CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I TSN- ATTY.

GIL GARCIA III

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)

August 4, 2017 – FRIDAY
LJ Mahipus
V. THE STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
A. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
ART. VI Sec. 1 POWERS OF CONGRESS
LEGISLATIVE POWER: The power or competence of the legislative
propose, enact ordain or alter, modify or repeal laws. It is the department that
makes the laws including appropriation laws. It is vested in the powers that
consist of house or rep/congress and senate. It is characterized without limits
as a general rule, and therefore dili pwede naa kay law na would provide an
instant repeal of law, this is prohibited because it would delimit the power of
legislature, mabawasan ang plenary power.
1. Composition, Qualifications, and Term of Office
LIMIT FOR SENATORS: No Senator shall serve for more than two
consecutive terms. So 12 years ka na senator, after that, you have to rest for
3 years in the election of senators.
Effect IF ALREADY ON 12th year AND WANT TO SKIRT: Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term of which he was
elected. So, dili ka pwede na mag voluntary do something to interrupt your
12 years para ma-vote ka for the next 6 years.
MANDATOR DRUG TEST NOT VALID AS QUALIFICATION: So, remember
the law prescribes a drug test for senators and members of House of
Representative were questioned because it added another qualification in
the Constitution. So is it allowed to require candidates for senators or
members of the House of Representatives to undergo mandatory drug
testing as an additional requirement?
A: The Court said it is not valid because it adds to the qualification that is not
stated in the Constitution.

COMPOSITION: WHO ARE THE MEMBERS? b. House of Representative (Congressmen)

a. Senate (Senators) Art. VI
Article VI Section 5.
1. The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
Section 2. hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be:
The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who shall be (First type of representative) elected from legislative districts apportioned
elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be provided among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance
by law. with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio, and;
WHAT ARE THE ESSENTIAL QUALIFICATIONS? those who, as provided by law:
(take note of the natural-born citizen) (Second type of representative) shall be elected through a party-list system
of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
Section 3.
No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the “Unless otherwise fixed by law” – meaning proportional representation
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age,
able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for COMPOSITION: MEMBERS OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.
80-20 RATIO:
TERM OF OFFICE 80%- District representatives of membership of house
Section 4. 20% - Party list representatives of membership of house
The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence,
unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next 2. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the
following their election. total number of representatives including those under the party list.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I TSN- ATTY. GIL GARCIA III
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)

(take note that party list representatives constitute 20% of the total number of participating in
representatives including those in the party list system). the party list
system. You are
3. Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, representing a
compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two MARGINALIZED
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one group in a
representative. society.
Residence 2 years Not less than 1 Not less than 1
QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS OF HOUSE OF REP (immediately year year (immediately
preceding the (immediately preceding the
Section 6. election) preceding the election
No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a election
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at TERM 6 years; 3year-term limit. -
least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party- Prohibited from Rest after your
list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be having 2 3rd term, only
elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year consecutive then can you run
immediately preceding the day of the election. terms. Have to again.
rest in their 3rd
TERM OF OFFICE term then they
Section 7. can again run.
The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of
three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on Under The Constitution, we have provisions pertaining to the party-list
the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Member of the representation and the point of the party-list system is to accord those who
House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. have less in life and more in law, the marginalized, the vulnerable sector of
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be society. So this party-list system is important because it is a social tool
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term designed not only to give more to law to those people who are less in life, but
for which he was elected. also to enable them to be lawmakers of themselves, power to participate
directly in the enactment of law to benefit them. It makes the marginalized
DISTINCTIONS (TAKE NOTE) not under-represented so the state of the participants in the mainstream of
QUALIFICATION SENATOR CONGRESSMA PARTY-LIST representative democracy. Hence, not everyone can be a party-list
S N REP. representative. There are qualifications, before one can be a party-list rep. bc
Citizenship Natural-born citizen you are representing a specific sector.
Age on the day of 35 25 25
election REQUIREMENT OF DOMICILE:
Education Able to read and write SABILI VS. COMELEC 670 SCRA 664 (2012)
Registered voter In the In the district in NO. Need not be
Philippines which he shall a registered voter Residence is synonymous to domicile. Here, there’s nothing wrong with the
be elected in the district individual changing residences so dapat registered voter ka of the district to
represented BC represent. It’s not bawal for you to transfer ONCE you are able to prove that
you are certainty that you have effected a change of residence for election law
purposes or the period to inquire by law.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I TSN- ATTY. GIL GARCIA III
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
Here in Sabili, this involves a mayor, he ran as mayor in lipa city, it was
stated in his COC that he was a resident of lipa city for 2 years. This was
contested to by opponent because according to them, he failed to apply for
residency requirement because he declared under oath that he had been a
resident of that locality. He was disqualified by the COMELEC and his COC
was cancelled. What were pieces of evidence presented by his kalaban to
prove that his contested residency is transient ang iyang pag transfer didto.
So there was an element of transiency, dapat baya pag mag transfer ka
residence, there must be some kind of permanency. So his opponent
presented TAX DECLARATIONS of the property where sabili was staying as
proof that it was owned by his common-law wife. Na dili si sabili mismo ang
tiga-iya ng bahay where he stays. Therefore, to prove that sabili was sa
permanent resident, dapat iyaha gud tong property and not of his common
law wife.
Q: Is librea (opponent) correct?
A: The COURT said NO because this would add to another requirement In
the Constitution which is property ownership. Property ownership is not
among the qualifications required of candidates. You cannot add
qualifications not required under the law in the first place. Here, as a
candidate for mayor, property ownership is not among the qualifications
required of candidates. Otherwise, if you add this kind of requirement, only
the rich can run, rather, it is a “candidate’s residence” in a locality to actual
residency in whatever capacity.
In fact the court stated a CASE here, another case, he ran for a specific local
position and then he was found out by the COMELEC that he was just
boarding a very shaggy room, it was not furnished etc., it was contested that
his presence there was temporary, dili gud sya nagpuyo, but just for the sake
of complying. The court said that a candidate’s scarcely furnished leased
room can be considered as residence for the purpose of complying with the
residency requirement. In other words, wala pakialam ang SC as long as you
can prove that you have been residing in that locality and there is this
element of permanency. It does not care if you like to sleep anywhere. It is
not required for a candidate to buy his own house in order to establish his
residence or domicile. He could live in a rented house.
Q: What about the contention of librea na wala’y business si sabili in the
locality meaning, sabili does not have the intent to stay?
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A: Again, that is a property requirement NOT required by law. With respect
to the income tax returns (ITR) where sabili proves his permanence in
residence, the court said that the presentation of ITRs is material. The fact
that sabili was filing his ITRs in lipa city showed that he actively elected and
established residence in that city. So the court said here, the kalaban here,
librea was not able to prove the transient nature of sabili’s stay in the locality.
So he was allowed to run and was not disqualified.
THE THREE-TERM LIMIT
ALDOVINO VS. COMELEC 609 SCRA 636 (2009)
This three-term limit is not limited to members of the House of
Representatives but also for other local government officials under the local
gov’t. The purpose is to avoid political dynasties. So here, councilors, there is
also a limit. Again for members of House of rep. 3 consecutive years.
Here, Asilo was elected as councilor for 3 consecutive terms, 1998-2000.
However, in his 3rd term, he was preventively suspended by the
sandiganbayan for 90 days but this preventive suspension was eventually
lifted. So the suspension, he was not able to serve his duty for 90 days. Now,
in the fourth term, he ran again for the same position. And this was contested
too by the opponent because that would violate the 3- term limit BC this was
the fourth term.
Asilo argued that because of the preventive suspension, it interrupted his
three-term limit so he was not able to fully render service.
Is a preventive suspension equivalent to a cessation of his term which would
call for the non-application of the three term limit?
The court said here that preventive suspension does not involve loss of title
and severance from the service. So meaning, you are still disqualified. The
term, even if na-suspend ka sa 3 rd term, wala nimo sya na serve na full, it’s
considered a full term.
So under the Constitution, ART. 10 and LGC. For LocGov officials
particularly on the three-term limit. The term of local elective officials set
which was determined by law shall be three years and no official should
serve for more than three-consecutive terms.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I TSN- ATTY. GIL GARCIA III
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
TERM- It is a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an
officer may hold office.
Q: You already know that if you voluntarily renounce/sever your service it will
not be considered as an interruption in the three-term limit, why?
A: Because in the context of the three-term limit, the loss of title through
voluntary severance is presumed to be a purpose sought to avoid application
of the three-term limit.
Q: What does the interruption in the continuity of service for the full term
mean?
A: Interruption requires meeting of these two requisites (application for 3-
term limit):
1.) That the official concerned elected for 3 consecutive terms;
2.) Official has fully served three-consecutive terms.
INTERRUPTION- It is severance from the office; loss of title which renders
the three-term limit, inapplicable. Dapat matanggal ka talaga from office to
have no fault on your part, wala ka nag-decide, tinanggal ka for a valid
reason.
HERE, a preventive suspension does not involve loss of title or
severance from office. Suspended lang ka, after that period, balik na pud
ka. The purpose of preventive suspension is to prevent the evidence,
because there is a pending case against you. It does not constitute loss of
title.
VALID SUBSTITUTION OF A CANDIDATE
TALAGA VS. COMELEC 683 SCRA 602 (2012)
The point of this case is that you can only be substituted, if you are a
candidate in the first place. So if you’re COC is invalid, then, dili ka pwede
ma-substitute. No one can substitute because you are not a candidate in the
first place.
Here, RAMON talaga and Castillo filed their respective COCs for the position
of mayor in lucena city. Castillo filed to comelec a petition to cancel COC of
talaga because he violated the three-term limit and applied gihapon for the
fourth term.
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The COMELEC disqualified talaga for violating his three-term limit. Then, in
his place, ruby, filed her own COC for mayor of lucena in substitution of
husband, ramon Talaga. On the election-day, the votes casted were counted
in favor of ruby, a substitute candidate.
It is argued that ruby, would not substitute ramon talaga because his COC
had been cancelled and denied due course. Is this correct?
The COURT said YES. Ramon could not be substituted. The substitution
here is invalid.
The Existence of a valid CoC is a condition sine qua non for a valid
substitution. There are grounds under the election code by which you can
be substituted and instances where you cannot be substituted. A cancelled
CoC cannot give rise to a valid.
Nonetheless, whether the ground for substitution is death, withdrawal or
disqualification of a candidate, Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code
unequivocally states that only an official candidate of a registered or
accredited party may be substituted.
A cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy, therefore you
cannot be substituted because you are not a valid candidate. Also if you are
have not withdrawn your CoC in accordance with omnibus election code, you
are also substituted. Here, BC of decision of COMELEC that ramon to be
disqualified, his CoC was invalid. Since it is invalid and not a validate
candidate, he cannot be substituted.
There can be no valid substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of the
Omnibus Election Code. It should be clear, too, that a candidate who does
not file a valid CoC may not be validly substituted, because a person without
a valid CoC is not considered a candidate in much the same way as any
person who has not filed a CoC is not at all a candidate. An invalid candidate
cannot conquer a substitute.
AUTOMATIC SEVERANCE OF A POSITION
QUINTO VS. COMELEC 606 SCRA 258 (2009)
If you are appointive public officer who files CoC, you are immediately
deemed resigned. Because of the amendment introduced, there is a
distinction:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I TSN- ATTY. GIL GARCIA III
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)

APPOINTIVE ELECTIVE authority. are elected to serve for a definite

File CoC= deemed automatic Filing of CoC= Not deemed term and remove them under
resignation effectively resigned. stringent provisions.
Under the Administrative Code, Can engage in partisan political
So katong appointive public officers, they are claiming that this is a violation they are prohibited from engaging in activity because that’s their job.
of the equal protection laws. Why is there a separate treatment for elective partisan political activity. They have to add specific loyalty
public officers? Why are they not deemed resigned? Example: You are beholden to your political parties.
Example: Senator who is in your second term, so you cannot run for the 3rd mayor. You cannot fulfill you duties
term so filed sya to stay in public service, file sya as candidate for properly because you discriminate
presidency, why is he not deemed resigned? Dili pareha sa appointive na those who are not loyalists to your
mu-file ko, deemed resigned na ako. So naa distinctions between appointive mayor.
and elective official and this was contested to by the appointive officials. In civil service, they are prohibited Expressly allowed to take part in
from engaging In partisan political political and electoral activities.
In this first quinto case (2009), the court held that the provision which made activity or take part in such except
the distinction was UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Not only because if violates equal to except to vote.
protection clause but also it was not the purpose of the law.
So, the court concluded that there is a valid classification justifying the
613 SCRA 385 (2010)- Same Quinto case imposition of that distinction between appointive and elective officers. So as
things stand now, if you are an appointive officer and you file your CoC, you
However, the aforementioned ruling in 2009 case was reversed. The court are deemed resigned, If you are an elective officer and filed you CoC, you
found out that the intention to impose a strict limitation on participation of are NOT deemed resigned.
appointive public officers was clear in the law. It is the intent of both congress
and framers of the Constitution to limit the participation of civil service officers The court said that it is not unfair. That is the intent of the legislature, its
and employees in partisan political activities. wisdom. So you cannot overturn plus mas maayo na isang sector is related.

Q: Is there a violation of the equal protection clause? Was there a valid REQUISITES OF RESIDENCE
classification here? MITRA VS. COMELEC 622 SCRA 749 (2010) (Nagpuyo sa shaggy)
A: As a general rule, we observe the equal protection. The exception to GR
is if there is a valid classification. The equal protection clause of the The court said here that the residence requirement is synonymous with
Constitution is not absolute and is subject to reasonable classification. The domicile. The ff. are the requirements as to the Domicile:
classification is reasonable, meaning, the rule does not necessarily applies to
you because you are a class of your own IF there is a presence of the (1) that a person must have a residence or domicile somewhere;
requirements of a valid classification. (2) once established, it remains until a new one is acquired; and
(3) that a person can have but one residence or domicile at a time.
The court said here, that substantial distinctions exist between elective and
appointive officers: So if you want to change your domicile, you have to have this element of
permanence.
APPOINTIVE OFFICERS ELECTIVE OFFICERS
Hold their office by appointed Occupy their office by virtue of the The dwelling where a person permanently intends to return to and remain or
designations by the appointing mandate of the electorate and they his/her capacity or inclination to live in a place is immaterial. So the court

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I TSN- ATTY. GIL GARCIA III
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
cannot rely on the evidence presented, if it can be established na he is really
staying there permanently.
CONCEPT OF RESIDENCE
ASISTIO V. AGUIRRE
Residence is similar to domicile importing not only an intention to reside in a
fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention. "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence.
Q: How do you lose your Domicile?
A: Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a transfer thereof, one
must be able to demonstrate:
(1) an actual removal or change of domicile;
(2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and
(3) acts which correspond with that purpose. There must be animus manendi
coupled with animus non revertendi
Apportionment / Districts
Article IV Section 5.
3. Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.
4. Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall
make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards
provided in this section.
Q: Why is there a requirement under the Constitution based on the district?
A: Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.
CREATION OF PROVINCE by ARMM
SEMA VS. COMELEC 558 SCRA 700 (2008)
Take note!
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This involves the creation of municipalities in the ARMM. Is ARMM allowed to
create municipalities, cities and provinces?
There is a law which created the ARMM. Under this law, it allowed ARMM to
create these barangays and municipalities. Pursuant to this, the ARMM’s
legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create
provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,5 enacted Muslim
Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of
Shariff Kabunsuan in the first district of maguindano.
So there was the issue on the creation of the province. It is argued since a
province requires one representative in Congress and it is only congress
which can create these districts to increase representation so ARMM cannot
skirt this because it would be exercising the powers of congress.
ISSUE: Can the ARMM create provinces and cities? Is Sec. 19 Art. VI, RA
9054 (Law used by ARMM) unconstitutional?
RULING: The provision is unconstitutional in so far as it grants ARMM
regional Assembly to create provinces and cities. Creation of municipalities
and barangays is okay but when it comes to provinces and cities, where
district representatives will be required to be voted, dili na pwede.
3 Conditions on how to create an LGU:
1) Follow criteria under the Local Government Code
2) Must not be in conflict with the Constitution
3) There must be a plebiscite in the political units affected
There is no express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the
Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies
the power to create local government units. However, under its plenary
legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the
power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and
provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution.
Q: Why is the power to create cities and provinces not allowed for the ARMM
regional assembly?
A: Because under the Constitution, each city with a population of at least
250,000 or each province shall have at least one representative in the house
of representative. So pag city ka or province, dapat naa ka representative in
the house of representatives.
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)

However, legislative districts are Created or Reapportioned only by an Act of

Congress it cannot be done by any entity. Under the Constitution, the power
to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and
to reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress. Since
these cities and provinces increase the representation of congress, only
congress can do such act.

Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to

increase, through a law, the allowable membership in the House of
Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative
districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes
the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress
exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not
through a law that regional or local legislative bodies enact, such as ARMM
in this case.

So dili na sya consistent with the Constitution if you allow a regional body like
ARMM TO CREATE a city to province which would increase the
representation of Congress because only Congress can increase
representation. The allowable membership of the House of Representatives
can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created,
only through a national law passed by Congress.

HOWEVER, the provision allowing ARMM to create municipalities and

barangays is valid because wala man sila representatives.

