,
like the Planning Commission, Finance Ministry, and the Indian bureau-
cracy. Broader gendered institutional norms and practices within the In-
dian bureaucracy are also discussed, as are three sets of important actors:
bureaucrats, political leaders, and the women’s movement. Chapters 5–8 fo-
cus on the two case study states of Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. Each
chapter compares the two states with a different thematic focus: broader
socio-economic indicators and socio-political histories (­Chapter 5), the
gendered institutional context of state-level development (Chapter 6), state-
level discourses of gendered development (Chapter 7), and gendered devel-
opmental subjectivities and agency (Chapter 8). Chapter 5 highlights the
 Introduction 17
complexity, specificity, and internal diversity of these two states, providing
a rich descriptive comparative profile. Chapter 6 explores similarities and
differences between state-specific institutional norms and structures, show-
ing varied subnational opportunities for mainstreaming gender. ­Chapter 7
identifies and compares three gendered discourses of development at the
state level, their relative dominance or marginality, how they relate to wider
reformist and populist development discourses in each state, and what op-
portunities they provide for gender mainstreaming. Chapter 8 explores how
the discursive and institutional context of state policy creates different de-
velopmental subjectivities and thus different degrees and kinds of agency
for different sets of actors: women, political leaders, bureaucratic actors,
and the w ­ omen’s movement. Evidence of creative resistance to dominant
­positionalities is also briefly discussed. The Conclusion draws together
and reflects on the findings, and considers implications for ­mainstreaming
­gender in development policy in India. It identifies contributions to the
­international and Indian literature on gender mainstreaming, gender,
­development and the state, and federalism and multilevel governance. It
highlights avenues for further research, including a new research agenda on
gender, federalism, and the state in India.

Notes
1 See the UN Beijing Platform for Action, Chapter IV and Chapter V (UN, 1995).
See also the UN Economic and Social Council definition of gender main-
streaming (UN ECOSOC, 1997). Chapter 2 discusses definitions of gender
mainstreaming.
2 Subnational state comparisons of the implementation of the National Rural Em-
ployment Guarantee Act are relevant because the programme employs gender
quotas for women’s employment and childcare for women workers on NREGA
sites (Sudarshan, 2011). However, this cannot unambiguously be classified as
gender mainstreaming: whilst the main policy mechanism is positive action (res-
ervation/quota), the childcare provision deputes women workers, reproducing
rather than destabilising childcare as women’s work.
3 ‘Intersectionality’, coined by US feminist legal scholar Kimberle Crenshaw,
recognised how US anti-discrimination law according to sex or race precluded
intersecting claims of both sex and race, such as experienced by Black women
(Crenshaw, 1989). I use it in conjunction with Mohanty’s (1984) recognition of the
homogeneous depiction of Third World Woman in international development
discourse, and preceding experiences of pre-Independence Indian feminists
with white Western imperial feminism under British colonialism (Liddle and
Rai, 1998). Whilst recognising these concepts’ different temporal and contextual
origins, the intention is to connote an inclusive critical feminist approach, cap-
turing complex relationships between identity, difference, and situatedness with
dynamics of discrimination, marginalisation, and oppression.
4 I refer to Andhra Pradesh in its pre-2014 bifurcation form, unless otherwise
stated.
5 http://censusindia.gov.in/2011-Common/CensusData2011.html, last accessed
7th December 2018.
6 The census identifies 76 Scheduled Caste groups in the state; the five largest are
Adi Dravidas, Pallan, Paraiyan, Chakkiliyan, and Arunthathiyar. Thiruvarur
18 Introduction
district has the highest proportion of Scheduled Caste members (32.4 percent),
whilst Kanyakumari district has the lowest (4 percent).
7 The census identified 36 different Scheduled Tribes (STs) in Tamil Nadu. The
five most numerical constitute more than 85 percent of the state’s ST population:
Malayali, Irular, Kattunayakan, Kurumans, and Kondareddis. The six districts
with highest ST concentration are Salem, Tiruvannamalai, Villupuram, Vellore,
Dharmapuri, and Namakkal. STs mostly reside in rural areas except Kattunay-
akans, two-thirds of whom are urban residents.
8 Minority religious communities of Jains, Buddhists, and Sikhs constitute less
than 1 percent of the population (Census 2011).
9 Coastal Andhra includes Srikakulam, Vizianagaram, Vishakapatnam, East
Godavari, West Godavari, Krishna, Guntur, Prakasam, and Nellore; Telangana
includes Hyderabad, Rangareddy, Mahabubnagar, Medak, Nalgonda, Nizam-
abad, Adilabad, Karimnagar, Warangal, and Khammam; and Rayalseema in-
cludes Chittoor, Cuddapah, Anantapur, and Kurnool. Occasionally, analysts
divide coastal Andhra and Telangana into northern and southern areas of each
region, and consider Hyderabad separately, to capture variations in agrarian
and industrial development (see e.g. Subrahmanyam, 2003).
10 The Census of India 2001 identified 59 Scheduled Caste groups; Madigas and
Malas combined make up nearly 91 percent of the state’s Scheduled Caste
population.
11 Visakhapatnam, Warangal, Adilabad, and Nalgonda districts are also home to
large numbers of STs. The Census of 2001 registered 33 different STs; the larg-
est group is Sugalis (41 percent), followed by smaller groups of Koya, Yenadis,
­Yerukulas, and Gond.
12 Telugu is the third most commonly spoken language in India reflecting the fact
Telugu is also spoken in Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and Orissa (Census of India 1991).
13 Until May 2004, Andhra Pradesh’s chief minister was Chandrababu Naidu, but
he was defeated in the state election by the Congress Party’s Y.S. Rajasekhara
Reddy.
14 Both states were amongst those linguistically redrawn in the late 1950s.
15 Regional parties have dominated Tamil Nadu electoral politics in the last four
decades whilst the Congress Party is still a key party in Andhra Pradesh.
16 See Dudley-Jenkins (2003) and Guha (2003).
17 Feminist economists in India have highlighted the lack of sex-disaggregated
data, making gender inequality invisible and problematic assumptions in data
collection, including the lack of consultation of women in the census data collec-
tion, which led to their invisibility in these data. Gender-blind categorisations of
what counts as ‘work’ or ‘economic activity’ have undervalued women’s subsist-
ence and domestic activities when measuring the contribution of women to the
economy (see Jain, 1996; Prabhu et al., 1996; Mukherjee, 1996).
18 Prabhu et al. (1996) observed this for the 1991 Census.
19 UNDP facilitated the State-level Human Development Reports (SHDR) in India
from the mid-1990s. Twenty states and the National Capital Territory of Delhi
released their own SHDR, with some states publishing more than one (UNDP
India, n.d.): Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Chhattisgarh, Delhi,
Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharash-
tra, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Sikkim, Tamil Nadu,
Tripura, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. Reports include gender-­disaggregated
state-level data on human development indicators; some have compiled gender
development indices and gender empowerment indices, and some have a sepa-
rate chapter on gender equality and empowerment. UNDP India claim these
reports ‘serve as platforms for public accountability and action’ (ibid).
20 www.niti.gov.in.
 Introduction 19
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2 Gender, development, and the
state in India
Debates and perspectives

Introduction
This chapter critically reviews selected debates within broad literatures
on development policy and gender mainstreaming. It offers two substan-
tive arguments: first, several classic works on Indian development policy
pay insufficient attention to development as a gendered concept, process,
and outcome; and second, research on gender mainstreaming initiatives has
said little about India. Discussing the vast literature on Indian development
policy, I focus on institutional norms and structures of development pol-
icymaking and planning and on post-1991 changes in Indian federalism.
I argue for greater attention to factors affecting subnational development
policymaking, particularly gender. I discuss shifting post-Independence
formal government discourses of development and the role of different ac-
tors, including political leaders, bureaucrats, and the women’s movement.
I illustrate the complexity of the institutional, discursive, and agential in-
fluences on and relationships with Indian development policy. I argue that
considerations of the fundamentally gendered character of development
remain peripheral. Feminist studies of Indian development provide much
greater insight, but rarely focus on ‘gender mainstreaming’, and feminist
subnational analyses have focused more on ‘women’s empowerment’.
I then discuss the international gender mainstreaming literature, much
of which addresses gender mainstreaming policies in the European Union
(EU) and international development organisations. I explore concepts and
definitions, the relationship with women’s national machineries as compet-
ing or complementary institutional structures, and obstacles and resistance
faced. The focus narrows to studies of gender mainstreaming in develop-
ment policy, including the role and influence of bilateral and multilateral
donor agencies. Pulling together these two discussions, I note the absence
of research on gender mainstreaming in Indian development policy, despite
­extensive literature on women, gender, development and the state, and
numerous initiatives since the 1990s. Amid the persistence of gender ine-
qualities, more research is needed on the state’s claims to advance gender
equality, to understand feminist scholar-activists’ strategies of engagement
with the state.
24 Debates and perspectives
Development policy in India and beyond: discourse(s),
institutions, and agency

Discourses of development: global mainstream and feminist debates

Accounts of twentieth-century development discourse commonly compare
modernisation theory and dependency theory (Leys, 1995), with moderni-
sation theory’s normative prescriptions of domestic economic and political
development, invoking a dichotomy of tradition and modernity, and de-
pendency theory’s focus on political economy and unequal relations in the
international capitalist system. Dependency-linked development economics
was influenced by neo-Marxist and Latin American structuralist thought.
This modernisation-dependency dichotomy produced an ‘impasse’ in devel-
opment thought; both theories were underpinned by a teleological notion of
progress rooted in Enlightenment thought but differed on how states should
proceed (Schuurman, 1993; Leys, 1995). The concept of ‘development’ itself
came under attack from different quarters in the 1980s: the popularisation
of postmodern thought and rejection of ‘development’ as a grand narrative;
growing recognition of the failure of development in the ‘South’; a problem-
atisation of state capacity and nation-state sovereignty due to globalisation
and the rise of neo-liberal thought; and capitalist triumphalism and the os-
tensible delegitimisation of socialism and planning following the end of the
Cold War (Schuurman, 1993; Leys, 1995).
The rise of neo-liberal thought and policy in the 1980s was underpinned
by a ‘counter-revolution’ of neoclassical economics and manifested in inter-
national financial institutions’ policies, Structural Adjustment Programmes
(SAP) (Toye, 1993; see Lal, 1997 [1983] for a neoclassical critique of develop-
ment economics). However, state minimalism proposed by neo-liberals con-
trasted with institutionalist and interventionist theories of the developmental
state literature, associated with successfully industrialising East Asian econ-
omies (Johnson, 1982; Woo-Cummings, 1999), and faced new challenges from
alternative bottom-up discourses. Responding to a crisis of legitimacy, the
neo-liberal Washington Consensus of the 1980s became the post–­Washington
Consensus of the 1990s, conceding a greater role for the state and institu-
tions in development, selectively and somewhat superficially incorporating
critical opposing discourses of human, sustainable1 and participatory de-
velopment.2 ‘Security’ became increasingly tied to development in bilateral
and multilateral circles, linking poverty in low-income states to instability
(Duffield, 2001). Development thus became positioned as an investment in
conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. This proliferation of ap-
proaches partially derived from the mainstream’s selective incorporation of
critical perspectives (Leys, 1995; Harriss, 1998), but was mainly an expansion
of ‘means’ but a closing down of the ‘ends’ of development (Mosse, 2005).
Feminist critiques of development emerged in the 1970s. Esther Bose-
rup’s pioneering study Women’s Role in Economic Development (Boserup,
 Debates and perspectives 25
1970) drew on liberal feminist theory, arguing women were excluded from
development and modernisation, and their inclusion would be beneficial for
both ­equity and efficiency reasons. Boserup saw development as a ­necessary,
­positive project, and her critique formed the basis of the Women in Devel-
opment (WID) discourse, still popular amongst development agencies.
Initially, the WID critique made a major contribution, raising questions
regarding WID processes, but later was criticised for major shortcom-
ings: it lacked critical attention to gendered structural relations of power.
One feminist critical response to WID, named Women and Development
(WAD), mirrored dependency theory’s critique of modernisation theory, but
incorporated feminist insights, arguing that women had always been part
of the development process, including as workers, but had been incorpo-
rated unequally (Benería, 1982; Benería and Sen, 1982, Mies, 1986). A third
conceptual shift produced gender and development (GAD), recognising
gender rather than just women, and both reproductive and productive roles
­(discussed below).
WID, WAD, and GAD are the most frequently identified discourses in
the literature on mainstream perspectives on women, gender, and devel-
opment (Kabeer, 1994; Parpart and Marchand, 1995; Visvanathan et al.,
1997; Jackson and Pearson, 1998). Women, Environment and Development
is less well known internationally but has proven important in the Indian
context, as a radical critique of the Western and state-led development
projects, stressing detrimental environmental effects and linking the op-
pression of nature with the oppression of women. Opinion divided over the
causes of oppression: one strand linked women’s overlooked economic role
as managers of natural resources and the subjugation of this knowledge in
development thought and policy (e.g. Agarwal, 1994), influencing the shift
to more participatory approaches. By positing women’s superior ecologi-
cal knowledge and experience as based on material circumstances rather
than biological essence, it avoided criticisms of essentialism addressed to
another strand, ecofeminist thought, exemplified by Shiva (1988), Mies
and Shiva (1993), and Merchant (1980, cited in Agarwal, 1998). Ecofemi-
nist approaches emphasising woman’s seemingly ‘special’ relationship with
nature were criticised as romanticised and essentialised (for a critique, see
Agarwal, 1998). Roy and Borowiak (2003) critiqued Shiva’s approach for the
gendered essentialisms she posits in the urban/rural dichotomy. Yet ecofem-
inism has resonated with some women’s movement groups and ecological
movements in India.
Southern and Third World feminists’ rejection of the WID agenda was
exemplified by the group Development Alternatives with Women for a
New Era, articulated in the publication Development Crises and Alternative
­Visions (Sen and Grown, 1988). This coincided with the shift from WID to
GAD in the 1980s, and a shift in focus from women-specific studies and strat-
egies to ‘gender’ – socially constructed roles and relations assigned to men
and women. It theorised how processes of change in development interacted
26 Debates and perspectives
with and affected gender roles and relations. It stressed e­ mpowerment, rather
than equity (WAD) or equality and efficiency (WID) (Kabeer, 1994).
GAD was initially seen as a potentially more transformative approach
than WID and WAD. State institutions veered towards WID discourse
(if anything); non-governmental and women’s organisations were more
­associated with GAD. A mixture of both perspectives came to influence
development policy discourse, particularly the more integrationist and less
‘threatening’ WID perspective (Moser, 1993). Despite being potentially
more transformative, GAD has also come under scrutiny. The WID-WAD-
GAD triumvirate is not exhaustive of all approaches. In more recent years,
both WAD and GAD have evolved further to influence the important field
of feminist global political economy (e.g. Benería, 2003).
Indian feminist conceptual frameworks and critiques played i­ mportant
roles in the international literature on women, gender, and development,
and in conceptualising women’s empowerment in grassroots women’s
movements (Batliwala, 1994, 2007). WID predominantly focused on
­e ducation and employment policies, but several studies, in India and else-
where, have demonstrated it is simplistic to assume women’s increased
labour force participation will reduce gender discrimination and en-
hance women’s autonomy (Swaminathan, 2002; Mukhopadhyay, 2003a).
Scholars of GAD in India (both from within and outside India) have con-
tributed important insights. Studies have shown how programmes for
women’s empowerment – whether international, state, or NGO led – have
co-opted and manipulated more radical notions of women’s empowerment
(Sharma, 2008; Kalpana, 2017). Jeffrey and Jeffrey (1998) showed how ed-
ucation policies to empower women have been instrumentalised towards
population control objectives.
Postcolonial and postmodern feminist critiques of development present
profound challenges to mainstream and gendered development discourse:
mainstream discourses represent ‘Third World women’ in highly problem-
atic ways, as ‘the backward, vulnerable, ‘other’’ (Mohanty, 1984; Parpart
and Marchand, 1995). Mohanty’s ‘Under Western Eyes’ (1984), directed
at ­Western feminist scholarship, including WID texts, became a classic
­postcolonial feminist critique of Western development discourse and Western
feminism. Catherine V. Scott provided a feminist critical rereading of mod-
ernisation and dependency theory, showing that both prioritised scientific
and technological pursuits of progress, through evolutionary or revolution-
ary means, and reproduced gendered dichotomies of modernity/tradition,
­independence/dependence, detachment/family, city/village, and urban/­
rural. Marchand and Parpart (1995: 17) countered trends of postmodernists’
outright rejection of development, instead underscoring deconstruction of
development discourse and challenging unequal knowledge hierarchies, in a
more affirmative project of ‘deconstructing the West’ (Pieterse, 2001). They
saw postmodern feminists’ task was to change development’s harmful dis-
cursive constructs and asymmetrical power-laden practices.
 Debates and perspectives 27
Discourses of development in India: selected mainstream and
feminist debates
For years, development literature on India was disconnected to broader
­development studies literature (Harriss, 1998), except perhaps Amartya
Sen’s work which traversed Indian and international spheres. Sen (along with
Mahbub Ul Haq) helped reorient international discourse towards ­human
­development, valorising human wellbeing and capabilities (with ­philosopher
Martha Nussbaum), public goods, and democratic freedoms rather than
abstract, impersonal economic goals like economic growth as the ends of
development (summarised in Sen, 1999; Nussbaum and Sen, 1993)3, and
­extensively studied socio-economic development in India with Jean Dréze
(e.g. Dréze and Sen, 1995, 2002, 2013). Beyond Sen, the vast scholarship on
Indian development is dominated by economic and class-based analyses
­attempting to explain the success or failure of state-led development policy.
Two major periods in the history of development discourse in post-­
independent India are the establishment of modernist-infused planning at
Independence, and the shift to more neo-liberal economic policy in 1991.4
Newly independent India’s development discourse in India was founded on
a Nehruvian socialist development strategy in the 1950s aimed at ‘redistri-
bution with growth’. The Nehruvian modernising approach based on heavy
industrialisation, influenced heavily by the economist Mahalanobis, and
­reflected in the Second Five-Year Plan, was favoured over the alternative
Gandhian approach (Chakravarty, 1987: 8).5 Chakravarty’s classic study
sums up the debate as ‘plan vs. market’ (Chakravarty, 1987). Nayar pre-
sents economic planning, autarky, and socialism6 as the three key features
of post-Independence Indian development (2001: 51). Autarky, represented
as export pessimism, self-sufficiency, and tight controls over foreign invest-
ment, was explained in terms of the Nehruvian socialist approach to de-
velopment (Nayar, 2001); Ahluwalia (1998), on the other hand, points out
that self-reliance was not a significant feature until the Third Five-Year Plan
(1961–1966).7
The historical context for these discourses was postcolonial nation-­
building: freed from the impediments and stagnation imposed by its for-
mer oppressive colonial ruler, the development project became a national
imperative, ‘a constituent part of the self-definition of the post-colonial
state’ (Chatterjee, 1997: 277). Chatterjee’s Gramsci-inspired reading argues
this did not involve a radical shake-up of existing administrative or class
­structures but a ‘passive revolution’, in which the state ‘seeks to limit [the]…
former power [of the pre-capitalist dominant classes], neutralise them where
necessary, attack them only selectively, and in general bring them round to
a position of subsidiary allies’ (1997: 288).
Economic reforms from 1991 ostensibly ushered in a more neo-liberal dis-
course. The Government of India sought an International Monetary Fund
(IMF) loan in response to a fiscal crisis. For some, the crisis was a critical
28 Debates and perspectives
juncture, a symbolic final parting with Nehruvian socialism. For others, it
was an opportunity for neo-liberal proponents to come to the foreground
rather than an ideological conversion (Sachs et al., 1999: 22). In retrospect,
the neo-liberal shift was dissimilar to ‘shock therapy’ experienced else-
where: reforms were attempted in the 1960s and 1980s, and the manner and
extent of the 1990s’ reforms was debated, some seeing them as incremental
and partial (Corbridge and Harriss, 2000; Nayar, 2001), insufficient (Bhag-
wati and Srinivasan, 1993), stunted by ‘vested interests’ (Chhibber, 2003)
or led by ‘demand-groups’ (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987). Others saw them
as implemented with continuity and skill, by ‘stealth’ (Jenkins, 1999). The
essence of the debate was the extent to which a neo-liberal discourse became
embedded within Indian development institutions and policy, and whether
government autonomy on economic reforms was constrained by the dem-
ocratic context, reflecting global debates on democracy and development,
particularly on East Asia and South East Asia.8
Scholars differed over the discursive power of post-Independence
­development. Kaviraj (1991) argued that the Nehruvian developmental
state failed to popularise its elite modernising discourse to legitimise state-
planned development amongst the masses.9 Corbridge and Harriss (2000)
instead argued that the masses had recycled Nehruvian-era values to con-
test state-led neo-liberal development. Kaviraj’s account helps to explain
the weakness of neo-liberal discourse amongst the masses, but does not
sufficiently consider the gendered relations of power inherent in the ‘lower’
discourse. But it has some potential, by extension, to explain the absence of
mass mobilisation amongst women for gender-aware development policies
(notwithstanding workers’ unions), beyond the urban-concentrated wom-
en’s movement.
Having identified selected academic and policy debates of development,
in India and elsewhere, I would argue, broadly speaking, that these ­classic
texts on India have not paid attention to the gendered character of de-
velopment, except for the work of Amartya Sen on gendered patterns of
intra-­household resource distribution (Sen, 1990) and (with Jean Drèze) the
declining ­female-to-male child sex ratio in India (Drèze and Sen, 2002).
­Partha Chatterjee (1989) also engaged with how nationalist elites addressed
the issue of gender inequality at Independence, suggesting this was resolved
in accordance with nationalist sentiments, whereby nationalists viewed
women’s domesticity and reproduction of cultural values as symbolic of the
spiritual superiority of the Indian nation over its colonial oppressors. The
state thus did not consider women’s inferior status or inequitable gender
relations as a central concern of national development in the immediate
post-Independence years. Chaudhuri’s analysis of an early planning doc-
ument suggested that whilst senior nationalist leaders discussed w ­ omen’s
status and gender inequality in progressive terms in the years just before
­Independence, the debate almost disappeared without a trace in the years
following Independence (Chaudhuri, 1996). In the case of the Hindu Code
 Debates and perspectives 29
Bill in the early years of Independence, even constitution drafter Dr. Ambed-
kar’s vocal support for equal inheritance rights could not convince conserv-
ative political elites to support progressive legislation, despite constitutional
commitments of equality according to sex (Rege, 2013a). The early years of
Independence were thus a disappointing period for state-led progress on
gender equality.
Feminist scholars and activists in India and elsewhere have extensively
studied the anticipated or actual detrimental gendered effects of neo-liberal
economic policies, including IMF and World Bank Structural Adjustment
Policies and development programmes, on national economies and social
sectors (Craske, 1998; Arora, 1999; Upadhyay, 2000; Mukhopadhyay and
Sudarshan, 2003). Mukhopadhyay (2003a: 9) groups ‘apprehensive accounts’
into three arguments. First, SAPs are inherently biased against women,
ignoring women’s reproductive labour. Second, job security requirements
and labour rights are downplayed resulting in lower job security in the pri-
vate sector, disproportionately affecting women due to their concentration
in lower-paid, less secure, more marginalised areas of the labour market.
Third, adverse economic impacts on the household include increased work-
loads, livelihood, and budgetary adjustments and diminished state support
in the social sector. However, little initial information existed, says Muk-
hopadhyay (2003b), on the actualisation of anticipated gendered effects
of SAPs. Only a few documented studies on India in the 1990s possessed
detailed evidence. However, numerous compelling critiques of the adverse
gendered impact of continuing neo-liberal reforms emerged a few years later
(Harriss-White, 2004; Ghosh, 2009; see multiple contributions to Kapadia,
2002). These are discussed in Chapter 5 regarding the case study states.

Institutions of development – central government planning in India

A major debate in development theory is the degree and form of state
­intervention. Nationalist modernisation projects often designate a central
role for the state as a director, facilitator, or conduit for interest groups or
international capital. State planning has been a major institutional feature
in India since Independence, principally through the Planning Commission
although its authority has varied. Close analysis of Indian development
planning shows the state not as coherent and co-ordinated, but as an inter-
nally differentiated ensemble of institutions.
Hanson’s (1966) detailed early study of Indian planning offered insights
into the Planning Commission and its relationship with government min-
istries and the National Development Council (NDC).10 Hanson saw the
Commission initially as a consultative and recommendatory body, but over
time became more of a ministerial body, reflected in its close relationship
with the Ministry of Finance (1966: 58). Hanson charted the rise of the NDC
as a rival to the Planning Commission, with its influence ‘imperfectly re-
vealed’ in plan documents (1966: 61–62),11 but concluded the NDC had far
30 Debates and perspectives
from replaced the Commission at the time of writing (1966: 62). Chhibber’s
(2003) more contemporary assessment of the Planning Commission traced
the decline of its capacity and influence vis-à-vis the ministries, arguing
that even early on, despite ardent support from Nehru, the Commission
experienced considerable resistance from the ministries. This accelerated
­under the leadership of Lal Bahadur Shastri (1964–1967) and Indira Gandhi
­(1967–1977, 1980–1984), until the Planning Commission was firmly reestab-
lished as a consultative body. The new locus of development policy – the
ministries, especially the Finance Ministry, and the NDC – bore signifi-
cance for the centre-state relationship (Jenkins, 1999: 227).
Dirigiste approaches to development became increasing unpopular glob-
ally from the late 1970s onwards with the rise of neo-liberal development
discourse, though economically ‘successful’ developmental states in East
Asia lent legitimacy to state intervention. Planning was also criticised by
postmodern scholars invoking Foucauldian governmentality. Scott (1998:
88) saw planning or ‘the administrative ordering of nature and society’ as
part of high modernity: pervasive social engineering by the state was dis-
cursively justified in the name of ‘the people’. Post-developmental scholars
defined planning as ‘the belief that social change can be engineered and
directed, produced at will’ (Escobar, 1992: 132). Escobar asserted that
‘[p]lanning techniques and practices have been central to development since
its inception. As the application of scientific and technical knowledge to the
public domain, planning lent legitimacy to, and fuelled hopes about, the
development enterprise’ (1992: 132).
Development planning in India was understood to be a highly political
exercise. Chatterjee (1997) argued that though government bodies like the
Planning Commission were established to depoliticise contentious issues by
delegating to a panel of technocratic experts, these bodies would inevitably
be used politically by the very forces they endeavoured to transcend. But
the Planning Commission itself was not neutral, devoid of a normative view
of the state, economy, and society; as Chatterjee argues (ibid), state insti-
tutions embody their own political objectives and ideals and are designed
to legitimate the state’s sovereign power as the sole planning authority on
behalf of the nation. Consequently, some questioned whether the post-1991
shift towards a neo-liberal minimalist state did indeed entail state with-
drawal.12 After all, the postcolonial state is a regulatory state in the name
of ‘nation-building’. Instead, Foucauldian-inspired critiques pointed to
converging neo-liberal and postcolonial regulatory practices (Gupta, 2001).
Neo-liberal governmentality involved more subtle intervention rather than
a rolling back, with its normalising techniques penetrating deeper into soci-
ety. Population control policies exemplified this. Concerns of repressive and
coercive target-driven government fertility programmes resulted from his-
torical experiences of forced sterilisation during the Emergency (1975–1977)
in India. Subsequent governments publicly decried such practices and in-
stead tried to persuasively mobilise citizens towards an ideal of a two-child
 Debates and perspectives 31
family norm (Chatterjee and Riley, 2001). According to Rao (2005), the
National Population Policy of 2000 signalled a progressive move towards
a Reproductive and Child Health (RCH) approach, in the spirit of the 1994
International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo. But
this less coercive approach is not universally implemented. Chatterjee and
­Riley’s analysis (2001) highlighted how population policies continued to
align with Indian planned development and are gendered and class differ-
entiated, with adverse effects on women and the poor. Regressive state gov-
ernment policies concerned with population control have invoked two-child
norm policies for eligibility to contest panchayat elections (Buch, 2006).
Whilst the centre publicly emphasised the non-coercive RCH approach,
rulings of the Supreme Court and High Courts at the subnational level have
sometimes upheld the two-child norm (Rao, 2005). Evidence of informal co-
ercive fertility targets have also been found in some states (see Chapter 5).13
At the more micro-level, governmentality approaches to Indian state devel-
opment efforts focused on how the state comes into view in the everyday and
shapes citizens’ experiences of the state, through anti-poverty programmes
(Corbridge et al., 2005) and state-led women’s empowerment programmes
(Sharma, 2008). These ethnographic and anthropological accounts of
­development interventions provide a refreshing alternative critical lens to
analyses of top-down planning and policy prescriptions depicting the state
as overwhelmingly homogeneous, monolithic, and distant.
New directions for Indian planning require new analyses. The ­Planning
Commission’s leadership of development planning was tested by the
­emergence of the National Advisory Council (NAC) under the United Pro-
gressive Alliance government (2004–2014). This body of academics, retired
bureaucrats, and civil society activists advised the governing coalition on
policy and was associated with wide-ranging progressive and pro-poor leg-
islation in areas of socio-economic development (Harriss, 2011; Arora and
Kailash, 2014).14 Some NAC members earlier publicly challenged Planning
Commission poverty criteria, measures, and policies as inadequate and
conservative. Despite the NAC’s progressive influence, concerns were also
raised that the non-elected body impinged on the powers and functioning
of parliament without sufficient oversight (Pai and Kumar, 2014: 12–13).15
In 2014, the Planning Commission was abolished and replaced with a new
agency – NITI Aayog – with a curiously similar mandate as the National
Institute for Transforming India.16
The rising influence of subnational state governments has tested central
government institutions. The federal relationship has long been ­considered
important to the planning process (Chakravarty, 1987: 47) and is politi-
cally sensitive, especially the fiscal (re)distribution of resources between
centre and states, and historical interferences of the centre in subnational
state government affairs. Federalism is significant for policy jurisdiction,
as states have ‘extensive’ responsibilities in economic and social develop-
ment (Guhan, 2001 [1995]: 127).17 Three common criticisms of the federal
32 Debates and perspectives
planning system are a perception that state governments are under-funded
by the central government; subnational state ministries are subordinated
under centrally sponsored schemes; and funds and responsibilities are ex-
cessively self-allocated to the centre at the expense of states (Chakravarty,
1987: 48).
Different developmental experiences amongst states justify attention to
federal dynamics. Several studies argue that the greater (but still limited)
fiscal autonomy afforded to states by the centre as a result of liberalisation
has produced varied approaches to development and a competitive reform
dynamic amongst a few states striving to create a conducive environment
for private investment (Jenkins, 1999, 2004; Guhan, 2001 [1995]; Kennedy,
2004). Widening disparities between state-level indicators of economic and
human development suggest economic growth and improvements in wellbe-
ing are not occurring universally across Indian states. Chakravarty (1987: 45)
emphasised the almost inevitability of differential growth due to the uneven
resource endowment of different regions in India, and 30 years later this
disparity has not dissipated. He also asserted ‘the problem of poverty is
beginning to emerge as more of an inter-regional problem than before…’
(ibid: 46–47). Increasing competition amongst states in recent years may
have exacerbated existing interstate inequalities.
Increasingly, studies have analysed changing dynamics between
­c entral and state governments and differences between states in reform
­approaches.18 Kennedy (2004) shows following the 1991 liberalisation re-
forms, individual states with new autonomy have followed different paths.
She relates this to varying styles of reform ‘packaging’, contrasting state
government approaches of Andhra Pradesh (pre-2004) and Tamil Nadu.
She argues these different styles derive from the extent of fragmentation
in state-level party systems and the extent of political mobilisation of ­dalits
and other conventionally marginalised groups. This allowed one state gov-
ernment (Andhra Pradesh) to vocalise their reforms agenda more than the
other. Kennedy’s contribution demonstrates the importance of accounting
for how differences in the subnational institutional context may lead to dif-
ferent outcomes in subnational development policy, an approach followed
in this book. In sum, the federal relationship is important and warrants at-
tention for how it affects development policy, centre-state relationships, and
state capacity to implement development policy.
The all-India elite tier of Indian bureaucracy plays an important role in
development policy. Studies of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS)
and its colonial predecessor, the Indian Civil Service, document charac-
teristic features of the Indian bureaucracy (Mars, 1974; Potter, 1986, 1996;
Mathur, 1996; Thakur, c.1997, 2000; Bhattacharya, 2003 [1989]; Rudolph
and Rudolph, 2003 [1987]). Mathur (1996) argues a fundamental tension
exists between the elite professional background of civil servants and the
­constituency-facing politician. Civil servants, usually educated in cosmo-
politan institutions, are often careerists and support their seniors. Potter’s
 Debates and perspectives 33
(1986) study identified a dominant norm of civil service as the ‘gentlemanly
mode’, which emphasised ‘the virtue of public service,…the amateur ideal,
and… the norms of courage, confidence and self-discipline’ and service-class
­values, namely, loyal service to government in exchange for political leaders’
trust and ‘autonomy and discretion to act appropriately (in accordance with
the law) for those they served’ (Potter, 1986: 233).
Potter’s (1986) study does not focus explicitly on gendered institutional
norms and practices of the Indian civil service, but provides insights for un-
derstanding the bureaucracy as a gendered institution, as do similar studies
cited above. What is missing from these studies, however, is an explicit and
detailed analysis of the gendered character of these institutions, which has
parallels outside India (e.g. see Ferguson, 1984; Puwar, 2004). Few detailed
studies exist of the gendered institutions of Indian development from which
development policy emerges, despite strong feminist analyses of the state
in India. There are some important exceptions. One of the most valuable
publications for researchers of feminist engagement with the Indian state in
recent years is the CWDS collection by Sharma (2011). This volume is an in-
credibly useful archive of correspondence and experience of feminist schol-
ars and activists engaging with the state over the past 40 years on equality
initiatives. Comprising both government and non-government documents,
many entries in the volume would otherwise be dispersed in government
archives and private collections, if at all available anymore, meaning it is a
hugely important archive of women’s movement activism. Beyond Sharma’s
introductory chapter, it provides an impressionistic picture rather than a
sustained analysis, focusing mostly on national-level engagements. The late
Vina Mazumdar’s (2008) memoirs complement this archive well, providing
a detailed personal account of her experiences as a feminist educator and
scholar repeatedly commissioned by the government to draft reports on the
status of women, and policies and legislation to improve their status, espe-
cially the landmark Towards Equality report in the 1970s (see Chapter 4).
This account is of immeasurable value to the archive of women’s movement
efforts to engage the state on issues of gender (in)equality. Grewal’s (2016)
discussion of colonial and postcolonial masculinities during the transition
to Independence via a rich analysis of bureaucrats’ memoirs gives us a de-
tailed insight into ‘elite masculinities as patriarchy’, but by necessity focuses
on the earlier post-Independence years.
Two other exceptions include Thakur’s (c. 1997) study of the gendered
­institutional norms of the All India Administrative Services, discussing
recruitment practices, service rules, incentive structures, and gendered
patterns in postings within the IAS, and the collection by Kabeer and Sub-
rahmanian (1999) on the Gender Planning Training Project in India. Both
are discussed in Chapters 4 and 6. A fifth is a study of gendered institutional
exclusion within the government development programmes of the Integrated
Rural Development Programme and the Development of Women and Chil-
dren in Rural Areas programme (Kabeer and Murthy, 1999). This, however,
34 Debates and perspectives
is a study of the institutional contexts in which policy is implemented rather
than formulated, though implementation can tell us much about success
and failure of gender mainstreaming efforts.19 Other studies focus on gov-
ernment schemes, often in a diagnostic or programmatic-evaluative format.
Whilst these provide insights into the gendered character of the state,
some are isolated to specific schemes or single subnational states, rather
than the state itself or different gendered institutional contexts of develop-
ment policymaking in India. But an important locus of single subnational
state studies is Rajasthan State’s Women’s Development Program (Mathur,
2004; Madhok and Rai, 2012). Events surrounding the rape of a govern-
ment functionary as punishment for her challenging local resistance to her
social justice efforts led to deep questioning and introspection about state
capacity to understand the implications of its own programmes and ensure
the safety of government workers, volunteers, struggling for social change
and risking violence from patriarchal backlash. The consequences were far
reaching: the Supreme Court in 1997 introduced the ‘Vishaka guidelines’ on
sexual harassment in the workplace, and in 2013, the government enacted
legislation to more forcefully implement these guidelines. Also worth men-
tioning are Devika and Thampi’s (2012) study of women’s participation in
local planning and governance in Kerala, Devika’s (2008) critical history of
family planning in Kerala, and several insightful ethnographic and compar-
ative studies of the Mahila Samakhya programme in different states (e.g.
Solanki, 2010). Despite being focused on single state cases, these studies
use single entry points to provide broader insights about the relationship
between gender, development, and the state in India, which show complex
dynamics, and sometimes frustrating, dangerous, and unanticipated chal-
lenges of engaging with the Indian state, challenges which are recognisable
outside the Indian context.

Agents of development
Studies of development in India (and beyond) also attribute varying ­degrees
of agency to different actors. Political leaders, bureaucrats, bilateral and
multilateral donors, international development agencies, and powerful in-
terest groups in society are often designated more powerful actors than
‘targets’ or ‘beneficiaries’ of development policies, or ‘facilitators’ such as
NGOs and other civil society and voluntary organisations. The state is of-
ten positioned as the most prominent agent of national development policy.
The ‘developmental state’ literature analyses how the state acts to promote
national development, implementing its own agenda, insulated from in-
terference by domestic and foreign interest groups whilst strategically and
selectively encouraging investment. Studies have variously conceptual-
ised the Indian state as ‘embedded’ (Herring, 1999), ‘soft’ (Myrdal, 1968),
as a ‘pluralist class state’ (Bardhan, 1990), and as ‘weak-strong’ (Rudolph
and Rudolph, 1987). These distinctions represent different assessments of
 Debates and perspectives 35
state efficacy: how state and societal structures and characteristics deter-
mine state capacity to formulate and implement development policy, and
shape the drivers influencing policy substance. However, with the exception
of Herring’s embedded state model, some have a tendency to oversimplify
the state, obscuring complex and diverse forms of interaction between, and
organisational culture within, different state institutions. Some accounts
downplay internal politics amongst state actors and institutions. Most im-
portantly, these accounts do not make explicit the gendered character of
state institutions.
Studies of political leaders and their relationship to development in the pre-
1991 national context have focused on prime ministers of the ­Nehru-Gandhi
family: Jawaharlal Nehru, his daughter Indira Gandhi, and her son Rajiv
Gandhi. The influence of Nehru’s leadership on early post-­Independence
development planning is well established, as is the centralising, institu-
tional weakening effects and authoritarian aspects of Indira Gandhi’s rule.
The developmental intentions and capacities of individual political lead-
ers are tested by structural forces or interest groups and s­ ubjected to the
­structure-agency dilemma.20 Jenkins’ more institutionalist perspective of
the economic reforms of the 1990s concludes ‘political actors are more in an
ongoing improvisation than a scripted piece of theatre’ prompted by signals
from elections, protests, and public opinion (1999: 208). For Jenkins, p ­ olitical
actors are highly influenced by historical contingency (1999: 209–210).
This contrasts with the modus operandi of civil service policy planners dis-
cussed above where enduring institutional culture is influential.
Subnational political elites such as chief ministers and party leaders are
also significant actors (Wyatt, 2010), partly due to their proximity to imple-
mentation (Manor, 1995). Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister and leader of the
Telugu Desam Party (TDP) Chandrababu Naidu was personally associated
with orchestrating economic and governance reforms in the 1990s (Mooij,
2003; Kennedy, 2004; Manor, 2004). Mooij (2003) focused on the strategic
image-building of Chandrababu Naidu and the TDP regime, his centrali-
sation of policymaking (despite more participatory discourse), and policy
implementation for party-building purposes. Naidu combined two faces
of leadership: first, enhancing regime legitimacy amongst voters, through
schemes like Janmabhoomi, which simultaneously sought to strengthen
and extend the TDP network, bypassing established channels; second, cre-
ating legitimacy in the international arena, by cultivating the image of an
outward-facing, dynamic, reformist regime, embodied by Naidu’s personal
image as IT enthusiast and World Bank client (Mooij, 2003: 22). This is con-
sistent with Kennedy’s signalling theory (Kennedy, 2004). However, more
overt signalling increases pressures to deliver to secure re-election (Mooij,
2003: 22).
Senior female politicians in India have also been subject to analysis (Basu
1993; Sarkar, 1993; Chowdhry, 2000; Keating, 2001; Banerjee, 2004; Skoda,
2004; Spary 2007, 2014). These studies show female political leadership does
36 Debates and perspectives
not guarantee the inclusion of women’s movement demands, and many ques-
tion the assumption it would. Sonia Gandhi’s attempts to pass legislative
gender quotas for women in national and state legislatures failed, despite
being party president and chairperson of the ruling government coalition
for two terms (2004–2014). Few in-depth studies have linked party ­political
leaders with gendered development policy; few have examined political
leadership in championing gender-sensitive development policy, though
a few have discussed how political leaders have rhetorically appealed to
women as voters (see later chapters). Can any of India’s top political lead-
ers, men and women, be called ‘policy entrepreneurs’ (True, 2003)? To what
extent have political leaders demonstrated accountability to the women’s
movement? Why is regime legitimacy not tied more explicitly to addressing
gender inequality?
Studies of Indian bureaucrats have focused on policy roles, whether
­bureaucrats introduce or resist new ideas and norms, and the influence of
epistemic communities on policymaking, including the 1990s liberalisation
reforms.21 Studying these reforms under the premierships of Rajiv Gandhi
(1984–1989) and Narasimha Rao (1991–1996), Shastri (1997: 28) depicts the
epistemic community as political leaders and bureaucrats both career and
‘laterals’, identifying the impetus for change emerging from within state insti-
tutions (both political and bureaucratic). ‘Laterals’ – individuals entering the
senior Indian civil service from outside, not via internal career p ­ rogression
– institutionalised external ideas and influences from their foreign-­based
education and training, often in the United Kingdom (older generation)
or the United States (younger generation), and exposure to different work
ethics and ideas (Shastri, 1997: 38). They have diverse career backgrounds
and ‘are key links in a process of international networking and policy co-­
ordination’ (ibid). Laterals with World Bank experience ‘bring to India
their cross-­country experience and knowledge of how similar reform pro-
grammes have been introduced and operated elsewhere’ (Shashtri, 1997: 39),
suggesting that in the 1980s, ‘the “new laterals” have played a key role in
developing the more technical aspects of the liberalizing program’, though
not without resistance (ibid). Similarly, Nayar (2001) suggested contact with
overseas economists and overseas training of top Indian economic theo-
rists and planners had a disproportional effect on the Second Five-Year
Plan in India’s early planning years. Chakravarty suggested a more mutual
interaction and influence between economists and Indian planners and
policymakers in the 1950s and 1960s: ‘…[d]ominant ideas of contemporary
development economics influenced the logic of India’s plans, and corre-
spondingly, development theory was for a while greatly influenced by the
Indian case’ (1987: 4). Both Byres and Rudra (cited in Byres, 1998) disagree
with the theory of ‘foreign’ influence on Indian planners – Byres attributes
the 1991 reform architecture to Montek S. Ahluwalia, then ­Finance Secre-
tary of the Government of India but formerly of the World Bank (1998: 3).
Rudra sees the development of Indian economic models as more independent
 Debates and perspectives 37
and autonomous than Nayar. Byres goes further suggesting ‘India’s contri-
butions have been in advance of contributions made anywhere else’ (Byres,
1998: 14), but rejects Bhagwati and Srinivasan’s assertion that liberalisation
originated in India and was ‘recycled’ in multilateral policy advice to India
(Bhagwati and Srinivasan, quoted in Byres, 1998: 8, orig. emphasis).
Thus, there is considerable ambiguity as to where and how ideas origi-
nate, and how they become embedded in domestic contexts and circulate
internationally. Byres and Rudra’s accounts emphasise a foreign/domestic
binary, obscuring ideological commonalities. Shastri’s ‘laterals’ is a useful
concept, but says less about how international exposure does not guarantee
progressive reforms, particularly on gender-responsive policy; international
financial institutions like the World Bank also suffer from gender-blindness.
At the same time, bureaucrats and political leaders can be exposed to gen-
der advocacy within (trans)national feminist policy debates and networks,
through interactions with international fora or domestic country offices
of international organisations like the United Nations, facilitating contact
­between domestic feminist advocates and policymakers. Assessing their rela-
tive influence is important for understanding how change in policy discourse
occurs and because international influence can be politically sensitive.
Globally, feminists theorised the gendered character of the state as an
actor but varied in terms of their treatment of the ‘state’ and its interests:
benign, capitalist, patriarchal, imperial, biopolitical, fragmented. Marxist
and radical feminist accounts were criticised for undifferentiated accounts
of the state; institutionalist and post-structuralist feminists see the state as a
heterogeneous set of institutions and discourses, a product of particular his-
torical and political conjunctures (Pringle and Watson, 1992: 57–58, 62–63;
Waylen, 1998: 5–6). The state becomes a site of the construction of problems
and identities and of contestation and struggle. This spectrum of theories is
similarly present amongst feminist scholars and activists in/on India, with
postcolonial theories discussing the particularities of postcolonial states;
postcolonial states emphasise ‘nation-building’ invoking particular gender
norms, and link the status of women to the legitimacy of the newly inde-
pendent state and its capacity to govern (Rai, 1996; Sunder Rajan, 2003).
Literature on the Indian women’s movement is extensive, a prominent
topic being feminist engagement with the state.22 Women’s organisations
are diverse in structure, leadership, and mandate. Karlekar (2004: 149–
150) divided women’s organisations into four categories: those connected
to political parties, autonomous apolitical women’s groups, rural and ur-
ban grassroots women’s organisations, and women’s research, develop-
ment, and documentation organisations. Grassroots organisations have
been particularly effective. The movement is crucial for ‘articulating and
making demands on the government on specific issues as they arise, and
for the setting up of appropriate policies and programmes by the state…’
(Karlekar, 2004: 148–149). Studies point to the rise, decline, and rise of the
women’s movement during, respectively, the pre-Independence nationalist
38 Debates and perspectives
movement, the early post-Independence period, and the post-Emergency
period and ­b eyond (Agnihotri and Mazumdar, 1995). Studies provided in-
sights into the risks of co-optation, fragmentation and lack of solidarity of
the women’s movement, welfare-oriented versus agitational feminist organ-
isations, the structure and leadership style within women’s organisations,
women’s organisations as a form of capacity-building and gender sensiti-
sation in themselves, and the transformational character of the women’s
movement in response to socio-economic changes in government policy
and Indian s­ ociety.23 Agnihotri and Mazumdar (1995: 1874) observed that
socio-­e conomic development policy propelled academics to enter the wom-
en’s movement, straddling the academic-activist divide, arguing they have
been highly influential regarding the ‘priorities and lines of advocacy for
dialogues with policy-makers’ (ibid). But a frequent debate is whether a
homogeneous ‘women’s interest’ exists, given the diverse, plural, and frag-
mented nature of the women’s movement, highlighting varied, potentially
conflicting interests (Rai, 2003a). The rise of Hindu nationalism challenged
the women’s movement, but neo-liberal economic policies have prompted
resistance and unity ­(Agnihotri and Mazumdar, 1995). Instead, we should
recognise there is no ‘one way of understanding or locating women’s oppres-
sion’ (Akerkar, 1995: WS-13). Asking which issues or whose issues receive
more visibility can amplify marginalised voices – the under-representation
of Dalit feminist voices and interests is something the women’s movement
have sought to address (Rege, 2013b).
Women’s political empowerment is a key component of gender-responsive
development. Extensive literature on formal political participation has
analysed gender quotas (or ‘reservations’ in India) at the panchayat (local
council) level and debated successive constitutional amendment bills to
reserve one-third of seats for women in parliament and subnational legis-
lative assemblies (Rai, 1999; Rai and Sharma, 2000; Randall, 2006). State
and national elections now witness similar overall voter turnout for men
and women, notwithstanding regional variance, but women participate as
candidates and elected representatives in far lower proportions compared
to women voters and women as local representatives.24 Legislation for lo-
cal gender quotas in panchayats passed in the mid-1990s was hailed as a
progressive development. Many initially questioned whether panchayats of-
fered real opportunities for women’s political participation, given examples
where women panchayat representatives were dominated by family members
(for a discussion on pradhan patis or proxy participation, see Kudva, 2003).
Also debated is whether formal political participation is an effective institu-
tional route for feminist organisations for lobbying. Women’s political party
wings have few links with women’s movement organisations or their femi-
nist agendas (Rai, 2002), with the exception of the Left. Can the women’s
movement generate new and better strategies for building networks of ad-
vocacy with transnational feminist organisations and engaging in effective
influential dialogue with policymakers, outside formal channels of electoral
 Debates and perspectives 39
participation? This might strengthen the capacity of feminist actors both
within and outside the state, and create pressure on state ­institutions and ac-
tors for more accountability towards gender-responsive development policy.

Gender mainstreaming: concepts, definitions, and debates

Gender mainstreaming strategies seek to mainstream a gender equal-
ity perspective into policies and institutional practice to ensure greater-­
responsiveness to gender inequality. How have scholars, practitioners, and
activists defined, discussed, and assessed gender mainstreaming? Here
I briefly outline relevant concepts and definitions from the gender main-
streaming literature before focusing specifically on the context of develop-
ment policy. I discuss institutional structures and contexts linked to these
strategies, and the role of policy entrepreneurs and transnational feminist
advocacy and activism. Key questions include the following: from where
does the impetus for mainstreaming emerge, and how can individuals or
groups affect its adoption? How do the goals of development and gender
mainstreaming coincide or differ? What kind of institutional structures and
cultures are conducive to gender mainstreaming?
Gender mainstreaming emerged in the 1990s. Defined either as an equal-
ity strategy distinguishable from other strategies, or an umbrella term
encompassing diverse strategies, it is united by a shared concern to make
gender equality a reality. Mieke Verloo defined gender mainstreaming as
a fundamentally transformative strategy targeting ‘…gender inequality at
a more structural level, identifying gender biases in current policies…[and]
­reorganising policy processes so that …policy makers will be obliged and
­capable to incorporate a perspective of gender equality in their policies’
(2001: 3). Verloo’s approach is a distinctive rather than all-­encompassing
strategy, a potentially more transformative approach (Squires, 2005),
­compared to integrationist and agenda-setting equality strategies. It is
better equipped to deal with diverse gender identities and relations than
(a) integrationist strategies which assume sameness amongst men and
women and promote inclusion of women in the existing system to redress
unfair exclusion and discrimination, and (b) agenda-setting strategies which
emphasise gender difference and promote the participation of women be-
cause they have different but similarly valuable perspectives and experiences
to contribute (ibid). Rounaq Jahan’s (1995) study of international devel-
opment organisations differentiated between integrationist and agenda-­
setting approaches, before the transformative approach began to properly
materialise. This third approach sees gender identities and relations as
more diverse and complex and seeks to destabilise and displace hegemonic
gender norms which reproduce inequality (Squires, 2005). According to
Squires’ ­matrix, different strategies emerge. Inclusion/integrationist strat-
egies favour equal opportunity, agenda-setting approaches favour positive
action ­prioritising presence, and displacement strategies work more deeply
40 Debates and perspectives
to change institutional norms, practices, and attitudes towards gender ine-
quality. Rather than seeking to incorporate women into the existing system
without changing that system, or to add a set of perspectives to ‘comple-
ment’ those already present, gender mainstreaming aims for a deeper and
more wide-ranging transformation.
Despite these analytically distinct strategies, some suggest it is possible,
evenly strategically desirable, to adopt multiple approaches simultane-
ously (Squires, 2005: 2). Jacqui True offers the all-encompassing umbrella
­definition of gender mainstreaming, ‘the whole range of contemporary inno-
vations designed to achieve more gender-equitable outcomes…’ (2003: 369).
There is some value in recognising diversity of techniques and approaches,
but it is more analytically useful to adopt a distinct conceptualisation of
gender mainstreaming, in line with Verloo’s transformative definition
above, to capture changes in advocacy and state institutional strategies and
their different theoretical foundations, which can affect the substance and
realisation of equality goals.
Gender mainstreaming proponents universally acknowledge engagement
with the state as a necessary strategy (Miller and Razavi, 1998). Gender
mainstreaming approaches focus on institutions and advocacy strategies
are usually underpinned by an institutionalist perspective, concerned with
norms, processes, and informal structures (Goetz, 1997b). The dominance
of empirical studies in the literature reflects the policy orientation of the
field, but theoretical reflection has grown considerably since the late 1990s,
particularly critical awareness of gender mainstreaming’s operational limi-
tations when faced with intractable institutional norms and cultures. Several
studies of gender mainstreaming, and of state feminism, are comparative or
collaborative, enabling dialogue amongst advocates and analysts (Stetson
and Mazur, 1995; Goetz, 1997a; Randall and Waylen, 1998; Mazur, 2002;
Rai, 2003b).
The role of international institutions such as the EU, World Bank, and
United Nations in the transnational diffusion of norms of gender ­equality
has also generated interest. EU debates focus on mainstreaming equal
­opportunity into all areas of policy (Rees, 1998) and provides a compara-
tive context to examine the influence of a regional supranational body on
domestic policy change. It asks important questions of congruent institu-
tional design, policy adoption, and norms for newly integrating member
governments. The Fourth UN Conference in Beijing in 1995 and its Plat-
form for Action is a key milestone for gender mainstreaming strategies
in ­development contexts (Baden and Goetz, 1998). Some have questioned
the relationship between gender mainstreaming strategies and national
machineries for women, like National Commissions for Women, asking
whether gender mainstreaming would increase or undermine the legitimacy
of these organisational bodies (Rai, 2003b). Others questioned whether the
­institutionalisation of gender equality perspectives entailed the loss of a crit-
ical transformative edge of agitational politics, with or without co-option
 Debates and perspectives 41
(Squires, 2005). Some were concerned gender mainstreaming strategies were
elitist; feminist actors became gender ‘experts’, technocratic policy elites,
rather than mass movement leaders or grassroot women’s representatives
(ibid). These debates are linked to wider issues of governance and reform,
accountability, citizenship and democratic participation, and transnational
social movement activism.

Gender mainstreaming in development policy

The policy focus of EU gender equality strategies differs from gender
­mainstreaming in development policy; the latter’s aim is to make develop-
ment policy more gender-responsive, which means operating in a different
terrain. Important early studies drew attention to gendered hierarchies
in development institutions and policies (Kabeer, 1994; Goetz, 1997a). As
noted, Moser argued gender planning is more ‘confrontational’ than plan-
ning for integrating women into development (1993: 4), though both Moser
(ibid: 109) and Standing (2004) question whether the policy route is the most
effective for institutional change.
National machineries for women take on new significance in the context
of gender mainstreaming. Moser (1993) traces the creation of national com-
missions for women to the first major conference of the UN Decade for
Women (1975–1985), which recommended ‘the establishment of interdisci-
plinary and multisectoral machinery within government, such as national
commissions, women’s bureaux and other bodies…’ (UN 1976: para 34; cited
in Moser, 1993: 111). These new institutional structures to institutionalise
gender planning were created in varied administrative contexts, including
national and subnational governments, multilateral donor agencies, and
in NGOs and civil society organisations (Moser, 1993: 108). Departments
and National Commissions proliferated in national governments, but their
­effectiveness was limited by their institutional exclusion from planning pro-
cesses and underfunding (Moser, 1993: 1), and resistance, lack of political
will and leadership, continuous dislocation within government structures,
short-termism of party politics and electoral cycles, and resistance to cross-
party initiatives. Internal difficulties included overambitious mandates,
tenuous alliances with women’s movements, confusion over objectives, the
continuation of welfarist approaches, charges of elitism and co-optation,
and dependency as a result of patronage (Beall, 1998; Rai, 2003a). Institu-
tional location and role assignment of WID/GAD units marginalised and
stigmatised their ambitions in advance (Goetz, 1997b: 2). Institutional de-
sign could thus embed asymmetrical power relations and constraints from
the very beginning.
As Sen (2000) and Miller and Razavi (1998) argued, finance ministries
proved hardest to infiltrate, often dominated by gender-blind neoclassical
economic thought. Technical skills and the advocacy of feminist econo-
mists like Diane Elson were important for scrutinising ministries’ work in
42 Debates and perspectives
their own language. Initial efforts to ‘sensitise’ these ministries assumed
­gender-blindness and ignorance rather than informed hostility, though once
‘sensitised’, claims of ignorance became less plausible. Inter-ministerial
­hierarchies, especially between finance ministries and ministries with equal-
ity mandates, undermined enthusiasm, engagement, accountability, enforce-
ment and general political will for gender mainstreaming, over-burdening
gender experts, and less powerful and under-resourced ‘women’s ministries’.
Other actors involved in gender mainstreaming include NGOs, bilateral
partnerships between national governments, and international development
agencies, sometimes more directly, other times as stakeholders, funders, or,
otherwise, interested parties. Debates have focused on international donor
discourse and transnational feminist networks pushing for change. Some
self-evaluations by international development agencies introspect on their
limited efforts and ineffectiveness of gender mainstreaming. The same or-
ganisations may produce prescriptive strategies but no (externally available)
evaluation; the more attentive will be evaluative, but less often critical and
working within pre-prescribed organisational constraints.25 Whilst these
provide empirical insights into particular cases, they provide less theoretical
or critical discussion, perhaps reflecting reluctance to risk organisational
reputations, so external analyses have provided greater insights. Jahan’s
study evaluated gender mainstreaming in Bangladesh and Tanzania, focus-
ing on two multilateral donors (World Bank and UNDP) and two bilateral
donors (Norway and Canada), and argued that an insider-outsider alliance
was important in institutionalising policy (Jahan, 1995). Within bilateral
agencies, a few feminist staff acted to mobilise externals. Multilateral agen-
cies were influenced by powerful country members, feminist advocates, top
leadership, and outside women’s lobby groups. Partner governments were
influenced more by women’s organisations, political leadership, and donor
agencies, than their apparently weak and ineffective national machineries.
Partner country women’s organisations influenced donor and international
agencies more than their own governments (Jahan, 1995).
Hafner-Burton and Pollack’s (2002) study of four major international
­organisations – World Bank, UNDP, Organisation for Security and Co-­
operation in Europe, and the EU – similarly showed a large variation in
­i mplementing strategies with the United Nations most hospitable, con-
sistent with the overall frame of the organisation. This is consistent with
Bergeron’s (2003) assessment of the World Bank – despite its move towards
a post–­Washington consensus incorporating more social aspects of devel-
opment, representations of WID at the Bank have changed little. However,
in 2012 when the World Bank’s annual flagship report, World Development
Report, chose as its main theme, ‘Gender Equality and Development’, it
received mixed praise and criticism – praise for increased visibility and
acknowledgement of the intrinsic value of gender equality as opposed to
solely its contribution to economic growth, but criticism for missed oppor-
tunities in analysing ‘gender biases of macroeconomic policy agendas’ and
 Debates and perspectives 43
gender-specific barriers in social policy (Razavi, 2012) both of which produce
inequality and limit state efforts to address gendered inequalities arising
from informal and unpaid labour (ibid). Scepticism over gender main-
streaming strategies has now become more commonplace. Mukhopadhyay
(2004) noted after three decades of activism, advocacy is still necessary to
remind institutions to mainstream gender into policy, suggesting a lack of
institutionalisation. Subrahmanian (2004: 89) argued gender mainstream-
ing has become a ‘hollow discourse, a generator of myths that simplifies the
complexity of gender in ways that are counterproductive, and in many ways
a constraint on political action by feminists’.

Mainstreaming gender in development policy in India

The literature on gender mainstreaming in development policy in India
is an underdeveloped area, particularly academic scholarship, with most
analysis related to development organisations, NGOs, and grassroots pro-
jects rather than government policy (Murthy, 2001). Possible explanations
for earlier absences are the newness of gender mainstreaming initiatives;
scholar-­practitioners were understandably busy doing rather than writing
about it; a reluctance to use the conceptual language of gender mainstream-
ing or to follow gender mainstreaming strategies; and an absence of external
donor influence, pressure, or incentive to adopt such strategies. The lack
of ­literature may reflect limited uptake or perceived importance of gender
mainstreaming strategies in India26 and the predominance of other strat-
egies or concepts like women’s empowerment. Batliwala (2007) discussed
the earlier rejection in the 1980s and early 1990s of the WID/WAD/GAD
triumvirate in favour of the more politicised terminology of women’s em-
powerment, which retained the political subject of women as opposed to
gender. Having an identifiable constituency of citizens to be empowered
also resonated with the identity-based electoral language of the 1990s, mak-
ing it preferable amongst politicians (Batliwala, 2007: 561). Subsequently,
‘women’s empowerment’ became diluted and depoliticised when co-opted
and instrumentalised by government actors and donors, and incorporated
into funding language, policies, and programmes. Its wide array of trans-
formative strategies narrowed considerably to women’s self-help groups and
­political quotas for women (Batliwala, 2007).
The absence of attention to gender mainstreaming in India may also
suggest its explicit rejection as a technocratic discourse, potentially worse
than the co-option of ‘women’s empowerment’. For Menon (2009), Indian
government policy which promises to mainstream gender in development
policy – her example is the National Policy for the Empowerment of Women
(2001) – subordinated gender to the broader development agenda, thereby
lending the latter legitimacy it does not deserve. It employed women as a
synonym for gender, transforming the radical potential of ‘gender’ into a
more stabilised category of ‘“women” as they are located in patriarchal
44 Debates and perspectives
society’ (Menon, 2009: 95, 104). Women’s existing skills and experiences be-
came useful for enabling development, not the other way around (ibid: 104).
Little attention was paid to transforming unequal structures like the sex-
ual division of labour. In this guise, gender mainstreaming became a pro-
foundly non-feminist project: ‘Mainstreaming gender or adding a “gender
component” to development programmes planned within this agenda can-
not possibly be a feminist goal’ (ibid). In sum, it ‘…depoliticizes feminist cri-
tique of patriarchy as well as of development and of corporate globalization’
(Menon, 2009: 104). Menon acknowledged, however, that state policies and
programmes, by enabling women’s public participation, may unwittingly
enable forms of solidarity and resistance amongst women to emerge, but
because such unanticipated positive outcomes are not guaranteed, and be-
cause the trade-offs could be worse, she warns us to remain suspicious of
such initiatives (2009: 111).
These explanations encourage more research on gender mainstreaming in
India. The few relevant studies focus on the institutional structure and policy
legacy constituting the environment for gender mainstreaming initiatives in
India (to which I contribute my own analysis of gender mainstreaming ini-
tiatives in Chapter 4). Desai (1998) and Raju (1997) charted some key devel-
opments in Indian policy (see Table 2.1). Desai (1998) identifies three main
phases since Independence: welfare phase (1951–1974), women’s develop-
ment phase (1975–1985, beginning with the publication of Towards Equality),
and women’s empowerment phase (1986–). Both of them chart changes in
bureaucratic structures addressing GAD issues, such as the creation of
a National Commission for Women in January 1992 under the National
Commission for Women Act, 1990 (Rai, 2003c: 230). The efficacy of the
National Commission for Women in India has not been studied extensively;
Rai (2003c) provides one assessment (see also Arya, 2009). According to
Rai, the Act was established in response to the National Perspective Plan
for Women and after consulting various members and organisations from
the women’s movement (1991; cited in Murthy, 1998: 30–31) and feminist
advocates in mainstream electoral politics (Rai, 2003c: 229). Rai asserts
that women’s organisations’ support for the establishment of a National
Commission for Women created legitimacy for the institutional body, in
five ways. First, the growth of the Indian women’s movement prompted
increased confidence to make demands on the state. Second, a politics of
presence was acknowledged as necessary for gender-sensitive policy. Third,
feminist activist and academic capacity existed for training on gender is-
sues. Fourth, engagement with the state was acknowledged as necessary
due to the growing conservatism of civil society groups. Lastly, policy
change from the top was deemed important (Rai, 2003: 229). Questions
­remain about the efficacy of Commission, its relationship (other than struc-
tural) with the Ministry of Women and Child Development and its parent
ministry, the Ministry of Human Resource Development, and with other
ministries and the courts.
 Debates and perspectives 45
Table 2.1 A
 pproach to women, gender, and development in Five-Year Plans
(1951–1997)

Year(s) Plan Approach to women and/or gender

1951–1956 First Five-Year Plan Focus on welfare; development of

maternal and child health and family
planning services.
1956–1960 Second Five-Year Plan Focused on women workers: less
organised and vulnerable to social
prejudices and physical disabilities.
Suggested protection against
injurious work, equal pay for equal
work, crèches, training facilities,
expanding opportunities for part-time
employment.
1960–1966 Third Five-Year Plan Focus on expansion of girls’ education.
1969–1974 Fourth Five-Year Plan Continued focus of previous plan.
1974–1979 Fifth Five-Year Plan Shift from welfare to development; need
to train women in need of income and
protection.
1980–1985 Sixth Five-Year Plan Women’s development recognised as
specific development sector with
separate chapter. Three-pronged thrust
on education, employment, and health.
Several schemes launched to benefit
women.
1985–1990 Seventh Five-Year Included a separate chapter on women
Plan entitled ‘Socio-economic Programmes
for Women’.
1992–1997 Eighth Five-Year Plan Shift from development to empowerment.
Focus on three key sectors of
education, health, and employment.
Women now seen as equal partners and
participants in development and must
be empowered for this.

