Chương 1-2-3

1
Introduction
As World War II approached its final days in April 1945, delegates from
50 countries convened in San Francisco for the United Nations (UN)
Conference on International Organization. The aim of the conference was to
discuss and sign the UN Charter, the draft of which had been prepared jointly
by the Republic of China (ROC), Soviet Union, United Kingdom (UK)
and United States (US) earlier in 1944. Also known as the Dumbarton Oaks
proposals (so named due to the location of the meeting among the Allied
‘Big Four’), the draft outlined the new institution’s purposes, membership
and organizational structure (‘Dumbarton Oaks’, 1945). The UN would
have four principal bodies, namely a General Assembly (UNGA), a Security
Council (UNSC), an International Court of Justice and a Secretariat.
Significantly for non-major powers such as Australia and Canada, the
Dumbarton Oaks proposals appeared to give extensive decision-making
powers to the five permanent members of the UNSC –the aforementioned
‘Big Four’ and France. While it was generally accepted that the major powers
would primarily be the ones with the responsibility and ability to maintain
global peace and consequently ‘must enjoy an authority commensurate with
their economic and military resources’, there was also concern over their
unchecked influence that could pose a risk to the interests of the smaller
countries (Evatt, 1946, pp 27, 106; see also Hilliker, 1990, p 734). In this
context, the Australian and Canadian representatives, among others, voiced
the opinion that their respective states should be given priority among the
non-major powers, for non-permanent seats on the UNSC.
Australia’s claims to ‘special recognition’ in the UN were based on the
argument that ‘middle powers’1 like itself possessed both the resources
and willingness ‘to make practical contributions to security’, as evident in
their contributions to the first and second world wars (Evatt, 1946, p 27).
Meanwhile, Canadian officials argued for a ‘Middle Power amendment’ to
the selection of UNSC non-permanent members (Hilliker, 1990, p 780).
As one of the world’s ‘responsible middle powers’, Canada was ‘willing and
able to expend lives and resources on a considerable scale towards achieving
1
MIDDLE POWERS IN ASIA PACIFIC MULTILATERALISM
[the UN’s] purposes’, and hence should be distinguished from other states
that, ‘because of small resources, backward political development, or inertia,
could not or would not make a sizable contribution’ (Hilliker, 1990, pp 734,
900). As one scholar observed, the Australian and Canadian efforts sought to
place their countries ‘as something less than major and something more than
minor powers’ in the international system (Holmes, 1963, p 138). Despite
their efforts, Australia and Canada ultimately did not succeed in securing
a special position for ‘middle powers’ in the UN. The UNSC’s permanent
five members ‘had no particular interest in delineating categories for non-
great powers. And countries relegated by the self-described middle powers
to small power status had no interest in seeing another layer constructed
atop them’ (Neack, 2003, p 164).
Nevertheless, the middle power label stuck in the Australian and Canadian
foreign policy discourse, with the term subsequently being used to also
describe the status and diplomatic styles of states such as Denmark, Norway,
Sweden and the Netherlands through the Cold War years. In the post-Cold
War period, more countries have been referred to as middle powers, including
South Korea and Indonesia. In September 2013, Mexico, Indonesia, South
Korea, Turkey and Australia launched the MIKTA grouping, which was
described by Seoul as a platform for ‘middle power nations that … have the
willingness and capability to contribute to the international community’s
development’ (Shin, 2013). In a jointly written article, the foreign ministers
of the five countries highlighted the need to ensure ‘the effective functioning
of the multilateral order and [address] shortcomings of global governance’,
and suggested that MIKTA could ‘fill an important gap in the international
arena’ as a ‘force for good’ (Meade et al, 2014). While debates abound on
the actual impact that MIKTA has had on global issues thus far, its formation
indicates that the middle power concept, for all its perceived failings, has
been useful in the diplomatic sphere. Statements from official documents as
well as former and current diplomats have continued to profile the middle
power status and emphasize the value of countries such as Australia, Indonesia
and South Korea in international affairs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Indonesia, 2015; Evans, 2018; Kang, 2019). Alongside these
developments, the study of middle powers has also risen to prominence,
as scholars examine how these states could navigate challenges posed by
major power dynamics and security threats, to protect their own interests
in the international system (see, for example, Gilley and O’Neil, 2014b; de
Swielande et al, 2019).
Middle powers and multilateralism

Both in MIKTA and at the UN’s inception, middle powers have sought
to secure their foreign policy interests and, from their perspectives,
2
Introduction
maintain global stability, through multilateral diplomacy. The reason is that

multilateral platforms allow middle powers to work together to restrain
major power unilateralism and to establish rules, norms and institutions
that would contribute towards the predictability of state behaviour and a
more equitable process in collective decision making. Multilateralism further
helps to strengthen and amplify a middle power’s voice on global issues.
Indeed, the middle power inclination for multilateral diplomacy is often
brought up in the relevant literature. Such arguments could follow two
possible trajectories. The first leans towards a neorealist view; considering
the limited influence and strategic weight vis-à-vis the major powers, there
is little that middle powers can do even when they band together through
multilateralism. In this regard, the middle power concept is of little value
as structure acts as a constraint on middle power agency. The second type
of explanation –rooted in institutional liberalism –takes the opposite
view, where middle powers are argued to have demonstrated leadership
and been able to drive the progress of multilateral cooperation. The bulk
of middle power theorizing, perhaps unsurprisingly, has been premised
on these more optimistic prospects (see, for example, Cooper et al, 1993;
Behringer, 2012). In such accounts, middle powers are able to overcome
structural constraints through multilateralism. This book unpacks both
the neorealist and institutional liberal claims by exploring the persistent
relationship between middle powers and multilateralism, and examining
the opportunities that structure generates for middle power behaviour in
terms of multilateral diplomacy. This would provide us with better insight
into how middle powers engage with multilateralism.
Developments at the level of structure are unobservable, but it is possible
to study the middle power behaviour and outcomes that would help to trace
the processes at work at the structural level. By doing so, the aim is to obtain
a clearer idea of what characterizes the fundamental relationship between
middle powers and multilateralism, in order to better understand why and
how middle powers behave the way they do in such platforms. Drawing on
the works of scholars such as Mathias Albert, Barry Buzan, Michael Zürn and
Jack Donnelly, this book advances the argument that differentiation, which is
constitutive of the international political structure, serves as a mechanism to
generate middle power behaviour in multilateralism (Donnelly, 2009; Buzan
and Albert, 2010; Albert et al, 2013; Donnelly, 2013). The effects of the
differentiated structure on middle powers are activated through negotiations
of power politics. This results in such countries pursuing a dilution of
major-power stratificatory forces as well as functionally differentiated roles
for themselves in multilateral diplomacy. Empirically, the book focuses on
the context of post-Cold War Asia Pacific multilateralism.
This book seeks to contribute theoretically and empirically towards
two groups of literature: first, on middle power theory more broadly,
3
and second, on middle powers in Asia Pacific multilateralism. The book

introduces a new theoretical framework for middle power behaviour –one
that puts at its core a concept that is often taken for granted in the study
of middle powers but thus far not explicitly theorized in the literature.
This concept is differentiation. This fills a key gap in the middle power
literature. While the current approaches to middle powers imply that
these states are different from the major powers and smaller countries, as a
whole they have not analysed the conditions that make it possible for such
differentiation. Analysing middle power behaviour through the lens of
differentiation theory offers insight into what is distinctive about such states
and consequently the strategies they adopt to maintain their relevance and
importance in international politics. The point is not to disproportionately
inflate the importance of middle powers vis-à-vis other actors, but rather,
to examine how these states have been able to shape international politics
through multilateral diplomacy.
Empirically, this book examines the contributions and roles of middle
powers –specifically Australia, Indonesia and South Korea –in Asia Pacific
multilateralism. To be sure, there has been a plethora of valuable studies
that analyse the contributions and roles of Australia, Indonesia and South
Korea in regional multilateralism, alongside similar works that examine the
influence of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the
major powers in shaping the regional architecture (see, for example, Cooper
et al, 1993; Gilley and O’Neil, 2014b; Emmers and Teo, 2018). There is,
nevertheless, scope to delve deeper into the structural forces that generate
the behaviour of middle powers in Asia Pacific multilateralism. Even as it is
acknowledged that middle powers are oftentimes constrained by their place
in the international system, the studies on Asia Pacific multilateralism have
illustrated that opportunities exist for middle powers to be able to exercise
some level of influence through multilateral diplomacy. While one could
make the uncontroversial argument that these countries are driven to invest
in regional multilateralism as a result of their limited material capabilities
and diplomatic clout as compared to the major powers, it would be useful
to probe further on the ways in which underlying processes give rise to
particular middle power strategies in multilateralism. This would add to
understandings about how middle powers interact with multilateralism and
the conditions under which middle powers could achieve their objectives
in such platforms.
The rest of this introductory chapter is organized as follows. The next
section will outline how a differential framework could add value to the
study of middle power behaviour. This will be followed by a section on
the book’s research design, which includes explanations for the selection of
case studies and research method. The chapter concludes with an overview
of the book.
4
Introduction
Making the implicit explicit: differentiation in the