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I TSN- ATTY. GIL GARCIA III
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
TSN from the Lectures of Atty. Gil Garcia II
August 8, 2017
-Franklin
COCOFED vs. COMELEC
Facts:
This involves COCOFED which is an organization, sectoral party whose
membership comes from the peasant sector, particularly coconut farmers.
They participated in the May 2013 elections but submitted to COMELEC only
two nominees.
Issue:
Now, the COMELEC cancelled its registration as a party-list organization
that, among others, they failed to comply with the provisions of Section 8 of
RA 7941 or the “Party-List System Law” because they only submitted two
nominees instead of five. That is being contested now by COCOFED.
Ruling:
The court upheld the COMELEC decision to disqualify COCOFED, because
it failed to submit the list of nominees before election and warranted the
cancellation of registration. The law expressly requires the submission of a
list that contains at least five qualified nominees under Section 8 of RA 7941.
Under the same law, Section 6, the violation or failure to comply of laws,
rules and regulations relating to elections is a ground for the cancellation of
registration as what happened here. They failed to comply with the provision
of the law itself, the Party-list system law, so it is a ground for the
cancellation of registration.
However, the court said here that not every time that a violation automatically
bar or warrants the cancellation of a party-lists group’s registration, it is only
when the violation is primarily imputable to the party itself and not one that is
chiefly combined to an individual member or nominee. Meaning, it is the
party that caused the violation.
If it is a violation that is combined to an individual member, it may not be a
ground for the cancellation of registration. The court emphasized that the
requirement of a submission a list of five nominees is a statutory requirement
for the registration of party-list groups.
Why are there five nominees?
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Why is it needed to give the COMELEC the list of five nominees?
This is because it makes it public, or it informs the public. It is an information
which satisfies the people’s constitutional right to information on matters of
public concern. The identity of these five nominees carries critical bearing on
the electorate’s choice. That is why the provision of the law is mandatory.
ANAD vs. COMELEC
It is the same thing with COCOFED vs COMELEC. ANAD, for unknown
reasons submitted only three nominees instead of five which is a violation of
the Party-List System Law. Because of that, the COMELEC cancelled its
registration.
The court upheld the cancellation of its registration by a violation of the law.
ABANG LINGKOD vs. COMELEC
ABANG LINGKOD is a party-list which is a sectoral organization. As we
learned in the case of ATONG PAGLAUM, there are three types of parties,
the national, regional, and sectoral party-lists. The ABANG LINGKOD
belongs to the sectoral. It represents the interests of the peasant farmers and
fisherfolk. It manifested its interest to participate in the May 2013 elections
and it required to comply with the requirements or guidelines set forth with
the previous jurisprudence “ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. COMELEC.”
However, the COMELEC, after notifying the ABANG LINGKOD for it to
comply, cancelled its registration for its failure to establish its track record as
required in “ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. COMELEC.” It failed to establish its
track record in uplifting the cause of the marginalized sector and
underrepresented.
So ABANG LINGKOD went to the Supreme Court to question this decision
and pending the determination of that issue, the court promulgated Atung
Paglaum which laid down the new parameters.
Should ABANG LINGKOD’s registration be cancelled?
The court said it should not be cancelled on the ground that it failed to submit
its track record representing the marginalized and the underrepresented.
Under RA 7941, it did not require the groups intending to register under the
party-list system to submit proof of their track record. This requirement was
only imposed in the jurisprudence, in ANG BAGONG BAYANI. Under RA
7941, they are not required to submit their track record. They are only
required to attach their Constitution and By-Laws, platform of program of
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
government list of officers, coalition agreement, and other relevant
information as the COMELEC may require. It did not require this track record.
In fact, by the passage of Atung Paglaum, the requirement of track record is
asked only on the nominee himself.
Take note of Atong Paglaum: Evidence showing a track record in
representing the marginalized and underrepresented only from the
nominees, it would be difficult for these sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the marginalized and underrepresented, if the nominee herself
does not actually belong to the sector represented by the party or
organization. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those
who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must belong to their
respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. It did not require that the party-list itself present a track
record as a party.
Only sectoral organization would be required to present a track record. This
track record consists of actual activities conducted by them to further the
cause of the marginalized.
Why do we have to follow that logic that sectoral parties must submit a track
record? It would give a premium for these parties to shift sectoral
representation to becoming national/regional parties because this would not
need the submission of a track record. There is no logic in treating sectoral
organizations differently from national or regional parties or organizations as
regards their bid for registration under the party-list system. It would give a
premium in groups intending to register as a national parties against those
wanting to register as sectoral organizations because it would impose
additional burden to submit a track record. This adjustment deters the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors from organizing themselves
under the party-list system.
Now we go the concept of TERMS OF OFFICE and connected with this
issue is the three-term *inaudible*. Under the constitution, there is a
requirement that the national and local elections must be synchronized. In
fact, based on the case we discussed before, the elections in the ARMM
would also be synchronized with the national elections. Because of this, we
discussed the term limits of the members of Congress.
ALDOVINO vs. COMELEC
This is about preventive suspension. If you are in your third term, as
Councilor or Congressman and you are preventively suspended during the
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term, it is not considered the interruption that would interrupt your enjoyment
of the three terms. And even if you are preventively suspended, to stop an
interruption, you can no longer run for a fourth term. You have to rest, then
you can run again.
Again we discussed that this term interruption must mean loss of title to the
office and he or she must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time.
If you are preventively suspended, you are only barred from exercising the
functions for reasons provided under the law, but you do not lose your title of
the office. You are still a Congressman, Councilor, Senator, but you cannot
exercise your functions because of the suspension. Therefore, that is not
considered an interruption which removes you from the ambit of the three-
term limit.
Take note of the two requisites for the application of the disqualification of the
three-term limit
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in
the same local government post; and
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
ABUNDO vs. COMELEC
This summarized prevailing issues affecting consecutiveness of terms and/or
involuntary interruption. There is an enumeration of the instances if what is
considered as interruption and what is not considered as interruption.
A permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position, Mayor, and the Vice-
Mayor assumed the position pursuant to the rules on succession of the Local
Government Code. Pagkatanggal ni Mayor, musaka si Vice Mayor. The
disservice for the unexpired portion of the term of the replaced official cannot
be treated as one full term as mandated on the three-term limit. Therefore, if
the official runs again for the same position he held prior to his assumption of
the higher office, then his succession to the position of the higher office, is, in
operation of law, considered an involuntary severance or interruption.
What does that mean?
Vice Mayor ka, you succeeded the Mayor, and it is your third term as a Vice
Mayor. So you want to run again for Vice Mayor for a fourth term.
Did that succession operate as an interruption to your term?
The court said yes. Since your service as a Vice Mayor has been interrupted
not because of your fault, but because of the rules of succession, then it is
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
considered as an involuntary severance or interruption therefore, you are not
affected by the three-term limit.
The abolition of an elective office due to the conversion of a municipality into
a city does not by itself work to interrupt the incumbent’s official continuity of
service.
When a candidate is declared a winner for an elective post and assumes
office, his term interrupted when he loses an election protest and is ousted
from office, thus enabling him from serving what is an unexpired portion of
his term. An interruption of three years is not necessary. An interruption of
any length of time as long as it is involuntary is sufficient to break from the
rule.
*In another case, if you already fully served your term and after that, you
were ousted from office, then that is not considered interruption because you
managed to serve the full term from start to finish.
In Abundo, the court said that he is not disqualified. Here Abundo assumed
the Mayor post and only served for a year and a month because he was
removed from office due to an election protest. So he can still run for a next
term because his three-term limit has been interrupted.
NAVAL vs. COMELEC
From 2004-2007 and 2007-2010, he has been elected and served as a
member of the Sanggunian of the Second District of Camarines Sur. There is
this law, RA 7196, the legislative districts of Camarines, 8 out of 10 towns
were taken from the old 2nd District to form a 3rd district. Now, in the third
term of Naval, once again won as a member of the Sanggunian but now for
the 3rd district. The 3rd district was the former 2nd district which was the
reason he won in the previous elections and now he wants to run for a fourth
term. He is contested that he is not violating the three-term limit.
Did he violate the three-term limit?
The court said yes. The old 2nd district was made into the new 3rd district.
The 3rd district is the same with what made him win his 2004-2007 and
2007-2010 terms.
What are the types of election under the Constitution?
We have the REGULAR ELECTION under Section 8 Article 6 and special
election under Section 9 Article 6. It is provided under section 8 that unless
otherwise provided by law, regular election of the Senators and the members
of the House of Representatives shall be held on the 2nd Monday of May.
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Another type is a SPECIAL ELECTION and when can you invoke that? In
section 9 of article 6, in case of vacancy in the Senate or the House of
Representatives, a special election may be called to fill the vacancy in the
manner prescribed by law. The elected official will only serve for the
unexpired term.
TOLENTINO vs. COMELEC
When Gloria assumed the position as President, she confirmed Senator
Guingona as her Vice President. Guingona then was a senator and when he
served as Vice President, one seat in the Senate became vacant. The
senate issued a resolution certifying the existence of that vacancy. It called
on the COMELEC fill the vacancy with a special election to be held
simultaneously with the regular elections on May 2001. The COMELEC
resolution provided that the Senatorial candidate who will garner the 13th
highest number of votes will only serve the unexpired term of Senator
Guingona. The election pushed through and the COMELEC canvassed the
votes. They issued a resolution that the first twelve Senators should serve for
six years and the 13th Senator who is Honassan, will serve the unexpired
term of Senator Guingona.
It was contended that that resolution was issued without jurisdiction for the
following reasons (1) the COMELEC failed to notify the electorate of the
position to be filled for the 13th Senator. (2) they also failed to require
Senatorial candidates to indicate in their COCs whether they seek to be
elected under the regular elections or they want to run for the position of
Guingona. Because of the lack of information and notification, both assailing
the validity of the election.
Did this failure of the COMELEC to notify the electorate whether a candidate
is running for the regular or the special elections nullify the results of the
election?
The court said that it did not. The special election to fill the senate seat of
Senator Guingona was validly held but the Court noted there the deficiencies
committed by the COMELEC and warned it to not repeat the same again.
Even if there was no notice that the 13th candidate to receive the highest
votes will fill the vacant seat, it did not render the election null and void. The
court even said that the resolutions of the COMELEC prior to the conduct of
the elections contain nothing which would amount compliance to the
requirements of RA 6645. But, even considering that an election held at that
time has prescribed, it is not invalidated by the fact that the body charged
COMELEC, by the law, with the duty of the election failed to do so.
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
Why?
The right of duty to hold the elections is emanated from the Statute and not
from any call by the election by some authority and the law thus charges
voters with knowledge of the time and place of the election. The court said
that they cannot disenfranchise those who voted for Honassan, in the
absence of proof that COMELEC’s omission prejudiced voters in the exercise
of their right of suffrage so as to negate the holding of the special election.
Now we go to the
SALARIES, PRIVILEGES, AND DISQUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS OF
CONGRESS.
ART. VI, Section 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives shall be determined by law. No increase
in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the
full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives approving such increase.
ART. XVIII, Section 17. Until the Congress provides otherwise, the
President shall receive an annual salary of three hundred thousand
pesos; the Vice-President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, and the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, two hundred forty thousand pesos each; the
Senators, the Members of the House of Representatives, the
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and the Chairmen of the
Constitutional Commissions, two hundred four thousand pesos each;
and the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, one hundred
eighty thousand pesos each.
Article 6 Section 10. The salaries of Senators and the members of the House
of Representatives shall be determined by law. No increase, however, in that
compensation shall take effect until actual expiration of the full term of all the
members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving that
increase.
It is only after 6 years can Senator have their increase. There has to be an
expiration of the full term of the Senate and the House before they can
increase salaries of those members.
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PHILCONSA vs. MATHAY
If in July 1, 2010, Congress approves a law increasing the salary of the
members to 1 million or 1 billion monthly when the laws publishing it, when
will it take effect? It will take effect upon the date of expiration of the full term
of the Senate and House. Since it was passed on July 2010, the expiration of
the term of the Senators will be June 30, 2016. That will be the date when
the increase will be effective.
Facts:
The members of the Congress wanted RA 4134 take effect immediately. But
PHILCONSA noted that it should only take effect upon the expiration of the
full term not only of the Members of the House of Representatives, but also
of the Senate which approved that increase.
Issue:
Does this provision require that not only the terms of the house but also the
senate must have fully expired for the law or the increase to be effective?
Does it require the term of the members of the senate before the law could
take effect?
Ruling:
Yes. The terms of all the members of the Congress which approved the
salary must end before the increase becomes effective. Because the
provision refers to all the members of the senate and house of
representatives in the same statement without any distinction or separation.
LIGOT vs. MATHAY
This is similar to PHILCONSA vs. MATHAY but this involves the retirement
pay. Gi increase ang sweldo sa mga members sa House of representatives,
and naay Congressman diri, retired siya but he wants the new/increased rate
rather than the old rate.
Which rate should be used in computing his retirement benefits?
The petitioner wanted to apply the increase given by RA 4134 to his
retirement salary after serving three full terms. The effectivity of the law shall
take effect on December 30, 1969 which is also the day of his retirement.
Does the new rate after his retirement follow?
No. This new rate was disallowed by COA. The old rate should be used.
To whom should the new rate be applicable? For the incoming members of
Congress, even if the effectivity and the retirement is on the same day. A
retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of compensation within the purview of
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
the Constitutional provision limiting their compensation and "other
emoluments" to their salary as provided by law. It would in effect, increase
their salary beyond which is permitted by the Consitution to receive during
their incumbence.
FREEDOM FROM ARREST
ART. VI, Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six
years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in
session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other
place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee
thereof.
If you are a member of Congress, you are free from arrest as a general rule
as provided in Section 11, Article 6. A senator or member of the house of
representatives shall in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, kung hindi mulapas ang penalty to whatever offense he
committed, he should be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in
session. Those are the conditions.
1. The offense must not be punishable more than six years
imprisonment, and
2. Congress must be in session.
PEOPLE VS JALOSJOS
Jalosjos the rapist, a member of Congress was confined at the National
Penitentiary serving his conviction for statutory rape (2 counts), feeling niya
special, he filed a Motion because he won in the elections, even after he was
convicted, nakadaog sya as a Congressman. So, he filed a motion asking to
be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including
attendance on legislative sessions and meetings despite having been
convicted in a non-bailable offense. He insists that having been re-elected by
his constituents, he had the duty to perform the functions of a congressman
and that voices of the people should be heard / or the vox populi vox dei
should prevail and that since he is treated as bona fide member of the House
of Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal branch of government to
respect his mandate. He adds that the covenant with his constituents cannot
be defeated by mere insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending
criminal cases.
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So is he allowed to serve as a Congressman?
No, he cannot be allowed. Take note that, if the penalty does not exceed 6
years, you can be immuned from arrest, and also when the congress is in
session. Here, Jalosjos was convicted for the crime of statutory rape, which
the penalty exceeds 6 years, thus he cannot be allowed.
Now, because of that circumstance, what did the SC say?
If ma-allow ni si Congressman Jalosjos, it would amount to creation of a
privileged class without justification and reason, etc. The performance of
legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an
excuse to free a person validly in prison. In fact, he is only one of 250
members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members
of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to
function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members.
So as said, this would create a privileged class of the provisions not
only of the immunity but also equal protection. The election and the position
of Congressman is not a reasonable classification, the court finds that
election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification.
The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift
him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in
liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the
purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.
TRILLANES VS PIMENTEL
This involves Trillanes, he was involved to this Oakwood Mutiny, and
eventually na stop sya, and he was charged with coup d’etat , etc. pending
his conviction, he remained in detention but he ran for Senator and he won a
seat in the Senate for a term of 6years. Before the commencement of his
term, he wanted to participate in proceedings, so he filed before the RTC an
Omnibus Motion that he be allowed to attend sessions, and argued that he
should be allowed to do his functions as a Senator, but it was denied by the
RTC, so Antonio Trillanes went to the SC to question the order of the trial
court. He wanted to make a distinction, because the basis of the trial court in
denying his claim is the case of People vs Jalosjos. The basis of the
distinction he wanted to make is that Jalosjos was already convicted, while
he is still a detention prisoner, meaning wala pa sya na-convict. As a
detention prisoner, he also asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and
political rights since the presumption of innocence is still in his favor.
So can he be released?
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
The court said NO! In so far as the provisions on bail is concern
(before we go the discussion on the immunity from arrest), he cannot be
released on bail because provisions on bail provides that:
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. xxxxxxx xx xxxxxxxxxx
*here, nigawas nga he is chargeable by this offense (coup de etat)
punishable by RP, and the evidence against him is strong, so why should he
be allowed an application for bail.
The Rules state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to
bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
action.
That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d’etat cases, both
being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of
offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly
no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in
the crime charged. (so walay distinction kung ma pa rape man na or coup de
etat, basta kay reclusion perpetua ang penalty)
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner’s application
for bail and for release on recognizance was denied. The determination that
the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an
application for bail or imported from a trial court’s judgment of conviction,
justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to
provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to
bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action." Such
justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense
applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-
appellants like Jalosjos.
So what about now his immunity from arrest?
Of course, he cannot invoke this because his offense is punishable by more
than 6 years.
Now, he wanted to make a distinction between preventive detention
prisoners and those na convicted na. the SC said that there is no distinction
between them. when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is
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deemed placed under the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint
of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the
offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against
him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on
recognizance.
Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or
serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any
business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in
detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.
*take note of those cases.
SPEECH AND DEBATE CLAUSE:
ART. VI, Section 11. XXX XXXX X XXX X X X XXXXX , No Member shall
be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate
in the Congress or in any committee thereof.
JIMENEZ VS CABANGBANG
The Congressman here purportedly issued a libelous letter, it was
argued by the congressman that as the member of the Congress, the letter
he sent was a privilege communication, plus (idk , niambak rag kali tang
discussion ni Sir) but the court said here that publication issued was not
privilege.
At the time of the publication he was a member of the House of
Representatives, and because of that he is privileged from arrest during their
attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning
from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be
questioned in any other place. (Article VI, Section 15.)
But the court said that the publication involved in this case does not
belong to this category. According to the complaint herein, it was an open
letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when
Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter
to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the
communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty,
either as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof.
So it was not during discussions in Congress katong gihimo niya ng
statement, because congress was not in session when he made that letter
and he caused the communication to be so published, he was not performing
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any
Committee thereof, so the said communication is not absolutely privileged.
But the court did not indict him for Libel, because the prosecution failed to
prove all the elements of libel in this case.
OSMENA VS PENDATUN
Sergio Osmena filed a petition to enjoin the Special Committee
created by House Resolution No. 59. This Special Committee was created to
investigate the truth of the charges against the President of the Philippines
made by Osmena himself in his privilege speech.
He alleged in his petition that the Resolution violated his constitutional
absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House.
So was his PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY violated?
The SC said that there is no violation of his parliamentary immunity.
What is the purpose of parliamentary immunity, nganong gianatagaan man
ang members of Congress to speak their mind while they are in Session?
This is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to
discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably
necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he
should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to
whom exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a
fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the
democratic world.
What is the guaranty of this immunity?
It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without
fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or
any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. HOWEVER, THIS
IMMUNITY IS NOT ABSLOUTE. It does not protect him from responsibility
before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are
considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.
*so pwede ka ma-liable administratively by that body, the House itself.
Although you are accorded parliamentary immunity outside, the Congress for
criminal and civil actions before the Courts, pwede gihapon ka e-hold sa
14 | P a g e
judges or sa House for liability if your words and conduct are unbecoming as
a member.
And so the court here, that the resolution cannot be nullified on that ground
or for the violation of this parliamentary immunity, because he is not being
charged criminally or civilly outside the congress, he is being investigated
within the house concern. The House is the judge of what constitutes
disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution has conferred
jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual
circumstances of which the House knows best.
DISQUALIFICATIONS:
A. INCOMPATIBLE AND FORBIDDEN OFFICES
Section 13., ART. VI
*No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any
other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without
forfeiting his seat. **Neither shall he be appointed to any office which
may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during
the term for which he was elected.
*So, if you’re already a Senator or a Congressman, but you want to
serve in a GOCC, you can serve there but you have to forfeit your seat
because these offices are incompatible.
**So during the term, gipasaka ang sweldo up to 1 Billion(Grabe Sir! apply mi
ani,HAHAHA) then, muadto sya ato nga office para mag serve to enjoy the
benefit, it cannot be done, it is a forbidden office. Wala syay na-forfeit nga
seat, kay in the first place dili man sya allowed ana nga office.
Again the the two situations contemplated under the provision are
INCOMPATIBLE OFFICE and FORBIDDEN OFFICE.
1. The purpose of this INCOMPATIBLE OFFICE provision is to prevent
the member of the house for owing loyalty to any of the branch of
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government, to the detriment of the independence of the legislature-the
Doctrine of Separation of Powers.
The prohibition however is not absolute because, what is not allowed is the
simultaneous holding of that office. So if you want to serve under the
executive office or any other office beyond legislative, you have to forfeit your
seat in the legislative department, and it shall be automatic, upon the holding
of the incompatible office.
2. FORBIDDEN OFFICE on the other hand, in this provision, even if the
member of the congress is willing to forfeit the seat, they may not be
appointed to any office in that government that has been created or the
emoluments thereof that had been increased during his term, because that
position he wants to occupy is a forbidden office, so as to prevent trafficking
of public office.
However, the appointment of the member of the Congress to that forbidden
office is not allowed only during the term for which he was elected when such
office was created and emoluments were increased, AFTER the term, even
if the legislator is elected as a member of house or senator is, the
disqualification no longer applies, kay nahoman naman tong term na iyahang
gi-serve nga nag-create og office or increased emoluments thereof.
The prohibited appointment only refers to the office created during his term
increased emoluments during his term.
LIBAN VS GORDON 20091st case
Gordon here is a member of Senate, and he was serving as a
Senator, he concurrently served as a Chairman of PNRC (Phil. Nat’l. Red
Cross) Board of Governors, and because of such, his position was contested
because according to Sec. 13. Art. 6 – he is holding an incompatible office,
as since he is holding an incompatible office, he is deemed to have forfeited
his seat as a Senator when he accepted the appointment of PNRC as the
Chairman of the Board.
So in the first decision, the court said that what is the nature of PNRC?
Is it a GOCC? If yes, the provision on incompatible office would
apply.
If it’s not a GOCC, then it would not affect the holding of Gordon as a
Senator at the same time as a
Chairman of the PNRC Board, because it is no longer an incompatible office
prohibited by the Constitution.
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The court said here that the PNRC is not a GOCC but a private organization
performing public functions. It is an institution that should be autonomous
and independent from the government to conduct its activities efficiently. So
it is an cannot be a GOCC nga dependent sa government in order to ensure
its autonomy, independence and neutrality. It is according to the __________
controlled by a private sector and individuals. And so the court ruled here in
the first case, nullified the charter of PNRC. But in the Motion for
Reconsideration (LIBAN VS GORDON 2011)
LIBAN VS GORDON 20112nd case
The SC said here that the law creating the PNRC should not have
been nullified by the court,but still the court said that the PNRC is not a
GOCC.
So what kind of entity is PNRC?
It is not a government office, or an office of GOCC, it is a SUI
GENERIS institution. The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary,
humanitarian organization, whose mission is to bring timely, effective, and
compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable without
consideration of nationality, race, religion, gender, social status, or political
affiliation. It cannot be considered a GOCC.
In the 2009 Decision, when the SC required the PNRC to organize under the
Corporation Code just like a private corporation, it diminishes the status of
the PNRC as an international humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the
State, designated to assist it in discharging its obligations under the Geneva
Conventions. Although the PNRC is called to be independent under its
Fundamental Principles, it interprets such independence as inclusive of its
duty to be the government’s humanitarian partner. To be recognized in the
International Committee, the PNRC must have an autonomous status, and
carry out its humanitarian mission in a neutral and impartial manner.
The PNRC must maintain its autonomous status and to require PNRC to
register under the SEC, violates its autonomous status, and the SC said
again that PNRC enjoys a sui generis status. It cannot be classified as an
instrumentality of the State so as not to lose its character of neutrality" as
well as its independence, nor strictly as a private corporation since it is
regulated by international humanitarian law and is treated as an auxiliary of
the State.
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So in this case, sui generis sya nga body, so it did not affect the position of
Gordon in the Senate because when he took that position in the PNRC, it is
not a GOCC or considered as government, it is considered as a sui generis
agency or a body. So there was NO incompatible office here.

