THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Independence of the Judiciary

1. The SC is a constitutional body. It cannot be abolished nor may its membership or the
manner of its meetings be changed by mere legislation. [VIII, 4(2)]
2. The members of the SC may not be removed except by impeachment. (XI, 2)
3. The SC may not be deprived of its minimum original and appellate jurisdiction as
prescribed in Art. VIII, Sec. 5. (VIII, 2)
4. The appellate jurisdiction of the SC may not be increased by law without its advice and
concurrence. (VI, 30)
5. Appointees to the judiciary are now nominated by the JBC and longer subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. (VIII, 9)
6. The SC now has administrative supervision over all lower courts and their personnel.
(VIII, 6)
7. The SC has exclusive power to discipline judges of lower courts. (VIII, 11)
8. The members of the SC and all lower courts have security of tenure, which cannot be
undermined by a law reorganizing the judiciary. (VIII, 2)
9. They shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions. (VIII, 12)
10. The salaries of the judges may not be reduced during their continuance in office. (VIII,
10)
11. The judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. (VIII, 3)
12. The SC alone may initiate rules of court. [VIII, 5(5)]
13. Only the SC may order the temporary detail of judges. [VIII, 5(3)]
14. The SC can appoint all officials and employees of the judiciary. [VIII, 5(6)]

Judicial Power
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

- Lower courts is to be understood as referring to all other courts below the SC

- The SC is the only constitutional court, all the lower courts being of statutory creation
- Lower courts:
- CA, RTCs, Family Courts, MetCs, MTCs, MCTCs, CTA
- Special statutory court: Sandiganbayan
- Shari’a Courts
- As the Constitution speaks only of one SC, it is not competent for the legislature to
create even a temporary SC to sit in special cases
- Traditional concept of judicial power: To settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable
 - To determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government
- Broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was
before forbidden territory, the discretion of the political departments of the
government
- The power to review even the political decisions of the executive and the legislature and
to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave
abuse of discretion
- When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination as to
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned
- Judicial power not restricted in Art. VIII Sec.1-5
- Sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
Pres or VP (VII, 4)
- The power of the Court to review on certiorari the decision, order, or ruling of the
COMELEC and COA [IX(A), 7]
- May review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of
the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof (VII, 18)
- In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis for the extension of martial law, the
Court needs only to assess and evaluate the written reports of the government agencies
tasked in enforcing and implementing martial law
- Judicial power may be exercised where there are serious allegations that a law has
infringed the Constitution. This duty includes the power to set aside acts of government,
even if not tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
- The question whether any part or instrumentality of the government had authority or had
abused its authority is not a political question.
- Judicial power includes the power of the courts to alter, modify, or set aside their
decisions before they become final and unalterable and the inherent power to amend
and control their processes and orders to make them conformable to law and justice
- Continuing authority of the SC to enforce its final decisions because the execution of its
decisions is but an integral part of its adjudicative function
- May issue a writ of continuing mandamus to ensure compliance with its decision
- Judicial power provides the SC with the basic authority to exercise this judicial power as
an act of social justice and on the basis of equity and compassion, and provide reliefs
otherwise not expressly prescribed in laws.

Jurisdiction
SECTION 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over
cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
 - Jurisdiction is the authority by which courts take cognizance of and decide cases, the
legal right by which judges exercise their authority.
- Although the appellate jurisdiction of the SC may be increased by law, this may not be
done now except upon advice and with the concurrence of the SC itself (VI, 30)
- No law may be passed depriving it of the power to review a life sentence, for example,
as this comes under its minimum appellate jurisdiction, which may not be reduced.

Appointments
- To depoliticize our courts of justices, ensure the choice of competent judges, and fill
existing vacancies as soon as possible so as not to unduly disrupt judicial proceedings

SECTION 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed
by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council
for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from
the submission of the list.

- The reason for requiring at least 3 nominees for every vacancy is to give the President
enough leeway in the exercise of his discretion when he makes his appointment

Qualifications
- Every member of the judiciary be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity and
independence [VIII, 7(3)]
- To improve the quality of the judiciary by admitting thereto only deserving persons who
can dispense justice wisely and impartially

SECTION 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower
collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme
Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more a judge
of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.

- May not be reduced or increased by the Congress through ordinary legislation

(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person may
be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the
Philippine Bar.

- It is expressly permitted for the Congress to add to the constitutional qualifications, the
same being only minimum requirements
- Natural-born citizenship is not required for judges of courts lower than collegiate courts
- 5y of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to
second-level courts
The Judicial and Bar Council
- Takes the place of the Commission on Appointments in the matter of judicial
appointments
- Screens such appointments and not the Commission

SECTION 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice,
and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated
Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the
private sector.
(2) The regular Members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of
four years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first
appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of
law for three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the private sector
for one year.
(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and
shall keep a record of its proceedings.
(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be
determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the
appropriations for the Council.
(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the
Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to
it.

- The Congress may have only 1 representative in the JBC, and not 2 representatives, or
one from each House, with each having only ½ vote
- A rotational scheme similar to that of the Senate and the Constitutional Commissions is
proved for the Council
- Placed under the supervision of the SC
- When the policies of the JBC are being attacked, then the Court, through its supervisory
authority over the JBC, has the duty to inquire about the matter and ensure that the JBC
complies with its own rules
- In appointing the CJ or the presiding judge of any of the lower collegiate courts, or any
judge for that matter, the Pres is not bound by the seniority rule

SECTION 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall
not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

- Judges may not be appointed in an acting/temporary capacity as this would undermine

the independence of the judiciary, temporary appointments being essentially revocable
at will
Fiscal Autonomy
SECTION 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not
be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after
approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.

- To strengthen the independence of the judiciary

- To remove the courts from the mercy and caprice, not to say vindictiveness, of the
legislature when it considers the general appropriations bill
- Contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the
wisdom and dispatch that their needs require
- Power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not
exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the
government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or
prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions
- Freedom from outside control
- The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the SC allocate and utilize
the funds appropriated for their operations is violative of its independence and the
separation of powers
- No condition to fund releases to it may be imposed and that they should be given priority
in the release of their approved appropriations over all other agencies not similarly
vested when there is a revenue shortfall
- The need to secure the approval of the Pres or the DBM before granting new or
additional benefits does not cover agencies enjoying fiscal autonomy under the
Constitution

Composition of the Supreme Court

SECTION 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven
Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

- The maximum was at 15 to enable the Court to cope more effectively with its mounting
backlog of cases
- It may now meet not only en banc but in 2, 3 or 5 divisions, and any vacancy in the Court
must be filled within 90d from its occurrence
- The number of members of the full Court and of the divisions, which is fixed by the
Constitution and may not be changed by statute

En banc Cases
(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or
law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the
Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality,
application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances,
and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
 - Treaty is an international agreement concluded between states in written form and
governed by intl law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related
instruments and whatever its particular designation
- Intl agreements may be in the form of:
1. Treaties that require legislative concurrence after executive ratification
2. Executive agreements that are similar to treaties, except that they do not require
legislative concurrence and are usually less formal and deal with a narrower
range of subject matters than treaties
- Although treaties become valid and effective upon the Senate’s concurrence, their
validity would ultimately be subject to the determination by the SC, in exercise of its
jurisdiction, as to whether or not they contravene the Constitution
- The Court may void executive and legislative acts such as treaties when they violate the
Constitution
- As few as 5 members of the Court can declare any of the measures above
unconstitutional
- All decisions and actions in Court en banc cases shall be made up upon the
concurrence of the majority of the members of the Court who actually took part in the
deliberation on the issues or issues involved and voted on them
- Regardless of how close the voting is, so long as there is concurrence of the majority of
the members of the en banc who actually took part in the deliberations of the case, a
decision garnering only 8 votes out of 15 members is still a decision of the SC en banc
and must be respected as such
- The SC sitting en banc is not an appellate court vis-a-vis its Divisions, and it exercises
no appellate jurisdiction over the latter.

Division Cases
(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case
and voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at least three of such Members.
When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no
doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division
may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.

- When the necessary vote cannot be had in division, the case shall be referred to the
Court en banc and decided in accordance with its own rules
- There now 3 divisions of the SC with 5 members each
- The act of the head of a collegial body cannot be considered as that of the entire body
itself

Requisites of Judicial Inquiry

1. There must be an actual case or controversy
2. The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party
3. The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity
 4. The decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the
case itself.

Effects of a Declaration of Unconstitutionality

Orthodox view: an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no right; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, inoperative, as if it has not
been passed. No one may thereafter invoke it nor may the courts be permitted to apply it in
subsequent cases.
Modern view: the court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not annul or
repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and
determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute had no existence. It does not strike the
statute from statute books; it does not repeal, supersede, revoke, or annul the statute.

- The orthodox view has been applied by our SC

- General rule is that an unconstitutional law is void, the doctrine of operative fact as an
exception.

Doctrine of operative fact

- Applies only as a matter of equity and fair play
- It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a
statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot always be ignored.
- Applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on
those who have relied on the invalid law.
- The unconstitutional law remains unconstitutional, but the effects of the unconstitutional
law, prior to its judicial declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity
and fair play.
- Cannot be undone by the mere subsequent declaration of the nullity of the law or its
interpretation; thus, the declaration can only have a prospective application
- Also applies to executive acts subsequently declared as invalid
- Does not apply to board resolutions because they are not laws, executive acts or like
issuances which have the effect of law
- A judicial declaration of invalidity may not necessarily obliterate all the effects and
consequences of a void act prior to such declaration

Theory of Relative Constitutionality

- The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere
comparison of its provisions with applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the
statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its
application to another
- A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered
circumstances
- A provision of law, initially valid, can become subsequently unconstitutional, on the
ground that its continued operation would violate the equal protection of the law.
 - When a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the Constitution,
the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar
law or provision. It remains as such unless circumstances have so changed as to
warrant a reverse conclusion.

Partial Unconstitutionality
- Courts hesitate to declare a law totally unconstitutional and, as long as it is possible, will
salvage the valid portions thereof in order to give effect to the legislative will.
- A declaration of partial unconstitutionality will be valid only if two conditions concur:
1. That the legislature is willing to retain the valid portions even if the rest of the
statute is declared illegal. It is expressed in the separability clause.
2. That the valid portions can stand independently as a separate statute. If the valid
portion is so far independent of the invalid portion, it may be fair to presume that
the legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it could
constitutionally do so.

Powers of the Supreme Court

1. Original Jurisdiction
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus.

- Certiorari, mandamus, prohibition: the questions raised are questions of jurisdiction or

grave abuse of discretion
- Quo warranto: title of the respondent
- Petition for habeas corpus is a special proceeding
- The nature and importance of the issues raised may warrant direct resort to the SC

Certiorari: when any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or
in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal, nor
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
- Alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings, as the law requires, of such tribunal, board or officer and
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

Prohibition: when the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person, whether
exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction,or with
grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law
- Alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
defendant to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein or
otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
Mandamus: when any tribunal, corporation, board, or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust,
or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to
which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law
- Alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be
done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent

Quo warranto: an action for usurpation of office or against a public officer who does or suffers
an act which, by the provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office or
against an association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally
incorporated or without lawful authority to so act.