study of middle powers
Before we proceed further, it is necessary to outline the definition of
middle powers that is used in this book. As with most concepts in the
field of International Relations (IR), there is no single agreed definition
for what a middle power is, although the literature comprises a variety of
ways to approach the concept. These approaches will be covered in detail in
Chapter 2, but briefly, middle powers have been identified by their material
capabilities, identity and foreign policy behaviour. In light of the strengths
and weaknesses of each approach, as well as the fact that power is best
treated as a multidimensional concept, the book proceeds on the basis that a
composite definition of middle powers relying on all three approaches would
be the most suitable and useful for our purpose. Hence, a middle power
is defined here as a state that quantitatively ranks below the major powers,
but above most of the rest of the states; identifies and is regarded by others
as a middle power; and employs behavioural strategies such as investing in
multilateralism and relying on persuasive or soft power.
Based on the extant approaches to middle powers, it is clear that, at its
core, the concept of middle powers involves the notion of differentiation.
Most, if not all, works on middle powers have involved examining the
factors that make middle powers different from the major powers and smaller
countries, whether in terms of material capabilities, identity or behaviour. At
the broader level, an important –but often implicit –objective is to justify
and rationalize the category of ‘middle powers’ in the state system. In these
discussions, however, differentiation is rarely dealt with from a theoretical
perspective. Grasping the nature of middle power differentiation would
be a first step towards understanding the factors that drive middle power
behaviour in multilateralism. It is not just about a variation in resources or
identity, but more fundamentally, about the mechanisms and processes that
make it possible for middle powers to employ certain behavioural strategies.
As none of the mainstream IR theories have dealt in depth with the
concept of differentiation, this book borrows from sociology’s differentiation
theory to set up its argument. In their edited volume that reflects on how
differentiation theory could be utilized in IR, Albert, Buzan and Zürn define
differentiation as ‘the form and structure of a large-scale social entity … that
is, how and on the basis of which structuring principle, are the main units
within a social system (or subsystem) defined and distinguished from one
another’ (Albert et al, 2013, p 1). Similarly, Donnelly states that ‘differentiation
creates and fills the positions that comprise structures’ (Donnelly, 2013,
p 91). Three main forms of differentiation are visible in international politics,
namely, segmentation (or unit differentiation), stratification (or vertical
differentiation) and functional differentiation (Donnelly, 2009; Buzan and
5
Albert, 2010; Albert et al, 2013; Donnelly, 2013). While these terms are
not commonly seen in the IR literature, the concepts behind them are not
unfamiliar to the field. Segmentation denotes the idea of individual states
as actors in the international system; stratification suggests some form of
hierarchy among the actors; and functional differentiation refers to the
separation of different sectors within the international system (for instance,
global economic governance or international politics) as well as the notion
that certain states could take on specific roles in global affairs (Donnelly,
2009, pp 55–75; Albert et al, 2013, pp 1–2, 6). The value of differentiation
theory for IR lies in its ability to bring together these perspectives about
how the international system is organized into a single framework.
Considering the importance of differentiation in the study of middle
powers, this book uses differentiation theory as a heuristic framework to
understand middle power behaviour in multilateralism.2 It does this by first
laying out the claim that differentiation constitutes the international political
structure. This is certainly evident through the segmentation of political
units as territorially sovereign states or the distinguishing of these states in
terms of their capabilities or roles. Ideas about ‘major’, ‘middle’ and ‘small’
powers in themselves suggest the presence of pre-existing concepts that, in
the first place, enable discussion of these differentiated categorizations. Such
differentiation is subsequently reproduced or transformed by the behaviour
of states. This is not to say that the international system is static. When states
reproduce or transform differentiation, the outcomes of their behaviour form
the basis of structural change. In this way, the interaction of state behaviour
with the differentiated structure reflects precisely the dynamic nature of the
international system and its potential for change. Following from this, the
book argues that this mechanism of differentiation generates the possibilities
for middle power behaviour in multilateralism, with the effects actualized
when middle powers engage in negotiations of power politics.
The notion of power politics is closely associated with the realist paradigm,
although it is important to note that the approach here follows more the
classical realist (rather than neorealist) variant. In particular, the book’s
framework relies on J. Samuel Barkin’s account of power politics as social,
relative and relational (Barkin, 2010, pp 18–20). This treatment of power
politics takes into account both the material and ideational facets of power.
Overall, the framework here seeks to pursue an ‘integrative pluralism’
that ‘accepts and preserves the validity of a wide range of theoretical
perspectives and embraces theoretical diversity as a means of providing more
comprehensive and multi dimensional accounts of complex phenomena’
(Dunne et al, 2013, p 416).
This framework adds to the literature on middle power theory by bringing
together the key elements that account for middle power behaviour in
multilateralism. The expectation is that the presence of differentiation in
6
Introduction
the international political structure creates the conditions for middle power
behaviour to manifest. As a result, middle powers seek to dilute major-power
stratification and assume functionally differentiated roles in multilateral
platforms. The claim that middle powers seek to dilute stratificatory forces
emerges from the notion that given their limited capabilities and clout vis-
à-vis the major powers, middle powers would pursue ways to ensure that
major powers are not the sole decision makers in global affairs. This was,
for example, demonstrated in the efforts of Australia and Canada during
the formation of the UN. Meanwhile, the claim that middle powers seek to
strengthen functional differentiation for themselves is built on the premise
that these countries, in order to set themselves apart from the rest of the
non-major powers and highlight their relevance and weight in international
affairs, would leverage their ability to assume roles that no other country
could perform as effectively.
In these aspects, middle powers could contribute significantly to
international politics in their own ways and typically through multilateralism.
Such assumptions lay the foundations for this study, which seeks to find out
how structure could condition and generate the strategies specific to middle
powers in shaping the dynamics of multilateral platforms, within the context
of the Asia Pacific.
Research design
To explore the structural forces and underlying processes surrounding middle
power behaviour in Asia Pacific multilateralism, this book employs an
intensive research design that uses data and analyses to produce explanations
about how a process ‘works out in a particular case or limited number of cases’
(Sayer, 2010, p 242; see also Danermark et al, 2002, pp 161–5). The point
of an intensive research design is to put together an explanatory account of
how structure produces a particular phenomenon under specific conditions;
in this case, how it has been possible for middle powers to act and achieve
certain outcomes in multilateralism. An intensive research design follows a
‘strategic’ sampling approach (Danermark et al, 2002, p 170). This means that
the case studies are chosen based on how they ‘manifest the phenomenon
of interest’, rather than the extent to which they are most similar or most
different (Wagner, 2016, p 60). The focus here would thus be a within-case
analysis of the processes that have enabled middle power behaviour in regional
multilateralism to emerge. A case study in this book would comprise the
countries of interest and a specific instance of multilateralism.
The book’s empirical focus, as mentioned, is on the Asia Pacific. While
acknowledging that the Asia Pacific is a social construct and has been
geographically defined in different ways, this book primarily follows the
definition of the Asia Pacific that is reflected by the composition of most
7
regional multilateral institutions. This would include Australia, Brunei,

Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar,
New Zealand, North Korea, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea,
Thailand, Timor-Leste, US and Vietnam. It is from this list of states that
Australia, Indonesia and South Korea are identified as the middle powers
for study. Among all the Asia Pacific states listed here, it is these three that
fulfil, to varying extents, the dimensions of material capabilities, identity
and behaviour as encapsulated in the middle power definition mentioned
earlier. Multilateral platforms in the post-Cold War Asia Pacific that Australia,
Indonesia, and South Korea all participate in are the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) forum, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), East Asia
Summit (EAS) and ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM)-Plus.
Out of these four platforms, the three middle powers were arguably the
most active during the establishment of APEC, which covers the period
from the late 1980s to early 1990s, and the formative days of the EAS, which
stretches from the late 1990s to the early 2010s. These two platforms will
thus provide the multilateral contexts for the case studies. The book focuses
primarily on the early days of these forums because it is when the processes
and outcomes of middle power differentiation are arguably the most visible,
be it in terms of shaping membership composition or demonstrating the
specific functions of middle powers in the platforms.
The launch of both multilateral forums has been regarded as key junctures
in the regional architecture. APEC was established at the end of the Cold War,
amidst concerns –mostly from US allies and partners –about US withdrawal
from the Asia Pacific. APEC’s significance lies in the fact that it was the first
multilateral organization in the post-Cold War Asia Pacific with a relatively
inclusive membership, ranging from the major economies such as the US and
Japan, to emerging economies such as Indonesia and, later, China. While it
began as a ministerial-level meeting, by 1993 APEC had added an annual
leaders’ meeting to its line-up. As former Australian Prime Minister Paul
Keating underscores, APEC’s ‘importance and originality … lay not so much
in its function, which was trade and economic cooperation, as in its scope’
(Keating, 2000, p 76). ‘[A]‌ny meeting’, he explains, ‘that includes the presidents
of the US, China, Russia, Indonesia, and the prime minister of Japan and so
on is, by its essence, a strategic one’ (Keating, 2001). The idea of a regional
economic cooperation platform originally took shape in the late 1980s, as the
Cold War was winding down. During this time, regional states were aware
that new and effective forms of regional cooperation were needed to respond
to changing global strategic dynamics and deepening economic integration
outside the Asia Pacific (Hawke, 1994, pp 431–2; Dalrymple, 2003, pp 84–5).
In this regard, countries such as Australia, Japan and the US were
considering, separately, proposals to strengthen trade and economic
cooperation in the Asia Pacific. However, due to fears about major power
8
Introduction
domination of any potential multilateral platform, Australia took on the