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I TSN- ATTY. GIL GARCIA III
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
August 11, 2017
We began our discussion on the Congress or Legislative Department. We
discuss on the salaries, privileges, and disqualifications.
Let’s go back to our discussion about forbidden office and incompatible
offices.
We had a discussion as to what these offices are.
Incompatible office- if you are a legislator, you cannot hold any other position
in the government or any of its subdivision or GOCC during your term without
forfeiting your seat. In order to preserve your loyalty in one branch of the
government. Now if you take that other office, the cessation of your seat will
be automatic upon holding that incompatible office.
Now, we also have this kind of office that even if you are willing to relinquish
your position you cannot hold that office because that is a forbidden office.
Even if you are willing to forfeit your seat, you cannot be appointed to that
office. It is an office which is created or the emoluments thereof increased
during the term for which the legislator was elected the reason of the
prohibition is to prevent trafficking in public offices, these public officers or
legislators would just create offices, resign, and sit to those offices and
receive enormous salaries. However the provision in which the prohibition is
enshrined does not appliy to elected officers because these offices are filled
by the voters themselves and not by the volition of the officers. Take note
that the prohibition only applies during the term of the office of the legislator,
after your term you can be appointed because the prohibition only applies
during your term. You are not barred forever.
SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold
any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.
Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or
the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.
What are the other prohibitions?
Article 6 section 13
Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may
personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the
Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies.
This applies to Lawyer legislators , can you represent yourself in a suit? Of
course! Because that is your own problem. But there will be rules that will be
discussed later.
Paragraph 2. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in
any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
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any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his
term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the
Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act
on account of his office. (Emphasis supplied)
This provisions are included to prevent conflict of interests. Conflict of
interest starts when you have a choice, between you, your interest and the
public interest. To prevent that, the legislator must not be interested
financially in accordance with the above sighted article.
What is the rationale that when you are a lawyer legislator, you are not
allowed to appear as counsel? Definitly your presence will affect the case
G.R. No. L-51122 March 25, 1982
PUYAT, vs. DE GUZMAN, JR.,
On September 4, 1979, the Court en banc issued a temporary Restraining
Order enjoining respondent SEC Associate Commissioner from allowing the
participation as an intervenor, of respondent Assemblyman Estanislao
Fernandez at the proceedings in the SEC Case
The Puyat Group claims that at conferences of the parties with respondent
SEC Commissioner de Guzman, Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez, then a
member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, orally entered his appearance
as counsel for respondent Acero to which the Puyat Group objected on
Constitutional grounds. Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution, then
in force, provided that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before ...
any administrative body", and SEC was an administrative body. Incidentally,
the same prohibition was maintained by the April 7, 1981 plebiscite.
(i) On May 15, 1979, Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez had
purchased from Augusto A. Morales ten (10) shares of stock of IPI for
P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero to qualify him to run for election
as a Director.
A motion for intervention was filed claiming that Assemblyman Fernandez
cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing
on behalf of another, although he is joining the cause of the private
respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his
ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation and
not for the protection of the petitioners nor respondents who have their
respective capable and respected counsel.
Can this be done? Can he be allowed to appear in the SEC as counsel? NO
Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez
cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
on behalf of another, although he is joining the cause of the private
respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his
ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation and
not for the protection of the petitioners nor respondents who have their
respective capable and respected counsel.
However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of
Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case. He had acquired a mere
P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing ten shares out of 262,843
outstanding shares. He acquired them "after the fact" that is, on May 30,
1979, after the contested election of Directors on May 14, 1979, after the quo
warranto suit had been filed on May 25, 1979 before SEC and one day
before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC on May 31, 1979.
And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his
intention to appear as counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero, 2 but
which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the
objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest
in the matter under litigation. And it maybe noted that in the case filed before
the Rizal Court of First Instance (L-51928), he appeared as counsel for
defendant Excelsior, co-defendant of respondent Acero therein.
Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that there
has been an indirect "appearance as counsel before ... an administrative
body" and, in our opinion, that is a circumvention of the Constitutional
prohibition.
But!!! If there were no facts as to like the presented one he can be in good
faith representing the case, it can be done.
BELGICA vs. OCHOA JR.
This is the case about PDAF. PDAF has been integrated in the General
Appropriations since past administrations. the 2011 PDAF Article included
an express statement on lump-sum amounts allocated for individual
legislators and the Vice-President: Representatives were given P70 Million
each, broken down into P40 Million for "hard projects" and P30 Million for
"soft projects"; while P200 Million was given to each Senator as well as the
Vice-President, with a P100 Million allocation each for "hard" and "soft
projects." Likewise, a provision on realignment of funds was included, but
with the qualification that it may be allowed only once.
This scheme is not new to the system,
C. Post-Martial Law Era:
Corazon Cojuangco Aquino Administration (1986-1992).
18 | P a g e
After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986 and the restoration of
Philippine democracy, "Congressional Pork Barrel" was revived in the form of
the "Mindanao Development Fund" and the "Visayas Development Fund"
which were created with lump-sum appropriations of P480 Million and P240
Million, respectively, for the funding of development projects in the Mindanao
and Visayas areas in 1989. It has been documented23 that the clamor raised
by the Senators and the Luzon legislators for a similar funding, prompted the
creation of the "Countrywide Development Fund" (CDF) which was
integrated into the 1990 GAA24 with an initial funding ofP2.3 Billion to cover
"small local infrastructure and other priority community projects."
Under the GAAs for the years 1991 and 1992,25 CDF funds were, with the
approval of the President, to be released directly to the implementing
agencies but "subject to the submission of the required list of projects and
activities."Although the GAAs from 1990 to 1992 were silent as to the
amounts of allocations of the individual legislators, as well as their
participation in the identification of projects, it has been reported26 that by
1992, Representatives were receivingP12.5 Million each in CDF funds, while
Senators were receiving P18 Million each, without any limitation or
qualification, and that they could identify any kind of project, from hard or
infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, and buildings to "soft projects"
such as textbooks, medicines, and scholarships.27
D. Fidel Valdez Ramos (Ramos) Administration (1992-1998).
The following year, or in 1993,28 the GAA explicitly stated that the release of
CDF funds was to be made upon the submission of the list of projects and
activities identified by, among others, individual legislators. For the first time,
the 1993 CDF Article included an allocation for the Vice-President.29 As
such, Representatives were allocated P12.5 Million each in CDF funds,
Senators, P18 Million each, and the Vice-President, P20 Million.
In 1994,30 1995,31 and 1996,32 the GAAs contained the same provisions on
project identification and fund release as found in the 1993 CDF Article. In
addition, however, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) was
directed to submit reports to the Senate Committee on Finance and the
House Committee on Appropriations on the releases made from the funds.33
Under the 199734 CDF Article, Members of Congress and the Vice-
President, in consultation with the implementing agency concerned, were
directed to submit to the DBM the list of 50% of projects to be funded from
their respective CDF allocations which shall be duly endorsed by (a) the
Senate President and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, in the
case of the Senate, and (b) the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, in the case of the
House of Representatives; while the list for the remaining 50% was to be
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submitted within six (6) months thereafter. The same article also stated that
the project list, which would be published by the DBM,35 "shall be the basis
for the release of funds" and that "no funds appropriated herein shall be
disbursed for projects not included in the list herein required."
The following year, or in 1998,36 the foregoing provisions regarding the
required lists and endorsements were reproduced, except that the publication
of the project list was no longer required as the list itself sufficed for the
release of CDF Funds.
The CDF was not, however, the lone form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" at
that time. Other forms of "Congressional Pork Barrel" were reportedly
fashioned and inserted into the GAA (called "Congressional Insertions" or
"CIs") in order to perpetuate the ad ministration‘s political agenda.37 It has
been articulated that since CIs "formed part and parcel of the budgets of
executive departments, they were not easily identifiable and were thus
harder to monitor." Nonetheless, the lawmakers themselves as well as the
finance and budget officials of the implementing agencies, as well as the
DBM, purportedly knew about the insertions.38Examples of these CIs are the
Department of Education (DepEd) School Building Fund, the Congressional
Initiative Allocations, the Public Works Fund, the El Niño Fund, and the
Poverty Alleviation Fund.39 The allocations for the School Building Fund,
particularly, ―shall be made upon prior consultation with the representative
of the legislative district concerned.”40 Similarly, the legislators had the
power to direct how, where and when these appropriations were to be
spent.41
E. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada) Administration (1998-2001).
In 1999,42 the CDF was removed in the GAA and replaced by three (3)
separate forms of CIs, namely, the "Food Security Program Fund,"43 the
"Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap Program Fund,"44and the "Rural/Urban
Development Infrastructure Program Fund,"45 all of which contained a
special provision requiring "prior consultation" with the Member s of
Congress for the release of the funds.
It was in the year 200046 that the "Priority Development Assistance Fund"
(PDAF) appeared in the GAA. The requirement of "prior consultation with the
respective Representative of the District" before PDAF funds were directly
released to the implementing agency concerned was explicitly stated in the
2000 PDAF Article. Moreover, realignment of funds to any expense category
was expressly allowed, with the sole condition that no amount shall be used
to fund personal services and other personnel benefits.47 The succeeding
PDAF provisions remained the same in view of the re-enactment48 of the
2000 GAA for the year 2001.
F. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) Administration (2001-2010).
19 | P a g e
The 2002 PDAF Article was brief and straightforward as it merely contained a
single special provision ordering the release of the funds directly to the
implementing agency or local government unit concerned, without further
qualifications. The following year, 2003, the same single provision was
present, with simply an expansion of purpose and express authority to
realign. Nevertheless, the provisions in the 2003 budgets of the Department
of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and the DepEd required prior
consultation with Members of Congress on the aspects of implementation
delegation and project list submission, respectively. In 2004, the 2003 GAA
was re-enacted.
In 2005,the PDAF Article provided that the PDAF shall be used "to fund
priority programs and projects under the ten point agenda of the national
government and shall be released directly to the implementing agencies." It
also introduced the program menu concept, which is essentially a list of
general programs and implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF
project may be subsequently chosen by the identifying authority. The 2005
GAA was re-enacted in 2006 and hence, operated on the same bases. In
similar regard, the program menu concept was consistently integrated into
the 2007, 2008,58 2009,59 and 201060 GAAs.
Textually, the PDAF Articles from 2002 to 2010 were silent with respect to
the specific amounts allocated for the individual legislators, as well as their
participation in the proposal and identification of PDAF projects to be funded.
In contrast to the PDAF Articles, however, the provisions under the DepEd
School Building Program and the DPWH budget, similar to its predecessors,
explicitly required prior consultation with the concerned Member of
Congress61anent certain aspects of project implementation.
Significantly, it was during this era that provisions which allowed formal
participation of non-governmental organizations (NGO) in the implementation
of government projects were introduced. In the Supplemental Budget for
2006, with respect to the appropriation for school buildings, NGOs were, by
law, encouraged to participate. For such purpose, the law stated that "the
amount of at least P250 Million of the P500 Million allotted for the
construction and completion of school buildings shall be made available to
NGOs including the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce
and Industry, Inc. for its "Operation Barrio School" program, with capability
and proven track records in the construction of public school buildings x x
x."62 The same allocation was made available to NGOs in the 2007 and
2009 GAAs under the DepEd Budget.63 Also, it was in 2007 that the
Government Procurement Policy Board64(GPPB) issued Resolution No. 12-
2007 dated June 29, 2007 (GPPB Resolution 12-2007), amending the
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
implementing rules and regulations65 of RA 9184,66 the Government
Procurement Reform Act, to include, as a form of negotiated procurement,67
the procedure whereby the Procuring Entity68 (the implementing agency)
may enter into a memorandum of agreement with an NGO, provided that "an
appropriation law or ordinance earmarks an amount to be specifically
contracted out to NGOs."
G. Present Administration (2010-Present).
Differing from previous PDAF Articles but similar to the CDF Articles, the
2011 PDAF Article included an express statement on lump-sum amounts
allocated for individual legislators and the Vice-President: Representatives
were given P70 Million each, broken down into P40 Million for "hard projects"
and P30 Million for "soft projects"; while P200 Million was given to each
Senator as well as the Vice-President, with a P100 Million allocation each for
"hard" and "soft projects." Likewise, a provision on realignment of funds was
included, but with the qualification that it may be allowed only once. The
same provision also allowed the Secretaries of Education, Health, Social
Welfare and Development, Interior and Local Government, Environment and
Natural Resources, Energy, and Public Works and Highways to realign
PDAF Funds, with the further conditions that: (a) realignment is within the
same implementing unit and same project category as the original project, for
infrastructure projects; (b) allotment released has not yet been obligated for
the original scope of work, and (c) the request for realignment is with the
concurrence of the legislator concerned.
In the 2012 and 2013 PDAF Articles, it is stated that the "identification of
projects and/or designation of beneficiaries shall conform to the priority list,
standard or design prepared by each implementing agency (priority list
requirement) x x x." However, as practiced, it would still be the individual
legislator who would choose and identify the project from the said priority list.
Provisions on legislator allocations as well as fund realignment were included
in the 2012 and 2013 PDAF Articles; but the allocation for the Vice-President,
which was pegged at P200 Million in the 2011 GAA, had been deleted. In
addition, the 2013 PDAF Article now allowed LGUs to be identified as
implementing agencies if they have the technical capability to implement the
projects. Legislators were also allowed to identify programs/projects, except
for assistance to indigent patients and scholarships, outside of his legislative
district provided that he secures the written concurrence of the legislator of
the intended outside-district, endorsed by the Speaker of the House. Finally,
any realignment of PDAF funds, modification and revision of project
identification, as well as requests for release of funds, were all required to be
favorably endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations and the
Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be
20 | P a g e
Basin on the stated, is PDAF constitutional? The court said, for 4 Reasons ,
NO!
1. PDAF violates the principle of SEPARATION OF POWERS.
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation
of powers and is thus unconstitutional. It must be clarified, however, that
since the restriction only pertains to "any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law," Congress may still exercise its oversight function
which is a mechanism of checks and balances that the Constitution itself
allows. But it must be made clear that Congress‘role must be confined to
mere oversight. Any post-enactment-measure allowing legislator participation
beyond oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis and hence, tantamount
to impermissible interference and/or assumption of executive functions.
The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is
indisputably a function both constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted
to the Executive branch of government. The Court explained that the phase
of budget execution "covers the various operational aspects of budgeting"
and accordingly includes "the evaluation of work and financial plans for
individual activities," the "regulation and release of funds" as well as all "other
related activities" that comprise the budget execution cycle. This is rooted in
the principle that the allocation of power in the three principal branches of
government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. Thus, unless the
Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive department should exclusively
exercise all roles and prerogatives which go into the implementation of the
national budget as provided under the GAA as well as any other
appropriation law.
In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of government, much more
any of its members, should not cross over the field of implementing the
national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the domain of
the Executive. The Court stated that "Congress enters the picture when it
deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President. Thereafter,
Congress, "in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom, formulates an
appropriation act precisely following the process established by the
Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid from the Treasury
except in accordance with an appropriation made by law." Upon approval
and passage of the GAA, Congress‘ law -making role necessarily comes to
an end and from there the Executive‘s role of implementing the national
budget begins. So as not to blur the constitutional boundaries between them,
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
Congress must "not concern it self with details for implementation by the
Executive
In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled
with inherent constitutional inconsistencies which similarly countervail against
a full resort to stare decisis. As may be deduced from the main conclusions
of the case, Philconsa‘s fundamental premise in allowing Members of
Congress to propose and identify of projects would be that the said
identification authority is but an aspect of the power of appropriation which
has been constitutionally lodged in Congress. From this premise, the
contradictions may be easily seen. If the authority to identify projects is an
aspect of appropriation and the power of appropriation is a form of legislative
power thereby lodged in Congress, then it follows that: (a) it is Congress
which should exercise such authority, and not its individual Members; (b)
such authority must be exercised within the prescribed procedure of law
passage and, hence, should not be exercised after the GAA has already
been passed; and (c) such authority, as embodied in the GAA, has the force
of law and, hence, cannot be merely recommendatory. Justice Vitug‘s
Concurring Opinion in the same case sums up the Philconsa quandary in this
wise: "Neither would it be objectionable for Congress, by law, to appropriate
funds for such specific projects as it may be minded; to give that authority,
however, to the individual members of Congress in whatever guise, I am
afraid, would be constitutionally impermissible." As the Court now largely
benefits from hindsight and current findings on the matter, among others, the
CoA Report, the Court must partially abandon its previous ruling in Philconsa
insofar as it validated the post-enactment identification authority of Members
of Congress on the guise that the same was merely recommendatory. This
postulate raises serious constitutional inconsistencies which cannot be
simply excused on the ground that such mechanism is "imaginative as it is
innovative." Moreover, it must be pointed out that the recent case of Abakada
Guro Party List v. Purisima155 (Abakada) has effectively overturned
Philconsa‘s allowance of post-enactment legislator participation in view of the
separation of powers principle. These constitutional inconsistencies and the
Abakada rule will be discussed in greater detail in the ensuing section of this
Decision.
2. Non-delegability of Legislative Power.
a. Statement of Principle.
As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle, legislative power shall be
exclusively exercised by the body to which the Constitution has conferred the
same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that
such power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
21 | P a g e
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent
reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum. Based
on this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting as a bicameral body,
and the people, through the process of initiative and referendum, may
constitutionally wield legislative power and no other.
In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar
as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators,
violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively
allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which – as settled
in Philconsa – is lodged in Congress.201 That the power to appropriate must
be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
From this premise, the contradictions may be easily seen. If the authority to
identify projects is an aspect of appropriation and the power of appropriation
is a form of legislative power thereby lodged in Congress, then it follows that:
(a) it is Congress which should exercise such authority, and not its individual
Members; (b) such authority must be exercised within the prescribed
procedure of law passage and, hence, should not be exercised after the GAA
has already been passed; and (c) such authority, as embodied in the GAA,
has the force of law and, hence, cannot be merely recommendatory
3. Checks and Balances.
a. Statement of Principle; Item-Veto Power.
The fact that the three great powers of government are intended to be kept
separate and distinct does not mean that they are absolutely unrestrained
and independent of each other. The Constitution has also provided for an
elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the
workings of the various departments of the government.
If the congress enacts a very weird law, the president can veto it as a whole,
but in appropriation the president can veto items to still enable the other parts
of GAA for enactment.
in the current x x x system where the PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation, the
legislator‘s identification of the projects after the passage of the GAA denies
the President the chance to veto that item later on
, they submit that the "item veto power of the President mandates that
appropriations bills adopt line-item budgeting" and that "Congress cannot
choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-
given power of the President useless.
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a
collective allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided
among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum
allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF
funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations
are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of
the law, it necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation
would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus
effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-
enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a
budget within a budget" which subverts the prescribed procedure of
presentment and consequently impairs the President‘s power of item veto.
As petitioners aptly point out, the above-described system forces the
President to decide between (a) accepting the entire P24.79 Billion PDAF
allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may
or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole
PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.215
Moreover, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature,
the 2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since it would
then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation above-
characterized. In particular, the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be
treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending,
i.e., scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of
historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc. This setup
connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes
of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily
indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the President‘s power of
item veto.
4. Local Autonomy.
In the cases at bar, petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork Barrel
goes against the constitutional principles on local autonomy since it allows
district representatives, who are national officers, to substitute their
judgments in utilizing public funds for local development. The Court agrees
with petitioners.
Philconsa described the 1994 CDF as an attempt "to make equal the
unequal" and that "it is also a recognition that individual members of
Congress, far more than the President and their congressional colleagues,
are likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective
constituents and the priority to be given each project."Drawing strength from
this pronouncement, previous legislators justified its existence by stating that
22 | P a g e
"the relatively small projects implemented under the Congressional Pork
Barrel complement and link the national development goals to the
countryside and grassroots as well as to depressed areas which are
overlooked by central agencies which are preoccupied with mega-projects.
Similarly, in his August 23, 2013 speech on the "abolition" of PDAF and
budgetary reforms, President Aquino mentioned that the Congressional Pork
Barrel was originally established for a worthy goal, which is to enable the
representatives to identify projects for communities that the LGU concerned
cannot afford.
Notwithstanding these declarations, the Court, however, finds an inherent
defect in the system which actually belies the avowed intention of "making
equal the unequal." In particular, the Court observes that the gauge of PDAF
and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without
taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the
legislator represents. In this regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly
not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or
geographic indicators have been taken into consideration. As a result, a
district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount
of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural province which
would be relatively "underdeveloped" compared to the former. To add, what
rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives
– and in some years, even the Vice-President – who do not represent any
locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well. These
certainly are anathema to the Congressional Pork Barrel‘s original intent
which is "to make equal the unequal." Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF had
become personal funds under the effective control of each legislator and
given unto them on the sole account of their office.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the
CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development
Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated to "assist the
corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social
development, and coordinating development efforts within its territorial
jurisdiction.” Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are
essentially geared towards managing local affairs, their programs, policies
and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual
legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority
except only when acting as a body. The undermining effect on local
autonomy caused by the post-enactment authority conferred to the latter was
succinctly put by petitioners in the following wise:
With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development
council and initiate projects on his own, and even take sole credit for its
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execution. Indeed, this type of personality-driven project identification has not
only contributed little to the overall development of the district, but has even
contributed to "further weakening infrastructure planning and coordination
efforts of the government."
Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely
local matters and thereby subvert genuine local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF
Article as well as all other similar forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is
deemed unconstitutional.
Among others, an accountability mechanism with which the proper
expenditure of public funds may be checked is the power of congressional
oversight. As mentioned in Abakada, congressional oversight may be
performed either through: (a) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of
appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its
power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either
of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of
confirmation; or (b) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of
laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation.
The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some
forms of Congressional Pork Barrel, among others the 2013 PDAF Article,
has an effect on congressional oversight. The fact that individual legislators
are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget makes it
difficult for them to become disinterested "observers" when scrutinizing,
investigating or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law. To a
certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators,
who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking
on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, it must be pointed out
that this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of
Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that:
Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may
personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the
Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither
shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or
in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-
owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office.
He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for
his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of
his office.
23 | P a g e
Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project
implementation – a matter before another office of government – renders
them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.
What are the other limitations?
Under article XI
Section 16. No loan, guaranty, or other for of financial accommodation for
any business purpose may be granted directly or indirectly, by, any
government-owned or controlled bank or financial institution to the President,
the vice president, the members of the cabinet, the congress, the supreme
court, and the constitutional commissions, the ombudsman, or to any firm or
entity in which they have controlling interest, during their tenure.
Section 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and
as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under
oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the
Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme
Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices, and
officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be
disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law.
So this is the Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Networks, kinda uso
because of the allegations to the chairman of the comelec
Section 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
shall, upon assumption of office, make a full disclosure of their financial and
business interests. They shall notify the House concerned of a potential
conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of
which they are authors.
What is the purpose? So the public can monitor the status of your wealth
(mingsaka ba or wala?)
So we have a law RA 6713
Section 8. Statements and Disclosure. — Public officials and employees
have an obligation to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of, and
the public has the right to know, their assets, liabilities, net worth and
financial and business interests including those of their spouses and of
unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their
households
.
Where do you file your SALN?
The documents must be filed:
(a) within thirty (30) days after assumption of office;
(b) on or before April 30, of every year thereafter; and
(c) within thirty (30) days after separation from the service.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I TSN- ATTY. GIL GARCIA III
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
All public officials and employees required under this section to file the
aforestated documents shall also execute, within thirty (30) days from the
date of their assumption of office, the necessary authority in favor of the
Ombudsman to obtain from all appropriate government agencies, including
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, such documents as may show their assets,
liabilities, net worth, and also their business interests and financial
connections in previous years, including, if possible, the year when they first
assumed any office in the Government. Husband and wife who are both
public officials or employees may file the required statements jointly or
separately.
The Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and the Disclosure of
Business Interests and Financial Connections shall be filed by:
(1) Constitutional and national elective officials, with the national office of the
Ombudsman;
(2) Senators and Congressmen, with the Secretaries of the Senate and the
House of Representatives, respectively; Justices, with the Clerk of Court of
the Supreme Court; Judges, with the Court Administrator; and all national
executive officials with the Office
of the President;.
What if you violate with the rules?
Section 11. Penalties. — (a) Any public official or employee, regardless of
whether or not he holds office or employment in a casual, temporary,
holdover, permanent or regular capacity, committing any violation of this Act
shall be punished with a fine not exceeding the equivalent of six (6) months'
salary or suspension not exceeding one (1) year, or removal depending on
the gravity of the offense after due notice and hearing by the appropriate
body or agency. If the violation is punishable by a heavier penalty under
another law, he shall be prosecuted under the latter statute. Violations of
Sections 7, 8 or 9 of this Act shall be punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding five (5) years, or a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos
(P5,000), or both, and, in the discretion of the court of competent jurisdiction,
disqualification to hold public office.
(b) Any violation hereof proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall be
sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of a public official or employee, even
if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him. (c) Private individuals who
participate in conspiracy as co-principals, accomplices or accessories, with
public officials or employees, in violation of this Act, shall be subject to the
same penal liabilities as the public officials or employees and shall be tried
jointly with them.
(d) The official or employee concerned may bring an action against any
person who obtains or uses a report for any purpose prohibited by Section 8
24 | P a g e
(D) of this Act. The Court in which such action is brought may assess against
such person a penalty in any amount not to exceed twenty-five thousand
pesos (P25,000.00). If another sanction hereunder or under any other law is
heavier, the latter shall apply.
And since, SALN is submitted together with an oath, violators can be
prosecuted of perjuiry.
Now let us go to the composition of officers in the houses of congress.
Section 16. (1). The Senate shall elect its President and the House of
Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective
Members. Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary.
[G.R. No. 134577. November 18, 1998]
SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN. FRANCISCO S. TATAD,
petitioners, vs. SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN. MARCELO
B. FERNAN, respondents.
The Facts
On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Nominated by Sen.
Blas F. Ople to the position of Senate President was Sen. Marcelo B.
Fernan. Sen. Francisco S. Tatad was also nominated to the same position by
Sen. Miriam Defensor Santiago. By a vote of 20 to 2,Senator Fernan was
declared the duly elected President of the Senate.
The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore,
and Sen. Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader.
Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator
Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming
the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for
Senator Fernan comprised the majority, while only those who had voted for
him, the losing nominee, belonged to the minority.
During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate minority, Sen.
Juan M. Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-
UMDP Party -- numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a minority -- had chosen
Senator Guingona as the minority leader. No consensus on the matter was
arrived at. The following session day, the debate on the question continued,
with Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the third
session day, the Senate met in caucus, but still failed to resolve the issue.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body that he was in
receipt of a letter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating
that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I TSN- ATTY. GIL GARCIA III
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the
minority leader of the Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the
subject petition for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona
had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate
minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to
Senator Tatad
Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition? YES
In light of the aforesaid allegations of petitioners, it is clear that this Court has
jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the
Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a
violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise
of their functions and prerogatives.
But in this case, is there a violation of the constitution? The court said there
was NONE!
The method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative
of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional
provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself,
not by this Court.
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate
President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of
selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress.All that the Charter
says is that [e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary.
Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts
of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of
separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the
legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do
its work. In this case no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to
exist, then the legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to
fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts may
intervene.
Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such officers as
it may deem. And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to
prescribe the parameters for the exercise of this prerogative. This Court has
no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm,
without running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and
uphold -- the very duty that justifies the Courts being. Constitutional respect
and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents
this Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. To repeat, this
25 | P a g e
Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and
judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.
Article 6, section 16, paragraph 2
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a
smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the
attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under such penalties,
as such House may provide.
AVELINO v CUENCO
Here there 23 senators in the Philippines, 1 is in the US. 22 participated in
the deliberations in the senate. Because 1 is in the hospital and 1 is in the
USA. 12 of them out of 22 continued to session and voted for a new senate
president, 10 of them contested the validity of the election because according
to them it did not met the quorum.
Now? Where do we base our quorum? Is it base on 12 out of 24 or is it 12
out of 23
12 0ut of 23 why?
When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall
constitute aquorum, "the House: does not mean "all" the members. Even a
majority of all the members constitute "the House”. There is a difference
between a majority of "the House", the latter requiring less number than the
first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate
less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the
purpose of a quorum furthermore than even if the twelve did not constitute a
quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent
members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt a Quorum..
In other words, was there the majority required by the Constitution for the
transaction of the business of the Senate? Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and
Bengzon say there was, firstly because the minute say so, secondly,
because at the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen
senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in
view of the absence from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve
senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twelve three senators.
The senator that is in the USA cannot be arrested or compelled by the
senate thus excluding him from the vote but if the absent senator is within the
jurisdiction of the Philippines then the senate can order the attendance.
(3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its
Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of
all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when
imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I TSN- ATTY. GIL GARCIA III
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
ARROYO vs. DE VENECIA
This involves an issue of law on amending the TAX LAWS on the process.
This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of
Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called sin taxes (actually specific
taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes.
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this
suit against respondents Jose de Venecia, Speaker of the House of
Representatives, Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, Majority Leader Rodolfo
Albano, the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Finance, and the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, charging violation of the rules of the
House which petitioners claim are constitutionally mandated so that their
violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill
was approved on third reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on
September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain
amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral
conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of
the House and Senate versions of the bill.
The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8
a.m. on November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel
Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to
deliver his sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellated. Rep.
Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep.
Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected
to the motion and asked for a head count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy
Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of a quorum.[1] Rep. Arroyo
appealed the ruling of the Chair, but his motion was defeated when put to a
vote. The interpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the
respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally
passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November
21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos
on November 22, 1996.
Petitioners claim that there are actually four different versions of the
transcript of this portion of Rep. Arroyos interpellation: (1) the transcript of
audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the session hall immediately
after the session adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996, which
26 | P a g e
petitioner Rep. Edcel C. Lagman obtained from the operators of the sound
system; (2) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of
November 21, 1996, as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on
November 21, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; (3) the transcript of the
proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996 as certified
by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 28, 1996, also
obtained by Rep. Lagman; and (4) the published version abovequoted.
According to petitioners, the four versions differ on three points, to wit: (1) in
the audio-sound recording the word approved, which appears on line 13 in
the three other versions, cannot be heard; (2) in the transcript certified on
November 21, 1996 the word no on line 17 appears only once, while in the
other versions it is repeated three times; and (3) the published version does
not contain the sentence (Y)ou better prepare for a quorum because I will
raise the question of the quorum, which appears in the other versions.
Q: Is the law invalid?
A: The law is valid!
It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated
in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of
the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law,
i.e., Art. VI, 26-27. Petitioners do not claim that there was no quorum but only
that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation of the rules of the House, Rep.
Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.
Can the court inquire if the legislative department is no in compliance with
their own rules? The court said as a GR, It cannot. . The failure of the
legislature to properly weigh and consider an act, its passage through the
legislature in a hasty manner, might be reasons for the governor withholding
his signature thereto; but this alone, even though it is shown to be a violation
of a rule which the legislature had made to govern its own proceedings, could
be no reason for the courts refusing its enforcement after it was actually
passed by a majority of each branch of the legislature, and duly signed by
the governor. The courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on
account of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself to govern its
deliberations.
Mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action
(taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have
agreed to a particular measure.
Again as a general rule, courts do not take cognizance on the legislative
parliamentary rules with the exception that if the said rules affect other than
the members of the body, or affects private rights then the validity of that
conduct is now open to question..
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I TSN- ATTY. GIL GARCIA III
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles
in constitutional law is that the courts do not involve themselves with nor
delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive concern of
the legislative branch of the government. When the validity of a statute is
challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to
determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of
legislative power. No such transgression has been shown in this case.
GARCILLANO v THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
So have here garcillano tapes , there were questions to the validity of the
election of Gloria Arroyo because of the leaked conversations between her
and a comelec commissioner. There was a senate inquiry pursuant to that
expose. Now, there was a question as to the validity of thati inquiry,
according to them, the inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in
clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.
So are the proceedings, pursuant to that inquiry valid?
The court said NO!
The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned
legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear
derogation of the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that [t]he
Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. The requisite of publication of the rules is
intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. Publication is
indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise
burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no
notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitutes publication
is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that [l]aws shall take
effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the
Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
The senators argued that they have already published rules before so even if
not published this year it will be still carried in effect.
The court said: that cannot be done!
Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in
accordance with the duly published rules of procedure. We quote the OSGs
explanation:
The phrase duly published rules of procedure requires the Senate of every
Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of
legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it.
27 | P a g e
Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the
Senates membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the
end of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it
may deem fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject
hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14th Senate, are therefore,
procedurally infirm.
The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a continuing
legislative body. The present Senate has twenty-four members, twelve of
whom are elected every three years for a term of six years each. Thus, the
term of twelve Senators expires every three years, leaving less than a
majority of Senators to continue into the next Congress.
On the nature of the Senate as a continuing body, this Court sees fit to issue
a clarification. Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is
continuing, as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national election or
change in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its
day-to-day business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and
independently of the Senate of the Congress before it.
All pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even legislative
investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are considered
terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on
the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters,
not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time.
The logic and practicality of such a rule is readily apparent considering that
the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will typically have a different
composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound by the
acts and deliberations of the Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate
is a continuing body even with respect to the conduct of its business, then
pending matters will not be deemed terminated with the expiration of one
Congress but will, as a matter of course, continue into the next Congress
with the same status.
How about the argument that the senate did not amend the prior published
rules so they can stiil use it.
The courts said that is of no merit. The absence of any amendment to the
rules cannot justify the Senates defiance of the clear and unambiguous
language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law
instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of
procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not these rules
have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to
publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed
by the Senate.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I TSN- ATTY. GIL GARCIA III
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
DELA PAZ vs.SENATE
This case talks about PNP officials caught in Russia who have bundles of
Euros because of that the Senate conduct investigation. So the police
questions the conduct or the propriety of the proceedings
), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states:
"Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings."
This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary
authority to the Houses of Congress in the formulation, adoption and
promulgation of its own rules. As such, the exercise of this power is generally
exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing
of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial
of due process.
The challenge to the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
raised by petitioner in the case at bench, in effect, asks this Court to inquire
into a matter that is within the full discretion of the Senate. The issue
partakes of the nature of a political question that, in Tañada v. Cuenco,5 was
characterized as a question which, under the Constitution, is to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government. Further, pursuant to this constitutional grant of
virtually unrestricted authority to determine its own rules, the Senate is at
liberty to alter or modify these rules at any time it may see fit, subject only to
the imperatives of quorum, voting and publication.
Thus, it is not for this Court to intervene in what is clearly a question of policy,
an issue dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of the Senate’s action.
How about on the issue that can the court acquire jurisdiction?
The propriety of the inquiry is within the political sphere, thus the court
cannot interfere.
The court said it cannot, Even if it is within the Court’s power to inquire into
the validity of the exercise of jurisdiction over the petitioners by the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, the court is convinced that respondent
Committee has acted within the proper sphere of its authority.
The Philippine Senate has decided that the legislative inquiry will be jointly
conducted by the respondent Committee and the Senate Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon Committee).
Pursuant to paragraph 36, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules, the Blue
Ribbon Committee may conduct investigations on all matters relating to
malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance in office by officers and
employees of the government, its branches, agencies, subdivisions and
instrumentalities, and on any matter of public interest on its own initiative or
28 | P a g e
brought to its attention by any of its members. It is, thus, beyond cavil that
the Blue Ribbon Committee can investigate Gen. Dela Paz, a retired PNP
general and member of the official PNP delegation to the INTERPOL
Conference in Russia, who had with him millions which may have been
sourced from public funds.
Philippine Senate has already published its Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in two newspapers of general circulation.
The arrest order issued against the petitioners has been rendered ineffectual.
In the legislative inquiry held on November 15, 2008, jointly by the
respondent Committee and the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, Gen. Dela
Paz voluntarily appeared and answered the questions propounded by the
Committee members. Having submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
Senate Committees, there was no longer any necessity to implement the
order of arrest. Furthermore, in the same hearing, Senator Santiago granted
the motion of Gen. Dela Paz to dispense with the presence of Mrs. Dela Paz
for humanitarian considerations.9 Consequently, the order for her arrest was
effectively withdrawn.
Article 3 Section 16 Paragraph 3
Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members
for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its
Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when
imposed, shall not exceed sixty days
ALEJANDRINO v QUEZON
Honorable Jose Alejandrino, Senator for the Twelfth District, be, as he is
hereby declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of the
privileges of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted the Honorable
Vicente de Vera, Senator for the Sixth District on the occasion of the debate
regarding the credentials of said Mr. Alejandrino
Honorable Jose Alejandrino be, as he is hereby, deprived of all of his
prerogatives, privileges and emoluments as such Senator during one year
from the first of January, nineteen hundred and twenty-four;
May the Supreme Court of the Philippines Islands by mandamus and
injunction annul the suspension of Senator Alejandrino and compel the
Philippine Senate to reinstate him in his official position? NO!
The general rule of mandamus to be, that the writ will not lie from one branch
of the government to a coordinate branch, for the very obvious reason that
neither is inferior to the other. Mandamus will not lie against the legislative
body, its members, or its officers, to compel the performance of duties purely
legislative in their character which therefore pertain to their legislative,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I TSN- ATTY. GIL GARCIA III
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
functions and over which they have exclusive control. The courts cannot
dictate action in this respect without a gross usurpation of power. So it has
been held that there where a member has been expelled by the legislative
body, the courts have no power, irrespective of whether the expulsion was
right or wrong, to issue a mandate to compel his reinstatement. So even if
the punishment is not in accordance with the rules. The court still cannot
interfere because of the separation of powers.
OSMEÑA, JR., vs. PENDATUN
So remember this case where Osmena was investigated because of his
statements against the president, he was investigated if he can be
administratively liable. So he went to the Supreme Court to stop the
resolution.
Can the supreme court stop or nullify the resolution.
The SC said it CANNOT!
The power to discipline its member belongs solely to the legislative
department.
Under our form of government, the judicial department has no power to
revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department,
or of either house thereof, taking in pursuance of the power committed
exclusively to that department by the Constitution. It has been held by high
authority that, even in the absence of an express provision conferring the
power, every legislative body in which is vested the general legislative power
of the state has the implied power to expel a member for any cause which it
may deem sufficient
This power is inherent in every legislative body; that it is necessary to the to
enable the body 'to perform its high functions, and is necessary to the safety
of the state;' 'That it is a power of self-protection, and that the legislative body
must necessarily be the sole judge of the exigency which may justify and
require its exercise. '. . .
There is no provision authority courts to control, direct, supervise, or forbid
the exercise by either house of the power to expel a member. These powers
are functions of the legislative department and therefore, in the exercise of
the power this committed to it, the senate is supreme. An attempt by this
court to direct or control the legislature, or either house thereof, in the
exercise of the power, would be an attempt to exercise legislative functions,
which it is expressly forbidden to do.
SANTIAGO, v. SANDIGANBAYAN
29 | P a g e
This is in the nature of preventive suspension.
When Santiago when she was still the Commissioner of the Comission of
Immigration and Deportation she was complained of the violation of RA
3019 or the anti graft and corrupt practices act in the Sandiganbayan while
the case was pending, Santiago was elected as senator.
Now the Sandiganbayan, ordered to preventively suspend Santiago while
being the senator at that time
Now Santiago argued that the Sandiganbayan cannot do that because
according to the constitution, only the congress can suspend her. According
to Article 3 Section 16 Paragraph 3
Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members
for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its
Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when
imposed, shall not exceed sixty days
Is she correct? The Court said NO!
The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from
the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution
which provides that each-
x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members
for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its
Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when
imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a
punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the
house of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member.
Thus, in its resolution in the case of Ceferino Paredes, Jr., vs.
Sandiganbayan, et al.,[18] the Court affirmed the order of suspension of
Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on
the encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of congress. The Court
ruled:
x x x. Petitioners invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution
which deals with the power of each House of Congress inter alia to punish its
Members for disorderly behavior, and suspend or expel a Member by a vote
of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of
suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days is unavailing, as it
appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of
RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure,
prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for
misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives.
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer
concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
committed the acts with which he has been charged.Thus, it has been held
that the use of the word office would indicate that it applies to any office
which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office
under which he stands accused.
The nature of the Preventive suspension is not even a punishment, it is only
a preventive measure where the preventively suspended person is prevented
to influence the proceeding nor he can touch the evidence to provide a just
decision.
(4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time
publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect
national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request
of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal. Each House
shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
The enrolled bill doctrine, a bill signed by the Speaker of the House and the
Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of
Congress that it was passed and forwarded to the president.
What is its importance? Enrolled bill is conclusive as to its contents.
So if there was a challenge of the conclusiveness of a bill and if it was an
enrolled bill, it will be difficult.
ARROYO vs. DE VENECIA
This involves an issue of law on amending the TAX LAWS on the process.
This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of
Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called sin taxes (actually specific
taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes.
Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of
the House and the President of the Senate and the certification by the
secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21,
1996 are conclusive of its due enactment.
The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is cited
with approval by text writers here and abroad.[44] The enrolled bill rule rests
on the following considerations:
. . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by
Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and
having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President,
carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive
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departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of
enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress.
The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are
required by the Constitution to be recorded therein. With respect to other
matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also
been accorded conclusive effect. As already noted, the bill which became
R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence its due enactment has been
duly proven.
Farinas v. Executive Secretary
Remember the law which tackles the status of the elective and appointive
official with respect to the filing of COC? The law was questioned on its due
enactment.
The court applied the enrolled bill doctrine and adhered to this rule.
ABAKADA vs. PURISIMA
This case involves petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from
implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 93352 (Attrition Act of 2005)
which was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of
Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards
and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund)
and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service,
regardless of employment status.
This involves the legislative veto. Take note of this case.
So in the provision this law, when the law is passed , the implementing body
can now make an IRR or the execution but shall be valid upon approval of
the joint oversight committee of the congress. Under section 12 of the LAW
Is that provision constitutional?
The SC said it is no constitutional.
The provision of the law violates the presentment clause and bicameralism. It
held that the one-house veto was essentially legislative in purpose and effect
Where Congress delegates the formulation of rules to implement the law it
has enacted pursuant to sufficient standards established in the said law, the
law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves
the hands of the legislature. And it may be deemed to have left the hands of
the legislature when it becomes effective because it is only upon effectivity of
the statute that legal rights and obligations become available to those entitled
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)