Writ of habeas corpus: shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which
any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld
from the person entitled thereto.

- In the absence of special reasons, the parties cannot disregard the doctrine of the
hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court despite
the fact that the same is available in the lower tribunals in the exercise of their original
concurrent jurisdiction.
- The SC will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained
in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases
of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary
remedy
- Immediate resort to SC may be allowed when any of the ff grounds are present:
1. When genuine issues of constitutionality are raised that must be addressed
immediately
2. When the case involves transcendental importance
3. When the case is novel
4. When the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this Court
5. When time is of the essence
6. When the subject of review involves acts of a constitutional organ
7. When there is no other plain, speedy adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law
8. When the petition includes questions that may affect public welfare, public policy,
or demanded by the broader interest of justice
9. When the order complained of was a patent nullity
10. When the appeal was considered as an inappropriate remedy
- Where the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court has the
discretion to brush aside technicalities of procedure.
Principle of Judicial Courtesy
- Applies only to lower courts in instances where, even if there is no writ of preliminary
injunction or TRO issued by a higher court, it would be proper for a lower court to
suspend its proceedings for practical and ethical considerations
- Where there is a strong probability that the issues before the higher court would be
rendered moot and moribound as a result of the continuation of the proceedings in the
lower court or court of origin.

Principle of hierarchy of courts

- Recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction
with a higher court
- Transcendental importance standard should be limited in its use to exemptions from the
application of the hierarchy of courts principle
- The character of the funds or other assets involved in the case
- The presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory
prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the govt
- The lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in the
questions being raised

2. Appellate Jurisdiction
2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is
in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty
imposed in relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

- Appeal is as a general rule a matter of statutory right entirely dependent upon the
discretion or policy of the lawmaking body
- The appellate jurisdiction of the SC is irreducible and may not be withdrawn from it by
the Congress
- Appeals allowed in this section are from the final judgments and decrees only of lower
courts, or judicial tribunals. Administrative decisions are not included.
- On questions of facts, it is entirely up to the legislature to determine whether or not
appeals from such administrative decisions may be allowed.
- Where it comes to questions of law, it has been held that courts of justice possess an
underlying and inherent power to scrutinize the same as decided by administrative
agencies.
 - A decision rendered by a lower court without or in excess of jurisdiction is a total nullity.
Hence, it may be questioned at any stage of the proceeding, even on appeal before the
SC, unless the appellant is in estoppel.
- The SC is guaranteed appellate jurisdiction where the case involves only an error or
question of law
- Appealed cases involving mixed questions of fact and law are now under the jurisdiction
of the CA
- Lower courts can decide on constitutional questions, subject to review by the SC
- RTCs have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of statutes,
EOs, PDs, and other issuances
- Sandiganbayan has the authority to pass upon the constitutionality of a statute
- CTA has undoubted jurisdiction to pass upon the constitutionality or validity of a tax law
or regulation when raised by the taxpayer as a defense in disputing or contesting an
assessment or claiming a refund

3. Temporary Assignment of Judges

(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require.
Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge
concerned.

- Vests the power to temporarily assign judges of inferior courts directly in the SC and no
longer in the executive authorities
- To minimize the pernicious practice of the rigodon de jueces, or the transfer of judges at
will to suit the motivations of the chief exec
- To arrange for judges with clogged dockets to be assisted by their less busy colleagues,
or to provide for the replacement of the regular judge who may not be expected to be
impartial in the decision of particular cases

4. Change of Venue or Place of Trial

(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

- People v. Gutierrez
When the trial of the case was moved from Ilocos S. to Baguio City, the said witnesses
lost their inhibitions and gave the needed testimony that led to the conviction of the
defendants. It was the consensus that such conviction would not have been possible
had the case been tried in the regular venue
- People v. Pilotin
It was the accused who moved that his trial be transferred from Vigan, on the ground
that his life was in danger there. The motion was granted.
- This power may also be exercised in civil cases
 5. Rule-making Power

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved
by the Supreme Court.

- Pursuant to its constitutional rule-making power, the Court promulgated new sets of rules
which effectively increase its original and concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and the
CA
1. Rule on the Writ of Amparo
2. Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data
3. Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
- The rules must also provide for a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, as a remedy against the worsening problem of delay in the
administration of justice. This same policy underlines the reglementary periods for
deciding cases under Art. VIII, Sec. 15.
- Rules of procedure may be modified at any time and become effective at once, so long
as the change does not affect vested rights. It may be given retroactive effect.
- The rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the SC

Writ of Amparo
- It is preventive when it seeks to stop the impunity in committing offenses that violates a
person’s right to live and be free
- It is curative when it facilitates subsequent punishment or perpetrators through an
investigation and action
- Either prevents a threat from becoming an actual violation against a person, or cures the
violation of a person’s right through investigation and punishment
- The Court’s role is merely to determine whether an enforced disappearance has taken
place; to determine who is responsible or accountable; and to define and impose the
appropriate remedies to address the disappearance

Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases

- Writ of kalikasan
1. There is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced
and healthful ecology
2. The actual of threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or private individual or entity
 3. The actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental
damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of
inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces

Writ of Habeas Data

- A procedure designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age
- A judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational
privacy of individuals
- To protect a person’s right to control information regarding himself, particularly in the
instances where such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to
achieve unlawful ends
- There must be a showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim
- A remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party
- An independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a form to enforce
one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy

Limitations on the rule-making power of the SC

1. The rules must be uniform for all courts of the same grade
2. Must not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights

6. Appointment of Court Personnel

(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.

- Appointments made by the SC are required to be in accordance with the Civil Service
Law

7. Administrative Supervision of Courts

SECTION 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the
personnel thereof.

- It is only the SC than can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all
laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation
thereof
- Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed
before it referred to the SC for determination as to whether an administrative aspect is
involved therein
- Administrative jurisdiction over a court employee belongs to the SC, regardless of
whether the offense was committed before or after employment in the judiciary
 - Entitles the SC to regulate foreign travels of judges of lower courts and court personnel
- Includes the authority to discipline a lawyer since he is in fact an officer of the court, and
like the court, itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice

Tenure of Judges
SECTION 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office
during good behavior until they reached the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to
discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members
who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

- Judges cannot be removed except for cause, which includes inability to discharge the
duties of their office
- The members of the judiciary may be removed only after charges have been filed and
proved against them in a proper administrative proceeding conducted or ordered by the
SC
- Judges of lower courts includes justices of the Sandiganbayan

Section 2(2). No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security
of tenure of its Members.

Consultations of the Court

SECTION 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for decision en
banc or in division shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a Member for
the writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice
shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon the
parties. Any Member who took no part, or dissented, or abstained from a decision or resolution
must state the reason therefor. The same requirements shall be observed by all lower collegiate
courts.

- The SC is required to reach its conclusions after an exchange of ideas and full
deliberation among its members
- The primary purpose of a collegiate court is precisely for the most exhaustive
deliberation before a conclusion is reached
- A separate opinion is required from any dissenting justice, who should state the reasons
for his dissent
- A justice who takes no part or abstains must now also explain his non-participation as it
is not permitted for a member to refuse to accept except for valid reasons
- The certification is intended as an added guaranty that the consultation requirement will
be complied with by the court.
- A decision becomes binding only after it is validly promulgated
- Court deliberations are generally considered to be privileged communication, making it
one of the exceptions to the constitutional right to information.
Decisions of the Court
SECTION 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be
refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.

- It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it was
decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions
of the court
- The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a higher court, if
permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed.
- The decision rendered makes clear why either party prevailed under the applicable law
to the established facts
- This rule is applicable only to a decision, which is described as a judgment rendered
after the presentation of proof or on the basis of a stipulation of facts
- As long as decisions are complete, clear and concise, there would be no breach of the
constitutional mandate
- Decisions with a full exposition of the facts and the law upon which they are based,
particularly if they originate from the SC, are useful references for bar and bench alike,
not to mention law students.
- Minute resolutions are issued for the prompt dispatch of the actions of the Court
- Sec. 14 does not apply to decisions in administrative proceedings. Said decisions are
however, still subject to the requirements of due process
- Memorandum decisions, which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of
law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals, are not violative of due process
- Sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial proceedings to
avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of
justice.
- Doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a
court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in
all later suits on all points and matters determined in the former suit
- Principle of conclusiveness of judgment: bars the relitigation in a second case of a
fact or question already settled in a previous case
- Law of the case doctrine: whatever is irrevocably established as the controlling legal
rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of
the case so long as the facts on which the legal rule or decision was predicated continue
to be the facts of the case before the court
- Doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere: to adhere to precedents, and not to
unsettle things which are established. Once a question of law has been and examined
and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument
- Doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment: once a judgment has
become final and executory, it may no longer be modified in any respect
- To avoid delay in the administration of justice
- To put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors
 - exceptions:
1. The correction of clerical errors
2. The so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party
3. Void judgments
4. Whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision that
render its execution unjust and inequitable
- Nunc pro tunc: the object of judgment is one placing in proper form on the record the
judgment that had been previously rendered, to make it speak the truth

Salaries of Judges
SECTION 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their
salary shall not be decreased.

- If circumstances warrant, even the constitutional salaries of the CJ and the assoc
justices of the SC, and more so the compensation of judges of lower courts, may be
raised by the legislature

Periods for Decision

SECTION 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be
decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court,
and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and
three months for all other lower courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing
of the last pending, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.
(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by
the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to
the record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a
decision or resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period.
(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice
to such responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or
resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determination, without further delay.

- Simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases

- The above provision of the applicable periods for decision is mandatory
- For the prevention of needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial
business
- The failure to decide even a single case within the required period constitutes gross
inefficiency that merits administrative sanction
- If a judge is unable to comply with the period for deciding cases or matters, he can, for
good reasons, ask for an extension.
- Although decision within the max period is now mandatory, failure to arrive at the same
will not divest the court of jurisdiction, without prejudice to any responsibility that may
attach to the judge
Annual Report
SECTION 16. The Supreme Court shall, within thirty days from the opening of each regular
session of the Congress, submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on the
operations and activities of the Judiciary.