leading role in the initiative and Prime Minister Bob Hawke proposed the
formation of APEC in a speech on 31 January 1989 in Seoul (Cooper et al,
1993, p 104; Dalrymple, 2003, p 85). Twelve member economies participated
in the inaugural APEC ministerial meeting, held in Canberra in November
that same year. Due to initial concerns about Chinese domination of the
economic grouping and global political developments, the participation of
China –along with Hong Kong and Taiwan –was only finalized in 1991,
with the assistance of South Korea. To be sure, not all regional states were
equally committed to the APEC idea initially. Some ASEAN member states,
for instance, were concerned about the potential for APEC to sideline
ASEAN in regional multilateralism. As the de facto leader of ASEAN,
Indonesia worked to preserve the organization’s central role in APEC and
ultimately became a strong advocate of the APEC agenda. It also persuaded
fellow ASEAN members to agree on converting Malaysia’s counter proposal
for an East Asia Economic Group (EAEG) to a ‘caucus’ that would be
incorporated within the APEC framework (Pura, 1992; Milne and Mauzy,
1999, p 130). These circumstances surrounding the establishment of APEC,
and the high-profile roles taken by Australia, Indonesia and South Korea
during this time, make it a valuable context for this book.
The second context focuses on the EAS, which was inaugurated in 2005.
The time period of concern, however, extends over a relatively long period
of time, from the late 1990s to early 2010s. This is due to how the EAS
concept and membership have developed over the years. The idea for an
EAS has generally been credited to a recommendation from the East Asia
Vision Group (EAVG) initiated by then South Korean President Kim Dae-
jung in the late 1990s (Kim, 2006, p 11; Cho and Park, 2014, p 584). The
recommendation, which was presented by the EAVG in 2001, was that an
EAS would evolve, over the long term, from the ASEAN Plus Three (APT)
Summit. Given this expectation, many in the region were caught by surprise
when, in May 2004, Malaysia expressed the intention to host the first EAS
the following year. Disagreement emerged regarding EAS membership. The
backdrop of China’s rise and its rivalry with Japan for regional leadership, as
well as concerns from other regional countries about what kind of power
China would become, were important factors shaping this debate. China
and Malaysia wanted an ‘Asians only’ organization that would mirror the
APT membership, while Japan, Indonesia and Singapore advocated for
an open and inclusive membership (Malik, 2006, p 208). Indonesia, in
particular, expressed concerns that an EAS comprising only the APT states
could sideline ASEAN centrality, given the combined economic weight
of China, Japan and South Korea vis-à-vis the ten ASEAN member states
(Natalegawa, 2018, p 88). Following negotiations within ASEAN, specific
membership criteria were established and the inaugural summit was attended
9
by the leaders of the ten ASEAN states as well as Australia, China, India,
Japan, South Korea and New Zealand.
The inception of the EAS in 2005 was a salient moment because it
institutionalized the annual gathering of the leaders of regional states that
were considered key to the power dynamics of the time. This was slightly
different from APEC, which had focused on ‘member economies’. APEC’s
exclusion of India and inclusion of entities such as Hong Kong and Taiwan,
as well as further-flung countries such as Peru and Chile, also complicated
its regional relevance by this time. Following the Asian financial crisis in the
late 1990s, there was moreover a pushback against perceptibly ‘western’-
dominated forms of cooperation such as APEC. While the EAS’ agenda
originally focused on areas of non-traditional security –specifically, finance,
energy, education, avian flu prevention and disaster management –its ability
to gather key regional leaders for annual meetings made it ‘the region’s
premier forum for strategic and security issues’ (Turnbull, 2017). This was
even more so after the US and Russia were formally admitted as members
in 2011, an outcome attributed in large part to efforts from Indonesia and
Australia –even if the latter’s ill-fated Asia Pacific Community (APC)
initiative ultimately failed to materialize in its intended form. Consequently,
the time period for the EAS case study is from the late 1990s to the early
2010s, although the focus is on three specific instances –the EAVG, the
launch of the EAS and its expansion to include the US and Russia.
The activism and contributions of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea to
APEC and the EAS would provide the necessary empirical data to examine
how differentiation helped to generate middle power behaviour in Asia Pacific
multilateralism and how negotiations of power politics shaped the outcomes of
those behaviour. The specific developments within each multilateral context
will be discussed in more detail later in the book. Suffice to note here that in
both contexts, the middle powers sought to dilute major-power stratificatory
forces. This is admittedly a logical objective for all multilateral efforts, but
as we will see later, the ways that each middle power pursued this goal were
slightly different. The founding of the respective multilateral platforms also
enhanced functional differentiation for middle powers in light of the specific
roles that they took on in shaping the organizations.
To trace the workings of the underlying processes within each multilateral
context, the book relies mainly on two complementary modes of inference,
namely, abduction and retroduction. The former involves ‘the redescription
or recontextualization of a known phenomenon’, while the latter aims to
unpack the constitutive properties of the ‘abduced’ structures (Wagner, 2016,
pp 56–7). While often compared to induction and deduction, abduction and
retroduction are more appropriate for this book’s purposes given that the aim
is to explore the underlying processes that make it possible for a phenomenon
to manifest itself within a specific context, rather than to identify law-like
10
Introduction
regularities or general patterns across cases (Danermark et al, 2002, pp 80–1;

Robson, 2011, p 37). The aim of abductive and retroductive reasoning is
not to uncover ‘the ultimate truth’ –this is viewed to be almost impossible
in open contexts of social science –but rather, to make an ‘inference to the
best explanation’ given the available knowledge (Danermark et al, 2002,
p 94; Halperin and Heath, 2012, p 38).
In applying abduction, the central question that is asked is: ‘[w]‌hat meaning
is given to something interpreted within a particular conceptual framework?’
(Danermark et al, 2002, p 80) The core tenet of abduction is that there
exists an empirical and observable phenomenon, which the researcher
(re)interprets according to ‘a frame of interpretation or a theory’, which in
turn results in a new account about the phenomenon (Danermark et al, 2002,
p 90). The analysis can therefore move from individual empirical phenomena
to unobservable structures, for example interpreting a meeting at work
(individual empirical phenomenon) as a ritual produced by the mechanism
of social cohesion (unobservable structure) (Danermark et al, 2002,
p 94). This book recontextualizes middle power behaviour in Asia Pacific
multilateralism as being generated by the mechanism of differentiation. The
aim of interpreting the phenomenon within a new framework is to enhance
understanding of the phenomenon with ‘a different, possibly more developed
or deeper conception of it’ (Danermark et al, 2002, p 91).
Following abduction, the structures are ‘retroduced’ to find out their
characteristic properties. The central question here is: ‘[w]‌hat qualities must
exist for something to be possible?’ (Danermark et al, 2002, p 80). Andrew
Sayer points out that retroduction allows the researcher to ‘get beyond the
recognition that something produces some change to an understanding of
what it is about the object that enables it to do this’ (Sayer, 2010, p 106). It
is not just that X is followed by Y; rather, the focus is on the ‘continuous
process’ by which X produces Y (Sayer, 2010, p 107). This study will thus
need to ask the question: what processes need to occur for differentiation
to generate middle power behaviour in regional multilateralism? For this
study of middle power behaviour, it is postulated that these processes involve
negotiations of power politics. Both abductive and retroductive reasoning
would thus help to uncover the underlying processes and conditions that
have framed middle power behaviour in Asia Pacific multilateralism. In short,
the book’s argument and framework will rely on abducing differentiation in
the regional structure, before retroducing the conditions which enable the
effects of differentiation to shape middle power behaviour and outcomes.
Overview of book
The book is organized as follows. Following this Introduction, Chapter 2
reviews the extant literature on middle powers and their behaviour with three
11
aims in mind. First, assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the existing
approaches to middle powers will help to establish a definition for middle
powers as used in the book. Second, the review will highlight the implicit
notion of differentiation embedded in the middle power approaches thus
far. Third, the review will call attention to the prevalent association between
middle power behaviour and multilateralism.
Chapter 3 establishes the theoretical framework that this book uses to
explain middle power behaviour in multilateralism. Against mainstream
understandings of structure in IR, the chapter makes the case for segmentary,
stratificatory and functional differentiation as being constitutive of the
international political structure. It also outlines how this differentiated
structure serves as a mechanism to generate middle power behaviour in
multilateralism. Given that segmented states remain the primary actors in the
study, the book’s analytical focus is primarily on how middle powers interact
with the forces of stratificatory and functional differentiation. The chapter
also discusses the role of power politics in shaping the multilateral strategies
of middle powers, as they pursue the dilution of major-power stratification
and functionally differentiated roles to their advantage.
The APEC and EAS case studies are explored respectively in Chapters 4
and 5. Both chapters first examine the regional dynamics and structural
conditions that characterized the Asia Pacific in the period leading up to
the proposal of the initiatives, and highlight how differentiation was present
in the structure at the time. This will shed light on how the context was
conducive (or not) to the formation of APEC and the EAS. The initiatives of
Australia, Indonesia and South Korea in the context of the two multilateral
platforms are then outlined.
Chapter 6 brings together both case studies and links it back to the
theoretical framework of the book. The analysis here will draw out the
consistencies or discrepancies for each country in their approaches towards
the two instances of regional multilateralism, as well as similarities and
differences across the three middle powers. Based on the empirical data, the
chapter will trace how differentiation conditioned middle power behaviour in
Asia Pacific multilateralism, as well as how social, relational and relative power
politics activated the effects of the differentiated structure for middle powers.
These dynamics enabled Australia, Indonesia and South Korea to carve for
themselves a seat at the table of regional decision making. This chapter will
also briefly consider instances of Asia Pacific multilateralism which did not
appear as conducive for middle power behaviour to materialize.
Last but not least, Chapter 7 brings the book to a close by reiterating the
main argument and findings, as well as the contributions to the literature.
The chapter also offers some theoretical and policy implications of the
research findings, and highlights key areas for further research.
12
2
The Study of Middle Powers and