Source: Adapted from Murli Desai (1998) and Raju (1997).

On gendered development policy, Raju (1997) and Desai (1998) p ­ rovide

analyses of how India’s successive Five-Year Plans (up to the Eighth ­Five-Year
Plan) have articulated the approach to women, gender, and ­development.
Raju (1997) highlights a significant shift from welfare to development in
the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1974–1979) and from development to empower-
ment in the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1992–1997) (see Table 2.1). The Eighth
­(1992–1997), Ninth (1997–2002), and Tenth Five-Year Plans (2002–2007) will
be explored in Chapter 3.
Another study of gender mainstreaming in India narrates the experiences
of academic-activists collaborating with the Indian government (Kabeer and
Subrahmanian, 1999). The Gender Planning Training Project, a ‘landmark’
collaboration between the UK Department for International Development,
46 Debates and perspectives
the UK Institute of Development Studies (IDS), and the Indian government
developed training modules for gender mainstreaming to train would-be
trainers. Training sessions for civil servants took place at IDS, and later at
the Indian civil service training institute, the National Academy of Admin-
istration in Mussoorie (Kabeer and Subrahmanian, 1999; Subrahmanian
et al., 1999). Few studies have explored the effects of this training on devel-
opment policy formulation and administration. The collections in Murthy
(2001) focused mainly on gender sensitisation training by NGOs for societal
groups at the grassroots level, but Stephen’s (2001) chapter on NGO train-
ing for women in gram panchayats highlighted the ministerial conflicts and
resistant attitudes of high-level government functionaries of gender sensi-
tisation programmes, in this case between the Department of Women and
Child Development, who approved of the training, and the Panchayat Raj
Department, who resisted the training.27

Conclusion
A key theme of this review is that the vast literature on development ­policy
can be improved by further understanding of the gendered character of state-
led development in India. International literature on gender mainstream-
ing in development policy shows limited attention to India. The changing
centre-­state relationship since 1991 is the subject of a growing ­literature, and
presents interesting opportunities for understand gender mainstreaming
and multilevel governance. National and subnational state-level discourses,
institutions, and actors involved in development policy should be explored
for their influence on gendered development policy. Emerging initiatives
which appear largely unassessed in the scholarly literature suggest room for
a valuable and original contribution.

Notes
1 Similarly, ‘sustainable development’ reflected incorporation of environmental-
ism, human rights, and the impact of development on ‘sustainable livelihoods’
and community practices. Rai (2001: 114) linked the impact of these new devel-
opment discourses with the 1990 launch of the annual UN Human Development
Reports.
2 Chambers (1997) advocated participatory approaches to increase stake-
holder participation. Others suggest that despite radical origins in the ‘South’,
­‘participatory’ development was adopted to increase legitimacy of develop-
ment projects (Cooke and Kothari, 2001). Bad practice meant participation of
­‘beneficiaries’ was tokenistic (Mosse, 2001), and programmes rarely addressed
and even reproduced gendered power relations (Chhotray, 2004), constituting a
new ‘tyranny’ of development (Cooke and Kothari, 2001).
3 Harriss stated that global discourses of development were profoundly influenced
by Indian thought on human development and conceptualisations of poverty
­beyond income deprivation (1998: 299).
4 Accounts of India’s development history emphasise particular periods: attempts
to introduce market-oriented policies under Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri
 Debates and perspectives 47
(1964–1966), shift in agricultural strategy and the Green Revolution, and Rajiv
Gandhi’s failed attempts at liberalisation in the 1980s. These periods influenced
current Indian development discourse, but I focus on the two major periods
discussed.
5 For Chakravarty, the pre-Independence debate polarised around Nehruvian
and Gandhian approaches, but the latter was never a serious contender for
postcolonial national development strategies (1987: 7). The debate was between
­mainstream economists and the Left who differed over details but shared views
on the fundamental problem of development, thinking a ‘commodity-centred ap-
proach… [where] more goods are preferred to less’ was the best way ahead (1987:
7–8). The Gandhian approach instead thought demand should be r­ estricted, and
villages should be self-sufficient and sustainable (1987: 7–8).
6 ‘Socialism’ in Indian development thought is not the same as socialism adher-
ing to Marxist prescriptions; it is economic development for socially beneficial
outcomes for all Indians, as acknowledged in the Second Five-Year Plan (GOI,
1956).
7 Harriss (1998) argued that dependency thinking had little influence on devel-
opment thinking in India, despite Bagchi’s (1982) significant contribution on
underdevelopment.
8 Singapore’s first Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew argued against democracy’s
destabilising influence, assuming elected representatives would favour short-
term populist policies over long-term planning. Amartya Sen argued democracy
was an intrinsic component of development, both means and ends, and not a
‘constraint’ on development (Sen, 1999).
9 Varshney (1999) argued the shift to neo-liberal economic policy was confined
to ‘elite politics’ of bureaucrats, politicians, intellectuals, and graduates; ‘mass
politics’ is dominated by identity politics.
10 The NDC brought together chief ministers of India’s subnational state
­governments, chaired by the Prime Minister, and deputy-chaired by the member-­
secretary of the Planning Commission. After the Planning Commission was
abolished, the government announced the NDC’s powers would be transferred
to NITI Aayog (The Hindu, 2016a).
11 Hanson claimed the anticipated reactions of chief ministers (amongst council
members) influenced the Commission’s proposals (1966: 62).
12 Gupta (2001: 109) discussed the Integrated Child Development Scheme,
­contrasting cuts in social sector spending under neo-liberal policies with data
on increased allocation for the Integrated Child Development Services pro-
gramme, focusing on child nutrition, amongst other goals.
13 Population policies and reproductive technologies are not wholly state-led:
­i nternational development institutions and INGOs, bilateral Western govern-
mental aid agencies, and the global pharmaceutical industry have been linked to
­population control technologies and practices (Wilson, 2013).
14 This includes the Right to Information Act 2005, Right to Education Act,
the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 2005,
the ­National Food Security Act 2013, and the Scheduled Tribes and Other
­Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act 2006 (Arora
and Kailash, 2014).
15 See also Harriss (2011) on UPA social policy, especially the pro-poor legislation
mentioned.
16 Furthermore, in 2016, Five-Year Plans were reportedly scrapped, replaced with
medium- and long-term planning (The Hindu, 2016b).
17 Chakravarty (1987: 47) explains the multilevel character of planning under Indian
federalism. Plans were formulated at central and state levels, yearly and Five-
Year Plans were formulated by the Planning Commission and approved by the
48 Debates and perspectives
NDC, chaired by the prime minister and subnational chief ministers of states and
union territories (Chakravarty, 1987: 47). Guhan (2001 [1995]: 127) listed national
government responsibilities as defence, foreign policy, currency, central banking,
national transport and communication infrastructure, and finance, insurance,
capital market regulation, electoral regulation and audit, civil and police service
recruitment, broadcasting, basic employment law, research investment, legisla-
tion on industrial regulation and promotion, mines and oil resources. National
government is also responsible for interstate issues. The states’ responsibilities
include law and order, primary judicial administration, and economic and social
development, comprising agriculture and related sectors such as fisheries, animal
husbandry and dairying, and forests, irrigation, power, roads (not national mo-
torways), education, health, water supply, and urban development.
18 Jenkins (2004) is a landmark volume; see also Wyatt and Zavos (2003) and Tillin
et al. (2015).
19 Implementation is important for policy feedback affecting formulation of new
policies and is a site of contestation and struggle where policy intentions may
take on new forms. The formulation-implementation distinction is more blurred
than suggested here.
20 Assessments of Rajiv Gandhi’s leadership included the failure of liberalisation
reforms to take off in the 1980s. Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and his Finance
Minister, Manmohan Singh (later Prime Minister from 2004), are associated
with early 1990s liberalisation reforms.
21 Haas (1992: 3) defines an epistemic community as ‘a network of professionals
with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an au-
thoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area’.
This is distinct from more ad hoc ‘advocacy coalitions’, whose members seek to
self-maximise their interest.
22 For an overview, see Akerkar (1995), Agnihotri and Mazumdar (1995), Kumar
(1989), and Forbes (1982). For a detailed history, see Forbes (1998), Kumar (1993),
and Pawar et al. (2008). See Murthy (2001) and Kannabiran and Kannabiran
(2002) on capacity-building experiences with women’s organisations. See the lat-
ter and Mageli (1997) for studies of women’s organisations in Andhra Pradesh
and Tamil Nadu, respectively. Akerkar (1995) is an interesting post-structuralist
discourse analysis of the Indian women’s movement.
23 The women’s movement organised on diverse issues from dowry, arrack, ­v iolence
(including rape), equal economic and employment opportunities, and anti-­
development protests. Since the 1980s, the Hindutva movement has ­mobilised
right-wing women, with dubious potential for empowerment, manifesting mil-
itancy around communal issues (Basu, 1993). The latter will not be considered
here as part of the feminist women’s movement.
24 The 2004 Lok Sabha elections saw women Members of Parliament (MPs) com-
prising up to 8 percent of the Lok Sabha, with varying proportions of contesting
and elected women amongst political parties. This rose to almost 11 percent in
the 2009 Lok Sabha elections but remained constant in the 2014 election with
only one more woman MP elected than in 2009.
25 See the Commonwealth Secretariat handbook series entitled New Gender Main-
streaming Series on Development Issues (for the volume on poverty eradication,
see Kabeer, 2003).
26 Murthy (1991; cited in Murthy, 1998: 30–31) found ‘70 percent–75 percent of train-
ing programmes for development functionaries in India were …gender-blind…
[they] are implicitly male-biased as they do not delve into gender biases within
mainstream thinking’.
27 Stephen (2001: 136) stated that DWCD approved of the programme, but the
Secretary of the Panchayat Raj Department ‘fiercely resisted’ on the grounds
 Debates and perspectives 49
that responsibilities and funds had already been allocated for their training at a
national institute and no further training would be required or funds allocated.
The Panchayat Raj Department Secretary also resisted gender-specific training
needs of women gram panchayat members (2001: 136).

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3 Mapping national planning
policy since 1990

Introduction
To what extent has the Government of India recognised and sought to
­address gender disparities in processes and outcomes of social, economic,
and political development since 1990? This chapter maps and discusses
national policy discourse and institutional developments, focusing on the
national government’s Five-Year Plans, as formulated by the Planning Com-
mission.1 It traces shifts in policy discourse since 1990, beginning with the
Eighth Plan (1992–1997) and ending with the Eleventh Plan (2007–2011),
­investigating where, how, and to what extent concerns about gender-equitable
development appear in development planning and policy.
I argue that significant shifts throughout the 1990s and 2000s can be
­identified in the government’s planning discourse(s) in relation to gender-­
(in)equitable development. Policy constructions of ‘women’ as subjects and
objects of development have changed over time, with increasing recogni-
tion given to different aspects of women’s participation in development
processes as producers and citizens, not just welfare recipients, vulnerable
dependents, or programme beneficiaries. Successive plans visibly articulate
a rhetoric of concern to address gendered development inequalities across
an increasing range of policy sectors. However, important limitations and
silences remain, particularly on diversity amongst women and the extent to
which men are visible as gendered subjects and actors in development. More
fundamental questions remain about the broader neo-liberal development
growth model indicated in Plan discourse: the extent to which this model
can address, rather than exacerbate, existing gender inequalities; whether
efforts to recognise and address gender inequality conform to rather than
challenge this discourse; and whether this model reproduces rather than
transforms structures of gender-based marginalisation and inequality. The
shift towards a rights-based discourse in the Eleventh Plan suggests greater
introspection about the limits of neo-liberal models to address inequalities,
and a revived role for the state in social protection programmes and rights-
based legislation, but does not significantly depart from the broader neo-­
liberal paradigm.
 National planning policy 59
The historical context of post-1990 gendered development
planning
A brief account of the historical context of gender and development plan-
ning in India will highlight the constitutive role of contexts, which provide
the conditions of possibility (John, 1996: 102) for gendered development
discourse in the 1990s onwards. Apart from a relatively progressive early
planning document – the Report of the National Planning Committee on
Women’s Role in the Planned Economy (Chaudhuri, 1996) – the status of
women and gender inequality was not subjected to substantial scrutiny as
part of development planning until the 1970s.2 But this changed with two
landmark government reports on women, gender, and development. The
first was the Towards Equality report, a government-commissioned study on
the status of women in India (CSWI, 1974), a report written by the Commit-
tee on the Status of Women in India especially constituted for that purpose,
and (eventually) chaired by feminist academic Vina Mazumdar. The report
was submitted to the United Nations for the first UN Decade for Women
beginning in 1975.3 The Committee was tasked to examine the status of
women in relation to constitutional, legal, and administrative provision; ed-
ucation and employment; the ‘changing social pattern’; population policy
and family planning programmes; and enabling women ‘to play their full
and proper role in building up the nation’. Towards Equality highlighted
women’s continued low status in India, despite constitutional equality guar-
antees and nearly 30 years of post-Independence development planning.4
The second landmark report, Shramshakti, was a government-­commissioned
report on the status of self-employed women workers and women working
in the informal sector (NCSEWWIS, 1988). Similar to Towards Equality,
a commission was established, the National Commission on Self-Employed
Women and Women in the Informal Sector, and chaired by Ela Bhatt
(founder of women’s co-operative SEWA). Shramshakti depicted the precar-
ious status and working conditions of these women workers. Both reports
are widely acknowledged as key milestones in the assessment of women’s
status, gender equality, and development in India prior to 1990.
In between these two landmark reports, the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1980–
1985), for the first time included a separate chapter on women, a milestone
signalling increasing visibility of women, and gender disparities in devel-
opment in government planning discourse. Intentions to ‘mainstream’ the
concerns of ‘women’ can also be found as early as 1978 in the records of a
National Committee formed out of the National Plan of Action. Mazumdar
et al. described the sentiment at the time:

Women were no longer the responsibility or the constituency of one

Department or Bureau, nor confined to the ‘soft’ social sectors. It was
accepted that the plans and policies of all departments and sectors
­affected women…[and] realised that all Government agencies should
60 National planning policy
take into account the effect of their policies and programmes on women
and should specifically mention the special steps taken by them for
­i mproving the condition of women…
(2001: 63)

Attempts were made in the early 1980s to establish government departments

or semi-autonomous agencies for women’s development at central and state
levels, similar to efforts in the 1990s (Mazumdar et al., 2001: 65). However,
when the government drafted the National Perspective Plan for Women in
1988, the women’s movement criticised the lack of government consultation
and organised a two-day debate to assess the draft plan (Sharma, 2012: ­x xiii).
A few years prior, the women’s movement made headway in their campaigns
protesting violence against women but suffered a setback in the Shah Bano
case, where the government overturned a more progressive Supreme Court
ruling relating to Muslim women’s rights in marriage and divorce. A more
positive development from government policy in the 1980s was the National
Policy on Education (1986) from which the Mahila Samakhya programme
emerged, a programme now globally recognised for its successes in educat-
ing and empowering women at the grassroots. Thus, prior to 1990, we can al-
ready observe momentum for the women’s movement’s engagement with the
state and government cognisance of gender inequalities, even though govern-
ment action was not always straightforwardly progressive and depended on
the mobilisational energies of women’s movement organisations to maintain
pressure. This momentum partly reflected concerns for institutionalising
government commitments and global discourse on women in development,
which increasingly asked countries to establish government bodies to pro-
mote women’s rights and gender equality, referred to as ‘national machiner-
ies for women’. But undoubtedly developments were domestically driven by
the women’s movement, making full use of available opportunities. The To-
wards Equality report and other campaigns of the 1970s changed the way in
which women were seen, as subjects of reform, policymakers, not objects, or
targets of policies (Patel, 1985, cited in Armstrong, 2013: 49; Subramaniam,
2006: 32). The upsurge in women’s movement activity was part of a broader
invigoration of social movements in the immediate post-Emergency context,
contributing to heightened demands on the state and ‘one of the many ef-
forts to reassert the claims of citizens to participate as equals in the political
and development process’ (Subramaniam, 2006: 32). Additionally, growing
gendered class consciousness amongst women and a desire for freedom from
violence against women provided a foundation for growing activism into the
1980s onwards (Armstrong, 2013: 48).

Plan discourse in the post-1990 period

The entry point for the analysis of the government’s development discourse
begins in this chapter with the Eighth Plan (1992–1997), released shortly
 National planning policy 61
after a major symbolic turning point in national policy away from Nehru-
vianism and towards neo-liberalism, as discussed in the previous chapter.
I begin with a quick survey of broader plan discourse from the Eighth to
Eleventh Plans, before discussing in more detail the more explicit aspects of
gendered development discourse in the Plans.
The change in policy direction was immediately discernible in Plan dis-
course. Planning was to become largely ‘indicative’ rather than directive,
now advising on the ‘optimal utilisation’ of limited resources (GoI, 1992:
para 1.1.5). The Plan sought to transform the inefficient, uncompetitive,
and dependency-creating public sector to make it ‘efficient and surplus gen-
erating’ (ibid: para 1.1.4). The manufacturing sector was identified as the
crucial sector for high growth, and efforts were to be focused on creating
an ­environment for ‘industrial growth, modernisation, and productivity
improvements’ (ibid: 1.2.4). At the same time, the Eighth Plan justified the
continued importance of planning, acknowledging the shortcomings of eco-
nomic growth as a redistributive measure and the ‘as-yet’ underdeveloped
capacity of the private sector for addressing human development:

Planning in our country still has a large role to play. Planning is needed
for creating social infrastructure and for human development…[T]he
private sector, as yet, is not capable of taking care of the entire needs
of the society, particularly of the poor and the weak, in remote and
the ­r ural areas…Planning is necessary to take care of the poor and
the downtrodden who have little asset endowments to benefit from the
­natural growth of economic activities.
(ibid: paras 1.5.5–1.5.6)

Thus, the continued role of the Planning Commission was not only to
­provide infrastructure but also to compensate those excluded from the
­benefits of growth, preferring to leave the growth model unchanged despite
its limitations. In this view, planning would remain important to women,
identified as one of the groups likely to be left behind by economic liberali-
sation and in need of state protection:

Although development brings economic gains to society in general,

specific measures become necessary to ensure that they reach the
disadvantaged and the weaker sections of the population such as
women, children, the disabled, the elderly, and the destitute. The wel-
fare and ­development of these weaker sections of the society largely
depend upon suitable policy directions executed through appropriate
programmes and strategies.
(GoI, 1992: Vol. 2, para 15.1.1)

The backward regions and the weaker sections of the society, if not pro-
tected fully, are more likely to be left behind in the natural process of
62 National planning policy
growth. Adequate protection will have to be continued to be provided
to the poor and the weaker sections of the society.
(GoI, 1992: para 1.4.22, my emphasis)

Thus, the early growth discourse of the 1990s began with identifying and
­positioning women outside mainstream development and as both d ­ ependents
and beneficiaries of state protection in a two-tier approach to development:
mainstream growth and a compensatory and protectionist approach to
‘special’, ‘vulnerable’, ‘weaker sections of society’.
The new economic policy was, understandably, not well received by the
women’s movement in India. As discussed in the previous chapter, many
scholars and activists contested the shift in government policy, drawing
upon critical evaluations of neo-liberal economic policy, including well-­
established (feminist) critiques of neo-liberal structural adjustment policies
from around the world (John, 1996). Indian feminist critiques forewarned
that the deleterious effects of structural adjustment programmes, particu-
larly on women, that had concerned other (feminist) studies around the
world, would be reproduced in India, should the government proceed with
IMF-advocated measures. They condemned the possibility of state with-
drawal from the social sector and warned globalisation would bring new
gender inequalities to India’s informal sector, due to the lack of regula-
tory worker protection in this sector and increased competition from for-
eign companies. Indian women activists voiced these concerns at the UN
Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in September 1995. The
adversely gendered outcomes of processes of liberalisation and structural
adjustment constituted one of 12 key concerns of the Beijing Platform for
Action. Women’s lack of voice in national development planning processes
was another concern; addressing this concern was a commitment to im-
prove institutional mechanisms for the advancement of women. Conse-
quently, a collaborative attempt to engender the Government of India’s
Ninth Five-Year Plan was initiated after the Beijing conference (discussed
in Chapter 4).
Despite widespread criticisms of the new direction in macroeconomic
policy, the Ninth Plan advocated liberalisation more aggressively, combined
with nationalist discourse, and pushed for further reforms, both at the cen-
tral and state levels.

There should be no doubt that the process of reforms…which has

yielded many good results, must be continued and strengthened…The
remaining controls [on the industrial sector] at the Central Govern-
ment level need to be reviewed for further liberalisation…[T]he major
effort in the future has to be to extend liberalisation to the level of State
Government.
(GoI, 1997: Vol. 1, paras 1.10–1.12)
 National planning policy 63
The Plan argued globalisation was inevitable so should be ‘managed’
through developing Indian competitiveness to reap benefits:

…[P]olicies in the Ninth Plan must be tailored to the objective of acceler-

ating growth in an environment in which the world is becoming increasing
integrated and globalised. The process of globalisation is a reality which can-
not be denied and also should not be avoided. However, it needs to be man-
aged so that we can derive the maximum advantage from world markets…
[I]t is necessary to continue the process of ­opening up of the economy to
international competition…while making parallel efforts to strengthen the
potential of Indian industry to compete effectively in world markets.
(GoI, 1997, my emphasis)

This totalising discourse of inevitability undermined feminist critiques of lib-

eralisation and its adverse impact on women in particular. Dependence on the
government by ‘socially disadvantaged groups’ was also heavily ­discouraged
in Plan discourse. Income-generating schemes deemed unproductive would
be phased out wherever possible. Instead, ‘self-reliance’ was the new goal,
flexibly signified in both nationalist and neo-liberal frames. The emphases on
productivity and self-reliance were also to be found in the government’s new
‘empowerment’ discourse on women’s development ­(discussed below).
Much like the Eighth Plan, for the Tenth Plan the role of government ­remained
important in infrastructure development and social sectors, and as a facilitator
for private sector investment. The Tenth Plan continued with a two-tier ap-
proach, recognising the shortcomings of economic growth as a redistributive
measure and thus the need for ‘special’ programmes for those excluded from the
benefits of growth. These special programmes formed part of a three-pronged
strategy to achieve equity and social justice alongside high rates of growth.
At the same time, the Tenth Plan indicated a re-imagining of the ‘poor’
and ‘women’, their role in development processes, and the importance of
human development objectives. First, self-reliance remained important, as
in the Ninth Plan, but a new emphasis was placed on encouraging individual
entrepreneurship and self-employment. This was reflected in calls for more
democratised development and increased participation of the poor in shap-
ing their own destinies (GoI, 1997: Vol. 1, para 1.1), as opposed to merely
being more involved in the implementation of development activities as the
Eighth Plan proposed (GoI, 1992: preface). Self-reliance would also address a
significant challenge in the Tenth Plan, the creation of sufficient employment
opportunities. The importance of providing employment was two-fold –
to encourage individuals to fulfil their potential and to prevent social unrest
and disorder resulting from unemployment and poverty (GoI, 1997). The
Plan forecasted that the growth process alone would not fulfil demand for
employment without intervention, such as improvements in vocational ed-
ucation. The Tenth Plan discourse effectively transferred responsibility for
employment creation from government to individuals.
64 National planning policy
The rationale for investing in human development became more aligned
with growth objectives in the Tenth Plan, and human development discourse
became more visible in plan discourse thereafter. However, human devel-
opment was presented mostly instrumentally: human development was im-
perative to achieve and sustain growth rather than an intrinsic goal; both
‘socially desirable’ and a ‘valuable input’ for sustained development in the
long term, and driven primarily by domestic demand despite the focus on
liberalisation:

It is important to re-emphasise that the equity related objectives of

the Plan, which are extremely important, are intimately linked to the
growth objective, and attainment of one may not be possible without
the attainment of the other…[H]igh growth rates may not be sustainable
if they are not accompanied by a dispersion of purchasing power which
can provide the demand needed to support the increase in output with-
out having to rely excessively on external markets.
(GoI, 2002: Vol. 1, para 1.33)

Thus, the Tenth Plan envisaged the ‘poor and the disadvantaged’ as future
consumers who, given the right investment in human development, would
enable India to achieve high rates of growth. Human development, in this
sense, was conceived as a means to an end.
In the 2004 national elections, the BJP-led National Democratic Alli-
ance (1999–2004) was defeated by the Congress Party-led United Progres-
sive Alliance. The latter included outside support from the Left parties.
Correspondingly, the Eleventh Plan (2007–2012) exhibited a notable shift
in discourse. This discourse appeared to be much less celebratory about
the effects of the growth process, particularly in terms of its impact on
marginalised groups. The Plan envisioned a recovered role for the state
in terms of social protection and as an employment stimulus and regu-
lator. Members of marginalised groups were also rights bearers, rather
than – or as well as – potential future consumers who would drive the
growth process. The Eleventh Plan focused more on what growth should
do for marginalised groups rather than what marginalised groups could
do for growth, emphasising growth was of little value if it was not ‘inclu-
sive growth’. However, the pernicious effects of growth would be offset
or compensated for rather than following an alternative path.

Gendered development discourse in the Five-Year Plans

Turning to focus on the more explicit gendered discourse of the Plans,
I ­explore the following questions. Where and how do the Plans discuss
­women’s participation in development and how development processes
and outcomes affect them? Do the Plan documents acknowledge gender-­
inequitable development as a problem to be addressed, and if so, how do
 National planning policy 65
they define it as a problem and what strategies do they propose to address it?
To what extent is this a concern isolated to a few areas of planning or a more
comprehensive engagement?
Notwithstanding some variability across Plans, the subject of w ­ omen’s
welfare, development, or empowerment has been consistently located in the
social sector. To an extent, this is predetermined by how Plans are drafted
and the administrative location of responsibilities for different policy a­ reas.
However, the administrative division of labour indicates how the pol-
icy problem has been conventionally defined. In all four Plans examined,
‘women’ have been the focus of a separate chapter or predominant section
of a chapter. In the Eighth Plan, women were identified as one component
group of the ‘weaker sections’ of society and thus the government’s most
explicit and systematic articulation of its perspective on women, gender, and
development5 came under the ambit of the Social Welfare chapter. At the
same time, ‘women’s issues’ appeared to be taken into consideration and
integrated on a sectoral level, indicated by references to women in 13 of 19
sectoral chapters.6 These mainly related to ‘special schemes’ and ‘special
measures’ for women within general schemes, often as a result of their ‘dis-
advantaged’ or ‘weak’ status, or ‘special provisions’ such as separate train-
ing institutes for women and support services such as housing schemes for
working women. Thus, whilst ‘women’ may appear in other Plan chapters,
their ‘special’ status perpetuates the idea the state must make extra effort to
incorporate them in the planning process. In the Ninth Plan, the ­language
and location changed from ‘Social Welfare’ and women’s development came
under the ambit of ‘Human and Social Development’.7 In both the Ninth
and Tenth Plans, women were located in a separate chapter with children,
reflecting administrative changes to ministerial portfolios – the new Depart-
ment of Women and Child Development – even though this had happened
before the Eighth Plan.
When Plan documents discuss women and the development process, they
communicate their sense of what role(s) women should play in development
processes, which determines the degree of women’s centrality or marginal-
ity in national development strategy, and the degree of agency women are
seen to exercise in the process. For example, at one end of the spectrum are
dependents of state benevolence or passive ‘beneficiaries’ of state-sponsored
programmes; at the other end are agents and catalysts driving development.
This results in a hierarchy of gendered developmental subjectivities, though
the extent of autonomy from the state is not straightforwardly equated
with the degree of agency that can be exercised (discussed ­further below). Over
the successive four Plans, women’s participation in development processes
was envisaged as increasingly more recognised, more central, and ostensibly
more agential. The Eighth Plan proposed a more substantive and participa-
tory role for women in the development process than the ­beneficiary-oriented
role it had identified under previous Plans. It maintained that ‘women must
be enabled to function as equal partners and participants in development
66 National planning policy
and not merely as beneficiaries of various schemes’ (GoI, 1992: para 15.5.1,
my emphasis). In the Ninth Plan, the goal entailed ‘empowering women as
the agents of social change and development’ (GoI, 1997: Vol. 2, para 3.8.27).
The Tenth Plan continued with the role for women as agents of development
envisioned in the Ninth Plan. It also explicitly stated the aim of empower-
ment strategies in the Tenth Plan was for ‘women and girls to act as catalysts,
participants and recipients in the country’s development process’ (GoI, 2002:
Vol. 2, para 2.11.60, my emphasis).
Similarly, whether Plan documents recognise the various roles women
perform in economic, social, and political spheres – as workers, as carers,
as citizens, and decision-makers – determines how Plan discourse discur-
sively positions them in development policy. In the Eighth Plan, concerns
of women’s developmental status also linked to women’s role as producers,
a role for which, the Plan claimed, they were still not fully recognised. This
focus is most likely the influence of the women’s co-operative movement
leader Ela Bhatt and her involvement in the draft planning process (dis-
cussed further below). This included agricultural production, construction
work, and other informal sector work, including home-based activities. The
Plan stated women as workers in these sectors suffered from lack of labour
protection; lack of access to credit, training, and technology; wage discrim-
ination, insecurity, and poor working conditions. They also faced increas-
ing competition from new technologies. Lack of recognition of women as
producers also included subsistence activities and the unpaid care economy,
identifying conventional measures of women’s contribution to the economy
as gender biased:

The contribution of women to the economy continues to remain grossly

under-reported due to certain conceptual, methodological and per-
ception problems, reflecting a gender bias since economic value is not
assigned to unpaid household work and various kinds of subsistence
activities. Home-based production activities and unpaid family work
also tend to be grossly under-reported.
(GoI, 1992: para 15.4.6)

The juxtaposition of ‘women’ as ‘weak’ and filed under Social Welfare in the
overall Plan message but recognised as workers, as producers, in the chapter
addressing women’s status in development, is one illustration of the multiple
and contradictory interpellations of ‘women’ in Plan discourse.
The Ninth and Tenth Plan chapters on women were largely based on
­various drafts of the NPEW. Unsurprisingly, the discourse shifted towards
empowerment and incorporated language on political rights, autonomy,
and decision-making power. The Ninth Plan defined empowerment as
­creating ‘an enabling environment where women can freely exercise their
rights both within and outside home, as equal partners along with men’
(GoI, 1997: 3.8.27).
 National planning policy 67
Whilst the Eighth Plan was more critically insightful of the structural
causes (mostly economic and social) of gender inequality with a strategy
mostly implied, the Ninth and Tenth Plans presented a more explicit and
comprehensive strategy for addressing gender-inequitable development us-
ing the language of social and economic empowerment and gender justice.
Strategies for social empowerment included affirmative developmental pol-
icies and programmes for the development of women and access to all the
basic minimum services. Economic empowerment included provision of
training, employment, and income-generation activities with the objective
of making all potential women economically independent and self-reliant.
The strategy to achieve gender justice aimed to eliminate all forms of gen-
der discrimination, so women enjoy de facto as well as de jure ‘rights and
fundamental freedoms on par with men in all spheres’ (GoI, 2002: Vol. 2,
para 2.11.57).
But the empowerment discourse was largely articulated as an approach
to empowerment in which self-maximisation of the individual was promi-
nent and consistent with the government’s liberalising discourse. Strategies
for women’s development were not always pursued in the name of gender
equality per se but presented in utilitarian terms as a means for social and
economic development. The creation of an enabling environment was fre-
quently justified to enable women to become agents of development. In
other words, the absence of an enabling environment for women was seen
as something holding development back, preventing them from acting as
agents of development, rather than a development goal to achieve in itself.
The assessment provided in the Eighth Plan focusing on women workers and
structural inequalities was arguably more promising in its feminist c­ ritique
than the subsequent two Plans.

Policies for gender-responsive development

Affirmative action was the most consistent policy instrument proposed for
women’s development, and increasingly so after the Eighth Plan which also
stressed remedial measures for discriminatory societal attitudes. Legal
provisions in the Constitution were used to justify the use of affirmative
action:

Article 15 of the Constitution prohibits any discrimination on grounds

of religion, race, caste, sex, etc. Article 15(3), however, clarifies that this
provision will not prevent the State from making any special provisions
for women and children.
(GoI, 1992: para 15.2.2)

All four Plans justified special treatment based on women’s difference in the
pursuit of equality. The importance of affirmative action as a ­strategy for
empowerment was strongly advocated for increasing women’s ­participation
68 National planning policy
in decision-making. An important omission in the Eighth Plan which
the Ninth Plan did include was a consideration of women’s political
participation.

The status-quo…can only change when women’s concerns gain political

prominence and a fairly representative number of women are in a posi-
tion not only at grass-roots level, but also at the state and national levels
to convert them into a political will.
(GoI, 1997: para 3.8.24)

For women to be empowered, this required representation in decision-­

making and their direct participation:

As the representation of women in the decision-making levels has

a direct bearing on all the affirmative actions directed towards their
well-being and empowerment, every effort will be made to ensure that
women are in adequate numbers at the decision-making levels.
(ibid: para 3.8.49)

Affirmative action was also the core element of several other schemes.
A ‘special strategy’ named the ‘Women’s Component Plan’ directed that
‘not less than 30 percent of funds/benefits are earmarked in all the women-­
related sectors…[and] through an effective mechanism…ensure that the
[WCP] brings forth a holistic approach towards empowering women’ (ibid:
para 3.8.28).
By placing an emphasis on mainstreaming across all sectors, the Tenth
Plan appeared to be setting a new trend against the segregation of con-
cerns of gender-equitable development into a single chapter on women. But
this was still a strategy premised on gender difference, difference between
women and men, and based on the interpretation of gender mainstreaming
in the NPEW as ‘mainstreaming women’ using an approach emphasising
women’s presence for agenda setting. One of the policy’s several goals was
‘mainstreaming a gender perspective in the development process’, which
was interpreted thus:

Policies, programmes and systems will be established to ensure main-

streaming of women’s perspectives in all developmental processes, as
catalysts, participants and recipients. Wherever there are gaps in poli-
cies and programmes, women-specific interventions would be undertaken
to bridge these. Coordinating and monitoring mechanisms will also be
devised to assess from time to time the progress of such mainstreaming
mechanisms. Women’s issues and concerns as a result will specially be
addressed and reflected in all concerned laws, sectoral policies, plans
and programmes of action.
(GoI, 2005: article 4.1, my emphasis)
 National planning policy 69
As noted, mainstreaming gender was interpreted as mainstreaming ­women’s
perspectives and not necessarily gender. This approach, whilst increasing
visibility of women and their concerns, inherently risks the assumption
that women’s interests are homogeneous, erasing complexity and diver-
sity of interests amongst women. By advocating presence, it did not guar-
antee a commitment to furthering gender equality or the incorporation
of ­gender-responsive perspectives. It also transferred responsibility and
­accountability for addressing gender inequality onto women.

Contradictions, silences, and exclusions

At times, Plan discourse was inconsistent; several significant contradictions
can be identified. The Eighth Plan proposed a more substantive and par-
ticipatory role for women in the development process than the beneficiary-­
oriented role envisioned in the previous Plans. It maintained ‘women must
be enabled to function as equal partners and participants in development
and not merely as beneficiaries of various schemes’ (GoI, 1992: para 15.5.1).
Yet this vision was accompanied by a more beneficiary-oriented commit-
ment to ‘ensure that the benefits of development from different sectors do
not bypass women and special programmes are implemented to complement
the general development programmes’ (ibid: para 15.5.1, my emphasis). This
strategy continued to segregate women’s development from mainstream de-
velopment, despite an earlier commitment that ‘the issues relating to women
will be integrated in the total development endeavours’ (ibid: para 15.5.2).
Overall, the development approach remained largely unaffected by gender
inequality considerations, only establishing special programmes to address
women’s exclusion from mainstream programmes.
Similarly, whilst the Ninth’s Plan’s stated goal was to empower women
as the agents of social change and development, women as a group were
identified as ‘the most important target groups in the context of the present
day developmental planning’ (GoI, 1997: Vol. 2, para 3.8.1, my emphasis).
A five-fold category identified different developmental needs of women
and girls: ‘girl children’ (0–14), adolescent girls (15–18/19), women of repro-
ductive age (15–44), women of economically active age (15–59), and elderly
women (60+). This categorisation constituted adult women primarily as
dependents, reproducers, producers, and dependents once again. In Plan
discourse, elderly women, as a residual category, have only ‘limited needs
mainly relating to health, emotional and financial support’ (ibid: para
3.8.2). Women of reproductive age needed ‘special care and attention’ and
economically active women had ‘different demands’ including for educa-
tion, training, and income generation. Thus, Plan discourse constituted
women as objects of development, defining the basis upon which they are
included in development policy and their relationship with the state, ar-
ticulating how the state sees its responsibility to women in development
planning. It inferred the ‘needs’ of ‘women’ from their demographic status
70 National planning policy
and assumed life cycle, constructing women’s developmental subjectivities
and agency.
Another important absence across plans, particularly in the Eighth Plan,
is any detailed consideration of how caste and other identity markers inter-
act with gender. In the Eighth Plan, this is touched upon but not in depth in
a chapter identifying increased ‘poverty and deprivation’ faced by Sched-
uled Caste (SC) and Scheduled Tribe (ST) women. The Ninth Plan’s more
reductive, homogeneous portrayal of women did not adequately account for
intersectional dynamics amongst women. The Tenth Plan addressed this
more explicitly in its chapter on women.8
Another significant silence is of men as gendered subjects or objects in
development discourse. ‘Men’ as gendered bodies rarely appear in Plan doc-
uments; where they do appear, their gender identity is implied rather than
stated. They appear as subjects defined by their status as workers (farmers,
agricultural labourers, fishermen, etc.), whereas ‘women’ frequently appear
as ‘women’, courtesy of their ‘special’ or ‘weak’ status and sometimes in
spite of their status as workers.9 For example, the Eighth Plan stated,

Animal husbandry is one of the important sub sector[s] of agricultural

economy and plays a significant role in the rural economy by providing
gainful employment particularly to the small/marginal farmers, women
and agricultural landless labourers.
(GoI, 1992: Vol. 2, para 1.8.1, my emphasis)

Plan documents position male subjects as the norm rather than a ­privileged
group, benchmarking the magnitude of women’s ‘lagging’ status and
achievements, for example, in literacy rates, child sex ratios, and work
participation rates. On the one hand, this lends greater visibility to gender
disparities between men and women and a (potential) platform for identi-
fying and addressing discrimination. However, it also inadvertently depicts
women (and other ‘laggers’) as a group ‘dragging down’ overall achieve-
ments in human development, rather than identifying the privileges enjoyed
by demographic groups registering higher human development indicators.
These latter groups – often men compared to women, higher castes com-
pared to lower castes, wealthier classes compared to working classes, and
so on – enjoy greater access to resources and absence of discrimination and
structural inequality (notwithstanding intersectional dynamics which com-
plicate these categories).10 Particularly amongst welfare and social security
Plan discourse, women, along with other marginalised groups such as SCs,
STs, the elderly, the destitute, the disabled, and others, become inscribed as
a deviant, hyper-visible cluster; men are the default subject and (­invisible)
norm of development planning discourse; ‘deviance’ from the norm requires
‘special measures’, ‘special programmes’, and ‘special assistance’. The vis-
ibility or presence of ‘women’ and/or ‘gender’ in Plan documents is thus
not always synonymous with inclusive, sensitivity, or responsiveness, and
 National planning policy 71
invisibility is not always a process of marginalisation but can enable various
forms of privilege to remain unquestioned.

Conclusions
Gendered development discourses articulated in national planning
­discourse have foregrounded women’s development, whilst recognising
different experiences of women and men, and have prescribed affirmative
action for women’s development and empowerment based on their special
category status and a ‘politics of presence’.11 However, this has ensured
continued segregation and compartmentalisation of women’s issues. The
emphasis on gender difference between women and men has also homoge-
nised experiences amongst women and amongst men, limiting opportunities
for a more transformative gender mainstreaming approach. Remnants of
a welfarist approach to women are evident, deemed necessary to address
the failure of growth processes to benefit ‘special’ (read excluded) groups.
But this liberal model of redistribution leaves the main growth model un-
altered, supplemented with a welfarist approach to women. Yet ironically,
women are simultaneously being made increasingly responsible for the
­nation’s development. The Eleventh Plan paid greater attention to the fail-
ures of growth models and their impact on the marginalised. It marked a
return to a statist development discourse, particularly in reference to social
protection, rights-based approaches, and gender justice. Claims to inclu-
sivity promise greater potential opportunities to address socio-economic
inequality, yet invites feminist advocates to be more vigilant of the risk of
co-option and to be cautious of abandoning more progressive alternative
development models.
The government’s shifting discourse evolved in its depiction of women as
development objects and subjects of development, positioning women on a
spectrum of possibilities for agency, ranging from passive recipients to cat-
alytic agents of development. Women were articulated as welfare recipients,
workers and producers, agents, catalysts, participants, and equal partners
of development; as weak, special, disadvantaged, vulnerable, lagging, and
nurturing. Women were located outside different sectoral concerns, deserv-
ing of a separate chapter; depicted as needing protection, recognition, spe-
cial treatment, justice, and empowerment; and sometimes as a homogeneous
category devoid of caste, class, and religious identity. Women comprised
development objects and subjects sometimes by virtue of visibility in the
Plans, compared to the frequent invisibility of men. Whilst a shift towards
empowerment was visible, it was consistent with the government’s liberal-
ising discourse. Furthermore, the shift sometimes occurred in inconsistent
ways, and a welfarist approach continued. Plans tended to foreground an
analysis of women rather than gender. An equality discourse based on gen-
der difference underpinned the construction of women’s poor development
status as well as the prescription of affirmative action strategies.
72 National planning policy
Creating developmental subjectivities for women with enhanced agency
has not been uniformly positive for enabling gender-equitable development
or participative-democratic models of gender mainstreaming. Throughout
the 1990s onwards, the government’s gendered development discourse has
placed increasing emphasis on productivity, entrepreneurship, self-­reliance,
and individual choice. Poor women are now seen as ‘harder working, easier
to mobilise, better credit risks, more selfless because they are concerned
with their entire families and communities, more loyal voters, the best anti-­
corruption vigilantes, and the best agents to uplift their families and com-
munities…’ (Batliwala and Dhanraj, 2004: 12–13). Women’s roles as mothers
are rearticulated in the new social empowerment discourse. ­Targeted im-
provements in women’s education are justified as investments in fertility
control to restrict population growth, a key obsession of national planning.
Women as mothers retain a key role in development discourse, but in a way
which fits uneasily with feminist understandings of empowerment. On the
other hand, multiple significations of women as subjects or objects, agents or
target groups of development, suggest unintended opportunities for agency,
because of the state’s unsuccessful attempt to totalise the field of discur-
sive possibilities on the relationship between women and development. But
whether such possibilities for agency can be realised is an empirical ques-
tion, contingent on context-specific factors.
In the following chapter, we explore selected national initiatives address-
ing gender and development during the period of the Plans discussed here.
What were these initiatives to make planning discourse and development
policy more gender-responsive and what did they seek to achieve? How did
they conceptualise gender and development, the role of the state, and its in-
stitutions? Which actors were involved in and what role did non-government
actors play? What were the outcomes of these initiatives and to what extent
could they be deemed successful?

Notes
1 The National Policy for the Empowerment of Women (hereafter NPEW) was
­released in 2001. This will be discussed only briefly to help contextualise the
Tenth Plan (beginning in 2002). Chapter 4 briefly discusses the agency belatedly
set up to implement the NPEW.
2 Left women’s activism in India, such as campaigns in Tamil Nadu on women’s
working conditions and violence against women, complicates the dominant nar-
rative of early post-Independence as a quiet period for the women’s movement
(Armstrong, 2013: 39).
3 See Mazumdar (2008) for an illuminating account of co-ordinating the T ­ owards
Equality report. She recalls there was added pressure to produce a well-­
researched report, because it would be submitted to the United Nations, and
because then India had a female Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi. Mazumdar’s
account of the difficult and clandestine process of finalising and releasing the
report, aware of its controversial conclusions, illustrates the report’s significance
and the gender politics involved in its production.
 National planning policy 73
4 Two prominent feminist scholar-activists, Lotika Sarkar and Vina Mazumdar,
committee members involved in compiling the report and its underpinning
research, recorded their dissent disagreeing with the report’s decision not to
recommend quotas for women in legislative bodies. They argued, ‘despite pro-
gressive legal changes, the actual condition of the mass of Indian women has not
changed much. The continuing under-representation of women prevents their
proper participation in the decision-making process in the country’ (Sarkar and
Mazumdar, 1999 [1974]: 134). They concluded that minimal change since Inde-
pendence in women’s presence in higher elected bodies ‘is a sufficient indicator
of the reluctance of our society to accept the principle of equal representation
of women’ (ibid: 135). Mazumdar also recalls the process of working on the
report was a shocking experience, revealing differences between urban, middle-­
class educated women, and rural and working-class women (Mazumdar, 2008:
68–69).
5 Despite references to the disabled, elderly, and destitute, the Social Welfare
chapter contains only two sections, on ‘development of women’ and ‘child
development’. The chapter did refer to projects assisting destitute women to
become ‘economically self-sufficient’ and the ‘economic rehabilitation of so-
cially disadvantaged groups of women like devadasis and prostitutes’ (GoI,
1992: Vol. 2, para 15.5.25). Otherwise, the disabled, elderly, and destitute have
been largely excluded. In this hierarchy of exclusion, women and children
are marginally acknowledged by virtue of their perceived current and future
contributions.
6 These chapters include Agricultural and Allied Activities, Rural Development
and Poverty Alleviation, Environment and Forests, Village and Small Indus-
tries and Food Processing Industries, Labour and Labour Welfare, Education,
Culture and Sports, Health and Family Welfare, Urban Development, Hous-
ing, Water Supply and Sanitation, Social Welfare, Welfare and Development
of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, Special Area Development Pro-
grammes, and Science and Technology. There are no references to women in the
remaining six chapters of Irrigation, Command Area Development and Flood
Control, Industry and Minerals, Energy, Transport, Communication, Informa-
tion and Broadcasting, and Plan Implementation and Evaluation.
7 Example chapters in this sector include ‘Health’, ‘Family Welfare’, several
­chapters on education, ‘Youth and Sports’, and ‘Art and Culture’. Women were
situated within ‘human and social development’.
8 In the Eleventh Plan, ‘intersectionality’ is repeatedly acknowledged and SC, ST,
and Muslim women become hyper-visible as more marginalised groups amongst
women. This suggests greater recognition of diversity amongst women but
brings new limitations.
9 An important exception includes the reference to men’s migration from hill a­ reas
and the effects on women as household heads (GoI, 1992: Vol. 2, para 17.4.5).
Another includes a family planning initiative to regulate men’s and women’s fer-
tility. The reader is told this is a ‘new thrust’ but given little detail, appearing
supplementary to core strategies (GoI, 1992: Vol. 2, para 12.5.3 xix).
10 In different contexts, feminist theorists have discussed how policy discourse
emphasising ‘special treatment’ for marginalised groups gives the impression
members of these groups are ‘needy’ and require unending assistance, whilst
obscuring the privileges higher-achieving groups enjoy in the absence of dis-
crimination (Fraser, 1989; Bacchi, 1996).
11 This last aspect, that women need to be present and part of governmental struc-
tures to change them, is consistent with Rai’s (2003c) study of India’s National
Commission for Women.
74 National planning policy
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A View from the Indian Frontline’, IDS Bulletin, 35 (4), pp. 11–18.
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of the First Plan Document on Women’, pp. 211–235 in Uberoi, P. (Ed.) Social
­Reform, Sexuality and the State. London: Sage.
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in India’, New Delhi: Department of Social Welfare, Ministry of Education and
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4 Gender mainstreaming and the
state in India
National initiatives

Introduction
This chapter builds on the previous chapter’s discussion of national p ­ olicy by
exploring selected gender mainstreaming strategies since 1990. O ­ stensibly,
these strategies have been employed to transform the institutional con-
text of national development to make it more gender-responsive. The first
­strategy has targeted and sought to transform specific institutions within
governmental structures deemed ‘gender-blind’ – the Planning Commission
­(‘Engendering the Plans’) and the Ministry of Finance (Gender Budgeting) –
to increase their awareness of gender equality concerns and encourage them
to mainstream a gender-equitable perspective in policy. The second strategy
has been to improve technical competency and awareness of gender-­related
concepts amongst IAS officers (gender training projects for civil servants), to
inculcate a more gender-aware and gender-responsive institutional ­culture.1
A third supportive or complementary strategy has involved building new
institutional spaces and agencies (the National Commission for Women,
the Parliamentary Committee for the Empowerment of Women, and the
­National Mission for the Empowerment of Women) and strengthening and
reorienting existing bodies (the Ministry of Women and Child Develop-
ment, or MWCD), to improve state responsiveness to gender inequities in
development policies and processes (often referred to as ‘national machin-
eries for women’). I begin by briefly discussing the third strategy (national
machinery) to establish the institutional context before exploring the first
and second strategies in more detail.
An examination of each initiative illustrates the extent to which the
­Indian state has attempted to transform its institutional structure, open
up its ­policymaking process, increase its technical competency, modify its
­conceptual perspective, and bring about normative, structural, and attitudi-
nal changes in the Indian bureaucracy ostensibly towards making national
development policy and the state itself more gender-aware and gender-­
responsive. I also discuss observations from these initiatives in terms of the
different forms of agency exercised, paying particular attention to politi-
cal leaders, bureaucrats, and the women’s movement, in determining the
­success or failure of state-led gender mainstreaming strategies.
76 National initiatives in gender mainstreaming
I argue that several gender mainstreaming initiatives have partially suc-
ceeded in transforming prevailing institutional practices, government de-
velopment policymaking, and planning processes. Within government, the
mandate, initiatives, and transformative labour still emanate largely from
the MWCD (at times supplemented by the National Mission for the Em-
powerment of Women), often initially sponsored by international organisa-
tions like UN Women. Both bodies are driven primarily by the persistence
of Indian feminist scholars and activists, directly or through external
pressure. This is consistent with broader trends in state feminist strategies
which recognise the necessity of a dual strategy of national machinery plus
gender mainstreaming, and state actors plus civil society and movement
representatives, the so-called ‘feminist triangles’, ‘velvet triangles’, trian-
gles of empowerment’, or ‘women’s co-operative constellations’ (see Holli,
2008). However, the facilitative labour required to sustain mainstreaming
efforts suggests such initiatives have not yet been successful in institution-
alising a norm of gender-responsiveness throughout national government
institutions. Explanations for this partial success relate to two issues: pos-
sibilities for transformation in the gendered institutional context of state
institutions, and particular mainstreaming strategies and processes. There
are identifiable tensions between the mainstreaming strategies adopted,
some stemming from contradictory conceptualisations of ‘gender’, some
relating to how these strategies translate into institutional initiatives, and
some relating to issues of representation and inclusion in policymaking
processes.

Development of the national machinery for women: supporting

gender mainstreaming?
Three distinct governmental bodies were established or enhanced in the
­period 1990–2007: the establishment of a National Commission for Women
by an Act of Parliament in 1990 and first constituted in 1992, the establish-
ment of the Parliamentary Committee for the Empowerment of Women in
1997, and the promotion of the Department of Women and Child Develop-
ment to Ministry status in 2006. The establishment of the National Mission
for the Empowerment of Women followed later in 2010 to implement the
National Policy on the Empowerment of Women 2001. First, and as dis-
cussed in Chapter 2, the National Commission for Women was established
‘to review the constitutional and legal safeguards for women, recommend
remedial legislative measures, facilitate redressal of grievances and advise
the Government on all policy matters affecting women’ (NCW, cited in Rai,
2003: 231).2 Rai argues the establishment of the Commission was primarily
a result of successful efforts by the women’s movement to pressure the na-
tional government to better represent women’s interests in policy, though
women’s movement actors criticised its design as flawed (Rai, 2003: 228;
see also Arya, 2009). It also reflected an increasing emphasis on national
 National initiatives in gender mainstreaming 77
machineries for women amongst the international women’s movement and
UN bodies beginning in the 1970s and consolidated in the 1980s.
Upon its establishment, the semi-autonomous National Commission for
Women was located within the nodal department for the national machin-
ery for women in India, the Department of Women and Child Development.
This department had itself undergone changes in the 1980s. Prior to 1985,
the Ministry of Social Welfare was charged to deal with ‘women’s issues’,
until that same year the Department for Women and Child Development
was established and subsumed under the Ministry of Human Resource
Development. The Department’s position within the government structure
remained this way until January 2006, when it was promoted to Ministry
status. This enhancement sought to improve the standing of the Ministry,
including status of Cabinet rank for its minister, and its position vis-à-vis
other national ministries.
The national machinery for women was further consolidated in 1997 with
the establishment of a Joint Parliamentary Committee for the Empower-
ment of Women (Rai and Spary, 2019). On International Women’s Day,
8 March 1996, female MPs in the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha simultane-
ously moved resolutions in support of establishing a committee. The Rules
Committee established the terms of reference for the committee and the
first committee was constituted on the 29 April 1997. The first Chairper-
son of the ­committee was Najma Heptullah MP, a high-profile member and
long-serving Deputy Chairperson of the Rajya Sabha, who had moved the
original 1996 resolution in the Rajya Sabha; Pratibha Patil, who later be-
came the first female President of India, moved the resolution in the Lok
Sabha. Though the first mandated task of the committee was to scrutinise
the functioning of the National Commission for Women, its mandate in-
cluded the power to scrutinise government programmes and policies for
women and women’s employment in state institutions and agencies across
all ministries, and could choose other topics to examine.
These three structural organisational developments sought to increase
the visibility and priority given to women’s interests in national-level policy.
They demonstrate an increasing focus on state institutional strategies in the
1980s and 1990s, mirroring international discourse. In themselves they have
been both successful and limited in several ways. Rai (2003) notes the Na-
tional Commission for Women has been limited in resources and legitimacy,
given its low funding and semi-autonomous status, and not always aided by
the government appointment of political party-affiliated Chairpersons. The
Commission’s restricted autonomy was a significant disappointment to the
women’s movement. A journalist at the time of the 1990 Act noted ‘while
giving with one hand, the government is taking away with the other through
the introduction of clauses which will undercut the commission’s auton-
omy by making it heavily dependent on government patronage’ (Sharma,
1990). A related concern was the power of the government to hire and fire
the chairperson (and other members of the commission), which in practice
78 National initiatives in gender mainstreaming
limited independent scrutiny of central and state government practices
(ibid). It also took the government a long time to act; the Towards Equality
committee had recommended the establishment of a statutory and autono-
mous commission for women as long ago as 1976, later reiterated on several
occasions, for example, at a conference for women in 1981 (Times of India,
1981) and then again in the context of the Shramshakti report’s findings in
the 1980s (Sharma, 1990).
The MWCD has a wide-ranging role but is regularly under-resourced; its
budget is dominated by the national Integrated Child Development ­Services
(ICDS) scheme for child development, and limited welfarist schemes for
women. For example, of the more than 8,500 crore rupee actual budget ex-
penditure by the Ministry in 2009–2010, more than 95 percent was spent on
the ICDS programme for child welfare (GoI, 2011: 353–358). The Parliamen-
tary Committee for the Empowerment of Women in its first two terms was
restricted in its operation due to factors beyond its control – the fragility
of minority governments – and it was not until 1999 that it could produce
substantial policy evaluations on a range of issues, the first of which was
the functioning of National and State Commissions for Women. Its role is
mostly one of oversight and scrutiny rather than generating policy or exam-
ining draft legislation. Within the scope of the committee’s selected subjects,
it does, however, provide women’s movement representatives opportunities
to give evidence, and its reports do provide documented insights into the
limitations of government schemes and the extent to which government
­officials are responsive to questioning and recommendations.
The establishment of the National Mission for the Empowerment of
Women was announced on International Women’s Day, 8 March 2010.
The key mandate of the Mission was ‘intersectoral convergence’, as an
institutional strategy to implement the National Policy for the Empow-
erment of Women (2001) announced almost ten years earlier. Initially, it
was convened by the Minister for Women and Child Development and the
Chair of the National Commission for Women was a permanent mem-
ber, as well as ministers from 14 ministries and departments, including the
Finance Minister and Deputy Chair of the Planning Commission. There
were also two spaces for chief ministers to be appointed, to improve the
co-ordination of state-level policies and programmes. These posts would
be rotated to other chief ministers every two years, with the first two from
Andhra Pradesh and Bihar. The panel also included five spaces for civil
society members.
These institutional developments demonstrate the emphasis on establish-
ing and strengthening specific state and parliamentary bodies for gender
equality and empowerment from the 1990s onwards. These bodies have
played varied roles in sustaining momentum on several policy initiatives in
an often-resistant or indifferent institutional context. With respect to devel-
opment policy, the MWCD has managed to transcend its narrow mandate
to further gendered policy concerns across government, acting as a nodal
 National initiatives in gender mainstreaming 79
agency, though not without limitations. This new role has proved important
to the other three mainstreaming initiatives underway in the 1990s and later.

Facilitating external gender expertise in development planning

Increased formal structural presence and visibility for women in national
government as a result of these new, specialised institutional bodies was
gradually supplemented by several initiatives attempting to mainstream
gender concerns across government structures to more broadly transform
public policy. The first, beginning in the mid-1990s, focused on forming ad-
visory groups constituted by external gender experts, particularly Indian
academic scholar-activists, to advise during the preparatory stages of Five-
Year Plans, and increase visibility of gender concerns throughout all areas of
planning rather than just conventional sectors. In August 1995, pre-Beijing,
UN Development Fund for Women (then known as UNIFEM) initiated the
establishment of a Think Tank to work with the Planning Commission to
‘engender’ the Ninth Five-Year Plan. The initiative involved different agen-
cies within the Union government (the Department of Women and Child
Development and the Planning Commission), international development
organisations (UNIFEM and UN Development Programme [UNDP]), and
several scholars and activists including members of a national NGO repre-
senting women’s NGOs from different regions of India (National A ­ lliance
for Women’s Organisations, or NAWO). UNIFEM described the planning
process for the Ninth Five-Year Plan as providing ‘a necessary entry point
for articulating gender concerns in policies and programmes in India’
­(UNIFEM, 2000: 3). The Think Tank identified Five-Year Plans as

…the most critical policymaking instrument. It is the Five-Year Plan,

which sets the development agenda, gives broad directions and defines
priority areas. Therefore, it is essential that the policy documents and
plans reflect the voices, concerns and perspectives of both women and
men. Hence, engendering plans is critical….
(Think Tank, 2006: 1)

The Think Tank understanding of gender was about ‘recognising that women
and men are socialised differently. And, as gender is a macroeconomic
variable, it needs to be incorporated into the growth model’ (Think Tank,
2006: 1).
Prior to this, gender expertise in planning was limited. Ela Bhatt was the
first woman member of the National Planning Commission (Rose, 1992: 267).
She was invited in 1990, with regard to her leadership of the women’s co-­
operative movement, to draft the Employment chapter of the Plan. Bhatt had
served previously on the National Commission on Self-Employed Women
drafting the Shramshakti report. Despite this extensive experience, her inclu-
sion in the Commission was reportedly criticised internally by economists
80 National initiatives in gender mainstreaming
and planning bureaucrats, complaining that her experience was limited to
social work and that her inclusion undermined development planning as a
professional process (Rose, 1992: 268). External actors, on the other hand,
interpreted this as co-option by the government (Rose, 1992: 268).
Criticism of Bhatt’s inclusion in the Commission reflected the constrained
opportunities for feminist advocacy in public policy in India, resulting, in
part, from an expertise bias towards economics and finance – disciplines
which have historically been gender-blind – and an inadequate recognition
of or active devaluation of specialist knowledge and expertise in gender
­(Elson, 1991; Sen, 2000). Whilst senior civil service norms train bureaucrats
as generalists who are recruited young through competitive examination,3
expected to be knowledgeable in a wide range of areas, and are promoted
through years of service, planning agencies often drafted in external exper-
tise and recruited laterally, with officers receiving specialist training and
posted on deputation to, or recruited with previous experience of working
in, international development agencies such as the World Bank. The lack of
gender expertise in these disciplines, combined with the non-recognition of
gender expertise in conventional sectors where women’s empowerment and
development were often located, meant that planning was often a gender-­
blind exercise. Lateral entry into the IAS was less common outside areas
requiring ‘specialist technical expertise’, which restricted opportunities
for gender experts to work ‘in and against’ the state as gender-conscious
bureaucrats. In this context, the government initiative to consult external
gender experts to advise on development planning was a significant step in
recognising the need for such expertise.
The Think Tank originally consisted of seven women members with activ-
ist and academic backgrounds, many nationally renowned for their women’s
movement experience, and representative of a wide regional base. Through
NAWO’s regional network, Think Tank members were able to organise
regional consultations to consult women’s organisations from around the
country on issues of concern to women regarding national development and
their lived realities. A national consultation in Delhi also took place.4 This
consultation process enabled the process to be more participatory than if it
had been based on the expertise of Think Tank members alone.
Some of the main issues that emerged were guaranteeing women’s right to
information; deepening democracy through decentralisation; ensuring the
right to work by introducing employment guarantee schemes throughout the
country; gender sensitisation of all functionaries of government; ­increased
resource allocation for the social sectors; the inclusion of women’s issues
and perspectives in every sectoral plan and programme, not just the Depart-
ment of Women and Child Development; gender analysis and a­ udit of plans,
programmes, and policies; and elimination of violence against women and
girls (UNIFEM, 2000: 9). The issues were subsequently presented to the
Planning Commission for consideration when formulating the Plan doc-
ument. The initiative was repeated for the Tenth and Eleventh Five-Year
 National initiatives in gender mainstreaming 81
Plans, becoming a more institutionalised exercise that allowed for feminist
scrutiny of draft national development plans and planning processes. For
the Eleventh Plan, the Think Tank expanded to 16 members (including all
the original members). It represented a similar mix of feminist scholars and
activists and two former secretaries of the Department of Women and Child
Development. Several participated in successive plan initiatives.5
The Think Tank had mixed success in mainstreaming gender concerns
into the government’s broader development discourse. UNIFEM claimed
several successes, describing it as ‘an orchestrated gender sensitisation of the
planning process’ (2000: 18). Several policy documents referenced ­Beijing,
and the subsequent National Policy for the Empowerment of Women
(a commitment made at Beijing) was seen as an important milestone in the
explicit gender-responsiveness of public policy in India, though as noted
earlier it took almost ten years for the policy to find an institutional home in
the National Mission for the Empowerment of Women. Think Tank mem-
bers and others invited to mainstream gender into development planning
expressed disappointment that Plans had fallen far short of expectations de-
spite consultations. For example, when the Planning Commission released
the Approach Paper to the Eleventh Plan – considered a good indicator of
the flavour of the final Plan – it was met with disappointment. Think Tank
members, along with a working group on ‘Empowerment of Women’ consti-
tuted by the Planning Commission in 2006 and chaired by the secretary of
the MWCD, criticised the Approach Paper (GoI, 2006).
One Think Tank member publicly criticised the Eleventh Plan Approach
Paper for failing to address gender concerns and for overlooking the d ­ ynamic
processes which excluded many from the development process (Hirway,
2006). Hirway acknowledged that ‘India definitely needs faster and more
inclusive growth’ but questioned as to whether the proposed growth strat-
egy in the Approach Paper would ensure it was inclusive (2006: 3464). The
MWCD’s recommendation for the Eleventh Plan was ‘inclusive and inte-
grated policy and strategy for economic, social and political empowerment
of women’, which consistently emphasised the importance of integrated,
holistic, and inclusive policy for the empowerment of women from different
sections of society (GoI, 2006). Subsequent to the release of the Approach
Paper, an MWCD-led Working Group report commented that

Though for the first time, a separate section on `Gender Equity’ was
included in the Draft Approach Paper to the 11th Five Year Plan, the
paper has not given enough focus on women’s empowerment issues in
the country. The strategy for women is confined to three areas - violence
against women, economic empowerment and women’s’ health. There
has been no attempt to understand that empowerment of women has to
be visualized as a holistic integrated approach and not in a piece meal
manner or as water tight compartments.
(GoI, 2006: 11)
82 National initiatives in gender mainstreaming
Through these critiques, we see that whilst external experts did not funda-
mentally dislodge the logic of faster growth as essential for development, as
suggested in the Eleventh Plan Approach Paper (‘sustained and rapid growth
rates are the most effective route to poverty reduction’), they did question
whether the government’s approach would be inclusive, re-emphasising that
such growth needed to be pro-poor and pro-women (GoI, 2006: 20). One
positive outcome of the initiative, however, was the securing of advocacy op-
portunities in planning processes, enabling an informed engagement with
government policymakers and planners, government-commissioned studies
on important areas of concern, and a sense of the government’s heightened
responsibility to be accountable to these advocacy groups, even if progress
in influencing planning outcomes was slow and limited. In March 2007,
Dr. Syeda Hameed of the Planning Commission issued guidelines for the
establishment of a Working Group of Feminist Economists to review, in-
form, and make suggestions for the Eleventh Five-Year Plan from a gender
perspective, across all sectors. The group included several senior feminist
scholars from around the country. This Working Group documented their
contributions to the Eleventh Plan, including itemised examples from each
member where their inputs appeared in the Plan (GoI, 2010).6 Hameed sug-
gests in her foreword that an important achievement was to shift the Plan’s
perspective from social development to one of agency and rights (ibid: iii).
Another success documented elsewhere is the Eleventh Plan’s recognition
that

women and children are not homogeneous categories; they belong to

diverse castes, classes, communities, economic groups, and are located
within a range of geographic and development zones. Consequently,
some groups are more vulnerable than others. Mapping and address-
ing the specific deprivations that arise from these multiple locations is
­essential for the success of planned interventions.
(GoI, 2010: 9)

Have these consultative processes been sustained? The process was ex-
panded for the Twelfth Five-Year Plan Approach Paper to include contri-
butions from beyond the smaller panel of feminist academics. In ­November
2010, Planning Commission member Dr. Syeeda Hameed opened the
­consultation to a broader range of civil society organisations and gender
‘experts’. Hameed submitted a query through the UN-co-ordinated plat-
form Solution Exchange, which, based around a moderated mailing list, was
a virtual knowledge-sharing forum, with a large number of subscribers from
the development sector from across the country. Hameed explained how for
the previous Plan, a committee of feminist economists were convened and
invited to comment on the plan from a gender-analytical perspective, and
asked Solution Exchange members to build on this initiative for the Twelfth
Plan. She invited members to apply a gender lens to all 12 identified key
 National initiatives in gender mainstreaming 83
challenges. Though these challenges were wide ranging, responses had to
offer gendered analyses within these already identified categories. However,
Hameed did invite suggestions for issues not covered by the 12 challenges
identified. A consolidated reply was compiled and circulated, which detailed
the 71 replies received from 17 states around the country,7 plus one from
the United Kingdom. The profile of individuals and organisations included
academics, NGO and INGO staff, religious organisations, freelancers and
consultants, former bureaucrats, staff from current government schemes
and state-level government institutes and parastatal organisations, lawyers,
and women’s movement activists. Whether these responses informed the
final content of the Twelfth Plan is a different question which cannot be
addressed here, but the consultation process effectively continued and drew
in a wider range of contributions to supplement the ‘expert body’. It also
tried to address geographical constraints using a virtual forum, though ad-
mittedly this still restricted participation via membership of the forum and
basic Internet connectivity.