- Can be the basis of appropriate legislation and govt policies intended to improve the
administration of justice and strengthen the independence of the judiciary

1. MARBURY V. MADISON – 1 CRANCH 137 [1803]

FACTS: On his last day in office, President John Adams named forty-two justices of the peace
and sixteen new circuit court justices for the District of Columbia under the Organic Act. The
Organic Act was an attempt by the Federalists to take control of the federal judiciary before
Thomas Jefferson took office. The commissions were signed by President Adams and sealed by
acting Secretary of State John Marshall (who later became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
and author of this opinion), but they were not delivered before the expiration of Adams’s term as
president. Thomas Jefferson refused to honor the commissions, claiming that they were invalid
because they had not been delivered by the end of Adams’s term. William Marbury (P) was an
intended recipient of an appointment as justice of the peace. Marbury applied directly to the
Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of mandamus to compel Jefferson’s Secretary of
State, James Madison (D), to deliver the commissions. The Judiciary Act of 1789 had granted
the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus to any courts appointed, or
persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.

ISSUES:
1. Does Marbury have a right to the commission? (YES)
2. Does the law grant Marbury a remedy? (YES)
3. Does the Supreme Court have the authority to review acts of Congress and determine
whether they are unconstitutional and therefore void? (YES but not in the instant case)
4. Can Congress expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction beyond
what is specified in Article III of the Constitution? (NO)
5. Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus? (NO)

RULING:
1. Yes. Marbury has a right to the commission. The order granting the commission takes
effect when the Executive’s constitutional power of appointment has been exercised, and the
power has been exercised when the last act required from the person possessing the power has
been performed. The grant of the commission to Marbury became effective when signed by
President Adams.
2. Yes. The law grants Marbury a remedy. The very essence of civil liberty certainly
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives
an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection. Where a specific duty
is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, the
individual who considers himself injured has a right to resort to the law for a remedy. The
President, by signing the commission, appointed Marbury a justice of the peace in the District of
Columbia. The seal of the United States, affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, is conclusive
testimony of the verity of the signature, and of the completion of the appointment. Having this
legal right to the office, he has a consequent right to the commission, a refusal to deliver which
is a plain violation of that right for which the laws of the country afford him a remedy.
3. Yes. The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and determine
whether they are unconstitutional and therefore void. It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial
Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of
necessity, expound and interpret the rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Court must
decide on the operation of each. If courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is
superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must
govern the case to which they both apply.
4. No. Congress cannot expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction
beyond what is specified in Article III of the Constitution. The Constitution states that “the
Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the
Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.” If it had been intended to leave it in the
discretion of the Legislature to apportion the judicial power between the Supreme and inferior
courts according to the will of that body, this section is mere surplusage and is entirely without
meaning. If Congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction where the
Constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and original jurisdiction where the
Constitution has declared it shall be appellate, the distribution of jurisdiction made in the
Constitution, is form without substance.
5. No. The Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus.
To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate
jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction. It is the
essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause
already instituted, and does not create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be
directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper is, in effect, the
same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and is therefore a matter of original
jurisdiction.

2. SANTIAGO V. BAUTISTA – 32 SCRA 188 [1970]

FACTS: The graduation exercises in Sero Elementary School were set for May 21, 1965. But
three days before the graduation day, the “third placer” Teodoro Santiago, Jr., represented by
his mother, and with his father as counsel, sought the invalidation of the “ranking of honor
students”. They filed a civil case in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato. The petitioners argue
that Teodoro Santiago, Jr. had been a consistent honor pupil from Grade I to Grade V. Petitioner
argues that the “Committee on the Rating of Student for Honor” violated the Service Manual for
Teachers of the Bureau of Public Schools and that there are direct and circumstantial matters
wherein the respondents have exercised grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners, during the
pendency of the suit, prayed that the school set aside the final list of honor students in Grade VI
but the lower court in its order of May 20, 1965 denied the prayer. The graduation exercises
proceeded with the same protested list of honor students. Respondents filed a motion to
dismiss the petition on the grounds (1) that the action for certiorari was improper, and (2) that
even assuming the propriety of the action, the question brought before the court had already
become academic. This was granted by the court.

ISSUE: Whether the Committee on the Ratings of Students for Honor may exercise judicial
function in this case? (NO) If it does exercise judicial function, is it grave abuse of discretion?
(NO)

RULING: No. The Committee on the Ratings of Students does not exercise judicial function. A
judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers; the exercise of judicial function
is the doing of something in the nature of the action of the court. In this jurisdiction certiorari is
a special civil action instituted against 'any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial
functions.' (Section 1, Rule 67.) In order that a special civil action of certiorari may be invoked
in this jurisdiction the following circumstances must exist:

1. that there must be a specific controversy involving rights of persons or property and said
controversy is brought before a tribunal, board or officer for hearing and determination of their
respective rights and obligations.
2. the tribunal, board, or officer before whom the controversy is brought must have the
power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision on the controversy
construing and applying the laws to that end
3. the tribunal, board, or officer must pertain to that branch of the sovereign power which
belongs to the judiciary, or at least, which does not belong to the legislative or executive
department.

It will be gleaned that before tribunal board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts,
it is necessary that there be a law that give rise to some specific rights of persons or property
under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing
therefrom is brought, in turn, before the tribunal, board or officer clothed with power and
authority to determine what that law is and thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of the
contending parties. As pointed out by appellees, however, there is nothing on record about any
rule of law that provides that when teachers sit down to assess the individual merits of their
pupils for purposes of rating them for honors, such function involves the determination of what
the law is and that they are therefore automatically vested with judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. Worse still, this Court has not even been appraised by appellant of the pertinent
provisions of the Service Manual of Teachers for Public Schools appellees allegedly violated in
the composition of the committee they constituted thereunder, and, in the performance of that
committee's duties.

For discussion purposes:

1. It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what the law
is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever
an officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts
judicially
2. "Judicial power" implies the construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights. It
includes the power to hear and determine the rights of persons or property by arbitrating
between adversaries in specific controversies at the instance of a party thereto; but not
everyone who may hear and determine has judicial power. The term "judicial power" does not
necessarily include the power to hear and determine a matter that is not in the nature of a suit or
action between the parties.
3. If the matter, in respect to which it is exercised, belongs to either of the two last-named
departments of government, it is not judicial. As to what is judicial and what is not seems to be
better indicated by the nature of a thing, than its definition.
4. As to failure to attach in the petition, It might be true, as pointed out by appellant, that he
received a copy of the programme of the graduation exercises held by the Sero Elementary
School in the morning of the very day of that graduation exercises, implying that he could not
have attached then a copy thereof (to show the decision of the committee of teachers in the
ranking of students complained of) to his petition.

The stubborn fact remains, however, that the appellant had known of such decision of the said
committee of teachers much earlier, as shown by the circumstance that according to him, even
before the filing of his petition with the lower court on the 19th of May, 1965, he had personally
appealed the said committee's decision with various higher authorities of the abovenamed
school, who merely passed the buck to each other. Moreover, appellant mentions in his petition
various other documents or papers — as the Service Manual for Teachers allegedly violated by
appellees in the constitution of their committee; altered grading sheets; and erasures in his
Grade I certificate — which appellant never bothered to attach to his petition. There could be no
doubt then that he miserably failed to comply with the requirement of Rule 65 above-mentioned.
With this conclusion, it is no longer necessary to pass upon the other two errors assigned by
appellant.

3. NOBLEJAS V. TEEHANKEE –23 SCRA 405 [1968]

FACTS: Antonio Noblejas, herein petitioner, was the duly appointed and confirmed
Commissioner of Land Registration. Under the terms provided in Republic Act No. 1151, the
said Commissioner is entitled to the same compensation, emoluments and privileges as those
of a judge of the Court of First Instance. On March 7, 1968, respondent Secretary of Justice
sent to the petitioner a letter requiring him to explain in writing why no disciplinary action should
be taken against petitioner for "approving or recommending approval of subdivision,
consolidation and consolidated-subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess of the areas
covered by the original titles." Noblejas answered and apprised the Secretary of Justice that, as
he enjoyed the rank, privileges, emoluments and compensation of a Judge of the Court of First
Instance, he could only be suspended and investigated in the same manner as a Judge of the
Courts of First Instance, and, therefore, the papers relative to his case should be submitted to
the Supreme Court, for action thereon conformably to section 67 of the Judiciary Act (R. A. No.
296) and Revised Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
On March 17, 1968, petitioner Noblejas received a communication signed by the Executive
Secretary, "by authority of the President", whereby, based on "finding that a prima facie case
exists against you for gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to the public interest", petitioner
was "hereby suspended, upon receipt hereof, pending investigation of the above charges."
On March 18, 1968, petitioner applied to this Court, reiterating the contentions advanced in his
letter to the Secretary of Justice, claiming lack of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion, and
praying for restraining writs. In their answer respondents admit the facts but denied that
petitioner, as Land Registration Commissioner, exercises judicial functions, or that the petitioner
may be considered a Judge of First Instance within the purview of the Judiciary Act and Revised
Rules of Court 140; that the function of investigating charges against public officers is
administrative or executive in nature; that the Legislature may not charge the judiciary with
non-judicial functions or duties except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial
duties, as it would be in violation of the principle of the separation of powers.

ISSUE: Is the Commissioner of Land Registration, who enjoys the same benefits as a Judge of
the Court of First Instance, subject to the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court? (NO)

RULING: The Supreme Court of the Philippines and its members should not and cannot be
required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or
connected with the administration of judicial functions. There is no inherent power in the
Executive or Legislative to charge the Judiciary with administrative functions except when
reasonable incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties. The judiciary cannot give decisions
which are merely advisory, nor can it exercise or participate in the exercise of functions which
are essentially legislative or administrative.

As Commissioner of Land Registration, Noblejas had administrative or executive functions, not

judicial. Even the Resolutions on consultas that he signs cannot be said to be judicial rulings. In
fact, the SC held that the resolution of consultas is but a minimal portion of Noblejas's
administrative or executive functions and merely incidental to the latter.

Other Executive officials enjoy the same privileges as officers of the court. The Solicitor
General, for example, has the rank and privileges of a Justice of the Court of Appeals. Despite
this, the SolGen remains under the disciplinary authority of the President. If the law had really
intended to include the general grant of “rank and privileges equivalent to Judges”, the right to
be investigated and be suspended or removed only by the Supreme Court, then such grant of
privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the doctrine of separation of powers
because it would charge the Supreme Court with an administrative function of supervisory
control over executive officials, simultaneously reducing pro tanto, the control of the Chief
Executive over such officials.

As such, RA 1151 while conferring the same privileges as those of a judge, did not include and
was not intended to include, the right to demand investigation by the Supreme Court, and to be
suspended or removed only upon the Court’s recommendation. Said rights would be violative of
the Constitution. The suspension of Noblejas by the ES valid.

