A New Way with the Consequence Argument, and the Fixity of the Laws

Author(s): Jonathan Westphal

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Analysis, Vol. 63, No. 3 (Jul., 2003), pp. 208-212
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Committee
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3329312 .
Accessed: 13/12/2011 18:01

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Oxford University Press and The Analysis Committee are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and
extend access to Analysis.

http://www.jstor.org
zo8 JONATHAN WESTPHAL

The University
of Kansas
Lawrence,KS 66045, USA
sawyer@ku.edu

References
Boghossian,P. 1997. Whattheexternalist can knowa priori.Proceedings of theAris-
totelianSociety97: 161-75.
Burge,T. 1982. Otherbodies.In Thoughtand Object: Essays on Intentionality, ed.
A. Woodfield. Oxford:ClarendonPress.
Evans,G. 1982. The Varieties ed. J.McDowell.Oxford:OxfordUniver-
ofReference,
sityPress.
McDowell,J.1977. On thesenseand reference ofa propername.Mind86: 159-85.
McDowell,J. 1984. De re senses.In Frege:Traditionand Influence, ed. C. Wright.
Oxford:BasilBlackwell.
McDowell,J.1986. Singularthought andtheextentofinnerspace.In Subject,Thought
and Context,ed. P. PettitandJ.McDowell.Oxford:ClarendonPress.
Noonan,H. W. 1986. Russellianthoughts and methodological solipsism.In Language,
Mindand Logic,ed. J.Butterfield.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press.
Noonan, H. W. 1991. Object-dependent thoughtsand psychologicalredundancy.
Analysis51: 1-9.
Noonan, H. W. 1993. Object-dependent thoughts:a case of superficial
necessitybut
deep contingency. In MentalCausation,ed. J.Heil and A. Mele. Oxford:Oxford
UniversityPress.
Segal,G. 1989. The returnoftheindividual.Mind98: 39-57.
Segal,G. 2000. A SlimBook AboutNarrowContent.Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

A newway withtheConsequenceArgument,
ofthelaws
and thefixity
JONATHAN WESTPHAL

1. The ConsequenceArgument
Van Inwagen'sso-called'Consequence Argument'startsfromthe charac-
terizationof determinismas the claim that what happens in the past,
togetherwiththelaws of nature,entailswhat happensin thepresent.But
we have no choice about what happens in the past or about the laws of
nature.It seems to follow that if determinism
is true,thenwe have no
choice about what happens in the present,and so compatibilismis false
(van Inwagen1983: 93-96). The ConsequenceArgumentis usuallystated
approximatelyas follows.

ANALYSIS 2003,pp.208-212.? Jonathan

63.3,July Westphal
 A NEW WAY WITH THE CONSEQUENCE ARGUMENT 209

(1) O((Po&L) D P) Determinism

(2) O(Po D (L D P)) 1, Exportation
(3) N(Po D (L D P)) 2, RuleAlpha
(4) N(Po) The FixityofthePast(premiss)
D
(5) N(L P) 3, 4 (RuleBeta)
(6) NL The FixityoftheLaws (premiss)
(7) NP 6
5, (RuleBeta)
Rule Alpha is a ruleof argumentwhichallows us to pass fromtheneces-
sityof p to Np, withN beingan operatorof a psychologicalor perhaps
kindwhichsays'No onehas a choice
metaphysical about__'.
Rule Beta is a rule of argumentwhich allows us to go fromNp and
N(p D q) to Nq.
P is anyproposition,Po is a completedescriptionoftheworldbeforewe
were born,and L is theconjunctionof all thelaws of nature.
Van Inwagenobservesthat'If thisargumentis sound,thendeterminism
entails that no one has or ever had any choice about anything'(van
Inwagen 1995: 224), so compatibilismis false. I want to show that the
argumentis not sound. I do not attackBeta,whichis theusual way,butI
tryto show that(6) is false,thoughin a way thatis slightlydifferent from
David Lewis's (Lewis 1986). Still,I am, like Lewis, an indeterminist
and a
compatibilist,because I thinkthatdeterminism, whethertrueor false,has
no tendencyto compromiseour freedom,and I believethatdeterminism is
improbable. I thinkthatitis quitepossiblethat we might findout thatsome
ofour actionshappennotto have a cause,1forexamplean actionas simple
as mygoingto visita foreigncountry, butthepointthatis importantto me
is thateveniftheseactionsdid have causes,theywould nottherefore or for
thatreasonalone be unfree.