Gender budgeting
In a similar effort to the Think Tank consultations, gender budgeting initi-
atives since 2000 have sought to transform how public finance is allocated
and also scrutinise and evaluate the gendered impact of various public pol-
icies on women and men. Such initiatives are based on the recognition that
the conventional state institutional processes and practices of formulating
budgets are gender-blind. They address a key concern that extensive rhet-
oric supporting gender-responsive policies is rarely matched by sufficient
resources, either for programmes or institutional bodies.
Gender budgeting in India represented another collaborative effort, in-
volving government, non-governmental, and international agencies. The
­Department of Women and Child Development and the Finance M ­ inistry
were the key governmental agencies, with the Finance Ministry playing an
unfamiliar role in championing gender mainstreaming. Beyond the i­ nitiative’s
preliminary development phase, the hub of gender budgeting was located
in the Finance Ministry rather than the Department of Women and Child
Development, but the latter retained a key co-ordinating role.8 ­UNIFEM
played a significant role in promoting and facilitating the adoption, training,
and implementation of gender budgeting in India. The National Institute
for Public Finance and Policy (NIPFP), the government’s foremost think
tank on public finance and policy, was commissioned to develop conceptual
and methodological tools for implementing gender budgeting in India and
to undertake a gender analysis of Union budgets. Leading the project for
NIPFP was then-Director Dr Ashok K. Lahiri, who later became the Chief
Economic Advisor to the government, supported by Dr Lekha Chakraborty,
a senior economist at NIPFP, and P.N. Bhattacharyya, a former budget
­finance ­officer for the Government of India and a consultant at NIPFP.
84 National initiatives in gender mainstreaming
Despite being one of the government’s most recent gender mainstream-
ing initiatives, the terminology and practice of ‘gender budgeting’ achieved
a relatively high profile in bureaucratic circles.9 Following a UNIFEM-­
sponsored workshop in Delhi in July 2000, ‘gender budgeting’ appeared
in several key government documents. The first of NIPFP’s commissioned
studies formed the basis of a new section on gender inequality in the social
sector chapter of the Government of India’s ‘Economic Survey 2000–2001’,
a flagship annual survey produced by the Finance Ministry (GoI, 2002).
The second study by the NIPFP was a gender budget analysis of the Union
Budget for 2001–2002, the findings of which were discussed in two follow-up
workshops in October and December 2001. Gender budgeting was also in-
cluded in the National Policy for the Empowerment of Women (2001) as one
of the strategies recommended for resource management in implementing
the policy. The 2001–2002 Annual Report of the Department of Women and
Child Development included for the first time a chapter on gender budget-
ing (GoI, 2002). The Department also undertook gender budget analyses
of the Union Budgets for the years 2002–2003 and 2003–2004. Meanwhile,
institutional mechanisms for gender budgeting were established in several
central government departments as Gender Focal Points. Ministries and
Departments were directed by the Cabinet Secretary to include in their
Annual Reports a chapter identifying gender issues, initiatives, and alloca-
tions for each department.
The gender budgeting initiative retained momentum despite the change of
government in 2004. The Department of Women and Child Development per-
sisted with gender budgeting and it was mentioned in the Union Budget Speech
2004 for the first time, when the new Finance Minister, P. ­Chidambaram,
made his first speech of the new government. He acknowledged the concerns
of women’s groups regarding gender budgeting and promised to review the
recommendations of an expert group (­Chidambaram, 2004). Gender budg-
eting again received a mention the following year in 2005, recognising that
important progress had been made but only a beginning, and communicated
to other departments that they would also be required to undertake gender
budget exercises (Chidambaram, 2005).
How did gender budgeting achieve this level of attention? A combination
of reasons are the most plausible: the involvement of the Finance Minis-
try and its relative importance in the bureaucratic hierarchy, a ­‘strategic
framing’ of twin concerns of equity and efficiency in its conceptual lan-
guage, and continuity with or moderation of past policy. First, the Finance
Ministry’s engagement with the gender budgeting initiative prima facie
represented a coup for feminist economists and feminist organisations in-
terested in ­gender-responsive macroeconomic policy. Locating gender
mainstreaming initiatives within Finance Ministries means initiatives are
more likely to carry influence ‘because of the central and powerful role of
the Finance Ministry in current structural reform processes’ and because
of their higher relative status in relation to other government departments,
 National initiatives in gender mainstreaming 85
their expertise, their macroeconomic focus, and the support they can then
provide to less powerful ministries (Sen, 2000: 1388).10 The Department of
Women and Child Development acknowledged that ‘the lead taken by the
Ministry of Finance has also lent strength to the Department’s efforts’ (GoI,
2005: para 6.13).11 It forced the Finance Ministry to directly engage with
gender ­mainstreaming, which Finance Ministries often avoid (Sen, 2000:
1379) and enabled expertise on public finance and budgets to be combined
with gender expertise, making public finance processes more accessible for
non-­economist gender experts and bureaucrats, further enabling informed
scrutiny of government budgets (Sen, 2000: 1380). It also enabled Finance
Ministry officials to be exposed to gender analyses of public finance inform-
ing their more technocratic perspectives.
The positive influence of the Finance Ministry’s involvement has not come
without trade-offs related to the strategic framing of the initiative. Both
concerns of equity and efficiency were deployed as rationales to persuade
the government to adopt gender budgeting practices. Gender budgeting em-
braced equity as a central concern, but the rationale was also articulated in
a way that made economic sense to policymakers who may otherwise be un-
concerned with equity issues – the so-called ‘business case’ for gender equal-
ity. The efficiency rationale asserts that gender-blind policies and budgets
will be badly targeted and thus wasteful; on the contrary, gender-sensitive
budgets and policies would be better targeted and more efficient. Therefore,
gender budgeting was appealing as it would not necessarily require more
budgetary allocation, but a more efficient distribution, or a ‘reprioritisation
rather than an increase in overall public expenditure and, in particular, the
reorientation of programmes within sectors rather than changes in the over-
all amounts allocated to particular sectors’ (Lahiri et al., 2005). This was
consistent with the government’s ongoing fiscal reforms as part of a broader
neo-liberal restructuring of the state’s role in development planning.
Official policy statements on gender budgeting also justified the govern-
ment’s initiative by referring to international efforts to mainstream gen-
der in macroeconomic planning such as those related to Beijing and other
United Nations and international fora, as well as initiatives in national
contexts such as Australia (1984), South Africa (1995), and 35 other coun-
tries including members of the Commonwealth (GoI, 2002: para 11.1.3). At
the same time, policy statements claimed that many of the principles of
gender budgeting were not alien to the Indian context: statements linked
gender budgeting and previous schemes such as the Women’s Component
Plan, arguing that the same or similar ideas have surfaced in different ways
in the past (extract from the Seventh Five-Year Plan cited in GoI, 2005). In
this way, gender budgeting was presented not as a foreign or completely new
concept, but as a re-articulation and evolution of the policies preceding it.
However, this linking with past government policy (especially the ­Women’s
Component Plan) has caused some conceptual confusion with ­gender
­budgeting. The Department of Women and Child Development made clear
86 National initiatives in gender mainstreaming
the break from the previous Women’s Component Plan approach when it
defined gender budgeting and outlined its main objectives:

Gender Budgeting is not a separate budget for women; rather it is a

­ issection of the government budget to establish its gender-differential
d
impacts and to translate gender commitments into budgetary commit-
ments. The main objective of a gender-sensitive budget is to improve the
analysis of incidence of budgets, attain more effective targeting of pub-
lic expenditure and offset any undesirable gender-specific consequences
of previous budgetary measures.
(GoI, 2002: para 11.1.1, my emphasis)

The concept of gender budgeting, they argued, extended beyond the iden-
tification of budgetary allocations in Union and State Budgets for women
in a few so-called ‘women-specific’ and ‘women-related’ sectors to encom-
pass a wider range of public and fiscal policy instruments and sectors (GoI,
2005: para 6.3). This approach was underpinned by a commitment to gender
mainstreaming which extended beyond the social sector. The Department of
Women and Child Development’s Annual Report 2004–2005 stated,

…there is a perceived need for a broader perspective under the concept

of gender budgeting - Gender Mainstreaming. The gender perspective
on Public Expenditure and Policy is no longer restricted to the realm
of social sector departments like Education, Health, Rural Develop-
ment etc. All areas of public expenditure, Revenue and Policy need to
be viewed with a gender perspective… [I]t is not adequate to analyze in
detail, allocation of resources for a few sectors of the economy which are
traditionally considered as women related. The analysis has to cover every
rupee of public expenditure. It has to cover the way schemes are conceptu-
alized and how women friendly they are in implementation and targeting of
beneficiaries. It has to embrace a gender sensitive analysis of monetary
policies, covering impact of indicators like inflation, interest rates etc.
and fiscal policies covering taxation, excise etc. Thus gender budgeting
analysis has to go hand in hand with gender mainstreaming.
(GoI, 2005: para 6.5a, my emphasis)

The Department was not naïve as to the implications of this new approach –
it represented a ‘mammoth task’ (ibid). On a more positive note, the gen-
der budgeting initiative has given impetus to a potentially more radical
­development – changes in how women and men’s paid and unpaid labour,
including in the care economy, is measured and recorded in the system of
national accounts. This has potential to change the ways in which women
are seen to contribute to the national economy, including a revalorisation of
unpaid labour. For example, with regard to the gender budgeting initiative,
the ­Department of Women and Child Development asserted
 National initiatives in gender mainstreaming 87
It is necessary to recognize that women are equal players in the economy
whether they participate directly as workers or indirectly as members of
the care economy. To that extent, every policy of the Government fiscal,
monetary or trade, has a direct impact on the well being of women.
(GoI, 2005: 6.5a)

At the same time, gender budgeting exercises are limited in only seeking
to recognise rather than transform gendered inequalities. Gender budgeting
approaches present men and women as two sets of economic actors, with
different preferences and affected by different incentives by virtue of their
different socio-economic roles and structural locations in both paid and
unpaid economies. As a result, both men and women are affected by and
respond to budgetary policies differently (Lahiri et al., 2005: 2). In achieving
recognition of these differences, there is also a danger that these differences
become essentialised and entrenched. A reductive essentialism may also ex-
clude other different dynamics amongst men and amongst women, accord-
ing to class, caste, religion, and region, which also affect and interact with
gendered inequalities. It is also highly heteronormative and assumes that
persons can be divided into binary genders (Mishra and Sinha, 2012: 53).
This contradicts recent developments in public policy, such as recognising
transgender and intersex persons as citizens, voters, electoral candidates,
and elected representatives. These dynamics affect the ability of all to par-
ticipate in market and non-market activities, and to respond to and benefit
from, or be adversely affected by, public policy.
In this sense, gender budgeting in India still has a long way to go. D­ espite
continued efforts, it has been a struggle to gain acceptance within the
­bureaucracy that these concerns should be part of government policymak-
ing practice, though some departments have made more progress than oth-
ers. Beyond conceptual difficulties, it also seems to be the case that gender
budgeting practices within government departments are still influenced by
the narrow allocative concerns of the previous Women’s Component Plan
approach, and as a result are concentrated in social sector departments
where ‘women’ beneficiaries of government schemes are easily identifiable.
But as two former UN Women South Asia officials noted, even in cases
where the allocation is provided, ‘the question that escapes scrutiny is
whether these allocations, in any way, seek to redress gender imbalances…
Does this expenditure then promote women’s empowerment or gender
­inequality in any way?’ (Mishra and Sinha, 2012: 52). They argue that, ac-
cording to this logic, conversely, a gender sensitisation training programme
for male officers would presumably not be counted, despite the fact it is de-
signed to address gender inequality (ibid). And even in departments where
women are often the main target beneficiary, this does not always guarantee
identification of allocation – according to one study, the 2007–2008 Budget
made no separate allocation for implementing the Domestic Violence Act
of 2005 (Patel, 2007: 16).
88 National initiatives in gender mainstreaming
It has been harder to convince departments that do not have women as a
target beneficiary of their policies that gender is a relevant concern for their
policymaking process. The 2007–2008 Budget of the Government of India
was criticised for not mentioning women in the chapter on Water Supply
and Sanitation, despite being both consumers and suppliers of water to the
household (Patel, 2007: 16). This author witnessed a different episode where
one government official was unaware how a gender analysis could be con-
ducted on export policy and thus deemed it irrelevant to their particular
ministry (author’s fieldnotes). Mishra and Sinha’s suggestion for such minis-
tries is not to dismiss its relevance because budgetary allocations cannot be
easily divided by gendered ‘beneficiary’ identities, by gendered bodies, but
to ask how they can make their own policy more gender-responsive (Mishra
and Sinha, 2012: 53).
In part this might be attributed to limited progress on establishing Gen-
der Budget Cells across ministries of the central government. In some min-
istries, they had not been established and in others they existed on p ­ aper
only. The parliamentary committee examining gender budgeting initiatives
suggested improving inter-ministerial co-ordination; in its reply to the com-
mittee, the Department of Women and Child Development said this had
been done with the establishment of an inter-ministerial institutional co-­
ordinating mechanism led by the Ministry of Finance with the Secretary of
Women and Child Development as a Member. Yet, more than seven years
later, one study suggested this Gender Budgeting Directorate was yet to be
established (Mishra and Sinha, 2012: fn. 11).
There has also not been insufficient commitment to broader gender
­auditing concerns (Mishra and Sinha, 2012). Questions have been raised,
­including by those within government, as to what use is an increase in
­allocation for specific gender-responsive schemes if macroeconomic gov-
ernment policy exacerbates gender inequalities in poverty and other
forms of deprivation (Goyal, 2005). Similarly, the parliamentary commit-
tee ­examining gender budgeting noted the Secretary of Women and Child
­Development had written to the Ministry of Finance and the Planning
Commission asking them to consider the adverse gendered consequences of
policy instruments to reduce the government’s debt burden (Rajya Sabha,
2005b: para 6.1).

Gender mainstreaming and internal norm change in the

civil service
So far, the initiatives discussed have sought to transform particular aspects
of public policymaking such as planning and budgeting and have drawn on
specialist, often external, expertise to inform policy. Since the mid-1990s,
­attempts have also been made to transform the institutional norms of the sen-
ior civil service more broadly and to develop awareness and competency in
 National initiatives in gender mainstreaming 89
gender concepts and concerns through formal training, to change the broader
institutional culture and improve the gender-responsiveness of policy.

Gendered institutional norms

Post-Independence India inherited the ‘steel frame’ of the colonial ICS,
with dominant codes reflecting its class-based and gender-based profile:
­m iddle-class, ‘gentlemanly’, public service-oriented, with a sense of superi-
ority, and a detached and generalist approach to governance (Potter, 1986:
233; Mars, 1974: 323, 344; Shrimali, 1960, quoted in Mars, 1974: 324). The
IAS has remained a predominantly urban, middle-class, male-dominated
institution. As of 2015, the IAS was made up of 83 percent male officers and
17 percent female officers.12 In part, this aggregate figure reflects the histori-
cally lower intake of women IAS officers. However, in recent years, the entry
of women IAS officers has fluctuated, from 12 percent in 2005 to 32 percent
in 2010, falling again to 16 percent the following year, and then rising again
to more than 30 percent for three consecutive years (2013, 2014, and 2015;
discussed below).13
Institutionalised gender inequalities in the IAS are reflected in historical
and contemporary civil service rules and norms. India’s new constitution
at Independence gave women the right to equal employment opportuni-
ties in government employment (Article 16, quoted in Thakur, c.1997: 14).14
However, the 1954 IAS Recruitment Rules stipulated that no married
woman could be appointed to the service. Furthermore, a women officer
who ­subsequently married would be asked to resign if her role as wife was
deemed to interfere with her role as officer (Thakur, c.1997: 15). Whilst this
rule was deleted in 1972, the implicit assumption remained that for women,
‘family and domestic commitments are solely a woman’s responsibility…The
career is viewed as an adjunct or supplementary activity to the responsibil-
ity of family commitments’ (Thakur, c.1997: 15). Similarly, Thakur’s study
of gender norms in the civil service noted

spouses of male officers are almost automatically considered to be

extensions of their husbands, [but] for female officers if their spouses
do not share the same career there is often a sharp division between
activities on the home front and in office. This impacts on the nature
of informal networks, placing constraints on women officers’ informal
social interactions and opportunities to build rapport with more senior
colleagues.
(c.1997: 27)

Some women officers believed these practices denied them the same career
opportunities as their male colleagues (Thakur, c.1997: 27). This may ex-
plain why female officers are more likely than male officers to marry within
90 National initiatives in gender mainstreaming
the service (Benbabaali, 2008). Thus, official and unofficial gendered norms
work to position men officers as the norm and women officers as outsiders,
or ‘space invaders’ (Puwar, 2004), in the civil service.
Thakur’s survey of IAS officers revealed a sense amongst female officers
that their performance is judged based on gendered assumptions and that
both success and failure is attributed to being a woman:

… The slightest slip up on your part is immediately attributed to your

being a woman. If you are successful it is because you have taken undue
advantage of being a lady; if you are bad it was to be expected.
(quoted in Thakur, c.1997: 25)

Sexual harassment was considered more of a problem in the IAS by female

officer respondents, than men: less than 10 percent of male respondents saw
it as being a problem compared to more than one-fifth of female respond-
ents (Thakur, c.1997: 21–22).
Bureaucratic postings also reveal gendered patterns, with men in field
postings and women concentrated in social sector postings, especially
‘Women and Child’ or ‘Social Welfare’ but also Health, Rural Development
and Education and sometimes Personnel (Thakur, c.1997: 18, 20).15 In con-
trast, male officers remarked that female officers benefitted from ‘comfort-
able’ and ‘safe’ postings compared to some dangerous postings assigned
to male officers. Finance, however, is a male domain with female officers
­assumed to be less capable in this sector. A senior officer observed,

even within social sectors, posts concerned with ‘economic and fi

­ nancial’
principles are viewed as male preserves, as if women cannot master such
subjects unless they are financial advisers with accounts backgrounds.
If at all women get an opportunity to work in male preserves they are
given personnel, housekeeping, and co-ordination jobs and invariably
asked whether they have science and maths qualifications. This is a
question rarely put to a male.
(Thakur, c.1997: 18).

The presence of international donors in social sectors has impacted the way
bureaucrats view social sector postings, however, due to perquisites such
as foreign travel and deputation to international organisations (Das, 2005).
This has increased interest of male officers (Thakur, c1997: 21). One senior
bureaucrat remarked,

in the normal scheme of things the Women and Child Ministry is looked
down upon, it’s viewed as a woman’s Ministry, though there are very
competent men who have worked there. Men have become more inter-
ested in working there…when perks are available…[T]hey’d love to work
on the seat which has UNICEF, or which is linked with UNIFEM, as
 National initiatives in gender mainstreaming 91
there may be foreign travel involved. They wouldn’t like to work on pro-
grams in the field. I mean they’re not really enamoured by it… The com-
mon perception is that people who are in the economics ministries or
commerce ministries are highly successful… [N]o careerist man would
necessarily want to be in Women and Child.
(interview, February 2007)

Thus, the bureaucracy reflects and reproduces entrenched gendered divi-

sions of labour and unequal gender relations in broader social institutions
(Thakur, c.1997: 32). Planning, finance, and economic affairs as policy do-
mains are equated with male officers and gender concerns with social sectors
and female officers. To what extent does this gendered division of labour in
postings impact the content of public policy? Might increasing the presence
of female officers in conventionally male-dominated areas (and overall) cre-
ate a more conducive institutional culture for mainstreaming concerns of
gender equity into conventional and unconventional policy sectors? Have
such reforms been attempted and with what results? To what extent is the
IAS open to change, particularly in relation to its gendered institutional
culture?
Studies of the IAS argue it has been consistently resistant to fundamental
reforms, notwithstanding some minor adjustment in the 1990s as a result of
liberalisation (Potter, 1986, 1996; Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987; Weiner, 2002;
Das, 2005). The IAS has also become somewhat more inclusive of margin-
alised communities as a result of reservations in government employment,
but as Weiner argues, the latter has ‘apparently done little to reduce the
enormous social and economic disparities that persist in India’s hierarchi-
cal and inegalitarian social order’ and has had little effect on public policy,
redistribution and an increase in public expenditure to benefit lower castes
(2002: 212–213).
Successive administrative reforms have rarely been explicitly concerned
with gender inclusiveness within the service, dominated instead by dis-
cussions over general remuneration, increasing the specialisation of civil
servants, improving accountability, transparency and ‘good governance’,
curbing corruption, and streamlining the bureaucracy to increase admin-
istrative efficiency. Of the 15 reports released by the Second Administrative
Reforms Commission 2005, recruitment is the focus of a whole chapter of
the tenth report on reforming personnel administration, but the low pres-
ence of women in the IAS is not mentioned as a concern (GoI, 2008).16 The
twelfth report on Citizen Centric Administration acknowledged the need for
greater responsiveness to women citizens but did not link this to the IAS’s
gendered institutional culture. The report of the Committee on Civil Service
Reforms17 restricted its comments to women’s low numbers in the higher
civil service and recommended preferential policies to enable increased re-
cruitment. The aim was to double the proportion of women in the higher
civil service to at least 25 percent in the next 15 years from 12 to 13 percent
92 National initiatives in gender mainstreaming
(GoI, 2004: 80). The report attributed the problem of women’s low presence
to the gendered division of labour outside the service, which made it difficult
for women to perform official duties. It provided no further detail to explain
why ‘domestic responsibilities’ only affected female not male officers:

In our country women are meritorious enough to come in larger ­number

into the higher civil service but they do not feel encouraged to join
the service as they have to balance their roles as wives and mothers
with highly demanding roles as civil servants. Higher civil service –
­particularly the All India Services and some other Central Services
which have field duties – makes a lot of demand on the time of officers
and women officers often find it difficult to apportion time to official
work at the expense of their domestic responsibilities.
(GoI, 2004: 79)

The report suggested reservation was not a favoured strategy amongst

women officers themselves for increasing the recruitment of women to the
IAS: ‘Women officers of the higher civil service have pointed out that they
do not want either any reservation of posts for them or any other conces-
sions to join the civil service in larger number’ (GoI, 2004: 79).
Previous governments have also rejected discrimination in civil service
recruitment practices as a reason for women’s low numbers. In a response
to a parliamentary question in 2005, the Minister of State for Personnel,
Suresh Pachouri, rejected the possibility that such low numbers was a result
of discrimination. The Minister referred to the constitutional provision of
equal opportunities for women and men in government employment, sug-
gesting that this provision was adequate. The Minister attributed the low
number of women in government employment to ‘various social, economic
and cultural factors’ (Rajya Sabha, 2005a) without specifying what these
factors were or the reason why they might result in low numbers of women
in government employment.
However, the year prior, the Hota Committee recommended preferen-
tial policies to increase women officers’ entitlements to paid leave from the
current entitlement of 135 days paid maternity leave, which the Commit-
tee deemed ‘not at all adequate to enable women in the higher civil service
to play their roles effectively as mothers and wives’ (GoI, 2004: 79). The
Committee recommended increasing this to four years’ paid leave, over and
above that already provided under service rules, to ‘enable them to balance
their roles as officers with their roles as mothers/housewives’ (GoI, 2004:
104). Subsequently, the government responded to a parliamentary question
asking what efforts the government had made to address the low numbers
of women in central government service, and responded that text encour-
aging women to apply would be added to government recruitment adver-
tisements with the message that the government aims for a gender-balanced
workforce (Lok Sabha, 2009). Women would also be exempt from the civil
 National initiatives in gender mainstreaming 93
service examination fee (ibid). Several years later, newspapers reported that
the UPSC issued a notice encouraging women to apply for the civil services
examination (Indian Express, 2015; Deccan Chronicle, 2016).
Women officers’ rejection of reservations for women is not surprising,
given the dominance of liberal norms of merit through competitive recruit-
ment. A senior female bureaucrat explained,

there’s a lot of resistance… women who are just got into the civil service
resist tremendously. And the reason they resist, which is understand-
able,… people who have just come in on their merit, it’s like doing an
exam, [an individual] gets into the civil service because she’s a bright
student… So she doesn’t like to hear [about quotas].
(interview, February 2007)

Why have All India Services been able to defend the institutional norm of
merit against recruitment policies underpinned by special treatment on
the grounds of gender but not caste?18 One possibility is the background of
women who enter the service. Another question is whether women have ac-
cess to recruitment opportunities through caste reservations in the absence
of reservations for women.
Even in central government service, reservation has not been adopted to
increase numbers of women in government service. Instead, several state
governments have reserved government jobs for women, but these have been
restricted to lower levels of the public sector. State governments have no
authority to implement reservation for women in the All India Service (dis-
cussed in Chapter 6). The implications of this bureaucratic resistance do
not bode well for feminist transformative strategies. The higher intake of
women into the IAS in recent years is encouraging, but these women (and
men) enter, and are socialised into, a gendered institutional environment.
The IAS has, however, made attempts to improve awareness amongst civil
service officers on the relevance of gender for public policy.

Gender training in the civil service: developing gender-

responsiveness, changing institutional culture?
In 1993, a three-year collaborative civil service training project was set in
motion as a concerted attempt to ‘establish gender issues as a priority con-
cern in development initiatives’ (GoI and British Council, 1996: 1). A key
outcome of the project was the development of a ‘national gender train-
ing resource’. It served as a precursor to a larger capacity-building project
of the Department of Personnel and Training (GOI) and UNDP, tasked
with civil service administrative reform. The Gender Planning Training
Project was an international collaboration between the governments of In-
dia and the United Kingdom, involving the Department of Personnel and
Training (GOI), the British Council Division in New Delhi (on behalf of
94 National initiatives in gender mainstreaming
DFID, then named the Overseas Development Administration), the Insti-
tute of ­Development Studies (IDS) in Sussex, UK, the Lal Bahadur Shastri
­National Academy of Administration (India’s premier civil service training
institute), and five participating states (Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh,
Maharashtra, Karnataka, and Rajasthan). The project adopted the analyt-
ical framework of an IDS course on women, men, and development and
adapted it for the Indian context (GoI and British Council, 1996: 1). This
framework underpinned the development of ten gender training modules
and their application for gender training in policy analysis and the planning
process.19 Evaluation feedback suggested some success. There were also
signs of early success in application and coverage amongst the participat-
ing states involved – individual thematic modules had been adapted and
delivered as standalone modules. Institutionalisation of the project was a
key issue for sustainability (GoI and British Council, 1996: 5). As the des-
ignated lead training institute, LBS National Academy of Administration
(LBSNAA) established a National Centre for Gender Training, Planning
and Research within the academy in 1998.
By 2003, LBSNAA proposed changing the approach to delivering gender
training to civil service officers and emphasised mainstreaming gender issues
in development policy and planning. They recognised that

in order to give gender issues the necessary attention there is a felt

need to shift the focus from running “stand alone modules” on gender-­
specific topics, to integration of gender issues into the existing syllabi
and ­curriculum of the Academy, which is developed for the Officer
Trainees.
(LBSNAA, 2003: 1–2)

The proposal for the new format not only retained the analytical gender
relations framework from the earlier (GPTP) phase but also reiterated the
need to ‘focus on gender rather than women…, [which] implies not look-
ing at ‘women’ and ‘women’s issues’ in isolation’ (LBSNAA, 2003: 3). This
shift in focus required a consideration of both women’s and men’s concerns
and experiences, which ‘recognize[d] the different needs of women and men’
(LBSNAA, 2003: 3). It also suggested that mainstreaming gender in the
training curriculum would contribute towards ‘good governance’. Other key
objectives included gender sensitisation of officers and trainees, familiarity
with the rights-based approach to development, and training on the recently
adopted strategy of gender budgeting as part of gender-responsive planning.
Consequently, gender training became formally institutionalised into
state bureaucratic structures at the All India Services level. Gender training
in the bureaucracy is important, given that, in India, the femocrat s­ trategy –
the lateral entry of gender experts – has not represented much of an option
for Indian feminist advocates, though important exceptions exist. Senior
­Indian civil service norms emphasise generalism and promotion by seniority
 National initiatives in gender mainstreaming 95
more than performance, meaning that for a considerable time, specialist
e­ xpertise was rarely introduced via lateral entry; few experts were recruited
from external bodies to work in government ministries at levels directly in-
fluencing public policymaking. The exception was in finance, planning, and
economics where this took place (see Chapter 2). Introducing gender train-
ing in induction training and across the service is an effort to mainstream
gender awareness and provide relevant expertise and tools for public policy
analysis. However, this depends on the training reaching b ­ eyond the ‘gender
person’ within departments and ministries, limiting the institutionalisation
of awareness, especially when individuals are transferred to new postings, as
in the case of gender budget cells and gender budgeting initiatives (Mishra
and Sinha, 2012: 55).
Furthermore, initial feminist consciousness and gender awareness may
become diluted over time with bureaucrats becoming institutionalised into
IAS culture instead. As C.K. Gariyali, a senior woman IAS officer from
­Tamil Nadu stated, ‘I lost my gender consciousness long ago. But I have
been able to help many women who are deprived and oppressed through my
job’ (quoted in Santhanam, 2005). The implications for changing the ‘rules
of the game’ once in service, considered central to a feminist strategy of
transformation, are thus limited: if seniority in the IAS is determined by the
number of years in service, it makes it all the more difficult for ‘femocrats’ to
sustain such a strategy of resistance over time in the face of a routinisation
and institutionalisation of gendered bureaucratic norms and practices.
These arrangements provide little opportunity to feminists to work i­ nside
the state as bureaucrats to further an agenda of gender equality within state
policies and practices. Nevertheless, institutional resistance to feminist-­
minded bureaucrats does not discount the possibility that through expo-
sure to issues of gender equality and women’s empowerment in particular
postings or ad hoc career training, individual officers, men and women, will
become interested in these issues (explored in a later chapter). For example,
in the case of gender budgeting, a government-wide requirement to report
gender-differentiated allocations and provisions of budgets, policies, and
programmes, might stimulate further thought and reflection on the impacts
of that Ministry’s policies on women and on gender equality (Mishra and
Sinha, 2012: 51).
Thus, opportunities for institutionalising organisational learning requir-
ing further research for deeper understanding. Training policy to sensitise re-
cruits to the importance of gender-equitable development issues is a positive
development. But the effectiveness of gender training is unclear and requires
sustained analysis. First, has this new gender awareness yet translated into
gender-responsive policy (and is it a naïve assumption that it would)? Sec-
ond, has the impetus for gender training been sustained beyond the National
Academy at Mussoorie in government departments and state-level training
institutes, some of whom were involved in the original training project? Has
gender training become embedded, institutionalised, within bureaucratic
96 National initiatives in gender mainstreaming
norms and practice? As a former official suggested, what kind of time lag
should we expect, between training and seniority before the fruits of training
become visible in policy and practice? Third, should we anticipate limits to
gender sensitisation? Finally, can changes to gender norms in the IAS effect
broader societal changes in gender relations, particularly the urban middle
class, or will societal change precede and drive institutional change in the IAS
towards a more gender-responsive institutional culture?

Subject, objects, and agents of national development

Whose participation determines the success or failure of gender ­mainstreaming
initiatives? Not surprisingly, political leadership matters for gender main-
streaming. Feminists engaging the state face different ­opportunities depend-
ing on which party is in power. As one feminist former government adviser
explained,

Government has many faces, the government has many forms, and
whether we like it or not, it depends a lot on who is in power. For in-
stance, when the right-wing BJP-kind of parties in power, you find that
there is almost no space for women at all… [M]aybe that’s the nature of
their politics. Similarly when you look at the extreme Left parties like
CPI(M) in West Bengal, even there they don’t like to talk about women’s
issues as women’s issues… [W]hen you look back at the whole tradition
of communist parties across the world, this has been a big issue… [T]
here is a lot of resistance in some political parties to be able to engage
with women. On the other hand most of the centrist kind of groups
which have come to power at different points of time, seem to be want-
ing to use the women’s constituency a lot more than maybe people who
are on the extreme right or extreme left. So I think… in India it depends
a lot on who is in power, and what the equations are, and how we are
able to pressurise or mediate at any given point in time.
(interview, December 2007)

Engaging with political parties in government is not straightforward, but

surprising gains can be made in seemingly hostile contexts. A former of-
ficial of the MWCD explained that despite the particular ideological
­considerations of the governing political party, this did not preclude policy
developments in relation to the National Policy for the Empowerment of
Women (2001):

…we had a pushing minister who wanted to get it through, we got it

through even though he was from the BJP, [there was] a lot of support
from him and a lot of resistance at various levels from other ministries
but yes we did get that through
(interview, February 2007).
 National initiatives in gender mainstreaming 97
As noted, both specialisation and gender-sensitisation of bureaucrats are
important for gender mainstreaming. One feminist government advisor sug-
gested that slowly the need for specialists in women’s development to work
within government is being recognised but that it needs to be done more,
something which has been happening in other sectors for a while:

[I]f you look at the economic advisors that the government has had,
very senior economic advisors, most of them are people that have been
in and out of universities, research institutions, World Bank, and things
like that. But when it came to social sector programmes, this was not
a practice, because somehow there was a feeling that you don’t need
somebody with any kind of specialisation to work on these issues, any-
one, any woman with sensitivity can do it. And then suddenly there was
a realisation that ‘No I think it’s important to get people who maybe
from the university who can actually do this kind of work’. And once
there was a recognition, then it became easy, because there are systems
in India to do that…[I]n the Finance Ministry there have been systems
like this for a long time, and they have used these systems… But when
it came to women’s development, for instance women’s empowerment,
these systems were not being used to the same extent.
(interview, December 2007)

Growing demand for gender expertise has mixed implications. If b ­ ureaucrats

increasingly specialise as ‘gender experts’, or are exposed to gender exper-
tise of external advisors, ‘evidence-based’ policy proposals may improve
the prospects for gender mainstreaming success. Gender sensitisation
may also enable bureaucrats to develop new administrative subjectivities,
including enabling male bureaucrats to become engaged in policy areas
hitherto considered ‘women’s issues’. Individual gender-responsive male
­bureaucrats have also challenged the notion that only women can be fem-
inist ­bureaucrats, or that female bureaucrats are more sensitive to gender
policy concerns, to the extent that gender-responsive male bureaucrats
become role models for other male bureaucrats (interview, February 2007).
One such male bureaucrat was temporarily a secretary of MWCD (then
only a department), but later became Chief Secretary. A former civil servant
recalled,

Though he had always worked in economics ministries, he was a

­ ynamo. He pushed things which had been lingering for years…I think
d
it did the Women and Child Ministry a lot of good, shook it up and got
it moving, got lots of stuff through, he initiated a lot of stuff. But as I
said, I don’t think he would have… I mean five years in Women and
Child would have been too much. I think he moved on… And now of
course he’s Cabinet Secretary.
(interview, February 2007)
98 National initiatives in gender mainstreaming
On the other hand, increasing reliance on gender ‘expertise’ may produce
more technocratic results, preventing democratic participation in policy
processes. Also, the pace and extent to which gender training and gender
sensitisation can bring about a transformation should not be overesti-
mated, as the same official observed: ‘to a large extent it is a long haul, and
I don’t think one should actually pretend or fool oneself to think that you
get a massive attitudinal change at the end, you know things are so deeply
­embedded’ (interview, February 2007). Addressing the devaluation of the
so-called ‘soft’ sectors does not guarantee the so-called ‘gender-blind’ sec-
tors will open up faster or more sincerely to feminist scrutiny. Opportunities
to influence policy remain precarious and have to be repeatedly secured; the
degree of institutionalisation should not be overstated.
The success or failure of mainstreaming initiatives is also highly con-
tingent on individual bureaucrats occupying senior positions and whether
they are supportive. In the absence of a more gender-responsive institutional
­culture, individual actors’ commitments to pursue progressive policies are
just as important as their discursive and institutional context. Policy is of-
ten a compromise, requiring feminist bureaucrats not only to bargain and
­negotiate and recognise but also to push against the parameters of possi-
bility. The passage of the National Policy for the Empowerment of Women
(2001), for example, involved a lot of compromise:

I don’t think the final product was the ideal empowerment policy but
you know sometimes to get something through you have to compro-
mise, and it is actually a lot of compromise on this and that and so on,
but we were very pleased that we could get the policy through.
(interview with former official of MWCD, February 2007)

External (non-government) feminist actors engaging with state institutions

have played important roles on the few occasions these opportunities became
available (beyond an advisory or consultative role). Vimala R­ amachandran
was one of a few individuals coming from outside ­government, from a
­university on a secondment and was invited with colleague Srilatha B
­ atliwala
as specialists to work within government.20 They were tasked with design-
ing a programme for women’s adult education, to help implement part of
the new education policy, education for women’s equality. The programme
became known as the Mahila Samakhya programme. These women saw en-
gagement with the state as crucial; they sought to enter government spaces
and make changes from within. But the will from within government also
needs to be there, as one specialist explains,

I think somewhere there is a sort of a realisation within the ­government

that maybe certain things are better done by civil society organisations.
But very often people in government do not know how to go about it….
So it depends a lot on who is actually driving this within the government.
 National initiatives in gender mainstreaming 99
You need a sensitive civil servant or you need a group of civil servants
who are willing to drive this from within, and when that happens then
it’s possible to get people from outside to come into the government and
work and go out again.
(interview, December 2007)

Thus, external participation requires initiative from within the state by

­sensitive bureaucrats. Part of the reluctance to engage with non-government
specialists on gender and development issues has been the hostile relation-
ship or ‘inherent suspicion’ between the state and the women’s movement
dating back to the 1970s when the feminist movement ‘was essentially di-
rected against the government’ (interview with specialist, December 2007).
The state has resisted highly progressive civil society organisations: ‘there’s
no doubt that the state always pulls back when civil society is very progres-
sive and starts challenging the state too much and the state does tend to pull
back’ (interview with former IAS officer, February 2007). But journalist
and commentator Kalpana Sharma noted in relation to the shortcomings of
the National Commission for Women Act 1990, ‘each time the government
falls short of its promises, it contributes to the prevailing cynicism that little
can be achieved through the state apparatus for the true emancipation of
women’ (Sharma, 1990).
Despite state reluctance, it is encouraging that observers believe civil
­society has had a ‘huge impact…and still does’ in the area of women, gender,
and development policy (interview with former IAS officer). One specialist’s
experience of working from both within and outside government led her to
believe that working within government alone is insufficient, that it is im-
portant ‘to have people with different skills who can leverage what they can
do from different spaces’ whether it be from within government or outside.
She suggests it involves the coming together of four groups – social activists,
people within government, bilateral and multilateral donors, and research
and academic community – and of them working from their respective
spaces that will bring about systemic change (interview, December 2007).
International fora have provided significant space for feminist mobili-
sation for the women’s movement in India. The Fourth World Conference
on Women in Beijing in 1995 enabled the women’s movement to renew old
demands on the Indian state and construct new demands. Nearly all the
initiatives undertaken in the 1990s referenced the Beijing Platform for Ac-
tion to add greater legitimacy to new policy. Several Think Tank members
involved in Engendering Five-Year Plans were members of nascent organ-
isation NAWO, whose establishment was a direct outcome of the women’s
movements’ mobilisation for Beijing in 1995 (NAWO, 2000: iii). NAWO
fully endorsed the goals and language of the Platform for Action; one of
its objectives included working towards and monitoring the Beijing Plat-
form for Action (NAWO, n.d.). In its Beijing+5 report, NAWO described
the Beijing Platform for Action as a ‘powerful framework and reference
100 National initiatives in gender mainstreaming
point’ for different actors to ‘advance the goals of equality, development
and peace’ (2000: i). UN committees reviewing state government action un-
der the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Woman
have also provided an important forum and co-ordination mechanism for
the Indian women’s movement to hold the Indian government accountable.
­International agencies such as DFID, UNIFEM, and UNDP have played
facilitative roles in several mainstreaming initiatives. Meanwhile, how-
ever, we see neo-liberal discourses of ‘gender equality as smart economics’
­informing policy, and thus the power-laden asymmetries of international
development ‘expertise’ and donor agendas must not be forgotten.
Women’s Studies in India has provided important resources for feminists
engaging with government. However, Women’s Studies departments face a
dilemma regarding research agendas and funding constraints. The institu-
tional politics of research is challenging for critical analyses of gendered
development in India, as one practitioner explains,

the quality of research has come down in India…partly because over the
last at least ten years, there is more commissioned research than inde-
pendent research…A lot of the research is purely driven by the projects
that they [organisations including bilateral and multilateral donors] are
funding. So the whole world of commissioned research has actually
squeezed institutions and there is very little money.
(interview, December 2007)

In an environment where gender-responsive development policy ­increasingly

relies on gender expertise, this raises the crucial question of how the wom-
en’s movement can sustain efforts to critically engage the state to address
feminist demands.

Conclusion
This chapter has identified and analysed several initiatives undertaken by
the national government since the 1990s to make government policy, in-
stitutional structures, and state actors more gender-responsive. This has
involved building institutional structures in the form of a national machin-
ery for women including the establishment of a National Commission for
Women, a National Mission for the Empowerment of Women, a Parliamen-
tary committee for the Empowerment of Women, and formal promotion in
the status from Department to MWCD. Attempts at mainstreaming gender
have engaged with planning and budgeting processes and have formally
institutionalised gender training in the senior civil service. The state, in
varied forms, has resisted substantial change although the extent and form
of this resistance is often complex and contingent. Also complex is the ex-
tent to which differently positioned subjects and agents have been afforded
 National initiatives in gender mainstreaming 101
different degrees of agency as a result of specific institutional norms and
practices, and thus opportunities for agency appear highly contingent.
Identifiable tensions also exist in the conceptualisation of gender main-
streaming strategies. A positive development is the government’s increased
recognition and employment of ‘gender expertise’ to inform planning pro-
cesses, which in part is a success of agenda-setting strategies which seek to
gain recognition for women’s perspectives and interests, requiring presence
and participation in agenda setting. Agenda-setting strategies can bring
needed attention to previously unacknowledged group demands. Whilst
some suggest the preference for professional gender expertise stems from
the political economy of donor funding as opposed to a sincere recognition
of its importance or a commitment to gender equality and women’s empow-
erment, and whilst external consultations are not always influential, such
external consultations have achieved some important successes.
But is this gender expertise truly inclusive and representative of the
­diversity of women’s interests and the complexity of intersectional gender in-
equalities? Is the (albeit limited) gender mainstreaming process sufficiently
democratised? This is an acknowledged difficulty with gender mainstream-
ing strategies generally and not confined to the Indian context. It manifests
in particular ways in India, with the intersectionality of caste and gender,
for example, which has been a challenge for the Indian women’s movement
in terms of representation and inclusiveness (Rege, 2013 [1999]: 4).
Initiatives have been underpinned by different policy approaches. Some
strategies privilege the language of women’s empowerment as opposed to
gender equality, which channels resources and energy towards women, but
in some guises can encourage an isolated focus on women alone, implor-
ing women to change their behaviour, as opposed to addressing structural
gender inequalities. Gender-responsive policymaking focusing on gender
has been informed by an equality discourse emphasising gender difference,
that is, both men and women are different so should be treated differently
in policy. Feminist theorists define a difference equality perspective as one
which ‘seeks to reverse the order of things: to place at the centre that which
is currently marginalized, to value that which is currently devalued, to priv-
ilege that which is currently subordinated’ (Squires, 2000: 118). This rever-
sal strategy ‘involves replacing male-ordered thinking with a discourse that
privileges women’s experiences and women’s perspectives’ (ibid). Influenc-
ing and effectively replacing the ‘male-dominated’ agenda with a feminist
standpoint based on women’s experiences becomes the priority.
Gender difference may be a much more contextually acceptable discourse
compared to liberal focus on sameness – where men and women are the
same, but gender inequality arises from unfair differential treatment. But
focusing on difference creates potential for interpretative slippage between
difference as natural (a more conservative, essentialist discourse) or dif-
ference produced as a result of situatedness in societal institutions, labour
102 National initiatives in gender mainstreaming
markets, access to resources, and so on. Even if the latter is potentially
more transformative, it still runs the risk of essentialising these differences
as static, rather than as a locus for transformation. Furthermore, whilst
the presence and visibility of ‘difference’ are strategically important, the
inadvertent danger is that hypervisibility reproduces marginality: ‘women’
are repeatedly constituted as a hyper-visible ‘special’ and ‘needy’ policy
target group, for which ‘special’ programmes are devised, separate from
the ‘mainstream’. Meanwhile, the privilege underpinning the unspoken,
unnamed ­occupants of the ‘mainstream’, in actuality a minority, goes un-
acknowledged and unquestioned. Instead, what may be more fruitful is to
reverse the policy gaze from ‘backwardness’ or ‘weakness’ to ‘privilege’,
to challenge the naturalised, essentialised ‘weakness’ amongst marginal-
ised social groups, and better recognise the structures that reproduce such
marginalisation and sustain the unquestioned privileged minority’s status
as ‘mainstream’. The discourse of targeted policy enabling ‘weak groups’,
the majority, to ‘catch-up’ to the ‘mainstream’ – an ironic reproduction of
problematic modernisation discourse – instead is replaced by a recognition
of how the privileged position of the few constituting the ‘mainstream’ is
relative to and contingent on the marginalised status of ‘weaker’ groups.
Finally, a focus on gender difference seriously complicates efforts to rec-
ognise and address intersectional disparities amongst women as a result of
caste-based or religious-based marginalisation or oppression. A strategy of
mainstreaming, which represents diverse configurations of gender relations,
is essential to be more transformative in the long run.
In the following four chapters, we shift focus from the national to the
subnational level, exploring similarities and differences in institutions,
­discourses, and agency at the state level in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil
Nadu. The task is to understand not only the different institutional, discur-
sive, and agential contexts of national- and state-level policy on gender and
development but also the diversity amongst states, including those within
the same regional location in (south) India. Implicitly, the analysis asks
whether the national context frames subnational state policy or whether
states, especially since 1990, have tried to follow their own path in relation
to gender and development, and with what outcomes, consequences, and
implications.

Notes
1 Another 1990s initiative not discussed here, but which has aided other initia-
tives, has sought to increase official gender-disaggregated statistical data, both
at national and subnational levels.
2 Prior to the National Commission for Women’s establishment in 1992, the main
government body besides the Department of Women and Child Welfare, was the
Central Social Welfare Board (CSWB), established in 1953. CSWB co-ordinated
women’s welfare programmes through voluntary organisations (Mazumdar
et al., 2001: 33). See Rai (2003) and Arya (2009) on the Commission.
 National initiatives in gender mainstreaming 103
3 The exception is the rare promotion of senior employees of state civil services
into the IAS.
4 For the Ninth Plan, regional consultations took place in 1997 in Calcutta (east-
ern states), Pune (western states), Bangalore (southern states), Chandigarh
(northern states), and Umiam (northeastern states). The national consultation
took place in Delhi in March 1997.
5 Feminist economist Bina Agarwal contributed to various working groups of
the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Plans, before joining the Eleventh Plan’s advisory
body of feminist economists. She chaired the working group on ‘Disadvantaged
Farmers Including Women’ in 2011.
6 This interesting document serves as an important historical record, because ad-
visory work for public bodies often goes unacknowledged.
7 Replies were received from states from all regions of India: Rajasthan, Delhi, Ma-
harashtra, Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal, Kerala,
Chhattisgarh, Uttar Pradesh, Karnataka, Haryana, Bihar and Jharkhand,
Madhya Pradesh, and Arunachal Pradesh.
8 The Finance Ministry has responsibility for budgets and contains the highest
concentration of IFS officers in central government, whose familiarity with budg-
eting and finance procedures outweigh most senior personnel in the MWCD.
9 Initiation of gender budgeting was linked to a New Delhi workshop held in July
2000 in collaboration with UNIFEM, on ‘Engendering National Budgets in the
South Asian Region’ (GoI, 2002: para 11.2.4).
10 Mishra and Sinha (2012: 56) suggest the Finance Ministry’s involvement is
‘critical’.
11 The Department also acknowledged positive responses from other Departments
(GoI, 2005). Similarly, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Human
­Resource Development endorsed gender budgeting when they scrutinised ini-
tiatives in 2004 and 2005, though shortcomings were noted (Rajya Sabha, 2004:
para 3.5).
12 Sourced from the IAS Civil List database at http://civillist.ias.nic.in/YrCurr/
ListOfQueriesCL.htm.
13 Calculated by the author from the IAS Civil List search query database accord-
ing to allotment year at http://civillist.ias.nic.in/YrCurr/ListOfQueriesCL.htm.
14 Remarkably, few studies exist on gendered norms and practice in the Indian civil
service. Sarojini Thakur’s study of gender in the Indian civil services is the most
detailed (Thakur, c.1997; see also Thakur, 2000). At the time of Thakur’s study,
she was an IAS officer posted at the LBSNAA in Mussorie.
15 Thakur’s study reported 20.3 percent of all women officers surveyed were in
­social sectors and 43.9 per cent of all men officers surveyed were in field positions.
16 The reports are available on the 2005 Administrative Reforms Commission’s
website (GoI, n.d.-a).
17 Also known as the Hota Committee, after Chairperson P.C. Hota, former
­Chairperson of the UPSC.
18 Candidates categorised as SC, ST, and OBC enter as direct recruits to the All
India Services through two streams: the general category and the reserved
­category. The latter has ‘relaxed standards’ for recruitment (GoI, 1989).
19 Module topics included gender and development, violence against women, gen-
der and forestry, women and panchayati raj, gender and health care, gender and
literacy, girls’ education, gender and co-operatives, gender issues in anti-poverty
programmes, and gender and entrepreneurship development.
20 Jandhyala (2003: fn.5) notes Vimala Ramachandran’s subsequent appointment
as the Mahila Samakhya programme’s first National Project Director was un-
precedented, in that a non-governmental person was appointed to director in
the national Department of Education.
104 National initiatives in gender mainstreaming
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5 Subnational policy in context
A profile of two Indian states

Introduction
From this chapter, we shift from the national to subnational levels, to the
south Indian states of Andhra Pradesh1 and Tamil Nadu. This chapter in-
troduces these states, discussing two themes. First, what do official data and
independent analyses say about gender inequalities in the socio-­economic
development of each state? Do they face similar or different challenges?
Second, how have wider socio-political movements in each state in the
post-­Independence period treated the issue of gender (equality)? How has
this treatment framed possibilities for articulating feminist policy goals of
­gender-equitable development? These questions assume that the broader so-
cial context partially determines the ‘conditions of possibility’ for acceptable
strategies for mainstreaming gender in development policy (John, 1996).
The first half of the chapter uses official data supplemented, informed, and
contested by studies of gendered development in these two states. It focuses
especially on gender and employment, but also discusses gender and educa-
tion, and gendered life chances including the child sex ratio, maternal mortal-
ity, and violence against women (political participation is discussed later in
this chapter and subsequent chapters). These are highly complex and nuanced
issues; I provide only a brief discussion due to space constraints. The pur-
pose is to ‘co-construct’ (Sunderland, 2004) a dynamic picture of gendered
socio-economic development inequalities in both states, to contextualise and
demonstrate the complexity of gender and intersecting inequalities. Compar-
ing two south Indian states also provides an alternative lens to the common
‘north-south’ distinction in debates on gender inequality in India, which
emphasise the higher status of women in south India. Observable changes
brought by economic development suggest it is important to understand how
such processes are mutually constitutive of gender relations and that devel-
opment and growth may have both beneficial and deleterious effects. This is
relevant for the two states analysed here, given that both have been charac-
terised as ‘reform states’ (Bajpai and Sachs, 1999; cited in Kennedy, 2004: 34,
n. 12). As discussed below, several contributions in Kapadia (2002b) suggest
that economic development and its wider corollary, ‘modernity’, have pro-
duced some adverse consequences for women and girls, exacerbating rather
 Subnational policy in context 109
than eradicating gender inequalities in India. I argue that significant gen-
dered development inequalities exist within and across the two case study
states, which dispels a more common perception that (a) Andhra Pradesh is
universally less ‘developed’ than Tamil Nadu, despite its lower status in many
national indices of state-level development, and also that (b) Tamil Nadu’s
higher achievement in many development indicators does not necessarily also
entail a greater degree of gender equality and female autonomy, as indicated
by data on the child sex ratio and attitudes towards violence against women.
The second half of the chapter explores how gender relations have been
conceived in the dominant socio-historical trajectories of the two states.
I selectively examine important post-Independence socio-political debates,
to understand the historically contingent construction of gender relations
and their implications for the articulation of gendered development dis-
course in the two states in the 1990s and beyond. In Tamil Nadu, I discuss the
reconstituted articulation of gender in Tamil cultural nationalist discourse
in the political discourse of one of the state’s main political parties, the
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (hereafter DMK), and gendered character-
istics of competing styles of populism in the DMK and its main rival party,
the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (hereafter AIADMK)
from the 1980s onwards. In Andhra Pradesh, I focus on the participation of
women in two movements commonly associated with the politicisation of
women in Andhra Pradesh (Niranjana, 2002): the left-wing class-oriented
struggles primarily in Telangana but also elsewhere in the state, and the
well-­documented women-led prohibition movement in the early 1990s. I ar-
gue that socio-political movements and debates in Andhra Pradesh offered
more opportunities for the articulation of feminist demands compared to
the more conservative context of neighbouring Tamil Nadu, particularly
because in the latter, women were positioned more symbolically and in the
former they were interpellated with more agency in movement discourse.
However, opportunities in Andhra Pradesh were not realised, largely due
to the manoeuvring of both statist and non-statist forces. Concerns of gen-
der equality did not find prominence in the dominant post-Independent
socio-political debates in these two states, or were transformed by their
articulation in conservative or paternalist discourses. Women have been
positioned discursively as objects and subjects in socio-political debates in
problematic ways. The latter narrowly circumscribe women’s participation
in cultural nationalist (TN) and left-based movements (AP), and paternalist,
co-optive, and politico-economic compulsions of the state (in both TN and
AP) shape the ways in which women experience the state in both the more
abstract sense of citizenship and in their everyday experiences of the state.

A profile of gender and development in Tamil Nadu and

Andhra Pradesh
Tamil Nadu is one of India’s more economically prosperous and industri-
alised states. In 2003, it was ranked second in the country for quality of
110 Subnational policy in context
infrastructure facilities and third for Foreign Direct Investment approval
(GoTN, 2003: 7). Tamil Nadu is one of the most industrialised states in In-
dia (GoTN, 2003: 6) and ranks third amongst major states in per capita net
state domestic product in 2012–2013, after Haryana and Maharashtra (GoI,
2014).2 Prior to the 1990s, per capita income was below the national average,
until 1991–1992, and has remained above the national average since (GoTN,
2003: 8). The service sector in Tamil Nadu is the largest contributor to net
state domestic product, followed by the manufacturing and agricultural and
allied sectors (see Table 5.1). Agriculture’s share of the state’s economy has
declined in recent decades, but nearly two-thirds of the state’s population still
depend on agriculture for their livelihood (GoTN, 2003). Madras Economic
Processing Zone (EPZ) is one of the three largest in the country, along with
the Santa Cruz EPZ and Noida EPZ, producing more than 85 percent of to-
tal exports from India’s EPZs (Ghosh, 2009: 73). After Andhra Pradesh and
Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu has the largest number of notified SEZs in India
(Vijayabhaskar, 2014: 311). Most EPZs in Tamil Nadu are located in Chennai
and Coimbatore and situated in two main sectors: IT and IT-enabled services
and the automobile sector, prominent industries in the state (ibid).
Andhra Pradesh is a less prosperous state than Tamil Nadu but not a poor
state. Andhra Pradesh ranked third amongst major states for net state do-
mestic product in 2012–2013, just in front of Tamil Nadu, but eighth amongst
major states for per capita net state domestic product 2012–2013, behind Ta-
mil Nadu (third), Gujarat (fourth), Uttarakhand (fifth), Kerala (sixth), and
Punjab (seventh) (GoI, 2014). Growth in gross state domestic product in AP
for 2005–2006 to 2006–2007 was lower than the national average, due to
negative growth rates in agriculture (GoAP, 2007; see Table 5.1). The tertiary

Table 5.1 Economic indicators for Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and all-India

Andhra Tamil All-India

Pradesh Nadu

Net state domestic product (NSDP) (Rs. crore), 678,524 671,729 837,27442
2012–20131
Growth in Net SDP, % increase from previous year 14.2 11.4 11.5
Per capita Net SDP (Rs.), 2012–20131 78,958 98,628 67,839
Growth in per capita Net SDP (Rs.), % increase 13.2 10.8 9.73
from previous year

State-wise gross domestic product Agriculture 18.99 7.28 13.95

by industry of origin 2012–2013 and allied
(% of total state gross state Industry 24.40 30.19 27.27
domestic product)
Services 56.61 62.53 58.79

Source: Tables 1.8A and 1.8B, Government of India Economic Survey 2014–2015 (GoI, 2014).
Notes
1 Based on 2004–2005 current prices.
2 Net national income rather than NSDP.
3 At 2004–2005 Current Prices.
 Subnational policy in context 111
sector contributes the largest share of gross state domestic product, followed
by primary and secondary sectors. Since 1999–2000, the share of the tertiary
sector has increased, with the primary sector’s share declining and the sec-
ondary sector staying constant (GoAP, 2007). The primary sector registered
negative growth in 2006–2007, mostly due to negative growth rates in ag-
riculture. In 2012–2013, industry contributed proportionally more to gross
state domestic product than the agriculture and allied sector, though gross
state domestic product from agriculture is still greater than manufacturing,
and agriculture and allied still comprises a larger share than at the national
level (Planning Commission, 2014).
Andhra Pradesh is home to the Hyderabad Information Technology and
Engineering Consultancy City, which in addition to domestic companies,
also hosts offices of Microsoft, Google, and Facebook, amongst others.
Andhra Pradesh has almost 100 SEZs and the land allotted to the 56 ‘noti-
fied’ SEZs in the state makes up to one-fifth of land allotted to SEZs across
the whole of India (Srinivasulu, 2014: 75). Many are concentrated in two
regions of Andhra Pradesh – in districts next to the state capital Hyderabad,
and in Visakhapatnam, in coastal Andhra. More than half of all AP’s SEZs
are in the IT and IT-enabled services sectors (ibid).

Human development and poverty reduction

Official human development indicators suggest that Tamil Nadu has higher
levels of human development than Andhra Pradesh. Tamil Nadu has a
higher than average score compared to all India, whereas Andhra Pradesh
has been located closer to the all-India score. Scores and rankings vary de-
pending on when they are recorded and how many states are included, but
this overall picture remains the same from 1996 to 2006 to 2014.3 Differ-
ent methods estimate poverty levels in India from 29 percent to 55 percent
(OPHI, 2010). Whilst different measures contest the extent of poverty, they
show roughly the same picture for Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh relative
to each other and to all India.4 Tamil Nadu has lower levels of poverty than
Andhra Pradesh, in both rural and urban areas, and both states suffer less
poverty than the all-India average (see Table 5.2).5 Official figures suggest
that poverty in both states declined from 1980 to 2000, with Tamil Nadu
now lower than the all-India average and with poverty in Andhra Pradesh
declining at a much faster rate than at the national level, over the period
1983 to 1999–2000, mostly due to a sharp decline in rural poverty figures;
urban poverty figures actually increased slightly during the period 1983 to
1993–1994 (GoI, 2002b). More recently, since 2000, poverty in Tamil Nadu
has fallen faster than in Andhra Pradesh and the national average, according
to official estimates (see Table 5.3). But considerable intra-state inequalities
remain in both states, according to official data. Unsurprisingly, poverty in
both states is higher amongst SC and ST households, and the Tamil Nadu
Human Development Report shows higher poverty in urban compared to
rural areas (GoTN, 2003: 35).
112 Subnational policy in context

Table 5.2 Human and gender development, gender and empowerment, and
poverty indicators in Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and all-India

Andhra Pradesh Tamil Nadu All-India

Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank

Human development 1996 0.519 27 0.589 15 0.53 n/a

index1 2006 0.585 28 0.666 16 0.605 n/a
Gender and Development 1996 0.509 27 0.576 15 0.514 n/a
index (GDI)2 2006 0.574 27 0.655 16 0.590 n/a
Gender Empowerment 1996 0.467 4 0.459 5 0.416 n/a
Measure (GEM)3 2006 0.547 5 0.498 14 0.497 n/a

Incidence of poverty, 2009–2010 (% population below poverty line)

Rangarajan method Total 28.1 27.7 38.2
Rural 27.0 25.9 39.6
Urban 30.5 29.7 35.1
Tendulkar method Total 21.1 17.1 29.8
Rural 22.8 21.2 33.8
Urban 17.7 12.8 20.9

Decline in poverty incidence, 2004–2005 to 2009–2010 (in percentage points)

Tendulkar method Total 8.5 12.2 7.4
Rural 9.5 16.4 8.2
Urban 5.7 7.0 4.6

Source: Planning Commission (2014) and MWCD (2009).