4. MALAGA V. PENACHOS – 213 SCRA 516 [1992]

FACTS: This controversy involves the extent and applicability of P.D. 1818, which prohibits any
court from issuing injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects of the government. The
Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards
Committee (PBAC) caused the publication in the November 25, 26, 28, 1988 issues of the
Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the construction of a Micro Laboratory Building at
ISCOF. Petitioners Maria Elena Malaga and Josieleen Najarro, respectively doing business
under the name of B. E. Construction and Best Built Construction, submitted their
pre-qualification documents at two o'clock in the afternoon of December 2, 1988. Petitioner Jose
Occena submitted his own PRE-Cl on December 5, 1988. All three of them were not allowed to
participate in the bidding because their documents were considered late, having been submitted
after the cutoff time of ten o'clock in the morning of December 2, 1988. The petitioners filed a
complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo against the chairman and members of PBAC in
their official and personal capacities. The plaintiffs claimed that although they had submitted
their PREC 1 on time, the PBAC refused without just cause to accept them. Judge Lodrigio L.
Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and awarding
the project. The defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that; the
Court was prohibited from issuing restraining orders, preliminary injunctions and preliminary
mandatory injunctions by P.D. 1818.

ISSUE: Whether the Court is prohibited from issuing injunction in cases involving infrastructure
projects of government (YES but in this instant case NO)

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the prohibition of P.D. No. 1818 applied only to
administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in a technical
sense. In the case of Datiles and Co. vs. Sucaldito, this Court interpreted a similar prohibition
contained in P.D. 605, the law after which P.D. 1818 was patterned. It was there declared that
the prohibition pertained to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders by courts against
administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical
cases. The Court observed that to allow the courts to judge these matters would disturb the
smooth functioning of the administrative machinery. Justice Teodoro Padilla made it clear,
however, that on issues definitely outside of this dimension and involving questions of law,
courts could not be prevented by P.D. No. 605 from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit
administrative acts.

The ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered by P.D. 1818. Nevertheless, it
does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the said decree. The
prohibition pertained to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders by courts against
administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical
cases. On issues definitely outside of this dimension and involving questions of law, courts
could not be prevented from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.
There are at least two irregularities committed by PBAC that justified injunction of the bidding
and the award of the project. First, PBAC set deadlines for the filing of the PRE-C1 and the
opening of bids and then changed these deadlines without prior notice to prospective
participants. Second, PBAC was required to issue to pre-qualified applicants the plans,
specifications and proposal book forms for the project to be bid thirty days before the date of
bidding if the estimated project cost was between P1M and P5M. PBAC has not denied that
these forms were issued only on December 2, 1988, or only ten days before the bidding
scheduled for December 12, 1988. At the very latest, PBAC should have issued them on
November 12, 1988, or 30 days before the scheduled bidding.

It is apparent that the present controversy did not arise from the discretionary acts of the
administrative body nor does it involve merely technical matters. What is involved here is
non-compliance with the procedural rules on bidding which required strict observance. P.D.
1818 was not intended to shield from judicial scrutiny irregularities committed by administrative
agencies such as the anomalies above described, Hence, the challenged restraining order was
not improperly issued by the respondent judge and the writ of preliminary injunction should not
have been denied.

5. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS V. ANG CHO KIO – 33 SCRA 494 [1970]

FACTS: Respondent Ang Cho Kio aka Ang Ming Huy had been charged, tried and convicted of
various offenses committed in the Philippines and was sentenced to suffer penalties. He filed a
petition for habeas corpus which the CFI of Rizal denied. The CA affirmed the decision but
recommended that Ang may be allowed to leave the country on the first available transportation
abroad. The Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration praying for the deletion of the
recommendation. The Solicitor General maintains that the recommendation is not a part of the
decision and was uncalled for; that it gives the decision a political complexion, because courts
are not empowered to make such a recommendation, nor is it inherent or incidental in the
exercise of judicial powers. He also contends that allowing convicted aliens to leave the country
is an act of the state exercises solely in the discretion of the Chief Executive. It is urged that the
act of sending an undesirable alien out of the country is political in character, and the courts
should not interfere with, nor attempt to influence, the political acts of the President.

ISSUE: Whether the courts of justice may interfere in the exercise by the President, thru his
Executive Secretary, of his administrative power of recommitment (NO)

RULING: No. The only question to be resolved by the Court of Appeals was whether, or not, the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, had rightly dismissed the petition of Ang Cho Kio for habeas
corpus. The Court of Appeals was not called upon to review any sentence imposed upon Ang
Cho Kio. The recommitment to prison of Ang Cho Kio was done in the exercise by the
President of the Philippines of his power pursuant to the provision of Section 64 of the Revised
Administrative Code, and the courts should not interfere with the exercise of that power. When
the Chief Executive, exercising his powers pursuant to Section 64(i) of the Revised
Administrative Code, ordered Ang Cho Kio recommitted to prison, it is assumed that the Chief
Executive had decided that Ang Cho Kio should be dealt with that way under the circumstances.
For the court to suggest to the Chief Executive to modify his decision to recommit Ang Cho Kio
to prison by allowing him to leave the country instead is indeed to interfere with the functions of
the Chief Executive. It would be an interference on, or an attempt to influence, the exercise by
the Chief Executive of the political powers of his office.

Under the principle of separation of powers, it is not within the province of the judiciary to
express an opinion, or express a suggestion, that would reflect on the wisdom or propriety of the
action of the Chief Executive on matters purely political in nature. Courts are not concerned with
the wisdom or morality of laws but only in the interpretation and application of law. We believe
that judges should refrain from expressing irrelevant opinions in their decisions which may only
reflect unfavorably upon their competence and the propriety of their judicial actuations.
However, of the ten members of the Court as presently constituted, only five are of the opinion
that the recommendation embodied in the decision of the majority of the special division of the
Court of Appeals, now in question, should be deleted from the decision. There is, therefore, one
vote less than the majority of the Court that is necessary to grant the certiorari prayed for.
Accordingly, the petition is denied, and the decision of the special division of the Court of
Appeals stands.

The recommendatory power of the courts in this jurisdiction are limited to those expressly
provided in the law — and such law is the provision of Section 5 of the Revised Penal Code as
follows:
Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and
which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief
Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that
said act should be made the subject of penal legislation. In the same way the court shall submit
to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice such statement as may be deemed
proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the
provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into
consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.

6. REPUBLIC V. GARCIA – 527 SCRA 495 [2007]

FACTS: The Republic filed against Maj. Gen. Garcia and his family a petition for forfeiture of
unlawfully acquired properties, with a verified urgent ex-parte application for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment. The Republic said that it being a sovereign political entity, it was
exempt from filing the said attachment bond (Attachment bond is a bond given by a defendant in
order to have an attachment released that ensures payment of a judgment awarded to the
plaintiff. It is a bond required of a plaintiff seeking an attachment, conditioned to pay the costs
and damages that the defendant may sustain in the event the plaintiff loses the suit).
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution ordering the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment
against the properties of the Garcias upon the filing by the Republic of a P1 million attachment
bond; the Republic paid the P1 million to avoid delay and then filed a motion for partial
reconsideration, saying again that they were exempt from filing the attachment bond.
Sandiganbayan denied it twice by reason of a.) there was nothing in the rules of court that said
the Republic was exempt, and b.) a re-examination of Tolentino vs. Carlos. Hence, this petition

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of discretion when it
rejected the Republic’s claim of exemption from the filing of an attachment bond? (YES)

RULING: Yes: Under Rule 57 of Rules of Court, before a writ of attachment may be issued, a
bond must first be filed to answer for all costs which may be adjudged to the adverse party and
for the damages he may sustain by reason of the attachment. However, this rule does not cover
the State. In Tolentino, this Court declared that the State as represented by the government is
exempt from filing an attachment bond on the theory that it is always solvent (meaning, the
State is always able to carry out its obligations). The Sandiganbayan thus erred when it
disregarded the foregoing presumption and instead ruled that the Republic should file an
attachment bond. The error was not simply an error of judgment but grave abuse of discretion.
There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is done contrary to the Constitution, the law or
jurisprudence.

Here, the Sandiganbayan’s January 14, 2005 resolution was clearly contrary to Tolentino.
Worse, the Sandiganbayan transgressed the Constitution and arrogated upon itself a power that
it did not by law possess. All courts must take their bearings from the decisions and rulings of
this Court. Tolentino has not been superseded or reversed. Thus, it is existing jurisprudence and
continues to form an important part of our legal system. Surprisingly, the Sandiganbayan
declared that Tolentino need(ed) to be carefully reexamined in the light of the changes that the
rule on attachment ha(d) undergone through the years. Indeed, as correctly cited, Art VIII Sec
4(3) states that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en
banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.

7. BAGUIO MARKET VENDORS MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE V. CABATO-CORTES

FACTS: Petitioner Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative is a credit cooperative
organized under RA No. 6938 or the Cooperative Code of the Philippines. Article 62(6) exempts
cooperatives from the payment of all court and sheriff's fees payable to the Philippine
Government for and in connection with all actions brought under this Code, or where such
action is brought by the Cooperative Development Authority before the court, to enforce the
payment of obligations contracted in favor of the cooperative.

In 2004, petitioner, as mortgagee, filed with the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City a petition to extrajudicially foreclose a mortgage under Act 3135, as amended which
provides that petitions for extrajudicial foreclosure are subject to legal fees based on the value
of the mortgagee's claim. The trial court, denied the request for exemption, citing Section 22 of
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended, exempting from the Rule's coverage only the
"Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities" and certain suits of local
government units.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but respondent denied its motion. This time, respondent
reasoned that petitioner's reliance on Article 62(6) of RA 6938 is misplaced because the fees
collected under Rule 141 are not "fees payable to the Philippine Government" as they do not
accrue to the National Treasury but to a special fund under the Court's control.
The OSG submits that as the substantive rule, Article 62 of RA 6938 prevails over Section 22 of
Rule 141, a judicial rule of procedure. The OSG also takes issue with respondent's finding that
the legal fees collected under Rule 141 are not "fees payable to the Philippine Government" as
the judiciary forms part of the Philippine government, as defined under the Revised
Administrative Code.

The OCAT recommends the denial of the petition opining that Section 22, Rule 141, as
amended, prevails over Article 62(6) of RA 6938 because the power to impose judicial fees is
eminently judicial and the 1987 Constitution insulated the Court's rule-making powers from
Congress' interference by omitting in the 1987 Constitution the provision in the 1973
Constitution allowing Congress to alter judicial rules.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner's application for extrajudicial foreclosure is exempt from legal
fees under Article 62 of RA 6938 (NO)

RULING: No, Article 62(6) of RA 6938 does not apply to petitioner's foreclosure proceedings.
The scope of the legal fees exemption Article 62(6) of RA 6938 grants to cooperatives is limited
to two types of actions, namely, actions brought under RA 6938; and actions brought by the
Cooperative Development Authority to enforce the payment of obligations contracted in favor of
cooperatives.RA 6938 is no authority for petitioner to claim exemption from the payment of legal
fees in this proceeding because first, the fees imposable on petitioner do not pertain to an action
brought under RA 6938 but to a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage under Act
3135. Second, petitioner is not the Cooperative Development Authority which can claim
exemption only in actions to enforce payments of obligations on behalf of cooperatives.

This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power
to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most
importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate
rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more
so with the Executive.

The payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified
by Congress. Reaffirming Echegaray's construction of Section 5 (5), the Court described its
exclusive power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure as one of the
safeguards of this Court's institutional independence, the power and is now the Court's
exclusive domain.
 9. IN THE MATTER OF CLARIFICATION OF EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF ALL
COURTS AND SHERIFF’S FEES OF COOPERATIVE
FACTS: PHCCI requests for issuance of a court to clarify and implement the exemption of
cooperatives from payment of court and sheriff’s fees pursuant to RA No. 6938, as amended by
RA No. 9520 (Philippine Cooperative Code of 2008). PHCCI reports that it filed with the Office
of the Executive Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Dumaguete City, Negros
Oriental, a Motion to implement the exemption of cooperatives from the payment of court and
sheriff’s fees but the Executive Judge ruled that the matter is of national concern and should be
brought to the attention of the Supreme Court for a uniform answer.

Executive Judge Antonio Estoconing (Executive Judge Estoconing), MTCC, Dumaguete City,
Negros Oriental, issued an Order treating the motion filed by PHCCI as a mere consulta
considering that no main action was filed in his court. He reported that many cases filed by
PHCCI are small claims cases and under Section 8 of the Rule on Small Claims, the plaintiff is
required to pay docket fees and other related costs unless he is allowed to litigate the case as
an indigent

ISSUE: WON cooperatives are exempt from the payment of court and sheriff’s fees (NO)

RULING: No. Cooperatives can no longer invoke Republic Act No. 6938, as amended by
Republic Act No. 9520, as basis for exemption from the payment of legal fees. It is stressed in
the 1987 Constitution is a stronger and more independent judiciary that took away the power of
congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure; and
held that the power to promulgate these Rules is no longer shared by the Court with Congress,
more so, with the Executive (Echegaray vs Secretary of Justice).

The court has fiscal autonomy which recognizes the power and authority of the court to levy,
assess and collect fees, including legal fees. Legal fees under Rule 141 have two basic
components, the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the Special Allowance for the Judiciary
Fund (SAJF). The laws which established the JDF and SAJF expressly declare the identical
purpose of these funds to guarantee the independence of the Judiciary as mandated by the
Constitution and public policy. An exemption from payment of legal fees granted by Congress
will necessarily reduce the JDF and the SAJF. It impairs the Court’s guaranteed fiscal autonomy
and erodes its independence.

The term "all court fees" under Section 6, Article 61 of Republic Act No. 9520 refers to the
totality of "legal fees" imposed under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court as an incident of instituting
an action in court. These fees include filing or docket fees, appeal fees, fees for issuance of
provisional remedies, mediation fees, sheriff's fees, stenographer's fees and commissioner's
fees. With regard to the term "sheriff's fees," this Court, in an extended minute Resolution dated
1 September 2009, held that the exemptions granted to cooperatives under Section 2,
paragraph 6 of Republic Act No. 6938; Section 6, Article 61 of Republic Act No. 9520; and OCA
Circular No. 44-2007 clearly do not cover the amount required "to defray the actual travel
expenses of the sheriff, process server or other court-authorized person in the service of
summons, subpoena and other court processes issued relative to the trial of the case," which
are neither considered as court and sheriff's fees nor are amounts payable to the Philippine
Government.

10. IN RE CUNANAN
FACTS: Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for
admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must
have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent
in any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering the varying
difficulties of the different bar examinations held since 1946 and the varying degree of strictness
with which the examination papers were graded, this court passed and admitted to the bar those
candidates who had obtained an average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70
per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was raised to 75 per
cent.

Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this
court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against, unsuccessful candidates who
obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in
Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others,
reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946.
The President requested the views of this court on the bill. Complying with that request, seven
members of the court subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse thereto, and
shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it
approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill.
Although the members of this court reiterated their unfavorable views on the matter, the
President allowed the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953 without his signature, which
became the RA 972 or the Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.

ISSUE: WON RA 972 is unconstitutional (YES)

RULING: The admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the
practice of the profession and their supervision have been disputably a judicial function and
responsibility. Even considering the power granted to Congress by our Constitution to repeal,
alter supplement the rules promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to the practice of
law, to our judgment and proposition that the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly belonging to Congress, is
unacceptable.

​The Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal responsibilities
concerning the admission to the practice of law. the primary power and responsibility which the
Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Congress may repeal, alter and
supplement the rules promulgated by this Court, but the authority and responsibility over the
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision
remain vested in the Supreme Court. The power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules does
not signify nor permit that Congress substitute or take the place of this Tribunal in the exercise
of its primary power on the matter.

The ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and
the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say,
merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.

Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and enforce rules for the
admission to the practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them
may and should be exercised with the respect that each owes to the other, giving careful
consideration to the responsibility which the nature of each department requires.

RA 972 is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly
had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as was exactly found by this
Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of legal profession
adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times
become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the
practice of law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal
profession is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve
officially of those inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a delicate
mission is to create a serious social danger.

11. IN RE LETTER OF UP LAW FACULTY – 644 SCRA 543 [2011]

FACTS: Shortly after the promulgation of the Supreme Court decision in Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary (the Vinuya decision), the case involving the Filipino comfort women during the
Japanese occupation, the counsel for the petitioners therein filed, first, a Motion for
Reconsideration reiterating the fundamental responsibility of states in protecting its citizens’
human rights specifically pertaining to jus cogens norms and, second, a supplement thereto
asserting that the Vinuya decision was plagiarized from different sources and that the true
intents of the plagiarized sources were twisted by the ponente, Justice Mariano del Castillo
(Justice del Castillo), to suit the arguments laid down in said decision.
Vis-a-vis the Court’s formation of an ethics committee tasked to investigate the veracity of the
alleged plagiarism, the authors who were purportedly plagiarized sent their respective letters to
the Supreme Court, noting the misreading and/or misrepresentation of their articles. Hence, in
their articles, they argue that the crimes of rape, torture, and sexual slavery can be classified as
crimes against humanity, thus attaining the jus cogens status; consequently, it shall be
obligatory upon the State to seek remedies on behalf of its aggrieved citizens. However, the
Vinuya decision cited them to support the contrary stand.

In response to this controversy, the faculty of UP College of Law came up with a statement
entitled “Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines
College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court”
(Restoring Integrity Statement), which statement alleged plagiarism against Justice del Castillo,
treating the same not only as an established fact but as a truth. Said statement was posted
online and at the College’s bulletin board and was submitted to the Supreme Court. The
manner in presenting the arguments and the language used therein, the Court believed, were
inappropriate considering its signatories are lawyers. Thus, the Supreme Court issued a Show
Cause Resolution directing respondents to show cause why they should not be disciplined as
members of the Bar for violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Conversely,
compliance to such a resolution was unsatisfactory, except for one respondent.

ISSUES: Whether or not the Show Cause Resolution denies respondents their freedom of
expression (NO)

RULING: A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly show that it was neither the fact
that respondents had criticized a decision of the Court nor that they had charged one of its
members of plagiarism that motivated the said Resolution. It was the manner of the criticism
and the contumacious language by which respondents, who are not parties nor counsels in the
Vinuya case, have expressed their opinion in favor of the petitioners in the said pending case for
the “proper disposition” and consideration of the Court that gave rise to said Resolution. The
Show Cause Resolution painstakingly enumerated the statements that the Court considered
excessive and uncalled for under the circumstances surrounding the issuance, publication, and
later submission to this Court of the UP Law faculty’s Restoring Integrity Statement.

One such societal value that presses for recognition in the case at bar is the threat to judicial
independence and the orderly administration of justice that immoderate, reckless and unfair
attacks on judicial decisions and institutions pose.

The right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of expression in the Bill
of Rights of the Constitution, must be exercised responsibly, for every right carries with it a
corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with
responsibility. Thus, proscribed are the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high
esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration, or tends necessarily to
undermine the confidence of people in the integrity of the members of the Court. In other
words, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm
does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless
possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but
not offensive.

In a long line of cases, the Court has held that the right to criticize the courts and judicial officers
must be balanced against the equally primordial concern that the independence of the Judiciary
be protected from due influence or interference. In cases where the critics are not only citizens
but members of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the authority of this Court to
discipline lawyers whose statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or
extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits of fair comment and common decency.

For purposes of discussion kasi may sui generis HAHAHA: Disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial
of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its
officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court
motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account
for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the
legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted
with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there
can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.

This Court is certainly not claiming that it should be shielded from criticism. All the Court
demands is the same respect and courtesy that one lawyer owes to another under established
ethical standards. All lawyers, whether they are judges, court employees, professors, or private
practitioners, are officers of the Court and have voluntarily taken an oath, as an indispensable
qualification for admission to the Bar, to conduct themselves with good fidelity towards the
courts. There is no exemption from this sworn duty for law professors, regardless of their status
in the academic community or the law school to which they belong.

12. AMPONG V. CSC

FACTS: Evelyn Decir took the Professional Board Examination for Teachers (PBET). The
petitioner was a public school teacher and later on transferred to the RTC in Sarangani
Province, where she was appointed as Court Interpreter III. In 1994, a woman representing
herself as Evelyn Decir went to the Civil Service Regional Office (CSRO) to claim a copy of her
PBET Certificate of Eligibility. The CSRO personnel noticed that the woman did not resemble
the picture of the examinee in the Picture Seat Plan (PSP). It was confirmed that the person
claiming the eligibility was different from the one who took the examinations. It was the petitioner
who took and passed the examinations under the name Evelyn Decir. The CSRO filed a case
against Decir and Ampong. Decir denied the charges while Ampong admitted to the
wrongdoing. The CSC found petitioner Ampong and Decir guilty of dishonesty, dismissing them
from the service.

The petitioner appealed to the CA and insisted that as a judicial employee, it is the SC and not
the CSC that has disciplinary jurisdiction over her. The CSC acted with abuse of discretion when
it continued to exercise jurisdiction despite her assumption of duty as a judicial employee. The
CA ruled that a member of the judiciary may be under the jurisdiction of two different bodies. As
a public school teacher or a court interpreter, petitioner was part of the civil service, subject to its
rules and regulations. When she committed acts in violation of the Civil Service Law, the CSC
was clothed with administrative jurisdiction over her.
ISSUE: WON the CSC has administrative jurisdiction over an employee of the Judiciary for acts
committed while said employee was still with the Education Department (NO)
RULING: It is true that the CSC has administrative jurisdiction over the civil service. However,
the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court is given exclusive administrative supervision
over all courts and judicial personnel (Art. VIII, Sec. 6). By virtue of this power, it is only the
Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws,
rules and regulations. It may take the proper administrative action against them if they commit
any violation. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul
of the doctrine of separation of powers.

At the time of commission, petitioner was a public school teacher under the administrative
supervision of the DECS and, in taking the civil service examinations, under the CSC. Petitioner
surreptitiously took the CSC-supervised PBET exam in place of another person. When she did
that, she became a party to cheating or dishonesty in a civil service-supervised examination.
That she committed the dishonest act before she joined the RTC does not take her case out of
the administrative reach of the Supreme Court.