by the language of the statute. Subject to the indispensable requisite of

publication under the due process clause,61 the determination as to when a
law takes effect is wholly the prerogative of Congress.62 As such, it is only
upon its effectivity that a law may be executed and the executive branch
acquires the duties and powers to execute the said law. Before that point, the
role of the executive branch, particularly of the President, is limited to
approving or vetoing the law.63
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation
of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that
requires Congress or its members to approve the implementing rules of a law
after it has already taken effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision
that allows Congress or its members to overturn any directive or ruling made
by the members of the executive branch charged with the implementation of
the law

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I TSN- ATTY. GIL GARCIA III
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)

August 14, 2017
-Victor
ABAKADA vs PURISIMA
This case involved an Attrition law or RA 9335 which optimized the revenue
generation capability of the BIR and BOC. There’s a provision of this law
which provides for the creation of a Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee under Section 12, it is composed of 7 members of the Senate and
7 members of the House of Representatives and the function of this
committee is to approve the IRR of the law.
SEC. 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. – There is hereby
created a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee composed of seven
Members from the Senate and seven Members from the House of
Representatives. The Members from the Senate shall be appointed by the
Senate President, with at least two senators representing the minority. The
Members from the House of Representatives shall be appointed by the
Speaker with at least two members representing the minority. After the
Oversight Committee will have approved the implementing rules and
regulations (IRR) it shall thereafter become functus officio and therefore
cease to exist.
Is this provision valid?
The Supreme Court said that this provision is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Why?
The requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to
approval by Congress as a condition for their effectivity violates the cardinal
constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule on presentment.
These are the violations which rendered the provision
UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
 Violation of the Concept of Bicameralism
 Violation of the Rule on Presentment
 Violation of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers
 Violation of the Supreme Court’s power to pass upon the legality of
an IRR
What are these principles?
1. Concept of Bicameralism, Art VI Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution
provides:
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum.
So, as to the concept of bicameralism, the court said that Congress is
composed of two chambers, the Senate and the HOR. And the valid exercise
of legislative power which is to propose, enact, or amend and repeal laws
requires the act of both chambers. It cannot be exercised solely by one of the
two chambers nor by the committee of either or both chambers.
Assuming the validity of a legislative veto, just like in Section 12, na pwede
mag veto sa legislature ang IRR. This veto done by a single chamber or a
congressional committee is INVALID!
Now, what about the bicamercal conference committee. Diba committee pud
siya to reconcile the provisions of law? Ngano dili man ni siya invalid? It is
because the product of this committee is scrutinized, meaning gina pass ra
na siya sa Congress to deliberate dili i-take tung report as is. Unlike here
(Sec. 12), naay power ang committee to disapprove the IRR, and dili na siya
kailangan muagi sa body itself. So according to the Supreme Court, that
cannot be done.
2. It also violates the rule on presentment which is the presentation of
as
the bill or the approval of the President under Sec. 27 of Art VI of the
Constitution which provides:
Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it
becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same,
he shall sign it, otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I TSN- ATTY. GIL GARCIA III
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections
at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such
reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to
pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House
by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all
the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the
votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of
the members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The
President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it
originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it
shall become a law as if he had signed it.
So, every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President for
approval or veto. In the absence of presentment to the President, no bill
passed by Congress can become a law. In this sense, law-making under the
Constitution is a joint act of the Legislature and of the Executive. Assuming
that legislative veto is a valid legislative act with the force of law, it cannot
take effect without such presentment even if approved by both chambers of
Congress.
Since this provision bypasses the veto of the President, kay ning-agi naman
siya, valid naman ang law tapos himu-an naman siya’g IRR. Now, i-present
napud sa Congress ang IRR kung valid, dili na siya muagi sa President kung
iyaha bang i-approve ang Act na atong committee, then it violates now the
rule on presentment.
So there are TWO STEPS according to the Supreme Court for a bill
becomes a law.
 First, it must be approved by both Houses of Congress.
 Second, it must be presented to and approved by the President.
As summarized by Justice Isagani Cruz and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., the
following is the procedure for the approval of bills:
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 A bill is introduced by any member of the House of Representatives
or the Senate except for some measures that must originate only in
the former chamber.
 The first reading involves only a reading of the number and title of
the measure and its referral by the Senate President or the Speaker
to the proper committee for study.
 The bill may be "killed" in the committee or it may be recommended
for approval, with or without amendments, sometimes after public
hearings are first held thereon. If there are other bills of the same
nature or purpose, they may all be consolidated into one bill under
common authorship or as a committee bill.
 Once reported out, the bill shall be calendared for second reading. It
is at this stage that the bill is read in its entirety, scrutinized, debated
upon and amended when desired. The second reading is the most
important stage in the passage of a bill.
 The bill as approved on second reading is printed in its final form and
copies thereof are distributed at least three days before the third
reading. On the third reading, the members merely register their
votes and explain them if they are allowed by the rules. No further
debate is allowed.
 Once the bill passes third reading, it is sent to the other chamber,
where it will also undergo the three readings. If there are differences
between the versions approved by the two chambers, a conference
committee58 representing both Houses will draft a compromise
measure that if ratified by the Senate and the House of
Representatives will then be submitted to the President for his
consideration.
 The bill is enrolled when printed as finally approved by the Congress,
thereafter authenticated with the signatures of the Senate President,
the Speaker, and the Secretaries of their respective chambers.
The President’s role in law-making.
 The final step is submission to the President for approval. Once
approved, it takes effect as law after the required publication.
3. It also violates the doctrine of separation of powers.
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation
of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Here, himu-on na sa executive ang
IRR, meaning i-pacheck balik sa Congress. This provisions requires
Congress or its members to approve the IRR after it has already taken effect
is unconstitutional because it allows members of Congress to overturn any
directive or ruling made by the Executive branch which is charge to the
implementation of the law.
And this brings us to the concept of Legislative Veto, that is what Section 12
is.
Legislative Veto – is a statutory provision requiring the President or an
administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules and
regulations (IRR) of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a
committee formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove
such regulations before they take effect.
So mura siya’g si President na mu approve or disapprove. According to the
Supreme Court, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight
committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation designed to
attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and
investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated
broad powers. So murag gina limit sa Congress ang power aning Executive
Department kay ipabalik pa siya for approval, whatever has already done
pursuant to the implementation of that law. It entrusts to Congress a direct
role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws, thereby violated the
Principle of Separation of Powers.
4. Moreover, it also violates upon Supreme Court’s power to pass
upon the legality of an IRR which is created by the Executive.
As a general rule, IRR only can be questioned in a proper forum or courts, if
unconstitutional ba siya or dili. This provision bypasses the procedure
because that power to approve the IRR if it is legal, illegal or constitutional, is
within the powers of the Court to decide not the Congress itself. In exercising
34 | P a g e
discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of
whether or not they conformed with the provisions of RA 9335, Congress
arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power exclusively vested in this Court
by the Constitution.
xxxx
Probative Value of the Journal
We discussed before that there are some entries in the Constitution na
kailangan i-sulat sa journal.
US vs PONS
Pons was charged with the crime of illegal importation of opium. This violates
certain law Act 2381. So in order to escape liability, Pons wanted to prove
that this law was enacted on March 1, 1914 but the law itself says and its
journals say na it was approved on 28 th day of February, kung kanus-a nag
close ang Congress. So siya, he is going against the entries of the journal by
his own extraneous evidence on March 31. Because March 31 gi approve
ang law, and February 28 wala na nag session ang Congress, it was invalid
though because it was approved when the Congress was no longer in
session.
So, kinsa ang tuohan, the entries in the journal which states na February 28
gi enact ang law, meaning naa pay session ang Congress or si Pons, na
naga ingon na March 1 gi approve ang law na wala na naga session ang
Congress and therefore the law daw at the time it was approved is invalid.
The Court of course believed the entries of the legislative journals. Whether
the courts take judicial notice of the journals, the court said yes, the result is
that the law and the adjudicated cases give or naay mga decisions nga gi
invoke sa Supreme Court which states the court takes judicial notice of the
journals. These journals are not ambiguous or contradictory as to the actual
time of the adjournment. They show, with absolute certainty, that the
Legislature adjourned sine die at 12 o'clock midnight on February 28, 1914.
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
Now, in order to prove that the law was passed on March 1, this would
depend on the memory and the recollection of witnesses while on the other
kung tuohan nato ang journal, these are acts of the government or the
sovereign itself. So the court said, that they have to rely on the journals or
has permanent memorials rather than the recollection of witnesses.
From their very nature and object the records of the Legislature are as
important as those of the judiciary, and to inquiry into the veracity of the
journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as we have said, clear
and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic
laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to
invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to
interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. So as a
general rule, the court cannot go against the entries of the journal, and
cannot go to extrinsic evidence to prove otherwise. In fact, these records are,
as a general rule, unimpeachable.
Matters required to be entered in the Journal
a. Yeas and nays on third and final reading of a bill (Art. VI, Sec. 6 [2])
b. Veto Message of the President (Art. VI Sec. 27 [1])
c. Yeas and nays on the repassing of a bill vetoed by the President
(Art. VI Sec. 7)
d. Yeas and nays on any question at the request of 1/5 of members
present (Art. VI Sec. 16 [4])
e. Summary of Proceedings
Question: What if there is a clash or conflict between the ENTREES IN
THE JOURNAL and the ENROLLED BILL?
ASTORGA vs VILLEGAS
So there was a law here, which originated from the lower house. And then,
there were amendments introduced by Senator Roxas. Now, Senator
Tolentino has also its own amendments to the law. The amendments
recommended by Senator Roxas do not appear in the journal, as having
35 | P a g e
been acted upon. And then, when the law was passed, it was passed by
Senate with amendments, and this letter sent to the House of
Representatives naka attach didto not the amendments of Senator Tolentino,
but the amendments of Senator Roxas. Pero in the journal, walay nakasulat
didto nga naay amendments nga gi introduce si Senator Roxas, pero pag
approve sa law, naay letter nga naka attach didto and ang kay Senator
Roxas nga amendments ang gi adopt, and not that of Tolentino which was
one actually approved by the Senate.
And so there was an issue as to the validity of the law, in fact gipang disown
sa Senate President kay wrong version of the bill daw ang gipasa sa Senate
because it did not embody the amendments introduced and approved by the
Senate.
So was the law valid? No.
The court said here the rationale of the enrolled bill theory:
It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the
President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of
the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in
obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass
Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives
his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a
bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and
unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not
passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of
State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the
United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and
executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the
duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress.
The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the
judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having
passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so
authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.
So kamo paghatag sa President, it’s already an enrolled bill. So, dapat
conclusive jud siya as to the contents thereof.
Was the enrolled bill theory followed here? No. So mu-resort sa journal.
The court said here that Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the
presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment,
required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-equal department of the
government, is neutralized in this case by the fact that the Senate
President declared his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a
subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant
that the bill he had signed had never been approved by the Senate.
Otherwise, gi retract ni Senate President ang iyang pirma. The court further
stated that, this declaration should be accorded even greater respect than
the attestation it invalidated, which it did for a reason that is undisputed in
fact and indisputable in logic.
So because of that, ma negate ang enrolled bill theory kay kung kinsa tung ni
pirma didto, gibawi niya ang iyahang pirma.
The court held that, if the attestation is absent and the same is not
required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the
journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment,
as what happened here.
What did the journals reveal here?
Inconsistent with how the law was approved, the journal discloses that
substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and
approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to
the President and signed by him. Therefore, the court said that the bill was
not duly enacted and therefore it did not become a law.
FIELD VS. CLARK
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This is involved their own tariff law on goods imported by the person here.
Now he alleged that the enrolled act, which was in the custody of Secretary
of State of US is missing a certain section. And this Section 13 is evidence
daw by the Congressional records of the proceedings and reports of
committees of houses and reports and committees of conferences. Now he
wanted to prove that the enrolled act is missing a specific section, not basing
on the enrolled bill itself but based on extrinsic evidences, such as
proceedings, committee reports, etc.
So, who who to believe? Should the law be declared null and void based on
evidence of the congressional record of the proceedings, and etc?
The court said that no, it believed the enrolled bill here. The enrolled act,
authenticated by the signature of the presiding officers is sufficient. It is a
conclusive proof that the enactment with the contents of the law and could
not be contradicted by the legislative journals or in any other mode. So there
is only a limited instance that the journal will prevail against the enrolled bill.
Why does the enrolled bill so persuasive?
It is because if dili nato i-follow ang bill and we’ll resort to extrinsic evidence
or other theories nalang, it suggests a deliberate conspiracy to which the
presiding officers, the committees on enrolled bills, and the clerks of the two
houses must necessarily be parties, all acting with a common purpose to
defeat an expression of the popular will in the mode prescribed by the
Constitution. So instead na kana nga way of thinking, may pag mutoo nalang
ta aning enrolled bill no, which says that the law is in this form.
What is the effect of the Enrolled bill to the courts?
 It is conclusive proof of the enactment and contents of a
statute, and could not be contradicted by the legislative
journals or in any other mode.
So take note of the earlier case (Astorga vs Villegas), kato wala nato gi-
follow ang enrolled bill because ang mga required pirma didto gibalibad sila,
they were saying that the law that was signed was not the law approved.
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
Congressional Record
Art. VI Sec. 16 (4), par. 2. “Each House shall also keep a Record of its
proceedings.”
Sessions
What are these sessions done by Congress? Regular and Special.
 Regular Sessions
o Art. VI, Sec. 15. The Congress shall convene once every
year on the fourth of Monday of July for its regular session,
unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to
be in session for such number of days as it may determine
until thirty days before the opening of its next regular
session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal
holidays. The President may call a special session at any
time.
GUEVARA VS. INOCENTES
They were challenging kung kinsa ang tinood na appointee by the President.
Here, Guevara was extended an ad interim appointment as the
Undersecretary of Labor in November 18, 1965. Now, karun nga President,
after the incumbent executive, issued a memorandum circular declaring that
all ad interim appointments made by the previous or the former executive
lapsed to the adjournment of special session in Congress which is on
January 1966. So dili palabot si Guevara kay bag-o pa lang gud siya, tapos
marevoke dayun iyang appointment because of this Memorandum Circular.
So, he filed before the Supreme Court, but before that the President
extended an ad interim appointment to another person, Inocentes on January
1966, so now, duha na kabuok na tao ang nag contest aning the same
position. Of course, Guevara wanted to remain, so niadto siyag Supreme
Court, questioning the validity of his removal and the appointment of
Inocentes for the same position. His argument is that, adjournment means
adjournment of a regular session and not a special session.
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Under the prevailing Constitution, Art. VII, Section 10, subsection 4: “The
President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of
the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval
by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.”
He is arguing that this provision, “until next adjournment of the Congress”,
means an adjournment of a regular session. According to him, since dili man
ni regular session ang gi adjourn, wala pud siya natanggal. Wala pa man pud
gi disapprove sa Commission on Appointments ang iyahang appointment, so
he should retain his position.
So the court explained here that there are two modes in 1935 Constitution on
terminating ad interim appointments. Ad interim appointment may be
terminated by:
1. The disapproval by the Commission on Appointments
2. Until the next adjournment of the Congress
What was the applicable mode here? The second mode.
Note: These two modes are separate and independent of each other.
Now, do we believe him that the session that has a to be adjourned here
must be a regular session? The court said here that word used by the
Constitution does not make any reference to any specific session of
congress, whether regular or special. but such silence is of no moment, for it
is a well-known maxim in statutory construction that when the law does not
distinguish we should not distinguish. Therefore, when the framers of the
Constitution employing the word “adjournment”, Congress had in mind either
regular or special session and not simply the regular one as contended by
the petitioner. So dili na kailangan mag distinguish, kay it will be either or
special session. And so because of this, his appointment was deemed
terminated because of the second mode.
Now, he also argued that it was only the Senate which adjourned and wala
naapil ang HOR. The Supreme Court said that the it is already an
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
adjournment of the Congress itself because the congress does not operate
separately, the adjournment of Senate is also the adjournment of the HOR.
Therefore, his appointment must have lapsed upon adjournment of the
session of Congress.
 Special Session
o Art. VI Section15. “… The President may call a special
session.”
o Art. VII Section 10. The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the
morning of the third day after the vacancy in the offices of
the President and Vice-President occurs, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call and within
seven days, enact a law calling for a special election to elect
a President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier than
forty-five days nor later than sixty days from the time of such
call. The bill calling such special election shall be deemed
certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article V1 of this
Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on third
reading by the Congress. Appropriations for the special
election shall be charged against any current appropriations
and shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4,
Section 25, Article V1 of this Constitution. The convening of
the Congress cannot be suspended nor the special election
postponed. No special election shall be called if the vacancy
o Also, in Art. VII, Section 18. This involves the exercise of
occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next
presidential election.
o Art. VII Section 11. Whenever the President transmits to the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he
transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such
powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President
as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet
transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of
the House of Representatives their written declaration that
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties
38 | P a g e
of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume
the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of
the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that no inability
exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office.
Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the
Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the
Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
their written declaration that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress
shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall
convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in
accordance with its rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last
written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days
after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds
vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the
President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of
his office.
the calling out power of the President for the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as well as the
declaration of Martial Law, here the President is empowered
to call out armed forces or to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus to declare martial law. Now, what is
the rule of the Congress? The Congress, voting jointly, by a
vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or
special session, may revoke such proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress
may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or
suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if
the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety
requires it.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I TSN- ATTY. GIL GARCIA III
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
 Joint Sessions
(Voting separately)
o Art. VII, Sec. 4. Section 4. The President and the Vice-
President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a
term of six years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth
day of June next following the day of the election and shall
end at noon of the same date, six years thereafter. The
President shall not be eligible for any re-election. No person
who has succeeded as President and has served as such for
more than four years shall be qualified for election to the
same office at any time.
No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of the service for the full term for which he was
elected.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for
President and Vice-President shall be held on the second
Monday of May.
The returns of every election for President and Vice-
President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each
province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress,
directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the
certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not
later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all
the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House
of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress,
upon determination of the authenticity and due execution
thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be
proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an
equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall
39 | P a g e
forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the
Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing
of the certificates.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.
o Art. VII, Section 11. Whenever the President transmits to
the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he
transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such
powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President
as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet
transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of
the House of Representatives their written declaration that
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties
of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume
the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of
the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that no inability
exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office.
Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the
Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the
Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
their written declaration that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress
shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall
convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in
accordance with its rules and without need of call.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I TSN- ATTY. GIL GARCIA III
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last
written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days
after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds
vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the
President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of
his office.
o Art. VII Section 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office
of the Vice-President during the term for which he was
elected, the President shall nominate a Vice-President from
among the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation
by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of the
Congress, voting separately.
o Art. VI, Sec. 23 (1). The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of
both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately,
shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state
of war.
o Art. XVII, Sec. 1 (1). Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution may be proposed by:
1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
Members
(Voting Jointly)
 Art. VII, Sec. 18 (to revoke or extend martial law or
suspension of privilege of habeas corpus)
Electoral Tribunal
Art. VI Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members,
three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by
the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or
40 | P a g e
the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
When is it to be created?
Section 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments
shall be constituted within thirty days after the Senate and the House of
Representatives shall have been organized with the election of the President
and the Speaker. The Commission on Appointments shall meet only while
the Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its
Members, to discharge such powers and functions as are herein conferred
upon it.
BARBERS vs COMELEC
The COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, there was a
proclamation here that Biazon was declare as winner of the 12th seat as a
Senator in the 2004 National Elections. Barbers contested the declaration, he
was the 13th. So he filed a petition on the COMELEC to annul the declaration.
Take note that Biazon was already proclaimed by the COMELEC as the
winner. The petition was denied. Then he went to the Supreme Court.
So does the Supreme Court have the jurisdiction?
It did not, because there was already a proclamation of Biazon as the
member of Senate then the body of the tribunal which has the sole authority
to determine the contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of their members would be the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) not the
Supreme Court.
FERNANDEZ vs HRET
Vicente sought the cancellation of Fernandez’s COC among others because
Fernandez naa daw siyay material representation. So the COMELEC
dismissed the claim for lack of merit. So it agreed with Fernandez na mali si
Vicente. Fernandez was proclaimed as a duly elected representative, so
congressman ni siya. Since after the declaration, nisaka si Vicente sa HRET.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I TSN- ATTY. GIL GARCIA III
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
Now, contrary to the decision of the COMELEC kay nag prevail si
Fernandez. The HRET granted Vicente’s prayer and disqualified Fernandez.
Fernandez challenged the decision of HRET claiming that it should have
been guided by the decision of the COMELEC. “I already won in the
COMELEC so dapat ikaw HRET tu-o ka sa iyang decision.”
Is he correct?
The court said that he is wrong, the HRET and the SET shall be the sole
judges of all contest relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
members. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the
jurisdiction of these Tribunals,33 which is conferred upon the HRET and
the SET after elections and the proclamation of the winning candidates.
And therefore, dili nimo pwede i-argue na you should be guided by the
decision of the COMELEC because the HRET is the one which determines
an independent of whatever the findings of the COMELEC.
Can it be considered as a forum-shopping? Kay naa nay na file sa
COMELEC tapos mag file napud ka diri sa HRET.
The court said here that no, it cannot be considered as a forum-shopping.
There are requisites which an action can be considered one which violates
the rules on forum-shopping.
MENDOZA vs COMELEC
Mendoza and Pagdanganan, they were vying for the position of Governor in
Bulacan. And then Mendoza won as a candidate and he assumed office of
governor. Pagdanganan now filed an election protest. Thereafter, the
COMELEC transferred the Bulacan ballot boxes included those in the contest
here to the SET, in connection to the protest filed by Pimentel against Zubiri.
Now, na shock si Mendoze, he moved to suspend the proceedings because
according to him, dapat he was notified by the transfer and thus he should be
allowed to participate in the proceedings before the SET kay katong ballot
boxes na involved sa ilahang gi-contest kay niabot sa Senate so dapat he
should participate in the proceedings or atleast be notified.
41 | P a g e
He also argued that the election protest involves his election as a governor
and he is entitled to notice and participation in all matters related to the
election protest. Since he was not accorded notices and participation in the
proceedings, so he is claiming that it should be declared null and void,
because it violates his right to due process.
Is he correct? No.
The COMELEC is a constitutionally-created body that is primarily an
administrative agency, which also possesses quasi-judicial and quasi-
legislative functions. And as a quasi-judicial body you have a different set of
rules as far as due process is concerned. Kung court ka, kani imong due
process, distinction of the parties etc., if you are an administrative body or a
quasi-judicial body there is a different set of rules of due process, as cited in
the case of Ang Tibay vs CIR. So these are the rules of due process which
should be applied in so far as the Mendoza is concerned.
Was he denied due process here? No.
The hearing and the revision of the ballots before the COMELEC was
already submitted for resolution. Dili na mag ihap or mag present ug ballota,
kay ang kailangan nalang himuon sa COMELEC is to resolve ang case
based on the evidence presented. Moreover, it fully participated in the
proceedings of the election protest until the case is submitted for resolution.
Insofar as the proceedings of the SET is concerned, the court said that the
contested proceedings are no longer part of the adversarial aspects of the
election contest that would require notice of hearing and the participation of
the parties, in fact the case was already submitted for resolution, because
the COMELEC has already set or poised to resolve the protest. The parties
therefore need not to take part therein.
ABAYON vs HRET
The fact that a member of the party list, a nominee, and ang nakadaog nga
party list nahimo siyang representative sa Congress, he is to be considered a
member thereof and therefore it is the HRET and not the COMELEC which
has the jurisdiction over his qualifications even if it has touched upon the
nature of the party’s organization.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I TSN- ATTY. GIL GARCIA III
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
There are several people here who filed the petition for quo warranto against
AANGAT TAYO and its nominee ABAYON. It claimed that AANGAT TAYO
was not eligible for a party list seat. They also pointed out that ABAYON is
not marginalized or under-representative as she is the wife of an incumbent
congressman.
Abayon on the other hand countered, that the COMELEC had already
confirmed status of AANGAT TAYO as a legal valid party list and also she
pointed out that the HRET had no jurisdiction over the petition for quo
warranto. The HRET dismissed the petition but upheld its jurisdiction over the
qualifications of Abayon etc.
So does the HRET had jurisdiction over the qualifications of ABAYON and a
collateral issue of the validity of AANGAT TAYO as a party list?
The court said here that the HRET has a jurisdiction. Again, party-list is not
an organization which seats as a member of the HRET but a nominee, and
that nominee becomes the member of the house.
Take note that the HOR is composed of two classes of members: district
representatives and party-list representatives. Once elected, both these
representatives treated in line of man. Consequently, since the matter now
involves a member of the HOR, it is for the HRET to interpret the
qualifications of the nominee of a party-list.
Now, Abayon argued that it is for the party-list organization to determine the
qualifications, the Supreme Court said that that is true sa sugod, but when
there is already an election in so far as the member of the HOR is concerned
then we apply the provision that it is the HRET which has the sole judge of all
contests relating to qualifications of its members.
LAYUG VS COMELEC
The court said here that, it has no jurisdiction over the qualifications of Mike
Velarde and the collateral issue on the validity of the Buhay party list
because Mike Velarde was not even a member of the HRET.
JALOSJOS vs COMELEC
42 | P a g e
So here, Romeo Jalosjos who was the mayor of Zamboanga Del Norte. Later
on, he filed a COC for the position of representatives of Zamboanga Sibugay.
The COMELEC declared Jalosjos as ineligible to seek election as a
representative of the Second district as it does not satisfy the residency
requirement.
Does the HRET has jurisdiction over this case?
According to the Supreme Court, while the Constitution vests upon the
COMELEC to decide all questions affecting elections, it does not extend to
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members