Notes
1 Health, education, and income.
2 HDI adjusted for gender disparities. The MWCD methodology differs from the UNDP
methodology. The latter is the proportion of female HDI to male HDI; a score less than 1
indicates an unfavourable score for females.
3 Political decision-making, ‘economic’ decision-making (civil service and medical/­
engineering enrolment), and power over economic resources.

Gendered inequalities in socio-economic development

Whilst officially Tamil Nadu has better levels of human development amongst
men and women compared to Andhra Pradesh and all India, the gender dis-
parity between men and women within each state is similar (MWCD, 2009: 14;
see Table 5.2).6 Though Tamil Nadu leads Andhra Pradesh, which recorded
a score below the all-India average, Tamil Nadu is still placed only amongst
the middle ranks of Indian states. Moreover, Tamil Nadu fell from fifth place
to fourteenth in its Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) between 1996 and
2006. It scores well on some health indicators such as maternal mortality ra-
tio, being less than half that of the all-India average (111 maternal deaths per
100,000 live births in Tamil Nadu compared to 254 for all-India in 2004–2006
according to official government data). In this measure, amongst all 16 major
states it came second only to Kerala (95). But Tamil Nadu fares less well on
the GEM, which is a composite index reflecting decision-making power and
power over resources. Andhra Pradesh is placed higher than Tamil Nadu, and
both states are above the GEM average for India. Tamil Nadu’s score for 2006
 Subnational policy in context 113

Table 5.3 Work participation rates and status of workers for Andhra Pradesh, Tamil
Nadu, and all-India, 2011

Andhra Pradesh Tamil Nadu All-India

Males Females Males Females Males Females

Percent of total Total 57 36 59 32 53 26

population classified Rural 58 45 60 41 53 30
as workers Urban 54 19 59 22 54 15

Main and Total Main 89 76 88 78 82 60

marginal Marginal 11 24 12 22 18 40
workers Rural Main 88 76 85 76 79 56
(percent Marginal 12 24 15 24 21 44
of total Urban Main 89 75 92 84 90 77
workers) Marginal 11 25 8 16 10 23

Source: Census of India, 2011. NSS data for 2011–2012 show similar patterns (see NSSO, 2013: 58,
Table S23).

is the lowest amongst the four south Indian states whilst Andhra Pradesh
has the highest score, exceeding both Kerala and Karnataka.7 The following
­subsections explore some of the relevant socio-economic indicators in more
detail, beginning with a basic thematic profile followed by a discussion.

Gender and employment

Labour markets are gendered institutions (Elson, 1999). Women’s increasing
or decreasing participation in the formal labour market can signify different
dynamics and needs careful interpretation. Liberal feminist approaches to
development see women’s participation in the labour market as positive and
empowering for women and their households8; thus upwards trends in work par-
ticipation rates amongst women are welcomed (for a critique, see Swaminathan,
2002). Alternative perspectives see high (or increasing) rates of women’s labour
force participation as driven by economic necessity, signifying economic stress
(Swaminathan, 2002; Ghosh, 2009).9 Declining women’s participation rates also
raise questions. Women may withdraw amid increasing household income and
greater financial security, though their withdrawal may not necessarily mean
empowerment and autonomy for women.10 They may be forced to withdraw due
to individual or structural changes, such as illness (including from poor work-
ing conditions), depleted sources of livelihood, or to increase their reproductive
labour to compensate for the absence or inaffordability of public goods and
services, including childcare, elderly care, inadequate or non-functioning public
infrastructure, and so on (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh, 2014: 26).
Different kinds of work are valued differently; formal work participation
does not include all forms of labour. The Census of India defines work as
‘any economically productive activity with or without compensation, wages
or profit…including part time help or unpaid work on farm, family enterprise
or in any other economic activity’ (GoI, 2005). However, ‘persons engaged in
 114 Subnational policy in context
Table 5.4 D
 istribution (%) of status of ‘usual’ worker (all ages), 2011–2012

Andhra Pradesh Tamil Nadu All-India

Self- Regular/ Casual Self- Regular/ Casual Self- Regular/ Casual

employed salaried labour employed salaried labour employed salaried labour

Rural Male 48.4 11.8 39.8 31.5 17.0 51.5 54.5 10.0 35.5
Female 44.7 3.2 52.1 27.8 9.5 62.8 59.3 5.6 35.1
Person 46.8 8.0 45.2 30.0 14.0 56.0 55.9 8.7 35.4
Urban Male 35.4 49.4 15.2 32.4 43.7 23.9 41.7 43.4 14.9
Female 44.4 37.4 18.1 39.8 41.8 18.4 42.8 42.8 14.3
Person 37.5 46.6 15.8 34.3 43.2 22.5 41.9 43.3 14.8
Rural Male 44.2 23.8 31.9 31.9 28.9 39.2 50.7 19.8 29.4
+ Female 44.7 8.5 46.8 31.4 19.1 49.5 56.1 12.7 31.2
urban Person 44.4 17.9 37.7 31.7 25.5 42.8 52.2 17.9 29.9

Source: NSSO (2013).

daily household chores like cooking, cleaning utensils, looking after children,
fetching water etc’ are classified as non-workers (ibid), discounting consider-
able labour often performed by women (and girls). Women’s unpaid domestic
work thus constitutes a shadow subsidy to the household economy.11
The Census of India classifies workers as either main or marginal, reflecting
whether employment is sustained throughout the year or is only seasonal or in-
termittent.12 The split character of women’s paid employment and unpaid do-
mestic labour mean women are more likely to be classified as marginal workers
than men, despite women often working longer hours, as Time Use studies have
shown. The Government of India’s National Sample Survey (NSS) Organisa-
tion uses a similar classification distinguishing between a worker’s principal
and subsidiary status, which together distinguish workers from non-workers.13
The NSS also captures differences in the type of work, whether regular/sala-
ried, casual labour, or self-employment. Both sources of data are used here.14
Data on gender and employment in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh
suggest an interestingly mixed picture, with clear similarities and differ-
ences compared to all-India averages, as well as differences between the
two states. A general impression is that Andhra Pradesh is more typical of
the all-India picture than Tamil Nadu, but it also differs in some impor-
tant respects. Similarities with all-India patterns include work participa-
tion rates for men are higher than those for women, higher in rural areas
compared to urban for both men and women, and much lower for urban
women. Most men and women workers are classified as main workers, but
a higher proportion of women workers are marginal workers compared
to men, and rural women marginal workers outnumber men in the same
category (see Tables 5.3 to 5.6). Women are predominantly employed in the
agricultural sector, though urban women in Tamil Nadu are more com-
monly found in manufacturing (NSSO, 2013: 80, Table 35). Women workers
are generally more occupationally concentrated than men in both states,
and at the all-­India level, though they may perform supplementary work in
 Subnational policy in context 115
Table 5.5 D
 istribution (%) of males and females across worker categories for
Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and all-India, 2011

Andhra Pradesh Tamil Nadu All-India

Males Females Males Females Males Females

Total Cultivators 18 14 13 13 25 24
Agricultural labourers 34 58 23 42 25 41
Household industry 3 5 3 7 3 6
workers
Other workers 46 23 62 38 47 29
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Rural Cultivators 25 17 22 18 35 29
Agricultural labourers 46 67 37 56 34 48
Household industry 2 4 3 5 3 5
workers
Other workers 26 12 38 21 28 18
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Urban Cultivators 2 2 3 3 3 3
Agricultural labourers 6 15 7 14 5 9
Household industry 4 9 3 9 4 9
workers
Other workers 88 74 88 74 89 79
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100

Source: Census of India, 2011.

Table 5.6 D
 istribution (%) of males and females within worker categories for
Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and all-India, 2011

Andhra Pradesh Tamil Nadu All-India

Males Females Males Females Males Females

Cultivators Total 67 33 64 36 70 30
Rural 67 33 64 36 69 31
Urban 74 26 71 29 77 23
Agricultural Total 48 52 50 50 57 43
labourers Rural 48 52 50 50 57 43
Urban 55 45 57 43 66 34
Household industry Total 45 55 43 57 53 47
workers Rural 40 60 41 59 49 51
Urban 53 47 46 54 61 39
Other workers Total 76 24 75 25 78 22
Rural 74 26 73 27 75 25
Urban 77 23 76 24 81 19
Total workers Total 61 39 65 35 69 31
Rural 57 43 59 41 65 35
Urban 74 26 73 27 79 21

Source: Census of India, 2011.

116 Subnational policy in context
other sectors (see Tables 5.5 and 5.6; see also NSSO 2013). Consistent with
previous trends (Swaminathan, 1994: 69), work participation rates also
generally vary amongst different caste groups, with women from SCs and
STs recording higher rates than Other Backward Class women and upper
caste women (NSSO, 2012).
Similarities aside, in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh, both men and
women, but particularly women, have higher work participation rates com-
pared to all-India levels. Women make up around four in ten workers in Andhra
Pradesh and one third in Tamil Nadu; even in urban areas where participa-
tion is lower, women are still at least one quarter of all workers (Census 2011).
Particularly in rural Andhra Pradesh, women have some of the highest work
participation rates in the country.15 These contrast markedly with much lower
work participation rates in some major states of north India such as B ­ ihar and
Haryana. This is consistent with historical trends, where work p ­ articipation
rates of women in south India have been higher than all-India (Da Corta
and Venkateshwarlu, 1999: 73). But south India has seen a marked rise in the
­proportion of female workers, particularly female agricultural labourers, since
the 1960s (ibid). Ghosh (2009: 61–62) also notes variations in women’s work
participation rates across Indian states, but suggests that few studies have in-
vestigated what causes these variations. She suggests that social and cultural
factors may provide only partial explanations (ibid).
Overall, women are concentrated in agriculture more in Andhra Pradesh
than in Tamil Nadu, with more than three-quarters of rural women work-
ers, closer to the all-India average, compared to half of rural female workers
in Tamil Nadu (NSSO, 2013: 80, Table 35; for census data, see also Tables
5.5).16 Female rural agricultural labourers also outnumber male rural agri-
cultural labourers in Andhra Pradesh – almost nine million women (and
girls) compared to just over eight million men (and boys) (Census 2011).
Women in both Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu also make up more than
half of all household industry workers (see Table 5.6), whereas male workers
make up a higher proportion of ‘cultivators’ and ‘other’ workers (a large
residual category). In both states, male workers are more dispersed than
female workers across occupational sectors, with around 80 percent in five
(men) as opposed to two or three sectors (women).17 The four most com-
mon occupational categories are the same for men and women, but the fifth
largest sector of employment for female workers is education compared to
transportation and storage for male workers (NSSO, 2013). These figures
show the significance of attention to gender and women workers when for-
mulating policy in these sectors.
Another key difference to all-India is that more men and women, espe-
cially women, in both states are classified as ‘main’ workers (except in urban
areas of Andhra Pradesh). Thus on average, men and especially women work
for longer periods throughout the year. The gender gap between main and
marginal worker status is smaller than at the all-India level (see Table 5.3).18
NSS data for 2011–2012 show similar patterns. However, casual labour, as
 Subnational policy in context 117
Table 5.7 Daily wages (Rs.) of workers (15–59 years) and gendered wage disparities
in Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and all-India, 2011–2012

Andhra Pradesh Tamil Nadu All-India

Regular/ Casual Regular/ Casual Regular/ Casual

salaried labour salaried labour salaried labour

Rural Male 251.28 167.65 292.55 196.65 322.28 149.32

Female 225.01 111.19 199.44 110.41 201.56 103.28
Female /male 90 66 68 56 63 69
wages (%)
Urban Male 427.82 193.52 420.76 227.66 469.87 182.04
Female 244.3 126.6 297.63 126.53 366.15 110.62
Female /male 57 65 71 56 78 61
wages (%)
Rural Male 369.3 – 378.79 – 417.08 –
+ Female 238.41 – 264.53 – 307.72 –
Urban Female /male 65 – 70 – 74 –
wages (%)

Source: NSSO (2013). Wage disparity computed by the author.

opposed to regular/salaried work or self-employment, is the predominant

form of work in Tamil Nadu, and for rural females in Andhra Pradesh (see
Table 5.4). This suggests that whilst employment is more continuous, it
may be insecure, low quality with low wages.19 Both states’ workers are less
likely to be classified as self-employed than across all India where it is the
main form of work, according to NSS data. Smaller proportions of urban
women are in regular/salaried work in Andhra Pradesh compared to all
India. This has implications for formal labour policy and social policy at
the state level. Gender inequalities also manifest in child labour indicators
in Andhra Pradesh; the rural 5–14 years age category is the only category of
main workers in which females outnumber males (GoAP, 2005: 47). This has
both immediate (child labour) and longer term implications (educational
achievement amongst girls and their future livelihood opportunities).
NSS data illustrate gendered wage inequalities in both states and com-
pared to all-India averages (see Table 5.7). In Andhra Pradesh, this is much
worse in urban areas where women’s wages are half those of male regular/
salaried workers, a disparity far worse than the national gender wage gap.
Tamil Nadu shows a similar but not as stark disparity for the same category
of workers. However, the gender wage gap in casual labour is much higher
in Tamil Nadu: female casual labourers earn half of a male worker’s wages
in both rural and urban areas, compared to almost two-thirds in Andhra
Pradesh. Significant gendered inequalities in wage rates in Tamil Nadu exist
even when the work requires similar levels of skill (Harriss-White, 2004a).
The Equal Remuneration Act of 1976 is poorly implemented, and the lack
of attention to highly gendered segregated labour activities affects the appli-
cation of equal pay for equal work. Geetha’s study of women workers in the
118 Subnational policy in context
construction industry and Dietrich’s study of women workers in the fishing
industry in Tamil Nadu suggest that hard-won industry-specific legislation
at the state level to protect informal sector workers does not adequately
address the causes of poor working conditions and low wages of informal
workers, particularly women (Geetha, 1990; Dietrich, 1995; for a discussion
of challenges faced by women workers in construction and manufacturing
in Chennai, see Kapadia, 2009).
It is not surprising then that both Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu have
seen higher than average take-up of the National Rural Employment Guar-
antee Scheme (MGNREGA) that aims to provide income security in rural
areas by offering up to 100 days of employment per household, with one
third of these days reserved for women.20 Jeyaranjan’s (2011) study of MGN-
REGA in a village in Thanjavur district, Tamil Nadu, suggests the scheme
has impacted working conditions and wages for women in the agricultural
sector. This is partly due to flexibility in state implementation following
initially low demand from workers (Jeyaranjan, 2011: 66). D ­ espite higher
wages for women under NREGA compared to local market rates (Rs. 80
compared to Rs. 40 per day), women were reluctant to take up work un-
der the scheme due to longer hours and more difficult working conditions.
Once the norms of the scheme were made more flexible to enable women to
combine different sources of employment, demand from women workers
increased. Amid a limited supply of local agricultural labour, the change
in the scheme enabled women workers to negotiate wage rates and work-
ing conditions for non-NREGA agricultural labour (Jeyaranjan, 2011: 68).
Women’s wage rates doubled to meet NREGA wages and overall income
increased as a result of multiple sources of employment per day (Jeyaran-
jan, 2011: 69). But despite the rise in wage rates, women agricultural labour-
ers are still paid at rates lower than men and are often excluded from more
mechanised activities.
Studies have sought to understand changes in gendered labour patterns
in agriculture. Some suggest women constitute a reserve army of labour
in agriculture, increasing their formal labour to compensate for bad har-
vests (Parthasarathy and Anand, 1995: 811). In contrast, a study in Andhra
Pradesh suggested women performed more days of agricultural labour than
men, not just when seasonal demand was high but throughout the year (Da
Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 1999: 97). Women’s increasing employment in
agricultural work relates to changes in the gendered division of labour and
the classification of agricultural activities designated as exclusively female
(such as weeding and transplanting), joint work (such as seed preparation),
and exclusively male (such as ploughing with bulls), and differential wage
rates attached to male and female tasks (ibid: 97). Activities previously des-
ignated as exclusively male became designated as joint work, and some joint
work became exclusively female. Because of women’s increasing entry into
joint work, this is increasingly seen as women’s work, reducing wage rates.
 Subnational policy in context 119
Men are thus deterred from low wage joint work, further increasing the
feminisation of agricultural labour (Da Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 1999:
102). Male agricultural labourers are also attracted to higher wages in the
off-farm sector, meaning women are taking over some of the labour men
previously performed (ibid: 103). Thus, women’s employment in agricultural
labour is increasing due to the exit of male workers.
Significantly, women agricultural labourers are increasingly responsible
for household income through increasingly ‘unfree’ labour relations with
employers (Da Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 1999). Amid the breakdown of
traditional agrarian patronage relationships between higher landowning
and lower labouring castes, male agricultural labourers are increasingly as-
sertive against tied labour, demanding better working conditions and wage
rates (ibid: 105). However, the same male labourers have not prevented their
wives from taking up the same work. When men refuse the work but do not
find an alternative, they increasingly rely on the income of their wives to
support the family (ibid: 108). Consequently, women ‘feel compelled to take
up all offers of wage work, no matter how humiliating, which increases their
unfreedom’ (Da Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 1999: 108). This effectively re-
duces household income and women’s wages and increases the gender wage
gap and women’s work burden (ibid). Women’s increased responsibility for
household consumption expenditure has increased their demands for small
loans and led them to re-establish credit ties with employers, re-entering
tied labour arrangements (Da Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 1999: 110). Thus,
changes in the gendered division of labour in agriculture have benefited
male labourers at the expense of female labourers.
Research suggests that women prefer factory work as it is regular and
confers higher status than agricultural work or household industry work,
despite sometimes poorer working conditions. However, research has evi-
denced gender inequalities in manufacturing employment practices in AP. A
study of garment manufacturing firms in and around Hyderabad found that,
similar to landowners’ preference for obedient and disciplined female agri-
cultural labour, women in manufacturing are hired for their ‘characteristic
docility’ and the lower likelihood of trade union organising (Chakravarty,
2004: 4912). Gendered inequalities in wage remuneration are also evident in
manufacturing in Andhra Pradesh (Parthasarathy and Anand, 1995: 816).
A different dimension of gender inequality in manufacturing employment
relates to working hours. Labour laws, which prevent women from working
during the night if the company cannot provide dedicated transport facili-
ties for women to ensure their safety, mean that male workers often benefit
from additional wages from piece rate work in export manufacturing firms,
which characteristically demands overtime (Chakravarty, 2004: 4913). Both
these examples challenge the wider assumption outlined earlier that the in-
creased work participation of women in paid employment is beneficial and
empowering for women.
120 Subnational policy in context
Economic growth and development may or may not bring employment
opportunities for women; new jobs may be concentrated in male-dominated
occupational sectors.21 If economic development in India has brought new
employment opportunities for women, research has shown these oppor-
tunities have not been straightforwardly liberating (see Mukhopadhyay
and Sudarshan, 2003). This seems to bear witness to the concerns feminist
economists raised towards liberalisation in the early 1990s, highlighting the
likely harmful effects of women’s concentration in the informal sector and
the increasing ‘feminisation’ of employment. Research has documented the
concentration of women in low-paid, low-skilled employment, with high
levels of employment insecurity and casualisation of work contracts, and
poor working conditions, to suggest that gendered labour market inequali-
ties have not receded in the process of economic development and modern-
isation in India. National Family Health Survey (NFHS) data from 2005 to
2006 show women’s higher participation at predominantly lower levels of
wealth, suggesting that women more often participate in the labour mar-
ket out of ‘economic necessity rather than … an expression of choice and
self-fulfilment’ (Kishore and Gupta, 2009: 48). Concerns have also been
raised over the growth of urban female domestic workers, because of low
pay and precarious working conditions in the sector and lack of growth in
formal wage/salaried work for female urban workers.
Particularly worrying are increases in female child and adolescent labour
associated with new employment opportunities, with implications for edu-
cational achievement (Majumdar, 2001; cited in Swaminathan, 2002: 119).
Opportunities can be undermined by a lack of investment in education and
vocational and professional training for women and girls to pursue skilled
jobs and professional careers, rather than low or unskilled jobs and casual
labour. Also of concern is how economic development affecting gendered
patterns of employment, and the impact on women’s reproductive labour
burdens. It has important implications for labour and social policy, par-
ticularly in the context of government focus on women’s self-employment
strategies discussed in later chapters. Government schemes which make
substantial demands on poor women’s time, sometimes for no remuneration
at all, need to be more considerate of and responsive to women’s existing
productive and reproductive labour burdens.

Gender and education

Gender inequality in school education has been explained by gendered social
role expectations and discriminatory attitudes on the comparative worth of
educating boys and girls, which result in the undervaluation of girl’s educa-
tion (Drèze and Sen, 2002: 161–162). The practice of patrilocality in much
of north India also means that the investment in a daughter’s education will
be transferred to the affinal family upon marriage. Social practices com-
monly dictate a bride should be of equal or lower educational background
 Subnational policy in context 121
than their groom; thus, ‘female education can turn into a liability…“over-­
educating” a daughter may make her more difficult – and expensive – to
marry’ (Drèze and Sen, 2002: 162). The prevalence of these practices and
beliefs mean that girls receive less education than boys, particularly if this
involves making a decision about whether to educate sons or daughters.
Women and girls generally record lower literacy rates, levels of educational
attainment, and enrolment ratios, and higher dropout rates, particularly for
educational levels beyond primary school.
Gender inequalities also intersect significantly with other educational in-
equalities, like poverty. Amongst lower income groups, sending a daughter
to school denies or reduces the household the income or unpaid labour,
such as caring for elderly members or younger siblings, she could be con-
tributing to the household, Elder daughters in particular may receive a
lower level of schooling than their younger siblings (Drèze and Sen, 2002:
157). The social status of SCs and STs often limits access to educational
opportunities due to social discrimination and poverty. Rural areas also
suffer from lower educational achievement due to poorer educational in-
frastructure, proximity to schools, and higher teacher absenteeism in rural
areas, which exacerbates low demand for education. Supply-side factors af-
fecting the demand for school education include affordability, accessibility,
and quality of schooling (Drèze and Sen, 2002: 159). Supply-side failures in
educational infrastructure impact female children more than male children
because parents are less likely to spare additional expenditure for daugh-
ters’ private education or send their daughters to school outside the village
(Drèze and Sen, 2002: 161). Measures to increase participation of girls in
school education include subsidising girls’ schooling, reducing the distance
to schools, providing a midday meal, and installing toilets for girls, par-
ticularly in rural areas where they are often absent (Basu, 1999: 151). Wom-
en’s movement educator-activists have also urged educational authorities
to address gender stereotypes in school curriculum textbooks and teaching
practices (Patel, 1998).
Policy initiatives to increase the educational development of women and
girls are driven by both intrinsic and instrumental motives; intrinsic for
valuing the importance of women and girls’ education for its own sake,
and instrumental for the assumed impact of female education on lowering
fertility and child mortality rates, and improving child nutrition (Drèze
and Sen, 2002: 39). The prevalence of conservative attitudes on gender
inequalities in educational achievement and a demographic obsession
with curbing population growth ensures the fertility argument is a far
more influential argument for women’s education than women’s techni-
cal education and training for employment in the modernising economy
(Swaminathan, 2002).
Overall, literacy rates are above the national average in Tamil Nadu, but
below the national average in Andhra Pradesh (see Table 5.8). Tamil Nadu
compares favourably with other states in India on literacy rates, ranked
 122 Subnational policy in context

Table 5.8 L
 iteracy rates for Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and all-India, 2001–2011

Andhra Pradesh Tamil Nadu All-India

Males Females Males Females Males Females

Percent of population Total 75 59 87 73 81 65

literate (aged 7 years Rural 69 52 82 65 77 58
and above) (2011) Urban 86 74 92 82 89 79
SC 70 54 81 66 75 56
ST 58 40 62 47 69 49

Percent of population Total 70 50 82 64 75 54

literate (aged 7 years Rural 65 44 77 55 71 46
and above) (2001) Urban 83 69 89 76 86 73
SC 55 37 64 46 55 35
ST 39 22 43 28 48 28

Increases in literacy Total 5 9 5 9 6 11

rates of population Rural 4 8 5 10 6 12
aged 7 years and Urban 3 5 3 6 3 6
above, 2001–2011 SC 15 17 17 20 20 21
(percentage points) ST 19 18 19 19 21 21

Increases in literacy Total 15 18 9 13 11 14

rates of population Rural 18 20 10 13 13 16
aged 7 years and Urban 7 12 3 6 5 9
above, 1991–2001 SC 13 16 5 11 5 11
(percentage points) ST 14 13 7 8 8 10

Source: Based on data in Census of India, 1991, 2001, 2011. 1991 data cited in GoI (2002a: 190–191).
Increases in literacy computed by the author.

third amongst major states after Kerala and Maharashtra. Following na-
tional trends, higher literacy rates can be observed in urban as opposed
to rural areas, amongst males as opposed to females, and amongst the
overall population as compared to members of SC and ST communities.
Tamil Nadu has witnessed increased literacy over the past two decades,
particularly in rural areas and for females, slightly narrowing the gap be-
tween both rural and urban areas and male and female literacy. However,
female rural literacy levels remain low and gender disparities in literacy
remain highest in rural areas. The urban-rural literacy gap is still wider
for females than for males. Other intra-state inequalities exist. Gender
inequalities in literacy across districts of Tamil Nadu suggest large varia-
tions in gender inequality. Kanyakumari and Dharmapuri districts record
the highest and lowest literacy rates for both males and females overall
(Census 2001). Female literacy rates vary more widely across districts
(from 85 percent to 51 percent) than male literacy rates (from 90 percent
to 72 percent).22 Notwithstanding Tamil Nadu’s high literacy levels over-
all, literacy amongst SC and ST communities is much lower, particularly
for women and girls. Literacy amongst ST communities in Tamil Nadu
 Subnational policy in context 123
is lower than the national average. Literacy increases between 1991 and
2001 were lower for SC and ST communities than for the overall popula-
tion, although the gender gap in SC literacy was comparable to the gender
gap for all, and slightly lower for STs. However, between 2001 and 2011,
the largest increases in literacy were found amongst these communities,
with the highest increases amongst SC females. Despite these encourag-
ing signs, the gender gap within these communities narrowed more slowly
than amongst the total population.
In contrast to Tamil Nadu, overall literacy rates in Andhra Pradesh re-
main below the national average, ranking 13th amongst major states, but
12th for female literacy (Census 2001). Literacy in AP also follows some
all-India trends. Males have higher literacy rates than females, females at-
tain lower levels of schooling, post-primary enrolment ratios are generally
lower for girls, and girls’ dropout ratios are higher across all class levels.
Gender inequalities in literacy vary across districts, and rural areas have
lower literacy levels than urban areas. SC and particularly ST communi-
ties have lower literacy levels than the rest of the population.23 Combined
district and intersectional variations illustrate complex and wide-ranging
inequalities in literacy levels: compare overall male literacy in Hyderabad
(84 percent) to female ST literacy in Mahbubnagar district (11 percent).
Improvements in literacy rates in AP between 1991 and 2001 in both ­r ural
and urban areas and for males and females were impressive, particularly in
rural areas and for females, slightly closing the literacy gender gap. These
improvements were higher than in Tamil Nadu and the national ­average.
Between 2001 and 2011, literacy increased at a slower pace but like in
Tamil Nadu, important gains were made amongst SC and ST communities.
Improvements in literacy in TN between 1991 and 2001 were lower than
the national average, perhaps due to TN’s higher initial levels. The greater
improvement in literacy in AP has thus narrowed the gap between the two
states, but the gender gap remains larger in AP than TN, narrowing faster
in TN during the period 1981–2001, despite initially higher literacy levels.
Despite state differences, literacy rates are comparable in the state capitals
Chennai and Hyderabad generally (79–80 percent), and for males (84–85
percent) and females (74–75 percent).
Gender inequalities in education are also illustrated by levels of edu-
cational participation and achievement (measured by enrolment ratios,
dropout ratios, and completed stages of formal education) (see Table 5.9).
Census data suggest that fewer females compared to males go on to sec-
ondary and higher education, but the gender disparity is more marked in
Andhra Pradesh than Tamil Nadu. In 2001, the proportion of females going
on to complete some form of secondary education or higher was similar in
both states, but by 2011 Tamil Nadu had pulled ahead.24 The implications
for female skilled employment in Tamil Nadu are significant; as Swami-
nathan suggests, ‘literacy and the completion of some basic education no
longer guarantees a place in the labour force…[E]mployers begin to require
higher levels of attainment for the same jobs’ (1994: 73). The lower level of
 124 Subnational policy in context

Table 5.9 Levels of educational achievement in formal education in Andhra

Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and all-India, 2011

Andhra Pradesh Tamil Nadu All-India

Males Females Males Females Males Females

Educational Literate without 6 6 4 5 4 5

achievement educational
as percent level
completing Below primary 14 16 10 12 18 21
each stage Primary 24 29 23 25 23 26
of formal Middle 11 12 18 19 18 17
education Total before 55 63 56 60 63 69
secondary
Matric/secondary 17 17 16 15 15 13
Higher secondary/ 12 10 12 13 11 10
intermediate
pre-university/
senior
secondary
Non-technical 0 0 0 0 0 0
diploma or
certificate not
equal to degree
Technical diploma 2 1 4 2 1 1
or certificate
not equal to
degree
Graduate and 13 9 11 10 10 8
above
Total secondary 44 36 44 40 36 31
and above
(Unclassified) 1 1 0 0 0 0

Change Total before −10 −12 −14 −15 −6 −7

since 2001 secondary
(percentage Total secondary 9 11 14 15 5 7
points) and above

Source: Census of India, 2011.

educational attainment of women may exacerbate existing gender-based

discrimination in the labour market as educational standards of recruit-
ment increase.
The much lauded Chief Minister’s Noon Meal Scheme, first launched un-
der Tamil Nadu’s former Chief Minister M.G. Ramachandran in July 1982,
aimed to ‘increase enrolment in schools and reduce dropouts’ by providing
a nutritious meal for all children at lunchtime (GoTN, 2002–2003, cited in
Swaminathan et al., 2004: 4811). However, concerns have been raised about
 Subnational policy in context 125
the dubious quality and quantity of meals, questionable implementation and
reporting practices, and vastly different experiences amongst the scheme’s
beneficiaries (Harriss-White, 2004b; Swaminathan et al., 2004). However,
studies do suggest that the scheme has encouraged enrolment and reduced
dropouts even though this is by no means universal across all categories,
and it has been influential beyond the state.

‘Gendered life chances’25: child sex ratios, reproductive health, and

violence against women
Whilst gendered inequalities in employment and education represent
s­ ocio-economic forms of structural violence and deprivation, women and
girls face direct forms of violence in other areas. In India, the sex ratio, cal-
culated as the number of females per 1,000 males, serves as a key indicator
of the status of women vis-à-vis men. Lower child sex ratios mark discrim-
inatory societal practices, most notably son preference, in household deci-
sions on fertility, nutrition, education, health care, and can involve extreme
strategies of female infanticide and female foeticide through sex-selective
abortions. Low child sex ratios are also caused indirectly by birth order and
the decision to stop having children after a son is born (Jeffrey et al., 2012).26
These practices have resulted in the phenomenon of ‘missing women’ (Sen,
1990; Das Gupta and Bhat, 1997; Drèze and Sen, 2002).
Low child sex ratios have commonly been associated with northern states,
but declining ratios in south India (and elsewhere) in recent decades has
caused further concern. Discriminatory practices such as son preference were
assumed to be ‘traditional practices’ which would wither away during pro-
cesses of modernisation, economic prosperity, and greater education. But it is
now well established that the unfavourable decline in the child sex ratio is oc-
curring alongside, with some arguing it is an integral element of, economic de-
velopment (Heyer, 1992; Harriss-White, 2001; Swaminathan, 2002; Kapadia,
2002a). Studies note some of the lowest sex ratios can be found in economically
‘developed’ states like Haryana and Punjab (in 2001, 861 and 876, respectively).
NFHS data show the child sex ratio steadily declines in ever higher wealth
quintiles and is lowest amongst more highly educated mothers (Kishor and
Gupta, 2009: 10, 12). A plausible explanation is that increasingly consumerist-­
oriented dowry practices, which serve as a means for capital accumulation
and economic upward mobility, have intensified discrimination towards the
girl child and the ‘radical devaluation of women’ (Kapadia, 2002a: 164, 170).27

… [I]n the popular imaginary, “dowry” is …the quintessential moder-

nity because it provides the fast track to class mobility. The capital
transfer embodied in “dowry” is the single largest sum of money that
most men will receive in their entire lives…“[D]owry” is “necessary” to
every man, because those men who don’t receive it are left behind.
(Kapadia, 2002a: 164)
126 Subnational policy in context
Policymakers and social reformers were advised to rethink dowry not as a
‘traditional’ practice, but intrinsic to modernity and modernisation, and
therefore not something likely to ‘disappear as India “modernises”’ (ibid: 164).
Low child sex ratios have posed problems in Tamil Nadu and Andhra
Pradesh at different times. Both states have higher sex ratios than the na-
tional average, for all ages, 0–6 years, and in both rural and urban areas
(Census 2011; see Table 5.10). Tamil Nadu witnessed a longer term decline
in its sex ratio (all ages) since 1901, decreasing sharply until the 1970s, more
moderately thereafter until 1991. The long-term trend for Andhra Pradesh is
more mixed, starting from a lower base and seeing Tamil Nadu’s ratio come
into line with its own (see Figure 5.1). Both states’ ratios (all ages) improved
in 2001 and 2011. But Tamil Nadu’s child sex ratio remained virtually static
between 2001 and 2011, recovering from an earlier decline, whereas a recent
decline in Andhra Pradesh’ child sex ratio means it has now fallen below
that for Tamil Nadu.
Some important inter- and intra-state differences include variations be-
tween and within social groups and communities. SC communities in both
states tend to have similar or higher sex ratios than the national average for
all ages and for 0–6 years.28 For STs, sex ratios are mostly the same or lower
than the national average, with the child sex ratio amongst Tamil Nadu’s ST
communities strikingly lower at 918. Whilst the child sex ratio for ST com-
munities is declining elsewhere in India, it has declined particularly sharply
in both Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh and should be cause for serious
concern.29 In some districts of Andhra Pradesh, the child sex ratio amongst
STs is as low as 823, widening the gap between SC and ST child sex ratios.

Table 5.10 S
 ex ratios for Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and all-India, 2011

Andhra Pradesh Tamil Nadu All-India

All 0– 6 All 0– 6 All 0– 6

ages years ages years ages years

Sex ratio (number Total 993 939 996 943 943 918
of females per Rural 996 941 993 936 949 923
1,000 males) Urban 987 935 1000 952 929 905
SC 1008 959 1004 958 1008 933
ST 993 931 981 918 993 957
1991 (total) 966 975 (R) 981 945 (R) 927 945
1002 (U) 954 (U)
2001 (total) 978 961 987 942 933 927
Change 2001–2011 Total 15 −22 9 1 10 −9
(number of Rural 13 −24 1 3 3 −11
females per Urban 22 −23 18 −3 29 2
1,000 males) SC 27 −14 5 −1 72 −5
ST 21 −41 1 −27 15 −16

Source: Census of India, 1991, 2001, 2011.

Note: R = rural, U = urban.
 Subnational policy in context 127

1,060

1,040

1,020

1,000

980
Sex Ratio

960 All-India
940 Andhra Pradesh

920 Tamil Nadu

900

880

860
1901

1911

1921

1931

1941

1951

1961

1971

1981

1991

2001

2011
Year

Figure 5.1 C
 omparative sex ratios (all ages) for Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, and
all-India (1901–2011).

In Tamil Nadu, low child sex ratios have affected particular districts. In
2001, Tamil Nadu’s child sex ratio was prominently lower than the state aver-
age ‘in a contiguous belt of districts running south to north along a western
corridor of the state’ (Athreya and Chunkath, 2000: 4345). Salem district’s
ratio was most unfavourable at 811 (for rural areas) and, disturbingly, the
second lowest district ratio for rural areas in the country (GoI, 2003: 4),30
and the only district outside Haryana and Punjab amongst the country’s
worst ten districts. Ratios are more uniform across Andhra Pradesh, though
slightly higher in northern coastal districts. Child sex ratios are not as low as
in Tamil Nadu’s lowest districts, but the decline is more widespread, which
presents a different challenge if it further declines.
What explains Tamil Nadu’s low child sex ratios? Some point to the
increasing acceptance of female infanticide and female foeticide in Ta-
mil Nadu (Athreya and Chunkath, 2000; Harriss-White, 2001; Kapadia,
2002a), but also government propagation of a small family norm, which
combined with the ‘prevailing socio-cultural ethos of strong son prefer-
ence’ to threaten the survival of females of higher birth orders (Athreya and
Chunkath, 2000: 4348). A Danish government-funded project implemented
by the Government of Tamil Nadu (GoTN) during the late 1990s focused on
female infanticide using a strategy of social mobilisation, and was judged
successful in reducing incidences of female infanticide in Dharmapuri (Ath-
reya and Chunkath, 2000: 4347). However, the project’s evaluators warned
against complacency and advocated the creation of structural mechanisms
128 Subnational policy in context
for active monitoring against the re-emergence of female infanticide, with
proactive government involvement (Athreya and Chunkath, 2000: 4348).
More recent, Census data suggest efforts in Salem and Dharmapuri dis-
tricts made a long-term positive impact improving child sex ratios.31 How-
ever, the problem later appeared in two eastern districts: Cuddalore’s rural
child sex ratio rapidly declined from 957 to 878 as did Ariyalur’s from 946
to 890. These trends suggest new areas for attention, on top of continued
efforts to maintain previous improvements.
Women’s reproductive choices are affected by India’s population control
objective of replacement fertility levels of 2.1 children per couple. Tamil Nadu
achieved this towards the end of the 1980s and Andhra Pradesh in the mid-1990s.
More recent, NFHS data show both states have now dipped below replacement
levels, with some of the lowest fertility rates in the country. Past success in fertil-
ity control programmes has been facilitated by high institutional delivery rates
in Tamil Nadu (Van Hollen, 1998). Tamil Nadu, with more than 90 percent
of urban deliveries, has the second highest proportion of institutional deliver-
ies amongst major states after Kerala (NFHS data for 1998–1999 cited in GoI,
2002b: 248). Success also resulted from widespread use of contraceptive tech-
nologies, particularly in Andhra Pradesh. By the age of 25–29 years, more than
two-thirds of women in Andhra Pradesh had already been sterilised, and just
over half of women of the same age in Tamil Nadu (NFHS, 2008: 52, Table 21).
Corresponding figures for male sterilisation are a tiny fraction.
Family planning in India has officially adopted a more consensual ap-
proach after the horrors of compulsory sterilisation of men and women
during the 1970s Emergency. Yet several studies contest the notion that
the success in reducing fertility rates has been as co-operative as claimed
(Van Hollen, 1998; Swaminathan, 2002). In Tamil Nadu, Van Hollen’s mid-
1990s ethnographic research corroborated a previous study to suggest that
in urban-based government hospitals, contraceptive targets were achieved
through practices such as routine intrauterine device (IUD) insertion which
were not always consensual, either against the patient’s will or without their
knowledge (Van Hollen, 1998: 103; cf. Swaminathan, 1996, cited in Van
­Hollen, 1998). Van Hollen’s interviews and NGO campaigns pointed to a tar-
get culture amongst health institutions and workers which, combined with
high levels of female sterilisation, partly explain how Tamil Nadu achieved
its demographic transition so effectively, with serious consequences for
women’s reproductive rights. Though NGOs were successful in convincing
government ministers to officially end aggressive target-driven approaches,
Van Hollen’s follow-up visit suggested an enduring target culture. Recent
NFHS data also suggest that Tamil Nadu continues to promote female ster-
ilisation despite having achieved replacement fertility levels. Recent reports
also suggest IUD ‘camps’ in primary healthcare centres have emerged in the
state (HRW, 2012). Similar concerns have been raised in Andhra Pradesh
with regard to sterilisation camps.
It is also worrying that despite educational achievements, attitudes to-
wards spousal violence are reportedly more accepting in both states than
 Subnational policy in context 129
across all India, especially amongst women (see Table 5.11). A national sur-
vey on attitudes to wife-beating found that just over half of men and women
aged 15–49 years agreed a husband is justified in hitting or beating his wife
for at least one specified reason (Kishor and Gupta, 2009: 74).32 Agreement
was substantially higher in Andhra Pradesh, where around three-quarters
of women and men agreed, and slightly above average amongst women in
Tamil Nadu where nearly two thirds of women agreed, compared to just over
half of men (Kishor and Gupta, 2009: 81). Few states outside the North East
had levels of agreement similar to Andhra Pradesh. Figures for neighbouring
Kerala were similar to Tamil Nadu, once again demonstrating that conserv-
ative gender norms can exist alongside higher levels of education and pros-
perity.33 Furthermore, rates of spousal violence are higher in Tamil Nadu
than Andhra Pradesh (Kishor and Gupta, 2009: 108). Four out of ten mar-
ried women in Tamil Nadu had experienced spousal physical violence, the
fourth highest rate in the country out of 29 states, behind Bihar (56 percent),
Madhya Pradesh (43 percent), and Uttar Pradesh (41 percent), and on par
with Rajasthan (40 percent). Around one third of women in Andhra Pradesh
(34 percent) had experienced spousal violence, slightly above the all-India
average (30 percent) (ibid). Levels of spousal sexual violence are lower in both
states, though men and women’s attitudes towards sexual autonomy of mar-
ried women are less encouraging, particularly in Andhra Pradesh.
The analysis presented thus far suggests the two states share some simi-
larities compared to all-India, but also that Tamil Nadu is considered more

Table 5.11 Attitudes towards and experiences of gender-based violence in Tamil

Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, and all-India

Andhra Pradesh Tamil Nadu All-India

Percentage of women (15–49 years) allowed to go alone to market, health facility,

and outside community
Women respondents 37 54 37

Agreement amongst men and women regarding justification of ‘wife-beating’ (%)

Women 75 66 56
Men 73 52 54

Currently married women’s (age 15–49) experience of spousal violence (ever

experienced)
Physical 34 40 30
Sexual 3 3 8
Emotional 12 15 14

Percentage of women and men agreeing that wife’s refusal to have sex with her
husband is justifiable
Women 59 63 68
Men 65 73 71

Source: Compiled by the author from NHFS-3 survey data presented in Kishor and Gupta (2009).
130 Subnational policy in context
‘developed’ than Andhra Pradesh in many conventional development in-
dicators. However, gender inequalities are discernible in both states, and
sometimes more marked in Tamil Nadu. The picture is further complicated
by important intra-state variations according to caste, class, community,
religion, age, and locality (across districts and in rural/urban areas), high-
lighting the importance of intersectionality when considering gendered de-
velopment inequalities. Such a dynamic picture demonstrates that women’s
interests, already diverse, are also fragmented across Indian states, even
amongst neighbouring states, highlighting the importance of state-level pol-
icy which captures state-specific challenges.
Agriculture holds clear importance for women’s employment in both states,
and yet employment patterns are changing, and seemingly not always for the
better. Indications of growing casualisation, longer working hours, lower
pay, or more insecure work for women are cause for concern. Educational
improvements are laudable achievements but do not have straightforwardly
empowering effects, as attitudes towards dowry, the girl child and violence
against women show. Thus, some inequalities remain or have become recon-
figured whilst new forms of inequality emerge. This demonstrates the com-
plex relationship between economic development and gender (in)equality and
cautions against assumptions about what development can do for women’s
empowerment and gender equality.

Gender and socio-political histories in state politics

The remainder of the chapter explores socio-political constructions of gen-
der in state politics during the post-Independence period. Party political
and movement-based discourses in the states partially constitute social his-
tories of gender relations and norms; these discourses influence the condi-
tions of possibility for what can be articulated in development policy, and
partially determine the extent to which women mobilise collectively for gen-
der equality. Thus, dominant socio-political discourses in each state have
some bearing on how the state’s vision of desirable gender relations is artic-
ulated in state-level development policy discourse (discussed in Chapter 7),
and the extent to which this vision is adopted, subverted, or contested by
different actors in each state (discussed in Chapter 8).
The discussion is necessarily selective. For Tamil Nadu, this includes
the rise of Tamil cultural nationalist discourse, the politico-cultural pro-
ject of movement protagonists and party political conduit, the DMK, and
the ‘paternalist populism’ (Subramanian, 1999) of the AIADMK. I also
draw on analyses of more recent developments in Tamil politics, to ex-
plore whether the emergence of several smaller movements and parties
offered opportunities for alternatively conceptualising and articulating
demands for gender equality beyond dominant socio-political discourses.
For Andhra Pradesh, I focus on women’s participation in leftist agrarian
 Subnational policy in context 131
movements in the 1940s and 1970s, the gendered populist style of leader-
ship of N.T. Rama Rao (the leader of the regional Telugu Desam Party or
TDP), and the much-­documented women’s anti-arrack movement in the
early 1990s.

Gendered discourses of populism and cultural

nationalism in Tamil Nadu
Historical accounts of late twentieth-century Tamil politics show the declining
influence of the national Congress Party, transformation of the anti-­Brahmin
Self-Respect Movement into a political party (the ­Dravida Kazhagam) and
its later consolidation as the DMK, appealing to a Dravidian cultural na-
tionalism, and the subsequent emergence of the rival regional political party,
the ADMK. Since 1967, when under the leadership of C.N. ­Annadurai
the DMK was elected to the Tamil Nadu State Legislative Assembly,
­Tamil Nadu has been governed by either the DMK (1967–1977, 1989–1991,
1996–2001, 2006–2011) or the AIADMK (1977–1989, 1991–1996, 2001–2006,
2011–present). After Annadurai’s death, M. Karunanidhi led the DMK.
M.G. Ramachandran (hereafter MGR), a popular film-­actor-turned-politician
and prominent DMK leader, left the party in 1972 to form the ADMK (later
renamed the All India ADMK). Upon MGR’s death in 1987, a leadership
struggled ensued between two factions: the first led by his widow, Janaki, and
the second by his former co-star and AIADMK party propaganda secretary,
J. Jayalalithaa. The latter subsequently won the battle to succeed MGR as
party head, and remained leader until she passed away in December 2016.
Gender equality has featured discursively in state politics in various
forms: from the radical social reform agenda of the Self-Respect Movement
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with progressive ideas
on gender relations, and its subsequent demise in the mid-twentieth century;
cultural nationalist interpretations of gender relations DMK party dis-
course, and contrasting gendered discourses and politics of social welfare
in the competitive populisms of the two main rival parties from the 1980s.
Prominent scholars such as S. Anandhi, M.S.S. Pandian, S.V. ­Rajadurai,
and V. Geetha (cited in Harriss, 2002, and discussed below) lament the
demise of progressive Self-Respect discourse on gender equality, arguing
it represented a radical vision towards more equitable gender relations in
areas of marriage (including inter-caste marriage), work, and community
relations. These authors have deconstructed the gendered cultural nation-
alist discourses of the DMK, which gradually pushed out those of the Self-­
Respect Movement, and rearticulated gender relations through notions of
Tamil honour based on women’s chastity.
Rajadurai and Geetha (1996) discuss how the DMK attempted to recast
Tamil history by reinterpreting classic Tamil literary works to generate pop-
ular support for a cultural nationalist Tamil identity. Representations of
132 Subnational policy in context
Tamil identity posited notions of maanam (honour) which equated a wom-
an’s purity with the purity of the Tamil nation (ibid: 554). Drawing ­parallels
with Indian nationalism, Anandhi referred to Tamil nationalism as a
‘masculine dream’, arguing that ‘control over women and their sexuality has
been central to the construction of Tamil identity and Tamil nationalism…’
(2005: 4876). Cultural nationalists positioned ‘women, as markers of Tamil
national identity, … [and set] the boundaries of culturally acceptable fem-
inine conduct; … gender interests could only be articulated within these
parameters’ (ibid).
Thus, Tamil nationalist discourse positioned women as cultural reposito-
ries of the nation, evident in the gendered subjectification in Tamil nation-
alist discourse of woman as mother, in the imaginary of Tamilttay (Tamil
mother) and the thai-kulam (community of mothers) as cultural reproduc-
ers of the Tamil nation. The mother icon is one of the most enduring im-
ages of Tamil cultural discourse throughout the twentieth century. Though
­Tamilttay originated as an elite literary concept in classic Tamil literature,
epitomised as the ‘guardian deity of the Tamil-speaking community’ and the
personification of the Tamil language, it was popularised and reimagined as
a ‘frail and endangered mother to be protected by her “children”, the loyal
speakers of Tamil’ (Ramaswamy, 2001: 19). The protection of Tamilttay fea-
tured prominently in anti-Hindi language protests in the newly independent
Indian nation-state, sitting uncomfortably beside the Hindi Indian nation-
alist imaginary of Bharat Mata (‘Mother India’) (Ramaswamy, 2001: 21).
The importance given to women as mothers of the Tamil nation, specif-
ically mothers of Tamil sons, reified the role of motherhood in upholding
­Tamil national honour. Tamil mothers’ bodies became ‘sites of divinity,
sanctity and purity’ (Lakshmi, 1990: WS-80). Their bodies are endowed with
‘mystical qualities which make them “naturally” produce what is termed ‘the
milk of valour’ for their sons to infuse in their blood bravery and courage to
make them warriors…’ (ibid). Moreover, the protection of Tamil mothers be-
comes central to Tamil masculinity. Women’s identity becomes co-­terminous
with motherhood, and women as subjects of a gendered nationalist discourse
are positioned as a supportive rather than a transforming element.
This supportive role for Tamil women reflects in women’s limited partici-
pation in Tamil political party organisations and associated forms of activ-
ity. Lakshmi (1990) comments on how the DMK party organisation mirrored
familial structures, such that DMK women occupied supportive subservient
roles, limiting their party activities to ‘womanly’ areas, and limiting their par-
ticipation in decision-making and debates (Lakshmi, 1990: WS-81). Outside
main party structures, women have often been excluded from a key party po-
litical organisational activity – cinema fan clubs – both in the AIADMK and
the DMK (Dickey, 1993, 2003). The powerful symbiotic relationship between
Tamil cinema and politics has meant cinema has been used as ‘a political
springboard’ for aspiring politicians (with many leading politicians entering
politics from the film industry), and one of the most effective mechanisms
 Subnational policy in context 133
political leaders use to communicate with the electorate (Dickey, 1993: 340).34
Cinema fan clubs ‘provide a pre-existing network of supporters, often highly
organised, that can easily be transformed into a political cadre’ (Dickey,
1993: 342). However, gender norms restrict women’s participation in fan
clubs: clubs are ‘male institutions’ dominated by young men; their public
nature and the ‘vaguely licentious reputation of cinema’ pose dangers to a
woman’s reputation under prevailing cultural norms (Dickey, 2003: 214–217;
see also Dickey, 1993). Women also face time and mobility constraints for
leisure (ibid). These restrictions on women’s participation in film fan clubs
consequently limit opportunities for women’s induction into mainstream po-
litical parties, where fan clubs have provided important training grounds for
Tamil politicians (Dickey, 1993: 361; Dickey, 2003: 361).35
However, women had greater access to MGR’s films. The popularity of
MGR’s films was strategically beneficial for his subsequent political ca-
reer, including the AIADMK’s appeal to women voters. Narratives of so-
cial struggle against inequality, the representation of women in his films
and their treatment by MGR’s characters influenced his political persona
and immense popularity in Tamil politics, enabling him to shape debates
about gender relations in Tamil society. MGR’s films appealed to women
in several ways (Pandian, 1996): subverting conventional power structures
that determined marriage choices such as parental authority and class and
caste norms; presenting MGR’s character as guardian and protector in an
environment rife with physical and sexual violence towards women; MGR’s
characters’ adoration of the mother-figure; and MGR’s self-positioning as
the object of female desire (Pandian, 1996: 536–539). What may be over-
estimated, however, is the transformative potential of MGR’s films with
regard to prevailing gendered inequities in Tamil society. Pandian argues
MGR’s films rarely developed ‘a subversive critique of the iniquitous sys-
tem which [MGR’s films] portray[ed]…’, instead resolving conflict within the
male-dominated system, reaffirming it rather than transcending it (1996:
535). Conservative gender norms are ‘defended as embodying the foremost
“womanly virtues”’ (Pandian, 1996: 540). Thus, MGR’s films did little to
envision a more gender egalitarian order.
The paternalist approach to women evident in MGR’s films became prom-
inent in state politics, as part of a competitive populist dynamic made possi-
ble by MGR’s establishment of a party rival to the DMK, the (AI)ADMK, in
1972 (Swamy, 1998). Several authors suggest that despite this break, the two
parties initially remained virtually identical in ideology; Dickey suggests the
split was more a personality clash between Karunanidhi and MGR (Dickey,
1993). In contrast, Swamy argues that ‘MGR’s accession to power marked
a shift in the politics of Tamil Nadu from one characteristically associated
with issues relating to upward mobility to one in which social welfare poli-
cies became the hallmark of the state’ (1998: 119). Issues of social inequality,
welfare, justice, and development have been constituted through two com-
peting populist styles in the 1990s and beyond (discussed in Chapter 7).
134 Subnational policy in context
Both Swamy (1998) and Subramanian (1999) have attempted to define and
analyse the two parties’ distinct styles of populism. Swamy (1998) distin-
guishes between the ‘empowerment populism’ of the DMK and the ‘pro-
tection populism’ of the AIADMK. Similarly, Subramanian (1999) refers
to the ‘assertive populism’ of the DMK’ and the ‘paternalistic populism’
of the AIADMK. Both authors adopt a similar understanding of populism
as ‘a style of political rhetoric that describes society as a conflict between
‘the common people’ and a narrow elite, demanding greater privileges for
out-groups on behalf of ‘the people’’ (Swamy, 1998: 110). The DMK’s em-
powerment populism is based upon notions of upward mobility. Along
with cultural nationalist appeals to Dravidian, and later Tamil, identity,
the DMK also mobilised on the issue of poverty, a significant theme in the
DMK’s delegitimation of the Congress Party as a representative of the poor
in the 1967 election (Swamy, 1998: 117). But the DMK had problems appeal-
ing to lower caste groups and the poorest, exacerbated by the death of the
popular DMK leader, C.N. Annadurai, in 1969, and the leadership acces-
sion of M.K. Karunanidhi, who enjoyed more popularity with the backward
classes but did not then have mass appeal (Swamy, 1998).
In contrast to the DMK’s ‘empowerment populism’, Swamy defines the
AIADMK’s protection populism as ‘a rhetoric that emphasises themes of
vulnerability, offering to protect “the weak” and “truly needy”’ (1998: 110).
Similar is Subramaniam’s (1999) ‘paternalist’ populism, which articulates
the state as a paternalist and benevolent protector of the poor and vulner-
able. Studies of the AIADMK’s popular appeal and their social welfare
policies often emphasise how MGR’s popular political image and policy
orientation drew on his film roles (Pandian, 1992; Dickey, 1993). MGR most
commonly played a crusader against tyranny, a champion of the poor, and a
protector of women (Swamy, 1998: 135). MGR’s policies focused, in a much
more limited sense, on the poorest, rather than the backward classes or in-
termediate social groups and he directed social policies such as prohibition
towards women (ibid: 119). MGR came from a high caste background but
had a poor childhood due to his father’s early death, and he often referred
to his ‘mother’s plight’ to justify his concern for widows and abandoned
women (ibid). Partly due to MGR’s appeal, his rhetorical style of ‘protection
populism’, and his consistent appeal to women, the AIADMK opened up a
gender and class voting gap (ibid: 112). Women and the poorest comprised
a greater share of the AIADMK’s electoral base compared to the DMK;
opinion polls showed women and illiterate voters supported MGR in larger
numbers than men and college-educated voters, and opposition to Karuna-
nidhi was more marked amongst women voters (ibid: 121).
After MGR’s death in 1987, his political heir and former co-star
J. ­Jayalalithaa continued his paternalist or protective populist legacy. This
political style is thus significant for how gender relations are articulated
through populist party political discourses, and how the proximity of state-
level party politics to government, policymaking and the bureaucracy, and
 Subnational policy in context 135
the development of an identity-based politics constrains a more comprehen-
sive state-level policy of redistribution. The contrasting empowerment and
protection populisms invoke tension ‘as visions of social justice…’ which
accordingly ‘…allows them to be championed by rival parties under com-
petitive conditions’ (Swamy, 1998: 110).
The extent to which these political styles affect the discursive substance
of gendered development policy is a question explored in later chapters, as
is how competitive party politics and personalised political leadership influ-
ence gendered development policy. Following these two populism models,
we expect to find the DMK’s cultural nationalism infuses state discourses on
women’s empowerment in conservative ways, as will the AIADMK’s claims
of concern for women’s welfare but in a way that perpetuates women’s de-
pendence on a paternalistic state, positioning its pursuit of gender equality
as a benevolent act rather than a constitutional obligation to citizens. We
might expect the close identification of party politics with social policies
to have a substantial impact on state-level policy on gender-equitable de-
velopment; alternatively, the state bureaucracy might enjoy relative auton-
omy from party political elites, who may be more concerned with superficial
repackaging of state policy on gender-equitable development according to
their populist rhetorical styles. These issues are examined in later chapters.
A later development in Tamil politics is also noteworthy: the political
mobilisation of Dalits and the rise of smaller caste-based parties such as
the Dalit Panthers of India (DPI), and the Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK),
the latter a party appealing to the Vanniyar ‘backward’ caste community
concentrated in northern Tamil Nadu (see Harriss, 2002; Wyatt, 2004, 2010;
Gorringe, 2005). What is particularly interesting about this development
is the complex relationship between the Tamil Nadu Dalit movement and
gender, and the Dalit movement’s caste-based solidarity with Dalit women.
Anandhi argues that in the case of the DPI, its transition ‘from a political
movement to a party seems to have led to a dramatic dilution of its radical-
ism’ (Anandhi, 2005: 4877). Previously, the movement invoked the radical
progressive values of Periyar and the Self-Respect Movement, including
the rejection of the violent masculine imposition of women’s chastity (ibid).
But events such as the establishment of the Tamil Protection Movement by
the DPI and PMK demonstrate attempts to revive a pan-Tamil identity, to
‘expand their support base beyond their respective caste constituencies’
(Anandhi, 2005: 4876). In a particular episode in September 2005. Kushboo,
a popular Tamil film actress, during a Tamil Magazine interview on wom-
en’s sexuality, spoke openly about cultural taboos on women’s virginity and
sexuality. Kushboo argued that, contrary to cultural expectations, many
women engaged in pre-marital sex and were not virgins at the time of mar-
riage. The DPI and PMK protested, claiming the actress had insulted the
morality and dignity of Tamil women, thus mobilising a gendered Tamil cul-
tural nationalism. The PMK’s women’s wing filed defamation cases against
Kushboo. Anandhi concluded at the time, ‘the past of the DMK has become
136 Subnational policy in context
the present of the DPI and the PMK’ (2005: 4876). Moreover, the DPI’s new-
found role as protector of an ‘homogenised, hegemonic, collective identity
of the “Tamil women”’ undermined gains made by Dalit women’s organisa-
tions in the state to gain recognition for Dalit women’s specific identity and
experience, distinct from upper caste women and Dalit men and between
multiple oppressions suffered by Dalit women (Anandhi, 2005: 4877). These
events demonstrate the resilience and diffusion of the DMK’s early conserv-
ative cultural nationalist discourse.
In summary, the DMK’s early conservative Tamil cultural nationalist
discourse revised the more gender egalitarian ethos of the earlier Dravid-
ian Self-Respect Movement, positioning women as cultural repositories of
the nation, foregrounding their role as mothers of Tamil sons. With the rise
of MGR’s leadership of the breakaway AIADMK party, women became
one amongst several favoured beneficiary groups of his paternalist style of
leadership, demonstrating a gendered and class-based style of populism.
Yet, neither the DMK’s conservative cultural nationalist discourse nor the
­AIADMK’s paternalist populism offered much potential for gender egali-
tarianism in Tamil Nadu. Furthermore, both party organisations present
few opportunities for women’s leadership to challenge dominant gender
norms, despite Jayalalithaa’s leadership of the AIADMK after MGR’s
death in 1987. The emergent smaller movements and related political parties
have also not offered much potential for more gender egalitarian relations,
rearticulating the dominant socio-political discourses in the state.

Left-wing agrarian movements, populism, and state co-optation in

Andhra Pradesh
Historically, women in Andhra Pradesh actively participated in political
and social movements but were often disappointed with movement out-
comes. One example is the Telangana struggle, documented in oral histo-
ries by Lalita et al. (1989). Whilst India was transitioning to Independence
in the late 1940s, an anti-feudal struggle occurred in the Telangana region
(1946–1951), with rural lower castes mobilised against forced labour (vetti)
and exploitation by upper caste landlords. The movement operated through
the Communist-dominated Andhra Maha Sabha, forming sanghams (move-
ment groups) at the grassroots.
The Telangana movement differed significantly from the character of the
women’s movement at the time, attracting rural low caste women rather
than urban middle and upper caste women. Party support for women’s sym-
bolic participation in the movement remained marginal, positioning women
as ‘supportive’ despite extensive participation. Communist Party of India
(CPI) leader, Ch. Rajeshwar Rao, said of the time, ‘We praised women when
they came, but we did not do anything to encourage them to come… They
fought boldly, organised shelters, brought food etc. [Yet] the party made no
special efforts to attract them.’ (quoted in Lalita et al., 1989: 17).
 Subnational policy in context 137
The party’s reluctance to encourage women’s participation was partly
because of how the movement’s struggle was conceptualised. A CPI party
document acknowledged: ‘We always viewed … [women’s] problems as a
separate issue. Due to this attitude, we only succeeded in making them
sympathetic to the movement, but could not involve them as a direct force
in the fight’ (cited in Lalita et al., 1989: 17). Women’s participation in the
movement also challenged societal norms: ‘women had to fight against tra-
ditional beliefs and a feudal outlook even to become a part of the political
struggle’ (Lalita et al., 1989: 263). This posed a problem for the party ‘be-
cause their protection was a problem’ (Ch. Rajeswar Rao, quoted in Lalita
et al., 1989: 17), and they were seen as ‘separate, embarrassing and burden-
some’ (Lalita et al., 1989: 263). Women’s oral narratives of their experience
in the Telangana movement suggest ‘women often felt used and then cast
aside’ and that within the movement there was a ‘brooding, pervasive sense
that women were “problems”’, articulated not always explicitly but in ‘every-
day moments of dismissive encounter’ (Lalita et al., 1989: 25).
Despite their symbolically marginal status in the Telangana movement,
Lalita et al.’s analysis suggests their participation was liberating and empow-
ering: ‘they believed it was possible to break with custom – to travel alone,
travel at night, carry guns, act as couriers, fight in squads – all of which they
did’ (1989: 261). Women’s involvement increased their consciousness:

Reading, writing, discussing political questions, attending classes, ad-

dressing public meetings and organising women gave [women] a very
positive sense of their role…[The Party] gave them the tools to under-
stand their social reality and was a source of enormous strength and
clarity. They felt that the struggle brought them wisdom, knowledge,
clarity and enormous physical stamina.
(Lalita et al., 1989: 261)

Yet this positive sense of the movement’s impact on women’s agency was ac-
companied by disappointment at the lack of change (Lalita et al., 1989: 25).
Women felt frustrated when asked to return to their families when the move-
ment ended; as Brij Rani attested, ‘what do you think it means, to wield
weapons in the struggle and sit before sewing machines now?’ (quoted in
Lalita et al., 1989: 18).