The bottom line is administrative jurisdiction over a court employee belongs to the Supreme
Court, regardless of whether the offense was committed before or after employment in the
judiciary.

Indeed, the standard procedure is for the CSC to bring its complaint against a judicial employee
before the OCA. Records show that the CSC did not adhere to this procedure in the present
case.

13. CARPIO-MORALES V. CA
FACTS: Private respondent Jejomar Erwin Binay, Jr. and other public officers and employees of
the City Government of Makati were accused of Plunder, Graft and Corruption in connection
with the 5 phases of the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building.
Upon recommendation of the Special Panel, the Ombudsman issued the preventive suspension
order upon the private respondent and other employees for 6 months without pay during the
pendency of the cases. Sec. Roxas caused the implementation of the preventive suspension
order through the DILG-NCR. Binay, Jr. was replaced by Makati VM Peña, Jr. who assumed
office as Acting Mayor.

Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, seeking the nullification of the preventive
suspension order, and praying for the issuance of TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its implementation.
CA granted the TRO. Binay, Jr. also filed a petition for contempt against Sec. Roxas, Pena, Jr.
and others. The Ombudsman and the Sec of Justice were subsequently impleaded. The CA
directed the Ombudsman to file her comment thereto.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court, in her capacity as the
Ombudsman, through the OSG assailing the CA’s issuance of TRO against the Ombudsman’s
preventive suspension order to Binay, Jr. The Ombudsman claims that the CA had no
jurisdiction to grant Binay, Jr.’s prayer for TRO, citing Sec. 14 of RA 6770 (The Ombudsman Act
of 1989) which states that no injunctive writ could be issued to delay the Ombudsman’s
investigation unless there is prima facie evidence that the subject matter thereof is outside the
latter’s jurisdiction; and the CA’s directive for the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.’s
petition for contempt is illegal and improper, considering that the Ombudsman is an
impeachable officer, and therefore, cannot be subjected to contempt proceedings.

Binay, Jr. argues that Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the Constitution specifically grants the CA judicial power
to review acts of any branch or instrumentality of government, including the Office of the
Ombudsman, in case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
which he asserts was committed in this case when said office issued the preventive suspension
order against him.

ISSUES:
1. WON the present petition is the Ombudsman’s plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
(YES)
2. WON the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or WPI enjoining the
implementation of a preventive suspension order by the Ombudsman (YES)
3. WON the CA committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing TRO and WPI against the
Ombudsman’s preventive suspension order (NO)

RULING:
1. A common requirement to both a petition for certiorari and a petition for prohibition taken
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civ Pro is that the petitioner has no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. As a general rule, a motion
for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court prior to resorting to the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition since a motion for reconsideration may
still be considered as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Among the exceptions to this rule is where there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the govt
and where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
These exceptions were present in this case.

This case tests the constitutional and statutory limits of the fundamental powers of key
govt institutions – the office of the Ombudsman, the Legislature, and the Judiciary – and
hence, involves an issue of transcendental importance that demands no less than a
careful but expeditious resolution. As such, the Ombudsman’s direct resort to certiorari
and prohibition before this Court is justified.

2. Under Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the Constitution, judicial power is allocated to the SC and all
such lower courts. The SC is the only court established by the Constitution, while all
other lower courts may be established by laws passed by Congress. Through BP 129, or
the The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, lower courts were established including
the CA. In addition, Sec. 2 of Art VIII empowers Congress to define, prescribe, and
apportion the jurisdiction of all courts, except that it may not deprive the SC of its
jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Sec. 5.
 The basis for the CA’s subject matter jurisdiction over Binay, Jr.’s petition is Sec. 9(1),
Chapter I of BP 129, as amended, which states

Section 9. Jurisdiction – The Court of Appeals shall exercise:

1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,
habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes,
whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

The CA’s certiorari jurisdiction is not only original but also concurrent with the RTC and
the SC. when a court has subject matter jurisdiction over a particular case, as conferred
to it by law, said cout may then exercise its jurisdiction acquired over that case.

While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts
is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this Court under Section 5 (5), Article
VIII of the Constitution.

The Court rules that when Congress passed the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770
and, in so doing, took away from the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to
enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, it encroached upon this Court’s
constitutional rule-making authority. Clearly, these issuances, which are, by nature,
provisional reliefs and auxiliary writs created under the provisions of the Rules of Court,
are matters of procedure which belong exclusively within the province of this Court.
Without the Court’s consent to the proscription, as may be manifested by an adoption of
the same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular issued
therefor, there thus, stands to be a violation of the separation of powers principle. It also
dilutes a court’s ability to carry out its functions.

Hence, with Congress interfering with matters of procedure without the Court’s consent
thereto, it remains that the CA had the authority to issue the questioned injunctive writs
enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr.

3. It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave
abuse of discretion when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the
law or existing jurisprudence. The CA in imposing the TRO and WPI followed settled
precedents, which at the time, unwittingly remained good law. Therefore, it cannot be
concluded that the CA committed a grave abuse of discretion. The WPI against the
Ombudsman’s preventive order was correctly issued.

14. MMDA V. CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY

FACTS: Respondents filed a complaint before the RTC in Imus, Cavite against several
government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the clean-up, rehabilitation, and
protection of Manila Bay. The complaint alleged that the water quality of Manila Bay had fallen
way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically the Philippine Environment Code or
Presidential Decree (PD) 1152. As plaintiffs a quo, respondents prayed that petitioners be
ordered to clean Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the
purpose. The RTC ruled in the respondents’ favor.The Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Philippine National Police
(PNP) Maritime Group, and five (5) other executive departments and agencies filed directly with
this Court a petition for review under Rule 45. Petitioners were one in arguing in the main that
the pertinent provisions of the Environment Code relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution
incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. Apart from raising concerns about the lack of
funds appropriated for cleaning purposes, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of the
Manila Bay is not a ministerial act that can be compelled by mandamus.

The CA denied the petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto, stressing
that the trial court decision did not require petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic
functions under existing laws. Thus, the Manila Bay Advisory Committee was created to receive
and evaluate the quarterly progressive reports on the activities undertaken by the agencies in
accordance with said decision and to monitor the execution phase. In the absence of specific
completion periods, the Committee recommended that time frames be set for the agencies to
perform their assigned tasks.

ISSUE: Whether or not the recommendation by the Committee is an encroachment over the
powers and functions of the Executive Branch (NO)

RULING: NO. The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of
judicial power under Art. VIII of the Constitution, because the execution of the Decision is but an
integral part of the adjudicative function of the Court. None of the agencies ever questioned the
power of the Court to implement the December 18, 2008 Decision nor has any of them raised
the alleged encroachment by the Court over executive functions. While additional activities are
required of the agencies like submission of plans of action, data or status reports, these
directives are but part and parcel of the execution stage of a final decision under Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court.

Section 47 Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final
order, may be as follows (c) In any other litigation between the same parties of their successors
in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which
appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto.

It is clear that the final judgment includes not only what appears upon its face to have been so
adjudged but also those matters "actually and necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto." Certainly, any activity that is needed to fully implement a final judgment is necessarily
encompassed by the said judgment. Moreover, the submission of periodic reports is sanctioned
by Secs. 7 and 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. With the final and
executory judgment in MMDA, the writ of continuing mandamus issued in MMDA means that
until petitioner agencies have shown full compliance with the Court's orders, the Court exercises
continuing jurisdiction over them until full execution of the judgment. There is no encroachment
over executive functions to speak of.

15. VILLANUEVA V. JBC

FACTS: The petitioner was appointed as the Presiding Judge of the MCTC, Compostela-New
Bataan in 2012. In 2013, the petitioner applied for the vacant position of Presiding Judge in
three different branches of RTC. JBC informed the petitioner that he was not included in the list
of candidates for the said stations. The petitioner seeked for reconsideration. The JBC Exec
Officer informed the petitioner that the JBC’s decision not to include his name was due to the
JBC’s long-standing policy of opening the chance for promotion to second-level courts to
incumbent judges who have served in their current position for at least 5y. Since the petitioner
has been a judge only for more than a year, he was excluded from the list. Hence this petition.

ISSUES:
1. WON the JBC could add more to the qualifications of an RTC Judge prescribed by the
Constitution (YES)
2. WON the JBC’s five-year requirement violates the equal protection and due process
clauses of the Constitution (NO)
3. WON JBC’s five-year requirement violates the constitutional provision on Social Justice
and Human Rights for Equal Opportunity of Employment (NO)

RULING:
1. The JBC is mandated to recommend appointees to the judiciary and only those
nominated by the JBC in a list officially transmitted to the President may be appointed by
the latter as justice or judge in the judiciary. While the 1987 Constitution has provided the
qualifications of members of the judiciary, this does not preclude the JBC from having its
own set of rules and procedures and providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate.

The Constitution did not lay down in precise terms the process that the JBC shall follow
in determining applicants’ qualifications. In carrying out its main function, the JBC has
the authority to set the standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every vacancy in
the judiciary, subject only to the minimum qualifications required by the Constitution and
law for every position. The search for these long held qualities necessarily requires a
degree of flexibility in order to determine who is most fit among the applicants. Thus, the
JBC has sufficient but not unbridled license to act in performing its duties.

The JBC had to establish a set of uniform criteria in order to ascertain whether an
applicant meets the minimum constitutional qualifications and possesses the qualities
expected of him and his office. Thus, the adoption of the five-year requirement policy
 applied by JBC to the petitioner’s case is necessary and incidental to the function
conferred by the Constitution to the JBC

2. JBC employs standards to have a rational basis to screen applicants who cannot be all
accommodated and appointed to a vacancy in the judiciary, to determine who is best
qualified among the applicants, and not to discriminate against any particular individual
or class. In issuing the assailed policy, the JBC merely exercised its discretion in
accordance with the constitutional requirement and its rules that a member of the
Judiciary must be of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence.
Consideration of experience by JBC as one factor in choosing recommended appointees
does not constitute a violation of the equal protection clause. The JBC does not
discriminate when it employs number of years of service to screen and differentiate
applicants from the competition. The number of years of service provides a relevant
basis to determine proven competence which may be measured by experience, among
other factors.

The assailed JBC policy need not be filed in the UP Law Center Office of the National
Administrative Register because the publication requirement in the ONAR is confined to
issuances of administrative agencies under the Executive branch of the government.
Since the JBC is a body under the supervision of the Supreme Court, it is not covered by
the publication requirements of the Administrative Code. Nevertheless, the assailed JBC
policy requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify
as applicants to second-level courts should have been published.

Nonetheless, the JBC’s failure to publish the assailed policy has not prejudiced the
petitioner’s private interest. At the risk of being repetitive, the petitioner has no legal right
to be included in the list of nominees for judicial vacancies since the possession of the
constitutional and statutory qualifications for appointment to the Judiciary may not be
used to legally demand that one’s name be included in the list of candidates for a judicial
vacancy. One’s inclusion in the shortlist is strictly within the discretion of the JBC.