Their Behaviour
Introduction
The contemporary study of middle powers has focused primarily on defining
the concept and examining the foreign policies of such states. While there
has yet to be a standardized definition of what middle powers are, the
literature suggests three primary ways of approaching the concept, based
on material capabilities, identity and behaviour. These approaches are not
mutually exclusive; rather, as we will see in the following discussion, their
respective elements are interlinked. The themes in each of these approaches
to middle powers moreover correspond to the three dominant IR paradigms,
namely, (neo)realism, constructivism and (neo)liberalism. This chapter
reviews the existing approaches to middle powers with three aims in mind.
First, examining the strengths and weaknesses of each approach would
help to establish a working definition for middle powers. This would, in
turn, be the basis upon which the countries for study are selected. While
acknowledging that definitional issues remain the biggest challenge for
middle power theory building, the best way forward would nonetheless be to
arrive at a composite definition of middle powers that draws on the strengths
of the three approaches while offsetting their weaknesses. Consequently,
the working definition of a middle power in this book refers to a state that
quantitatively ranks below the major powers but above most of the rest of the
states; identifies and is regarded by others as a middle power; and employs
behavioural strategies such as investing in multilateralism and relying on
persuasive or soft power.
Second, through a review of the extant approaches to middle powers,
we will be able to discern the notion of differentiation that is implied in
the study of middle powers but thus far undertheorized. For instance,
defining middle powers based on material capabilities –also known as the
position approach –is premised on the assumption that these states have a
different level of capabilities as compared to others. The identity approach
13
makes the case that middle power identity is different from the identities of
major powers and smaller states. Last but not least, the behaviour approach
emphasizes that middle powers rely on particular foreign policy strategies
or diplomatic styles that other types of states may not be as drawn towards
or be as effective in. In this sense, differentiation is present in all three
approaches to middle powers, but the current literature does not go deep
enough in examining this notion of differentiation and its value for the
middle power concept.
Third, the survey will highlight that, according to the behaviour
approach, middle powers are generally acknowledged to be inclined
towards multilateralism in their foreign policies. This argument is linked
both to the limited level of material capabilities that middle powers
possess, as well as to what a self-perceived middle power regards as
appropriate foreign policy strategies for itself. Through emphasizing the
established link between middle powers and multilateralism, this chapter
will clarify the rationale for the book’s focus on middle power behaviour
in multilateral organizations.
This chapter is organized as follows. It will first examine the position,
identity and behaviour approaches to defining middle powers, including the
value and gaps of each approach. The discussion will further demonstrate
that differentiation is a fundamental assumption in the scholarship on middle
powers, although an in-depth investigation into the theoretical implications
of this differentiation has been lacking. In the third section of the chapter, we
will arrive at a composite definition of middle powers based on the strengths
and weaknesses of the three extant approaches. This definition will then be
used to select the three countries of primary interest for the book, namely,
Australia, Indonesia and South Korea.
Approaches to middle powers

This section will discuss the three main approaches in the study of middle
powers, which are premised respectively on material capabilities, identity
and behaviour.
Middle power capabilities: the position approach

The position approach focuses on ranking countries by their material
capabilities, such as gross domestic product (GDP), military expenditure,
population or territorial size. Based on these rankings, a tier of countries –
typically those coming in just below the major powers –are identified to be
middle powers. The possession of material capabilities in the measurement of
power is important; without the requisite resources, it would be challenging
for a country to back up its claims to middle power status.
14
The Study of Middle Powers and Their Behaviour
In general, those using this approach could be divided into two groups.
The first group stresses the utility of economic size as the primary defining
characteristic of middle power capability (Holbraad, 1984, pp 78–9; Wood,
1987, p 5). Carsten Holbraad observes that gross national product (GNP) is
‘more reliable and useful’ than other indicators because:
This quantity reflects most of the material and moral factors that
make up power, including population, area, location, resources,
organisation and leadership. Since it is essentially a measure of
economic strength, it indicates potential as much as actual military
power … [and] correlates highly with a number of much more
complex and elaborate indices of power … What is more, it
corresponds fairly closely to most people’s impressions of the relative
power of nations. Finally, carefully calculated figures for GNP are
readily available. (Holbraad, 1984, p 78)
Likewise, Bernard Wood relies on GNP to identify middle powers not only
because it is a ‘remarkably simple and accessible single indicator of the relative
power of nation-states’, but also because of its perceived ‘objectivity’ over
other indicators (Wood, 1987, pp 5–6).
The second group of scholars has preferred to use composite indices
in determining which states are middle powers (Ping, 2005, pp 66–70;
Gilley and O’Neil, 2014a, pp 5–6; Emmers and Teo, 2018, pp 19–24).
The indicators used in these works span the economic, military and social
sectors. A combination of several indicators across different sectors is aimed
at enhancing the comprehensiveness of the measurement (Neack, 1991,
pp 53–4). Even Holbraad, who privileges GNP over other indicators, adds
that population size could also be a valuable supplementary criterion for the
longer term, while in the shorter term troop numbers, military expenditure
and the standard of weaponry might be helpful as they reflect concrete
military power (Holbraad, 1984, p 79).
Regardless of whether they rely purely on economic size or a combination
of indicators, both methods encompass a ranking of some sort in order to
pinpoint the middle powers based on material capabilities and resources. To
be sure, these countries are not necessarily –and in fact, rarely –in the literal
‘middle’ of the quantitative rankings. Rather, as Bruce Gilley and Andrew
O’Neil note, middle powers are typically those countries ‘with a ranking
roughly in the tenth to thirtieth range across a range of capability indicators’
at the global level (Gilley and O’Neil, 2014a, p 5). Others have made the
case for determining the ‘line of separation’ between middle powers and
other states at where it seems the most logical to the researcher, or with a
statistical technique known as cluster analysis (Holbraad, 1984, p 81; see
also Gilley and O’Neil, 2014, p 5).
15
The lack of agreed parameters and standardized indicators have led critics
to highlight the arbitrariness of this approach (Chapnick, 1999, pp 77–8;
Jordaan, 2019, p 113). Potentially, this could mean that a ranking based solely
on GNP and a ranking that gives more weight to other types of indicators
could produce middle power groups that comprise different states. Another
challenge involves the different rationales that different scholars would have in
determining the lines of separation between middle powers and other states.
In this sense, a quantitative approach could to some extent be influenced
by preconceived notions of which state should or should not be a middle
power. To be sure, the possession of capabilities remains important for state
power at the most basic level. This approach provides an important basis for
identifying middle powers because material capabilities ‘are the necessary
condition for middle powers … to have sufficiently broad sets of interests
at stake; and for their initiatives to be credible and thus feasible’ (Gilley and
O’Neil, 2014a, p 4). Without an adequate level of resources, a country would
face difficulty fulfilling its middle power aspirations. Material capabilities
could thus be a point of departure in identifying middle powers, although
it alone cannot offer a comprehensive definition of power (Cox, 1989, p
827; Wight, 1995, p 26; Manicom and Reeves, 2014, p 33). It would be
important to also consider other, qualitative, factors when it comes to middle
powers. It is thus to the identity approach that we now turn.
Middle power image: the identity approach