Contemporary electoral politics

Since the formation of Andhra Pradesh along linguistic lines in 1956, the
Congress Party has dominated government and party politics in the state,
until the 1980s when a regional-based party, the TDP, was elected to the
State Assembly in 1983.36 The leader of the TDP, N.T. Rama Rao, was a
populist leader and former film actor, who had rapidly established the party
and came to power astonishingly within less than a year. The Congress
138 Subnational policy in context
regained political office in 1989 but were elected out of office in 1994. The
TDP returned to government from 1994 to 1999 and 1999 to 2004, mostly
under the leadership of Chandrababu Naidu, NTR’s son-in law, after Naidu
deposed NTR in a party leadership coup in 1995. The Congress Party re-
turned to government in the 2004 State Assembly elections, and again in
2009, fighting off the challenge posed by a new party, the Praja Rajyam
Party, led by another popular Telugu film actor, Chiranjeevi. Other par-
ties in state politics were those from the Left (CPI, CPI(M)), less so in re-
cent years after the Left’s popularity declined (Srinivasulu, 2011), and the
Telangana Rashtra Samiti (TRS). The TRS was driven by its campaign for
Telangana statehood, enjoying some early influence and electoral success
followed by decline (Srinivasulu, 2011: 303–304), until the state’s electoral
context changed with the death of Congress Chief Minister Y.S.R. Reddy
in 2009. The national Congress-led coalition government granted separate
statehood in 2014, and the TRS was elected to the new Telangana state gov-
ernment on the basis of their majority of seats in the newly formed state’s
territory.
The rise of the TDP was significant as an alternative to Congress Party
dominance, and for caste and regional identity politics. According to Suri,
‘the emergence of the TDP heralded a new era in AP politics’ as a result
of increased inter-party competition and electoral choice (2006: 283). Suri
offers five different explanations for the formation and rising popularity of
the TDP, centring on firstly, intra-caste rivalry between the two dominant
peasant castes, the Reddy’s (which dominated the Congress Party) and the
Kammas (who formed the TDP); secondly, the importance of the backward
caste vote after their alienation from the Congress Party; third, the issue
of Telugu self-respect in protest at Indira Gandhi’s centralising tendencies
during the late 1970s and early 1980s and her encouragement of factionalism
within the Congress Party in AP; fourthly, increasing demands for state-
level autonomy as a result of a conflict between an emerging regional bour-
geoisie and their national counterpart; and lastly, the ability of the TDP to
attract the vote of non-Congress political parties (Suri, 2006: 284–287). Suri
concludes that all these explanations have some merit, but each alone are
insufficient to explain the TDP’s rise.
The TDP’s rise in the 1980s and 1990s was also significant for gender pol-
itics. NTR’s charismatic leadership and populist appeals helped build the
TDP’s popularity. Kannabiran (1997) is one of few studies on the TDP pay-
ing attention to N.T. Rama Rao’s charismatic appeal and paternalist and
benevolent persona amongst women voters. Kannabiran argues ‘women
have always been central to the rhetoric of the Telugu Desam Party, since its
inception. N.T. Rama Rao entered politics appealing to Telugu mothers and
sisters to use their political will to bring his party into power, since his party
was the only one that held the promise of a ‘better life for women’’ (1997:
1237). Similar to MGR, he harnessed the patron-protector and benevolent
elder brother roles he played as a film actor (although NTR’s characters
 Subnational policy in context 139
were rarely common heroes, more mythological characters or kings) (ibid).
NTR particularly appealed to women because his rhetoric starkly con-
trasted the inability of the Congress government to stem the rising tide of
violence against women in the state (Kannabiran, 1997: 1236). Thus, ‘when
NTR came with his offerings of equal property rights and a safe and clean
environment free of violence, women were more than eager to give him a
chance…’ (Kannabiran, 1997: ibid). His scheme of rice for Rs 2 a kilo was
also popular amongst women, and he implemented reservations for women
in local bodies. However, as women’s experience of campaigning for prohi-
bition in AP show, the TDP’s willingness to address women’s demands was
ultimately limited.

The anti-arrack movement

The struggles discussed so far were not specifically or solely ‘women’s
struggles’ but part of larger struggles, evidencing women’s participation in
more radical but still mainstream movements. In contrast, the anti-arrack
movement in AP in the early 1990s was a specifically women-led movement
against the sale of arrack (saara in Telugu, meaning country liquor). The
movement, crystallising in Nellore district in the early 1990s, and leading to
the (albeit temporary) state prohibition of arrack, is now well documented
(see Anveshi, 1993; Reddy and Patnaik, 1993; Rao and Parthasarathy, 1997;
Pande, 2002). The large-scale mobilisation of poor lower caste women
resulted from a state-directed literacy programme which used literacy
towards empowerment. The programme materials sought to raise awareness
and provoke debate on social issues. Through this programme, women be-
came increasingly agitated around what they saw as the underlying reasons
for domestic violence and poverty: alcohol consumption by male household
members and the presence of arrack shops in their villages.
The political economy of arrack is significant to the Andhra Pradesh
­government – excise revenue is sourced from liquor sales and from licensing
fees from liquor contractors. In 1991–1992, arrack was the largest source of
revenue from liquor sales (Rs. 630.27 crores), and excise taxes constituted
8 percent of state taxes (Anveshi, 1993: 87). Arrack sales were also linked
to the village labour economy – landlords often paid labourers in arrack
tokens rather than cash or other goods. Furthermore, arrack sales had
risen rapidly between 1981 and 1991 due to a deliberate state-led market-
ing strategy known as ‘varun vahini’ (‘the flood of liquor’) which packeted
liquor in individual sachets, partly to facilitate convenient consumption
beyond conventional public drinking spaces (ibid). The Congress govern-
ment at the height of the movement’s expansion was reluctant to concede
women’s demands because arrack generated revenue and was a source of
power from patronage of liquor contracts. But the women’s anti-arrack
movement successfully closed liquor shops, protested against and prevented
the state-sponsored sale and marketing of arrack, and eventually achieved
140 Subnational policy in context
their goal of prohibition in October 1993. The movement also effected con-
siderable changes in the lives of the lower caste, rural (but later also urban)
women participating in the movement, raising awareness, spreading the
movement’s message, and encouraging other women to mobilise and protest
against arrack, to combat domestic violence and poverty.
However, the movement ultimately exemplified the state’s willingness
and ability to co-opt the demands of the women’s movement, motivated by
electoral compulsions to capture women’s votes (Kannabiran, 1997: 1237).
Movement support began to evaporate once it became a partisan issue sup-
ported by the TDP opposition (Pande, 2002: 360). But the TDP successfully
converted its support of the prohibition movement into women’s votes in
the 1994 election; the newly elected TDP implemented prohibition soon af-
ter. Prohibition was short-lived, however, and lifted from November 1995,
when the TDP’s new leader, Chandrababu Naidu, faced opposition to tax
increases intended as an alternative source of revenue to replace lost liquor
excise duties (Pande, 2002: 360). Thus, women’s votes were deemed insuf-
ficiently important to continue prohibition. The reneged promises of the
AP government on prohibition evidences the reluctance of political elites
and the Indian state to uphold demands for change generated through their
own programmes of social mobilisation and empowerment.37 The anti-­
arrack stories were removed from the texts used by the state-led literacy
programmes (Pande, 2002: 360).
Naidu’s TDP instead sought women’s votes by reviving Development of
Women and Children in Rural Areas (DWCRA) groups (an earlier form of
self-help groups) and distributed funds to these groups. National Election
Survey data showed a gender voting gap with women more in favour of the
TDP than men by 10 percentage points (50–40 percent) (Srinivasulu, 2011:
297). However, women’s support returned to the Congress Party in the 2004
election due to greater attention to the rural crisis, promises of a broad wel-
fare policy package, and low interest loans to DWCRA groups (Srinivasulu,
2011: 298). In the 2009 election, both TDP and Congress lost some support
from women voters, and a slightly higher proportion of women than men
(13.5 percent women and 11.5 percent men) supported the new Praja Rajyam
Party (NES 2009 data, in Srinivasulu, 2011: 298).
Congress Chief Minister Y.S.R. Reddy was often associated with devel-
opment and populist welfare policies, including election pledges and poli-
cies aimed at women voters (Srinivasulu, 2011; discussed in later chapters).
YSR developed some autonomy from the central Congress Party leadership
in Delhi, acting almost as a regional party with a highly centralised lead-
ership in the state (ibid). However, with his accidental death in September
2009, the leadership trajectory and electoral support for the Congress Party
became unclear. Then Finance Minister and long-serving Congress politi-
cian, K. Rosaiah, was appointed Chief Minister, but later resigned on health
grounds and Kiran Kumar Reddy, a reported YSR loyalist and former
Assembly Speaker, was appointed Chief Minister. Meanwhile, YSR’s son
 Subnational policy in context 141
Y.S. Jaganmohan Reddy, an MP, split from the Congress Party and formed
the YSR Congress, managing to persuade some Congress leaders to join,
and achieved some success in subsequent by-elections. But in August 2011
a CBI investigation was ordered by the Andhra Pradesh High Court and
­Jaganmohan Reddy was arrested in May 2012 in a disproportionate assets
case (The Hindu, 2012). The longer term impact on the electoral support of
the Congress Party, and thus the broader long-term policy context, is still
unclear, but in the 2014 state elections, the TDP under Chandrababu Naidu
returned to government. The new YSR Congress still managed to win 70 of
293 seats available, with the original Congress Party winning only 20 seats.
Simultaneously, the TRS formed the government in the new Telangana state.

Comparing socio-political histories

Important similarities and differences within and between the two states
demonstrate the diversity of the broader subnational socio-political con-
text. Both states historically experienced regionally concentrated social
movements, engaging, albeit in limited ways, with the question of gender in-
equality and women’s participation, but ultimately offered limited substan-
tial opportunities for changes in gender relations. In both states, regional
parties emerged, two appealing specifically to women voters (AIADMK in
Tamil Nadu and TDP in Andhra Pradesh), albeit in ways which reinforced
conservative gender norms. Regional parties have become politically insti-
tutionalised in state government (and at the national level in recent years)
and have therefore become important actors in state-led development. But
significant differences remain between the two states. Regional parties have
not emerged under the same conditions or followed similar trajectories (Suri,
2006: 281). The TDP and DMK (and later AIADMK) have different origins
(ibid); the nature of regional party competition in the state is different; the
Congress retained influence in Andhra Pradesh longer than in Tamil Nadu.
This suggests a complex relationship between state and national development
policy, with different levels of influence of national parties on state-level pol-
icy, though permutations of coalition politics complicate this dynamic.
Notwithstanding early feminist debates of Tamil Nadu’s Self-Respect
Movement, the women’s movement appears stronger and more mobilised in
Andhra Pradesh, possibly due to the stronger presence of left-wing politics
compared to Tamil Nadu. It is unclear what role women played in Dalit
movements emerging in AP from the 1980s, and whether these movements
incorporated understanding of Dalit women’s oppression within movement
discourse, since there are few detailed studies.

Conclusions
This chapter explored the broader socio-economic and socio-political dy-
namics which constitute the context for gendered subnational state-led
142 Subnational policy in context
development in these two states. Gendered development is highly complex
and nuanced, intersecting with unequal relations of caste, class, space,
and place. Generalisations about levels of subnational development must
be watchful of simplistic assumptions about relative women’s status and
whether gender relations are more egalitarian in south India. Tamil Nadu is
not universally more developed and gender-egalitarian compared to Andhra
Pradesh. Higher income and more industrialised states like Tamil Nadu
may experience new challenges of inequality, marginalisation and depriva-
tion in the context of economic change. Possibilities for articulating feminist
strategies of gender-equitable development may be enabled or constrained
by broader socio-historical and political developments. Analyses of state-
level policies of development must sufficiently consider their embeddedness
in state-specific socio-economic and historical contexts and the conditions
of possibility these contexts constitute.
The next two chapters focus on state-level initiatives that have exhibited
an interest, in various ways, in addressing gender inequalities in Tamil Nadu
and Andhra Pradesh.

Notes
1 ‘Andhra Pradesh’ refers to the state pre-2014 bifurcation.
2 The state rose from sixth in the country in per capita income (Rs. 23,358) af-
ter Haryana, Maharashtra, Punjab, Gujarat, and Kerala (GoI, 2007: Table 18).
However, relative positions depend on specific figures used and baseline. The
Tamil Nadu Human Development Report (2003), using per capita income data
(2000–2001) ranked the state fourth amongst major States and first amongst
southern States. Both sets of figures compare major States (population over
10 million).
3 Tamil Nadu scored a higher HDI than Andhra Pradesh in 1996 and 2006, but
still only ranked 16th in 2006. Whilst both states’ HDI scores improved from
1996 to 2006, Tamil Nadu’s improved more (see Table 5.2). The Government
of India’s Economic Survey (2014–2015) shows Tamil Nadu placed higher than
Andhra Pradesh in HDI rankings, improving in HDI scores from 1999 to 2000,
but Andhra Pradesh improved faster than Tamil Nadu, rising above the national
average, though from a lower base (GoI, 2014).
4 Government poverty headcounts and measurement criteria are contested,
criticised for their unrealistically low household income/expenditure levels
for defining poverty (Roy, in Times of India, 2011). Changes in measurements
make comparison difficult over time. The national Below-Poverty-Line crite-
ria (­Tendulkar method) estimated that in 2009–2010 only 29 percent of India’s
population were poor, compared to 42 percent using the international measure
of US$1.25 a day (OPHI, 2010). The Oxford Poverty and Human Development
Initiative’s (OPHI) Multidimensional Poverty Index uses several criteria be-
yond income, and estimates an even higher proportion of 55 percent (ibid). The
Planning Commission’s Rangarajan committee adopted a different methodol-
ogy, revising the Tendulkar estimates of the all-India population in poverty in
­2009–2010 upwards to 38 percent (Planning Commission, 2014; see Table 5.2).
5 OPHI estimates almost one-third in poverty in Tamil Nadu compared to 45 per-
cent in Andhra Pradesh, in 2005–2006 (OPHI, 2010), whereas the Rangarajan
method places estimates closer together.
 Subnational policy in context 143
6 See Table 5.2. Both states have a 0.011 difference between HDI and GDI scores.
Official report compiled by Indian Institute of Public Administration, Delhi, for
the Ministry of Women and Child Development, supported by UNDP.
7 Tamil Nadu’s decline in score might be explained by the 1996–2006 decline in
women in the civil service and enrolment in medical and engineering colleges
(few states declined in this indicator over the same period). Gains in the indi-
cator of political participation and decision-making power were not enough to
offset this decline relative to other states’ achievements, pushing Tamil Nadu’s
position down the ranking, in one of the largest overall declines in rankings
amongst all states between 1996 and 2006.
8 Women’s increased income-earning capacity may increase their intra-household
financial independence and thus their social standing, voice within the family,
and agency overall (Drèze and Sen, 2002: 246). Women’s increased labour force
participation may have positive effects on household expenditure, such as in
child nutrition and health care.
9 This may be due to reduced capacity to meet consumption needs arising from
unemployment or underemployment of other income earners in the household,
reduction in wages, or increasing rents and consumer prices. Furthermore, the
freedom of income-earning women to spend on education, nutrition, and health
care for family members assumes sufficient income and some security and au-
tonomy to spend the income.
10 Though if they return at a higher income or skill level, a U-shaped curve results
in women’s work participation rates (for discussion of the Indian context, see
Das et al., 2015).
11 Other non-workers include students, dependents such as infants and the elderly
not included as workers, pensioners, ‘beggars, vagrants [and prostitutes’, pris-
oners, those officially seeking work, and others deemed as not working (GoI,
2005a). The NSS collects data on these activities under two separate codes.
12 The definition of a main worker is having undertaken no less than six months’
work in the 12 months preceding the census survey period; a marginal worker
is defined as having undertaken less than six months work in the preceding 12
months.
13 ‘Usual status’ denotes a majority of time spent on an activity over the preceding
year, whereas current weekly status has a minimum threshold of one hour on
one day in the preceding seven days, and current daily status has a threshold of
four hours or more in the previous week (Ghosh, 2009).
14 Ghosh argues that whilst the NSSO classification is not perfect, it is better than
census data at capturing women’s work activity, though census data still provide
valuable coverage of broad trends (Ghosh, 2009: 54–56).
15 Female WPRs in rural areas vary by district from 24 percent (rural East
­Godavari) to 51 percent (rural Vizianagram), both northern coastal districts.
16 Census data show slightly different figures to the NSS: more than half of female
workers in AP are classed as agricultural labourers, rising to two-thirds of rural
female workers (see Table 5.5). This can be mostly explained by the distinction
between cultivator and agricultural labourer in the census data, whereas NSS
data record work by sector (agriculture).
17 Just over 80 percent of male workers in five sectors (agriculture, manufactur-
ing, construction, wholesale and retail trade, and transportation and storage),
whereas women workers in Tamil Nadu tend to be concentrated in three sectors
(78 percent in agriculture, manufacturing, and construction) and in two sectors
in Andhra Pradesh (77 percent in agriculture and manufacturing, with the next
largest being construction, another 6 percent of women workers). The fourth
largest sector for both men and women workers in both states is wholesale and
retail trade.
144 Subnational policy in context
18 Census data over time suggest a casualisation of employment, indicated by the
shift from main to marginal workers status in the two states, between 1991 and
2001, with the exception of urban female workers. Comparing 2001 and 2011
data shows a mixed picture, but in rural areas in both states there was a shift
towards main status for women overall, but towards marginal status for women
in urban Andhra Pradesh.
19 Tamil Nadu’s State Human Development Report attributes this to agrarian
transformation and mechanisation of agriculture, reducing demand for labour
(GoTN, 2003: 27).
20 According to the Government of India’s Economic Survey for 2013–2014, T ­ amil
Nadu recorded the highest number of person days per household (59 days) for
MGNREGA amongst major states (GoI, 2013), higher than the average for
Andhra Pradesh (50 days), and the all-India average (46 days). Tamil Nadu’s
share of women’s employment under NREGA at 84.1 percent, is the second high-
est (Kerala’s is 93.4 percent), and higher than Andhra Pradesh at 58.7 percent
(GoI, 2013: 236–237, 239).
21 One study suggests gendered occupational segregation negatively affected op-
portunities for growth in women’s employment and is partly responsible for
women’s declining labour force participation between 2005 and 2010 amid high
growth (Kapsos et al., 2014).
22 The male-female disparity in literacy rates is highest in Ariyalur district and
lowest in Kanyakumari district.
23 After the state capital of Hyderabad, the coastal district of West Godavari
has the highest literacy and surpasses Hyderabad for female literacy, includ-
ing SC and ST females. Mahbubnagar district registers the lowest literacy for
the same groups. The largest gender differential in literacy rates is recorded
in Cuddapah district (76 percent males and 50 percent females); the smallest
differential is in coastal East Godavari district (70 percent for males and 61
percent for females).
24 Between 2001 and 2011, both states saw increases in completed secondary or
higher education, above the national average. Male completion of secondary ed-
ucation was higher in Andhra Pradesh than Tamil Nadu in 2001, but the larger
increase in Tamil Nadu during 2001–2011 brought them level.
25 Term adapted from Harriss-White’s essay (2001).
26 NFHS national data on small families show sex ratios amongst first, second,
and third birth orders are adverse for girl children, particularly in more recent
rounds, with 762 girls per 1,000 boys at the birth of a couple’s second child
(Kishor and Gupta, 2009: 13). Figures are slightly higher for Tamil Nadu (819)
and Andhra Pradesh (844). ‘Last births’ show even lower child sex ratios at 630
girls for every 1,000 boys amongst women sterilised after their last birth (Kishor
and Gupta, 2009: 14). This figure is similar across levels of wealth and education
(ibid: 15).
27 Caplan (1985) distinguishes between consumer-oriented dowry (gifts in cash,
white goods, a car or moped) and traditional stridhanam (such as gold bangles).
The latter served as a pre-mortem inheritance from parents to the bride, kept
by the bride and only converted into cash in dire need. It is consumer-oriented
dowry, not stridhanam, that is commonly denounced as ‘the social evil of dowry’,
but still widely practiced (Caplan, 1985: 45–48).
28 2001 Census data for child sex ratios show diversity amongst different SC groups
in Tamil Nadu, the lowest amongst Arunthathiyars (928), who are more urban-
ised than other SC groups. In Andhra Pradesh, although all major SCs groups
have higher sex ratios than the national average, figures still vary between SC
groups. Apart from Madigas, the child sex ratio is lower than the all ages sex
ratio.
 Subnational policy in context 145
29 In 2001, the child sex ratio in Tamil Nadu differed markedly amongst major ST
groups: Irulars had the highest ratio at 984, Kondareddis much lower at 859. It
also varied amongst ST groups in Andhra Pradesh: the lowest amongst Suga-
lis (944), the highest amongst Koyas (1,000). It also varied geographically be-
tween Nalgonda district, (921, all ages) and Srikakulam (1,009, all ages). Further
research could explore the recent decline in both states, particularly Andhra
Pradesh.
30 The ranking in GoI (2003) was based on provisional population totals from the
2001 Census.
31 Salem’s rural child sex ratio increased from 811 to 897 and Dharmapuri’s from
815 to 905, between 2001 and 2011.
32 Specified reasons include ‘She shows disrespect for in-laws’, ‘He suspects her of
infidelity’, ‘She does not cook food properly’, ‘She refuses to have sex with him’,
‘She argues with him’, ‘She neglects the house or children’, ‘She goes out without
telling him’ (Kishor and Gupta, 2009: 74).
33 All four south Indian states had agreement rates amongst women higher than
the national average. The contrast between Kerala and Himachal Pradesh is
striking, despite otherwise similar position on gender-related indicators: in the
latter, only 28 percent of both men and women agreed with wife-beating for
at least one specified reason (Kishor and Gupta, 2009). Studies have discussed
Kerala’s more conservative gender norms in the context of high socio-economic
indicators (see Mukhopadhyay, 2007).
34 Extensive literature discusses this relationship between cinema and party politics
in Tamil Nadu. See Dickey (1993, 2003), Hardgrave (1973), and Pandian (1992).
35 Dickey (1993: 357, note 7) acknowledges film clubs have occasionally involved
women in their social service activities.
36 Prior to 1956, Brahmins dominated post-Independence state politics, but were
replaced by the Reddys, a dominant peasant caste. The latter’s rise resulted from
land reforms implemented after the late 1940s Telangana struggle.
37 Another example is Rajasthan’s Women’s Development Programme, where the
state government’s
goal was to empower women and undo gender hierarchies, [but which] ac-
tually ended up repressing women and reconstituting patriarchy [in the face
of women’s collective mobilisation as a result of the programme] by such
actions as ordering men to control their wives or else.
(Sharma, 2001: 1–2; see also WDP Fact Finding Team, 1992,
in Sharma, 2001)

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6 Gendered institutional contexts
State-level machineries?

Introduction
Chapters 3 and 4 discussed the gendered character of national development
policy and initiatives to mainstream gender. They explored the gendered dis-
courses produced by, and embedded within, state institutions like the Plan-
ning Commission, and institutional structures, mechanisms, and initiatives
created for the purposes of making the state more gender-­responsive. This
chapter re-focuses towards subnational institutions in Andhra Pradesh and
Tamil Nadu. Less attention has been paid to ‘state feminist’ institutional
strategies at the subnational level in India. Here, we explore the subnational
institutional context for gender mainstreaming in development policy to un-
derstand the ‘institutional politics of pursuing feminist policy ambitions’
(Goetz, 1997: 3) – how the state becomes an institutional site of struggle for
the constitution of gender-responsive development policy. This chapter pre-
sents the institutional context for the state’s discourse on gender-equitable
development explored in the next chapter.
Feminists cautiously engage with the state to bring change; their strategies
are informed by their understanding of the state’s institutional terrain. The
first half of this chapter explores how the state is an ensemble of gendered or-
ganisational and institutional norms and practices and how these embedded
norms and practices reproduce the ‘state’ as a gendered institution (Pringle
and Watson, 1992; Brown, 2006). Gendered norms and practices embedded
within state institutions in India create a context rarely conducive to femi-
nist policy goals and strategies, including tokenistic efforts to increase the
descriptive representation of women within these institutions. This does not
rule out the possibility of change, however, because the institutional sites,
within which dominant gendered discourses of development are embedded,
are contestable (Weedon, 1987: 109).
With this potential for change in mind, the second half of the chapter
discusses how these institutional norms and practices determine the possi-
bilities for feminist institutional transformation. I argue that ‘state-feminist’
(Stetson and Mazur, 1995) strategies for transforming state institutions to-
wards more gender-equitable goals in the two subnational states of Tamil
152 Gendered institutional contexts
Nadu and Andhra Pradesh represent a complex assortment of opportuni-
ties and limitations, some offering more potential for feminist intervention
and transformative change than others, with notable differences between
and within states’ institutional contexts. Generally, this demonstrates how
the ‘state’ is not a monolith but an ensemble of organisational and insti-
tutional structures, norms, and practices, which do not always act in uni-
son, sometimes even in contradiction (Pringle and Watson, 1992; Rai, 1996;
­Waylen, 1996).
This chapter demonstrates that the institutional contexts for women,
gender, and development policy have developed distinctive to individual
subnational states in India. This implies that to understand national and
subnational policy, the historical specificity of the institutional context
from which policy emerges needs to be understood, in order to recognise
the conditions of possibility for gendered development policy as much as
the strategies required to transform it. Feminist interests ‘do not pre-exist,
fully formed, to be simply “represented” in the state, but have to be actively
forged and, arguably, it is in the domain of the state that they are formally
constituted’ (Watson, 1992: 186–187). This chapter draws on my analysis of
policy documents, fieldwork, interviews, and other primary data, as well as
the most relevant secondary literature.

Part I – The gendered institutions of the state

Goetz (1997: 10) suggests that ‘in deconstructing institutions by gender, it
is easiest to begin by identifying their gendered effects, or their “gender-
ing” outcomes, and move from there to understanding how they are actually
constituted by gender difference’. We can ask how the state is both descrip-
tively and substantively gendered; ‘descriptively’ in the presence of men and
women in state government employment, in state structures, as political rep-
resentatives in electoral democracy, and as officers in the state bureaucracy;
and ‘substantively’ in terms of how gendered institutional norms and prac-
tices reproduce the ‘gendered’ state in complex ways. Focusing on gendered
bureaucratic norms and practices and the distribution and concentration of
men and women in different sectors and departments of government, I sug-
gest their employment and positioning represents and reproduces gendered
hierarchies within state institutions, demonstrating assumptions underpin-
ning the sectoral location of policy issues concerning women, gender, and
development. This gendered policy hierarchy influences the production of
policy discourse (discussed in Chapter 7).

Women in governance structures

The Government of Tamil Nadu (GoTN) directly employs more than
350,000 women, representing almost one third of government employees
out of a total of just over 1.1 million employees (figures for 2004–2005 in
 Gendered institutional contexts 153
GoTN, 2006b). This figure includes employment in state government, state
public undertakings, and local bodies. Women at the local level outnumber
men (around 42 percent men and 58 percent women), whereas at the state
level this is reversed (around 63 percent men and 37 percent women). Men
far outnumber women in state public undertakings (approximately 91 per-
cent men and 9 percent women) (ibid). This may represent the more auton-
omous, ­private-sector orientation of many state public undertakings, often
a more hostile employment environment towards women.1 As Sheela Rani
Chunkath, a senior woman IAS officer from Tamil Nadu cadre, was reported
as saying, ‘government service, in general, is more accepting of women and
more gender friendly than the private sector’ (Santhanam, 2005). Addition-
ally, many women work for the government but in a non-regularised – and
under-recognised, under-valued – capacity, as Accredited Social Health
­Activists on the National Rural Health Mission, and anganwadi workers
and helpers on the Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS). Both
are central schemes, but the state government contributes towards workers’
wages, classed as ‘honorariums’ rather than salaries, as programme workers
are not categorised as government employees. Low wages and lack of rec-
ognition have prompted persistent protests (discussed further below), not
least because of the state’s additional demands on these workers to raise
awareness of government schemes and perform unrelated tasks additional
to their main duties.
In the senior state bureaucracy, the Civil List shows 19 percent of all IAS
officers in Tamil Nadu are women (GoI, n.d.-b), up from 13 percent or 38 of
293 officers in 2007 (GoI, n.d.-b), and 11 percent in 1985 (Goyal, 1989).2 In
2007, the most senior woman IAS officer in Tamil Nadu (by year of i­ nduction)
was C.K. Gariyali, who held the post of Principal Secretary to the Governor
(GoI, 2007). In December 2002, the state government appointed Lakshmi
Pranesh as its first woman Chief Secretary, the senior-most bureaucrat in
the state government (she later retired in 2005). Despite these two examples
of senior appointments, women still only occupy a minority of senior posts
in the state-level bureaucracy.
According to its official Employee Census 2006, the State Government of
Andhra Pradesh employs nearly 1.3 million people, the majority of which
work for the state government (46.65 percent), more than one quarter for
local bodies (26.07 percent), and nearly one fifth for public-sector under-
takings (19.47 percent).3 In 1985, the proportion of women IAS officers in
AP was only 5 percent, or 15 women IAS officers (Goyal, 1989: 428). By
2007, this figure almost trebled with 41 women IAS officers or 13 percent
of IAS officers, similar to Tamil Nadu (GoI, 2007). By 2016 after state
bifurcation, women’s presence had increased in both states, to around 18
percent in Andhra Pradesh and around 24 percent in ­Telangana. In 2002,
Sathi Nair was appointed the first woman Chief Secretary of Andhra
Pradesh, at the age of 59, and six months before her official superannua-
tion date.
 154 Gendered institutional contexts
As elected representatives4
During British colonial rule, Madras province was one of the first legislative
councils to permit women to contest elections: well-known freedom fighter
Kamaladevi Chattopadhyay was the first woman candidate in 1926, and
Dr. Muthulakshmi Reddy was the first woman nominated to Madras Legis-
lative Assembly in 1927. Tamil Nadu is home to one of the country’s longest
serving women Chief Ministers, J. Jayalalithaa, but women’s participation
in formal electoral politics as candidates in State Assembly elections and
as Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) in Tamil Nadu, has been
­generally low. Despite increases over the past two decades, men still domi-
nate, with women representing less than 10 percent of candidates and elected
representatives. The picture is similar for Lok Sabha elections (see Table 6.1).
Both the DMK and AIADMK, the two major parties, have expressed sup-
port for the Women’s Reservation Bill to reserve one third of seats for women
in national and state legislatures. The AIADMK party has fared slightly bet-
ter, committing to 33 percent reservation in the party organisation respond-
ing to ‘the demand for recognition of women and according them equal status
as men in public life’ (AIADMK website, n.d.). Consequently, the ­AIADMK
has been acknowledged as one of the few parties in India to make a ‘conscious

Table 6.1 W
 omen in Tamil Nadu Assembly and Lok Sabha elections (1984–2016)

State Assembly elections 1984 1989 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 2016

Women Number of 46 78 102 158 112 156 143 320

candidates candidates
Percent 3 3 4 3 6 6 5 9
of total
candidates
Women Number of 8 9 32 11 25 22 17 21a
elected elected
Percent of 3 4 13 5 11 9 7 9
total elected
(Total = 234)

Lok Sabha elections 1984 1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009 2014

Women Number of 5 11 17 15 13 17 23 48 55
candidates candidates
Percent 2 2 4 2 4 5 4 6 7
of total
candidates
Women Number of 2 2 3 0 1 1 4 1 4
elected elected
Percent of 5 5 8 0 3 3 10 3 10
total elected
(Total = 39)

Source: Calculated by the author from Election Commission of India reports: www.eci.gov.in.
Note: a Total of 225.
 Gendered institutional contexts 155

30%

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%
1980 1984 1989 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 2016
State Assembly Election Year
AIADMK % women party candidates AIADMK % women party MLAs
DMK % women party candidates DMK % women party MLAs

Figure 6.1 W
 omen candidates and elected Members of Tamil Nadu Legislative
­Assembly – AIADMK and DMK parties (1980–2016).
Source: Election Commission of India reports, various years (HYPERLINK "http://www.eci.
gov.in" www.eci.gov.in)

move to bring many more women into d ­ ecision-making levels and posts
within the party’ (Ghosh, 1999). The party has also nominated a higher pro-
portion of women candidates in state elections (see Figure 6.1), though this
may not always translate to more meaningful participation of women, given
the centralised character of the AIADMK party (e.g. Palshikar, 2004).
In Andhra Pradesh, gender politics has played a role in electoral compe-
tition between the two major parties, Congress and the TDP, but the pres-
ence of women as candidates and elected representatives is still relatively
low in the state, increasing slowly over the past two decades (see Table 6.2).
Women embodied less than 10 percent of candidates and elected represent-
atives in 2014, and their participation in Lok Sabha elections is similarly
low. Political parties in AP have shown varying inclination to increase their
proportion of women candidates in Assembly elections (see Figure 6.2). In
absolute numbers, the TDP and the Congress Party have in the past nom-
inated larger numbers of women compared to other parties, but numbers
are low overall for both parties and the proportion of women candidates
nominated has fluctuated for both parties and fallen too. Neither party has
nominated women in more than one in five seats in the past eight Assembly
elections – at best the TDP managed to nominate women to 16 percent of
seats contested (in 2004), and Congress only 12 percent (2009). The Telan-
gana Rashtra Samithi, a new party, nominated no women amongst their 45
candidates in the 2009 Assembly election, but increased this to ten women
candidates (8 percent of party candidates) in 2014).5
 156 Gendered institutional contexts
Table 6.2 W
 omen in Andhra Pradesh Assembly and Lok Sabha elections (1985–2014)

State Assembly elections 1985 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014

Women Number of 66 70 127 157 161 300 317

candidates candidates
Percent of total 3 4 4 7 8 8 8
candidates
Women Number of 10 17a 8 28a 26a 34 27
elected elected
Percent of total 3 6 3 10 9 12 9
elected
(Total = 294)

Lok Sabha elections 1984 1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009 2014

Women Number of 7 7 26 90 18 18 21 39 43
candidates candidates
Percent of total 2 3 4 6 5 6 8 7 7
candidates
Women Number of 2 5 2 3 2 4 3 5 3
elected elected
Percent of total 5 12 5 7 5 10 7 12 7
elected
(Total = 42)

Source: Compiled by the author from Election Commission of India reports: www.eci.gov.in.
Note: a Not included are the nominated Anglo-Indian MLAs Christine Lazarus (1990–1994, 2004) and
Della Godfrey (1999–2004).

30%

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%
1983 1985 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014
State Assembly Election Year
Congress Party % women party candidates Congress Party % women party MLAs
TDP % women party candidates TDP % women party MLAs

Figure 6.2 Women candidates and elected Members of Andhra Pradesh Legislative
Assembly – Congress Party and Telugu Desam Party (1983–2014).
Source: Election Commission of India reports, various years (HYPERLINK "http://www.eci.
gov.in" www.eci.gov.in). Note: Figures for 2014 are Congress Party. Corresponding figures for
YSR Congress in 2014 are 8 percent women party candidates and 11 percent women party MLAs
 Gendered institutional contexts 157
The low proportion of women contestants and elected representatives
at the state level limits the availability of women for ministerial appoint-
ments. The number of women appointed as ministers in the Tamil Nadu
state cabinet (Council of Ministers) has been consistently low: three of the
thirty-one ministers under the DMK government elected in 2006, or just
under 10 percent. One of these women, Dr. Poongothai, held the portfo-
lio of Minister for Social Welfare (GoTN, c.2006). The other two, Gee-
tha Jeevan and Tamilarasi, held the portfolios of Minister for Animal
Husbandry and Minister for Adi Dravidar Welfare, Hill Tribes and
Bonded Labour, respectively. Under the previous AIADMK government
(2001–2006), three of the 24 ministers were women (or over 12 percent), one
of whom included the Chief Minister J. Jayalalithaa (GoTN, n.d.-a). Again,
a woman minister was appointed the portfolio of Social Welfare (P. Vijay-
lakshmi Palanisamy). The other minister, B. Valarmathi, was appointed as
Minister for Rural Industries. These three women were appointed to the
state cabinet amongst 20 elected women MLAs from the AIADMK. Under
the DMK government elected in 1996, only two of the 25 ministers were
women, one of whom, S.P. Sarkuna Pandian, was appointed as Minister for
Social Welfare, and the other, S. Jenefer Chandran, as Minister for Fisher-
ies (GoTN, n.d.-b).
In AP, the Congress Party state government from 2004 appointed
four women amongst 41 ministers (AP Online, n.d.). One of the four,
­Rajyalakshmi Nedurumalli, held the post of Minister for Women
Development and Child Welfare, Disabled Welfare and Juvenile Wel-
fare.6 Under the previous TDP government (1999–2004), there were only
three women ministers (and all were new to electoral politics). The first,
S. ­Saraswati, held the portfolio of Minister for Women Development and
Child Welfare. The second, Alimineti Uma Madhava Reddy, was elected
in 2000 in a by-election, after the death of her husband, former Home
Minister A. Madhava Reddy (The Hindu, 2004d). She was appointed
Minister of Social Welfare. The third woman minister, K. Pushpa Leela,
was given the portfolio of Social Welfare Minister.7 In contrast to these
relative newcomers, Pratibha Bharathi became the first woman Speaker
of the AP Legislative Assembly in 1999; she was also the first Dalit to
hold the position (Rediff, 1999). Bharathi, a TDP MLA, had been elected
consistently from the same constituency since 1983, and served as Social
Welfare Minister in 1983, 1985, and 1994, under the former Chief ­M inister
N.T. Rama Rao, and as Minister for Higher Education in 1998 under for-
mer Chief Minister Chandrababu Naidu (Indian Express, 1999). ­Bharathi
was not re-elected, however, in 2004. Another experienced woman MLA,
Gummadi Kuthuhalamma, was appointed Deputy Speaker of the State
Legislature Assembly in 2007. Kuthuhalamma served four terms as a
Congress MLA, elected from the same constituency in 1985, 1989, 1999,
and 2004.
Major political parties in Andhra Pradesh agree that the Women’s Res-
ervation Bill should be passed at the national level to reserve 33 percent of
158 Gendered institutional contexts
seats in national- and state-level assemblies. The TDP and the Congress
Party also committed to increasing the number of women in party organi-
sation posts through reservation. The TDP’s policy stated that

At least 50% of the executive committee positions, right from the pri-
mary level to the State level, shall be reserved for the Women, Dalits,
Girijans, Backward classes and the minorities. Care shall be taken to
see that women are given proper representation in all levels of Party
positions, and in the people’s representatives [sic] for various [govern-
ment] bodies.
(Telugu Desam Party, n.d.)

One-third of all party organisation posts in the Congress Party have been
reserved for women since the All India Congress Committee voted in the
resolution in December 1998 (Indian Express, 1998). Before this, the party
operated a 15 percent quota for women (Wolkowitz, 1987). But the compo-
sition of State Legislative Assembly committees under the Congress gov-
ernment elected in 2004 suggested an inconsistent approach to the inclusion
of women MLAs. In many committees, women are the minority; in oth-
ers, there are no women; and the Women’s Welfare Committee consists of
only women, suggesting a link between ascriptive identity and substantive
portfolios.8

Strategies to increase women’s presence in government

The State Government of Tamil Nadu is one of several to have adopted
affirmative action policies to increase women’s presence in government
employment.9 Government reservations first came in March 1989 when
the government amended the Tamil Nadu State and Subordinate Service
Rules (the state government’s personnel policy) to reserve 30 percent of all
direct recruitment vacancies for women, including reservations within res-
ervations (for Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, Backward Classes, Most
Backward Classes, as well as the ‘General Turn’) (GoTN, 2007d: 33). A 10
percent reservation within the reservation also applied to ‘destitute wid-
ows’ (ibid). Women could also compete alongside men for unreserved posts.
State policy also stipulated that ‘women alone shall be appointed to post in
any institution or establishment specially provided for them’ and that men
would only be appointed to such posts when ‘suitable and qualified’ women
were not available (GoTN, 2007d: 33). However, data on recruitment against
reservations are unavailable, making it difficult to assess whether recruit-
ment reservations have been effective. In 2001, the AIADMK government’s
finance minister announced another strategy to increase women in govern-
ment employment: ‘exclusive coaching programmes’ for women at centres in
Chennai and Madurai, to ‘encourage women to join the All India Services
and Central Services’ (Ponnaiyan, 2001: 17, para 69).
 Gendered institutional contexts 159
The same year, Tamil Nadu government announced affirmative action to
bring more women into state-level government committees: 30 percent reser-
vation for women in all statutory and non-statutory committees, ‘[c]onsider-
ing the imperative need to involve women in decision-making as a step towards
empowerment’ (GoTN, 2001: section 3.7). The State Minister for Finance also
mentioned this in the 2001 Budget Speech (Ponnaiyan, 2001: 24, para 97),
but again a lack of accessible data prohibits assessment of implementation.
The composition of the 38 steering committees, constituted to formulate the
state’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan, suggested women’s participation was uneven
and depended on their government position (GoTN, 2006a). Gendered norms
of portfolio appointment, where women tend to be appointed to the so-called
‘soft’ sectors like Social Welfare and Health and Family Welfare (discussed be-
low), determined women’s participation in committee structures for planning.
The GoAP has also utilised affirmative action policies to recruit more
women into government employment, first introducing 30 percent reserva-
tion for women in government jobs in 1984. The Andhra Pradesh Public
Service Commission (APPSC) states that 33.3 percent of state and sub-state
vacancies are reserved for women (GoAP APPSC, n.d.).10 The APPSC also
relaxes the maximum age for recruitment, otherwise set at either 26 or 28
years of age (depending on the post applied for). Age constraints vary for
different categories of reservation: it is extended to 40 years of age for wid-
ows, divorced women, and separated women not remarried who apply for
SC- and ST-reserved posts, and 35 years for all other posts (ibid).

Comparative conclusions on women’s presence in government structures

Whilst the number of women in government has visibly increased over the
past two decades, and with the exceptions of a few experienced women
bureaucrats, and current and former MLAs and ministers, women are de-
scriptively under-represented and form a small presence in electoral politics,
state government employment, and public office. Affirmative action strate-
gies to address under-representation have been employed, but the impact is
unclear or limited. Local government (panchayat) reservations for women
were implemented in both states. Parties in both states have expressed sup-
port for the Women’s Reservation Bill for reserved seats for women in na-
tional and state legislatures, but this commitment has not translated into
parties nominating a higher proportion of women candidates in state and
national elections. Parties in both states have made at least rhetorical com-
mitments to reserving party posts for women, though this may increase
their obligation to their party once in public office. Reservation for women
in government jobs exists at the State Subordinate Services level in both AP
and TN (though not all States). But a lack of available data makes it difficult
to discern whether these are being implemented. Reservation is not used to
increase women’s descriptive representation in higher levels of bureaucracy,
such as the IAS.
160 Gendered institutional contexts
The descriptive under-representation of women in state government in-
stitutions is a manifestation of gendered state institutional norms and prac-
tices. Women are constituted as gendered subjects in ways that deem them
incompatible with a masculine public sphere, indirectly excluding them
from participating in public governance structures, or enabling limited par-
ticipation, aligned with conventional gendered divisions of labour, for ex-
ample, women in social welfare portfolios. Brown argues that ‘the elements
of the state identifiable as masculinist correspond not to some property con-
tained within men but to the conventions of power and privilege constitutive
of gender within an order of male dominance’ (2006: 188). Women’s greater
presence in government, and in particular sectors, may disrupt institution-
ally embedded assumptions of organisational culture – that men dominate
public sector and particular policy sectors – regardless of whether women
themselves bring a change in institutional norms and practices, though such
change could happen, but would depend on the norms that shape their in-
corporation and the degree of agency afforded to them.

Gendered institutional norms of the state

Can we observe the same gendered distributional patterns of IAS post-
ings at the subnational level that Thakur (c.1997) observed at the national
level? A basic examination verifies Thakur’s observation to some extent.11
In Tamil Nadu, women rather than men have tended to hold posts in the
Department of Social Welfare (responsible for Women and Child Welfare),
but at senior (Secretary) level, appointments are more representative of the
service as a whole, including male officers, indicating that seniority is also
a factor. As expected, Planning and Finance have been male-dominated
with some exceptions. The Principal Secretary’s post, Finance Department,
has been held by only five male bureaucrats since 1989. One senior woman
IAS officer from TN cadre was quoted as saying, ‘We are waiting now for
a woman to be posted as Finance Secretary…When that happens, the last
bastion of the male officer would have fallen…’ (Santhanam, 2005).
Similar data show gendered patterns of postings of male and female bu-
reaucrats in Andhra Pradesh, confirming some of Thakur’s national ob-
servations. Women have rarely occupied the most senior posts in the state.
Sathi Nair was the first woman officer to be appointed Chief Secretary in
the State in 2002; the second, Minnie Mathew, was appointed in 2012. The
sectoral location of postings shows some gendered patterns; data since 2000
suggest equal numbers of men and women have served in the Department
of Women’s Development and Child Welfare, GoAP, including at the senior
secretary level,12 which, on the one hand, suggests gender balance, but given
the proportion of women in the IAS in AP, women are over-represented in
this department. Male officers have dominated the top post of Principal
Secretary in the Finance Department throughout the 1990s, although some
female IAS officers, such as Veena Ish and Vasudhra Mishra, have served in
lower posts in the department.
 Gendered institutional contexts 161
State service conduct rules, some applying only to lower levels of gov-
ernment employment, suggest that the state government has attempted to
institutionalise some of its more progressive anti-discrimination legislation
in state government employment codes of conduct. Rule 3A of the GoTN’s
Government Servants Conduct Rules prohibits government servants from
giving, receiving, demanding, or abetting the giving and receiving of dowry
as defined by the Government of India’s Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 (GoTN,
2005b: 4). Rule 19 prohibits government servants from entering into bigamous
marriages (GoTN, 2005b: 21). Sexual harassment of women, or more specif-
ically ‘working women’ or ‘any woman at the work place’ (harassment of
men is not referred to), is also prohibited under Rule 20A (GoTN, 2005b: 22).
Government servants in a position of authority are also expected to take
steps to prevent sexual harassment (ibid). But several other government em-
ployment rules and norms are imbued with gendered norms restricting the
autonomy of women employees and making visible their marginal status
in the gendered somatic norm of the civil service employee (Puwar, 2004).
The small family norm for family planning constrains female government
employees entitlements to maternity leave. Implicit in GoTN rules on ma-
ternity leave is that only married women are eligible, and the entitlement
to 90 days maternity leave on full pay is available to permanent (and some
non-permanent) female government employees and is restricted to women
with less than ‘two surviving children’ (GoTN, 2007c: 136).13 The state pro-
vides special leave entitlements for women and men undergoing sterilisation
and for women for operations to insert contraceptive devices (GoTN, 2007c:
266). Government personnel service rules reveal men to be the default gen-
der of government servants, with ubiquitous references to ‘he’ and ‘his’,
rarely ‘she’ and ‘her’, particularly evident in a rule pertaining to the posting
of government personnel and the prevention of corruption:

Every member of a State Service… other shall inform his immediate

official superior of any reason that there may be why it is undesirable in
the public interest that he should be employed in a particular district or
division such as the near relationship of himself or his wife to any person
or persons residing in that district or division.
(GoTN, 2005b: 20, my emphasis)

State civil service norms in AP mirror much of those already discussed for
TN: a contradictory mix of gender-responsive and lightly coercive rules for
government employment on issues such as dowry, sexual harassment, ma-
ternity leave policies, and small family norms. Another illustrative example
of the default male civil servant is articulated in regulations on bigamous
marriage (but also defers to personal law):

No Government employee who has a wife living shall contract another

marriage without first obtaining the permission of the Government,
notwithstanding that such subsequent marriage is permissible under
162 Gendered institutional contexts
the personal law for the time being applicable to him…No female Gov-
ernment Servant, whether unmarried or widow or divorced, as the case
may be, shall marry any person who has a wife living without first ob-
taining the permission of the Government, though the parties are gov-
erned by the personal law which otherwise permits contracting more
than one marriage while the prior marriage is subsisting.
(GoAP, n.d.: 36–37, my emphasis)

Note the absence of the male prefix and the presence of the female prefix;
government employees have wives, female ‘government servants’ need to be
explicitly marked as female. It is significant that the state feels compelled to
make an explicit statement on regulations regarding marriage relations for
its employees – public servants are used to set an example to society. The
emphasis on personal law is perhaps not surprising given that Hyderabad,
the erstwhile state capital, has a majority Muslim population.
This analysis of the substantively gendered norms of state-level adminis-
tration suggests that bureaucratic rules and norms are fairly similar despite
variations in the specific institutional context between States, but within each
state we can identify examples where state institutional norms vary accord-
ing to specific policy sectors such as in Finance or Planning compared to
Health or Social Welfare. Thus, whilst bureaucratic norms seem to remain
stable across states, within states bureaucratic norms vary.
Nationally, a perception exists that the civil service in the southern states
(and West Bengal) is generally more gender egalitarian, but that stereotyp-
ing may take place at the centre. Thakur’s survey respondents suggested
that gender stereotyping in the bureaucracy reflected regional variation in
gender relations in India (c.1997), leading her to conclude

that the nature of gender stereotyping of posts tends to correspond with

the overall situation of gender disparities within a particular state. This
correspondence underscores the fact that the IAS and the way it func-
tions is part of a wider societal context, and thus cannot be viewed in
isolation.
(c.1997: 18–19)

Elsewhere, C.K. Gariyali, once the most senior female IAS officer in Tamil
Nadu, suggested that ‘Tamil Nadu is a great State to serve in, as culturally,
women are held in high regard here compared to other States’ (quoted in
Santhanam, 2005). Several respondents interviewed for the research in this
book also commented on regional differences in gender relations, suggest-
ing that the southern states were both more gender egalitarian and also bet-
ter administered states.
National IAS training to inculcate an all-India espirit de corps, transcend-
ing regional differences in officers’ backgrounds, and a sense of belonging
to a larger entity, thus collides with socio-cultural norms which IAS recruits
 Gendered institutional contexts 163
bring with them into the service and the institutional context in which they
work. Potter and others have demonstrated a similar endurance of regional
differences in bureaucratic norms and practices between states (Potter,
1986: 211). But this has potential implications for gender mainstreaming
opportunities in AP and TN. Does the assumption of relatively more gen-
der egalitarian norms and culture in southern states influence the gendered
bureaucratic norms of formulating gender-responsive development policy?
Does it construct expectations that bureaucrats in southern states will nec-
essarily be more gender-responsive or gender-aware? Or can it potentially
close down bureaucratic efforts to scrutinise policies, norms, and practices
in these states, having assumed problems are worse elsewhere, leading bu-
reaucrats to underestimate the scope for improvement in southern states,
regardless of their more progressive position amongst Indian states? These
are pertinent questions requiring further research. In the following section,
I discuss the development of state-level institutions most closely identifying
a concern with women, gender, and development, to explore potential insti-
tutional openings for feminist transformative strategies.

Part II – ‘State feminist’ bureaucratic spaces in state-level

institutions?
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, a feminist bureaucratic-structural inter-
vention is where ‘women [and men] create new structures within government
or university administrations specifically designed to benefit women (such as
women’s policy units, women’s studies programmes, or ministries for wom-
en’s affairs)…’ (Eisenstein, 1989, 1991, cited in Witz and Savage, 1992: 39).
In Chapter 4, I briefly explored the development of the national machin-
ery for women in India, including the Ministry of Women and Child
­Development and the National Commission for Women, and argued that
the bureaucratic-structural strategy has been a more common strategy in
the Indian national context, more so than a bureaucratic-individual or ‘fem-
ocrat’ strategy. Weedon (1987: 110) argues ‘in order to have a social effect, a
discourse must at least be in circulation’. Feminist bureaucratic-structural
strategies can ‘get a foot in the door’, creating some space, albeit limited, for
feminist negotiation with the state, as a complementary strategy to a trans-
formative gender mainstreaming strategy.
One of my central arguments is that the institutional context for gendered
development policy at the subnational level is important, and increasingly so
since the early 1990s. Here, I analyse the development of the subnational state
institutions, including government departments identifying policy responsibil-
ity towards women, State Commissions for Women, and parastatal agencies
administering government programmes for women, gender, and development,
and compare these trajectories in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, consider-
ing the implications these institutional developments have for opportunities to
mainstream gender in development policy at the subnational level.
164 Gendered institutional contexts
Tamil Nadu
No distinct state government ministry or department for women or gender
equality exists in Tamil Nadu. Ostensibly relevant policy and programmes
have been located mostly within two departments – the Department of
­Social Welfare and the Department of Rural Development (DRD). Until the
DMK government came to power in 1967, the Women’s Welfare Unit was
located in the Home Department. Subsequently, it was removed, upgraded
to a full department, named the Social Welfare Department, and welfare
of the disabled and welfare of children was added to its list of activities
(Rao, 2003: 359). The Social Welfare Department has since been one of the
main departments involved in policy issues and programmes for women.
Not surprisingly given their title, many of these schemes are welfare ori-
ented, including assistance to ‘women in difficult circumstances’, working
women’s hostels, incentives and assistance schemes for inter-caste marriage,
widow remarriage, and marriage of daughters of poor widows, and, most
famously, the Nutritious Meal Programme, providing daily meals in schools
for children (discussed in Chapter 5). The Social Welfare Department has
historically been the administrative parent of the semi-autonomous gov-
ernment undertaking or parastatal agency, the Tamil Nadu Corporation
for the Development of Women (TNCDW), since its inception in 1983. The
Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare, an IAS officer, has acted as
Chairperson of TNCDW. This institutional arrangement lasted until July
2006 when administrative control of TNCDW transferred to the DRD and
Panchayati Raj.
Until the late 1990s, the DRD administered a UNICEF-funded (until
1996) central government scheme, the Integrated Rural Development Pro-
gramme, and its subcomponent, the Development of Women and Children
in Rural Areas (DWCRA). This subcomponent mobilised women to form
self-help groups (SHGs) of around 20 women for the purposes of savings
and credit, and other social and educational activities (similar to the scheme
the Tamil Nadu government would establish years later). Government
funding was split 75:25 between central and state governments. DWCRA
had varied results, notably its lack of coverage of poor women. In 1999,
­DWCRA, its parent scheme IRDP, and several other rural development and
employment-generating schemes were merged under a new central govern-
ment scheme, Swarnajayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY). This new
scheme continued to emphasise self-employment through the SHG model
and targeted poor women as key beneficiaries. The relationship between
this scheme and the Tamil Nadu government’s own scheme is discussed fur-
ther below.
The National Commission for Women Act 1990 provided for individ-
ual states to form their own state-level Commissions for Women. Several
state governments did so from the 1990s onwards, including both state
governments of Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. The Tamil Nadu State
 Gendered institutional contexts 165
Commission for Women was established in 1993 as a government under-
taking but positioned under the Department of Social Welfare, and lo-
cated in the state capital, Chennai. In 2005–2006, the State Commission
and TNCDW were housed in the same building in Guindy, Chennai, but
in 2008 the Commission was moved to a more central Chennai location in
the Secretariat building. Whilst the Commission is not explicitly concerned
with gender and development, it has an important mandate for women’s
empowerment, from a rights and justice-based perspective: to ‘protect the
rights and to safeguard the welfare of women’ (GoTN, 2005a: 26). This en-
tails taking up legal cases on behalf of women and raising awareness about
women’s rights through legal literacy programmes. The Commission has
also conducted gender sensitisation training for members of the police force,
the judiciary, and Government Revenue officers. The Commission includes
a chairperson and nine part-time members. In 2007, these nine members
including the Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Nutritious
Meal Programme, two women MLAs, one IAS officer and one Police of-
ficer, two ‘reputed’ public women, one lawyer, and the Director of Social
Welfare (to act as member-secretary) (GoTN, 2007b: 10).
In the early years of the State Commission for Women, the chairperson
was not an obviously political appointee; more recent appointments have
had clear political links. The first Chairperson of the Commission was Jus-
tice Padmini Jesudurai, the first woman judge of the Madras High Court.
In March 2002, Vasanthi Devi, a prominent social activist and a former
University Vice Chancellor, took over the position of chairperson. Argua-
bly, Vasanthi Devi had the most visible impact amongst chairpersons of the
State Commission for Women, and she continues to speak out on women’s
rights since leaving the Commission. After her tenure ended in March 2005,
the post became vacant and the Commission lapsed. Shortly after the DMK
was elected in 2006, the National Commission for Women representative
for the southern states, Nirmala Venkatesh, called on the new Chief Minis-
ter Karunanidhi to reconstitute the commission and appoint a chairperson.
From 2007, Dr. K.M. Ramathal, a former member of the State Public Ser-
vice Commission (overseeing the appointment of employees to government
service at lower levels), was appointed as Chairperson. A subsequent Chair-
person, Sarguna Pandian, a former Social Welfare Minister in the 1990s
and Deputy General Secretary of the DMK, was appointed in 2010. This
appointment was more obviously political. She was replaced by a relatively
unknown chairperson, Saraswati Rangaswamy, in September 2011 after the
rival party AIADMK’s election in 2011 (GoTN, 2011). Rangaswamy later
went on to become leader of the AIADMK women’s wing (2014) and a Dis-
trict Secretary (an important party position), and was initially nominated
as an AIADMK candidate in the 2016 State Assembly elections, but was re-
placed by another candidate. In 2013, the AIADMK government appointed
another political associate as chairperson, Dr. Visalakshi Neduncheziyan,
at the age of 89. Dr. Nedunchezhiyan was a former senior Public Health
166 Gendered institutional contexts
official, senior AIADMK party official, and widow of a former Chief Minis-
ter of Tamil Nadu (New Indian Express, 2013a). Thus, in more recent years,
chairpersons of the Commission have had clear political links with the in-
cumbent government.
The Commission suffers from several limitations. It was established by
a government order rather than a statutory obligation, and does not have
statutory powers like the National Commission for Women and most other
State Commissions for Women. Its continued operation relies on the good
will of the state government to reconstitute the Commission, appoint its
chairperson, and provide adequate funds and powers. The Commission’s
lack of status is evident compared to the Tamil Nadu Human Rights Com-
mission (established in 1997), and relative to the national level. At the fed-
eral level, the Chairperson of the National Commission for Women sits on
the National Human Rights Commission as one of its members, but this is
not the case in Tamil Nadu.
At an AIDWA Conference in 2005, former Chairperson Vasanthi Devi re-
iterated her previous assessment in 2003 that the Commission lacked power
and status. She called for the Commission to be granted more funds, infra-
structure, and powers (The Hindu, 2005a), supporting Poornima Advani,
Chairperson of the National Commission for Women, in her appeal to the
TN Chief Minister (J. Jayalalithaa) two years earlier (The Hindu, 2003b). In
a separate statement, then National Commission Chairperson, Poornima
Advani, praised the TN Commission for its achievements despite the con-
straints it faced (The Hindu, 2005b). Women’s organisations also continue
to engage the state government to improve the functioning of the Commis-
sion. In 2016, whilst Dr. Neduncheziyan was Chairperson, several women’s
organisations from Tamil Nadu wrote to the Chief Minister asking her to
appoint a ‘proactive, gender sensitive [chairperson who]… will work in con-
sultation with civil society, especially women’s organisations, in the state’
(cited in Times of India, 2016). The Commission and its members have man-
aged to dispose of legal cases on behalf of women and address grievances
despite acute limitations of reach and resources, as well as wider political
constraints, but have been less directly associated with policies and pro-
grammes relating to gender and development in the state. Whilst the State
Commission for Women is focused on legal redressal of atrocities against
women rather than women’s wider economic and social development, the
lack of recognition and support for the commission from the State Gov-
ernment raises questions about the latter’s commitment to gender equality.

Tamil Nadu Corporation for the Development of Women

The 1990s in Tamil Nadu saw the successive expansion of a government
programme aimed at women’s development, first through the International
Fund for Agriculture (IFAD)-funded Women’s Development Project from
1989 to 1998, and the continuation of that programme in Mahalir Thittam
 Gendered institutional contexts 167
(Women’s Scheme), funded by the TN state government. Both projects were
implemented by the parastatal agency introduced above, the TNCDW, es-
tablished in December 1983 and registered under the Companies Act (1956).
In 2006, administrative control of TNCDW transferred from the Depart-
ment of Social Welfare to the DRD and Panchayati Raj. IFAD’s involve-
ment in the Tamil Nadu Women’s Development Project officially ended on
31 December 1998. The year before, the government launched its own pro-
ject called Mahalir Thittam as a larger scale extension. The new scheme en-
visioned enrolling ten lakhs (1 million) women, forming groups of 20 women
into SHGs. By 2004–2005, the target was increased to 15 lakhs (1.5 million)
women over the next three years (GoTN, 2004: section 4.2).14 From its initial
beginnings in one district (Dharmapuri), the programme grew to cover all
30 districts of the State, both rural and urban areas, in 13 years.15
The Corporation (TNCDW) operated at the state, district, and block (lo-
cal) levels. The Project Management Unit (PMU) was based at TNCDW
headquarters in Chennai; Project Implementation Units (PIUs) were based
in the project districts; and several committees were based at the state, dis-
trict, and local levels (TNCDW, 2000b).16 The PMU was headed by a chair-
person who also occasionally held the post of managing director, assisted
by an executive director. The first appointed Chair under the IFAD-funded
TNWDP, Valamarthi Jebaraj (Chairperson TNCDW, 1991–1996), was, ex-
ceptionally, a political appointee, as a former MLA, and, according to the
media, a loyal supporter of the Chief Minister J. Jayalalithaa (The Hindu,
2001). All other subsequent chairpersons, managing directors, and execu-
tive directors have been IAS officers from the state cadre. The chairperson is
usually a senior bureaucrat of at least Joint Secretary rank (with 16 years of
service), although higher and lower ranked officers have also occupied this
post. IAS officers appointed as chairpersons of the Corporation have al-
most invariably been women, but other senior posts have often been staffed
by male officers. There appears to be no pattern of career service for the
chairperson – previous appointees had experience in agriculture, health and
family welfare, energy, planning, and finance – emphasising the generalist
orientation of the civil service, rather than specific sectoral expertise in gen-
der equality and women’s empowerment.
From 2006 to 2008, the state government’s SHG activities underwent
some changes, increasing the reach and responsibilities of TNCDW signif-
icantly. In July 2006, the new DMK government moved the TNCDW to
the DRD ‘to bring about greater synergy and better coordination in im-
plementing various schemes for Self Help Groups’ (GoTN, 2007a: 30). For
about a year, the Tamil Nadu-specific SHG scheme and the centrally spon-
sored scheme, SGSY, were administered separately – Mahalir Thittam by
TNCDW and SGSY by DRD, before finally merging the two in April 2008,
when TNCDW took on the SGSY scheme as well, to ensure a ‘convergence
of activities’. TNCDW also took charge of a similar World Bank–sponsored
programme initiated in 2005, the Tamil Nadu Empowerment and Poverty
168 Gendered institutional contexts
Reduction Project (also known as Vazhndhu Kaattuvom or Pudhu Vazhvu
under different administrations; GoTN, 2008: 37).
TNCDW’s administrative move to the DRD indicated changes in some
institutional and discursive logics – the DRD was a higher status depart-
ment because of its access to central government funding and close links
with the District Rural Development Administration (DRDA) in Tamil
­Nadu’s 30-plus districts. Funds under SGSY would also be made available
to eligible SHG members under Mahalir Thittam (GoTN, 2008: 36–37). The
move was consistent with the broader convergence and efficiency policy dis-
course (discussed in Chapter 7) and it made sense administratively, but it
would have implications for the workload of both the TNCDW and the SHG
women (discussed in Chapter 8). The TNCDW’s role after the move was
undiminished but changed orientation, with augmented responsibility, and
key personnel from the Mahalir Thittam scheme were retained. The move
also suggested a shift in gendered discourse from welfare to development,
but also towards a closer association between rural poverty and gender ine-
quality rather than a broader gender-analytical approach.17
The autonomous status of TNCDW, lauded by some, is debatable given
its close links with government. Its most senior staff members are IAS
officers, and at least two past chairpersons have also held the position of
Secretary for Social Welfare. At the state level, the two committees respon-
sible for directing policy are headed by senior government bureaucrats; the
Central Project Co-ordination Committee headed by the Chief Secretary of
the GoTN (the most senior civil servant in the state government), as well as
a TNCDW review committee headed by the Development Commissioner
(who is also the finance secretary, another senior position). But day-to-day
autonomy exists, the PMU undertakes monthly reviews of the project and
manages operations, and the board of directors take decisions over opera-
tional and sometimes policy issues. Furthermore, the senior profile of these
committee chairs gives TNCDW and its programmes, in principle, some
visibility in state government. The IFAD Completion Evaluation Report
looked positively on the TNCDW’s position in government and its semi-­
autonomous status as a government undertaking as a factor contributing to
the success of the project:

[I]t was able to benefit from the support of government authorities and
line departments while minimizing undue political or bureaucratic in-
terference due to its close association with IFAD and knowledge of the
latter’s implementing procedures and loan agreement clauses.
(IFAD, 2000)

But in acknowledging this autonomy, IFAD neglected to consider that it

was also more sheltered from public scrutiny at the state level, and also sug-
gested the programme’s autonomy was linked with the presence of the exter-
nal donor, with implications for non-donor–funded projects.
 Gendered institutional contexts 169
TNCDW and its Mahalir Thittam scheme also involved a diverse range of
governmental and non-governmental actors, with vertical and spatial hierar-
chies, giving TNCDW the ‘onerous’ task of co-ordinating a number of differ-
ent agencies to work towards the goals of the project (TNCDW, 2000a: 9). The
key institutional actors included banks – solely the Indian Bank under the
IFAD-funded TNWDP – and NGOs, government departments, and many
women’s SHGs. TNCDW celebrated their cordial relationship with banks,
considering them the ‘most important partners’, with an ‘excellent working
relationship’ with the State Level Bankers Committee, and with NABARD
‘an important ally’ (TNCDW, 2000a: 5). But TNCDW also recognised the
need for gender sensitisation training for their banking partners, and with
some ­assistance from NABARD they delivered training and orientation pro-
grammes to bank employees involved with MaThi to sensitise them to the
core principles of the project and the delivery of microcredit loans to SHG
members. TNCDW reported this training generated interest amongst bank-
ers in linking SHGs with credit and enabled SHGs to open accounts with ease
(TNCDW, 2000a: 8). They also claimed it had positively influenced bankers’
perceptions about the potential of women SHGs as ‘a promising business seg-
ment’ with high repayment rates (ibid), reproducing instrumental discourses
of women’s empowerment as ‘smart economics’. Such positive evaluations
glossed over a more complex picture: banker orientation was clearly necessary –
according to the IFAD completion evaluation in 2000, ‘a significant propor-
tion of the women interviewed stated that bankers’ attitudes had not changed
towards poor women’ (IFAD, 2000). External dynamics beyond the control
of TNCDW, such as bank staff relocation, also frustrated the institutionali-
sation of sensitisation and orientation training, requiring repeated rounds of
orientation training to ‘sensitise’ new staff (TNCDW, 2000a: 8). The project
also involved a diverse range of welfare and charity-oriented voluntary or-
ganisations such as the Women’s Indian Association, to more professional
NGOs such as MYRADA. NGOs were key to the delivery of training and
support to SHGs, but their transformative potential was diminished by the
project’s target-driven approach which generated a competitive dynamic
amongst NGOs for government funding for setting up groups, which at times
involved ‘poaching’ SHG members from existing groups to form new ones
(personal communication, NGO in Salem district, June 2007).
Part of the mission of Mahalir Thittam was ‘to advocate changes in
government policies and programmes in favor of disadvantaged women’
(TNCDW, 2000b: 17). The IFAD Completion Evaluation Report suggested
that the project had made a complementary and ‘unmistakable’ impact on
the organisation:

major increases in funds and influence have resulted from project ac-
tivities and new, purpose-built premises have been built…[resulting in]
­better-trained and more motivated staff, more confident management and
greater bargaining power vis-à-vis the state authorities. [It] has matured
170 Gendered institutional contexts
into a solid institution, capable of implementing poverty eradication
programmes efficiently and of providing invaluable advice to GOTN
and others…
(IFAD, 2000)

But like many microcredit programmes for women, the Corporation’s pro-
gramme design aimed to inculcate a ‘highly disciplinary institutional cul-
ture’ in programme participants (Rankin, 2004: 189; discussed in Chapter 8).
It said little about the Corporation’s own institutional culture, and whether
it had a self-reflexive organisational gender policy of its own, or considered
one necessary. The gendered discourse employed by the TNCDW’s policies
and programmes and the subjectivities and degrees of agency they manifest
are discussed further in the following two chapters.