3. The questioned policy does not violate equality of employment opportunities. The
constitutional provision does not call for appointment to the Judiciary of all who might, for
any number of reasons, wish to apply. As with all professions, it is regulated by the
State. The office of a judge is no ordinary office. It is imbued with public interest and is
central in the administration of justice. So long as a fair opportunity is available for all
applicants who are evaluated on the basis of their individual merits and abilities, the
questioned policy cannot be struck down as unconstitutional.

The petitioner has merely filed an application with the JBC for the position of RTC judge,
and he has no clear legal right to be nominated for that office nor to be selected and
included in the list to be submitted to the President which is subject to the discretion of
the JBC. The JBC has the power to determine who shall be recommended to the judicial
post. To be included in the list of applicants is a privilege as one can only be chosen
 under existing criteria imposed by the JBC itself. As such, prospective applicants,
including the petitioner, cannot claim any demandable right to take part in it if they fail to
meet these criteria.

16. PEOPLE V. GACOTT

FACTS: Respondent Judge Gacott was found grossly ignorant of the law and as such, he was
reprimanded and fined in the amount of P10,000 by the SC Second Division. The respondent
judge questions the competence of the 2nd Division of this Court to administratively discipline
him, relying on the second sentence of Section 11, Article VIII of the present Constitution which
reads: "The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or
order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon." He argues that it is only the full
Court, not a division thereof, that can administratively punish him.

ISSUE: WON the SC Second Division has the power to discipline erring judges of lower courts
(YES)

RULING: Section 11 of Article VIII clearly shows that there are actually two situations envisaged
therein. The first clause which states that "the Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to
discipline judges of lower courts," is a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary power to, and
the determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. It was not
therein intended that all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the
whole Court.

The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein and is
intentionally separated from the first by a comma, declares on the other hand that the Court en
banc can "order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in
the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted therein." Evidently, in this instance, the
administrative case must be deliberated upon and decided by the full Court itself.

Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary power to the Court en banc,
on February 9, 1993 a Court En Banc resolution was adopted. One of the en banc cases
stipulated therein is cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or
employee of the Judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a
period of more than one (1) year or a fine exceeding P10,000.00, or both.

Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative matters
or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would result in a congested docket
and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in the Court, especially in administrative matters,
since even cases involving the penalty of reprimand would require action by the Court en banc.
This would subvert the constitutional injunction for the Court to adopt a systematic plan to
expedite the decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in the Supreme Court or the
lower courts, and the very purpose of authorizing the Court to sit en banc or in divisions of three,
five, or seven members.

Only cases involving dismissal of judges of lower courts are specifically required to be decided
by the Court en banc, in cognizance of the need for a thorough and judicious evaluation of
serious charges against members of the judiciary, it is only when the penalty imposed does not
exceed suspension of more than one year or a fine of P10,000.00, or both, that the
administrative matter may be decided in division.

17. DEUTSCHE BANK V. CIR

FACTS: In accordance with the NIRC of 1997, petitioner withheld and remitted to respondent
15% branch profit remittance tax (BPRT) on its regular banking unit (RBU) net income for 2002
and prior taxable years.
Believing that it made an overpayment of the BPRT, petitioner filed with the BIR Large
Taxpayers Assessment and Investigation Division on 4 October 2005 an administrative claim for
refund or issuance of its tax credit certificate. On the same date, petitioner requested from the
International Tax Affairs Division (ITAD) a confirmation of its entitlement to the preferential tax
rate of 10% under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty.

Alleging the inaction of the BIR on its administrative claim, petitioner filed a Petition for Review
with the CTA. The claim of petitioner for a refund was denied. The court a quo held that
petitioner violated the fifteen (15) day period mandated under Section III paragraph (2) of
Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 1-2000. The CTA Second Division relied on Mirant
(Philippines) Operations Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Mirant) where the
CTA En Banc ruled that before the benefits of the tax treaty may be extended to a foreign
corporation wishing to avail itself thereof, the latter should first invoke the provisions of the tax
treaty and prove that they indeed apply to the corporation.

ISSUE: WON minute resolution (Mirant) is a binding precedent (NO)

RULING: A minute resolution is not a binding precedent. With respect to the same subject
matter and the same issues concerning the same parties, it constitutes res judicata. However, if
other parties or another subject matter (even with the same parties and issues) is involved, the
minute resolution is not binding precedent. The Court ruled that the previous case "ha(d) no
bearing" on the latter case because the two cases involved different subject matters as they
were concerned with the taxable income of different taxable years.

Besides, there are substantial, not simply formal, distinctions between a minute resolution and a
decision. The constitutional requirement under the first paragraph of Section 14, Article VIII of
the Constitution that the facts and the law on which the judgment is based must be expressed
clearly and distinctly applies only to decisions, not to minute resolutions. A minute resolution is
signed only by the clerk of court by authority of the justices, unlike a decision. It does not require
the certification of the Chief Justice. Moreover, unlike decisions, minute resolutions are not
published in the Philippine Reports. Finally, the proviso of Section 4(3) of Article VIII speaks of a
decision. Indeed, as a rule, this Court lays down doctrines or principles of law which constitute
binding precedent in a decision duly signed by the members of the Court and certified by the
Chief Justice.

Even if we had affirmed the CTA in Mirant, the doctrine laid down in that Decision cannot bind
this Court in cases of a similar nature. There are differences in parties, taxes, taxable periods,
and treaties involved; more importantly, the disposition of that case was made only through a
minute resolution.

REPUBLIC V MARIA LOURDES SERENO

Section 5(1), Article VIII

Doctrine: Quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be availed of when
the subject act or omission was committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election
relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election
invalid. Acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity being a continuing
requirement but nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or
validly elected official cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of impeachment if
the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable
offense, or to disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.

Facts:
From November 1986 to June 1, 2006, or spanning period of 20 years, respondent served as
member of the faculty of the University of the Philippines-College of Law, initially as a temporary
faculty member and thereafter, as a permanent faculty member until her resignation therefrom
on June 1, 2006. As a regular faculty member, respondent was paid by the month by U.P. While
being employed at the U.P. College of Law, or from October 2003 to 2006, respondent was
concurrently employed as legal counsel of the Republic in two international arbitrations: (a)
PIATCO v. Republic of the Philippines and MIAA; and (b) Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport
Services Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines (PIATCO cases).

Despite having been employed at the U.P. College of Law from November 1986 to June 1,
2006, the record of the U.P. HRDO only contains the Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net
Worth (SALN) for 1985, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, and 2002, filed by
respondent. Similarly, despite having been employed as legal counsel of various government
agencies from 2003 to 2009, there is likewise no showing that she filed her SALNs for these
years, except for the SALN ending December 31, 2009 which was unsubscribed and filed
before the Office of the Clerk of Court only on June 22, 2012.

After having served as a professor at the U.P. College of Law until 2006, and thereafter as
practitioner in various outfits including as legal counsel for the Republic until 2009, the
respondent submitted her application for the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
in July 2010.

In support of her application as Associate Justice, respondent submitted to the Office of

Recruitment Selection and Nomination (ORSN) of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) her SALN
for the year 2006. This SALN for 2006 bears no stamp received by the U.P. HRDO and was
signed on July 27, 2010. According to respondent, the JBC considered her nomination for the
position of Associate Justice as that of a private practitioner and not as a government employee.
Only recently, in letter to the ORSN dated February 2, 2018, likewise attached to her Ad
Cautelam Manifestation/Submission, respondent would explain that such SALN was really
intended to be her SALN as of July 27, 2010. Respondent further explained during the Oral
Arguments that she merely downloaded the SALN form and forgot to erase the year "2006"
printed thereon and that she was not required by the ORSN to submit a subscribed SALN.

Thus, as the certifications executed by the U.P. HRDO, the Ombudsman and the ORSN of the
JBC stand, the only SALNs available on record and filed by respondent were those mentioned
above or eleven (11) SALNs filed in her 20-year government service in U.P. No SALNs were
filed from 2003 to 2006 when she was employed as legal counsel for the Republic. Neither was
there a SALN filed when she resigned from U.P. College of Law as of June 1, 2006 and when
she supposedly re-entered government service as of August 16, 2010.

When the position of the Chief Justice was declared vacant in 2012, the JBC announced the
opening for application and recommendation of the position of Chief Justice. The JBC
announcement was preceded by a meeting held on June 4, 2012 wherein the JBC agreed to
require the applicants for the Chief Justice position to submit all previous SALNs up to
December 31, 2011 for those in government service. However, for the other judicial vacancies,
the JBC required the submission of only two SALNs. Accordingly, in the Announcement JBC
specifically directed the candidates for the Chief Justice post to submit, in addition to the usual
documentary requirements, the following:

(1) Sworn Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Networth (SALN):

1. for those in the government: all previous SALNs (up to 31 December 2011)

2. for those from the private sector: SALN as of 31 December 2011

(2) Waiver in favor of the JBC of the confidentiality of local and foreign bank accounts under the
Bank Secrecy Law and Foreign Currency Deposits Act.

The JBC announcement further provided that "applicants with incomplete or out-of-date
documentary requirements will not be interviewed or considered for nomination."

Respondent accepted several nominations and submitted to the ORSN her SALNs for the years
2009, 2010, and 2011. Respondent also executed a waiver of confidentiality of her local and
foreign bank accounts.
On July 6, 2012, or even before the deadline of the submission of the documentary
requirements on July 17, 2012, the JBC En Banc came up with long list of the candidates
totaling twenty-two (22), respondent included, and scheduled the public interview of said
candidates. the JBC in its Special En Banc Meeting, deliberated on the candidates for the
position of Chief Justice with incomplete documentary requirements. In particular, the JBC
examined the list of candidates and their compliance with the required submission of SALNs.
The minutes of the JBC deliberation reveal as follows

The Executive Officer asked for clarification, particularly with respect to SALNs, whether five (5)
SALNs would constitute substantial compliance if the candidate has been in government service
for twenty (20) years.

The Council examined the list with regard to the SALNs, particularly the candidates coming from
the government, and identified who among them would be considered to have substantially
complied:

Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno

The Executive Officer informed the Council that she had not submitted her SALNs for a
period of ten (10) years, that is, from 1986 to 2006.

Senator Escudero mentioned that Justice Sereno was his professor at U.P. and that they
were required to submit SALNs during those years.

Because there were several candidates with incomplete documentary requirements, the JBC En
Banc agreed to again extend the deadline for the submission of the lacking requirements to July
23, 2012 they further agreed that the candidates who fail to complete the requirements on
said date are to be excluded from the list of candidates to be interviewed and considered
for nomination, unless they would be included if in the determination of the Execom he
or she has substantially complied

Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno’s Response

As had noted in my Personal Data Sheet, after my resignation from government service in 2006,
as professor at the University of the Philippines, I became a full-time private practitioner. Hence,
when I was nominated for the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court in 2010, my
nomination was considered as that of a private practitioner, and not as a government employee.
Thus, the requirements imposed on me in connection with the consideration of my name, were
those imposed on nominees from the private sector, and my earlier-terminated government
service, did not control nor dominate the kind of requirements imposed on me.