The identity approach examines if and how a country has described itself as
a middle power, and whether others have acknowledged and recognized this
identity. Located in the constructivist school of IR, the identity approach
builds on the assumption that a state’s identity influences the formation of
its interests, and consequently the strategies it uses to protect those interests
(Jepperson et al, 1996, pp 60–2; Wendt, 1999, p 231). Many works on
middle powers have taken identity as a starting point, regardless of whether
they explicitly state so (see, for example, Gecelovsky, 2009; Patience, 2014).
Andrew Hurrell highlights that in light of the criticisms against the other
approaches to middle powers, constructivism might offer a ‘potentially
promising way’ to salvage the concept’s utility (Hurrell, 2000, p 1). From
this perspective, Hurrell writes, ‘[m]‌iddle-powermanship … becomes an
embedded guiding narrative, a particular foreign policy ideology that can
be traced historically, that is rooted within and around particular parts of the
bureaucracy, and that can be perhaps related to broader trends or tendencies
in the domestic politics of the country’ (Hurrell, 2000, p 1).
In terms of self-identification, statements from leaders and key
policymakers, political elites, as well as official documents, are usually taken
as an indication of whether the country assumes a middle power identity
16
(see, for example, Ungerer, 2007; Teo, 2018). Due to the intersubjective
nature of identity formation, it is also important that the middle power has
its status affirmed by other actors (Wendt, 1999, p 224). As Hurrell explains:
[y]‌ou can claim Great Power status but membership of the club of
Great Powers is a social category that depends on recognition by
others –by your peers in the club, but also by smaller and weaker states
willing to accept the legitimacy and authority of those at the top of
the international hierarchy. (Hurrell, 2000, pp 2–3)
In this context, other actors that affirm a middle power’s self-identity would
include fellow middle powers, major powers, smaller states, as well as regional
and global institutions.
A common theme in the literature on middle power identity is the
existence of a distinct difference between the identities of major powers,
middle powers and small states, even if it is not always clear what this
difference is. This point is often implicit in the authors’ arguments, such as
when Allan Patience posits that middle powers could identify themselves
as ‘junior partners’ of major powers or when David Scott points out that
former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s ‘sense of Middle Power
opportunities was precisely because Australia was not a Great Power’
(Scott, 2013, p 114; Patience, 2014, p 217). Another example is when Paul
Gecelovsky highlights the case of post-World War II Canada seeking a status
that was ‘between the “riffraff” and the great powers’ (Gecelovsky, 2009, p
83). In this sense, a middle power is viewed to be different from the major
or smaller powers. Patience argues that identity is particularly important for
middle powers because, unlike the great or small powers whose ‘greatness’ or
‘smallness’ is often assumed to be a given, middle powers suffer from ‘status
anxieties’ (Patience, 2014, p 211). The apprehension stems from the unclear
distinction between middle powers and –what self-identified middle powers
perceive to be –smaller states. As such, middle powers ‘have much to gain
if their [self-identification] is recognised at regional and global levels, but
they have a lot to lose if it is not’ (Patience, 2014, p 211). It is thus crucial
that a state declaring itself to be a middle power is similarly viewed by other
actors in the international system. Without this recognition, its ‘middle
power’ status could easily be brought into question.
A second theme in this approach involves the impact of middle power
identity on foreign policy behaviour. Some scholars note the positive
correlation between identity and behaviour. Carl Ungerer, for example,
observes that Australia’s self-identification as a middle power has been ‘one
of the strongest influences on the form and conduct of Australian diplomatic
practice’ in the post-World War II years, while Sung-Mi Kim highlights that
the middle power concept has been used by South Korean governments ‘as a
17
framework for their foreign policy vision and strategy’ (Ungerer, 2007, p 540;
Kim, 2016, p 2). Likewise, Gecelovsky notes that the middle power identity
‘has guided policy makers in crafting Canada’s foreign policy’ (Gecelovsky,
2009, p 77). Such a middle power identity is typically built on elements
such as international activism, functionalism and bridging (Ungerer, 2007;
Kim, 2016; Teo, 2018). Unsurprisingly, these elements are similar to what
the behaviour approach espouses.
While an identity approach would certainly allow the researcher to
directly pinpoint which countries regard themselves as middle powers,
relying solely on such an approach to define middle powers also has several
problems. It has been highlighted, for example, that while policymakers
use the middle power identity as a guide for their countries’ foreign policy
strategies, elements of the concept do not necessarily provide an accurate
description of those strategies. James Manicom and Jeffrey Reeves contend
that elements of Australia’s middle power identity reflect how policymakers
‘conceived of Australia’s middle power role’ rather than ‘an objective
assessment of the direction of Australian foreign policy’ (Manicom and
Reeves, 2014, p 33). This raises questions such as, could a state still be a
middle power if it assumes the identity but does not behave as expected?
Conversely, what about a state that acts like a middle power in its foreign
policy but does not explicitly describe itself as a middle power? For some
countries, moreover, the use of the middle power label varies across different
government administrations –if a newly elected government decides to stop
using the term ‘middle power’ to describe their country, for instance, would
it mean that the country is no longer one (Carr, 2014, p 76)? Similarly, if
the present US government decided to describe its country as a ‘middle
power’, would it mean that the global hegemon is now classified as a middle
power? Consequently, there is a need to link identity with both the position
and behaviour approaches, to ensure a more accurate reflection of which
countries are middle powers.
Middle power diplomacy and foreign policy: the behaviour approach

The behaviour approach, as the name suggests, defines middle powers
by their foreign policy behaviour. Conventional theories about middle
power behaviour postulate that, given their limited material capabilities
and diplomatic influence vis-à-vis the major powers, middle powers rely
heavily on multilateral institutions, niche diplomacy and soft power tactics
to preserve their interests in global agendas. Although it is debatable if such
strategies are applicable only to middle powers, the assumption is nevertheless
that middle power behaviour is unique and distinct from the behaviour
of other types of states. This approach leans toward a neoliberal outlook
where middle powers take on leading roles in international issues through
18
multilateral cooperation and institutions, the promotion of absolute gains,

as well as the expansion of international agendas to include non-military
concerns. Given the optimistic view of what middle powers could and
have achieved, it is not surprising that a major part of middle power theory
building has put this approach at the front and centre.
Ronald M. Behringer provides a concise summary of ‘middlepowermanship’,
which he argues consists of three core elements (Behringer, 2013, pp 14–
20). First, due to their limited resources, middle powers would only be
able to ‘exercise effective leadership’ in specific areas of international affairs
(Behringer, 2013, p 14). This means that a middle power would need to
limit its international involvement to issues in which it could presumably
wield the most influence, depending on the resources it has. In contrast,
major powers do not need to specialize, and smaller powers are ‘thought to
lack the wherewithal to exert global influence even through specializing’
(Cooper, 2011, p 321). While this idea of ‘niche diplomacy’ or ‘functional
leadership’ harks back to discussions on Canadian foreign policy in the
late 1940s, Andrew F. Cooper and Gareth Evans have been instrumental
in relating it to middle power behaviour in the post-Cold War period
(Cooper, 1997; Evans, 2011). As Australian foreign minister from 1988 to
1996, Evans advocated niche diplomacy, which he defines as ‘concentrating
resources in specific areas best able to generate returns worth having’ (Evans,
2011). Cooper adds that according to the premises of niche diplomacy, a
state’s ‘standing with respect to specific forums of decision-making rested
on specialized interests and task-related experience’ (Cooper, 1997, p 4).
Middle powers thus need to practice ‘[a]‌n element of selection’ in their
global activism (Cooper, 1997, p 6).
Second, middle powers rely on the deployment of soft power tactics to
influence the preferences and behaviour of other stakeholders (Behringer,
2013, p 18). These include diplomatic or persuasive skills, credible
reputation, as well as technical and intellectual leadership (Cooper et al,
1993; Behringer, 2013, pp 18–20). As Cooper et al found in their study of
middle powers, Australia and Canada possess ‘technical and entrepreneurial
capacities … to provide complementary or alternative initiative-oriented
sources of leadership and enhanced coalition-building in issue-specific
contexts’ (Cooper et al, 1993, p 7). Such capabilities enable middle powers
to be a ‘catalyst’ of initiatives, a ‘facilitator’ of agendas, and/or a ‘manager’ of
institutions (Cooper et al, 1993, pp 24–5). ‘Great powers clearly have these
capacities, too –often in significantly greater quantities’, write Mark Beeson
and Richard Higgott, but they may be less willing to use them (Beeson and
Higgott, 2014, p 224). The premise here is that because middle powers lack
the coercive or hard power assets of the major powers, they have to rely
more on soft power capabilities to protect their interests and maintain their
relevance in global affairs.
19
An element of social obligation is arguably also at play here. Middle

power theorists have described the ‘good international citizenship’ of middle
powers, meaning that these countries are ‘willing to engage in cooperative
international action to advance global public goods’ (Evans, 2017, p 109; see
also Cooper et al, 1993, p 19). Behringer also makes the case that ‘unlike
great powers, [middle powers] rarely resort to the deployment of military
forces for coercive purposes’ (Behringer, 2013, p 18). Certainly, the practice
of good international citizenship is largely predicated on a state’s own national
interests (Cooper, 1997, p 7; Evans, 2011). As Cooper recalls, Australia and
Canada –generally treated as the exemplar middle powers of the post-World
War II period –‘have been censured on a number of occasions for their
passivity and/or abdication of responsibility in responding to international
crises’ (Cooper, 1997, p 7; see also Abbondanza, 2021).
The third element of middlepowermanship, as argued by Behringer, is that
middle powers depend greatly on multilateral processes to shape outcomes
favourable to themselves (Behringer, 2013, p 16). This is the key analytical
focus of the book. The argument that middle powers have a preference
for multilateralism, coalition building and institution building is a popular
one in the literature. Matthew Sussex, for example, declares that ‘[i]‌t is
axiomatic that in order to enhance their relative positions in international
politics middle powers attempt to gain influence within multilateral
institutions’, among other strategies (Sussex, 2011, p 545). This preference
for multilateralism is ‘a function of the size and capacity of these states’, as
they are unable to individually influence global negotiations (Nossal and
Stubbs, 1997, p 151). As such, they rely on building ‘like-minded’ coalitions
to include their concerns on global agendas and ensure that their interests
are protected (Evans and Grant, 1995, pp 345–6; Wilkins, 2019, p 52).
The perception that multilateralism facilitates the institutionalization of
rules and norms that are relatively beneficial to all participants, regardless
of economic size or military capability, is also useful in explaining why
middle powers are inclined towards such platforms. Multilateral channels
are considered more open and fair, and could help to restrain major powers
from imposing their preferences on the smaller states (Nossal and Stubbs,
1997, p 151; Finnemore, 2005, p 196). This brings us to the argument, put
forth by Gilley and O’Neil, that middle powers pursue multipolarity in order
to enhance their importance and strengthen their voice in the international
system. It is in the interest of middle powers to have a ‘G20’ (Group of Twenty)
in global governance, rather than a ‘G2’ (Gilley and O’Neil, 2014a, p 13). For
middle powers, multilateralism becomes a useful way through which major
power relations could be (re)shaped and the international system could be
(re)fashioned towards multipolarity (Gilley and O’Neil, 2014a, p 11).
Major powers could dismiss multilateralism and institutions because
their preponderance allows them to achieve their aims without large-scale
20
cooperation. In an article tellingly titled ‘US unilateralism at the UN: Why