2. The denial of thefixityof thelaws

NL statesroughlythatwe have no choice about what the laws of nature
are. More precisely,it statesthatwe have no choice about what thetruth-
value is ofthosepropositionswhichare laws ofnature.Van Inwagenwrites
that,'No one, I think,could disputethe two premissesor Rule Alpha'
(1995: 224), and so forhimtheissueis whetherBetais true.YetNL, propo-
sition(6) in the ConsequenceArgument, can be disputed.
Considera putativelaw which includeswithinthe scope of its predic-
tionswhatwe will do, forexamplevan Inwagen's'If a humanbeingis not
made to feelashamed of lyingbeforehis twelfthbirthday, thenhe will lie

1 In thewaythatWittgenstein describes(Wittgenstein
1967: 106e) at Zettel608: 'But
whyshouldthesystem proceedfurtherinthedirection
ofthecentre? Whyshouldthis
ordernotproceed,so to speak,outofchaos?'
2IO JONATHAN WESTPHAL

wheneverhe believes it to be to his advantage.' Let us representthe

antecedentand theconsequentof thisconditionalas '-M' (for'not made
to') and 'A' (for'advantage'),respectively.
(L,)- MDA
Suppose, however,thatsome memberof the morallyuntrainedgroup,
the-M group,as I willcall it,decides,forwhateverreason,to speak truth-
fullyeven if the resultis disadvantageousto him, and succeeds. '-M'
remainstrue,but 'A' is now false.So theproposition(L1) is false,and it is
not a law. Nor was it ever.Is thisimpossible?It is not impossible,clearly,
ifthatmeans thatthereare possibleworldsin which-M is trueand A is
false.

3. Is NL analytic?
It mightbe said in responseto thisobjection,however,thatthe members
of the-M groupdo not changea law whentheyact so as to makeA false,
and theydid not have a choiceabout whetherthelaw (L1) was true.For if
the-M groupcan make it false,thenit was not a law in thefirstplace. 'If
Jonescould rendersome propositionfalseby performing any act he does
not in factperform, even such a simpleact as raisinghis hand at a certain
time,thiswould be sufficient to show thatthepropositionis not a law of
physics' (van Inwagen 1975: 186). (Bya law ofphysicsvan Inwagenmeans
something wider which would ordinarilybe called a law of nature.)Laws
cannotbe falsifiedbecause laws are truths.
Let itthenbe concededthenthatwhenand ifa memberofthe-M group
developsa moralconscienceand acts on it so as to make A false,thesitu-
ationshouldnotbe describedas one in whicha law has beenchangedfrom
(L1) to (-Li). I agree,as Lewis does,thatthatis analytically impossible.For
part,at least,of thedefinition of a law is a trueuniversalproposition.
It is ratherthatthemembersofthe-M grouphave a choiceabout which
propositionis goingto be and to have beenthetrueone, (L1) or (-L1), and,
therefore, ifeitherofthemis goingto have beena law,about whatthatlaw
is goingto be and have been.This is theimportant thing.Underthedescrip-
tion'proposition'themembersof the-M groupcan make '-M D A' false,
thoughunderthedescription'law' theyobviouslycannot.The believerin
thefixity ofthelaws cannotat theoutsetdeny,on pain of beggingtheques-
tion,thatthe-M grouphas thepowerto make a propositiontrueor false.
If theymake it false,it is not a law. If theymake it true,the proposition
mightyetbe a law. So in thisway theydo have a choice about L1. ('Law'
herefunctionsmerelyas an honorifictermfortruepropositionsor gener-
alizations,retroactively applied,and it is thetruthconditionforlaws that
carriestheweightof van Inwagen'sargument,not any extrametaphysical
or epistemologicalcondition,such as necessity.)
 A NEW WAY WITH THE CONSEQUENCE ARGUMENT 211I