Andhra Pradesh
In Andhra Pradesh, policy issues and administration relating to women,
gender, and development are mostly concentrated in the Department of
Women Development and Child Welfare (DWD&CW) and the DRD. The
DWD&CW was established in 1952 as the Women’s Welfare Department
in what was then Madras State. It became the Department of Women
and Child Welfare in 1973, and the Department of Women Development and
Child Welfare in 1989. According to the official ‘AP State Portal’ website,
this department currently sits within a larger department, the Department
for Women, Children, Disabled and Senior Citizens.18 DWD&CW classifies
its activities into two categories: (i) implementation of the part-World Bank–
funded Central Government’s ICDS and (ii) welfare-oriented schemes for
women, children, and the elderly, such as working women’s hostels, Swadhar
(central government scheme for ‘women in difficult circumstances’), schemes
to compensate for discrimination against girl children, and state homes for
the elderly (GoAP DWD&CW, n.d.). DWD&CW has also been involved
with prevention and investigation of domestic violence and dowry practices
and compensation of women survivors/victims, and efforts to combat traf-
ficking of women. The ICDS programme dominates the department and is
implemented through a network of more than 66,000 local anganwadi cen-
tres, run by women anganwadi workers; the scheme claims to reach nearly
2 million women, 7 million children, and 4 million adolescent girls (figures
for 2004–2005; GoAP DWD&CW, n.d.).
In contrast, the DRD has been more closely involved with anti-poverty
and development programmes for women, as the implementing agency of
the central government scheme, the IRDP, discussed above, since 1982. Since
the 1990s, the programmatic set-up has undergone several changes spe-
cific to Andhra Pradesh. In 1999, when the central government merged the
components of the IRDP in to the new scheme, SGSY (introduced earlier),
women’s SHGs remained separate and continued to be popularly known
 Gendered institutional contexts 171
as DWCRA. These groups existed alongside SHGs formed under a World
Bank–funded project specific to Andhra Pradesh called Velugu (meaning
‘light’ in Telugu) from 2000. Velugu comprised of two phases under the TDP
government,19 but a year after the new Congress Party government came
to power in the State Assembly elections in 2004, Velugu was merged with
SGSY and renamed Indira Kranthi Patham.20 Thus, the structure and ter-
minology of SHG programmes have been partly tied to party political and
electoral configurations of the state government.21
These programmatic changes entailed symbolically significant but prac-
tically minor changes in administration. In 2001, the DRD established
the sub-department Commissionerate for Women’s Empowerment and
Self-Employment, to formalise the ‘DWCRA wing’ of the department.
Mooij (2002: 37) argues the establishment of the new Commissionerate re-
flected the importance political leaders assigned to the programme, and
the government’s focus on women. But this changed in January 2005, as
part of a larger departmental reorganisation related to the Velugu/SGSY
convergence. The Commissionerate for Women’s Empowerment and Self-
Employment was merged with the Commissionerate for Rural Develop-
ment, creating instead an SHG wing in the Department for Panchayati Raj
and Rural Development. Thus, programme convergence has influenced the
administrative structures for state government policy for women.
The Andhra Pradesh State Commission for Women was first constituted
in 1999 after the Andhra Pradesh Women’s Commission Act was passed
in March 1998 with Presidential approval. This was several years after
­Tamil Nadu and seven years after the National Commission for Women
in Delhi was established. The Act provided for a Commission consisting
of a chairperson and six other members from AP, including one each from
the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Backward Classes, and Minorities
Communities (GoAP, 1998: article 5:1). Members hold office for five years.
The Act stated that the chairperson ‘shall be an eminent women [sic] com-
mitted to the cause of [the] welfare of women with sufficient knowledge and
experience in dealing with women’s problems’ (ibid: article 5:2). Members of
the Commission should be

women of ability, integrity and standing who have served the cause
of women or have had sufficient knowledge and experience in law or
legislation, administration of matters concerning the advancement of
women for protection or leadership of any trade union or voluntary
organization for women for protection, upliftment and promotion of
common interests of women.
(ibid: article 5:1)

The Commission could also invite subject experts to advise members.

Most chairpersons of the Commission to date have had political back-
grounds, though the first Chairperson, Susheela Devi, appointed in 1999,
172 Gendered institutional contexts
had legal advocacy background and had worked as the State’s Public Pros-
ecutor prior to her appointment. It is likely that her expertise influenced her
emphasis on raising women’s awareness of their legal rights whilst Commis-
sion Chairperson. Mary Ravindranath was appointed Chairperson in 2005,
after unsuccessfully contesting in the State Assembly elections in 2004 on
a Congress Party nomination. She had previously been elected to the same
constituency in 1989, but was not subsequently re-elected in 1994 or 1999
when both elections saw the rival party, the TDP, elected to office. As Chair-
person in 2006, Ravindranath asked the Chief Minister to demonstrate
support for her authority in response to what she perceived as disrespect to-
wards her leadership amongst Commission members (The Hindu, 2007a). In
contrast, members accused the chairperson of poor leadership and bad ad-
ministration. In July 2007, Ravindranath was reportedly asked by the Chief
Minister to resign as Chairperson after a public dispute with another Com-
mission member (who was also asked to resign) (The Hindu, 2007b). Media
reports quoted the Chief Minister of accusing Ravindranath of damaging
the reputation of the Commission as a result of the media coverage of the
dispute. The Commission subsequently remained defunct for several years
until it was reconstituted in 2013, with Dr. Tripurana Venkataratnam ap-
pointed as Chairperson (New Indian Express, 2013b). Dr. ­Venkataratnam
was a former TDP MLA elected in 1983 and a former Minister in the state
government, as well as a law graduate. When Andhra Pradesh state was
bifurcated in 2014, Dr. Venkataraman initially continued as Chairperson
of Commissions for both the Andhra Pradesh Commission and (newly
created) Telangana State Commission for Women, and remained Chair of
the Telangana Commission, after a senior TDP leader, former state legisla-
tor and state government minister, and official spokesperson of the party,
Nannapaneni Rajakumari, was appointed to chair the Andhra Pradesh
Commission in 2016. Thus, party political links and experience in gov-
ernment continued to be important for appointing State Commission
­Chairpersons in the newly created state.
Unlike in Tamil Nadu, the Andhra Pradesh Commission for Women was
granted statutory powers, including its own budget allocated by government
and the same powers as a Civil Court to try legal cases. The Commission’s
wide mandate, outlined in the Act, includes examining legal provisions and
state recruitment practices affecting women, inspecting state institutions
such as jails, police stations, and state-owned women’s hostels; submitting
annual reports to government on the Commission’s activities and recom-
mendations; and conducting or commissioning research and maintaining
data on the condition of women in the state (GoAP, 1998: article 15: 1). The
Commission’s mandate also includes participating in, and advising on, the
‘planning process of socio-economic development of women’ (GoAP, 1998:
article 15: 1: xi) and to ‘undertake promotional and educational research so
as to suggest ways of ensuring due representation of women in all spheres
and identify factors responsible for impeding their advancement’ (GoAP,
 Gendered institutional contexts 173
1998: article 15: 1: xiv). Despite this wide mandate, the Commission focused
on legal and educational activities, including raising awareness about HIV/
AIDS, improving women’s legal literacy and awareness, setting up a civil
court dedicated to women’s issues (the Mahila Lok Adalat), inspecting a
state prison, and trying to bring together a women’s university consortium.
It has not involved itself much with the planning process nor did it have
much to do with independently monitoring and evaluating the growing
women’s SHG programme in the state. Indeed, when a National Commis-
sion for Women member visited villages surrounding Vijayawada in June
2006 regarding allegations of harassment of women by micro-finance or-
ganisations, there was no notable presence of the State Commission for
Women (author’s fieldnotes, June 2006). The Commission was defunct for
several years until 2013, despite pleas from women’s organisations to recon-
stitute the Commission. In 2013, when it was reconstituted, the chairperson
focused in particular on violence against women including trafficking and
domestic violence.

Society for the Elimination of Rural Poverty

In Andhra Pradesh, gender-equitable development is part of a broader
mainstream programme at the parastatal level to address rural poverty,
unlike in Tamil Nadu. The Society for the Elimination of Rural Poverty
(SERP) was established as an independent, autonomous society registered
under the Public Societies Act to serve as the main implementing agency
for Velugu, the World Bank–funded project in Andhra Pradesh, commenc-
ing in June 2000. Velugu’s model was largely based on the earlier UNDP’s
South Asia Poverty Alleviation Programme, implemented in three state dis-
tricts between 1996–2000, deemed successful in building community-based
institutions for and by the rural poor to address rural poverty. Velugu/IKP
operated on the SHG model, with primarily women-only groups of around
15–20 members. Microfinance activities were seen as a cohering force for the
groups and provided an entry point for the programme’s social mobilisation
and social change objectives. SHGs were clustered into Village Organisa-
tions (VOs) and further federated to form Mandal Samakhyas. VOs were
involved in monitoring and strengthening their SHGs and village develop-
ment activities. Mandal Samakhya leaders were trained by SERP and other
contracted agencies to implement project components and take up larger
scale activities compared to SHGs and VOs, and helped strengthen VOs.
By December 2004, more than 440,000 SHGs, more than 27,000 VOs, and
nearly 750 Mandal Samakhyas were involved with the programme (GoAP,
2005: 7).
The Gender Strategy of the programme involved five interventions, four of
which required that mainstream institutional processes and activities took
gender issues into consideration: ‘mainstreaming gender in CIF activities’,
‘promoting gender awareness among project stakeholders’, ‘introducing
174 Gendered institutional contexts
engendered project management’, and ‘implementing gender disaggregated
[Monitoring and Evaluation]’ (World Bank, 2003: 25). Gender was one of
several cross-cutting issues for which SERP appointed functional special-
ists at the State level as State Project Directors (others included marketing,
microfinance, disability, and institution building) and at the district level.
Whilst Velugu/IKP was a mainstream programme designed to reduce rural
poverty, gender was seen as a key component, partly because women formed
a majority of SHG members, but also because its perspective on gender dif-
ference as complementary rather than conflictual: ‘poor communities are
able to achieve poverty alleviation through self-managed grassroots institu-
tions by harmonising the concerns of men and women’ (SERP, c.2002: 37).
But the project did not make women hyper-responsible agents – it sought to
expand beyond women-only groups to form men’s groups and youth groups,
based on the recognition that the ‘organization of women’s groups alone
would not help in either eliminating poverty or empowering women; the
process can be triggered and made sustainable when all members of the
family are organized’ (SERP, c.2002). Ostensibly, this seemed to reflect in-
creasing practice to involve men and boys in projects on gender equality and
women’s empowerment, though operationalising this strategy has not been
as clear cut, (discussed in Chapter 8).
Whilst SERP is considered independent and autonomous of government,
it has considerable government links with government personnel amongst
its most senior staff, and is under administrative control of the DRD. The
Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh acts as official Chairperson of SERP, and
the Minister for Rural Development is Vice Chairperson22 and ­President
of SERP’s Executive Council. IAS officers hold senior posts in SERP –
the Principal Secretary for Rural Development is Vice President of the
­Executive Council and sits on the General Body Council of SERP. The CEO
of SERP is an IAS officer heading the State Project Management Unit in
Hyderabad, member-convenor of the Executive Council, and secretary of
the General Body. Notwithstanding some intermittent periods, a single IAS
officer, T. Vijaya Kumar, held the post of CEO of SERP for the longest pe-
riod since it was established; prior to 2002, the founding CEO was K. Raju,
who later served as Principal Secretary in the Chief Minister’s Office, and
was subsequently appointed as secretary to the national UPA government’s
National Advisory Council, a body responsible for drafting several rights-
based legislations enacted by the UPA(I) government (2004–2009).
Despite this strong government presence, an interesting institutional
feature of SERP is its mix of personnel; non-government personnel form
a significant part of SERP, as the discussion above about the programme’s
approach to gender indicates. P. Jamuna, the State Project Director for
Gender (also credited as Director (Advocacy)), joined SERP in 2003, and
had a background in the women’s movement.23 Likewise, many of the State
Project Directors do not have a background in government service. Addi-
tionally, subject experts appointed from the NGO sector sit on the General
 Gendered institutional contexts 175
Body Council. Rural development professionals are recruited as commu-
nity co-ordinators at the mandal level as ‘change agents’: ‘key functionaries
who facilitate social transformation in direct participation with the people’
(SERP, c.2002: 13). Furthermore, SERP has often approached state-based
NGOs and educational institutions to compile training material or evaluate
policies and strategies: the Centre for Women’s Development at the National
Institute of Rural Development in Hyderabad was consulted to provide in-
puts into the programme’s gender strategy. APMAS, a Hyderabad-based,
professional development sector NGO part-funded by the UK Department
for International Development, influenced the evolution of assessment tech-
niques of microfinance activities in the programmes SERP administered.
SERP is also notable for the extent to which programme participants are
involved in the programme’s functioning; participatory identification and
assessment approaches have been a lauded feature of the programme. Ten
Mandal Samakhya leaders (all of them women) are selected by the govern-
ment to sit on the General Body of SERP, and programme participants
become part of the programme’s administration through its federated
structures.
Under the TDP government, the significant presence of non-government
personnel emerged as a source of political controversy, with the Congress
Party, then in opposition, accusing the TDP government of ensuring that
Velugu, and by implication SERP, lacked transparency and accountability
and that it bypassed democratically elected institutions of government at
the sub-state level (The Hindu, 2003a). Manor noted that the TDP Chief
Minister Chandrababu Naidu, suspicious of the possibility of Congress
control in local bodies, preferred to operate through non-elected commit-
tees and user associations ‘which [Naidu] is able to pack with his own party
loyalists’ (Manor, 2004: 273). Manor also noted, however, that Congress was
also guilty of undermining panchayat authority for the same reason. It is
clear from a programmatic comparison of Velugu (TDP government) and
IKP (Congress government) structures that the sub-state District Admin-
istration did not play a major role in Velugu; by merging SGSY (adminis-
trated by the DRDA) with Velugu, this enhanced their role within the state’s
anti-poverty programme. Yet Congress did not radically alter the role of
SERP; in fact, in June 2007 the government awarded SERP a leading role in
setting up a similar new agency to deal with urban poverty (GoAP, 2007b).
Although it appeared at first sight that government personnel would play
a larger role in the new agency, provisions for non-government functional
specialists remain part of the institutional design (GoAP, 2007a, 2007b).

Comparisons of bureaucratic-structural strategies and

some conclusions
To what extent do the institutional structures discussed above represent op-
portunities for gender mainstreaming strategies? The state-level government
176 Gendered institutional contexts
departments most visibly identifiable with women were not originally de-
signed to be ‘women’s policy units’ – nodal agencies to champion gender-­
responsive policy in other departments. They were largely designed to
deliver welfare-oriented schemes, financially dominated by the massive
child health and nutrition scheme (ICDS), thus dealing mostly with women
as mothers or anganwadi workers, or to provide state protection through
shelters and hostels for women, dealing mostly with women as a more vul-
nerable, disadvantaged, or ‘weaker’ section of society. State governments
have not been inclined to expand and convert these departments into nodal
agencies, unlike the national government’s reorientation of the Ministry of
Women and Child Development. Departments of rural development have
increasingly taken on women’s empowerment as a policy concern, through
the co-­ordination of the SHG programmes, which conflates women’s em-
powerment with rural poverty reduction.
State governments have established State Commissions for Women, but
with varying efficacy, often appointing loyal party affiliates as chairpersons.
Both State Commissions for Women have provided some room for question-
ing the political marginalisation of women and gender equality, but focus
largely on legal issues, protective rather than developmental, investigating
current, and trying to prevent future, atrocities against women. Often, a lack
of resources and political status means they are limited to redressing past
injustices, and even then, are often overstretched. Whilst the State Commis-
sion for Women in Andhra Pradesh was established with more powers than
its counterpart in Tamil Nadu, it was not always able to use them as effec-
tively, and remained defunct for several years. The Commission in T ­ amil
Nadu had fewer powers but has managed at times to be a vocal-lobbying
instrument, despite similar resource constraints, political affiliations which
restricted its critical capacity, and varying commitment to and experience in
work on gender equality and women’s empowerment amongst its leadership.
As semi-autonomous agencies, the two parastatal agencies engaged in
women, gender, and development, TNCDW and SERP, offer a more com-
plex set of opportunities than government departments or state commis-
sions for women. They have both involved a larger range of actors from
different backgrounds, offering potentially more opportunities for non-­
governmental involvement including feminist-oriented NGOs, although
such opportunities have been inconsistent, due to variations in access, stra-
tegic input, and impact on social and institutional transformation, with
SERP seemingly offering more potential than the TNCDW. Significantly,
SERP’s Velugu/IKP is largely a mainstream programme with gender as
a cross-cutting concern and intervention for social change in the project;
Mahalir Thittam focuses largely on women rather than gender, and appears
to be more integrationist in approach, something which we explore further
in the next chapter. TNCDW’s later move to Rural Development suggested
a convergence in sectoral location of women’s empowerment programmes
in the two states.
 Gendered institutional contexts 177
Conclusions
Women are numerically under-represented in state government institutions
in both states and the gendered norms and practices of state government
institutions limit how women as potential and actual policymakers are im-
agined and how gender equity as a policy issue is constituted. Such norms
are incompatible with a bureaucratic-individual feminist strategy, or at
least make individual bureaucrats’ tasks very difficult. The bureaucratic-­
structural strategy has provided varied opportunities for feminist transform-
ative strategies. Some examples suggest successful efforts to challenge the
gendered bureaucratic institutions of the state government. But both state
governments have not shown much evidence of efforts to mainstream gender
perspectives throughout government policy. State-led strategies have focused
on increasing descriptive representation through affirmative action policies,
more than attempting to change the gendered norms and practices of state
institutions. Parastatal agencies have been more effective in making a large-
scale impact and with a greater explicit focus on women’s development and
empowerment rather than welfare. But state structures are outward oriented,
concerned more with increasing the delivery and efficiency of pre-designed
programmes than with inward self-reflection on how they are themselves
gendered organisations. Both state governments have implemented several
initiatives, but these are not in the mould of an institutional context conducive
to gender mainstreaming through all state government policy sectors.
The plurality of institutions established in the past three decades to ad-
dress women’s welfare, development, and empowerment demonstrates how
the state is a not a monolith but an ensemble of institutions, offering var-
ied scope for feminist intervention. This is not a static process but a dy-
namic one, offering cautious hope for feminist engagement with the state.
In the next chapter, I explore the state governments’ discourse on women,
gender, and development to understand how the state government talks (or
not) about gender equality, whether and to what extent it forms a central
concern in the state governments’ mainstream development policy, how the
constructions of policy ‘problems’ and ‘solutions’ of gender-equitable devel-
opment are envisioned, and whether these are conducive to more transform-
ative approaches towards gender-equitable development.

Notes
1 More detailed sex-disaggregated data on levels of seniority or by identity groups
such as SC, ST, OBC, and so on, are not published.
2 Calculated by the author from the publicly available Civil List database. These
are approximate figures based on title designation (Shri, Smt., Ms., etc. listed
against each IAS officer). Gender identity is not indicated for a small number of
IAS officers with ‘Dr.’ titles, so this is a conservative but approximate figure.
3 The GoAP publishes two reports, ‘Manpower Profile’ and ‘Andhra Pradesh: At
a Glance’ which include sex-disaggregated data on public sector employees from
the government’s periodical employee census. However, these publications were
178 Gendered institutional contexts
not available when I visited Andhra Pradesh and they are not published outside
India. Available employee census data are highly disaggregated by department
and not readily comparable to the data on Tamil Nadu.
4 Space constraints prevent discussion of women in gram panchayats and munic-
ipal corporations in the two states, and there is a growing literature on this. See
Ghosh and Tawa Lama-Rewal (2005).
5 Women candidates nominated by the TRS decreased to four in the 2018
­Telangana Assembly election.
6 The remaining three held the portfolios of Minister for Mines and Geology,
Handlooms and Textiles, and Spinning Mills; Minister for Medical Education
and Health Insurance; and Minister for Major Industries, Sugar, Commerce and
Export Promotion.
7 More detailed information on past Council of Ministers is not accessible on
GoAP websites. Grover and Arora (1998) provide detailed information of gov-
ernment ministers until 1984, thereafter only including names of governors and
chief ministers each year until 1997.
8 A lack of historical data on committees under previous governments prohibits
comparison between parties and over time. A similar dynamic occurs in the
national parliament, with women as the majority of members of the Committee
for the Empowerment of Women (Rai and Spary, 2019).
9 This is not standard practice across all states within India. In 2005, in answer
to a Rajya Sabha MP’s question, Union Government Minister of State for Hu-
man Resource Development listed ten state governments as having state-level
reservation for women in government posts (Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh,
Jharkhand, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Rajasthan,
Sikkim, and Tamil Nadu) with Bihar state government providing reservations
for women belonging to the Backward Class category only (Rajya Sabha, 2005).
In contrast, there are no reservations for women in central government posts.
10 25 percent are reserved for Backward Classes, 15 percent for SCs, 6 percent for
STs, 3 percent for the physically disabled, and 1 percent for Ex-Servicemen.
11 Data sourced from press report of IAS transfers and confirmed by records on
the Ministry of Personnel website (GoI, n.d.-a). Data are limited to active IAS
officers at the time of access, including officers on leave or on deputation. Data
limitations prevent a thorough historical analysis – continuous data are limited
and less accessible.
12 Between 1999 and 2006, women to hold this portfolio were Comal R. Gayathri
(aka Gayathri Ramachandran) (1999–2001), Minnie Matthews (2002–2003), and
Vasuda Mishra (2006). During the same period, men holding this portfolio were
S.P. Singh (2001–2001); Dr. S. Chellappa (2001–2002); Dr. Prasanta Mahapatra
(2003–2004); and Prabhakar D. Thomas (2004–2006). See (GoI, n.d.-b, n.d.-a).
13 Prior to 1993, the entitlement was three children (GoTN, 2007c: 136).
14 Most of the following analysis is based on Mahalir Thittam rather than the
­IFAD-funded TNWDP, because the most available programme documentation
is on Mahalir Thittam, because of the larger scale of Mahalir Thittam, because
Mahalir Thittam has claimed to have incorporated lessons learnt from evalu-
ations of the IFAD project (also discussed), because Mahalir Thittam is more
recent, and because of space constraints.
15 Under the IFAD-funded phase, the project began in 1990 in Dharmapuri dis-
trict, with plans to extend it to another two districts (Salem and the erstwhile
district of South Arcot, which became Cuddalore and Villupuram districts in
1993). These three districts were selected as the ‘most backward districts in the
State with respect to the status of women’ (IFAD, 1989: 7–8). The programme
was extended to another two districts (Madurai and Ramanathapuram) by
the end of the IFAD phase. With the launch of Mahalir Thittam in 1997–1998,
 Gendered institutional contexts 179
the project included the same TNWDP districts and incorporated eight fur-
ther districts. In the second expansion phase (1998–1999), the project was ex-
tended to another seven districts and then another seven districts in phase three
­(1999–2000). Its focus was rural until in 2000–2001, the scheme was extended to
all town panchayats and municipalities in the 28 districts covered by the project
(TNCDW, 2000a: 5). In 2002–2003, the scheme expanded to include Chennai,
eventually covering all then 30 districts of Tamil Nadu.
16 At district level, the PIU is headed by a project officer with assistant project
officers. The large-scale replication of Mahalir Thittam required significant
co-ordination between the PMU in Chennai and District PIUs. District Project
Co-ordination Committees are headed by the district collector, with the dis-
trict project officer for TNCDW as member-secretary, and remaining members
composed of district government line department heads, bank, NGO, and NA-
BARD representatives, two elected representative women SHG members, ‘two
women with proven commitment to women’s issues’, and secretaries of the local
Block Level Co-ordination Committees. The latter is made up of NGO repre-
sentatives, bankers, the assistant project officer from the District PIU, and one
representative from each SHG in the Block (TNCDW, 2000b: 23–25).
17 In 2015, feminist scholars, activists, and women members of the Mahila Samakhya
programme appealed against the government’s proposal to close down the widely
praised Mahila Samakhya programme and merge it with the National Rural
Livelihoods Mission, effectively moving it from Education to Rural Development
(Menon-Sen, 2015). They suggested this move would ruin the essence of the more
educational and radically empowering Mahila Samakhya programme, considered
central to its success, and lead to a narrower target-driven programme logic.
18 www.ap.gov.in/?page_id=60, last accessed 16 August 2018.
19 The first was the Andhra Pradesh District Poverty Initiatives Project in 180 se-
lected ‘backward’ mandals of six districts of the state, from 2000–2005, and with
funding of Rs. 600 crores (approximately £73.5 million). The second phase of
Velugu was the Andhra Pradesh Rural Poverty Reduction Project, in selected
‘backward’ mandals of the remaining 16 districts, from 2003–2008, with funding
of nearly Rs. 1,500 crores (approximately £184 million).
20 As mentioned, IKP also includes the central government SGSY programme af-
ter it was merged with Velugu in 2005, and which SERP also administers.
21 TDP reinstated the term Velugu when re-elected in 2014; ‘Velugu’ and ‘IKP’ are
now used interchangeably by independent observers.
22 A recent exception is the appointment of Minister of Women Empowerment,
Child Welfare, Disabled and Senior Citizens Welfare as also the Minister for
SERP (Smt. Paritala Sunitha), possibly as a junior ministerial portfolio in Rural
Development.
23 P. Jamuna was later appointed as a member of the State Commission for Women
when it was reconstituted in 2013.

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7 Gendered discourses of
development in two Indian
states

Introduction
The previous chapter discussed the institutional context for gender main-
streaming strategies in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh, including the
development of the state-level institutional machinery for women. This
chapter discusses gendered discourses of development underpinning state-
level development policy, deconstructing and analysing discursive articu-
lations of gendered development and the policy strategies they prescribe,
to understand exactly ‘what is being mainstreamed when we mainstream
gender’ (Eveline and Bacchi, 2005). The aim is to ‘encourage deeper reflec-
tion on the contours of a particular policy discussion, the shape assigned a
particular “problem”’ (Bacchi, 2000: 48) – here, the relationship between
‘gender’ and ‘development’ in state policy. Policy is a site of discursive artic-
ulation and activity (Bacchi, 2000) and ‘it is only by looking at a discourse in
operation, in a specific historical context, that it is possible to see whose in-
terests it serves at a particular moment’ (Weedon, 1987: 111). The aim of this
chapter is to understand how discourse affects what can be said, thought, or
done in policy, particular meanings which arise as a result, and the possibil-
ities these meanings create or foreclose for gender mainstreaming strategies.
I argue that three gendered discourses of development can be identified in
state policy, which I label ‘protective-paternalist’, ‘competitive-­capabilities’,
and ‘structural-transformative’. I show how these three discourses, inter-
nally complex and articulating gendered development in very different
ways, help to explain divergent policy approaches (and absences) to gender-­
equitable development in the two states. I argue that important similarities
and differences are evident in the relative dominance or marginalisation of
policy discourses on gender-equitable development both within and between
the two states. This produces a highly complex but interesting compara-
tive dynamic. Furthermore, discourses of gender and development often
reflect the state’s wider development discourse. These observations suggest
the wider discursive and institutional context matters for how some dis-
courses become embedded within policies and others do not and that this
is a complex process. I conclude arguing that two discourses in particular
186 Gendered developmental discourses
present limited opportunities for gender mainstreaming, and the third – the
­structural-transformative discourse – holds the most potential, but has its
own limitations.
To demonstrate these arguments, the first section provides a brief back-
ground to each state government’s development policy since the 1990s, fo-
cusing on two identifiable discourses: reformist and populist. I then examine
articulations in state policy of the three discourses of gendered development
named above, followed by a comparative discussion, before concluding.
I draw upon a range of governmental and non-governmental documentary
and non-documentary sources: the most significant planning and policy
documents, programme documentation such as annual reports and train-
ing manuals, evaluative reports, and budget speeches; my own fieldwork
interviews, press coverage, and secondary literature. For Tamil Nadu,
I have focused on discourses articulated within the state government’s Tenth
Five-Year Plan (2002–2007), supplemented by other relevant planning and
policy documents. For Andhra Pradesh, I have examined discourses artic-
ulated by Vision 2020, a longer term comprehensive development policy re-
leased by the state government in 1999. Also included is an analysis of policy
discourses of the parastatal programme for women’s SHGs outlined in the
previous chapter –Tamil Nadu Women’s Development Programme/Mahalir
Thittam administered by the TNCDW and Velugu/Indira Kranthi Patham
administered by SERP in Andhra Pradesh.

Part I – State-level development policy: reformist and populist

discourses
Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh have been labelled reform states because
when the central government announced liberalisation reforms in 1991,
these two states embarked on a similar agenda. As at the national level,
this reforms agenda held significant implications for gendered development
discourse in the states: reimagining the role of the state and its commit-
ment to social and human development, and formulation and funding of so-
cial sector programmes and policies. As discussed in Chapter 5, state-level
policies in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh have articulated populist dis-
courses, driven by electoral compulsions. These populist discourses interact
in significant ways with reformist discourses of development emerging in
the 1990s. Here I outline the main features of these two wider state-level
development policy discourses as a backdrop to the articulation of gender-­
equitable development discourse in each state, discussed later.

Tamil Nadu
From the mid-1990s, but particularly between 2001 and 2004, the Tamil Nadu’s
state government development policy articulated a reformist discourse of de-
velopment, which partially resembled the Government of India’s reformist
 Gendered developmental discourses 187
discourse discussed in Chapter 3. This discourse was evident in Tamil N
­ adu’s
Tenth Five-Year Plan (2002–2007) and several reform-oriented policies
thereafter. The reforms envisaged a restructuring of the public sector, in-
cluding government downsizing, an increased role for the private sector in
state development, but perhaps most prominently, fiscal reforms prompted
by the state’s fiscal crisis in the late 1990s.
Tamil Nadu’s Eighth Five-Year Plan (1992–1997) suggested a re-envisioning
of the role of the state to create ‘a conducive environment for building in-
dividual capabilities and encouraging private initiative’ (GoTN, 2003b, my
emphasis). Tamil Nadu’s Tenth Five-Year Plan statement on governance re-
forms defined governance as ‘the management of all such processes that,
in any society, define the environment which permits and enables individu-
als to raise their capacity levels…and provide opportunities to realize their
potential and enlarge the set of available choices…’ (GoTN, 2003b: 901).
Policies ensuing from this discursive shift included partial privatisation of
the road transport sector and closure of loss-making Public Sector Units,
downsizing government, and encouraging public-private partnerships in
infrastructure development (GoTN, 2003b: 37). Government subsidies such
as food subsidies under the Public Distribution System (PDS) and power
subsidies for farmers were either reduced or modified to improve targeting
(GoTN, 2003b: 42–43). Governance reforms included streamlining admin-
istrative procedures, with single window clearance for private investors.
A New Industrial Policy was announced in 2003, reiterating reforms out-
lined in the state’s Tenth Five-Year Plan aimed at increasing investment in
the state.
Reforms relating to public sector privatisation, downsizing government,
and government employee entitlements and benefits were accompanied by
legislation to discipline labour relations. In 2002, the Tamil Nadu Essential
Services Maintenance Act (TESMA) was implemented, prohibiting govern-
ment employees of selected ‘essential services’ from striking. The following
year, several thousand government employees went on strike, protesting
reductions in government employee entitlements and customary benefits.
The government responded, invoking TESMA, dismissing many of those on
strike and later penalising those who were subsequently reinstated, by rec-
ognising the strike period as a disruption in service without pay, adversely
affecting employee entitlements. In the interim, the government replaced
striking government employees with temporary casual workers.
Fiscal reforms were considered essential to the wider reforms agenda,
as the finance minister explained, ‘a stable fiscal situation is an essential
pre-requisite for enabling the Government to implement its development
agenda’ (Ponnaiyan, 2003: para 9). The government sought to establish a
firm consensus on the need for fiscal reforms. The finance minister declared,

there cannot be two opinions on the urgent need to rectify the fis-
cal imbalance before it completely paralyses the functioning of the
188 Gendered developmental discourses
Government. Fiscal recovery is in the best interests of the State and has
to be above political differences, compulsions and expediency.
(Ponnaiyan, 2003: para 29)

Signalling commitment to fiscal reforms was also necessary to attract exter-

nal agency investment, impacting the government’s ability to compete with
other states. In 2003, the finance minister stated in his budget speech:

external funding agencies like the World Bank had moved away from
Tamil Nadu in the absence of any effort at fiscal reforms by the previ-
ous Government. Meanwhile, all neighbouring States have benefited by
such assistance and have been able to go in for larger Plan outlays while
Tamil Nadu was left behind. This Government has shown the will to
undertake the reforms necessary for restoring the fiscal health of Tamil
Nadu and taking the State forward on a higher growth trajectory.
(Ponnaiyan, 2003: para 10)

To institutionalise fiscal management and financial discipline at state level,

the Tamil Nadu government introduced the Fiscal Responsibility Act in
2003, which the finance minister suggested would ‘save future governments
from experiencing the serious fiscal problems that we have had to confront’
(Ponnaiyan, 2003: para 9).
The reformist discourse emerged in state policy despite a history of pop-
ulist policies in Tamil Nadu embedded in political party discourse (dis-
cussed in Chapter 5). Populist discourses in Tamil Nadu have been labelled
as either empowerment/assertive or protective/paternalist, and associated
with DMK and AIADMK governments, respectively (Swamy, 1998; Sub-
ramanian, 1999). However, from the 1990s, Tamil Nadu government’s
reformist discourse challenged established populist discourse. To an ex-
tent, the state’s fiscal crisis provided a useful entry point for the reformist
discourse. The AIADMK frequently justified reformist policies by refer-
encing the large fiscal deficit, which it claimed was caused by the liberal
expenditure of the previous DMK government. Under reformist discourse,
populist policies were implied to be expensive and wasteful; repeated refer-
ences to ‘reining in’ the fiscal deficit depicted expenditure as uncontrollable
and irresponsible.
However, the government also tempered fiscal reforms – reforms should
be considered with ‘the people’ in mind, particularly ‘vulnerable sections of
society’, taking care not to alienate the electorate (Ponnaiyan, 2003). The
fiscal reforms were segregated from the wider development agenda – the
finance minister declared in his budget speech in 2003 that ‘this Govern-
ment has the onerous responsibility of integrating the reform priorities with
the development imperatives of the State. The interests of the poor and the
needy have to be protected’ (Ponnaiyan, 2003). He appealed to government
employees to share the burden:
 Gendered developmental discourses 189
This Government recognises the important role played by Government
employees in implementing development and welfare programmes of
the Government. Government employees will have to also recognise
that at a time of extreme fiscal distress, they have to come forward to
share the distress. It is the policy of this Government to ensure the wel-
fare of its employees. At a time of extreme financial stress, it has been
difficult to entertain requests for increases in pay and allowances.
(Ponnaiyan, 2003)

The government’s stand on the wider reform policies remained relatively

unmoved in the state’s turbulent few years between 2001 and 2004, but this
period of second-generation economic reforms was interrupted following
the 2004 national Lok Sabha elections. The AIADMK failed to win a single
seat in the elections, so Chief Minister Jayalalithaa reversed several reforms
from the previous three years, reinstating some populist policies. Policy
reversals included reduction in electricity tariffs, restoration of free farm
power supply, and relaxation of restrictions on eligibility for food subsidies
under the PDS. Perhaps the most significant reversal was the dismissal of
disciplinary proceedings against striking government employees from the
previous year, and the reinstatement of several thousand government em-
ployees temporarily hired to cover for the striking government workers but
dismissed prior to the latter’s reinstatement. This starkly contrasted with
earlier reform policies of government downsizing and disciplining labour
relations. The repeal of TESMA, invoked during the strike to discipline gov-
ernment employees, was a DMK election manifesto promise, which they
later fulfilled in June 2006 after being elected into state government (GoTN,
2006).
The media quickly linked the policy reversals to the Lok Sabha defeat
and upcoming Tamil Nadu State Assembly Elections in 2006. Not surpris-
ingly, Chief Minister Jayalalithaa publicly rejected this representation (BBC
World, 2004). She justified reducing electricity tariffs as a special protec-
tive measure to relieve domestic consumers, particularly those affected by
drought, claiming ‘no other State provides such relief to all families in the
domestic category in order to protect them’ (The Hindu, 2004). The World
Bank was disappointed, stating the policy reversals threatened progress
on fiscal reforms, and warned that ‘Tamil Nadu has little choice but to re-
turn to the path of fiscal consolidation if it is to meet its development goals’
(World Bank, 2005: iv).
Thus, reformist discourse was restricted by populist discourse influenced
by an electoral logic. The 2006 State Assembly elections demonstrated that
populist discourse remained strong in Tamil Nadu. The DMK offered ma-
jor populist concessions including free colour TV sets and subsidised rice
in its election campaign. However, the DMK’s association with a national
telecom sector scandal during the UPA-I government (2004–2009), in which
DMK Union government ministers were implicated, affected the party’s
190 Gendered developmental discourses
re-election prospects at the state level. With heavy irony, an article in Busi-
ness Today pointed out the same TV sets given away by the DMK after the
2006 election ‘served to keep [electors] very well informed’ about the 2G
spectrum controversy and accusations of DMK corruption (Madhavan and
Balasubramanyam, 2011).
The DMK’s loss repeated in 2011, when Jayalalithaa’s AIADMK won
the State Assembly election with a majority 150 of 234 seats; the DMK
won 23 seats. The AIADMK also won 37 of Tamil Nadu’s 39 Lok Sabha
seats during the 2014 elections. However, in September 2014, Jayalalithaa
was convicted in a long-standing disproportionate assets case, filed in the
mid-1990s. The Supreme Court granted her bail and a suspended sentence,
but on appeal a Special Court acquitted her in May 2015. Between her con-
viction and acquittal, she was disqualified from the legislature and a party
loyalist temporarily held the chief minister’s post. Upon acquittal she was
re-elected in a June 2015 by-election. In the following State Legislative As-
sembly election of May 2016, her party won a majority of seats. Some at-
tribute Jayalalithaa’s success to her sustained populist politics, combining
socio-economic provisions through a protective-paternalist frame. Jayala-
lithaa provided basic subsidised goods branded ‘Amma’ (Mother), such as
subsidised canteen meals, bottled mineral water, medicines through Amma
pharmacies, and later, Amma mobile phones, distributed to SHG women
trainers (The Economic Times, 2015). In 2013, there were thought to be al-
most 300 Amma canteens providing subsidised nutritious meals, managed
and funded by municipal corporations and run by SHG women, and reports
suggest they have been especially popular with the urban working poor
(­Rajendran, 2013; see also Madhavan, 2014).1

Andhra Pradesh
Since the mid-1990s, the Andhra Pradesh state government’s commitment
to economic reforms has been characterised by aggressive self-promotion
as a reform-oriented government and, unlike most other reform-oriented
States, has extended the economic reforms agenda to encompass wider
transformational governance reforms (Mooij, 2003; Kennedy, 2004; Kirk,
2005). The state government’s strong pro-reform stance was articulated
at a National Development Council meeting in 2002, when then Chief
Minister Chandrababu Naidu stated, ‘reforms are no longer a matter of
choice but have become a matter of necessity…In an increasingly com-
petitive world unless we reform we will be in danger of being left behind’
(Naidu, 2002).
The strongest identifiable articulation of the TDP government’s reformist
discourse can be found in the state government’s Vision 2020 document, an
‘ambitious’ vision for the achievement of economic and human development
and governance reforms by the year 2020. Released by the state govern-
ment in January 1999, Vision 2020 was compiled in consultation with global
 Gendered developmental discourses 191
consulting firm McKinsey and supported by the UK government’s Depart-
ment for International Development.
Vision 2020 proposed a shift in the role of the state ‘from being primarily
a controller of the economy, …[to] a facilitator and catalyst of its growth’
(GoAP, 1999: 8). By stimulating economic growth, the state could achieve
development through increased incomes resulting from new employment
opportunities. Economic growth would increase state resources, which
could be invested in social sectors to combat poverty, improve education
and health, and build infrastructure for services such as water supply, trans-
port, and housing (GoAP, 1999: 1). Governance reforms proposed a transi-
tion to ‘SMART’ government administration – simple, moral, accountable,
responsive, and transparent. Investments in education and health were
deemed important for increasing productivity to achieve the high rates of
economic growth required (GoAP, 1999: 7). High demand for infrastructure
required ‘large-scale private investment’, facilitated by a ‘regulatory envi-
ronment that enables private investment and facilitates business’ (GoAP,
1999: 14).
Vision 2020 proposed restructuring government expenditure for effi-
ciency. The drive to reduce and target government social sector subsidies
was heavily concerned with ‘leakages’, and schemes should ‘provide only
for those with a genuine need’ (GoAP, 1999: 57). On sustainability of food
subsidies in the PDS, Vision 2020 urged targeting of the PDS to

clearly identified groups who are poor, vulnerable, or risk-prone. Since

food subsidies are consumption- rather than investment-oriented, they
are inherently less efficient than public employment programmes…[T]
argeting such subsidies…is difficult, making these programmes expen-
sive. In Andhra Pradesh, such programmes should be used only to provide
relief to genuinely vulnerable groups.
(GoAP, 1999: 58)

The government also proposed privatisation of sectors like higher education

and health care, suggesting ‘the private sector, operating in a competitive
situation, is better able than governments to provide efficient, rationally
priced and high quality services in many areas’ and that ‘the State’s support
in such areas should gradually be limited to ensuring access for the poor
to these services’ (GoAP, 1999). Privatisation would purportedly increase
quality of service provision and ‘free Government resources and attention
for higher priority developmental goals’ (GoAP, 1999). Vision 2020 proposed
to build on Janmabhoomi, an ostensibly large-scale exercise in participatory
development, which had established in parallel to the local panchayats sev-
eral non-state local community groups such as Water Users Groups to mon-
itor irrigation schemes and Mothers’ Committees to oversee child education
and the Integrative Child Development Services scheme at the local level.
SHGs would also be encouraged.
192 Gendered developmental discourses
In line with governance reforms, in 2001 the AP government set up a new
division of the General Administration Department to oversee administra-
tive reforms, and the same year, with a £6 million grant from the UK’s De-
partment for International Development, established the Centre for Good
Governance in Hyderabad as an academic think tank advising on state-level
reforms. The World Bank has also been a substantial international donor
of reforms in Andhra Pradesh; AP state constitutes one of the few Indian
states where the World Bank received agreement from the central govern-
ment to enter into subnational lending agreements with state governments
(Kirk, 2005). The first AP-specific World Bank project, the Andhra Pradesh
Economic Restructuring Project, was approved in 1998, and planned inter-
ventions in education, health, nutrition, roads, irrigation, and governance
and fiscal reforms (World Bank, 1998).
The state government’s willingness to avail of World Bank funding was
unsurprisingly criticised: Left parties criticised the state government for
acquiescing to anti-imperialist forces and media reports suggested the
BJP-led central government stalled approval to the 1998 World Bank loan,
from a nationalist perspective of swadeshi (self-reliance) (Indian Express,
1998). A third criticism positioned Naidu’s pro-Bank reform approach as
‘a “betrayal” of the state’s autonomy – a charge that resonated with an AP
political tradition of asserting Telugu “self-respect” after years of central
government interference in its affairs’ (Kirk, 2005: 292). Despite criticism
from the Congress Party whilst in opposition, they continued World Bank
funding once elected to state government in 2004.
Populism has been a characteristic feature of electoral politics in
Andhra Pradesh since the emergence of the TDP under N.T. Rama Rao in
the early 1980s (see Chapter 5). However, economic reforms espoused by
new Chief Minister Chandrababu Naidu in the mid-1990s suggested the
TDP was beginning to reject this style of politics, citing fiscal necessity
(e.g. prohibition discussed in Chapter 5). Nevertheless, on two occasions,
Naidu reverted to populist promises of concessions. The first instance
occurred just three months before State Assembly elections in October
1999, in which Naidu secured a second mandate. In early July 1999, Naidu
launched the ‘Deepam Scheme’, which aimed to provide one million liquid
petroleum gas connections to poor rural women who were members of
DWRCA groups (Development of Women and Children in Rural Areas).
This made Naidu popular amongst women voters, and also did not help
the opposition Congress Party when they protested against the scheme,
complaining the scheme’s launch had violated the Election Code of Con-
duct by occurring after elections were announced. Murty explained the
‘TDP cleverly used this as proof to show that the Congress was opposed to
this welfare measure… creat[ing] a feeling among women voters that the
Congress was trying to thwart this scheme’ (2001: 222). Several commen-
tators suggested this scheme’s influence on the electoral choices of women
voters decisively impacted the following elections, securing a large vote
 Gendered developmental discourses 193
bank for Naidu (Murty, 2001: 222). However, after elections, the Deepam
Scheme was criticised by DWCRA groups citing high increases in the costs
of refill cylinders.
The second instance occurred before the 2004 State Assembly election
which elected the opposition Congress Party into government. One of Con-
gress’ campaign promises was free power to farmers and continuation of the
Deepam Scheme. They later extended this to all below-poverty-line families
regardless of whether they were members of SHGs, although SHG members
would be allocated extra eligibility points, as would individuals with low
incomes and small family size, amongst other criteria. The TDP’s Janma-
bhoomi scheme attracted strong criticism from Congress, who accused the
TDP government of bypassing panchayats omitting this was because Con-
gress had a stronghold there. The newly elected Congress government ter-
minated the Janmabhoomi programme almost immediately when it came to
government (GoAP, 2004).

Comparing state discourses of development

Both states embarked on a reformist agenda in the 1990s, emphasising a new
role for government, including (partial) privatisation, increased efficiency
in public sectors, government expenditure and government administration,
and deregulation in favour of the private sector. GoAP’s vision was more
comprehensive and far reaching than that of GoTN, although execution
was perhaps more extensive in Tamil Nadu. Kennedy’s notes differences in
the way each State government politically positioned the reforms: Andhra
Pradesh loudly ‘trumpeting’ them, and Tamil Nadu’s main parties follow-
ing them more ‘discreetly’ (2004: 44). In Tamil Nadu, the broader position-
ing is also different: economic reform has not been situated ‘within a larger
transformationalist development agenda built around a vision of radical
citizen-oriented governance reform’ (Kennedy, 2004: 44).
Furthermore, both states’ reform agendas have been limited by populist
discursive logics, which are arguably more embedded in Tamil Nadu but
have proven decisive in both states in stalling some reform efforts, espe-
cially around election time. The analysis of gendered discourses of develop-
ment in the following section needs to be understood against this backdrop
of both a new reformist discourse of development in the 1990s but also its
limited ability to challenge and overcome embedded populist discourse in
both states.

Part II – Discourses of gendered development

Mapping dominant and marginal discourses

Discourses of gendered development are often articulated strongest in pol-
icies on women, gender, and development, but can be evident in polices not
194 Gendered developmental discourses
paying particular attention to the status of women, their development or
empowerment, or gender (in)equality. Here I identify three discourses of
gendered development traceable in state government policies in Tamil Nadu
and Andhra Pradesh. I have labelled these discourses protective-paternalist,
competitive-capability, and structural-transformative.2 ‘Women’s empower-
ment’ is prominently articulated in the latter two, but its context-specific
meaning differs in important ways. Below I outline some dominant charac-
teristics of these discourses, identified inductively in state policies, bearing
in mind that identifying such ideal types in policy discourse is challenging
because multiple discourses intersperse in policy. The implications of policy
narratives containing multiple discursive logics are, however, important and
explored further in Chapter 8.

Protective-paternalist
The protective-paternalist discourse depicts particular groups in society,
such as women, as ‘weak’ and ‘vulnerable’, lacking full autonomy, and in
need of ‘protection’. The state is characteristically depicted, often in the
guise of a supreme leader, as a benevolent patron, or ‘leader-as-donor’
(Subramanian, 1999: 75). Paternalist policies focus on minimal provision
and basic needs (Subramanian, 1999: 75). The large-scale distribution of
resources amongst groups by the state is presented as a charitable and al-
truistic gesture, akin to gift-giving (Goodell, 1985) rather than on the basis
of citizenship rights, human rights, or other forms of citizen entitlement.
The positioning of the state as a benevolent leader ‘encourages supporters
to assume an attitude of reverence and gratitude’ (Subramanian, 1999: 75).
Because resource distribution by the state is depicted as altruism, the state
ensures its relationship with beneficiaries is non-reciprocal because ‘al-
truism requires that nothing be returned’ (Goodell, 1985). But that means
‘beneficiaries’ have an ambiguous relationship with paternalist policies and
the state ‘because these programs are granted and withdrawn at the discre-
tion of the state,…they are neither designed in response to local request nor
subject to sustainable local pressures, [and] preclude any continuity that
the local “beneficiaries” themselves might be able to affect…’ (Goodell,
1985: 253).
A protective-paternalist state often displays an ostensibly benign yet
conservative attitude towards gender relations, a benevolent sexism, or ‘a
set of interrelated attitudes toward women that are sexist in terms of view-
ing women stereotypically and in restricted roles but that are subjectively
positive in feeling tone (for the perceiver)’ (Glick and Fiske, 1996: 491). The
state’s protection of women is presented as an affectionate and caring ges-
ture. As opposed to ‘hostile sexism’, which is defined as an overt antipathy
towards women (drawing on Glick and Fiske, 1996; Barreto and Ellemers,
2005: 634), benevolent sexism ‘provides a comfortable rationalization for
confining women to domestic roles’ (Glick and Fiske, 1996: 492).
 Gendered developmental discourses 195
Competitive-capabilities
The competitive-capabilities discourse draws on a liberal, integrative,
equal opportunities equality model, in which it is assumed, notwith-
standing instances of discrimination, the rules of society are generally
fair and such instances are seen as aberrations, barriers to equal com-
petition amongst individuals in society. It is the state’s task to remove
barriers, creating a level playing field and ensuring equal opportunities
for women to compete with men. The state-as-facilitator implements pref-
erential policies, such as ensuring access to education and employment,
to develop individual capabilities. ‘Removing the barriers’ initiates a par-
ticular kind of ‘empowerment’ process whereby individuals integrate into
the existing system and ‘fulfill their potential’, enabling them to become
‘self-reliant’.
It also ensures development is more efficient – women’s empowerment and
gender equality serve a useful purpose to development; ‘gender equality is
smart economics’. Eliminating discrimination towards women and enabling
access for women to education and employment is instrumentally benefi-
cial for development rather than merely intrinsically beneficial for women,
rights, justice, or entitlement. As Squires suggests, ‘the potential weakness
of this approach is that it may privilege those concerns that fit most readily
with dominant policy-making rationalities, thereby obfuscating the norma-
tive and contested nature of gender equality and privileging the ‘objective’
knowledge of gender experts’ (2007: 148).

Structural-transformative
A structural-transformative discourse posits inequality as the result of in-
equitable power relations and recognises the centrality of power to the pro-
cess of transforming inequitable relations. It tends to focus on empowering
‘vulnerable’ and ‘marginalised groups’ rather than individuals. It empha-
sises the importance of enabling participation of marginalised groups and
augmenting their role in decision-making and agenda setting, often aiming
to improve their access to mainstream institutional bodies. Increased par-
ticipation is understood to enable the empowerment of poor and marginal-
ised groups because it enables democratic deliberation and collective action.
This occurs either through creation of new institutions or through transfor-
mation of existing mainstream norms, structures, and processes which have
led to marginalisation and inequality. Thus, the onus of transformation is
not restricted to individuals themselves but mainstream institutions. Be-
cause of its focus on structural inequalities and on groups rather than indi-
viduals, a structural-transformative discourse is the most likely of all three
discourses to recognise intersectionality of multiple structural inequalities
deriving from caste, class, gender, religion, sexuality, age, disability, and
so on. However, a limitation of this discourse is the tendency to emphasise
196 Gendered developmental discourses
group differences to the point of reinforcing them at the expense of others,
privileging some groups or some forms of inequality over others, and thus
attention to intersectionality is not always adequately recognised, under-
stood, or addressed.

Gendered development discourses in state policy

Tamil Nadu
The strongest articulations of protective-paternalist discourse were found
in populist and welfare-oriented schemes of Tamil Nadu state government,
presented as part of state-provided social safety nets for those excluded
from national- or state-led development processes. The Department of
­Social Welfare commonly depicted women as weak, as one of several
‘vulnerable’ groups in need of state protection. Particularly ‘vulnerable’
women are identified as deserving beneficiaries of the state’s ‘affection’:
‘among women, pregnant women, lactating mothers, the poor women liv-
ing below poverty line, widows and destitutes deserve more affection and
assistance’ (GoTN, 2003a). Women are grouped with children, the desti-
tute, the elderly, street children, ‘delinquent’ children and ‘juveniles’, and
the disabled (GoTN, 2003b). Women and children are homogenised as ‘the
most disadvantaged category of population’ regarding indicators on liter-
acy, health, mortality, and dependency on agricultural livelihoods (GoTN,
2003b: 319).
Many state-level policies articulating protective-paternalist discourse
are administered by the Department of Social Welfare. Two prominent
­AIADMK schemes have sought to address female infanticide. The ‘Cradle
Baby Scheme’, begun in 1992, responded to the ‘menace’ and ‘evil practice’
of female infanticide. The scheme enabled parents to give up for adoption
their daughters at birth, transferring them into state care anonymously;
the state provided cradles in reception centres in state-run hospitals, pri-
mary care centres, and children’s homes. The main concern was to ‘enable
the rescue of female children abandoned by their biological parents due to
various social circumstances’ (GoTN, 2003b: 332). The second scheme, the
Girl Child Protection Scheme, was introduced in 1992. The government
deposited funds on behalf of girls, which they would receive on their 20th
birthday and could be used, the policy suggested, to fund higher educa-
tion studies or ‘defray marriage expenses’, a euphemism for dowry (GoTN,
2003b: 332). The scheme’s eligibility criteria stipulated parents should have
a low income, have undergone sterilisation, not have any male children,
and be under 35 years of age. The girl also must complete her tenth stand-
ard education and appear for the public examination. Both schemes were
reintroduced when the AIADMK party came back into government in
2001, and were continued by the DMK when they were elected into gov-
ernment in 2006.
 Gendered developmental discourses 197
Several other Department of Social Welfare schemes included assistance
(cash payments) for marriage for various women and girls in difficult cir-
cumstances, such as widows, ‘deserted wives’, orphan girls, and daughters
and school children of poor widows. Many came with conditions, mostly
income ceilings and age restrictions for the bride (but not the groom, 18–30
years). Sewing machines were given to destitute widows to assist them with
a livelihood, free textbooks to school children of poor widows, free bicycles
to Dalit girls as an incentive for education. The Department, through the
Tamil Nadu Social Welfare Board, also assisted Family Counselling Cen-
tres run by voluntary organisations, to ‘preserv[e] the basic social unit of a
family’ (GoTN, 2005: 230). These policies position the state as a benevolent
and charitable figure protecting vulnerable women, girls, and poor and des-
titute widows; the state becomes the paternal figure writ large. An implicit
heteronormativity and social conservatism underpin some of these policies.
Many are compensatory measures which implicitly acknowledge state fail-
ure to eradicate illegal and unjust societal practices discriminating against
women, such as dowry demands, sex-selective abortion and son preference,
and other forms of violence and discrimination against women and girls.
In contrast, the GoTN’s competitive-capability discourse stressed removal
of barriers to gender equity (2003b: 328), and ‘removal of gender bias’ (2002:
para 2.34). Its Tenth Five-Year Plan explicitly acknowledged the failure of
constitutional guarantees of equality combined with legislation for social
change:

…[T]he mere enactment of laws does not change attitudes, and iron-
ically, these advances in social legislation have engendered in some
measure an attitude of complacency whilst the views of society towards
the position of women have not changed much over the years.
(GoTN, 2003b: 319)

Failure of legislation justified affirmative action, particularly in education

and employment, and the Tenth Plan set targets for 50 percent reduction in
‘gender gaps’ in literacy and wage rates by 2007 (GoTN, 2003b: 32).
The efficiency orientation of the competitive-capability discourse meant
concern for women’s empowerment was often instrumentally articulated as
mutually supportive of poverty reduction. The GoTN’s Tenth Five-Year Plan
explained that ‘promoting micro credit with groups of women is increas-
ingly seen as the panacea for reducing poverty and empowering women’
(2003b: 328). Women’s empowerment was occasionally subordinated in fa-
vour of poverty reduction, predicated on assumptions concerning women’s
status, family income, and the household. Policy often failed to distinguish
gender-inequitable development and poverty as distinct problems, instead
collapsing the two. This assumed a necessarily positive relationship between
women’s empowerment and rising household income, which, as discussed in
Chapter 5, is not straightforward.
198 Gendered developmental discourses
Poverty reduction was one of the business cases offered for women’s
empowerment; the other was women’s empowerment as an investment in
human resources to benefit overall economic development. Women were
viewed as assets or inputs into economic development processes, as was
human development more broadly: ‘a country’s real wealth is its human re-
sources. If human resources develop, then the country’s economy will also
develop’ (GoTN, 2002: 1). Women become responsible for, but subordinated
to, the nation’s economic and human development: ‘the economic develop-
ment of a country depends largely upon the status of its human resource
development. The index of a nation’s social development is the status of its
women’ (GoTN, 2002: 1).
But the strongest state-level articulation of this competitive-capability
discourse came from the parastatal TNCDW (discussed in Chapter 6), re-
sponsible for implementing the state’s SHG programme Mahalir Thittam.
The scheme’s empowerment objectives emphasised dismantling barriers to
women’s empowerment: a key objective was to enable poor and disadvan-
taged women through capacity-building to ‘cross all social and economic
barriers and thereby facilitate their full development into empowered citi-
zens’. Social empowerment entailed dismantling various barriers to women’s
and girls’ equal development. Economic empowerment would be achieved
by greater access to financial resources outside the household and equal ac-
cess and control over resources within the household, a ‘significant increase’
in women’s incomes, reduced vulnerability of poor women to crisis, and
financial self-reliance of women (TNCDW, 2000: 18). Intrinsic and instru-
mental rationales were presented for women’s empowerment: the original
IFAD project stated, ‘the principal objective of the project is the economic
and social upliftment of women to enhance the welfare of their families and
to improve their status in the family and the community’ (IFAD, 1989, my
emphasis).
Mahalir Thittam emphasised empowerment was about making choices,
and only women and not ‘outsiders’ could empower women. Consistent
with the government’s wider reimagining of the state’s role in development,
TNCDW policy suggested government and non-government institutions
could play a supportive, facilitative role in this process (TNCDW, 2000: 18).
In contrast to protective-paternalist discourse, women were interpellated as
responsible agents. One policy statement acknowledged ‘women are aware
of their own strengths and weaknesses, family resources and risk-taking
ability…Accordingly, it is the women themselves who would be the best
judges in respect of economic activities and levels of credit required’
(GoTN, 2001a: section 3.1). Women were positioned as centrally responsi-
ble for their own empowerment. Thus, despite the emphasis elsewhere on
changing structures, the implicit thrust was on women who themselves had
to change.
TNCDW’s SHG programme did, however, distinguish between ‘good’
and ‘bad’ choices, and thus between good and bad SHG members. Mahalir
 Gendered developmental discourses 199
Thittam, and its predecessor the Tamil Nadu Women’s Development Pro-
ject, focused on integration rather than transformation: the original IFAD
project document identified the aim was to

increase [women’s] income-earning potential by integrating them into the

regular delivery system for credit and technical support services, to raise
women’s level of awareness and, through the strength and mutual sup-
port of group interaction, to encourage self-reliance, both individually
and communally and foster the confidence to strive for social change.
(IFAD, 1989: 8, my emphasis)

A former TNCDW official made clear the focus of the Corporation’s pro-
gramme was women not gender (interview, June 2007). Notwithstanding
the affirmative emphasis on women’s empowerment and ‘social change’,
the project primarily aimed to integrate women into the mainstream, repo-
sitioning them as creditworthy, capable individuals requiring an enabling
environment to participate in mainstream processes and institutions. How-
ever, creating the alternative and parallel structure of SHGs means this
strategy still foregrounds women’s difference and separation from, rather
than transformation of, the mainstream.
Women’s access to institutional credit is made possible by the SHG opera-
tional model, relying on ‘social capital’, defined as informal networks, benefits,
and norms generated by associational practices. Microfinance organisations,
mainstream development agencies, and commercial banks positively associ-
ate ‘social capital’ with the dynamic of peer pressure, which enables higher re-
payment rates for creditors (Mayoux, 1995; Rankin, 2002). Such outcomes rely
upon what Rankin calls a ‘highly disciplinary institutional culture’, nurtured
within microfinance programmes by a detailed and strict regime of group
practices. Mahalir Thittam evidenced elements of this ‘highly disciplinary in-
stitutional culture’ – the cultivation of self-regulating technologies moulding
individual and group behaviour around programmatic norms – ­including de-
tailed grading and assessment procedures which determined access to credit
(discussed in Chapter 8). The SHG model gained significant support from the
banking sector, which, driven by efficiency concerns, was persuaded that the
SHG model was an effective and cost-efficient mechanism to expand demand
for institutional credit and savings amongst the newly creditworthy rural poor.
A Reserve Bank of India circular to commercial banks emphasised

…the linking of SHGs with the banks is a cost effective, transparent and
flexible approach to improve the accessibility of credit from the formal
banking system to the unreached rural poor. It is expected to offer the
much needed solution to the twin problems being faced by the banks,
viz recovery of loans in the rural areas and the high transaction cost in
dealing with small borrowers at frequent intervals.
(RBI, 1996)
200 Gendered developmental discourses
SHGs lowered transaction costs for banks because banks would deal with
groups not individuals; high repayment rates were facilitated by peer group
pressure amongst SHG members, and individual security for loan collateral
was instead secured by group liability.
The group approach also enabled the implementing agency to govern
large numbers of programme participants from afar, encouraging them to
govern themselves through federating groups into larger bodies, appeal-
ing to administrative efficiency concerns of the state government’s wider
development discourse. Women’s SHGs were also seen as highly conven-
ient and accessible institutional delivery entry points for other govern-
ment schemes. Convergence of government poverty alleviation schemes
through SHGs was listed as a key focus point for Social Welfare under
Tamil Nadu’s Tenth Five-Year Plan (GoTN, 2003b: 330). However, as a
former TNCDW official observed, the attention from other government
departments often increased the burden of participation on women SHG
members (discussed in Chapter 8). Instead of opening upwards and ush-
ering in a process of gender awareness and inter-sectoral co-operation
across a range of government departments, this ‘convergence’ logic meant
different departments independently focused downwards and inwards to-
wards local delivery.
The structural-transformative discourse was the most marginal gendered
development discourse, but did manifest in some state policies. Tamil
­Nadu’s development policy recognised two problems: first, structural gen-
der inequalities which prevented women from possessing an independent
economic asset base, and second, poverty and low household incomes. The
Tenth Five-Year Plan stated,

To be asset less, unemployed, illiterate, destitute and yet over worked,

tired and weak is the lot of most rural women in India…[T]hrough their
lack of recognition in society, women are powerless, deprived of access
to improved means of production through credit, technical advice,
training, marketing skills etc.
(GoTN, 2003b: 328)

One reason offered for women’s lower status was that ‘crucial decision
making powers within the households are still with the males’ (GoTN,
2003b: 320). It acknowledged women’s income is often crucial in poor
households:

…[A]lthough accorded little social status or recognition, women’s earn-

ings are frequently essential to the survival of the family. In many cases
women are the actual de facto heads of the family by virtue of deser-
tion, migration, illness, unemployment or the addictive habits of their
husbands.
(GoTN, 2003b: 328)
 Gendered developmental discourses 201
This recognition and positioning of women’s economic contribution as ‘es-
sential to the survival of the family’ stands in tension with how, elsewhere,
women are positioned as dependent subjects:

Within the family, a woman is treated as a social and financial depend-

ent, controlled by the family in every aspect of her life; having had little
or no education, her worth is measured in terms of her ability to produce
male children or bring in money/assets; she no longer belongs to her fa-
ther’s family whilst her position in her husband’s family is conditional.
(GoTN, 2003b: 320)

Jayalalithaa’s 18 Point Programme for Women and Child Welfare, otherwise

known as Vision 2010, and released when the AIADMK was elected back into
office in 2001, aimed to revive the 15 Point Programme unveiled in 1993. The
programme noted several ‘critical governance issues’ to reform, indicating a
willingness to transform gendered practices and orientation of the state bureau-
cracy. The need for a gender-sensitive approach was identified as the ‘hallmark’
of the programme. The ‘patriarchal attitude of Indian society’ was identified
as ‘one of the major underlying causes for the violations and non-fulfilment of
many of the rights of children and women…and the low status given to women
and girls’ (GoTN 2001b: 13). The programme listed sensitisation of ‘manage-
ment styles, techniques and work culture in government departments’ towards
issues relating to women and children (ibid), akin to a gender mainstreaming
approach, although it did not elaborate further on what this would entail, and
these initiatives did not seem to find a prominent place in state policy.
Mahalir Thittam articulated several policy aims representing a structural-­
transformative discourse: one was to ‘create or reorient’ processes and in-
stitutions to enable women’s participation and decision-making; another
envisioned co-operative and egalitarian relationships between men and
women ‘as equal partners’ and sought to ‘inspire a new generation of women
and men to work together for equality, sustainability, and communal har-
mony’, and a further three aims sought to achieve ‘equality of status of poor
women as participants, decision makers and beneficiaries’, to promote and
ensure women’s human rights; and to influence Government policy in fa-
vour of ‘disadvantaged’ women (TNCDW, 2000: 17).
In sum, dominant gendered development discourses identifiable in policy
were protective-paternalist, and competitive-capabilities, with minor traces of
­structural-transformative discourse. The implications for subjectivity and agency
will be discussed in the following chapter. Meanwhile, we turn to discourse in
Andhra Pradesh, and compare discourses towards the end of the chapter.