great powers do not make great multilateralists’, Steven Holloway argues that:
The desire to maximize the freedom to use their greater power

made the top powers poor multilateralists. However, the interest of
the small powers was to lessen their power disadvantage by binding
the great powers to legal, alliance, and other multilateral institutions.
Great powers relied on their own power advantage; minor powers
relied on law and international organization. Put simply, great powers
tended to be unilateralist, small and medium powers multilateralist.
(Holloway, 2000, p 364)
The more ambiguous distinction here is between middle powers and smaller
states. As Laura Neack points out, the commitment to multilateralism since
the end of World War II has been ‘ubiquitous’ in the foreign policies of all
states, with the exception of North Korea (Neack, 2017). Consequently,
‘[c]‌oalition building is not the exclusive domain of middle powers but
is an oft-used method of politicking in an international order based on
multilateralism’ (Neack, 2017). A way to clarify the distinction between
middle powers and smaller states in this aspect would be to look at the
differences in terms of their contributions towards multilateral institution
building. Gilley and O’Neil posit, for example, that while both middle
powers and smaller states share the vision of building a rules-based order
through institutions, such initiatives are ‘not one that smaller states can
generally lead’ and leadership here is more likely to be assumed by middle
powers (Gilley and O’Neil, 2014a, p 12). In other words, small states lack
the necessary resources and diplomatic clout to take on leading roles in these
endeavours. Likewise, Robert O. Keohane also observes that while middle
powers ‘cannot act alone effectively but may be able to have a systemic impact
in a small group or through an international institution’, small powers could
‘never, acting alone or in a small group, make a significant impact on the
system’ (Keohane, 1969, p 296). The impact of middle powers and small
states in multilateralism is thus expected to be visibly different. While both
sides of the debate make valid arguments, they also lead to the important
question of what makes multilateralism more useful for middle powers vis-
à-vis other states.
More broadly, the behaviour approach to middle powers has been criticized
for its tautological orientation and inconsistency. The latter has been applied
particularly to the argument that middle powers employ niche diplomacy.
Essentially, this means that middle powers are only middle powers for as long
as they contribute to a particular issue (Chapnick, 1999, pp 74–5; Jordaan,
2019, p 114). Once they stop doing so, their middle power status vanishes.
Chapnick points out that this blurs the line between middle powers and
21
small states, making it hard to defend the distinct categorization of middle

powers over time (Chapnick, 1999, pp 74–5). Meanwhile, the criticism
of tautology arises from the practice of defining middle powers according
to behavioural characteristics drawn from states that are, in the first place,
taken to be middle powers, such as Australia, Canada and the Scandinavian
states (Carr, 2014, pp 74–5).
While some scholars have tried to circumvent this circular argument by
distinguishing between the ‘traditional’/‘established’ and ‘non-traditional’/
‘emerging’ (typically also referring to non-western) middle powers, Sean
Burges argues that such ‘conceptual stretching’ only adds to the murkiness
and confusion in middle power theorizing (Burges, 2013, p 287). Eduard
Jordaan, who wrote the seminal article that set out the defining parameters
for emerging and traditional middle powers in 2003, has more than a decade
later critiqued his own argument and suggested that such a distinction may
be unhelpful in the analysis of middle power behaviour (Jordaan, 2003;
Jordaan, 2019). Another response to the tautology of the behaviour approach
has been to prioritize the actual impact of middle power actions. Andrew
Carr defines middle powers in terms of their ‘systemic impact’, defined
as the ability for states to ‘protect their core interests and initiate or lead a
change in a specific aspect of the existing international order’ (Carr, 2014,
p 79). His approach builds on the analysis of Keohane, who, writing during
the Cold War, grouped states into four categories –great, secondary, middle
and small powers –according to their ability to change the international
system (Keohane, 1969, p 296). Others have also examined how middle
powers exert influence in multilateral negotiations (see, for example, Lee,
1998; Cooper, 2011). While measuring influence may be a more useful
gauge of the significance of middle powers in the international system, the
effectiveness of this method remains obscured by the vague distinctions
between middle powers and other types of states. Major powers, for
example, would certainly be able to ‘protect their core interests’ and ‘alter
a specific element of the international order’ (Carr, 2014, pp 79–80). To a
certain extent, some smaller states may also be able to fulfil these criteria
depending on the issue. It is thus unclear why such influence is unique to
middle powers.
Based on this review of the middle power literature, two points are broadly
evident. First, in all three approaches to middle powers, differentiation is
a fundamental assumption. Middle powers are understood to be different
from other types of states in terms of their material capabilities, identity or
behavioural strategies. Although the specific distinctions may not always be
clear or standardized, the notion of differentiation is nevertheless present.
Given the importance of differentiation for the study of middle powers,
it is thus worth examining the theoretical and empirical implications of
this concept in the context of middle powers. Second, analyses of middle
22
power behaviour have made the case that such countries depend heavily on
multilateralism to pursue their interests. The link between middle powers
and multilateralism may be ‘axiomatic’, as Sussex writes, but less apparent
are the conditions that make multilateralism a conducive platform for middle
power behaviour (Sussex, 2011, p 545). This book thus seeks to clarify
these conditions that make it possible for middle powers to behave the
way they do in multilateral organizations. This will be of value to middle
power theory building, in light of the well-established expectations about
middle powers and multilateralism. Chapter 3 will incorporate elements
from both differentiation and multilateralism, to establish a framework for
examining these conditions for middle power behaviour in such forums.
Before that, however, let us first focus on identifying the middle powers
in the Asia Pacific based on the three approaches discussed in this section.
These middle powers will serve as our case studies in the subsequent
empirical discussions.
Middle powers in the Asia Pacific

In light of the respective deficiencies of the position, identity and
behaviour approaches, the best way forward would be to arrive at a
composite definition of middle powers that draws on the strengths of
the three approaches. This follows scholars that examine the notion of
power, in general, as well as those conducting research into middle powers,
in particular. For instance, Tanguy Struye de Swielande points out the
importance of adopting an integrative and pluralistic approach to the study
of middle powers, so that the middle power literature could overcome
the constraints inherent in individual IR paradigms or specific approaches
(de Swielande, 2019, p 19). Likewise, Manicom and Reeves postulate
that the ‘archetypical middle power … possesses three characteristics: the
material capability, the behavioral element, and the ideational component’
(Manicom and Reeves, 2014, p 33). As Joseph S. Nye, Jr points out in the
context of rising powers such as China or India, ‘whether the capacity that
[their economic and military] resources imply can actually be converted
into preferred outcomes will depend upon the contexts and the country’s
skill in converting resources into strategies that will produce preferred
outcomes’ (Nye, 2011, p 10). The understanding of power should, in this
sense, encompass several dimensions. Material capabilities are important
but so are perceptions and actions.
Based on the preceding discussion, the working definition of a middle
power in this book refers to a state that quantitatively ranks below the major
powers but above most of the rest of the states; identifies and is regarded by
others as a middle power; and employs behavioural strategies such as investing
in multilateralism and relying on persuasive or soft power. Let us address
23
each of these dimensions in turn. It should be noted that the following