of HOR, because the power to that is lodged with the HRET.
When does its jurisdiction attach?
 It is upon the proclamation of the congressional candidate.
But the court clarified here that it is the fact that the
proclamation and assumption of office that gives the HRET
the jurisdiction to decide upon the election, returns and
qualifications.
So here, when the COMELEC issued its order, Jalosjos had already been
proclaimed as winner in the election, it is the HRET has jurisdiction over it
and not the COMELEC. So when the COMELEC ordered disqualifying him, it
acted without jurisdiction.
In later cases, kanus-a ba gyud? Is it by mere proclamation for assumption of
office or when is that? What is its specific date?
ATONG PAGLAUM vs COMELEC
In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and
subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following
parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1)
national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or
organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I TSN- ATTY. GIL GARCIA III
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or
organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not
need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they
register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in
legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not,
that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in
party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a
coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and
underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political
constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to
the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
"marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack
"well-defined political constituencies" include professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to
the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent.
Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must
belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties
or organizations that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined
political constituencies," either must belong to their respective
sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective
sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not
be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided
that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
43 | P a g e
REYES VS COMELEC
In this case, the COMELEC on May 14, 2013, cancel the COC of Reyes
because she failed to comply with the citizenship requirements of RA 9225
and residency requirement. Despite that cancellation, she was proclaimed as
the winner of the 2013 elections by the Board of Canvassers. But after that
the COMELEC issued a certificate of finality of the decision which
disqualified her on the same day which is on, she took her oath of office
before the Speaker of the House Belmonte.
Now she challenged the resolution of the COMELEC alleging that it doesn’t
have jurisdiction over her because she was already proclaimed as a winner.
Take note that the declaration of the COMELEC was on May 14, 2013 and it
was on June 5, 2013 na gi issue sa COMELEC ang certificate of finality ang
decision. She was declared as winner on May 18, 2013. So after pag declare
niya kung unsa pa tung proceedings, wala na sa COMELEC ang jurisdiction
kay declared naman siya as winner, it should be the HRET.
Is she correct?
It was found out here that she was yet to assume office upon the
proclamation which officially starts on the noon of June 30, 2013.
So, when does jurisdiction of the COMELEC cease?
 Insofar as the members of the HOR and Senate, it is at the
time when the candidate is considered a member of the
House of Representatives.
When is that candidate considered to be a member of the HOR?
 It is upon the concurrence of the following:
o a valid proclamation
o a proper oath, and
o assumption of office
Now, the court said here that Reyes cannot be considered as a Member
of the HOR because she has not yet assumed office (which was on June
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I TSN- ATTY. GIL GARCIA III
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
30) when the decision of the COMELEC was rendered and became final
and executory. Therefore, the COMELEC had the jurisdiction over her.
What about the previous cases na niingon nga proclamation lang ang
kailangan?
 The court noted that in those cases, the doctrinal
pronouncement was made in the context of a
proclaimed candidate who had not only taken an oath of
office, but who had also assumed office.
 So kailangan sa nimo mag assume sa office, and when do
you assume office? It must be on the noon of June 30.
Okay, so let’s discuss the Motion for Reconsideration next meeting.
August 22
-Meki
So we are still in the rules of the department on the Commission of the
Appointment, what is it, why is it relevant? Anyways under SECTION 18,
ART VI:
Section 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the
President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve
Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the
basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The
Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session
days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a
majority vote of all the Members.
When shall it meet under Section 19, ART VI:
Section 19. The Commission on Appointments shall meet only while the
Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its
44 | P a g e
Members, to discharge such powers and functions as are herein conferred
upon it.
So when there are appointments made no, while the congress was not in
session wala CA, kailangan ang permission from the CA will be called ad
interim appointments, anyways, so this commission just like the HRET SEC,
is independent of the house of Congress, even if its composition is
composed of members of congress, again, 25 members, President of the
Senate as ex officio Chairman, then 12 of each house. How do you distribute
the composition for proportional representation now what are the
appointments under the constitution, which require the permission of the
Commission on Appointment, these are, there are provisions in the
constitution that are scattered, more on the executive department, who are
these people, Heads of the Executive Department (exec sec is not included)
 Ambassadors, public ministers, officers of the AFP is the directors of the
head of the PNP included? It is not, its appointment is not required with the
confirmation of the CA, it is not stated in the constitution, can you expand the
list? By law you cannot add appointees which would require composition by
the commission on appointments.
Also there are appointments, which are vested in the President in the
constitution, which would require CA affirmation which are, members of the
constitutional commission, CSC, COA and the COMELEC, also the regular
members of the JBC composed of 7 members, 3 of these are ex officio
they compose these position because they are the Secretary of Justice, etc.
But, there are for regular members which would require the President to
appoint them and these appointees would also require, the confirmation of
the CA. Now there are appointments that are given to the President that
doesn’t require CA confirmation, because the constitution itself says that their
appointments did not need confirmation from the CA, who are these people,
Justices, and Judges of the lower courts, as well as the Ombudsman, and
the deputies, wisdom probably gi sarili ra ni Digong diri. Can the list
kailangan confirmation of the CA be expanded, the Court say, it cannot be
done
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I TSN- ATTY. GIL GARCIA III
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
So we have the case of Guingona vs Gonzales which tackles or deals with
the composition of the membership of the CA, particularly in so far as the 12
members coming from the senate, as we know it is based on proportional
representation, so what they did here was that, they took the number of
senators, by their respective party list, so as in this 15 senators belong to
LDP, 5 NTC, 3 to LAKAS, and 1 from PDP-LABAN, so gi total na, 34 how
many proportion na 15 over 24, 5 over 24, 3 over 24, and the ratio you get I
multiply lang to 12, so you come up with a figure, and that is the number of
members in that political party, which can be represented in the CA, now it
appeared here that using that formula it would be bungkig LDP 7.5, NTC 2.5,
Lakas 1.5, PDP .5, so is this, in order to remedy this proportion they decided,
na katong naa’y mga .5 I consider nalang na 1 ang .5, so LDP 8, 2 NTC, 1
from PDP, and 1 from LAKAS. Is that allowed?
The court said that it was unconstitutional, why is it unconstitutional? In this
case no, the problem encountered by the Senate as well as the SC here is
what to do with the fraction of .5 or the 1/2 , the court said here that it was
violative no, na tong 7.5 gitagaan ug 8 numbers, katong 1.5 is 7 ang gihatag,
ana ang SC that it cannot be done, because by doing this, one the parties
fractional membership, was reduced and the others were increased, this is a
violation because it no longer implies, with the provision, demanded in the
constitution that the composition of the commission will be based on the
proportional representation.
How was it settled, the course said here that the CA need not be fully
composed its members, in doing so would violate the constitution. The court
said here that to preserve the fractional membership, by adding together 2
halves to make a whole, to reach the proportional representation, it will give
the LDP, and member in the commission on value, utilizing the actual
membership of the other Political Party, who is now, deprived of the, or
actual representation, the court said that the provision here is mandatory, so
dapat gi follow diud nimo ang kung unsa ang proportion, the court held some
guidelines in order to fill up if ever there is, the senate daw the political
partner coalition is 2, duly elected senator for every seat, so if 1 party wants
to have 1 seat in that CA ang dapat duha mo kabuok belonging in the same
party, kay kung isa lang ka you’ll only get .5 and that will not be equivalent for
45 | P a g e
1, atleast 1 ra mo, you belong to LP, now the court said here, that the CA
again need no to be fully composed, it can perform its duties, by some of the
bodies of the Constitution can function as long as there is a required forum,
cause usually its majority of its membership, and the same principles apply to
the CA, again the court said this situation cannot be ractified, by distributing
the fractional .5 .5 and given to other parties, to sacrifice their representation
which the other parties would be entitled to, in the MR (Motion for
Reconsideration) the court upheld its own decision, and said that the
composition composed by the senators, violates, section 18 because it
doesn’t comply mandate that the membership of the commission be based
on the proportional representation.
In Pimentel vs HRET, we discussed this, here some members of the
congress, wanted to have party-list representative na musulod sila sa HRET
as well as the Commission on Appointments, so they went to SC directly and
questioned the composition of these bodies, the court said, that that is really
not sure, the bodies has the discretion in which the seat are allotted, to these
bodies, are the bodies itself, now the HRET it is the HRET, the CA it is the
CA, direct recourse of the SC is not allowed, their primary recourse therefore
rest with the House of Reps not on the supreme court.
So we will discuss more on the CA and its power, to approve appointments in
the executive department, or appointments given to the CA for their courts
approval, now what are the powers of the congress, it has the power to
legislate, it is the plenary power of the congress, it is in Section 1, Article VI:
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives,
except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum.
This power is its power of competence to legislate, to compose, enact,
ordain, amend, modify, abrogate or repeal laws, GENERAL RULE is given to
the congress, EXCEPTION for certain acts, reserved to the people, under the
Constitution, initiative.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I TSN- ATTY. GIL GARCIA III
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
So this legislative power as a general rule is FULL it is not as general rule
again no, limited and therefore congress cannot pass a law which would say,
that a certain cannot repeal, what are certain limitations? Even if the power of
congress is plenary, it is bound, by some limitations, the limits imposed by
the international law (pacta sunt servanda- they have to comply with the
agreements rendered by the international ones), there are also limits,
imposed by the Constitution, which can be procedural, katong manner in
which the law is passed, there are also laws which can only originate in
certain houses, so there is a procedural there, there are also substantive
limitations, under the constitution, under the Bill of Rights, etc.
Now one of the limitations, in the power of congress to legislate is the power
to delegate, the power to legislate, as a GENERAL RULE they cannot
legislate their power, because it is already delegated to you by the people,
but there are exceptions to this rule on non-delegation of power. The
congress aside from being the legislator, also has non-legislative powers, it
acts as the board of canvassers of the president and vp, and decide if the
president, is temporary disabled, concur the amnesty, etc! so there are
powers to be discussed before which are not related to the law making, it can
be a body which can initiate impeachment cases against the lower house,
initiates the complaint and send peers to the impeachment.
Now we have the case of CITY OF DAVAO vs RTC, this deals with the
concept of plenary power of congress, so much so that it was held here, that
a law cannot be irrepealable, congress had pass a law which says that it is
irrepealable, here the GSIS Davao City branch received a notice of public
auction because it failed to pay its real property taxes to the city of Davao, in
the years 1992 to 1994 so wala ta nabayran, delinquent, kailangan na bayran
to foreclose itself its properties, after that gibaligya to satisfy the liability, so
the GSIS received warrants of levy on 3 parcels of land, which they owned,
because of this it went to the RTC of Davao, and the trial court here initially,
to deny injunction mu stop sa ta, because the issue to be determined by the
court is whether or not, certain sections of the LGC had withdrawn the real
property tax of exemptions of the GOCC’s, before the enactment of the LGC,
certain GOCC’s among others GSIS, enjoys tax exemption from here, with
property tax, but because of the passage of the LGC nawala tong exemption,
46 | P a g e
as claimed by the City here, so they went to court, to determine whether or
not, gitanggal ba gyud sa LGC the exemption which the GSIS enjoys, and
insofar as its payment in their real property taxes is concerned.
Now, take note that the period covered here is from 1992 to 1993, the GSIS
law, which amended (*inaudible but it sounds like feebies) which are involved
in this case, gibalik ang tax exemption status sa GSIS, in 1997, so anyways,
prior to that mu stick ta sa issue na in 1992-1994, dapat mu bayad si GSIS of
real property tax?
In PD 1146 there was a law here provided for a GENERAL RULE which
exempted the GSIS from all taxes, and then this law was amended in 1985 to
PD 1981 and it added a 2nd paragraph in section 33, what is the section 33
and what is the added paragraph, there are lines in section 33 nag butang
siya ug exemption sa GSIS ug taxes, and it also provides that these
exemptions shall not be affected by subsequent laws on the contrary, unless
this section is EXPRESSLY and CATEGORICALLY repealed by law, and a
provision is enacted to substitute an exception for any annual taxes, in other
words, the repeal of this provision was subject to conditions, express repeal
as well as these provisions to substitute the effects of this exemptions, it is
removed- now, is that provision valid?
The court said that provision is invalid. So here in this case, since that
provision is invalid, wala siya nag exist in the first place, GSIS is subject to
real property taxes, because of the passage of the Local Government so
which lifted the exemption of the GSIS from the real property taxes, here the
court discussed that the GSIS is a GOCC, and even if it is a GOCC the local
government code provides that it is subject to real property tax.
Now let’s focus on the discussion on Section 33 why is this struck down by
the constitution to be invalid. Well among others it because it limits the power
of the congress, to repeal the law by making it almost irreapealable, there is
a fundamental proof of law that the SC pointed out here, that the amended
law in 2nd paragraph, reduced by PD1981 makes the law restricts on the
competency of the Congress to enact legislation on the taxability of the GSIS
it places and undue restraints of the plenary power of the legislature, to
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
amend or repeal laws, only the constitution may operate or include
restrictions on the amendment of the repeal of laws, not the laws itself. Can
or may repealable laws be passed? It cannot be done, because it deprives
succeeding legislatures of power to craft laws appropriated to the public.
Section 33. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. It is hereby
declared to be the policy of the State that the actuarial solvency of the funds
of the System shall be preserved and maintained at all time and that the
contribution rates necessary to sustain the benefits under this Act shall be
kept as low as possible in order not to burden the members of the System
and/or their employees. Taxes imposed on the System tend to impair the
actuarial solvency of its funds and increase the contribution rate necessary to
sustain the benefits under this Act. Accordingly, notwithstanding any laws to
the contrary, the System, its assets, revenues including all taxes,
assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds. These exemptions shall
continue unless expressly and specifically revoked and any assessment
against the System as of the approval of this Act are hereby considered paid.
The benefits granted under this Act shall not be subject, among others, to
attachment, garnishment, levy or other processes. This, however, shall not
apply to obligations of the member to the System, or to the employer, or
when the benefits granted herein are assigned by the member with the
authority of the System.
Take note, if you pass a irreapealable, you are saying that this congress
which is different from the other practices, would be infallible but the court
said here that perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes desired in the
legislative body, and a legislature which affects or stall, future amendments
or repeals of its enactments labors under delusions of (*inaudible) so the
court said here Sec 33 of PD 1146 as amended renders the law irrepealable,
therefore it cannot be given an effect, and since it cannot be given an effect,
the lifting done by the LGC would take effect which ang effect ana ang
property sa GSIS in so far as the previous case is concerned, it is subject
real estate tax, real property tax.
47 | P a g e
So that’s the general rule so the congress has plenary powers, but ofcourse
these powers has limitations as well, what are the substantive limitations as
we said earlier is provided under the constitution itself, there are provisions of
the Bill of Rights, naka butang sa inyong syllabus.
One case is the case of Araullo vs Aquino, we already discussed this, lets
focus of the more relevant ruling, the court in this case said that congress
cannot increase appropriations, there are certain officers in the constitution
that is allowed to transfer appropriation. But the general rule is that it cannot
be done, what happens if congress fails to pass an appropriation law? Well
the general appropriation law of previous year is controlling.
Nazareth vs Villar this emphasizes that no money shall be paid out in the
treasury, except in pursuant with the appropriation made by law, and it is
violated to spend ang money, it can be disallowed by the COA, so here there
is this law, RA 439, addresses the policy of the state to provide a program of
human resource development in Science and Technology, so gusto I
promote sa atong country and RnB (rnb diud iya gisulti haha or wrong ko)
mas daghan tag scientist, whatever the people would do research to develop
our technology and this law aims to increase the benefits given para
attractive siya instead na muadto sila sa other country, they would work here,
the DOST here Regional office 19, released the Magna Carta benefit given,
under this law despite the absence of the specific appropriation for that
purpose in the general appropriations act so there is a provision in RA 439,
na tagaan ug benefits ninny mga scientist, but pag pass sa GAA on the other
year wala to naka butang tong mga benefit so asa man to gikuha ang kwarta,
kay wala man siya gi itemize for the specific obligation, so because of that
the COA said na wala ma’y basis imong pag bayad ani imong benefit, it
disallowed the payment of allowances and benefit, etc. now it was argued
that it was provided that the law RA 8439 itself na tagaan ug benefits so
there is no need for us to specify that in the GAA more over there was also a
request to use the same things of the DOST to pay for these benefits, so
didto nila gikuha ang kwarta naa sila’y savings, gi bayad nila sa mga
scientist, did the DOST acted correctly? The court said, that it did not, it
upheld the disallowance, issued by the COA. What is the constitutional
limitation involved in this case? Again Article VI Sec 29:
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
Section 29.
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.
No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or
employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect,
church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any
priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except
when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed
forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated
as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which
a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if
any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government.
Meaning, there must be a GAA for purpose of releasing the money, and
therefore before money can be released for these benefits, the benefits must
be itemized or included in the GAA the purpose of that is precisely included
in the GAA, is the argument that the law itself alone, could fund for the
payment of the GAA? The court said that it will not as long as the GAA
doesn’t mirror the provision in RA 439, kailangan naa dyuy provision the
GAA that allowing or stating that the money or would be released for these
benefits, since wala then it cannot be done, RA 439 alone cannot fund the
payments of the benefits because the GAA did not mirror the provisions of
law that referred to it as source of funding.
Now, what about the argument that gi kuha ra nato sa savings, the court said
that, since as a general rule you cannot spend money or etc, and the
exception is that it can only be done by the president, president of the
senate, speaker of the HR, chief justice of the SC, we have to strictly
construe that provision, there was no valid transfer of appropriation with the
savings here, because there was no existing item, project, activity, purpose
or object of the expenditure with the an appropriation to which the savings
would be transferred or augmentation purposes, even if naa kay kwarta,
48 | P a g e
since wala naka butang sa GAA kung asa maadto ang kwarta, kay dili to siya
pwede, the court said that what the court has done here is direct of legal
basis.
What about the scientist who received the benefit? Gikasto man nila, gipalit
na nila ug sakyanan, ug balay, the court said that if they already claimed the
benefits in good faith they not be reimburse the state. Makuha gihapon nila
ang kwarta.
Now in Belgica vs Ochoa, we discussed this case before and we
enumerated the reasons why the PDAF particularly the 2011 PDAF, to relate
this to the topic no what are the violations that are relevant:
1. Doctrine of Separation of powers- given by the congress as a body
not individual legislators. What they did constitutes amendment, it
cannot be done because the power of the congress can only be
exercised by the congress as a whole. If the law is already enacted it
is done, then the congress has a very limited participation nalang,
just over sighting if the law was implemented as how it should be.
Individual members cannot implement the law- it violates the
separation of powers.
2. Non-delegate-ability of the legislative power- the power given by the
people to the congress can be delegated as a general rule. So no
individual members of the congress cannot exercise legislative
power by himself or herself, okay?
In Araullo vs Aquino, this is in relation to the DAP acceleration program. So
what initiated this case, there was a speech intiated by Jinggoy Estrada,
revealing that some of the senators caused the death of Chief Justice, why?
Because it was reported by Jinggoy that the senators who voted for Corona
were given 50Million each, to as an incentive to vote for the impeachment of
Corona, so because of that revelation no, the secretary Abad, of DBM, well
katong nadawat sa mga senators came from this DAP secretary of the DBM
said that this DAP is a valid program. The senators are part of the DAP which
is a program designed by the DBM to wrap up spending, to accelerate
economic expansion, in other words, we did not bribe the senators to vote
against the chief justice, apil diud na siya sa DAP na taga.an silag 50million
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
pesos for their own use, sa projects na ilang gusto, the funds were released
to the senators based on the letters for funding etc. where did the money
come from, according to the DBM the money came from the savings of the
government on the program funds so didto daw gikuha ang kwarta. Now,
they are challenging the constitutionality of this law, it was argued that the
DAP violate the section 29 of Article 6 of the constitution, because wala’y law
na naga allow for the disbursement of the fund pursuant to the DAP, so is a
law needed to effect the DAP? The court said that no law is needed to
implement the DAP, because this is already implementation, anyways this
case there was a discussion on the budget side here in our country, so first
there is a budget plotted, himuon sa ang budget in other words, mangayo ka
ug baon sa imong mama, you list of the items that you want to spend for a
year so you have a to submit that, the DBM checks then etc, after that
budget is finalize, I adto na na sa congress no, for budget hearings, tan.awon
kung weird ba imong gina request? Is it consistent with the mandate of you
department, so that is the first stage of budget preparation, then there is
budget legislation, congress receives the president’s budget katong gi collate
na, which is subject to hearing, this general appropriation fund which is
based on the budget which is requested, originates the sponsored, presented
and defended by the House of Reps appropriations committee, so mag
sugod na siya sa house of rep, dili kay sa senate mag originate ang laws
insofar as the appropriations are concerned, and then after that the bill is
submitted to the senate, which conducts his own committee hearings on the
general appropriations bill, after that the bicameral congress committee to
harmonize the provisions and by the end of the fiscal year, after that there
should be a general appropriations law. What is the effect if there is no law?
Re-enact the previous GAA, in the previous year, after the passage of the
law, it is the implementation, budget execution, and the department which
primarily executes the budget is the DBM it is the department which issues
the programs guidelines, in the release of the funds, compares the
allotment, cash with these programs, it also releases allotments. Now, after
that pag human na nimog gasto sa imong kwarta, mangayo ka sa imong
mama, nisugot imong mama, gitagaan kag kwarta to spend, after that is the
accountability phase there are certain bodies, which check kung tama ba
imong pag spend sa money, among others, the COA, now what about the
issue na DAP daw requires the law for it to be implemented the court said, it
49 | P a g e
needs no longer to be implemented because it is not an appropriation
measure, it is already the execution, of a law which is already been passed,
no law is necessary for the adoption or the implementation of the DAP
because it is not a fund or an appropriation but a program, or an
administrative system prioritizing spending.
What about the DBM did in implementing the DAP? What would the DBM
do? it realigned certain funds claimed to be savings para igasto to some
program which it determines needed spending kailangan ug speculous para
maging effective whatever, naa poy mga transfer of funds sa executive, to
other departments of the government among others, the legislative tagaan ug
kwarta ang mga senators, using the same case no, are those acts allowed?
So the court in this case concluded that the acts done pursuant to the DAP
were unconstitutional, (1) the withdrawal of an obligated allotments from
implementing agencies, that cannot be done because kaning unobligated
allotments, are defined as or included in the definition of savings,
unfortunately, these unobligated allotments cannot be construed savings in
this case, and we will discuss that why; (2) cross-bordered transfer using the
saving of the executive to augment the appropriations of other offices outside
of the executive, tagaan ug kwarta ang legislative no, and finally the court
held unconstitutional the funding of projects and activities that were not
covered of any appropriation in the GAA, as in the case ganiha, you cannot
use a savings for an activity program which was not provided by the GAA,
asa man nimo na igasto, okay so only the SC discuss those, the
unconstitutionality of foregoing practices.
How did the DBM defend his position? It is the position of the DBM to
implement the DAP, it use savings, meaning katong kwarta na wala na
gasto, amo nalang tong I transfer diri, diri, because it is allowed under the
constitution, katong exception to the general rule, that funds can be
transferred, under the constitution, the president can do that as long as the
money would come from the savings, that was the constitutional provision
which the DBM relies, the court said that for you to invoke that provision,
there must savings in the first case, where does the power to transfer funds
from one item to another emanates, it emanates under Article 6, Section
25:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I TSN- ATTY. GIL GARCIA III
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
Section 25.
1. The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the
President for the operation of the Government as specified in the budget.
The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be
prescribed by law.
2. No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general
appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular
appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in
its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
3. The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly
follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other departments
and agencies.
4. A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is
intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified
by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue
proposal therein.
5. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations;
however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and
the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
6. Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed
only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and
subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law.
7. If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass
the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general
appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed re-
enacted and shall remain in force and effect until the general
appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.
Granting the president among others the power to augment any item in the
General Appropriations Law, for their respective office from savings in other
items of their respective appropriation law, dapat naa’y GAA na’y item na
gastuhon nimo, and naa kay savings for other item, na gasto na nimo ang
money, pero wala nako, you used the savings or the other item in the GAA to
augment the funds they have and that can only be done by the president.
50 | P a g e
Ana si president oh, it can be allowed under the constitution, what are the
requisites therefore to transfer
1. There’s must be a law authorizing the president ;
2. The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the
appropriations for their office, and then
3. The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item into the GAA.
The GAA’s of 2011 and 2012, did not have the provisions that authorized the
transfers of funds, under the DAP, so for 2011 and 2012 whatever was done
using the invoked articles was unconstitutional, because it was not allowed
by the GAA, what is deficient in the provision of these two, GAA’s because it
did not carry the phrase, for their respective offices contained in the
constitution so because of that void ang provision, dili siya pwede I
implement, that provisions of 2011 and 2012 contravene the constitution and
therefore they cannot be used to claim authority appropriations from the
executive, or the other branch for the constitutional commission.
Now for the 2013 GAA, there is now a provision which allows the transfer of
savings, unlikes ’11 and ’12, however before that can be done, there must be
savings na gamiton nimo to transfer, the court said here that even if there is
this provision allowing the president to transfer the funds, under the GAA, the
requisite that there must be savings from the fund was not met, why? The
court defined what savings are, so the funds here are subject to 3 conditions
before they can be valid,
1. The funds here must still be available after completion of the final
discontinuance or abandonment of the work;
2. The funds must come from an appropriation balance arising from
unpaid compensation or related cause; and
3. From appropriation balances realize from the implementation, that
measures is only improve systems etc.
So there has to be a meeting of this conditions before a fund can be
considered as a saving. In this case, they are not considered as savings,
because the appropriation savings involved in this case, nag kuha.an ang gi
ingngon sa DBM, we use the money for these programs pero wala gi
implement ang programs, so among gi kuha nalang ang kwarta and to
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
implement the other program, the court said, the money that you used cannot
be considered savings because these appropriations have not even reached,
not being used by the agencies concerned vis-à-vis their programs and
activities, for which congress had allocated them.
Now what about the unreleased appropriations na gigamit daw sa DBM,
these cannot be considered as saving because these fall under the definition
of savings, so before you can say that these unreleased appropriations can
be used by the president, they have to meet again the 3 conditions, set and
the court said that dili siya mahulog didto. Unobligated allotments, rather!
Now what else? (SIR AMBOT HUHU SAGAD KAAYO I KENNAT NA!) No
funds from savings could be transferred under the DAP to augment deficient
items not provided in the GAA, that cannot be done because before money
can be released it must be provided in the General appropriations act, In
other words, an appropriation for any PAP must first be determined to be
deficient before it could be augmented from savings. Because these officers
who are allowed to transfer their savings can only do so with respect to their
respected offices. So the court declared this unconsti for giving money to
other departments.
Those were the EXPRESS substantive limitations. Naka butang sa consti na
bawal nimo buhaton ni. What are the IMPLIED substantive limitation, wala ni
naka butang sa constitution na bawal nimo buhaton ni, anyways. There are
the Doctrine of Non-Delegation of powers, which is encapsulated in the
maxim of Delegata potestas non potest delegari.
So again it cannot delegate what has already been delegated, that is the Gen
Rule. The Exceptions are: LGU’s, the executive can pass IRR provided that
there is a valid delegation in the first place, since delegation is an exception
there must be a test to know its valid:
In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative power,
the Court has adopted two tests: the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms
and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the
delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The second test
51 | P a g e
mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the
boundaries of the delegate‘s authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot.
in the case of Flores vs Montemayor, this has nothing to do with delegation
tho, There were several cases filed against respondent before the
Ombudsman here, it was initiated after the Office of the President decided to
dismiss Montemayor. More importantly, the proceedings before the PAGC
were already finished even prior to the initiation and filing of cases against
him by the Ombudsman. In fact, it was the PAGC’s findings and
recommendations which served as the basis in the Office of the President’s
decision to dismiss Montemayor from government service. Clearly then, the
exercise by the Office of the President of its concurrent investigatory and
prosecutorial power over Montemayor had already been terminated even
before the Ombudsman could take cognizance over the matter. The
Ombudsman, therefore, cannot take over a task that is already a fait
accompli.
Now we go to the Review Center Association of the Philippines vs
Executive Sec Ermita, kani tong leakage na case, the issue in this case was
whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of
legislative power as it expands the CHED’s jurisdiction? In this case the court
said that yes, it expands CHED’s jurisdiction, hence unconstitutional. The
scopes of EO 566 and the RIRR clearly expand the CHED’s coverage under
RA 7722. The CHED’s coverage under RA 7722 is limited to public and
private institutions of higher education and degree-granting programs in all
public and private post-secondary educational institutions. EO 566 directed
the CHED to formulate a framework for the regulation of review centers and
similar entities. The definition of a review center under EO 566 shows that it
refers to one which offers "a program or course of study that is intended to
refresh and enhance the knowledge or competencies and skills of reviewees
obtained in the formal school setting in preparation for the licensure
examinations" given by the PRC. It does not offer a degree-granting program
that would put it under the jurisdiction of the CHED.
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)