Andhra Pradesh
Notwithstanding the populist appeals of N.T. Rama Rao’s TDP government
up to the mid-1990s, the protective-paternalist discourse was the weakest of
202 Gendered developmental discourses
three discourses in Andhra Pradesh state government development policy.
Even when the government recognised women as a vulnerable group, it was
often followed by a commitment to empower women or eliminate discrimi-
nation. In other words, vulnerability was understood as an aberration, not
something inherent to women as a group; state intervention was not justified
by affection or nurture. The Girl Child Protection Scheme in AP aimed to
‘eliminate gender discrimination, to eradicate female infanticide, to improve
the sex ratio and empower and protect the rights of girl children and women’
(GoAP, 2005a). The scheme aimed to facilitate ‘the emergence of a girl child
to become a strong and assertive individual who will command equal sta-
tus and respect in society’ (ibid). This stronger articulation of an equality
and rights-based perspective contrasted with the benevolent charity artic-
ulated in Tamil Nadu state policy (although AP policy still employed small
family norm criteria). Several AP government policies on child trafficking
and adoption, for which the state could potentially articulate a protective-­
paternalist role, particularly in the wake of an adoption-trafficking scandal
in 2001, have not articulated such a paternalist discourse.3,4
The competitive-capabilities discourse was by far the most dominant gen-
dered development discourse articulated in AP state development policy.
Vision 2020 emphasised building capabilities in nutrition, education, health,
and employment to ensure a healthy, skilled, and educated workforce. It
emphasised removing barriers to gender equality based on policies enabling
equal treatment of women and men, promising that ‘a girl child born in this
year will have as many chances as her brothers will to go to school, find a job
and live a healthy and productive life’ (GoAP, 1999: 2). The policy-­envisioned
empowerment would enable women and girls to ‘fulfil their roles as equal
shapers, with men of the economy and society’ (GoAP, 1999). Again echoing
instrumentalist narratives of ‘gender equality as smart economics’, women
were positioned as assets to state and national development, with immense
potential as untapped resources: ‘women represent 50 percent of the popula-
tion, yet their productive potential remains largely untapped’ (GoAP, 1999:
68). Investment in women’s empowerment in areas like education was jus-
tified by the positive externalities they produced for families (e.g. increased
household income expenditure on nutritional, health, and educational levels
of other household members) and the assumed effect of women’s education
in lowering fertility levels: Vision 2020 in AP stated,

education also leads to improvement in other critical areas such as

health and family planning. Studies have shown educated women can
take better decisions about nutrition and healthcare for their families.
They are also more open to family planning and have fewer children.
(GoAP, 1999)

State policy positioned women as highly responsible for the overall

development process: ‘Andhra Pradesh’s development goals cannot be
 Gendered developmental discourses 203
achieved without harnessing the potential of its women’ (GoAP, 1999:
84). Their empowerment was presented as ‘critical to achieving the
transition to development’ (ibid: 68). Vision 2020 viewed women’s in-
creasing participation in employment positively, further encouraging
this by proposing to ‘eliminate’ gender inequalities like women’s ‘lower
pay and restricted access to employment opportunities and skill de-
velopment’. Several prescribed strategies included enforcing equal pay
legislation, continued ‘hard’ affirmative action policy of reserving one
third of government and public sector jobs for women, and ‘softer’ af-
firmative action strategies of training, self-employment schemes, and
institutional credit linkages (GoAP, 1999: 69). Vision 2020 policies to
achieve equitable development of ‘vulnerable’ groups would also use
temporary protective safety nets in the short term: ‘until these develop-
mental goals are achieved, the poor and other vulnerable groups must
be protected and provided with an acceptable standard of living’ (GoAP,
1999: ­56–57). Alongside encouraging women into the workforce, the gov-
ernment pledged to increase childcare provision, albeit leaving largely
undisturbed the expectation that women and adolescent girls were the
primary caregivers in the household.
The self-help programme administered by the parastatal SERP provided
the strongest articulation of a structural-transformative discourse of gen-
dered development in Andhra Pradesh. To recall, this agency was respon-
sible for implementing the World Bank-assisted Andhra Pradesh District
Poverty Initiatives Project and its successor, the Andhra Pradesh Rural
Poverty Reduction Project – both known collectively as Velugu, and then
later under the Congress government, the Indira Kranthi Patham scheme
which had merged Velugu with the central government SHG scheme
(SGSY). Velugu’s project design articulated a strong explicit commitment
to social transformation; a guiding principle aimed to ‘alter the relations
of power’ (SERP, c.2002: 4). Like Vision 2020, participatory development
was given high priority. Velugu envisioned it was ‘through decentralized,
community based, people participatory approach alone that the poor
are made equal partners in eliminating poverty and enable themselves to
change their destinies’ (SERP, c.2002: 1). The programme’s participatory
features were considered particularly important for enabling agency of the
poor (SERP, c.2002: 2). The programme claimed to foreground a ‘positive
rights-based empowerment approach’ (SERP, c.2002: 2). Inequitable power
relations were considered central to understanding the pervasiveness of
poverty:

Poverty has become deep rooted as large sections of people are denied
equality in the control of resources and are not included in the decision
making process. As such widespread poverty must be seen as a political
process as it denotes undeniable violation of human rights.
(SERP, c.2002: 1)
204 Gendered developmental discourses
The poor were interpellated as competent and independent agents: ‘…[with]
tremendous potential to help themselves and that this potential can be har-
nessed by organizing them. The poor have demonstrated that when ade-
quate skills and inputs in community organization, management and action
are provided they can shape their destinies’ (SERP, c.2002). The programme
thus demonstrated it was not restricted to micro-credit but involved a
powerful social-transformative component. Gender formed one of several
‘­action-oriented strategies’ for social mobilisation and social change. Velu-
gu’s gender strategy claimed to extend beyond targeting women to address
gender-specific disparities (SERP and Centre for World Solidarity, 2006: 2).
It recognised differences amongst women: ‘women are a heterogeneous
group and that gender inequalities are linked with other inequalities related
to caste, class and religion’ (ibid).
Training and sensitisation of programme participants and personnel was
emphasised. A Gender Resource Group was established at state level for con-
sultation and training, comprising ‘representatives from various sectors like
academicians, law, research, education, NGOs working on gender issues, ac-
tivists on women’s empowerment, health, human rights etc.’ (SERP, c.2002:
32). A similar arrangement existed at district level. Social action committees
were established at village level to address social issues. The project claimed
gender equity concerns had been built into guidelines and criteria for funding
sub-projects from the Community Investment Fund. Women were trained as
paralegal workers to address violence against women in several project dis-
tricts. Internally, SERP established its own HR policy on sexual harassment
in the organisation which became operational (GoAP, 2005b: 53).
However, there were still considerable limitations to SERP’s model; one
concerned opportunities for group members to opt for non-conventional
forms of livelihood. A senior official involved in SERP commented,

…we have decided to focus on the existing livelihoods of the rural

poor… We realized with a project of our scale…even to support existing
livelihoods itself is quite a complicated task. So rather than pick up new
livelihoods, we decided to focus on whatever they’re doing…[I]t is our
duty to support those livelihoods, rather than identify new livelihoods
depending on our own particular choice. However, wherever there are
new opportunities which we can tap with the support of some NGOs
this requires a longer period of time. That also we have facilitated in a
few cases.
(Vijay Kumar, in World Bank, 2004: c. 30 mins 43 secs)5

Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 8, convergence of departmental

schemes through SERP was strongly emphasised, creating problems for
SERP in co-ordinating and administering these schemes, but demonstrated
that SHGs were are a popular institutional delivery point for the govern-
ment, similar to Tamil Nadu.
 Gendered developmental discourses 205
Interdiscursivity in two states
Similarities between states are evident in the gendered development dis-
courses of state policy. Common to both is a broad explicit statement of
intent – commitment towards intervention to improve the status of women,
some form of affirmative action. Both states policies also embody strong ap-
peals to instrumental rather than intrinsic logic or rights-based perspectives
of gender-equitable development. Some discourses were articulated more
prominently in one state compared the other: the competitive-capabilities
discourse was found in both states, but the protective-paternalist discourse
was stronger in Tamil Nadu, and the structural-transformative discourse
was stronger in Andhra Pradesh. Particular differences were evident at the
parastatal level: in Tamil Nadu, programmes under study involved a less
radical, more integrative approach, whereas those in Andhra Pradesh en-
visioned a more transformative project of altering power relations through
social mobilisation and participation of the poor. The contrast is stronger
in Andhra Pradesh where there was considerable parastatal emphasis on
rights-based empowerment of the poor. The SHG model, popular in both
states, appealed to the efficiency concerns of both state governments’ wider
development discourse.
Parastatal policy evidenced a stronger articulation of more critically
informed elements of wider state policy: the parastatal policy in Tamil
Nadu more strongly articulated the competitive-capabilities discourse of
state policy, and traces of structural-transformative discourse in Andhra
Pradesh state policy were augmented in SERP’s programmes. Thus, para-
statal policies transcended more conservative elements of state policy, al-
though whether this creates agency conducive for gender mainstreaming is
discussed in Chapter 7. Did the relative autonomy of parastatal agencies
and increased circulation of gendered development discourses, in part due
to international agency funding and/or non-government interventions, cre-
ates openings for more gender-responsive approaches? Parastatal agency
discourse was still situated within and influenced by the wider state-level
development discourse in both states.
Finally, a discursive policy analysis was not a straightforward exercise
and it must be acknowledged that traces of each of the three distinct dis-
courses can be found in most policies examined. The presence of compet-
ing discourses in policy unsurprisingly can lead to varied and sometimes
contradictory constructions of gendered development. Policy prescriptions
were not always clearly inferred from policy problems, suggesting that pro-
gressive discourses were only superficially embedded and more established
conservative discourses shaping policy formulation and practice endured.
For example, in Tamil Nadu structural-transformative constructions of
gendered discrimination against the girl child and preferences for male
children, practices of female infanticide, female foeticide, and dowry were
assigned ­protective-paternalist policy solutions. This enabled the state to
206 Gendered developmental discourses
perform, and even strengthen, its protective-paternalist role whilst leav-
ing unchallenged societal norms which sanctioned such discrimination. In
Andhra Pradesh where the protective-paternalist discourse was weak, pol-
icies which were often associated with protective-paternalist discourse in
Tamil Nadu enunciated a more structural-transformative discourse (though
paternalist implementation practices cannot be ruled out).

Conclusions
What are the implications of these discursive configurations for opportu-
nities to mainstream gender in development policy? Analysing policy dis-
course was complicated by the absence of explicit discussion of a ‘diagnosis’
of policy ‘problems’. Even less evident was a specific acknowledgement
or commitment to ‘gender mainstreaming’ per se. Jayalalithaa’s 18 Point
­Programme mentions gender mainstreaming once but this was largely a
redundant feature of the policy. Part of the mission of Mahalir Thittam
was ‘to advocate changes in government policies and programmes in fa-
vor of disadvantaged women’ (TNCDW, 2000: 17). However, such ‘main-
streaming’ was not designed on an organisational level to effect change
in wider state government policy. Prospects for mainstreaming gender
across both state governments, in a transformative manner, were super-
seded by an efficiency discourse, prioritising convergence, streamlining
delivery of schemes and benefits to women through the institutional open-
ing of the SHG. Involvement with and exposure to Tamil Nadu’s wom-
en’s empowerment programme was limited to conventional departments.
Given the programme’s scale in Tamil Nadu, gender-sensitisation of
government participants even on paper appeared to include only those di-
rectly involved with the programme, if at all. Gender mainstreaming lan-
guage was similarly absent in Vision 2020 in Andhra Pradesh, but curiously
‘mainstreaming’ did appear elsewhere in Vision 2020 in relation to disabil-
ity. A rights-based approach to gender equality is also marginal in Vision
2020, but prevalent within discussions of child welfare.
Gender and development policy in both states, if addressing gender in-
equality at all, has adopted a combination of integrative and affirmative
action policies. The possibility for a potentially more radical, destabilising,
and transformative discourse of empowerment was ‘colonised’ by a more
liberal, integrative discourse. The policy objective of empowering women
has an ambiguous relationship with the achievement of gender equality.
Women’s empowerment is less often explicitly justified by a commitment
to gender equality per se, this is more implicit by seeking to raise women’s
status. Policy discourse only occasionally makes comparative references to
the status of men. The few explicit references to gender equality or gender
equity are ambiguous, providing another example of how ‘women’s empow-
erment’ is polysemic, malleable, and contingent, and often connotes more
than it can deliver. It can appear radical whilst reproducing conservative or
conventional depictions of gender relations, empowering women only to be
 Gendered developmental discourses 207
good mothers, providing for their household and children, or empowering
them to integrate into an unequal gendered system.
Squires argues ‘as long as gender equality is framed by dominant con-
siderations of utility with respect to other existing policy priorities, main-
streaming will remain an integrationist rather than a transformative
practice’ (Squires, 2007: 150). Development policy in both states articulated
gendered development in instrumentalist terms of efficiency, lauding the
anticipated positive externalities of investing in ‘women’s development’ and
‘women’s empowerment’ for wider development outcomes. Given the im-
portance assigned to income-generating schemes and prominence of rural
development departments, gender-equitable development continues to be
associated with and limited to poverty reduction, meaning wider impacts
of gendered development evade policy attention. Thus, possibilities for a
transformative gender mainstreaming at state level are highly questionable.
The next chapter examine forms of developmental subjectivity and agency,
constituted by the institutional and discursive contexts discussed, to ask
whether these forms of agency offer opportunities for more transforma-
tive gender mainstreaming strategies for state-level policy towards gender-­
equitable development.

Notes
1 Labelling provision of such important public goods, services, and resources
as populism may seem overly critical, but it is the precarity of this provision I
would emphasise.
2 The protective-paternalist concept builds on and extends Swamy’s (1998) and
Subramaniam’s (1999) concepts discussed in Chapter 5, but highlights its gen-
dered aspects. The competitive-capability discourse incorporates more aspects
of empowerment than paternalism, but in a more (neo-)liberal direction than
populism, focusing more on the individual than group identity.
3 Child trafficking is a serious concern in Andhra Pradesh. In 2001, it emerged that
several adoption agencies that rehoused girl children given up for adoption were
trafficking girl children, including across state borders. This prompted the gov-
ernment to ban a scheme homing unwanted girl children in state institutions. The
government prohibited non-state agencies from carrying out adoptions. Critics
of the ban suggested it will not solve the problem and may increase unmonitored
abandonments and female infanticide. See Nair and Sen (2005) and Sharma (2001).
4 Whether or not government officials adopt this discourse in everyday practice is
a question not discussed here.
5 In Tamil Nadu, TNCDW emphasised diversification and conducted (or commis-
sioned) studies of local markets to investigate potential opportunities for new
micro-enterprise for SHG women to develop (author’s fieldnotes, 2006).

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8 Gendered developmental
subjectivities
Actors, agency, and gender
mainstreaming

Introduction
In the previous chapter, I mapped the various competing discourses of
gendered development in state policy in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh.
I paid attention to how these discourses interpellated actors such as the state
and women as subjects and objects of development – weak and dependent,
or agents of and participants in development processes. I argued that these
discourses differed across different institutional contexts according to the
relative dominance of a particular discourse. This chapter explores the pos-
sibilities and limitations for agency as a result of these discursive and insti-
tutional practices. By examining the gendered developmental subjectivities
that emerge, it is possible to understand what kind of agency this creates
for particular actors to promote or obfuscate efforts to make development
policy more gender-responsive.
To recall, the concept of ‘agency’ employed here posits that agency can be
derived from, firstly, the authority accorded to each subject as positioned
within a particular discourse, and secondly, the simultaneous existence of
different subject positions and the ensuing dislocatory effect of competing
discourses, which creates momentary openings for creative capacity and ac-
tion including but also beyond resistance. Two possibilities for agency arise –
agency within discourse, and dislocatory agency, as the result of a dis-
course’s inability to fully fix subject positions. The discursive articulation of
gendered developmental subjects in the previous chapter enables an under-
standing of ‘how it becomes possible for subjects to act as agents…’ (Doty,
1997: 384). Some subjects are afforded more agency than others within
a particular discourse, but the complex interaction of multiple, unstable,
competing discourses, provides potentially dislocatory moments, which, in
turn, offer possibilities for transformative change. The more hegemonic a
discourse, embedded to the point of appearing commonsensical, the less
likely alternative subject positions will emerge, resulting in fewer opportu-
nities for dislocatory agency.
The possibilities are highly complex and differentiated between and
amongst different sets of actors, and between and within different institu-
tional and discursive contexts. I conclude that whilst the extent of agency is
212 Gendered developmental subjectivities
in some cases substantial, it is not always the right kind of agency to enable
more transformative mainstreaming strategies. ‘Agents’ might be enabled
to act by a particular discourse, but in the context of an inequitable status
quo, thus reproducing and embedding conservative gender norms. Agents
bestowed with protective authority may undermine transformation of un-
equal gender relations and further position women as weak and incapable
of action. Equally, the responsibilisation of women as agents of develop-
ment may entail the deferral of state responsibility and accountability for
implementing gender-responsive reforms. To demonstrate this argument,
the chapter discusses selected actors: the SHG women of the parastatal
programmes in both states, bureaucrats and parastatal agency personnel,
political leaders, and the women’s movement. I also briefly acknowledge
other actors originally beyond the remit of this study, but who were revealed
to be more important than anticipated – NGOs, banking institutions, and
international organisations. Given the wide range of actors in different in-
stitutional settings and different positions in multiple discourses, the com-
parative analysis for both states is not presented separately, as in previous
chapters, but rather is presented in passim, with any notable differences
identified.
Without political will and commitment from political leaders, gender
mainstreaming initiatives will likely fail, as will they if bureaucrats for-
mulating and implementing policies are unsupportive or if supportive bu-
reaucrats lack control over policy content and processes. But the agency of
SHG women and women’s movement actors is the most important for en-
abling a more deliberative democratic model of gender mainstreaming. At
the best of times state feminist policy agencies ‘can facilitate the influence
of feminist arguments for women’s political representation, and the inclu-
sion of women in decision-making processes, but only where the women’s
movement is cohesive on this issue and the policy environment is receptive’
(Squires, 2007b: 176). Without a strong women’s movement making politi-
cal demands on the state, representative of poor rural women who form a
majority of SHG members, supportive state policy agencies will struggle to
ensure gender-­responsive perspectives are embedded within state policy-
making processes.

Women of the self-help groups

The competitive-capability discourse and the structural-transformative
discourse both interpellated women as responsible agents, thus increasing
women’s potential agency relative to their interpellation as weak, vulnera-
ble, and dependent subjects of the protective-paternalist discourse. How-
ever, this gendered developmental subjectivity presented some detrimental
implications for women.
The agency afforded to women SHG members had, in many cases, em-
powering effects in each state, as suggested by programme evaluations.
 Gendered developmental subjectivities 213
Large numbers of SHG members have contested elections at the panchayat
level – one study estimated nearly one third of SHGs in Andhra Pradesh
have at least one member who has contested elections and nearly one
quarter of SHGs have members that have been elected to the panchayats
(EDA/APMAS, 2006).1 Policy instruments that aimed to empower women
were substantially, but not wholly, directed towards women and their self-­
improvement, implying that the ‘problem’ of their disempowered status
could largely be remedied by women themselves, by building their own ca-
pacities to participate in mainstream development processes: policies artic-
ulating a competitive-capability discourse obliged women to take advantage
of preferential policies designed for them.
This was noticeable in both states’ policies, but the emphasis on women’s
self-improvement was far more noticeable in Tamil Nadu, at the parastatal
level in TNCDW. This was exemplified when, during a visit to the TNCDW
headquarters in December 2005, an official in TNCDW passed to me the
most recent copy of Mutram (‘courtyard’), the Corporation’s monthly news-
letter for SHGs. On the front cover was a picture of a potter’s wheel which,
the official explained to me, signified ‘a woman moulding herself’, through a
process of self-development. Thus, a key narrative of project success was the
extent to which women participants had experienced a self-transformation.
Whilst this may be interpreted as increased agency for women to act on
themselves in a refashioning project of the self, it suggests they were disem-
powered to begin with, and were expected to mould themselves into newly
empowered women. In a visit to a project office in Chennai, training certif-
icates were being distributed to women participants. One woman explained
to me how she had become ‘developed’, describing how she had obtained
qualifications and built a successful microenterprise, and gave me her busi-
ness card (author’s fieldnotes). The focus, on individual improvement, was
predominantly towards women developing their own capabilities so as to
compete as qualified entrepreneurs in the market.
Programme literature tended to overstate programme success, reflecting
accounts in the literature of the inherent logic in development programmes
to produce narratives of success (Mosse, 2005: 8; Jakimow and Kilby, 2006).
This was more noticeable in Tamil Nadu, possibly due to the more vocal
scrutiny of women’s organisations in Andhra Pradesh (discussed further
below). As discussed in Chapter 7, microfinance programmes for women
are popular amongst banking and credit agencies because of assumed ad-
vantages of low transaction costs and high repayment rates. But the critical
literature on microfinance argues that microcredit programmes discipline
rather than empower women. A ‘highly disciplinary institutional culture’ is
nurtured within microfinance programmes to inculcate ‘women’s respon-
siveness to the discipline of weekly repayment schedules… [and involves]
wearing uniforms, chanting slogans, singing songs and taking oaths …
[practices which] may be credited for the extraordinarily high repayment
rates of most microfinance programmes’ (Rankin, 2004: 189).
214 Gendered developmental subjectivities
This ‘highly disciplinary institutional culture’ could also be observed in
both Mahalir Thittam and Velugu/IKP. Embedded in the programme design
of both AP and TN parastatal programmes was a detailed and strict regime
of practices which every group must adhere to and will be graded upon,
determining their creditworthiness for formal lending. The grading process
involved a detailed list of criteria to evaluate SHG performance, including
meeting frequency, attendance, member participation, savings frequency,
average savings per month, criteria relating to internal loans and savings
rotation, repayment of internal and formal loans, bookkeeping, group ac-
counts auditing, and group regulatory mechanisms. Group members must
regularly maintain and update seven different books and registers. Groups
that meet weekly are marked higher than those that meet less frequently,
as are groups that save more regularly (the most marks for weekly savings),
have higher attendance (above 80 percent is deemed high) and higher partic-
ipation (‘high’ is again above 80 percent). Groups that score highly overall
in the grading process, normally undertaken by their facilitating NGO, then
become eligible for applying for formal credit. As a result, whilst individual
members join a group based on entitlement criteria, determined by pov-
erty line estimates, the group’s access to formal credit, a key component of
the scheme and marker of group success, is based on performance-related
criteria, criteria largely unrelated to social empowerment objectives apart
from some crudely awarded ‘bonus points’ to groups for preventing dowry
payments and occurrences of female infanticide.
The effect is the cultivation of self-regulating technologies, moulding in-
dividual and group behaviour around programmatic norms, enabling the
implementing agency to govern a large number of programme participants
from afar. As in many SHG-based microfinance programmes, the SHG
model of Mahalir Thittam and Velugu/IKP relied on group pressure to en-
force repayment of loans, internally and to the formal lending agency. The
willingness of group members to exert peer pressure on other group mem-
bers is cited as an effective means of loan recovery and attractive to lending
agencies in terms of reducing transaction costs by reducing the level of ex-
ternal intervention in groups. In addition, group compliance is enforced by
a collective oath-taking ritual at the start of every meeting.2
The programme’s neo-liberal approach also transferred the responsibility
for collective development from the state onto non-state actors, including
individuals and communities (Rankin, 2002: 10). Whilst this developed a
new managerial subjectivity for women, it is not necessarily empowering in
ways that challenges gender inequalities. Mahalir Thittam in Tamil Nadu
envisioned extensive roles for SHG women, proposing that SHGs become a
key delivery agent of government programmes: ‘massive and intensive in-
volvement and participation of SHGs’ in government schemes was expected
to lead to ‘greater transparency, outreach and impact of economic develop-
ment programmes’ (TNCDW, 2000b: 47). Emphasis on convergence placed
an undue burden on SHG members, as a former TNCDW official explained:
 Gendered developmental subjectivities 215
…in some ways, there were some negative implications also, because
other government departments… basically everyone started eyeing
these groups. The Health Department thought it was just easier to pig-
gyback on the regularity of these institutions … For example, health
schemes, family planning, education department started wanting to go
through them for promoting family school enrolment. … The nutrition
scheme for women and children, nutrition, the importance of regular
AIDs monitoring … Everything started being piggybacked onto these
groups which in some ways was good up to a point but in some ways,
it became, it could have become a burden… [O]thers thought it was ef-
ficient to work through these groups … things started working better
through the groups. There were also concerns that there was too much
being expected of these groups. We had to make that as part of the
training, including training of trainers, [saying to them] ‘you know it
has to make sense for you, don’t just take on every social service with-
out building your capacity to do so. And it’s ok to say yes to certain
things and find other ways to do other things’… Basically we wanted the
women to do what they wanted out of their choice, rather than dictat-
ing, being pressured by other departments… It was just more efficient
to have all services converged … it was efficient, and everybody was
tempted to do that…
(interview with former TNCDW official, 2007)

Governmental and non-governmental agencies were urged to ‘use the or-

ganizational capabilities of SHGs to improve local governance’ (ibid). SHGs
became involved in running fair price shops of the Public Distribution Sys-
tem, government sanitation programmes, and in a case reported by the me-
dia in October 2006, the IKP Mahila Mandal Samakhya in Andhra Pradesh
had contracted the state’s public sector power utility to act as an intermedi-
ary to supply power, guard against power theft, and administer billing and
revenue collection (The Hindu, 2006).
The participation of programme beneficiaries at a level which enabled
decision-making on programme direction can be seen as an enabling factor
for women’s agency, even if alone it is not a sufficient condition for wom-
en’s empowerment (Jakimow and Kilby, 2006). As outlined in Chapter 6,
opportunities for SHG women’s participation in the governance of SHG
programmes varied between Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh and were
more institutionalised in the AP programme than in TN. A programmatic
drive to federate SHGs creates a potential opportunity for agency, enabling
collective organisation, potentially increasing their bargaining power and
collective voice (Nair, 2005), and a mandated space to come together, ar-
ticulate, discuss, and debate their experiences of the programme and other
issues (Jakimow and Kilby, 2006: 383). Both SERP and TNCDW federated
SHGs into larger units. In Tamil Nadu, this objective evolved slowly over
time; in AP, it was built in to the programme model from the beginning,
216 Gendered developmental subjectivities
though because the Velugu programme in AP was designed several years
later, federating occurred at similar times.3 These federated institutions act
as apex organisations for SHG members, providing services such as book-
keeping and training. They also act as on-lenders to SHGs, sustained by the
interest they charge SHGs and the marginal interest earned on their own
savings.
Parastatal agencies in both states viewed SHG federations positively.
A TNCDW report suggested that ‘federations can be very success-
ful when the decision-making process and the operations at the group
level are truly democratic, efficient and based on sound operational
principles in the overall interest of group members’ (TNCDW, 2000a).
A senior TNCDW official suggested that the quality of those federations
formed had varied, but was optimistic about their potential (interview
with TNCDW official, January 2006). One evaluation of federations in
the AP programme observed that ‘federations of SHGs are fast becoming
powerful voices expressing the social and economic needs of the poor’
(Deshmukh-­Ranadive, 2004: 1). Federating SHGs can reduce the burden
on individual SHGs as the government shifts its implementation focus
to federations. However, a study by APMAS, an NGO closely associated
with the AP parastatal, suggested that federations are highly depend-
ent on the promoting organisation and staff who support the federation
(Reddy and Prakash, 2003).
Providing a structural mechanism for collective voice, identity, and in-
creased bargaining power is just one concern driving parastatal efforts to
federate SHGs; another is to enable SHG sustainability. Three other com-
monly cited concerns include reducing transaction costs (of agencies deal-
ing with SHGs), reducing the incidence of default amongst SHG lenders,
and reducing the cost of SHG formation (Nair, 2005: 15–18). Additionally,
to what extent does federating SHGs discipline rather than enable SHGs?
Do federations ‘manage down’ (SHGs) rather than ‘manage up’ (state apex
agencies)? Do disciplining dynamics restrict the potential of federations
to confer individual and collective agency on SHGs? And what kind of re-
lationship do federations have, if at all, with the women’s movement (and
other social movements) in the state, with panchayat representatives, and
political parties generally, beyond the local level?
Discursive practices may discipline and regulate participant behaviour,
such technologies are rarely fully successful, creating ‘partial and con-
tradictory subjects of development who occupy certain identity slots that
development discourse creates for them while contesting others’ (Sharma,
2001: 8). Kalpana’s (2011) research on Tamil Nadu’s SGSY scheme details
how some women SHG members exercised creative agency, resisted the pro-
gramme requirements of collective SHG entrepreneurship, and subverted
programme rules, colluding with other actors involved in the p ­ rogramme –
bank staff, NGOs, and the local Block Development Official – to secure
loans for household consumption needs. In one case, women SHG members
 Gendered developmental subjectivities 217
pretended to be involved in brick-making and colluded with the brick kiln
owner to provide evidence they had acquired the kiln and had leased it to
him to manage for them (Kalpana, 2011: 53). Bank officials visited several
times to verify, though the SHG co-ordinator claimed the bank officials
knew the SHG was not managing the brick kiln (ibid). Elsewhere, women
SHGs claimed to be manufacturing footwear and apparel, and so bought
shoes and rented clothes to display at SHG product exhibitions as evidence
of their business. Kalpana (2011: 53) suggests that although subversion was
not always possible, the co-operation of other actors, including local gov-
ernment officials, was driven by programme pressure to achieve quotas
for loan dispersal, demonstrating again how such programmes manufac-
ture their own success narratives (Mosse, 2004; cited in Kalpana, 2011).
­Kalpana’s study also demonstrated how women SHG members exercised
control over the end use of their loans, even if this involved subverting pro-
gramme rules.
In Andhra Pradesh, Velugu/IKP workers resisted the government’s nar-
rative of convergence outsourcing by demanding recognition as government
employees for their role as village organisation assistants or ‘animators’.
IKP animators have organised and affiliated with the large national trade
union, the CITU, associated with the Left, protesting and demanding pay-
ment of wages, reportedly promised to them in the past by the state govern-
ment, including by the SERP CEO and a state government minister. Women
IKP workers staged dharnas in front of district collector offices demanding
payment of wages or higher wages, job security, formal appointment letters,
and access to insurance schemes amongst other demands (The Hindu, 2012,
2013, 2014). This suggests collective agency (and the presence of the Left in
facilitating mobilisation).

Bureaucratic actors
Discursive and institutional practices of development policy and pro-
grammes provide different examples of how bureaucratic agency is enabled
and constrained. Gender-sensitised bureaucrats constitute a potential new
developmental subjectivity: opportunities for gender-sensitisation may arise
in their formal professional capacity rather than as private citizens through
gender training, or exposure to gender-equitable development concepts
and practices through postings to parastatal programmes, and through ex-
posure to gender inequality and discrimination in postings. But there ap-
peared to be no state-level policy in either state on gender training. State
departments of personnel are responsible for training at the (subnational)
state level and operate training on request from state government depart-
ments. Consequently, training at IAS level is often voluntary, based on in-
dividuals identifying their own training needs and self-nominating, as well
as demand-driven, based on individual nominations by department heads
(who are also able to control training requirements).
218 Gendered developmental subjectivities
Given when gender training was introduced at the LBSNAA, most senior
IAS officers would not have received gender training as part of their induc-
tion period in Mussoorie. But most can attend gender training during their
mid-career training. Anecdotal evidence suggests this is not always initially
well received: one IAS officer recalled a situation in which participating
IAS officers raised several hostile questions towards the gender trainer at
the beginning of a two-day session, which made that officer uncomfortable.
Fortunately, the trainer overcame these hostile questions and participants
were more compliant throughout the remainder of the session as a result
(interview with IAS officer, June 2007). But this might differ amongst indi-
vidual bureaucrats, across the two states, and across different government
departments and parastatal agencies within states, particularly given the
gendered pattern of postings outlined earlier in Chapters 4 and 6.
Exposure to gender-awareness through postings also has varying poten-
tial. In Tamil Nadu, the IFAD Completion Evaluation report of the Tamil
Nadu Women’s Development Project (the precursor to Mahalir Thittam)
claimed that officials associated with the programme had undergone a
change in mind set, stating: ‘the skepticism of the officials has given way to
appreciation for the efforts of the SHG members…[for] saving regularly, se-
lecting proper beneficiaries for different enterprises, the excellent recovery
made by them, the regular conduct of meetings, etc’ (TNCDW, c.1998: 10).
One former TNCDW official expressed that they had derived a ‘tremen-
dous amount of personal satisfaction’ from being involved in the project
and that it had been ‘personally enriching’ (interview, March 2006). The
same official stated that many involved in the project were relatively more
sensitive to the concept of gender inequality when they were posted on, but
acknowledged the challenge was to institutionalise these changes (ibid). An-
other official suggested that after having been posted to the TNCDW for
some time, she became associated with posts which had a similar empow-
erment orientation (interview, June 2007). She also suggested that gender-­
sensitisation remained strictly in the bureaucratic field and did not transfer
into the bureaucrats’ personal lives; gender-sensitisation had its limits. In
Andhra Pradesh, on the other hand, an independent evaluation of the ear-
lier UN SAPAP project concluded that screening the ‘vision, social/gender
commitment and competence’ of staff hired from other areas of govern-
ment, had contributed to the project’s success, as had collaboration with
NGO activists and academics, in addition to the continuity of staff in the
project unit which later became SERP (Murthy et al., 2002: 44).
The emphasis both states’ reformist discourse placed on convergence
created varied possibilities for agency for senior parastatal personnel.
The heightened relative importance of the parastatal agency increased the
agency of senior personnel, positioning them as gatekeepers to a large num-
ber of potential beneficiaries of government programmes and an existing
institutional structure through which delivery could be managed. But par-
astatal personnel also became partially responsible for implementing the
 Gendered developmental subjectivities 219
agendas of other government departments in addition to their own. SERP
personnel felt the pressure:

The expectations from the government were very high. And we were
struggling to meet the competing demands of the variety of depart-
ments. The Health department wanted us to do this work, the AIDS
Controller wanted us to do this work, the Agriculture department
wanted our collaboration. So we became victims of our own success.
So we had all departments wanting to ride on the institutional arrange-
ments…So we’ve now learned to say no… quite forcefully also. Unless
institutions are strong they really can’t cope with the various competing
demands. So this was a very important challenge that we faced.
(Vijay Kumar of SERP in World Bank, 2004:
circa 1 hr 20 mins 30 secs)

Parastatal personnel also had to negotiate with other agencies, which some-
times required articulating project goals using a language these agencies
found more acceptable but which could potentially dilute more transforma-
tive goals. A former official of TNCDW recalled it was necessary, when ne-
gotiating with different agencies, to ‘bridge’ the discourse of the programme
with their own institutionally embedded discourse to convince others. Fi-
nance Ministry officials had to be convinced on efficiency grounds; poli-
ticians had to be convinced of a popular demand and that the programme
would be a ‘vote winner’. Once convinced, however, the operational auton-
omy of the programme was largely secure (interview with former TNCDW
official, June 2007). In contrast, P. Jamuna, the State Project Director for
gender in SERP, suggested that she worked relatively autonomously from
both the World Bank and senior personnel at SERP (interview, June 2006).
Reformist discourse which sought to ensure greater stability of tenure for
bureaucrats offered increased potential for agency through improving bu-
reaucratic autonomy from interference by political leaders. Political leaders
transfer bureaucrats as a means to exert control over policy and powerful
bureaucrats, and to ensure important sectoral postings are staffed by sup-
portive bureaucrats (contesting the notion of impartial government service).
In both states, instances of bureaucratic transfers occurred immediately
after elections. But the relative continuity of senior civil service personnel
SERP in AP demonstrated considerably more autonomy at the parastatal
level than the frequent transfers in TNCDW in Tamil Nadu.

Political leadership
Two factors enabled a high degree of agency amongst the most senior party
political leaders in both states when in government as chief ministers. The
first relates to the centralisation of party political leadership. Three out of
four political parties in power in the two states during the case study period
220 Gendered developmental subjectivities
were regional political parties, known for their high degree of centralised
leadership – AIADMK and DMK in Tamil Nadu and the TDP in Andhra
Pradesh (Suri, 2002; Palshikar, 2004). The centralisation of party political
leadership in AP was greater in the TDP than the Congress Party, the lat-
ter a national party where regional leaders are accountable to the national
leadership. Centralised leadership characterised the TDP under its founder
leader, N.T. Rama Rao, and his successor Chandrababu Naidu. Srinivasulu
argued that the TDP is a

highly personalised party therefore there has been an overt and exces-
sive focus on the persona of Naidu…[H]e has assumed an iconic status
with regard to the State-level economic reforms in the international and
national press and in the eyes of international donors and captains of
domestic big business.
(2007: 185)

Chandrababu Naidu, as Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh from 1995 un-

til 2004, came to personify the State’s reform enthusiasm, and was dubbed
‘the CEO of Andhra Pradesh’ for his business-like style and pro-­technology
reforms. This was central to the state government’s relationship with the
World Bank; ‘Naidu impressed the Bank as a dynamic market advocate who
was prepared to take tough measures and inject greater professionalism into
governance’ (Kirk, 2005: 293). Naidu’s exaggerated reform enthusiasm was
a conscious strategy to strongly signal to potential investors the state gov-
ernment’s commitment to economic and governance reforms (Kennedy,
2004: 51). The Andhra Pradesh government needed to adopt this signal-
ling strategy more so than Tamil Nadu because of AP’s comparatively lower
indicators on economic growth, human development, and infrastructure
(Kennedy, 2004: 51).
The second factor relates to the protective-paternalist discourse articu-
lated in government policy, and the personalisation of development and wel-
fare schemes by party leaders, restricting opportunities for less senior leaders
to champion policy. This dynamic appeared to be more dominant in Tamil
Nadu, but Naidu also had to carve out his own leadership persona to dis-
tinguish himself from his TDP predecessor N.T. Rama Rao who often self-­
presented as a benevolent patriarch, a protective brother (Kannabiran, 1997).
Chapter 7 demonstrated that political leaders are positioned differently
within competing reformist and populist discourses and are thus subject to
competing logics. To an extent, the political leaders of both state govern-
ments have witnessed challenges to their reform agendas, forcing them to
revert to populist politics. Subramanian (1999) notes ‘populist regimes face
pressure to deliver in some way on their promises to increase the entitle-
ments of emergent groups, and retain support only if they do so’. The way in
which political leaders have resorted to populist politics in AP suggests that
populism in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu is qualitatively different in
 Gendered developmental subjectivities 221
4
character. In Chapter 5, I questioned whether gendered development pol-
icy in Tamil Nadu might be aligned more with the ‘assertive/empowerment’
populist style of the DMK or the ‘paternalist/protective’ populist style of
the AIADMK (Swamy, 1998; Subramanian, 1999). It is possible to argue
that the DMK were often also paternalist towards women, even though they
have been more closely associated with assertive or empowerment populism.
Not surprisingly given the populist orientation of Tamil Nadu politics, so-
cial welfare schemes were often closely associated with party political lead-
ers, such as MGR’s ADMK government and the Nutritious Meal Scheme.
When the DMK came to power, they were keen to break this association,
by adding a fortnightly egg to the meal provision (Harriss-White, 2004: 53).
Similar ‘embellishments’ were made when the AIADMK party came back to
power in the 1990s (ibid). To some extent, social policy benefitted from elec-
toral competition. Protective-paternalist discourses articulated in state pol-
icy in Tamil Nadu expressed reverence to chief ministers for their leadership
for the welfare and development of society. This was common in both policy
documents of the Social Welfare department, but also public arenas such as
the Budget Speech with regard to the then Chief Minister J. J­ ayalalithaa.
Reverential expressions praised their ‘able’ or ‘skillful’ leadership or per-
sonal commitment to ensuring the welfare of the poor (GoTN, 2007: 1).5
The same political personalisation of social welfare in Tamil Nadu oc-
curred with state government programmes for women’s development. Both
the DMK and AIADMK and their respective leaders have sought to be
closely affiliated with the programme in various, usually unsubtle, ways.
Mahalir Thittam was politically personalised by being associated with a late
political leader and popular figure in Tamil Nadu: on International Wom-
en’s Day in March 2000, M. Karunanidhi, then Chief Minister, renamed
Mahalir Thittam as Annai Bangaru Ammaiyar Ninaivu Mahalir Thittam, in
memory of the mother of a former Chief Minister and founder of the DMK
party, the late C.N. Annadurai. This act of memorialisation attempted to as-
sociate a government programme with the benevolence of the DMK party.
Different Tamil Nadu governments have attempted to associate the growth
of women’s SHGs in the state and their success with each party’s term in
office. For example, whilst the IFAD-funded phase of the programme be-
gan in 1989 under the DMK government, some later policy statements by
the AIADMK government (2001–2006) traced the start of the programme
to 1991–1992 when the AIADMK were in power (GoTN, 2004: 47).6 Com-
peting claims to patronage, manifest in policy language, thus politicised the
bureaucratic-institutional memory of the programme.
Chief ministers have also closely associated themselves with the pro-
gramme through visual images on programme literature. Images of
­Jayalalithaa appeared on promotional literature of Chennai-based branded
SHG products as well as the government’s promotional brochure on SHG
success stories in Tamil Nadu.7 During a visit to the District Project Imple-
mentation Unit in Chennai, a picture of then Chief Minister Jayalalithaa,
222 Gendered developmental subjectivities
hung high on the wall next to the clock. Whilst this is common practice in
government buildings, it represents the important part charismatic leader-
ship and personalised politics plays in Tamil Nadu. The monthly newsletter
of TNCDW, Mutram, distributed to SHG members in the State, has also
served as a means of delivering the chief minister’s message to large num-
bers of women and their families. Events and features involving political
leaders from both parties appeared frequently in the magazine, suggesting
that party political leaders were keen to communicate with women SHG
members. This generated exposure to government and party politics for
SHG members, and a direct association with political leaders rather than
the state bureaucracy.8
Political leaders have also tried to mobilise women SHG members as po-
tential vote banks. The AIADMK in Tamil Nadu was accused of encour-
aging SHG women to campaign on the party’s behalf during the 2004 Lok
Sabha election campaign. The rival DMK party, the left-wing CPI(M) and
AIDWA, appealed to the Election Commission protesting the AIADMK’s
alleged coercion of SHG members (The Hindu, 2004; cf. Kalpana, 2005).
In AP also, SHGs have become somewhat politicised, in terms of potential
candidates for panchayat elections and as potential vote banks (EDA/AP-
MAS, 2006: 67). Local party workers interact with SHG members, parties
bring SHG members to political and government meetings, and at election
time, parties reportedly ‘distribute money to SHGs and SHGs have in turn
begun to demand funds and benefits’ (ibid).
According to Kennedy, the agency of political leaders to signal support
to ‘internal political constituencies’ differs in each state, but is also affected
by two broader determinants: first, the level of political party fragmenta-
tion in the state (which increases electoral competition), and second, the
degree of ‘political mobilization of Dalits and other traditionally low status
groups’ (2004: 52). Tamil Nadu’s greater fragmentation and higher mobili-
sation helps to explain why the state government chose to pursue economic
reforms with less fanfare than that observed in AP, where the two determi-
nants were relatively absent (Kennedy, 2004: 52). However, can the same be
said when we shift our focus to the women’s movement in each state, and
consider their level of political mobilisation, particularly in relation to the
Dalit movement? Perhaps not. First, as was suggested in Chapter 5, Anandhi
(2005) and others have questioned the extent to which the Dalit movement in
Tamil Nadu has been willing to consider the discrimination faced by Dalit
women and their political demands as core issues of the Dalit movement
(beyond reducing issues such as the rape of Dalit women during episodes
of caste-based violence to acts which symbolise of the oppression of Dalit
men). Second, despite the Left’s low presence in mainstream electoral poli-
tics in Andhra Pradesh, women’s groups associated with the Left parties are
vocal in the State, something which I return to later. Therefore, Kennedy’s
argument needs to be adapted when applied to the context of state govern-
ment welfare, development, and empowerment schemes for women.
 Gendered developmental subjectivities 223
As explained in Chapter 5, populist politics in Andhra Pradesh is driven
in part by electoral compulsions, and the women’s vote has been consid-
ered important in the state. The TDP has in the past considered women
as an important constituency, at least in terms of electoral votes, and
they proved crucial in voting the TDP in to government in 1994 and keep-
ing them in office in 1999. Many political observers attribute the TDP’s
state election defeat in 2004 to Naidu’s overt reform stance (see Sridhar,
2004). But Ayyangar suggests that in the 2004 elections, ‘the vote against
Chandrababu Naidu and the TDP was not a mandate against the World
Bank programmes espoused by the incumbent but for it [sic], and more of
it [sic]’ (, 2004). The TDP and the Congress competed for the votes of SHG
women through various promises on lower loan interest rates; ultimately in
2004, the Congress Party won.
A critical development took place in 2006 which shaped subsequent ap-
proaches to SHGs in Andhra Pradesh – a crisis in the microfinance sector
in Andhra Pradesh led to several private microfinance institutions (MFIs)
being temporarily shut down by the state government after protests and
complaints alleging exploitative practices (see Shylendra, 2006). The Con-
gress Chief Minister took a strong stance against the MFIs and ordered an
enquiry. The MFIs in Andhra Pradesh agreed to adopt a voluntary Model
Code of Conduct (ibid). In 2007, the Government of India drafted a Bill
which proposed to regulate the microfinance sector (the Micro Financial
Sector (Development and Regulation) Bill, 2007). This was criticised by
several groups, including the women’s movement who argued it would im-
pact SHG women adversely. In October 2010, the Government of Andhra
Pradesh passed an ordinance to regulate microfinance organisations (GoAP,
2010) and days later issued orders to accompany the rules with a stringent
time frame in which to register their compliance. The ordinance was enti-
tled ‘An Ordinance to Protect the Women Self Help Groups from Exploita-
tion by the Micro-Finance Institutions in the State of Andhra Pradesh…’
(ibid; my emphasis). The following year, the state government enacted the
ordinance as legislation in the Andhra Pradesh Microfinance Institutions
(Regulation of Money Lending) Act, 2011. This slowed lending and encour-
aged some SHGs not to repay at all, something which had earlier been en-
couraged by the TDP leader Chandrababu Naidu. The government then
established Streenidhi, a credit co-operative managed by a combination of
SHG women and state officials, thus enhancing the position of SHG women
in programme leadership and as borrowers due to the low cost of lending via
Streenidhi. The central government in Delhi introduced in the Lok Sabha
another draft Bill in 2012 to regulate the microfinance sector and referred
it to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance, but the Bill was
rejected by the Committee in 2014 and it subsequently lapsed when general
elections were called.
The Andhra Pradesh state law strengthened the authority of SERP
and the state government over private MFIs, and demonstrated the state
224 Gendered developmental subjectivities
government’s willingness to act in the interest of women’s SHGs, or at least
assert the state’s domain vis-à-vis private lenders.9 However, other accounts
suggested that the government’s response from 2010 onwards was provoked
by criticisms from the rival TDP, claiming that the state government was
not doing enough to curb the exploitative practices of MFIs and alleged
Congress links with one of the surviving MFI organisations in the state.
According to this narrative, the Congress Party was forced to respond by
regulating the operation of MFIs in the state (Kumar, 2010).

The women’s movement at the state level

The extent of engagement by both states’ women’s movements with state
policies and programmes has not been uniform across different sectors.
Whilst the women’s movement have been more engaged in campaigning for
or against particular legislation on issues like rape, dowry, and coercive pop-
ulation policies, it appears that women’s movements have been less directly
involved with state-led development policies and programmes, particularly
so in relation to state-led SHG programmes where few feminist-oriented
women’s movement organisations are involved as SHG promoting organisa-
tions in collaboration with government programmes, and where few wom-
en’s movement organisations have really engaged critically with state-led
SHG programmes to scrutinise and monitor them from the sidelines for
the impact they have on women of the state. This was a surprising finding,
though more critical engagement has emerged over time. As an experienced
feminist consultant observed,

We really need to look at self-help groups a little more critically and

see what’s happening, because unfortunately …if you look at it, none
of the organisations with a strong feminist orientation are running
self-help groups… maybe it’s because…it’s within the nature of the
feminist movement, I don’t know, but we really need to look at it more
carefully.
(interview, December 2007)

Development NGOs have a far more significant presence but do not always
have an explicit feminist agenda. This may be due to the more rural charac-
ter of the SHG movement and the rural NGOs implementing poverty alle-
viation programmes, relative to the more common advocacy focus of urban
women’s movement organisations than (IDS Bridge, 1995: 59). Women’s
wings of political parties appear to be far more critical of the government,
unsurprisingly when their own party is not in government. In both Tamil
Nadu and Andhra Pradesh, women’s organisations affiliated to the Left par-
ties have been the most vocal amongst various women’s movement groups
in their scrutiny of state government schemes for women’s empowerment.
Left-leaning feminist scholars and activists have also provided important
 Gendered developmental subjectivities 225
insights into SHG practices in the south. However, Soma K.P. suggests that
there has been little interaction between government and civil society or-
ganisations more generally with regard to SHG programmes, about

…their potential for empowerment or poverty reduction between civil

society actors and policy makers regarding the expectations from SHGs,
the ground level realities as well as possible ways of strengthening SHGs
in order that they may serve better the interests of poor women.
(Parthasarathy, 2006)

Feminist scholars in the state have argued that the institutionalisation of

women’s studies in higher education institutions in Tamil Nadu has affected
the capacity for feminist research and scholarship, which might purposefully
engage with and influence subnational state policy towards gender-equitable
development (Anandhi and Swaminathan, 2006). The institutionalisation of
women’s studies in Indian institutions of higher education from the 1970s
onwards was intended to generate data and analysis to understand women’s
socio-economic position (ICSSR Advisory Committee on Women’s Studies
1977, cited in Anandhi and Swaminathan, 2006: 4444). It was hoped that
women’s studies would challenge ‘the marginalization and misrepresenta-
tion of women in social science disciplines and scholarship’ and play a crit-
ical interventionist role in the production of knowledge about women’s role
in, and the impact upon gender relations, of the processes of modernity
and development (ibid: 4444–4445). Yet, it was the way in which women’s
studies were institutionalised in Indian higher education that limited the
possibilities of the newly established discipline to produce such knowledge:
focusing on extension activities constrained the discipline’s ability to also
critique knowledge production (Anandhi and Swaminathan, 2006). Thus,
despite a high profile for women’s studies in the state of Tamil Nadu, the
discipline does not have much influence on government policies, and wom-
en’s studies centres ‘have been instrumental in uncritically carrying out the
state’s “women’s empowerment” programme’ (Anandhi and Swaminathan,
2006: 4451). Research on gender, caste, and sexuality and more interdisci-
plinary connections has not been a strong theme of women’s studies in the
state (ibid). Therefore, the feminist academic-activist link for contesting
state policy is relatively weak in Tamil Nadu due to the low institutional
capacity of women’s studies as a discipline to engage critically with, rather
than merely implement, government policy on gender and development, and
this has arguably reduced the potential influence such a collaboration might
have on state policy, if the state government was at all open to such a collab-
orative relationship.
Women’s groups affiliated to the Left parties in Andhra Pradesh are
particularly strong. The Andhra Pradesh Mahila Samakhya,10 a women’s
organisation affiliated to the National Federation of Indian Women (which
is, in turn, linked to the Communist Party of India) has been persistently
226 Gendered developmental subjectivities
vocal. Women’s groups in AP are acutely aware of how political parties
have treated them as vote banks in the past, and have been keen to hold
political leaders to account for the pre-election promises they make to
women voters. In December 2003, just a few months before the election,
Chandrababu Naidu announced a series of populist measures targeted
specifically at members of DWCRA groups, including cellular phones and
increased subsidies on bank loan interest (The Hindu, 2003b). Just a few
days later, a state-level meeting of women’s SHGs criticised Naidu for ex-
ploiting them for political gain and demanded he implement his promises
(The Hindu, 2003a). However, it is only in the past few years that feminist
organisations have been vocal on the limited empowering effects of SHG
programmes. As Kameswari Jandhyala, former director of AP Mahila
Samakhya, pointed out,

…in Andhra Pradesh, the home as it were of the self-help strategy, even
the celebrated Nellore example, …has yet to be fully researched to es-
tablish the sustainability of the gains made by women…[T]here has
been little engagement with what is happening in the lives of the self-
help group members.
(Jandhyala, 2001)

The 2006 microcredit crisis generated further debate. A collective of three

women’s development NGOs released a report suggesting that women’s par-
ticipation in SHGs had increased their access to credit but has become an
extra burden and provided few empowerment effects otherwise (Nirantar,
2007). The draft Government Bill of 2007 which sought to regulate micro-
finance organisations was criticised by women’s movement activists. Led
by the CPM-affiliated women’s organisation AIDWA, women’s groups
­designated the Bill as a ‘black Bill’; they anticipated that if passed, it would
negatively impact poor women as consumers of microfinance products and
services (People’s Democracy, 2007). Representatives from AIDWA also
gave evidence to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance when
they examined a redrafted microfinance regulation bill in 2012, which was
ultimately rejected by the Committee.
A more worrying observation concerns the lack of critical research being
conducted on the effects of SHG schemes. According to one well-placed ob-
server, there is a silent but strong lobby in India against the kind of critically
engaged research which might draw out some of the more disempowering
effects of SHG schemes; many organisations funding research on SHGs are
reluctant to fund more critically informed research (interview, December
2007). The same observer suggested that research on SHGs in India is most
often commissioned research, driven by donors for project planning rather
than independent research, which is negatively impacting the extent to
which financially constrained institutions of higher education can conduct
critically informed research on SHGs:
 Gendered developmental subjectivities 227
…The quality of research has come down in India… partly because
over the last at least ten years, there is more commissioned research
than independent research… [A] lot of the research is purely driven
by the projects that they are funding. So the whole world of commis-
sioned research has actually squeezed institutions and there is very lit-
tle money.
(interview, December 2007)

This suggests feminist organisations, which have more recently begun to

critically engage the state on issues relating to SHGs and the state’s ques-
tionable claims to women’s empowerment, might demand more independ-
ent funding of research into the impact of state-led SHG p ­ rogrammes on
women participants and gendered development inequalities in India more
generally. Whilst this may create hierarchies as to which feminist organisa-
tions then become involved in the research process at the expense of others,
it may offer a first step towards stimulating increased democratic delibera-
tion to usher in more transformative ­feminist-inspired strategies.

Conclusions
I have argued that there are two potentially constraining and two poten-
tially enabling discursive effects on the agency of women SHG members.
Constraining effects include the interpellation of (particularly poor) women
as hyper-responsible agents of development and the disciplinary power of
SHG programme practices. Enabling effects include the potential for col-
lective mobilisation and articulation as a result of programmatic drives
to federate SHGs, as well as the participation of women SHG members
in decision-­making structures within and outside programme structures.
­According to the programme design, this is a more embedded feature of the
AP State SHG programme, although Tamil Nadu’s programme has evolved
to include this.
I have also argued that, in relation to the agentic capacity of bureaucratic
actors and parastatal agency personnel to mainstream gender within state-
level policies and programmes, the constraining institutional context of
the bureaucracy which closes down the creative potential for ‘policy entre-
preneurs’ or ‘femocrats’ (often lacking within the state-level bureaucracy
as a result), is counter-balanced by the need for co-ordinating bureaucrats
and parastatal agency personnel to negotiate between different actors and
their discursive frames. Whilst the relative autonomy of parastatal agency
personnel appears to be significant in both states, the continuity of ap-
pointment and freedom from bureaucratic-institutional transfers is more
evident in AP than TN. In both states, parastatal agencies provide bu-
reaucrats with opportunities to work with a wider range of actors, more
so in AP than TN. The agency of bureaucratic actors seems to be higher
228 Gendered developmental subjectivities
in the parastatal programmes, particularly in AP. Reformist discourses
emphasising convergence can increase bureaucratic actors’ agency by ena-
bling them to become important gatekeepers, but can also constrain their
agency as they are expected to implement the agendas of other government
departments.
The agentic capacity of political leaders was discussed with reference
to competing logics of reformist and populist discourse, which both con-
strain and enable agency. It was compared to the effect of the centralisa-
tion of political party leadership and paternalist discourses in augmenting
the agency of political leaders, in a way that was not conducive to trans-
formative gender mainstreaming strategies. This is despite demands of
accountability to women voters determining their policy priorities and
the recognition given to women in state policy. Both states have highly
centralised political parties, more so for the AIADMK than the DMK
in Tamil Nadu, the TDP in Andhra Pradesh, but not so much the Con-
gress Party in AP. This centralisation allows agency for only the most
senior political leaders, and in Tamil Nadu limits the accessibility of
political parties to external advocacy. Personalisation of social welfare
schemes by political leaders within paternalist discursive frameworks is
more evident in TN than AP, but Chandrababu Naidu’s personal associ-
ation with development policy has been more of a liberalising reformer.
As reformers, political leaders were constrained by populist logics, driven
by electoral considerations, and, in Tamil Nadu by a party political leg-
acy of social movement discourse. As populists, they were constrained
by the need to reform. Populist discourse appeared to be considerably
effective at stalling the reformist agenda in both states and social pol-
icy benefitted to an extent, avoiding the ‘fiscal discipline’ of public sector
‘rationalisation’. Protective-paternalist discourse enhanced the agency
of political leaders as benevolent leaders, more so in Tamil Nadu than
Andhra Pradesh, which is likely a legacy of the Dravidian parties’ former
social movement history and the way its parties consolidated their move
into electoral politics and government. The more centralised leadership of
the TDP in AP, and the DMK and AIADMK in Tamil Nadu, places lim-
its on the structural-transformative discourse of gender mainstreaming
which emphasises deliberation. Given the emphasis on policy expertise,
a ­c ompetitive-capability discourse requires that political leaders work
closely with bureaucratic actors, which both enables them as reformers
but constrains them as populists.
Analysis of the possibilities for agency for the women’s movement showed
constraints in both states on the women’s movement and their critical en-
gagement with SHG programmes, the presence of many non-feminist
NGOs, and a lack of critically informed research on the effects of state-level
policies of gendered development. Opportunities to institutionally support
feminist actors have also been restricted, with serious implications for the
 Gendered developmental subjectivities 229
capacity of feminist civil society organisations to engage the state for trans-
formative change.
What conclusions can be drawn as to whether the various kinds of agency
identified in this chapter are enabling or constraining for transformative
gender mainstreaming strategies? Studies of actor participation in gen-
der mainstreaming strategies generally distinguish between two models:
‘­expert-bureaucratic’ and ‘participative-democratic’ (Squires, 2007a). As their
labelling suggests, the ‘expert-bureaucratic’ model characteristically draws
upon technical gender expertise, whereas the ‘participative-­democratic’
model invites civil society organisations to participate in the process of pol-
icy deliberation, but tries to avoid ways which cements certain organisations’
and representatives’ privileged access to mainstreaming processes at the ex-
pense of others.
Where policy attempted to address concerns of gender-equitable devel-
opment, in both states the prominent gendered development discourse, the
competitive-capabilities discourse, articulated an integrative approach to
gender-equitable development, and reflected an expert-bureaucratic model.
This was more the case in Tamil Nadu than in Andhra Pradesh – SERP’s
more institutionalised collaboration with NGOs and its more structural-­
transformative discourse appeared to offer greater prospects for a more
participative-democratic model of gender mainstreaming. But because this
discourse is prominent at the parastatal rather than state level, these pros-
pects are circumscribed. Furthermore, as Squires (2007a: 153) points out,
‘consultation with non-governmental organizations is not synonymous
with the democratic participation of citizens’. This is particularly evident
amongst some of the more prominent NGOs that worked with both SERP and
the TNCDW, as professional, technocratic, and consultancy-type NGOs.
Another impediment to a participative-democratic model is the limited
state funding available for civil society organisations to support such a
model (Squires, 2007a: 154). The fiscal prudence promoted by the reform-
ist discourse of both states and party patronage and control over state
programmes suggests that funding is not likely to come from government
for this purpose. It is also questionable whether the participatory and
­deliberative spaces envisaged by federating SHGs provide such a space for
democratic debate given their disciplinary tendencies, but also their as-
sumption that women members have the resources to participate in such
deliberation.