discussion will be relatively brief, with the aim of broadly identifying which
countries are of interest to this book’s study. A more detailed examination of
the selected countries’ middle power credentials under specific time periods
would be undertaken in the later empirical chapters.
The first dimension is material capabilities. Considering the various
inconsistencies in selecting such indicators, David A. Cooper observes that it
might be more useful to employ a ‘deliberate oversimplification’ in assessing
national power as a way of identifying middle powers (Cooper, 2013, p 25).
Following this, it is suggested here that all that is needed is one indicator
that reflects broadly a state’s overall resources, and which through a ranking
reveals the countries that occupy appropriately ‘middle-ranking’ spots in the
global hierarchy. This indicator is GDP. In studies that focus on measurements
and assessments of state power, economic wealth is often found to be closely
correlated with other indices of power, such as population, territorial size
and other resources (Holbraad, 1984, p 78; Wood, 1988, p 17). As Hugh
White succinctly notes, economics is the ‘ultimate source’ of national power
and the most significant factor in power politics in the long term (White,
2010, p 19). He adds that ‘[n]‌o country in history has exercised great power
without great wealth, and the country with the most wealth always ends up
with the most power’ (White, 2010, p 19).
The wealth examined here is aggregate, and not per capita. This is
because per-capita wealth reveals more about the standard of living of a
state’s residents, rather than the overall resources it could potentially channel
into its foreign policy. In fact, in terms of per-capita GDP, Luxembourg
places at the top while China is somewhere in the middle of the global
rankings. This does not seem to correspond to their potential power at the
global level, particularly in terms of each country’s ‘political and strategic
weight in the world’ (White, 2010, p 19). Using aggregate GDP would
thus offer a relatively accurate reflection of the (quantitative) hierarchy of
power and allow us to identify a group of ‘appropriately qualified’ countries
as a starting point to the selection of middle powers (Cooper, 1997, p 1).
Following Gilley and O’Neil’s assertion that states ‘with a ranking roughly
in the tenth to thirtieth range’ at the global level could be considered
middle powers (Gilley and O’Neil, 2014a, p 5), a ranking of GDP between
1986 and 2020 reveals that among Asia Pacific countries, Australia, South
Korea and Indonesia have consistently qualified as (quantitative) middle
powers since the last days of the Cold War (see Table 2.1). Countries such
as India and Russia have also made the cut relatively frequently, but their
appearances in this ‘middle-ranking’ list have not been as persistent as the
former three countries.
The second dimension in this composite definition is identity. To pinpoint
which Asia Pacific countries have adopted and projected a middle power
24
Table 2.1: Asia Pacific countries ranking between tenth and 30th in GDP
Year Countries (in descending order of GDP)

1986 India; Australia; South Korea; Indonesia
1987 India; China; Australia; South Korea; Indonesia
1988 China; India; Australia; South Korea; Indonesia
1989 China; Australia; India; South Korea; Indonesia
1990 China; India; Australia; South Korea; Indonesia
1991 Russia; China; South Korea; Australia; India; Indonesia; Thailand
1992 China; South Korea; Australia; India; Indonesia; Thailand
1993 China; Russia; South Korea; Australia; India; Indonesia; Thailand
1994 South Korea; Russia; India; Australia; Indonesia; Thailand
1995 South Korea; Russia; Australia; India; Indonesia; Thailand
1996 South Korea; Australia; India; Russia; Indonesia; Thailand
1997 South Korea; Australia; India; Russia; Indonesia; Thailand
1998 India; Australia; South Korea; Russia
1999 South Korea; India; Australia; Russia; Indonesia
2002 South Korea; India; Australia; Russia; Indonesia; Thailand
2005 South Korea; India; Russia; Australia; Indonesia
2006 South Korea; Russia; India; Australia; Indonesia
2007 Russia; India; South Korea; Australia; Indonesia
2008 India; Australia; South Korea; Indonesia
2009 India; Russia; South Korea; Australia; Indonesia
2010 Russia; Australia; South Korea; Indonesia
2011 India; Australia; South Korea; Indonesia; Thailand
2014 India; South Korea; Australia; Indonesia; Thailand
2015 South Korea; Russia; Australia; Indonesia; Thailand
2019 Russia; South Korea; Australia; Indonesia; Thailand
Source: The World Bank (2021a).
25
Middle Powers in Asia Pacific Multilateralism
identity, the rhetoric adopted by policymakers, diplomats and government

officials will be examined. The US, which is the undisputed global hegemon
in the post-Cold War period, has never been described as a middle power.
Another group of countries –China, India and Japan –are also rarely viewed
consistently as middle powers, although observers have occasionally discussed
the middle power potential of some of them (see, for example, Segal, 1999;
Soeya, 2005, p 105; Efstathopoulos, 2011). Japan and China, moreover, have
under different time periods been considered potential challengers to US
dominance, both in the Asia Pacific as well as globally (Hawes, 1990, p 166;
Ziegler, 1994, p 529; Twining, 2007, p 79). Meanwhile, India and Russia
are typically seen as being located right outside the major power group,
not comparable to the US, China or Japan in the Asia Pacific context, but
yet exceeding the middle power status (see, for example, Nayar and Paul,
2003; Hancock, 2007). Most other countries in the region, such as Brunei,
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Philippines, New Zealand, North Korea,
Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste and Vietnam, likewise have not displayed
a consistent inclination towards projecting a middle power identity in the
post-Cold War period, despite observers occasionally referring to some of
these countries as middle powers (see, for example, Pongsudhirak, 2015;
Lemahieu and Leng, 2020, p 6; Le, 2021). This leaves us with Australia,
Indonesia, Malaysia and South Korea.
Among the 20 Asia Pacific countries identified in this book, Australia’s
middle power identity has been in existence for the longest period of
time –at least since the end of World War II (Ungerer, 2007). This
identity emerged out of an attempt to limit the influence of the major
powers in the then newly established UNSC, and since then Australia has
been associated very much with a middle power image (Evatt, 1946, p
27; Hudson and Way, 1989, p 134). To be sure, Australia’s middle power
identity has drawn different levels of enthusiasm from the country’s
two major political parties. Labor governments have typically embraced
and actively promoted Australia’s middle power identity, while Liberal/
Coalition politicians have dismissed the description of Australia as a middle
power. The latter’s denial of the middle power label stems from scepticism
over multilateralism and institutions, as well as the view that ‘middle
power’ connotes insignificance (Downer, 2003; Beeson and Lee, 2015,
p 234). Despite this rejection of the middle power rhetoric, observers
highlight that Australia’s status as a middle (or middle-sized) power has
been characterized by ‘a high degree of bipartisanship’ and continues to
occupy a paramount position in the country’s foreign policy (O’Neil,
2014, p 19; see also Ungerer, 2007, p 538). Although some scholars have
sought to question Australia’s middle power status, it has significantly
also been acknowledged by foreign actors (see, for example, Lim, 2002;
‘Korea, Australia’, 2009; Levy and Watkins, 2011). This suggests that
26
the middle power identity has been strongly embedded in the discourse
surrounding Australia’s foreign policy.
Compared to Australia, South Korea is a relatively recent adopter of the
middle power identity. Former President Roh Tae-woo was the first South
Korean president to describe the country as a ‘middle power’ in 1991, in
the context of its economic rise (‘Korean president’, 1991; Shin, 2016, p
195). Subsequently, and especially from the late 1990s, Seoul’s efforts to
promote its middle power status picked up pace (see, for example, Choi,
1999; Han, 2001). For the most part, South Korea built its middle power
identity on its rapid economic growth and the potential for it to be a bridge
between the advanced and emerging economies. The appointment of Ban
Ki-moon as UN Secretary-General in 2007 bolstered efforts to portray
the country as a proactive and constructive middle power in international
affairs. Under President Lee Myung-bak (2008–13), the promotion of
the middle power concept in South Korea’s foreign policy discourse
and decision making reached new heights. During this time, there was
also a concerted effort by South Korea’s research institutes and media
to advocate its middle power status (see, for example, Robertson, 2008;
Lee, 2012). Moreover, South Korea initiated the formation of MIKTA
in 2013, which its foreign affairs ministry described as a group of ‘middle
power nations’ aiming to collectively address global challenges (Shin,
2013). South Korea’s middle power identity has also been acknowledged
and accepted by external sources (see, for example, Sheridan, 2008;
‘Singaporean leader’, 2010).
Moving on to Indonesia, it is intriguing that its middle power identity
seems to have initially emerged from external sources, rather than from
Jakarta itself (see, for example, ‘Our media’, 1989; Mehta and Morais,
1990). Nevertheless, with its ‘robust economic growth, a stable domestic
environment, and the resilience of its newly established democratic political
system’ from the mid-2000s, Indonesian officials and academics began
promoting the country’s middle power status in global affairs during the later
years of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s administration (Emmers
and Teo, 2018, pp 44, 47–8; see also Darmosumarto, 2009; Wihardja,
2011). This narrative continued through the subsequent Joko Widodo
administration, as the Foreign Ministry’s Strategic Plan 2015–2019 called
for strengthening Indonesia’s ‘middle power’ diplomacy and bolstering
its role as a ‘middle power’ in global affairs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the Republic of Indonesia, 2015). Indonesia’s middle power identity has
been affirmed by other actors, as evident in its inclusion in MIKTA and
the earlier KIA acronym used to refer collectively to Asia’s middle powers
that also included South Korea and Australia. It should be noted that some
of Indonesia’s political elites have preferred to describe their country as
a rising ‘negara besar’ (big power), rather than ‘negara menengah’ (middle
27
power) (Sukma, 2013; Asril, 2015). As Dave McRae points out, however,
Indonesia’s projection of a ‘big power’ image runs counter to its foreign
policy community’s awareness of the country’s limitations (McRae, 2014,
pp 4–5). Consequently, the middle power status continues to prevail in the
discourse surrounding Indonesia’s international profile (see, for example,
Djalal, 2016; Taufiqurrahman, 2016).
In the case of Malaysia, it was only in the mid-2010s that the country
started to officially adopt the middle power identity. Prior to this, Malaysia’s
political elites tended to describe their country as a ‘small’ and ‘developing’
country, albeit ‘medium-sized and middle income’ (see, for example,
Badawi, 2004; Albar, 2006, p 6). Under the second half of the Najib Razak
government, however, the prime minister urged Malaysia to ‘embrace
our position as one of the region’s [m]‌iddle [p]ower of states’ (as cited
in Carvalho, 2014). While such rhetoric continued to make occasional
appearances beyond the Najib administration, Malaysia’s middle power
identity seems to remain largely under debate (see, for example, Liew, 2017;
Ahmad, 2019). Given its tentative embrace of a middle power identity and
the fact that this has only come about recently, Malaysia’s middle power
identity is thus considered relatively weak in comparison to Australia,
Indonesia and South Korea.
The behaviour aspect makes up the third and final part of the
composite definition used in this book. The indicator here would be
whether a country is active in multilateral diplomacy. While several
works relying on the behaviour approach have been critiqued for being
tautological –because middle powers according to this approach are
typically defined according to behavioural characteristics drawn from the
same states that are already taken to be middle powers –the criterion
of multilateral diplomacy is a requisite here. This is because the aim
is not to examine if a middle power uses multilateralism, but rather,
to examine the conditions that make it possible for a middle power to
pursue certain strategies in multilateral organizations. In this sense, it
would be necessary for the middle power countries under study to be
active in, or at least engaged with, multilateralism. Many of the Asia
Pacific countries would certainly fulfil this criterion at some point in
time. One could even make the case for North Korea, which –in spite
of its relative reclusiveness –is a regular participant in the ARF process.
In fact, all 20 Asia Pacific countries participate in various regional
multilateral forums.
Taking into consideration material capabilities, identity and behaviour,
Australia, Indonesia and South Korea are thus the countries in the Asia
Pacific that embody most strongly all three aspects of ‘middlepowerness’
(see Figure 2.1). These will be the primary countries of interest in
this book.
28
Figure 2.1: The three aspects of middlepowerness
Material Behaviour
capabilities
All other Asia