The court defined what a review course is in this case, which is only intended
to "refresh and enhance the knowledge or competencies and skills of
reviewees." Thus, programs given by review centers could not be considered
"programs x x x of higher learning" that would put them under the jurisdiction
of the CHED. "Higher education," is defined as "education beyond the
secondary level” or "education provided by a college or university." Further,
the "similar entities" in EO 566 cover centers providing "review or tutorial
services" in areas not covered by licensure examinations given by the PRC,
which include, although not limited to, college entrance examinations, Civil
Services examinations, and tutorial services. These review and tutorial
services hardly qualify as programs of higher learning.
In another case of Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation vs CIR what
is important to remember here is that tung allowable transitional input tax
credit is limited ra sa improvements on real properties, the court held in this
case that, NO, when you construe a statute daw they have to take the
thought conveyed by the status as a whole, construe the constituent parts
together; ascertain the legislative intent from the whole act; consider each
and every provision thereof in the light of the general purpose of the statute;
and endeavor to make every part effective, harmonious and sensible.
The statutory definition of the term "goods or properties" leaves no room for
doubt. It states: Sec. 100. Value-added tax on sale of goods or properties. –
(a) Rate and base of tax. – xxx. (1) The term ‘goods or properties’ shall mean
all tangible and intangible objects which are capable of pecuniary estimation
and shall include: (A) Real properties held primarily for sale to customers or
held for lease in the ordinary course of trade or business; xxx. The term
"goods or properties" by the unambiguous terms of Section 100 includes
"real properties held primarily for sale to costumers or held for lease in the
ordinary course of business." Having been defined in Section 100 of the
NIRC, the term "goods" as used in Section 105 of the same code could not
have a different meaning. Goods, as commonly understood in the business
sense, refers to the product which the VAT-registered person offers for sale
to the public. With respect to real estate dealers, it is the real properties
themselves which constitute their "goods." Such real properties are the
operating assets of the real estate dealer.
However, ang mga real estate dealers diri, kay their basis of the presumptive
input tax shall be the improvements, such as buildings, roads, drainage
systems, and other similar structures, constructed on or after the effectivity of
EO 273 (January 1, 1988). As mandated by Article 7 of the Civil Code, an
administrative rule or regulation cannot contravene the law on which it is
based. RR 7-95 is inconsistent with Section 105 insofar as the definition of
the term "goods" is concerned. This is a legislative act beyond the authority
of the CIR and the Secretary of Finance. The rules and regulations that
administrative agencies promulgate, which are the product of a delegated
legislative power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the
effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by
the legislature to the objects and purposes of the law, and should not be in
contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law. To
be valid, an administrative rule or regulation must conform, not contradict,
the provisions of the enabling law. An implementing rule or regulation cannot
modify, expand, or subtract from the law it is intended to implement. Any rule
that is not consistent with the statute itself is null and void. While
administrative agencies, such as the Bureau of Internal Revenue, may issue
regulations to implement statutes, they are without authority to limit the scope
of the statute to less than what it provides, or extend or expand the statute
beyond its terms, or in any way modify explicit provisions of the law. Indeed,
a quasi-judicial body or an administrative agency for that matter cannot
amend an act of Congress. Hence, in case of a discrepancy between the
basic law and an interpretative or administrative ruling, the basic law prevails.
Okay lets meet tomorrow. VYE!!!