Notes
1 However, the study also notes most of these women contestants ‘came from
families active in local mainstream politics’, suggesting that their selection as
panchayat candidates ‘is typically a question of money, contacts, and political
networks outside an SHG’ (EDA/APMAS, 2006: 59).
230 Gendered developmental subjectivities
2 The MaThi pledge was designed by MYRADA, an NGO working with TNCDW.
At the time of research, it was not clear whether there was a scheme-wide oath
for groups in Velugu/IKP.
3 In Tamil Nadu, SHGs are federated into block-level federations and then
­cluster-level federations. SHG Federations in Tamil Nadu are sometimes re-
ferred to as kalanjiams (following the Dhan Foundation approach). In Andhra
Pradesh, SHGs are federated into village-level organisations and then into
­Mandal Mahila Samakhyas, the latter located at the mandal (sub-district ad-
ministrative area) headquarters.
4 Using populist politics to soften (or contradict) economic reforms has not been
confined to these two states, and developments in one state serves as useful in-
formation for policy direction in another. Srinivasulu (2004: 6, n.3) suggests that
the Congress Party’s election victory in Andhra Pradesh in 2004, attributed to
their promise of free power to the agricultural sector, persuaded the AIADMK
state government in Tamil Nadu to implement the same.
5 Tamil Nadu MPs in the national parliament frequently make speeches revering
their party leaders, including on social policy matters.
6 In 2001–2002, 2002–2003, and 2003–2004, the policy statement previously ex-
pressed this as the programme receiving ‘its first growth thrust in 1991–1992’,
which would be more accurate, but omitted the start date of the programme as
1989.
7 It is not uncommon to find graphics used to make literature accessible to non-
and semi-literate members, but even for literate members, can still be personal-
ised by political leaders to signal their association.
8 The readership of these magazines and how they are received by SHG women is
an interesting question but is beyond the scope of this research.
9 In 2011, the AP state government established Stree Nidhi, a credit co-operative
society linked to SERP’s poverty alleviation strategy. The government home-
page of Stree Nidhi claims, in a clear reference to MFIs, that ‘SHGs are com-
fortable to access hassle free credit from Sthree Nidhi as and when required…
and therefore do not see any need to borrow from other sources at usurious
rates of interest’ (GoAP, n.d.). The 2014 Annual Report has on the front cover
a large picture of Chandrababu Naidu, re-elected as Chief Minister in 2014
(GoAP, 2014).
10 In Andhra Pradesh, there are three similar sounding but distinct organisations:
first, the AP Mahila Samakhya, as described above; second, the Andhra Pradesh
Mahila Samatha Society (http://www.apmss.org), which is part of the Govern-
ment of India’s Mahila Samakhya programme on educational empowerment op-
erating in selected States; and third, the Mahila Mandal Samakhyas, which are
federated organisations of the Velugu/IKP programme of the Government of
Andhra Pradesh.

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9 Conclusion

Gender mainstreaming in Indian development policy is under-explored

in the literature. National initiatives undertaken in India since the 1990s
should be better understood. Increased Indian state autonomy since 1991
and changes in federal and electoral politics prompt analysis of gendered
development policy and possibilities for gender mainstreaming at the sub-
national level. I explored this puzzle through three concepts – institutions,
discourse, and agency – which, I argue, influence gender mainstreaming
approaches in development policy. I suggested that institutional context
matters, that gendered discourses of development frame policy, and that
the successful pursuit of a mainstreaming strategy depends on the possi-
bilities for agency provided by the complex interplay of institutional and
discursive influences, which together shape gendered state developmental
subjectivities.
The main argument of the book is that, if at all gender mainstreaming has
been adopted in India, this is much more observable at the national level
than subnational level. National attempts to mainstream gender into the de-
velopment planning process include increasing the influence of the national
machinery for women to help champion gender mainstreaming, developing
gender budgeting and gender planning initiatives, and developing gender
expertise of senior civil servants (IAS) through international collaborative
gender training projects (see Chapters 3 and 4). At the subnational level,
in the two states examined, the discourses employed vary, but policy pro-
cesses have focused more on women’s empowerment than gender equality,
particularly through state-managed SHG programmes. State governments
appear less receptive to involving women’s movement actors in policymak-
ing, but have sought to engage women’s (and other) NGOs in implemen-
tation. Developments in national government institutions have not always
been replicated at subnational level, with limited transformation of govern-
ment ministries, limited incorporation of gender into planning processes,
and some co-option of State Commissions for Women through appointing
women loyal to ruling parties and often without women’s movement ex-
perience. Reflecting the less institutionalised subnational policy process,
political elites appear to have greater relative power than bureaucrats,
236 Conclusion
and political leaders personally associate with programmes, even in more
autonomous parastatal agencies. But these dynamics are not universal;
counter-examples to this national-subnational dichotomy include national
government policies, like the National Policy on the Empowerment of
Women (2001), which conceptually prioritise women’s empowerment rather
than gender equality, and organisational structures whose nomenclature
foreground women rather than gender equality (National Commission for
Women, Ministry of Women and Child Development, National Mission for
the Empowerment of Women, and Parliamentary Committee on the Em-
powerment of Women). Some subnational examples of efforts to address
structural gender inequality exist, and other states not examined in this
book may exhibit other dynamics. This final chapter summarises the book’s
main findings and contribution to the literature and highlights fruitful di-
rections for further research, proposing a new research agenda on gender
and federalism in India.

Institutions, discourse, and agency: comparative findings

The analysis of national policy (see Chapters 3 and 4) showed how national
plans increasingly paid attention to the gendered dimensions of develop-
ment, although not unproblematically. Several national gender mainstream-
ing initiatives from the 1990s attempted to transform national development
institutions to produce gender-responsive development policy, albeit with
varied success. Government policy mostly demonstrated integrationist and
agenda-setting models of mainstreaming and employed affirmative action
strategies to integrate women into the process of national development.
Whilst gender-inequitable development was discursively framed through
gender difference, policy strategies of women’s empowerment primarily
sought to integrate women into development, rather than substantially alter
the overall approach.
Comparative profiles of the two states’ socio-economic features and po-
litical histories (see Chapter 5) showed how, despite their similar location in
South India and shared historical context, they faced different challenges
with regard to gender-equitable development. Andhra Pradesh is, in some
indicators, more representative of all India than Tamil Nadu, but the latter
has still faced challenges, including a declining child sex ratio unfavour-
able to girl children. Gender inequality also varies within these two states
across districts, and intersects with other forms of marginalisation. Histor-
ical and contemporary political movements in both states provided varied
opportunities for women’s participation. In Tamil Nadu, the potential of
gender egalitarian perspectives in the Self-Respect Movement diminished
due to the rise of Dravidian politics articulating more conservative gender
norms and paternalist treatment of women. Thus, formal party politics,
dominated by Dravidian parties, has not been an easy entry point for the
state’s women’s movement organisations. Women participated in historical
 Conclusion 237
and contemporary movements in Andhra Pradesh but were often sidelined
or disappointed by political party leaders’ manipulations for electoral gains
and subsequent unfulfilled promises.
Comparative analysis of the two states’ approaches to gender and devel-
opment policy demonstrated complex institutional, discursive, and agen-
tial dynamics, affecting possibilities for gender mainstreaming. Chapter 6
­h ighlighted similarities in the descriptive and substantive gendering of state
government institutions. In both states, women are a small minority in pub-
lic office, governance, and decision-making, and those women who do make
it into public office, often hold gendered portfolios such as social welfare.
Women’s limited ministerial presence partly derives from the low nomina-
tion of women candidates by political parties to contest elections, as in the
rest of India, though this has fluctuated over time. Tamil Nadu was intermit-
tently governed by a female Chief Minister, J. Jayalalithaa, since the 1990s,
but this has not necessarily improved women’s presence in legislative and
ministerial positions. Much like all India, women are a minority in the sen-
ior civil service in both states. State Commissions for Women, established in
the 1990s, have not been effective entry points for the women’s movement as
they depend on state government patronage, usually chaired by loyal party
women (with some important exceptions) with limited engagement with the
women’s movement.
Chapter 6 also shows how the gendered institutional context of subna-
tional development policy has been internally differentiated in both states,
but institutional structures for gender and development policy – including
parastatal agencies SERP and TNCDW – have developed differently in the
two states, suggesting state-level institutional context mattered. Gender and
development policy has been situated primarily within the social welfare
and rural development ministries, with rural poverty logics influencing both
states’ programmes on women’s empowerment, though only more recently
in Tamil Nadu suggesting a convergence in sectoral administration of policy
on women, gender, and development. The approach of Andhra Pradesh’s
parastatal agency, SERP, has been more characteristic of gender main-
streaming in that gender was one component of a larger programme involv-
ing both men and women, whereas Tamil Nadu’s parastatal approach saw
women as primary beneficiaries and participants. There appeared to be few
explicit attempts at government introspection on the gender-­responsiveness
of its policies, except perhaps when government departments looked to
SHG women to help implement policy agendas.
The analysis of state-level gendered discourses of development (see
Chapter 7) identified three prominent discourses: protective-paternalist,
­competitive-capability, and structural-transformative, all of which differed
according to institutional context, both within and across states. These three
discourses presented different perspectives on gender-­equitable development
as a policy concern, with the protective-paternalist as the most conserva-
tive, the competitive-capabilities as the most (neo)liberal and integrationist,
238 Conclusion
and the structural-transformative as potentially the most empowering and
participatory of all three. Overall, the competitive-­capabilities discourse
appeared to be dominant in the more reformist-oriented development policy
in both states. The protective-paternalist discourse was far more prevalent
in Tamil Nadu, especially in the Department of Social Welfare, and was
particularly influenced by (patriarchal) populist discourses in state poli-
tics. The structural-transformative discourse was more prevalent in Andhra
Pradesh, but this was mostly limited to the parastatal level (SERP), with
some occasional articulation in state policy. Thus, the wider development
discourse appeared to strongly affect the possibilities for the discursive ar-
ticulation of gender-equitable development.
The analysis presented in Chapter 8 also suggested considerable varia-
tions in the possibilities for agency. National and state policy discourses
constituted women as subjects and objects of development policy differ-
ently through each discourse, ranging from weak, dependent, and vulner-
able victims of oppression, through to hyper-responsible and altruistic
heroines of national development. Whilst the former characterisation of-
fered little room for agency, the latter offered extensive possibilities, but
the kind of agency it offered was contingent on the disciplinary logic of
particular institutional norms and discursive practices. In other words,
women’s agency was dependent on a strategy of empowering the individual
rather than the collective, and empowerment of a particular kind of indi-
vidual as prescribed by the state – a subjectivity based on integration into
the mainstream rather than the transformation of the mainstream. It also
relied on women’s unpaid labour to bring about the kind of societal change
seen as desirable by the state; it imbued women with a particular kind of
agency and gave them responsibilities and duties, often without adequate
recompense or support.
Political leaders were positioned differently both through wider reformist
and populist discourses of development and specifically gendered discourses
of development, all of which offered different opportunities for agency, both
enabling and constraining. Where explicit policies on gender and develop-
ment did exist, these frequently reflected an expert-bureaucratic model of
gender mainstreaming (according to Squires’ (2007) model discussed in
Chapter 2). Bureaucratic agency appeared high in both states but especially
at the parastatal level in Andhra Pradesh, and was more conducive to an inte-
grationist, expert-bureaucratic model of gender mainstreaming rather than
an agenda-setting, participative-democratic model. Women’s movement or-
ganisations were positioned with relative little agency by institutional norms
and structures and discursive practices, and (implicitly) non-feminist NGOs
occupied a far larger role instead. The wider institutional environment was
also not conducive to the participation or critical engagement of women’s
movements with state programmes and policies and thus did not offer sig-
nificant opportunities for a more participative-­democratic model of gender
mainstreaming.
 Conclusion 239
The analysis presented in this book has highlighted the different insti-
tutional contexts between the national government and state governments.
One clear finding is the relative absence of explicit attempts to adopt the lan-
guage and approach of gender mainstreaming at the subnational level, when
compared with the national level. In other words, at the national level, gen-
der mainstreaming was one of the strategies being employed by (national)
state and non-state actors to bring about a more gender-responsive devel-
opment policy, through for example, engendering the planning process,
gender budgeting initiatives, gender training in the civil service, and an
augmented national machinery in the form of enhanced status to the Min-
istry of Women and Child Development, a new parliamentary committee
for the empowerment of women, gender budget cells within central govern-
ment ministries, and the National Mission for the Empowerment of Women
to help co-ordinate schemes from across different government sectors.
These initiatives involved a range of actors, but in particular UNIFEM,
the Planning Commission, the Ministry of Women and Child Development,
the Finance Ministry, the LBSNAA, and selected working groups of non-­
governmental gender experts, both scholars and practitioners.
When the focus shifted from the national to subnational levels, the case
study chapters (5–8) demonstrated little activity in terms of explicit strate-
gies to mainstream gender in development at the state level, compared with
the national level. In fact, the strong concern in both states with efficiency
and ‘convergence’ of policy resources might be considered the reverse of a
mainstreaming strategy, in that both state governments attempted to in-
crease the efficiency of delivery of development policies and programmes
with top-down, pre-designed policy, rather than reflexively introspecting
on its own gendered norms and practices influencing policy. The lack of
gender mainstreaming adoption, and opportunities for its adoption, at the
subnational level in these two states suggests that the policy language has
not travelled.
One possible explanation is that, compared to state governments, the
national government is more exposed to its international obligations, as
signatories to international conventions such as the Convention on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and the Fourth World
Conference on Women in Beijing. The institutional norms and practices
of the state government departments in which women’s development was
concentrated as a policy issue showed that in neither state was this depart-
ment akin to what the academic literature refers to as a ‘women’s policy
agency’, an agency to promote gender equality within state structures and
policy. In other words, the augmentation of status and orientation – a­ lbeit
partial and limited – of the national Ministry of Women and Child Devel-
opment had not occurred, or had been resisted, at the subnational level.
State government departments for women’s development or social welfare
in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu do not (yet) offer an institutional
opening for gender mainstreaming opportunities at the subnational level,
240 Conclusion
and in any case are themselves marginal to, and lower placed in, the gov-
ernment sectoral hierarchy, which diminishes their authority to influence
policy decisions and act as a gender mainstreaming champion without
accompanying institutional changes or serious support from more senior
ministerial actors.

What the Indian case contributes to existing literature and

scope for further analysis
This book contributes to the international literature on gender mainstream-
ing in development, exploring the journey of ‘gender mainstreaming’ in
India, and reiterates cautionary tales of gender mainstreaming and dis-
appointing progress discussed at the start of the book. But it also departs
from claims of ubiquity of gender mainstreaming (see Parpart, 2014) to
show ­limited adoption in India, especially at the subnational level. Women’s
empowerment remains a dominant concept in policy and aligns with the
discourse and logics of electoral politics. But it also reaffirms that if gen-
der mainstreaming has been de-radicalised and co-opted in neo-liberal and
technocratic ways, so has ‘women’s empowerment’ (Batliwala, 2007; Calkin,
2015; Kalpana, 2017).
This book also contributes to studies of Indian development policy and
planning, analysing gender and development discourse in national plan-
ning. It reaffirms that gender analysis should not be confined to or social
sector policy and programmes, and reiterates feminist-informed perspec-
tives which stress it is not enough for women (and men) to be visible in pol-
icy, but how they are thought about and spoken about matters, revealing the
gendered assumptions and frameworks of planners and policymakers.1 The
case of gender mainstreaming in India also further demonstrates the lim-
ited ability of gender mainstreaming to capture intersectional inequalities,
and diversity generally. Women may be more visible in policy discourse, but
diversity amongst women (and men) is still not sufficiently acknowledged,
something which affects gender mainstreaming approaches internation-
ally. In part, this is because policy discourse focuses on gender difference –
­comparing men and women – and less on gender diversity and intersectional
inequality amongst women and men. These silences and omissions also de-
rive from a technocratic urge to simplify and depoliticise (Ferguson, 1984).
A more holistic intersectional examination of what planners know in really
is a complex interrelationship of inequality, is splintered by bureaucratic
fragmentation into different ministries. Simultaneously, women’s move-
ment actors, in India and elsewhere, have been justifiably suspicious when
minority or marginalised women become hyper-visible in policy discourse,
because of historical experiences of co-option into policy discourse to serve
colonial, postcolonial, and new imperial agendas (Abu-Lughod, 2002).
For studies of federalism and multilevel governance, the book also
provides further encouragement for systematic studies of national- and
 Conclusion 241
state-level machineries for women in India. Comparing two Indian states
brought greater insights than could have been achieved with one. However,
the complexity of the comparative approach allowed only a limited depth
of coverage in each case study. With reduced scope, and assuming access,
the relationship between actors and policy could be explored in more depth.
For example, K. Kalpana’s more ethnographic study of Tamil Nadu’s SHG
programme provides greater ground-level insights into everyday practices
(Kalpana, 2017; see also her earlier work, 2005, 2011). A broader range of
policy initiatives or a different set of case study states could be explored,
or a narrower focus on individual institutions such as the State Commis-
sions for Women and state-level planning processes but across a broader
range of states could yield interesting insights into gender, federalism, and
the state in India (discussed below). Overall, the book provides further sup-
port to illustrate women’s fragmented experience of citizenship intersected
with caste, religion, ethnicity, sexuality, and more, but crucially this book
demonstrates how women’s experience of fragmented citizenship also differs
from state to state, how political geography or territory also informs women’s
fragmented citizenship in India.
This book also re-emphasises both the recognition of gender roles and
relations in policy and the need to transform them towards greater gender
equality. This requires a corresponding redistribution of roles, rights, re-
sponsibilities, and especially resources (financial, institutional, political will)
to support such responsibilities, especially if that responsibility is borne in
the name of state-led development. Transformative gender mainstreaming
requires not just looking outward at gendered outcomes, but inward to how
institutional norms and cultures affect both policymaking and implementa-
tion, examining of gendered and intersectional biases in governance prac-
tices, which is a much more challenging, disruptive, and sensitive task for
the state and a source of much resistance. Surprisingly, little research has
been conducted on the Indian civil service as a gendered institution and
the impact of this on the state’s gendered approach to development pol-
icy, and at the subnational level as opposed to the national level. Thakur’s
(c.1997, 2000) studies are some of the few to explicitly address this issue,
and came from within the service, but few have followed. This study also
provides insights on the varied power of individual governmental actors;
they can simultaneously be both powerful and powerless to effect change
within state institutions. Individual commitment to, and action in favour of,
gender mainstreaming in the absence of institutional memory can make a
difference, but a well-informed champion of gender-responsive policy, un-
less well placed within the bureaucracy, with influence in the most powerful
and well-resourced of ministries, and with support from political elites, can-
not change the system alone, and faces multiple potential veto points across
ministries, and across tiers of governance.
The book provides further confirmation of the powerful agency of po-
litical elites in shaping subnational policy, where political power and
242 Conclusion
policymaking decisions are often more centralised, and further confirms
and reiterates development as a political rather than merely technical pro-
cess. Advocates of women’s empowerment often stress the importance of
attention to power in empowerment processes (Batliwala, 2007) whereas
the shift to gender mainstreaming since the 1990s was lamented for the
emptying out of the role of political struggle of women’s movements for
achieving transformation. More recently, though, enduring resistance and
slow progress amid increased awareness and more sophisticated analytical
tools has increased awareness of gender mainstreaming as a political pro-
cess (Parpart, 2014). Development politics literature has long recognised
such fraught processes of change, so we should not be surprised that gen-
der mainstreaming is difficult to achieve because it requires a fundamental
transformation in power structures and political economy, changing deep-
rooted norms. Greater understanding is required to enable transformation
of gendered state institutional norms and practices and the role and power
of different actors. This book provided insights but certainly more can be
done to build on these insights.
The hypervisibility of women and invisibility of men in gender and devel-
opment policy discourse in India suggests national and state policies still
operate on a restrictive understanding of gender as largely synonymous with
women. Applying a critical masculinities lens would bring further insights
but was beyond the scope of this book. Studies employing a masculinities
approach in the Indian context have tended not to focus on development
policies, but have produced rich insights into colonial masculinities under
the British Raj (Sinha, 1995; Banerjee, 2012), and contemporary Hindu na-
tionalism (Banerjee, 2005). Policy and programme components focusing
on masculinity are far less common, although there is evidence to suggest
they are emerging. This can help to destabilise ‘abusive male’ stereotypes
in development thought (John, 1996). A Tamil Nadu government official
recounted to me that programme officials increasingly realised the impor-
tance of sensitising the male family members of women SHG members, and
particularly boys and young men, in managing expectations in relation to
changing stereotypical gender roles and the gendered division of labour (in-
terview, former TNCDW official, June 2007). But it is also important to be
mindful of the potential trade-offs and implications for women if scarce
funding, resources, and visibility are diverted for programmes for men and
boys (Chant and Gutmann, 2000; White, 2000; Cleaver, 2002). Another
fruitful area for further research is the tentative relationship between wom-
en’s movements and SHG programmes. Further research could also explore
in more detail the role and influence of international bilateral and multilat-
eral donor agencies in terms of influencing Indian state institutional norms
and practices and gendered development discourses. International organi-
sations, particularly UNIFEM (later UN Women), were important actors
in gender mainstreaming initiatives at the national level, often providing a
crucial platform for practitioners to come together.
 Conclusion 243
Further research could also follow up significant developments which
occurred subsequent to the completion of the research for this book. The
bifurcation of Andhra Pradesh in 2014 raises questions about continuity
and change in institutional norms and policy discourse. Can political elites
or women’s movement actors use new state creation as an opening in insti-
tutional continuity to do something different or advocate for change with
new political elites? The deaths of both party leaders in Tamil Nadu in 2014
(Jayalalithaa) and 2018 (Karunanidhi) raise questions about what will be
the priorities of the future leadership of political parties in Tamil Nadu, and
their approach to gender-equitable development. The abolition of the Plan-
ning Commission and the establishment of NITI Aayog in 2014 also raise
questions about the consequences for established gender mainstreaming in-
itiatives in national planning discussed in Chapter 4. Have these initiatives
been sustained despite institutional changes?

Towards a new research agenda: gender, federalism,

and the state in India
The book’s aim was an analysis of gender mainstreaming in the multilevel
governance context of India. Expanding this inquiry, we can ask questions
about the broader relationship between gender, federalism, and the state in
India. A growing international comparative literature on gender and fed-
eralism (Chappell 2002; Hausmann et al., 2010; Vickers, 2011, 2012), pri-
marily focused on Western or higher income states,2 could benefit from
insights from India, with its many different contextual challenges and dy-
namics. Increased scholarly interest in Indian federalism has not yet suffi-
ciently engaged with the question of gender and federalism,3 though it has
assessed the comparative politics of social welfare (Tillin et al., 2015), with
some overlapping gender policy concerns (but not all), and with different
interests. Literature on gender, development, women’s empowerment, and
the Indian state has commented on regional variations in women’s rights
and gender (in)equality, such as state-wise discrepancies in inheritance laws
(Agarwal, 1994), regressive state government legislation in disqualification
criteria for panchayat elections (Buch, 2006), and state-wise variations in
the recognition of domestic workers’ rights (Deshpande, 2015). Though it
has not addressed gender and federalism directly, it provides excellent ma-
terial from which conclusions can be drawn.
Opportunities exist, therefore, to contribute international literature on
gender and federalism and on Indian federalism, and to add insights on
gender and the state in India and beyond. The international literature asks
whether federalism offers an advantage for women’s movements to achieve
gender equality demands, with two competing perspectives: either that na-
tional governments are more receptive and effective than subnational gov-
ernments in addressing such demands, or that the relationship between
gender and federalism is contingent on several factors (Vickers, 2011).4
244 Conclusion
Many subsequent questions follow this initial question. How does the fed-
eral arrangement affect women’s movement strategies of mobilisation
and advocacy? Does the women’s movement benefit from ‘multiple access
points’ of national and state governments, using demonstration effects or
public support in one arena to convince politicians, policymakers, and the
public in other arenas? Or do the ‘multiple veto points’ of Indian federal-
ism make movement advocacy increasingly complex, time-consuming, and
­resource-draining? Does it help political elites in one arena to resist, reverse,
or dilute policy and legislation painstakingly generated in a different arena?
And can autonomy in subnational government jurisdictions enable greater
progress towards gender equality goals, particularly when the national gov-
ernment is either unmoved, actively regressive, or hostile in its attitudes
towards gender (in)equality? This entails understanding both formal and in-
formal institutions of Indian federalism, and the relative power of different
institutions and actors, that is, is the formal federal division of government
less important than the informal power-sharing arrangements of coalition
politics, party competition, and party elites? Why do competitive federal
dynamics regarding economic and industrial development not apply to gen-
der equality and women’s empowerment? From such studies, we might learn
(a) whether Indian federalism enables or constrains the Indian state’s con-
stitutional commitment to gender equality; (b) strategies to overcome spe-
cifically federalism-related challenges faced by women’s movements; and (c)
the gendered assumptions underpinning federal divisions of responsibility
in public policy and citizenship, with implications for the prioritisation and
financing of public policy issues, the (re)distribution of public resources,
and the realisation of citizenship rights and responsibilities.
In assessing the trajectory of gender, development, and the state in ­India
in the recent past, we can be more critically informed about future oppor-
tunities for transformation, and the role of the state in ensuring a more
gender-equitable future amid India’s rapidly changing and vast social, eco-
nomic, cultural, and political landscape of more than 1.2 billion citizens.

Notes
1 Feminist development scholars and practitioners have distinguished between
practical and strategic gender interests (Molyneux, 1985), whereby policy at-
tending to practical gender interests seeks to resolve women’s resource prob-
lems in their stereotypical gender roles (e.g. mothers), but does not question or
redistribute those roles or the labour involved according to strategic gender in-
terests of gender equality. Faced with limited resources, high demand due to
poverty and socio-economic inequality, and challenges in distributing resources
without ‘leakages’ or local elite or intra-household capture, political elites may
use gendered role stereotypes and rhetoric to ringfence goods and services for
women, hoping to reap rewards through electoral returns. In practice, this
­practical-strategic tension is difficult to resolve.
2 Solanki (2010) on federalism and the Mahila Samakhya programme in India is
an exception, discussing these questions in the Indian context.
 Conclusion 245
3 The only other studies I could find addressing this question were Chakraborty
(2011) and Saxena (2017); whilst Saxena and I draw on similar international
literature, our focus, examples, and treatment differ. Chakraborty (2011)
is particularly focused on fiscal federalism and whether incentives for states
to address gender inequality can be incorporated into federal fiscal transfer
mechanisms.
4 Discussed in more depth in Spary (2018). Earlier versions were presented in
­Oxford (2014) and the Centre for Multilevel Federalism, Delhi (2017). My thanks
to organisers and participants of both events.

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Index
Note: Boldface page numbers refer to tables; italic page numbers refer to figures &
page numbers followed by “n” denote endnotes.
abortion, sex-selective 197
Accredited Social Health Activists
on the National Rural Health
Mission 153
Adivasis 9 see also Scheduled Tribes
(STs)
Administrative Reforms Commission
103n16
ADMK see All India Anna Dravida
Munnetra Kazhagam party
(AIADMK)
adolescent girls 69, 120
adoption 196, 207n3
Advani, Poornima 166
‘advocacy coalitions’ 48n21
affirmative action 1, 67, 68, 71, 158, 159,
177, 197, 203, 205, 206, 236
Agarwal, Bina 3, 5, 103n5
agenda-setting strategies 101
agents and agency: gender and
development 5–8, 34–9; gender
mainstreaming, national initiatives
96–100; levels of 3
Agnihotri, I. 38
agricultural labourers 118–19
Ahluwalia, Montek S. 27, 36
All India Administrative Services 33
All India Anna Dravida Munnetra
Kazhagam party (AIADMK):
comparing socio-political histories
141; gendered developmental
discourses 188–9; gendered
developmental subjectivities
220–1, 228; gendered institutional
contexts 165; populism and cultural
nationalism 131; socio-political
histories 130; strategies, increasing
women’s presence in government
158; subnational policy in context
109, 132–6; women as elected
representatives 154, 157
All India Congress Committee 158
All India Services 92–3, 103n18, 158
Ambedkar, B. R. 29
Anandhi, S. 131, 132, 135, 222
Andhra Pradesh: anti-arrack movement
139–41; basic profile of 12; case
selection 9–13; casualisation of
employment 144n18; child sex ratios
125–30, 145n29; child trafficking
207n3; comparative sex ratios for 127;
Congress Party 230n4; contemporary
electoral politics 137–9; economic
indicators for 110; Economic
Restructuring Project 192; economic
survey 144n20; education 124, 120–5;
employment 113–20; gender and
development 109–30, 112; gender
and socio-political histories, state
politics 136–7; gender-based violence
in 129; gendered life chances 125–30;
gender mainstreaming approach
5; HDI scores 112, 142n3; human
development 112; inequalities, socio-
economic development 112–13;
introduction 108–9; left-wing agrarian
movements 136–7; literacy rates
for 122; multilevel governance 3–5;
populism 136–7; poverty 142n5;
poverty reduction 111–13; pre-2014
bifurcation 17n4; reproductive health
125–30; sex ratios for 126, 127;
248 Index
SHGs 230n3; socio-political histories
130–41; state co-optation 136–7; state
feminist bureaucratic spaces 170–3;
violence against women 125–30;
women candidates in state elections
156, 156; work participation rates and
status of workers 113
Andhra Pradesh District Poverty
Initiatives Project 179n19
Andhra Pradesh Rural Poverty
Reduction Project 179n20
Andhra Pradesh Society for the
Elimination of Rural Poverty 173–5
anganwadi workers 153, 170
Annadurai, C.N. 131, 134, 221
Annai Bangaru Ammaiyar Ninaivu
Mahalir Thittam 221
anti-arrack movement 139–41
APMAS 216
arrack, movement against 139–41
attitudes: change 98; vs. laws 197
autonomy, formulating policy 4
Bacchi, C. L. 3, 6–7
Bardhan, Pranab 13
Batliwala, Srilatha 43, 98
Beijing Platform for Action 40, 62, 99
Below-Poverty-Line criteria 142n4
beneficiaries vs. participants 65–6
benevolent sexism 194
Bergeron, S. 42
Bharathi, Pratibha 157
Bharat Mata 132
Bhatt, Ela 59, 66, 79–80
Bhattacharyya, P. N. 83
binary genders 87
biological essence 25
birth order 144n26
Borowiak, C. 25
Boserup, Esther 24–5
Brown, W. 160
budgeting 83–8, 103n9
bureaucratic postings 90–1
‘business case’, gender equality 85
Byres, T. J. 36–7
capacity-building experiences 48n22
Caplan, P. 144n27
casualisation of employment 144n18
casual labour 116, 117
catalysts vs. participants/recipients 66
central government planning 29–34
Central Project Coordination
Committee 168
Central Social Welfare Board (CSWB)
102n2
Centre for Good Governance 192
Centre for Multilevel Federalism 245n4
Centre for Women and Development
Studies 14
Chakraborty, L. 83, 245n3
Chakravarty, S. 27, 32, 36, 47n5, 47n17
Chambers, R. 46n2
Chandran, S. Jenefer 157
Chatterjee, N. 31
Chatterjee, P. 28, 30
Chattopadhyay, Kamaladevi 154
Chaudhuri, M. 28
Chellappa, S. 178n12
Chhibber, V. 30
Chidambaram, P. 84
childcare provision 17n2
child nutrition 121, 124
child sex ratios 125–30, 144n26, 144n28,
145n29, 145n31
child trafficking 207n3
Chiranjeevi (actor) 138
choices, empowerment 198
Chunkath, Sheela Rani 153
cinema: fan clubs 132–3; and party
politics relationship 145n34
CITU 217
civil service: data collection 13;
debates and perspectives 32–3, 46;
discrimination in 92; examination
fee 93; gendered institutional norms
89–93; gender in 103n14; gender
training in 93–6; ‘laterals’ 36–7; list
database 103n12–103n13, 177n2
coastal Andhra regions 18n9
Commissionerate of Women
Empowerment and Self Employment
14, 171
Committee for the Empowerment of
Women 178n8
Committee on Civil Service Reforms 91
Committee on the Status of Women 59
compartmentalisation, women’s issues 71
competitive-capabilities discourse 5–8,
185, 195, 202, 205, 207n2
Congress Party: Andhra Pradesh 18n15,
230n4; gendered developmental
discourses 192–3; gendered
institutional contexts 172, 175;
subnational policy in context 140–1;
women as elected representatives
155, 158
contraceptive technologies 128

Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women 100
Cradle Baby Scheme 196
Crenshaw, Kimberle 17n3
Dalit communities 9 see also Scheduled
Caste groups
Dalit Panthers of India (DPI) 135–6
‘deconstructing the West’ 26
‘Deepam Scheme’ 192–3
Department for Panchayati Raj and
Rural Development 171
Department of Personnel and Training
(GOI) 93
Department of Rural Development
(DRD) 164
Department of Social Welfare 164, 167
Department of Women and Child
Development (DWCD): approval of
programme 48n27; data collection
13; gender budgeting 83–8; national
initiatives in gender mainstreaming 76,
79–81
Department of Women Development
and Child Welfare (DWD&CW) 170
dependency theory 24
Desai, M. 44–5
Development Alternatives with Women
for a New Era 25
Development Crises and Alternative
Visions (Sen and Grown) 25
Development of Women and Children
in Rural Areas (DWCRA) 140, 164,
192–3
development policy: gains to society
in general 61; global mainstreaming
41–3; mainstreaming 43–6; plan
discourse post-1990 period 43–6
Devika, J. 8, 34
Devi, Susheela 171–2
Devi, Vasanthi 165, 166
Dickey, S. 133
Dietrich, G. 118
‘difference’, focus on 67–9, 71–2, 101–2
disability mainstreaming 3, 169, 176,
195, 196, 198, 201, 206
disabled populations 61–2, 73n5
‘Disadvantaged Farmers Including
Women’ 3, 103n5
discourses: analysing gender,
development, and the state 5–8;
competitive-capabilities 195; dominant
and marginal discourses 193–4; gender
and socio-political histories, state
Index 249
politics 131–6; global mainstream
and feminist debates 24–6; protective-
paternalist 194; selected mainstream
and feminist debates 27–9; structural-
transformative 195–6
discrimination 39, 92, 125, 170, 197
District Project Coordination
Committees 179n16
District Rural Development
Administration (DRDA) 168, 175
division of labour, gendered 44
DMK see Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam
(DMK)
Domestic Violence Act see violence
against women and girls
dowry practices 125–6, 130, 144n27,
196–7, 224
Dowry Prohibition Act (1961) 161
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK):
gendered developmental discourses
188–9, 196; gendered developmental
subjectivities 220–1, 228; gendered
institutional contexts 165, 167;
populism and cultural nationalism
131–6; socio-political histories 130;
subnational policy in context 109;
Tamil Nadu 164; women as elected
representatives 154, 157
Drèze, J. 28
Dyson, T. 13
‘economic activities’ 18n17
Economic Processing Zone (EPZ)
110–12
‘Economic Survey’ 84, 144n20
education 103n19, 122–5, 144n24
18 Point Programme for Women and
Child Welfare 201, 206
elderly population: development policy
61–2, 69; social welfare 73n5; state
homes for 170
Election Code of Conduct 192
Elson, Diane 41
employment 63–4, 113–20
empowerment: debates and perspectives
26, 44; gendered developmental
discourses 197; national planning
policy 65, 67, 69, 72; subordinated
197 see also National Mission for
the Empowerment of Women;
Parliamentary Committee for the
Empowerment of Women
‘empowerment populism’ 134
entrepreneurship 63, 103n19
250 Index
epistemic community 36, 48n21
equal opportunity 40
Equal Remuneration Act (1976) 117
equity and equality: constitutional
guarantee 59; Eleventh Five-Year
Plan 81–5; gender budgeting 85, 88;
multilevel governance 5
Escobar, A. 30
Eveline, J. 3
exogamous marriage practices 13
external female actors 98–9
external gender expertise 79–83
factory work 119
family commitments 89–90
family planning 34, 73n9, 128
federalism: multilevel character of
planning 47n17; overview 4–5; policy
jurisdiction 31–2
female child labour 120
female infanticide 196; acceptance 127–8
female political leadership 35–6
feminist debates 24–9
‘feminist triangles’ 76
fertility regulation 30–1, 72, 73n9, 121, 202
15 Point Programme for Child
Welfare 201
film clubs 145n35; see also cinema: fan
clubs
Finance Ministry 83–8, 97, 103n8,
103n10
Fiscal Responsibility Act (2003) 188
Five-Year Plans 45; Second Plan 27, 36;
Third Plan 27; Sixth Plan 59; Seventh
Plan 85; Eighth Plan 58, 61, 63, 65–8,
70, 103n5, 187; Ninth Plan 61, 65–70,
92–3, 103n3, 103n5; Tenth Plan 61,
63–8, 72n1, 80, 103n5, 186, 197,
200; Eleventh Plan 58, 61, 64, 73n8,
80–2, 103n5; Twelfth Plan 3, 82–3;
debates and perspectives 45; gendered
development discourse 64–70;
gender-responsive development 67–9;
replaced with medium and long-term
planning 47n16; Think Tank 79;
women, gender, and development in
44–5
foeticide, female 125, 127
forced sterilisation 30–1
formulation-implementation distinction
48n19
Foucauldian concepts 15, 30
Fourth World Conference on Women 99
Gandhi, Indira 30, 35, 72n3, 138
Gandhi, Rajiv 35–6, 46n4, 48n20
Gandhi, Sonia 36
Gandhian approach 47n5
Gariyali, C. K. 95, 153, 162
Gayathri, Comal R. 178n12
Geetha, V. 131
gender and development (GAD):
agents of development 34–9; central
government planning 29–34; child
sex ratios 125–30; debates and
perspectives 23–49; discourses of
development 24–6; and education
120–5; and employment 113–20;
gendered inequalities, socio-economic
development 112–13; gendered life
chances 125–30; global mainstream
and feminist debates 24–6;; human
development 111–13; institutions of
development 29–34; mainstreaming
1–3, 39–46; module 103n19; and
multilevel governance 3–5; overview
109–11; poverty reduction 111–13;
reproduction health 125–30; selected
mainstream and feminist debates
27–9; violence against women 125–30;
see also Andhra Pradesh; Tamil Nadu
gender and education 120–5
gender and employment 113–20
gender and socio-political histories, state
politics: Andhra Pradesh 136–7; anti-
arrack movement 139–41; comparison
of 141; contemporary electoral
politics 137–9; discourses, populism
and cultura nationalism 131–6; left-
wing agrarian movements 136–7;
overview 130–1; populism 136–7; state
co-optation 136–7
gender-blind categorisations 18n17
gender budgeting 83–8, 103n9
gender-disaggregated statistical date
102n1
gendered development subjectivities:
bureaucratic actors 217–19;
conclusions 227–9; introduction
211–12; political leadership 219–24;
women, self-help groups 212–17;
women’s movement, state level 224–7
gendered discourses of development:
Andhra Pradesh 190–3, 201–4;
comparison 193; competitive-
capabilities 195; conclusions 206–7;
gendered development discourses

193–204; interdiscursivity 205–6;
introduction 185–6; mapping
dominant and marginal discourses
193–204; overview 186, 193–4;
protective-paternalist 194; reformist
and populist discourses 186–93; in
state policy 196–204; structural-
transformative 195–6; Tamil Nadu
186–90, 196–201
gendered inequalities, socio-economic
development 112–13
gendered institutional contexts: Andhra
Pradesh 170–7; gendered institutional
norms of the state 160–3; introduction
151–2; state feminist bureaucratic
spaces 163–73; strategies, increasing
women’s presence in government
158–9; Tamil Nadu 164–70; women as
elected representatives 154–8; women
in governance structures 152–60
gendered institutional norms 88–93,
160–3
gendered life chances 125–30
Gender Empowerment Measure
(GEM) 112
‘Gender Equality and Development’ 42
‘Gender Equity’ 81
Gender Focal Points 84
gender in civil service 33, 46, 80, 88–96,
103n14, 161, 162, 167, 237, 239
gender inequality 18n17, 244n1
gender justice 67
gender mainstreaming, national
initiatives 1–3, 39–46; changing
institutional culture 93–6; conclusions
100–2; facilitating external gender
expertise 79–83; gender budgeting
83–8; gendered institutional norms
88–93; gender responsiveness
93–6; internal norm change, civil
service 88–96; introduction 75–6;
‘national machinery’ development
76–9; overview 88; subject, objects,
agents 96–100; see also disability
mainstreaming; mainstreaming
women
Gender Planning Training Project
(GPTP) 45–6, 93, 94
gender responsiveness 67–9, 93–6, 98
Ghosh, J. 116, 143n14, 178n4
Girl Child Protection Scheme 196, 202
girls’ education 69, 103n19
global discourses of development 46n3
Index 251
GoAP see Government of Andhra
Pradesh (GoAP)
Goetz, A. M. 152
GOI see Department of Personnel and
Training
GoTN see Government of Tamil Nadu
(GoTN)
Government of Andhra Pradesh
(GoAP) 177n3, 178n7 see also Andhra
Pradesh
governance feminism 7
Government of Tamil Nadu (GoTN)
127, 152, 161 see also Tamil Nadu
Green Revolution 46n4
Grewal, I. 33
Gupta, A. 47n12
Hafner-Burton, E. 42
Halley, J. 7
Hameed, Syeda 82–3
Hanson, A. H. 29, 47n11
Harriss, J. 46n3
Heptullah, Najma 77
Hindu Code Bill 28–9
Hindu nationalism, rise of 38, 48n23
Hirway, I. 81
honour, notion of 132
honorariums 153
‘hostile’ sexism 194
Hota Committee 92, 103n17
‘Human and Social Development’ 65
human development 112
implementation, policy feedback 48n19
inclusion 81–2, 91
Indian Administrative Service (IAS):
bureaucratic workers 217; debates and
perspectives 32; gendered institutional
norms 89–91, 93, 160–3, 167;
institutionalised culture 95; lateral
entry into 80; transfers 178n11
Indian Institute of Public
Administration 143n6
Indira Kranthi Patham (IKP) scheme
171, 186, 203
Industrial Policy 187
inequality see equity and equality
infanticide 127–8, 196
Institute of Development Studies (IDS) 94
institutions: changes in 3, 41; culture
93–6, 98; gender and development
analysis 5–8, 29–34; gendered norms
89–93
252 Index
Integrated Child Development Scheme/
Services (ICDS) 47n12, 78, 153,
176, 191 see also Nutritious Meal
Programme
Integrated Rural Development
Programme 164
internal norm change, civil service:
changing institutional culture
93–6; gendered institutional norms
88–93; gender responsiveness 93–6;
overview 88
International Conference on Population
and Development 31
International Fund for Agriculture
(IFAD) 166, 168–70, 198–9, 218, 221
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
27, 29
International Women’s Day 77–8, 221
‘intersectionality’ 8, 17n3, 73n8
‘intersectoral convergence’ 78, 167, 168,
171, 176, 200, 204, 206, 214, 216, 218,
228, 237, 239
intersex persons 87
intra-household resource distribution 28
invisibility, in development policy70
Ish, Veena 160
Jahan, R. 39, 42
Jamuna, P. 174, 179n23, 219
Jandhyala, Kameswari 226
Janmabhoomi programme 193
Jayalalithaa, J. 131, 134, 136, 154, 157,
167, 189, 221, 237
Jebaraj, Valamarthi 167
Jeevan, Geetha 157
Jeffrey, P. 26
Jeffrey, R. 26
Jenkins, R. 35, 48n18
Jesudurai, Padmini 165
Jeyaranjan, J. 118
John, Mary 4
Joint Parliamentary Committee for the
Empowerment of Women 77
Kabeer, N. 7, 33
kalanjiams 230n3
Kalpana, K. 216–17, 241
Kannabiran, K. 138
Karunanidhi, M. 131, 165, 221
Kapadia, K. 108
Karlekar, M. 37
Kaviraj, S. 28
Kennedy, L. 32, 35, 222
Kotiswaran, P. 7
Kumar, T. Vijaya 174, 219
Kushboo (actress) 135
Kuthuhalamma, Gummadi 157
Labour: laws 121, 139; rights 29
Lahiri, Ashok K. 83
Lakshmi, C. S. 132
Lalitha, K. 4
‘laterals’ 36–7
laws vs. attitudes 197
LBS National Academy of
Administration 13, 94, 218
Leela, K. Pushpa 157
left-wing activism 72n2, 136–7
legislative bodies, quotas for women 73n4
liberalisation: debates and perspectives
32, 37; national planning policy 62–4;
reforms, failure of 48n20
liquor, movement against 139–41
literacy: graphics in literature 230n7;
highest 144n23; male-female disparity
144n22; module 103n19; SC/ST
groups 123
Lok Sabha elections 48n24, 77, 155,
189, 222
Lovenduski, J. 7
maanam 132
macroeconomic government policy 88
Madras Presidency 9
Mahalir Thittam 166–9, 176, 178n15,
198–9, 201, 206, 214, 218, 221
Mahapatra, Prasanta 178n12
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural
Employment Guarantee Act (2005)
47n14
Mahila Lok Adalat 173
Mahila Mandal Samakhyas 173, 175,
215, 230n3, 230n10
Mahila Samakhya programme 4, 60, 98,
103n20, 179n17, 225–6, 244n1
Mahila Samatha Society 230n10
mainstreaming women 199, 201, 205, 206
main workers, defined 143n12
manufacturing employment 119
mapping national planning policy
(1990): conclusions 71–2;
contradictions, silences, and exclusions
69–70; Five-Year Plans 64–70;
gender-responsive development 67–9;
historical context 59–60; introduction
58; post-1990 period 60–4

Marchand, M. H. 26
marginal workers 143n12
marriage 13, 89–90, 135, 161–2, 196
Marxist thought 24, 47n6
maternity leave 92, 161
MaThi pledge 169, 230n2
Mathur, K. 32
Matthew, Minnie 160, 178n12
Mazumdar, V. 33, 38, 59, 72n3, 73n4
men as gendered subjects 70
Menon, N. 43–4
MGNREGA 144n20
MGR see Ramachandran, M.R. (MGR)
microfinance institutions (MFIs) 223
Mies, M. 25
Miller, C. 41
Ministry of Human Resource
Development 44
Ministry of Women and Child
Development (MWCD) 44, 63, 75, 78,
81, 96–7, 100, 143n6
minority religious communities 18n8
Mishra, Vasudhra 160, 178n12
Mishra, Y. 88
modernisation theory 24
Mohanty, C. T. 17n3, 26
Mooij, J. 35, 171
Moore, M. 13
Moser, C. 41
mother icon 132
Mukhopadhyay, M. 43
Mukhopadhyay, S. 29
multilevel governance 3–5, 17, 46,
240, 243
Murthy, R. K. 46
Murty, K. R. 192
Mutram 213, 222
MYRADA 169, 230n2
Naidu, Chandrababu 18n13, 35, 138,
140–1, 157, 175, 190, 192–3, 220, 223,
226, 228, 230n9
Nair, Sathi 153, 160
National Academy of Administration
46, 95
National Alliance for Women’s
Organisations (NAWO) 79, 99
National Centre for Gender Training,
Planning and Research 94
National Commission for Women:
debates and perspectives 40, 44;
gendered institutional contexts
165, 171; historical developments
Index 253
102n2; national initiatives in gender
mainstreaming 73n11, 76–8, 99–100;
National Commission for Women Act
(1990) 164; national planning policy
63; resource limitations 77
National Commission for Women Act
(1990) 164
National Commission on Self-Employed
Women 79
National Democratic Alliance 64
National Development Council (NDC)
29, 47n10, 47n17
National Family Health Survey
(NFHS) 120
National Food Security Act (2013)
47n14
National Human Rights
Commission 166
National Institute for Public Policy and
Finance (NIPEP) 83–4
National Institute for Transforming
India 31
national machinery for women 76–9,
100, 163, 235, 239; women’s policy
units’ 176
National Mission for the Empowerment
of Women 75–6, 81, 100
National Perspective Plan for Woman 60
National Planning Commission 79
national planning policy: conclusions
71–2; contradictions, silences, and
exclusions 69–70; Five-Year Plans
64–70; gender-responsive development
67–9; historical context 59–60;
introduction 58; post-1990 period
60–4
National Plan of Action 59
National Policy for the Empowerment
of Women (NPEW): gender budgeting
84; gender mainstreaming 76, 78,
81, 96; national planning policy 66,
68, 72n1
National Policy on Education 60
National Population Policy 31
National Rural Employment Guarantee
Act (NREGA) 17n2
National Rural Employment Guarantee
Scheme (MGNREGA/NREGA) 118
National Rural Livelihoods Mission
179n17
National Sample Survey (NSS)
Organisation 114
Nayar, B. R. 27, 36
254 Index
NDC see National Development
Council (NDC)
Neduncheziyan, Visalakshi 165–6
Nedurumalli, Rajyalakshmi 157
‘needy’ groups 73n10
Nehru, Jawaharlal 35
Nehruvian approach 27–8, 47n5, 61
neo-liberalism 24, 47n9, 62
NITI Aayog 47n10
Noon Meal Scheme 124
NREGA, economic survey 118,
144n20, 199
Nutritious Meal Programme 164–5, 176,
215, 221 see also Integrated Child
Development Scheme/Services (ICDS)
objects: of development 69–71; gender
mainstreaming 96–100
Other Backward Class women 116
Overseas Development
Administration 94
Oxford Poverty and Human
Development Initiative (OPHI) 142n4
Pachouri, Suresh 92
Palanisamy, P. Vijaylakshmi 157
panchayat elections 38, 229n1
Panchayati Raj 103n19, 164, 167, 171;
resistance 48n27
Pandian, S. P. Sarguna 157, 165
Pandianm M. S. S. 131
Parliamentary Committee for the
Empowerment of Women 75–6,
78, 100
Parliamentary Standing Committee
on Human Resources Development
103n11
Parpart, J. L. 26
participants vs. beneficiaries 65–6
participatory approaches 46n2
‘paternalist’ approach 130, 133–5
Patil, Pratibha 77
patriarchal attitude 201
patrilocality 13
Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK) 135
Periyar 135
physically disabled people 178n10
PIU district 179n16
Planning Commission 47n10; data
collection 13, 16; institutions of
development 29–30; mapping national
planning policy 58, 61; national
initiatives in gender mainstreaming
79–82
pluralist class state 34
Pollack, M. A. 42
policy prescriptions vs. policy
problems 205–6
political leadership 35, 36, 42, 96, 135,
219–24
Poongothai (Dr.) 157
poor women, depiction of 72
population policies 30–1, 47n13, 128;
coercive 224; replacement fertility
levels 128
populism: Andhra Pradesh 136–7;
discourses 186–93; gender and socio-
political histories, state politics 136–7;
styles 133–4; subnational policy 136–7
Potter, D. 32–3
poverty-stricken population:
development policy 61–2; education
121; exacerbation 88; gendered
developmental discourses 198;
headcounts 142n4; inter-regional
problem 32; reduction 111–13; SC and
ST households 111
practical vs. strategic gender interests
244n1
pradhan patis 38
Praja Rajyam Party 138
Pranesh, Lakshmi 153
premarital sex 135
producers, women as 58, 66
protective-paternalist discourse 5–8, 185,
194, 198, 201–2, 207, 207n2
Public Distribution System (PDS) 187
Pudhu Vazhvu 168
Rai, S. M. 44, 77
Rajadurai, S. V. 131
Rajakumari, Nannapaneni 172
Rajasthan’s Women’s Development
Programme 145n37
Raju, K. 174
Raju, S. 44–5
Rajya Sabha 77
Ramachandran, Gayathri 178n12
Ramachandran, Janaki 131
Ramachandran, M. G. (MGR)
131–2, 221
Ramachandran, Vimala 98, 103n20
Ramathal, K. M. 165
Rangarajan committee 142n4–142n5
Rangaswamy, Saraswati 165
Rani, Brij 137
Rao, Ch. Rajeshwar 48n20, 136–7
Rao, N.T. Rama 137–8, 157, 201, 220

rape 7, 34, 222, 224 see also violence
against women and girls
Ravindranath, Mary 172
Razavi, S. 41
Recognition for Forest Rights Act
47n14
Recruitment Rules, civil service 89
Reddy, A. Madhava 157
Reddy, Alimineti Uma Madhava 157
Reddy, Kiran Kumar 140
Reddy, Muthulakshmi 154
Reddy, Y.S. Jaganmohan 141
Reddy, Y.S. Rajasekhara 18n13, 138, 140
Reddys caste 145n36
‘reformed-oriented’ states 12
reformist discourses 186–93
regional political parties 18n15
Report of the National Planning
Committee on Women’s Role in the
Planned Economy 59
reproductive health 125–30
reproductive technologies 47n13
reservations for women 38, 93, 139, 154,
178n9
Right to Education Act 47n14
Right to Information 47n14, 80
right-wing women 48n23
Riley, N. E. 31
Rosaiah, K. 140
Roy, T. 25
sameness 39
Saraswati, S. 157
Sarkar, Lotika 73n4
Saxena, R. 245n3
Scheduled Caste (SC) groups 9, 12,
17n6, 18n10, 70, 116, 122–3, 158
Scheduled Tribes and Other
Traditional Forest Dwellers
(Recognition of Forest Rights)
Act (2006) 47n14
Scheduled Tribes (STs) 12, 18n7, 18n11,
70, 116, 122–3, 158
Scott, Catherine V. 26
Scott., J. C. 30
Second Administrative Reforms
Commission 91
segregation, gender71
self-employed women 59, 63
self-help groups (SHG) programmes
4–5, 42, 164, 167–8, 171, 173, 190,
198–200, 204–5
self-reliance 63, 192
Self-Respect Movement 131, 135, 141
Index 255
Sen, Amartya 27, 41, 47n8
senior civil service 80, 88, 94–5, 100,
219, 237
sex-disaggregated data 18n17
sex-selective abortion 197
sexual harassment 34, 90, 161
sexuality 135
SGSY see Swarnajayanti Gram
Swarozgar Yojana
shadow subsidy (unpaid labour) 114
Shah Bano case 60
Sharma, Kalpana 33, 99
Shastri, Lal Bahadur 30, 36–7, 46n4, 94
Shastri, V. 36
Shiva, V. 25
Shramshakti report 59, 78–9
Singh, Manmohan 48n20
Sinha, N. 88
Social Welfare Department 164
Society for the Elimination of Rural
Poverty (SERP): comparisons and
conclusions 176; data collection 14;
gendered developmental discourses
186, 203–5; poverty alleviation
strategy 173–5, 230n9
Solanki, G. 244n2
South Asia Poverty Alleviation
Programme 173
Squires, J. 7, 39, 207, 229
Srinivasulu, K. 230n4
Standing, H. 41
state: co-optation 136–7; feminist
bureaucratic spaces 163–73; as
paternal figure 197; self-representation
15; state-as-facilitator 195; state-like,
and state-affiliated power 7–8
State Commission for Women 165–6,
176, 179n23
State Human Development Report 16,
18n19, 144n19
State Level Bankers Committee 169
state-level machineries: Andhra
Pradesh 170–5; comparative
conclusions, women’s presence in
government 159–60; comparisons
175–6; conclusions 177; gendered
institutional norms of the state
160–3; introduction 151–2; state
feminist bureaucratic spaces 163–73;
strategies, increasing women’s
presence in government 158–9; Tamil
Nadu 164–70; women as elected
representatives 154–8; women in
governance structures 152–8
256 Index
Stephen, F. 46, 48n27
sterilisation 128
strategic vs. practical gender interests
244n1
strategies, increasing women’s presence
in government 158–9
streenidhi 223, 230n9
stridhanam 144n27
Structural Adjustment Programmes
(SAP) 24, 29, 62
structural-transformative discourse 5–8,
185, 195–6, 203
subjectivities 3, 16, 17, 65, 70, 72, 97,
170, 230
subnational policy: Andhra Pradesh
136–7; anti-arrack movement 139–41;
child sex ratios 125–30; comparison of
141; conclusions 141–2; contemporary
electoral politics 137–9; discourses,
populism and cultural nationalism
131–6; education 120–5; employment
113–20; gendered inequalities, socio-
economic development 112–13;
human development 112; introduction
108–9; left-wing agrarian movements
136–7; life chances 125–30; overview
109–11, 130–1; populism 136–7;
poverty reduction 111–13; profile
of gender and development 109–30,
112; reproduction health 125–30;
socio-political histories, state politics
130–41; state co-optation 136–7;
violence against women 125–30
Subrahmanian, R. 33, 43
Subramaniam, M. 134
Subramanian, N. 134, 220
Suri, K. C. 138
‘sustainable development’ 46n1
swadeshi 192
Swaminathan, P. 124
Swamy, A. 133–4, 207n2
Swarnajayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana
(SGSY) 167–8, 170, 175, 179n20,
203, 216
symbolic self-representation, India
state 15
Tamilarasi 157
Tamil Nadu: basic profile of 12; case
selection 9–13; child sex ratios 125–30,
145n29; comparative sex ratios for
127;discourses, populism and cultura
nationalism 131–6; district-wise
maps of 11; diversification 207n5;
economic indicators for 110;
economic survey 144n20; education
124, 120–5; employment 113–20;
gender and development 109–30,
112; gender-based violence in 129;
gendered life chances 125–30; gender
mainstreaming approach 5; GoTN
16; HDI scores 112, 142n3; human
development 112; inequalities, socio-
economic development 112–13; Left
women’s activism 72n2; literacy rates
for 122; multilevel governance 4–5;
populism and cultural nationalism
131–6; poverty 111, 142n5; protective-
paternalist discourse 196; ranking
decline 143n7; regional political
parties 18n15; reproductive health
125–30; sex ratios for 126, 127;
SHGs 230n3; socio-political histories
130–41; state feminist bureaucratic
spaces 164–6; State Human
Development Report 144n19; violence
against women 125–30; women
candidates in state elections 154, 155;
work participation rates and status of
workers 113
Tamil Nadu Corporation for the
Development of Women (TNCDW)
164, 166–70, 176, 207n5, 230n2, 230n4
Tamil Nadu Empowerment and Poverty
Reduction Report 168
Tamil Nadu Essential Services
Maintenance Act (TESMA) 187
Tamil Nadu Human Development
Report 142n1
Tamilttay 132
Tawa Lama-Rewal, S. 178n4
Telangana Assembly election 178n5
Telangana Rashtra Samiti (TRS) 138
Telangana regions 18n9, 136–7
Telangana State Commission for
Women 172
Telugu Desam Party (TDP) 35, 131,
137–8, 140–1, 155, 158
Telugu language 12, 18n12
Tendulkar method, poverty estimate
142n4
thai-kulam 132
Thakur, S. G. 33, 89–90, 160, 162, 241
Thampi, B. V. 34
Think Tank, members 79–83, 99
‘Third World’ women 15, 17n3, 26

Thittam, Mahalir 178n14
Thomas, Prabhakar D. 178n12
Towards Equality report 33, 44, 59–60,
72n3, 78
trade union organising 119
training programmes: civil service 93–6;
debates and perspectives 45–6; male-
biased 48n26
transgender persons 87
‘triangles of empowerment’ 76
True, Jacqui 40
two-child family norm 30–1
‘tyranny of development’ 46n2
UN Decade for Women 41, 59
under-representation of women 160, 177
‘Under Western Eyes’ (Mohanty) 26
UN Development Fund for Women
(UNIFEM): data collection 14;
external gender expertise 79–81;
gender budgeting 84
UN Development Programme (UNDP):
data collection 14; gender training
93; national initiatives in gender
mainstreaming 79
UN Fourth World Conference on
Women 62
UN Human Development Reports
(UNHDRs) 46n1
Union Budget Speech 84
Union Government Minister of State for
Human Resource Development 178n9
United Progresive Alliance 31, 64
unpaid labour: gender budgeting 86–7;
gendered inequalities 43; national
planning policy 66; subnational policy
in context 113–14
UPA social policy 47n14
‘usual status’ (worker): defined 143n13
Valarmathi, B. 157
Van Hollen, C. 128
Varshney, A. 47n9
‘varun vahini’ 139
Vazhndhu Kaattuvom 168
Velugu/IKP: AP Rural Poverty Reduction
Project 179n19–179n20; background
171; elimination of rural poverty 173–5;
federated organizations of 230n10;
gendered developmental discourses
186, 204; MaThi pledge 230n2
Velugu programme 216
‘velvet triangles’ 76
Index 257
Venkataratnam, Tripurana 172
Venkatesh, Nirmala 165
Verloo, Mieke 39–40
Village Organisations (VOs) 173
violence against women and girls 60;
alcohol consumption 139; attitudes
towards 128–9; Dalit movement 222;
external gender expertise 80; gender
budgeting 87; governance feminism 7;
training module 103n19; state profiles
125–30; ‘wife-beating’ 145n33
‘Vishaka guidelines’ 34
Vision 2020 186, 190–1, 201–3, 206
‘weaker’ sections of society 61–2
Weedon, C. 163
Weiner, M. 91
women: as catalysts and producers
65–6; compartmentalisation of issues
71; control over their sexuality 132;
de facto heads of family 200–1;
depiction of 71–2; developmental
needs categorisation 69; as elected
representatives 154–8; in governance
structures 152–8; homogeneous interests
38; increasing presence in government
158–9; movement issues 48n23, 60;
‘national machinery’ for 76–9; as objects
of development 69–70, 211; reservations
for 38, 93, 139, 178n9; under-
representation 160, 177; undervaluing
18n17; working in informal sectors 59
Women and Development (WAD)
25–6, 43
Women in Development (WID) 25–6,
41, 43
‘Women’s Component Plan’ (WCP) 68,
85, 87
women’s development phase 44
Women’s Indian Association 169
women-specific interventions 68–9
Women’s Reservation Bill 154–5, 157–8
Women’s Welfare Committee 158
Women’s Welfare Department 170
‘work’ activities 18n17
Worker; NSSO classification 143n14
working conditions 59, 66, 113, 118–20
World Bank 189, 192, 203, 223
World Bank Structural Adjustment
Policies 29
World Development Report 42
Yew, Lee Kuan 47n8