It makes no differencewhether we express the counterexamples

psychologicallyor physicalistically.Suppose thatthereis some physicalis-
tic equivalentof (Li). We expressthesame proposition(Li) extensionally,
substituting forA a propositionof physics,or at any rate one containing
onlyphysicalistterms.Butwhethertheconstituent propositionsof (Li) are
extensionaldoes not affectthe questionwhetherwe have a choice about
makingtheconsequentof theconditionaltrue.
The analyticdefenceof NL has somethingin commonwiththefamiliar
trick argumentfor fatalism.If two thousand years ago someone had
utteredthe propositionthat George W. Bush ('W.') would run for the
Presidencyof theUnitedStatesin theyearAD 2000, thatutterancewould
have expresseda trueproposition,goes theargumentforfatalism.So what
choice did W. have? He was bound to run forthe Presidency, giventhe
antecedenttruthof the propositionthat he would. Similarly,in van
Inwagen'sargumentwe have no choice about what the laws are, because
otherwisetheywouldn'tbe laws. Giventheantecedenttruthof an excep-
tionlessgeneralization,accordingto van Inwagenthereis no choice about
whetheran act whichwould be an exceptionto thegeneralizationcan be
performed.It cannot,forifit could, thentheexceptionlessgeneralization
would not be an exceptionlessgeneralization.
It is as ifvan Inwagenwere to say thatNW, where'W' is thetautology
that'The winneris thewinner.'No one has anychoice about whetherthe
winneris the winner,just as accordingto van Inwagen no one has any
choice about whetherthe laws are the laws or what the laws are. But
we may have a choice about who wins the race, or who the winneris. If
we choose to, and providedwe have the strengthand speed,we can run
faster.
Lewis makeshis marvellousdefenceof compatibilismhingeon a paral-
lel distinctionbetweena weak versionof NL (I am not able to do A such
that if I did A a law would be broken)which he does not accept,and a
strongerthesis(I am not able to breaka law), whichhe does accept(Lewis
1986: 293). Thoughthisdistinction seemsunexceptionable, to me it seems
a littleeasier to make the distinction,
whichhas much the same effectas
Lewis's,betweenpropositionssuch as theone I have labelledL1 underthe
description'proposition',and propositionslike L1 underthe description
'law', takenminimallyas an exceptionlessgeneralization.
4. Van Inwagen'sterminological
restriction
Thus itseemsto methatwhenvan Inwagenmakesthe'terminological' pro-
posal thatthelaws of nature,or 'laws of physics'as he calls them,should
not includepsychologicalor voluntaristicpropositionssuch as (Li), the
effectof thisis to exclude terminologically
any possible counterexamples
to NL!
212 JONATHAN WESTPHAL

The exclusionofvoluntaristic L fromthescope ofNL weakenstheCon-

sequence Argumentas a whole. For it makes its soundnessa stipulative
affair.It is possibleto provethatall menare oversix feettall,forexample,
ifwe stipulatethatanypersonunderthatheightis bydefinition nota man.
However,this is an ignoratioelenchiby redefinition.2 Similarly,we can
stipulatethatno law is voluntaristic,and therebyexcludecounterexamples
of voluntaristiclaws, i.e. laws or true generalizations(plus a preferred
modal or other metaphysicalingredient)about human choices and
behaviour.
The dilemmaforvan Inwagenis thatifhe allows psychologicalor vol-
untaristicpropositionsas laws of naturein his sense, then NL is false,
because thenthereare counterexamples.If he does not allow them(laws
of natureare laws of physics),then the soundnessof the Consequence
Argumentdepends on a stipulationabout the truthof NL, a stipulation
whichis clearlyan ignoratioelenchibyredefinition. Worse,it is a stipula-
tion about a propositionthat containsa crucial ambiguityon laws qua
propositionsand laws qua laws whichmakesthe ConsequenceArgument
as a whole unsound.3

Departmentof Englishand Philosophy

Idaho State University
Pocatello,ID 83209-8056, USA
westjona@isu.edu

References
J.1962. Thecompatibility
Canfield, offreewilland determinism.PhilosophicalReview
35: 712-36.
Lewis,D. 1986. Are we freeto breakthe laws? In his PhilosophicalPapers,Vol. II,
291-304. Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press.
van Inwagen,P. 1983. An Essayon FreeWill.Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press.
offreewilland determinism.
van Inwagen,P. 1975. The incompatibility Philosophical
Studies27: 185-99.
van Inwagen,P. 1995. Whenis the will free?In Agents,Causes, Events,Essays on
Indeterminism and Free Will,ed. TimothyO'Connor,219-69. Oxford:Oxford
UniversityPress.
L. 1967. Zettel.Ed. G. E. M. Anscombeand G. H. von Wright,
Wittgenstein, trans.
G. E. M. Anscombe.Oxford:Blackwell.

2 Van Inwagenseemsto be concedingthiswhenhe observesthat

'[f]orall thatis said
inthispaper,itmaybe thatsomeformofdeterminism basedon voluntaristic lawsis
compatible withfreewill',and saysthatJ.V. Canfieldmay have shown that this is in
factso (vanInwagen1975: n. 2), referringto Canfield.1962. I cannotsee,however,
fromwhatCanfieldhas written there,thathe has shownthisat all.
3 I wishto thankRalphBaergen,RussellWahland RustyHansenforhelpfuldiscus-
sionand criticism.