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I TSN- ATTY. GIL GARCIA III
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
August 25
-Treeng
VICTORIA GUTIERREZ vs. DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT (DBM)
These consolidated cases question the inclusion of certain allowances and
fringe benefits into the standardized salary rates for offices in the national
government, state universities and colleges, and local government units as
required by the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 and
implemented through the challenged National Compensation Circular 59
(NCC 59).
Congress enacted in 1989 Republic Act (R.A.) 6758, called the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 to rationalize the
compensation of government employees.
The purpose of the law is to consolidate the sweldo as enumetated in sec 12.
the Dbm issued NCC59- provided that katong allowances nga dili excluded
are deeemed included. And included didto ang Cost of Living Allowance
(COLA) and Inflation Connected Allowance (ICA).
So, It was questioned. Nag buot buot daw ang DBM kung unsa ang
allowances nga dili included.
Issue: Is NCC as well as IRR valid?
Rule: Yes it is.
GR: you cannot delegate
EX: explicit provisions of the constitution giving power to the President as
well as LGU.
First, is there a need for an IRR for RA 6758 to take effect? The court said
no. there’s no need for an IRR.
Is NCC valid? The court said it is.
53 | P a g e
Also, these administrative bodies, they are given rule-making powers.
Increasing variety of public functions. Ginatawagan ug leeway ang kining
mga executive bodies to clarify the implementation of the law.
of course, this delegation powers have to stick to the law itself. Cannot
expand. Cannot modify.
The purpose of these powers is to implement only the policies made by the
law.
Court said that the NCC 59 was valid. It only made a list of allowances that
are deemed included. DBM enumerated them .
Is there a need for irr for this law to take effect? No.
The irr and ncc 59 were not published. The court said, yes you are correct.
But
Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose
is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
The integration of COLA into the standardized salary rates is not dependent
on the publication of CCC 10 and NCC 59. This benefit is deemed included
in the standardized salary rates of government employees since it falls under
the general rule of integration—“all allowances.”
The non-publication of CCC 10 and NCC 59 in the Official Gazette or
newspaper of general circulation does not nullify the integration of COLA into
the standardized salary rates upon the effectivity of R.A. 6758. The validity of
R.A. 6758 should not be made to depend on the validity of its implementing
rules.
COCOFED VS REPUBLIC 663 SCRA 514 (2012)
In 1971, Republic Act No. 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut
Investment Fund (CIF). The source of the CIF was a P0.55 levy on the sale
of every 100 kg. of copra. The Philippine Coconut Administration was tasked
to collect and administer the Fund..
so because of this, daghan na ug kwarta ang fund. So the purpose of this
fund is to alleviate or improve the coconut industry.
Now, Marcos issued PDs. PD 755 prohibits the use of fund plus distribution
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
of fund. It permitted the use of the Fund for the―acquisition of a commercial
bank for the benefit of coconut farmers and the distribution of the shares of
the stock of the bank it [PCA] acquired free to the coconut farmers.
After EDSA revolution, it was found out that the fund was mismanaged. So
the PCGG investigated on this. Sandigabayan found out that there were
abuses committed.
It was contended that there was an undue delegation of power, which is
power to promulgate rules and regulations. The law did not provide for the
specific standards. The provision itself is incomplete.
The Sandiganbayan allowed the sequestration by ruling in a Partial Summary
Judgment that the Coconut Levy Funds are prima facie public funds and that
Section 1 and 2 of PD No. 755 (and some other PDs) were unconstitutional.
The law has no effect. Why? Undue delegation of legislative power. Invalid
delegation? Yes.
Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power:
(1) the completeness test and
(2) the sufficient standard test.
A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried
out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it
provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the
delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the
conditions under which it is to be implemented. PD 755 does not succeed
with both test.
54 | P a g e
1. Pca could crash any IRR. Definition of coconut farmer are important
features that must be states in the law itself.wala gidefine ani nga law kung
kinsa ang coconut farmers.
This decree authorizes PCA to distribute to coconut farmers, for free, the
shares of stocks of UCPB and to pay from the CCSF levy the financial
commitments of the coconut farmers under the Agreement for the acquisition
of such bank. Yet, the decree does not even state who are to be considered
as coconut farmers.
2. Did not delimit.
P.D. No. 755 did not identify or delineate any clear condition as to how the
disposition of the UCPB shares or their conversion into private ownership will
redound to the advancement of the national policy declared under it. So the
purpose of P.D. No. 755 is to “accelerate the growth and development of the
coconut industry and achieve a vertical integration thereof so that coconut
farmers will become participants in, and beneficiaries of, such growth and
development.”
However it was found out that P.D. No. 755 did not provide for any guideline,
standard, condition or restriction by which the said shares shall be distributed
to the coconut farmers that would ensure that the same will be undertaken to
accelerate the growth and development of the coconut industry pursuant to
its national policy. Thus, P.D. No. 755, insofar as it grants PCA a veritable
carte blanche to distribute to coconut farmers UCPB shares at the level it
may determine, as well as the full disposition of such shares to private
individuals in their private capacity without any conditions or restrictions that
would advance the law’s national policy or public purpose, present a case of
undue delegation of legislative power. Because of that, walay valid
delegation of power.
Commissioner of Customs and the District Collector of the Port of
Subic vs Hypermix Feeds Corporation
There is a clash here between tarrif and customs code and CM 27-2003
The Commissioner of Customs issued CM 27-2003 classifying wheat as
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
(1)importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge and
depending on these factors, wheat would be classified further as either food
grade with a tariff rate of 3% or feed grade with a tariff rate of 7%.
Now the Question of validity of this issuance is because:
(1) the regulation was issued without following the mandate of the Revised
Administrative Code; and
(2) there is an undue delegation of legislative power.
First of all, tama nga wala siya na publish pursuant to the Revised
Adminsitrative Code.
These issuances affects substantive rights. Dili lang ni mere interpretative.
CMO 27-2003 was issued without following the mandate of the Revised
Administrative Code on public participation, prior notice, and publication or
registration with the University of the Philippines Law Center. Kani nga rule
applicable kung naay affected nga substantive rights.
For tariff purposes, CMO 27-2003 classified wheat according to the
following: (1) importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of
discharge. This is a violation of the equal protection clause under the
Constitution. The Court does not see how the quality of wheat is affected by
who imports it, where it is discharged, or which country it came from.
Interpretative Rule v Rule which affects substantive Rights
If It is merely interpretative in nature, it gives no consequence. There is no
need to comply with the strict requirements of the revised administrative
code. Interpretative rules are designed to provide guidelines to the law which
the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.
In the case of an interpretative rule, the inquiry is not into the validity but into
the correctness or propriety of the rule. As a matter of power a court, when
confronted with an interpretative rule, is free to (i) give the force of law to the
55 | P a g e
rule; (ii) go to the opposite extreme and substitute its judgment; or (iii) give
some intermediate degree of authoritative weight to the interpretative rule.
Petitioner Commissioner of Customs also went beyond his powers when the
regulation limited the customs officers duties mandated by Section 1403 of
the Tariff and Customs Law, as amended. The law provides:
Section 1403. Duties of Customs Officer Tasked to Examine,
Classify, and Appraise Imported Articles. The customs officer tasked
to examine, classify, and appraise imported articles shall determine
whether the packages designated for examination and their
contents are in accordance with the declaration in the entry,
invoice and other pertinent documents and shall make return in
such a manner as to indicate whether the articles have been
truly and correctly declared in the entry as regard their quantity,
measurement, weight, and tariff classification and not imported
contrary to law. He shall submit samples to the laboratory for
analysis when feasible to do so and when such analysis is necessary
for the proper classification, appraisal, and/or admission into the
Philippines of imported articles.
Likewise, the customs officer shall determine the unit of quantity
in which they are usually bought and sold, and appraise the
imported articles in accordance with Section 201 of this Code.
in here, it diminished the powers granted by the law because naa na siyay
iyahang assessment nga dapat trabaho sa tariff officer. And since this went
beyond what the law allows, it is an invalid delegation of legislative powers.
ALFEO D. VIVASvs. THE MONETARY BOARD OF THE BANGKO
SENTRAL
Rural bank was mismanaged. And so, giimbestigahan sa monetary board. It
was found out that Rural bank here is engaged in unsafe or unsound banking
practices. MB issued Resolution No. 823,19 dated June 4, 2009, approving
the issuance of a cease and desist order against ECBI, which enjoined it
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
from pursuing certain acts and transactions. It placed its assets under
receivership.
The contention of the bank is that it was not given the chance to be heard.
It challenged the provision of RA7653 particularly on the power of monetary
board to close banks without hearing. Is it too broad? No. They are wrong.
Rule:
It is an acceptable practice of the monetary board to take over banks without
prior hearing.
The MB can immediately implement its resolution prohibiting a banking
institution to do business in the Philippines and, thereafter, appoint the PDIC
as receiver. The procedure for the involuntary closure of a bank is summary
and expeditious in nature. Such action of the MB shall be final and executory,
but may be later subjected to a judicial scrutiny via a petition for certiorari to
be filed by the stockholders of record of the bank representing a majority of
the capital stock. Obviously, this procedure is designed to protect the interest
of all concerned, that is, the depositors, creditors and stockholders, the bank
itself and the general public. The protection afforded public interest warrants
the exercise of a summary closure.
That practice is allowed to protect the bank’s depositors or creditor.
No Undue Delegation of Legislative Power
In this case, under the two tests, there was no undue delegation of legislative
authority in the issuance of R.A. No. 7653. To address the growing concerns
in the banking industry, the legislature has sufficiently empowered the MB to
effectively monitor and supervise banks and financial institutions and, if
circumstances warrant, to forbid them to do business, to take over their
management or to place them under receivership. The legislature has clearly
spelled out the reasonable parameters of the power entrusted to the MB and
assigned to it only the manner of enforcing said power. In other words, the
MB was given a wide discretion and latitude only as to how the law should be
implemented in order to attain its objective of protecting the interest of the
public, the banking industry and the economy.
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BELGICA V OCHOA
There is a violation of the legislative to appropriate in this case. Take note
there are exceptions to the delegation on legislative power:
1. Pursuant to the provisions of the constitutions: president, LGU
2. Subordinate legislation. Limited legislative power to administrative
bodies to promulgate rules and regulations.
Q: Here, why does the pdaf violate undue delegation
A: because it authorizes individual legislators to exercise the power of
appropriation. This power is only lodged in the COPngress. What acts of
appropriation, anyway? The power of appropriation involves setting apart
from law a sum of money from a public treasury and for specified purpose.
What did the 2013 pdaf do? Gave lumpsum funds to legislators. Which
diclates how much of such funds will go to specific project or beneficiary.
This can be done only by congress. They cannot do that individually.
DISINI V SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
The Cybercrime Law was challenged.
It is argued that the CICC or the Cybercrime Investigating and Coordinating
Center is given by the law a power to regulate a national cyber security plan
without any sufficient standard or parameters to follow. It is not.
The court said that the law passes the two test. Therefore there is no undue
delegation
The cybercrime law is complete in itself and directed the CICC to formulate
and implement a national security plan and it gave a sufficient standards. It
provided for the definition of cybersecurity.
so that is the general rule. You cannot delegate legislative power. And we
discussed the exceptions.
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)

1. Delegation to the President – Art VI, Sec. 23 (2) & Sec. 28 (2)
2. Delegation to the People- Art VII, Sec 23
3. Delegation to Local Governments
Power to create, divide, merge, abolish, and substantially alter boundaries of
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. That power is legislative in
nature.but because of Sec 10, Art X of the Constitution.
AURELIO M. UMALI vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed Resolution No.
183-2011, requesting the President to declare the conversion of Cabanatuan
City from a component city of the province of Nueva Ecija into a highly
urbanized city (HUC).
So they wanted to get out of the province of Nueva Ecija. Independent na mi.
The resolution of COMELEC is void.
True enough, Congress delegated such power to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan or Sangguniang Panlungsod to create barangays pursuant to
Sec. 6 of the LGC, which provides:
Section 6. Authority to Create Local Government Units. - A local government
unit may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries
substantially altered either by law enacted by Congress in the case of a
province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision, or by ordinance
passed by the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod
concerned in the case of a barangay located within its territorial jurisdiction,
subject to such limitations and requirements prescribed in this Code."
The guidelines for the exercise of this authority have sufficiently been
outlined by the various LGC provisions detailing the requirements for the
creation of barangays, municipalities, cities, and provinces.

Acceding to the request, the President issued Presidential Proclamation No.

418, proclaiming the City of Cabanatuan as an HUC subject to "ratification in
Why are the resolutions void?
a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein, as provided for in Section 453 of
the Local Government Code of 1991. There was a wrong interpretation as to the term “qualified voters. The
province of Nueva Ecija is affected. The plebiscite should not be limited to
So acting on that directive, the comelec conducted a prebiscite but it only
the city of Cabanatuan.
included Cabanatuan residents only .This was contested by the province thru
Governor.According to him, dili lang dapat ang mga taga Cabanatuan ang
mag approve ani nga conversion. Dili lang kamo ang affected. The nearby Procedural
localities are also affected. Substantive
-express (in the consti)
So, those localities should also be included in that plebiscite.
-implied (the prohibition of passage of irrepealable laws)
Issue: whether the qualified registered voters of the entire province of Nueva Prohibition of the paassage of irrepealable laws
Ecija or only those in Cabanatuan City can participate in the plebiscite called
for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city into an HUC.

Rule: “political units directly affected” does not only refer to residents of
Cabanatuan City.

57 | P a g e
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
Congress cannot pass an irrepealble law because It will diminish the power
of subsequent congresses. Why? It
It cannot bind future legislators in which the law may be amended of
modified. So dili ma forsee sa existing congress kung unsa na ang situation
sa future.
Procedural.
SECTION 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been
distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public
calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto
shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
General procedure
1. One subject one title rule. Dili pwede ang law is saksak sinagol. So that
the legislaors will be guided with the title. Dili sila ma deceive sa mga riders.
So that the legislators will be guided
2, Three (3) reading requirement
Ex--when president certified necessity of its immediate enactment or
emergency. 3rd reading, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the
vote thereon shall be taken immediately
58 | P a g e
SECTION 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be
presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall
veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where it originated, which
shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after
such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass
the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall
likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that
House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be
determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall
be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the
House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it
shall become a law as if he had signed it.
So, it’s type is lumpsum. It’s either pirmahan niya or I veto niya as a whole.
Now, can this veto be override? Yes. How? If after reconsideration, 2/3 of all
the members of such house is needed. So it is difficult to override a veto. So
ibalik kung asa nga house gikan, kung asa nag originate, 2/3 votes. Tapos
isaka o ibalik sa pikas nga house then 2/3 votes and the veto overrides.
Now, there is also a power of the president to item veto.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items
in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the
item or items to which he does not object.
the exception is specifically for the appropriation, revenue, or tariff bills.
what does that mean? For example, the appropriation bill is very long. Items,
kwarta o ang purpose, the president can take off specific items but it does
not affect the other items.it is because the import of these bills involves the
operation of the government. if there is no appropriation bill, walay kwarta, ug
I subject pa nimo sa 2/3 votes, it would would suspend the operation of the
govt. katong gipang veto lang ang Ma veto.
Katong mga items nga wala niya gi-veto would be given effect. Take note na
this is applicable only in A-R-T (aappropriation, Revenue or tarrif bill)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I TSN- ATTY. GIL GARCIA III
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
ARROYO VS. DE VENECIA G.R. NO. 127255
A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code.
In the passage of this law, there is a violation of parliamentary procedure.
The law originated from the lower house, to the senate and reconciled in a
bicameral committee, and committee subjected this to deliberations of both
houses.
There was an objection that was not entertained because nagsabay ug
storya ang chair ug speaker. After that, naaprove ang law. Napirmahan sa
president.
Rule: what was violated was a mere internal rules and regulation and not
constitutional requirement on the passage of a law.
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They
are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no
concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not
have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members
has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where
the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of
the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in
character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights
are involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a
member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the
dispute to the Court
B) IMPLIED SUBSTANTIVE LIMITATIONS 1) PROHIBITION AGAINST
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
DOCTRINE OF NON-DELEGATION OF POWERS APPLICABLE IN ALL
BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT
59 | P a g e
Delegation of power is the exception because the rule is non-delegation.
They are not allowed to delegate it further unless there is what we know as
ALLOWABLE DELEGATION.
IN ALLOWABLE DELEGATION, THERE ARE 2 TESTS:
(1) COMPLETENESS OF STATUTE TEST and (2) SUFFICIENCY OF
STANDARD TEST
COMPLETENESS OF STATUTES - When the law leaves Congress, the law
is supposed to be complete in itself. It must have sufficient limitations.
Example:Labor code provision which allows RWTB (Regional Wage
Tripartite Board) the power to fix minimum wage. In the Labor Code,
there are certain factors or guidelines to consideron how the
minimum wages per region will have to be fixed.
Congress is not expected to know all these specific details in terms of
legislation to address the particular human activity. So these administrative
agencies have been created by law and given these special functions thru
delegation by the Congress, to fill in the details of the particular legislation
affecting their offices.
Unless there is an abuse, such as when the administrative agency has
provided for a rule in relation to the law, which would provide more than what
the law has allowed, then these rules and regulations would have to be
considered as consistent.
SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION - This is the power of administrative offices
to promulgate rules and regulations to implement the provisions of the law.
LIMITATIONS:
1) The rule-making power must not contravene the Constitution; 2) It must
be consistent with delegated authority;
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
INWARD-TURNING LEGISLATION - When congress delegates the power
(subordinate legislation) to a particular government agency, the grant of
power is
supposed to be complete. Congress cannot withhold the power to approve,
or make these rules effective dependent upon the approval of congress.
ABAKADA V PURISIMA
This petition for prohibition1 seeks to prevent respondents from implementing
and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005). Sec 12 RA
9335 subjects the effectivity of IRR-- rule on bicameralism
topic: Creation of revenue performance evaluation board sec 2 and sec 7.
The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of
their revenue targets for the year, as determined by the Development Budget
and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or reward is taken from
the fund and allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion to their
contribution in the excess collection of the targeted amount of tax revenue.
Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the
allocation, distribution and release of the Fund; (2) set criteria and
procedures for removing from the service officials and employees whose
revenue collection falls short of the target; (3) terminate personnel in
accordance with the criteria adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a system for
performance evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including the issuance
of rules and regulations and (6) submit an annual report to Congress.
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of
60 | P a g e
Customs (BOC). This law involves penal statutes if they are not able to reach
their quota. So that is what is challenged here.
Rule: there is no undue delegation of legislative power here.
The policy optimized in RA 9335 is revenue generation. Section 7 provides:
Sec 7 (b) the board has the power and function
The requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to
approval by Congress as a condition for their effectivity violates the cardinal
constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule on presentment…
So, sec 7 is the guide. Kung dili nimo ma meet ang imong target nga at least
7%, noh, these are guides, specifics as to how to implement the law.
Tagaan pa ug chance to be heard ang mga empleyado. This provision does
not violate the security of tenure. No undue delegation. The law lays down
the reasonable yardstick for the removal should the revenue collection falls
short .
Take note: case provides for the procedure before a bil becomes a law. So
take note of the procedure.
Power to Conduct Investigation
1. Question Hour
2. Legislative Inquiry
Question Hour
Art VI Section 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the
President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear
before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written
questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be
limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the
State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall
be conducted in executive session.
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)

Legislative Investigation
Art VI Section 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.
The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE CONCEPT - Members of the cabinet can now be
called to congress not only in Question hour but they can be called in
Legislative Investigations.
n the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through
its various Senate
Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which
call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive
department, bureaus, and offices
including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled
Corporations, the Armed Forces

of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).