In the 05 June 2012 Announcement, the Judicial and Bar Council imposed the requirement of
submitting all previous SALNs for those in the government. As pointed out earlier, my service in
government is not continuous. The period of my private practice between my service in the
University of the Philippines ending in 2006 and my appointment to the Supreme Court in 2010
presents break in government service. Hence, in compliance with the documentary
requirements for my candidacy as Chief Justice, submitted only the SALNs from end of 2009 up
to 31 December 2011, since am considered to have been returned to public office and rendered
government service anew from the time of my appointment as Associate Justice on 16 August
2010.

Considering that have been previously cleared from all administrative responsibilities and
accountabilities from my entire earlier truncated government service, may kindly request that the
requirements that need to comply with, be similarly viewed as that from private sector, before
my appointment to the Government again 2010 as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.

A month after respondent's acceptance of her nomination, or on August 24, 2012, respondent
was appointed by then President Aquino III as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

On August 30, 2017, or five years after respondent's appointment as Chief Justice, an
impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon (Atty. Gadon) against respondent with
the Committee on Justice of the House of Representatives (House Committee on Justice) for
culpable violation of the Constitution, corruption, high crimes, and betrayal of public trust. The
complaint also alleged that respondent failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs.

Petitioner’s Arguments

The Republic, through the OSG, claims that an action for quo warranto is the proper remedy to
question the validity of respondent's appointment. It alleges that the instant petition is
seasonably filed within the one-year reglementary period under Section 11, Rule 66,[63] of the
Rules of Court since respondent's transgressions only came to light during the proceedings of
the House Committee on Justice on the allegations of the impeachment complaint filed against
her. Alternatively, the Republic claims that it has an imprescriptible right to bring a quo warranto
petition under the maxim nullum tempus occurit regi.

The Republic contends that respondent's failure to submit her SALNs as required by the JBC
disqualifies her, at the outset, from being candidate for the position of Chief Justice. Lacking her
SALNs, respondent has not proven her integrity which is a requirement under the Constitution.
The Republic thus concludes that since respondent is ineligible for the position of Chief Justice
for lack of proven integrity, she has no right to hold office and may therefore be ousted via quo
warranto.

Respondent’s Arguments

Respondent argues that the Chief Justice may be ousted from office only by impeachment.
Respondent contends that the use of the phrase "may be removed from office" in Section 2,
Article XI of the Constitution does not signify that Members of the Supreme Court may be
removed through modes other than impeachment. According to the respondent, the clear
intention of the framers of the Constitution was to create an exclusive category of public officers
who can be removed only by impeachment and not otherwise.

It is likewise the argument of respondent that since petition for quo warranto may be filed before
the RTC, such would result to conundrum because judge of lower court would have effectively
exercised disciplinary power and administrative supervision over an official of the Judiciary
much higher in rank and is contrary to Sections and 11, Article VIII of the Constitution which
vests upon the Supreme Court disciplinary and administrative power over all courts and the
personnel thereof. She theorizes that if a Member of the Supreme Court can be ousted through
quo warranto initiated by the OSG, the Congress' "check" on the Supreme Court through
impeachment would be rendered inutile.

Respondent also stresses that the failure to file SALNs or to submit the same to the JBC has no
bearing on one's integrity. The submission of SALNs was simply among the additional
documents which the JBC had required of the applicants for the position of Chief Justice. It is
respondent's position that the non-filing of SALN is not a ground for disqualification unless the
same was already the subject of a pending criminal or administrative case or if the applicant had
already been finally convicted for a criminal offense involving said failure to file SALNs. In this
case, respondent points out that the JBC was made aware as early as July 20, 2012 that
respondent had not submitted to the JBC her SALNs as a U.P. professor and yet none of them
invoked Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 or the "integrity rule."

Respondent likewise contends that the issue of whether an applicant for the position of Chief
Justice is a person of "proven integrity" is a question "constitutionally committed to the JBC" and
is therefore a political question which only the JBC could answer, and it did so in the affirmative
when it included respondent's name in the shortlist of nominees for the position of Chief Justice.

Substantive Issues

1. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for quo
warranto against respondent who is an impeachable officer and against whom an impeachment
complaint has already been filed with the House of Representatives; (YES)

2. Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the ground of prescription; (NO)

3. Whether respondent is eligible for the position of Chief Justice:

a. Whether the determination of a candidate's eligibility for nomination is the sole and
exclusive function of the JBC and whether such determination partakes of the character of
a political question outside the Court's supervisory and review powers;

b. Whether respondent failed to file her SALNs as mandated by the Constitution and
required by the law and its implementing rules and regulations; and if so, whether the
 failure to file SALNs voids the nomination and appointment of respondent as Chief
Justice;

c. Whether respondent failed to comply with the submission of SALNs as required by the
JBC; and if so, whether the failure to submit SALNs to the JBC voids the nomination and
appointment of respondent as Chief Justice;

d. In case of finding that respondent is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice,
whether the subsequent nomination by the JBC and the appointment by the President
cured such ineligibility.

4. Whether respondent is de jure or de facto officer.

Ruling:

1. The Court has Jurisdiction over the instant Petition for Quo Warranto

The petition challenges respondent's right and title to the position of Chief Justice. The Republic
avers that respondent unlawfully holds her office because in failing to regularly declare her
assets, liabilities and net worth as a member of the career service prior to her appointment as
an Associate Justice, and later as Chief Justice, of the Court, she cannot be said to possess the
requirement of proven integrity demanded of every aspiring member of the Judiciary. The
Republic thus prays that respondent's appointment as Chief Justice be declared void.
Respondent counters that, as an impeachable officer, she may only be removed through
impeachment by the Senate sitting as an impeachment court.

Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto

Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, in part, provides that the Supreme Court shall
exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
and habeas corpus. This Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs, including quo warranto.

The origin, nature and purpose of impeachment and quo warranto are materially different

While both impeachment and quo warranto may result in the ouster of the public official, the two
proceedings materially differ. At its most basic, impeachment proceedings are political in nature,
while an action for quo warranto is judicial or a proceeding traditionally lodged in the courts.

To lend proper context, We briefly recount the origin and nature of impeachment proceedings
and a quo warranto petition:

Impeachment
Historians trace the origin of impeachment as far as the 5th century in ancient Greece in a
process called eisangelia. The grounds for impeachment include treason, conspiracy against
the democracy, betrayal of strategic posts or expeditionary forces and corruption and deception.

Though both public and private officials can be the subject of the process, the British system of
impeachment is largely similar to the current procedure in that it is undertaken in both Houses of
the Parliament. The House of Commons determines when an impeachment should be
instituted. If the grounds, normally for treason and other high crimes and misdemeanor, are
deemed sufficient, the House of Commons prosecutes the individual before the House of Lords.

While impeachment was availed for "high crimes and misdemeanors", it would appear that the
phrase was applied to a variety of acts which can arguably amount to a breach of the public's
confidence, such as advising the King to grant liberties and privileges to certain persons to the
hindrance of the due execution of the laws, procuring offices for persons who were unfit, and
unworthy of them and squandering away the public treasure, browbeating witnesses and
commenting on their credibility, cursing and drinking to excess, thereby bringing the highest
scandal on the public justice of the kingdom, and failure to conduct himself on the most
distinguished principles of good faith, equity, moderation, and mildness.

While heavily influenced by the British concept of impeachment, the United States of America
made significant modifications from its British counterpart. Fundamentally, the framers of the
United States visualized the process as a means to hold accountable its public officials, as can
be gleaned from their basic law:

The President, Vice-President, and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed
from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, treason, Bribery, or other High
Crimes and Misdemeanors.

Other noted differences from the British process of impeachment include limiting and
specifying the grounds to "treason, Bribery, or other High Crimes and Misdemeanors",
and punishing the offender with removal and disqualification to hold public office instead
of death, forfeiture of property and corruption of blood

As currently worded, our 1987 Constitution, in addition to those stated in the 1935 basic law,
provided another additional ground to impeach high-­ranking public officials: "betrayal of public
trust". Commissioner Rustico De los Reyes of the 1986 Constitutional Commission explained
this ground as a "catch-all phrase to include all acts which are not punishable by statutes as
penal offenses but, nonetheless, render the officer unfit to continue in office. It includes betrayal
of public interest, inexcusable negligence of duty, tyrannical abuse of power, breach of official
duty by malfeasance or misfeasance, cronyism, favoritism, etc. to the prejudice of public interest
and which tend to bring the office into disrepute.

Quo warranto
In the Philippines, the remedies against usurpers of public office appeared in the 1900s, through
Act No. 190. Section 197 of the Act provides for a provision comparable to Section 1, Rule 66 of
the Rules of Court:

Sec. 197. Usurpation of an Office or Franchise - A civil action may be brought in the name
of the Government of the Philippine Islands:
1. Against person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
civil office or a franchise within the Philippine Islands, or an office in a corporation
created by the authority of the Government of the Philippine Islands;
2. Against a public civil officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provisions of
law, works forfeiture of his office;
3. Against an association of persons who act as corporation within the Philippine
Islands, without being legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act.

Based from the foregoing, it appears that impeachment is a proceeding exercised by the
legislative, as representatives of the sovereign, to vindicate the breach of the trust
reposed by the people in the hands of the public officer by determining the public
officer's fitness to stay in the office. Meanwhile, an action for quo warranto, involves a
judicial determination of the eligibility or validity of the election or appointment of a public
official based on predetermined rules.

Quo warranto and impeachment can proceed independently and simultaneously

Aside from the difference in their origin and nature, quo warranto and impeachment may
proceed independently of each other as these remedies are distinct as to
(1) jurisdiction
(2) grounds
(3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal, and
(4) limitations.

2. The Petition is Not Dismissible on the Ground of Prescription

Prescription does not lie against the State

The rules on quo warranto, specifically Section 11, Rule 66, provides:

Limitations. - Nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to authorize an action

against a public officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the same be
commenced within one (1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the
petitioner to hold such office or position, arose; nor to authorize an action for damages
in accordance with the provisions of the next preceding section unless the same be
commenced within one (1) year after the entry of the judgment establishing the
petitioner's right to the office in question. (Emphasis supplied)
Since the 1960's the Court had explained in ample jurisprudence the application of the
one-year prescriptive period for filing an action for quo warranto.

3. Respondent is Ineligible as a Candidate and Nominee for the Position of Chief Justice
a. The Court Exercises Supervisory Authority Over the JBC

b. Compliance with the Constitutional and statutory requirement of filing of SALN

intimately relates to a person's integrity.

c. Respondent failed to submit the required SALNs as to qualify for nomination

pursuant to the JBC rules

d. Respondent's disposition to commit deliberate acts and omissions demonstrating

dishonesty and lack of forthrightness is discordant with any claim of integrity

4. x