QUESTION HOUR and LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATIONS are part of their

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS.
QUESTION HOUR (SEC 22)
It is quite specific. It is referring to
heads of executive department.
There must have to be written
questions submitted before they
are asked.
Only those matters pertaining to
the respective departments of the
head who is called to testify can
be asked.
Discretionary
LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATIONS
(SEC 21)
As opposed to question hour, any
person can be called.
The purpose is for legislation.
Any question can be asked provided
it is an issue or question which
Congress has jurisdiction over.
The only limitation is that the rights of
any person appearing or may be
affected by such inquiry must have to
be respected. Also, the rules of the
inquiry must have been published
Mandatory
Because of this, nahadlok siguro si President no, she issued Executive Order
No. 464 (E.O. 464).
"Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence
to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public
Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
Constitution, and For Other Purposes,"7 which, pursuant to Section 6
thereof, took effect immediately. The salient provisions of the Order are as
follows: SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before
Congress. – In accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and
to implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers
between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of departments of
the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either House of Congress
So karon nag issue si Senate ug subpoena and most of them, they did not go
to the inquiry because they have not secured the consent of the President.
ISSUE: Whether E.O. 464 violates Article VII, Section 22 of the Constitution

Rule: the court nullified certain provisions of the EO. Why? Section 1 is
SENATE vs ERMITA similar to Section 3 in that both require the officials covered by them to
secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before Congress.
So there is an issue here on the North Railway Transit.
There are significant differences between the two provisions, however, which
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constrain this Court to discuss the validity of these provisions separately. EX: Executive privilege
Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. It does not, unlike Section
3, require a prior determination by any official whether they are covered by So that is the tenor of EO464.
E.O. 464. The President herself has, through the challenged order, made the
The purpose of executive privilege is that ikaw nga nay information, youcan
determination that they are. Further, unlike also Section 3, the coverage of
freely disclose it to the president and you cannot be compelled to disclose it
department heads under Section 1 is not made to depend on the department
to any other tribunal.
heads’ possession of any information which might be covered by executive
privilege. In fact, in marked contrast to Section 3 vis-à-vis Section 2, there is Even if yuou have this privilege, you still have to comply with the
no reference to executive privilege at all. Rather, the required prior consent requirement.
under Section 1 is grounded on Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution on
what has been referred to as the question hour. The rule here is that the executive privilege does not attach to your office.

An essential feature of the parliamentary system of government is the
immediate accountability of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet to the
National Assembly. They shall be responsible to the National Assembly for
the program of government and shall determine the guidelines of national
policy. Unlike in the presidential system where the tenure of office of all
elected officials cannot be terminated before their term expired, the Prime
Minister and the Cabinet remain in office only as long as they enjoy the
confidence of the National Assembly. The moment this confidence is lost the
Prime Minister and the Cabinet may be changed.
GR: anyone can be ‘subpoenad’
EX: there are certain officials that you cannot issue subpoena even pursuant
to these powers.
Who are those? The President himself or herself. Members of the SC.
Limitations of the power:
1. There must be duly published rules and procedure
2. Bill of rights must be observed
Can you reject the subpoena?
Not just because executive ka, you can avail of this privilege na or protected.
The privilege attaches to the type of information and not to the position of the
one’s invoking it.
Sensitive character.
Why are 2 (b) and 3 unconstitutional? Because as we said, these are invalid
invocation of executive privilege.
Sec 2b virtually says that the privilege attaches to the position and not the
information. Executive privilege is to specific categories of information and
not specific categories of people. You cannot issue an EO that gives you
executive privilege just because of your position.
Before you cam claim executive
Procedure:
Claim must be express.
eO 464 provide for an implied claim of privilege. It merely invoked EOE464.
This is an invalid invocation of that privilege.

GR: you cannot Congress has the power to conduct inquiries.

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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I TSN- ATTY. GIL GARCIA III
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
August 29
-Keah
Art. VI, sec. 21 – Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in accordance with
duly rules of procedure.
Distinction: Question Hour and Legislative Investigations
- Legislative investigation is more stringent, any person may appear,
investigations may be conducted by the committees or either House.
The subject matter must always be for the purpose of legislation.
- In Question Hour, only Department Heads may appear. The entire
body conducts the investigations and the subject matters are related
to the Departments involved. Also, appearance is discretionary.
SENATE BLUE RIBBON VS. MAJADUCON
This is an investigations on the alleged anomalies on the AFP. Now, if the
Senate conducts inquiries in aid of legislation, persons are invited. As a
general rule they have to go to courts because the courts have authority to
prohibit the committees on requiring persons to appear or to testify before the
committee or the body or the Congress. The said resolution filed in order to
conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation, the charges against members of the
AFP, naa daw plan of coup d’etat also, there was a corruption in the
management of the AFP retirement and separation benefits system. In fact, a
specific instance here with those of certain lot sold to Atty. Fabiano na
undervalued pag baligya sa iyaha. So in investigations, Fabiano was directed
by the committee hearing the matter to appear and testify before them and
he refused. He filed a petition for prohibition and preliminary injunction in the
RTC of General Santos. He contends that Courts may properly intervene into
these kinds of investigations and it would dealt the validity titling of the lot
which according to him is within the competence of Courts basig daw ma
apektohan ang decision sa whatever discussion didto sa committee sa
iyahang case nga pending didto sa Trial Court. Now the Judge here, Judge
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Majaducon issued a TRO against the committee to ceased and desist in
inquiring the matters over the sale of the lot. Can this be done? Did the Trial
Court Judge here commit grave abuse of discretion? The Court said here
that YES. Why?
- The inquiry involved here is one in aid of legislation. It is performed
by the committee involved pursuant to its authority to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation under Art. VI, Sec. 21. There was a clear
legislative purpose for this in order to look into the misused or the
mismanagement of the funds of the retirement system with intention
of enacting appropriate legislation.
Now, Courts may not enjoy directive of the Senate on a resource persons to
attend to the inquiry. Why? Because this is an encroachment on the powers
of legislative to conduct these kinds of investigations. Moreover, it was found
out here that No Court can acquire jurisdiction over the matter na gina ingon
ni Atty. Fabiano na pending daw before the Court because in fact it appear
that the matter was still before the Office of the Ombudsman when the
committee served the subpoena on him. So dili niya pwedi ma argue the
matters pending before the Court kay naa pa siya sa other Department wala
pa siya naadto sa Court. Anyway, that’s the rule.
SENATE VS. ERMITA
It relates to the EO 464 issued by GMA, wherein Heads of the Departments
and Executive Department will have to secure consent before they appear in
either House of Congress for any inquiries in aid of legislation or even
question hour. The Court here nullified sec. 2b, 3 and the rest except for sec.
1 and 2a. Now, we focus on the discussion as to why the foregoing
provisions were declared unconstitutional. The provisions that were not
nullified, they pertain to question hour, pwedi mangayo og consent ang mga
Department Heads kay nakabutang sa constitution nga pwedi mangayog
consent which pertains to question hour. But the remaining provisions that
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
pertains to inquiries in aid of legislation, the Court said that that cannot be
circumvented by mere executive order.
Why is the power of legislative inquiry so important?
- Because it is incidental to the legislative function. It is essential and
appropriate auxiliary legislative function. The legislature cannot
legislate wisely in the absence of information and the condition which
the legislation intended to affect the change.
Now, what if you did not appear if you are given subpoena by the committee
by the House of Congress in an inquiry of in aid of legislation. Well, you can
be cited in contempt by that Body.
Another distinction:
Question Hour – discretionary
In Aid of Legislation - compulsory
How can you be exempted in attending inquiries in aid of legislation?
- You can be validly exempted if you have a valid claim of executive
privilege. The general rule is that the privilege attaches to the
information. An exception to this rule, meaning the privilege attaches
to the person is when it is claimed by the President himself.
GUDANI VS. SENGA
Now here, the Senate invited several officers of the AFP. General Gudani
and other clarified the allegation on election fraud in 2004 election. The
president issued EO 464 and you already know what happened to that EO
464. So to appear before the Senate, you have to secure consent. The 2
officers of AFP here, appeared before the Senate even without the
President’s approval. As a result however, does the president have the
authority to order them prohibiting to testify before a legislative inquiry? The
Court said YES, In so far as AFP officials are concern. Why?
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- She has the authority because under the constitution she has the
Commander-In-Chief powers. In fact, pwedi pud kabaliktaran, kung
dili musugot ang Military Officer, pwedi pud siya mapugos by the
President.
Is that rule absolute? What if the President does not want that Military Officer
to appear before the Senate?
- The President, even if he/she is the Commander-in-Chief, will be
commanded by Judicial order to compel the attendance of the
Military Officer. So even if dili siya musugot pero nay order from the
Court, a valid order to compel na dapat mu-appear tong Military
Officer it has to be obey. Judicial Order as part of the law of the land,
the executive has to be faithfully execute. So as a general rule, the
President as in the case of Senate vs. Ermita, she cannot issue a
blanket requirement prior to the said official summoned to attend
judicial and congressional hearing. Except the ability of the President
to prevent military officer to testify, it can be done because it does
not rely on executive privilege on the power of the President as Chief
Executive and as Commander-in-Chief to control the actions of the
members of the Armed Forces.
IN RE: SABIO
The provision of EO No. 1 issued by former President Cory Aquino, this
EO created the PCGG. Sec. 4b of this EO provides that no members or
staff of the PCGG shall be require to testify or produce evidence in any
judicial, legislative, or administrative proceedings in any matters
concerning its official ???. So there is an exception or privilege granted
by this EO for members of the PCGG to appear in any of the
proceedings concerning matters within the PCGG. This is to ensure the
PCGG’s performance of its task. Now that provision has been questioned
because it destroys the power of the Senate to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation. There was an allegation that Philcomsat as well as the
POPC?, they were alleging proprieties in their operation. So there was a
Senate resolution to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation insofar these
entities are concerned. Now, one of those nga gi invite diri kay si
Chairman Sabio of PCGG. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
because he invokes sec. 4b of EO no. 01 nga naa silay exception from
any proceedings. This prompted Senator Gordon to issue an order to
show cause among others why they should not be cited in contempt. So
there reasons were not satisfactorily so they were arrest for contempt.
May sec. 4b of EO No. 01 may be invoked by Sabio to justify the non-
appearance in that investigation? That Court said NO. Sec. 4b is
repugnant to Art. VI, sec. 21 so therefore it is unconstitutional. Sec. 4b
exempts the PCGG members and staffs to appear in Congress inquiry.
The Court said that nowhere in the constitution granted such exemption.
The effect is that it could reduce the accountability of the PCGG’s staffs
because dili sila ma compel to appear in any investigations so pwedi sila
mag binuang kay dili man sila gina require to attend any investigation
under that provision. It is also inconsistent with the constitutional
provision that public office is a public trust. It encourages irresponsibility
and unaccountability. So the Court said that this provision is
unconstitutional kay daghan siyag provison nga gina violate. The Court
also emphasized here that Congress may exercise Contempt power
pursuant to its power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Why is the Congress given Contempt powers pursuant this?
- If wala ni siya nga power, Art. VI, sec. 21 would be meaningless kay
dili nimo siya ma compel to appear.
STANDARD CHARTERED VS. SENATE COMMITTEE
This involves Standard Chartered bank which is an institution in England. It
was alleged that it violated RA 8799 for selling unregistered foreign
securities. So there was a hearing conducted in Senate to investigate in aid
of legislation and invited officers of Standard Chartered bank to attend a
hearing to submit their position paper. Now, the officers in a letter submitted
to the Senate that there were already cases pending which involves the
same issue that is subject to this legislative inquiry. Therefore, wala daw
jurisdiction because there is a pending case, wala daw jurisdiction ang
Senate hearing the matter.
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Can the inquiry in aid of legislation here proceed?
- The Court said that the proceedings in the Senate may continue
because that proceedings does not encroach on the powers of the
courts. The committee here has the jurisdiction on the inquiry even if
the matter has already with the same subject matter pending in court
because it does not encroach upon the judicial powers.
What is the rationale? The power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
involves the exercise of a sovereign legislative authority and legislative
inquiries is essential component to that, it cannot be subordinated by any
criminal or administrative investigations.
NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE
Involving the ZTE scandal and the invocation of Neri here of the claim of
executive privilege. The DOTC in 2007 entered a contract with the ZTE for
the supply of equipment and services of the NBN Project to be financed by
the Republic of China. Now, because of this, may anomalies na na report
daw wherein resolutions and bills are filed by the committee of Senate to
investigate the ZTE. So the Senate invited some officers, Neri was among
those invited. He did, niadto siya, he testified before the committees for 11
hours. He disclosed that former Comelec Chairman Abalos offered 200M in
exchanged for his approval of the project. He further narrated that he
informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt. The president
instructed him not accept the bribe. However, when he was called further,
Neri refused to answer invoking the executive privilege. What were the
questions asked on him by the committees? 1) WON the President followed
the project? 2) WON she directed it or approved it?
In a letter, the Executive Secretary requested the committee to dispensed
with Neri’s testimonies on the ground of executive privilege. Ermita here
invoked the ruling in Senate vs. Ermita where the court held that it is covered
by executive privilege. Still, the committee cited Neri in Contempt and he was
further arrested.
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
Now are the communications elicited by here covered by executive privilege?
Did the Committee committed grave abuse of discretion when they issued
contempt order against Neri?
On the first issue, the Court said that the questions are covered by executive
privilege. There’s a discussion here on the provisions of the constitution on
Senate power to investigate. So nay silay power to investigate question hour
or inquiries in aid of legislation.
As to the nature of inquiry: the Question Hour, mas bug-at ang power sa
President kay sa sa Congress during Questions Hour.
Why are the elicited questions here covered by executive privilege?
What is the rationale?
- It is founded on President’s guaranteed confidentiality to assure the
candor of presidential advisers to provide the president freedom to
explore alternatives in process of shaping policies and making
decisions. So because of this privilege, dili siya ma compel.
What are the 2 kinds of executive privilege? (American jurisprudence)
1) Presidential communication privilege – applies to the decision
making power of the president. It is rooted on the constitutional
separation of powers. This privilege applies to the documents in its
entirety and congressional or judicial delegation of this privilege is
subject to greater scrutiny than the other privilege.
2) Deliberative process privilege – only applies to decision making of
executive officials. It is rooted in common-law privilege and does not
apply to documents in its entirety and the delegation is not
scrutinized as much as the above mentioned privilege.
What are the elements of executive privilege?
1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential or non-
delegable presidential power;
2) The communication must be authored and received by the adviser of
the president or the president itself and the test is that the adviser
must be in operational proximity with the president;
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3) The privilege remains a qualified privilege, meaning, it may be
overcome by an issue of inadequate or the information may be
unavailable elsewhere. So pwedi siya ma override by public interest.
In the case of Neri, the questions are said to be covered by executive
privilege. Why?
- First, the issue here relates to a quintessential or non-delegable
power which is specifically the power to enter into an executive
agreement with other country. Second, the communications here are
received by those advisers of the president. Neri can be considered
as such because he is a member of the cabinet. Finally, even if the
privilege is qualified, there was no adequate showing of to justify the
limitation of the privilege and the unavailability of the information
elsewhere.
The Court said that there must be a proper invocation of the privilege here
even if it exist. For the claim of the privilege to be properly invoked:
1) There must be a formal claim of privilege;
2) There must be a precise reason to preserve the confidentiality of the
information;
Was there a proper invocation of the privilege in this case? The Court said
that there was.
GARCILLANO VS HR COMMITTEE
Nay Senate inquiry on the matter but it was challenged on the validity of the
proceedings because it was not conducted pursuant to the duly published
rules of procedure. Kay required sa constitution to follow the Senate duly
published rules of procedure. But they did not follow. So gi nullify sa
Supreme Court ang proceedings.
PHILCOMSAT VS. SENATE
PHILCOMSAT is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Philippine Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), a government-sequestered
organization in which the Republic of the Philippines holds a 35% interest in
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
shares of stocks. However, POTC suffered its first loss. In view of the losses
that the government continued to incur and in order to protect its interests in
POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC In view of the losses that the government
continued to incur and in order to protect its interests in POTC,
PHILCOMSAT and PHC. Respondents Senate Committees submitted the
assailed Committee Report No. 312, where it noted the need to examine the
role of the PCGG in the management of POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC.
Petitioners filed the instant petition before the Court, questioning, in
particular, the haste with which the respondent Senate approved the
challenged Committee Report No. 312.
The Court held that the respondents Senate Committees cannot be said to
have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction when it submitted Committee Resolution No. 312, given its
constitutional mandate to conduct legislative inquiries. Nor can the
respondent Senate be faulted for doing so on the very same day that the
assailed resolution was submitted. The wide latitude given to Congress with
respect to these legislative inquiries has long been settled, otherwise, Article
VI, Section 21 would be rendered pointless.
Art. VII, Sec. 4, par. 4
Congress act as a board of canvassers for Presidential and Vice-
Presidential elections
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified
by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to
the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the
certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty
days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of
the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the
Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof
in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
BRILLANTES VS. COMELEC
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Comelec issued resolutions adopting an Automated Elections System
including the assailed resolution, Resolution 6712, which provides for the
electronic transmission of advanced result of “unofficial” count. Petitioners
claimed that the resolution would allow the preemption and usurpation of the
exclusive power of Congress to canvass the votes for President and Vice-
President and would likewise encroach upon the authority of NAMFREL, as
the citizens’ accredited arm, to conduct the "unofficial" quick count as
provided under pertinent election laws. Comelec contended that the
resolution was promulgated in the exercise of its executive and
administrative power "to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections” Comelec added that the issue is beyond judicial determination.
The Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing Resolution 6712. Article VII, Section 4 of the
Constitution, further bolstered by RA 8436, vest upon Congress the sole and
exclusive authority to officially canvass the votes for the elections of
President and Vice-President. The quick count under the guise of an
“unofficial” tabulation would not only be preemptive of the authority of
congress and NAMFREL, but would also be lacking constitutional and/or
statutory basis. Moreover, the assailed COMELEC resolution likewise
contravened the constitutional provision that "no money shall be paid out of
the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." It being
“unofficial”, any disbursement of public fund would be contrary to the
provisions of the Constitution
Art. VII, Sec. 10
Call special election for President and Vice President
The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the third day after the
vacancy in the offices of the President and Vice-President occurs, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call and within seven days, enact
a law calling for a special election to elect a President and a Vice-President
to be held not earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty days from the
time of such call. The bill calling such special election shall be deemed
certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article V1 of this Constitution and
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)
shall become law upon its approval on third reading by the Congress.
Appropriations for the special election shall be charged against any current
appropriations and shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4,
Section 25, Article V1 of this Constitution. The convening of the Congress
cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. No special election
shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date
of the next presidential election.
Art. VII, Sec. 18
Revoke or extend suspension of privilege of habeas corpus or
declaration of martial law
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case
of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a
period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within
forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report
in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a
vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session,
may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be
set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress
may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a
period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall
persist and public safety requires it.
Art. VII, Sec. 19
Approve presidential amnesties
Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this
Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons,
and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
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He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a
majority of all the Members of the Congress.
Art. VII, Sec. 9 and Sec. 16
Confirm certain appointments
Sec. 9 - Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President
during the term for which he was elected, the President shall nominate a
Vice-President from among the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority
vote of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
Sec. 16 - The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of
the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also
appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law
to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers
lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess
of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments
shall be effective only until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments
or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
Art. VII, Sec. 21
Concur in Treaties
No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
BAYAN VS. ZAMORA
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)

The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered
into an agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The
agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine government and was
ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the
total membership of the Philippine Senate.
The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the
Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further
defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in the matter of
criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and
exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates Sec. 25, Article XVIII of
the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly
concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.”
The Court held that the VFA is not unconstitutional.
crime was committed within the country’s jurisdiction. But pursuant to the
VFA, a treaty between the US and Philippines, the US embassy was granted
custody over Smith. Nicole, together with the other petitioners appealed
before the SC assailing the validity of the VFA. Their contention is that the
VFA was not ratified by the US senate in the same way our senate ratified
the VFA.
The Court held that the VFA is a self-executing Agreement because the
parties intend its provisions to be enforceable, precisely because the VFA is
intended to carry out obligations and undertakings under the RP-US Mutual
Defense Treaty. As a matter of fact, the VFA has been implemented and
executed, with the US faithfully complying with its obligation to produce Smith
before the court during the trial.
The VFA is covered by implementing legislation inasmuch as it is the very
purpose and intent of the US Congress that executive agreements registered
under this Act within 60 days from their ratification be immediately
implemented.

Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities
in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met (a) it must
be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and,
when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the
people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting state.

SUPLICO VS. NEDA

It has become moot and academic. ZTE-NBN was cancelled by the

President.

NICOLAS VS. ROMULO

Daniel Smith committed the crime of rape against Nicole. He was convicted
of the said crime and was ordered by the court to suffer imprisonment. Smith
was a US serviceman convicted of a crime against our penal laws and the

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