Pacific countries
Australia,
South Korea,
Indonesia
Malaysia
Identity
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the three main approaches in the literature
on defining middle powers, namely the position, identity and behaviour
approaches. Given the weaknesses of the respective approaches, relying on any
single perspective to define middle powers would be insufficient. To offset
some of the shortcomings inherent in each definitional approach and for a
more comprehensive way of identifying middle powers, this book argues for
a composite definition of middle powers that relies on all three approaches.
A middle power in this book refers to a country that quantitatively ranks
below the major powers but above most of the rest of the states; identifies
and is regarded by others as a middle power; and employs behavioural
strategies such as investing in multilateralism and relying on persuasive or
soft power. As shown in this chapter, Australia, Indonesia and South Korea
qualify as middle powers in the Asia Pacific. The discussion in this chapter
has further underscored both the importance and gap surrounding the notion
of differentiation in the study of middle powers. A better understanding
of differentiation in this context would help to strengthen the explanation
for middle power behaviour in one of the most acknowledged foreign
29
policy strategies for such countries, that is, multilateralism. Building on

the conclusions of this discussion, the next chapter establishes a theoretical
framework premised on differentiation that would help to explain the
structural forces and processes that condition and produce middle power
behaviour in multilateral organizations.
30
3
Towards a Differential Framework

for Middle Power Behaviour
Introduction
This chapter sets out a framework to explore the differentiation mechanism
that generates middle power behaviour in multilateralism. As highlighted in
the preceding chapter, while it is commonly accepted that middle powers
are inclined towards multilateral diplomacy, less attention has been given
to the underlying processes that produce middle power behaviour in such
forums. In addition to analysing the structural forces that make it possible
for middle powers to adopt certain strategies in multilateralism, this line
of research would also offer useful insights to help clarify the distinctions
between middle powers and other types of states. Building on the earlier
analysis that differentiation has been a core yet understudied dimension in
the middle power concept, the framework offered here seeks to make more
explicit the basis of differentiation in the study of middle power behaviour.
This is achieved by using differentiation theory as a heuristic to explain
middle power behaviour. Originating from sociology and anthropology,
differentiation theory has typically not occupied a major space in mainstream
IR. This is in part due to neorealism’s dominance in IR, which posits that
states are functionally alike, with the only difference among them boiling
down to the distribution of capabilities (Waltz, 1979, pp 93–9). Such a
reading leads to the assumption that a theory of international politics must be
necessarily based on the major powers and that non-major powers, including
middle powers, have little role to play in international politics due to the
constraints of structure (Waltz, 1979, p 73).
Certainly, it is evident that much of the behaviour approach to middle
powers focuses on how these countries could overcome their structural
constraints as defined by neorealism. Beeson and Higgott underscore the
basis of middle power theory as ‘the ability to use non-material assets’;
Cooper, Higgott and Kim Richard Nossal juxtapose the ‘non-structural
forms of power and influence’ that middle powers leverage against the
31
‘structural leadership’ of the US; and, Gilley and O’Neil distinguish

middle power theory from ‘more structurally determinative theories of
great powers and secondary states’ (Cooper et al, 1993, p 23; Beeson and
Higgott, 2014, p 223; Gilley and O’Neil, 2014a, p 18). In these statements,
structure is understood to prioritize material capabilities and consequently
has little regard for the agency of non-major powers in the international
system –‘the very antithesis of middle power thinking’ (Beeson and
Higgott, 2014, p 218).
A framework based on differentiation, however, suggests an alternative
to traditional middle power theory. In this alternative account, middle
power behaviour is enabled –rather than simply constrained –by structure.
Following scholars such as Albert, Buzan, Zürn and Donnelly, this
chapter makes the case that structure comprises three primary forms of
differentiation, namely, segmentation (or unit differentiation), stratification
(or vertical differentiation) and functional differentiation (Donnelly, 2009;
Buzan and Albert, 2010; Albert et al, 2013; Donnelly, 2013). As this chapter
will demonstrate, such a reframing of the international structure allows us
to more fully understand how middle power behaviour emerges from the
dynamics of structure. Segmentation denotes the idea of individual states
as actors in the international system; stratification suggests some form of
hierarchy among the actors; and functional differentiation refers to the
separation of different sectors within the international system (for instance,
global economic governance or international politics) as well as the notion
that certain countries could take on specific roles in international affairs
(Donnelly, 2009, pp 55–75; Albert et al, 2013, pp 1–2, 6). Given that the
reference system for this framework is the system of states, the segmentation
of sovereign units remains largely unchanged. Instead, the book’s framework
focuses more on explaining middle power behaviour through the dynamics
of stratification and functional differentiation.
The broad expectation of the framework here is that the presence of
stratification and functional differentiation in the international political
structure creates the conditions for middle power behaviour to manifest.
Consequently, middle powers seek to dilute major-power stratification and
assume functionally differentiated roles in international politics. The claim
that middle powers seek to dilute stratificatory forces emerges from the
notion that given their limited material capabilities and diplomatic clout
vis-à-vis the major powers, middle powers would pursue ways to ensure
that major powers are not the sole authority in collective decision making.
Meanwhile, the claim that middle powers seek to strengthen functional
differentiation is built on the premise that these states, in order to set
themselves apart from the rest of the non-major powers and highlight their
unique value and relevance to global affairs, would take on roles that no
other country could perform as effectively.
32
Towards a Differential Framework for Middle Power Behaviour
These possibilities for middle power behaviour are enabled by the

contingencies of the differentiated structure, but the specific behavioural
outcomes would be activated through the process of power politics that middle
powers engage in, at a particular time and place. To a large extent, analyses
about middle power behaviour in international affairs are unavoidably an
examination of power politics, that is, how middle powers are able to achieve
their interests vis-à-vis other states. Power is, moreover, the chief variable
in the international political sector (Morgenthau, 2006, p 29; Albert et al,
2013, p 10). The inclusion of power politics into the framework would thus
strengthen its utility in explaining middle power behaviour in international
politics. Here, the framework follows the classical realist treatment that
conceptualizes power politics as social, relative and relational (Barkin, 2010,
pp 18–20). This reading of power politics considers both its material and
ideational dimensions, which are important when examining how middle
powers exercise their power. These countries may possess a higher level of
material capabilities than most of the states in the international system, but
they lag behind those of the major powers. Consequently, material assets
could only carry their influence so far in international politics. The ideational
aspect is thus equally crucial because how middle powers view or are viewed
in terms of, for instance, their credibility or diplomatic skill, would shape
their policy options as well as the responses of others towards their initiatives.
Consequently, although the differentiated structure generates the potential
for middle power behaviour, its effects would only be actualized according
to how middle powers navigate the social, relative and relational power
politics in a particular situation.
The chapter is organized as follows. It begins by examining how structure
has been conceptualized in IR, and makes the case for differentiation as being
constitutive of the international political structure. The three main forms of
differentiation –segmentary, stratificatory and functional –will be outlined,
and their relevance to the study of middle powers will be highlighted. The
concept of power politics, focusing on its social, relative and relational
dimensions, will then be discussed in detail. Multilateral platforms are also
examined as sites of power politics. The final section before the chapter
concludes brings together the elements of differentiation theory and power
politics, incorporating them into a framework that will be used to explain
middle power behaviour in Asia Pacific multilateralism.
Reframing structure in international politics

Despite being a concept that is commonly referred to in IR, an agreed
definition of structure among scholars remains elusive. William H. Sewell
goes as far as to say that the concept of structure could never be pinned
down with a ‘formal definition’, while José López and John Scott observe
33
that social structure is typically regarded as a ‘taken-for-granted concept that

is not in need of any explicit definition or discussion’ (Sewell, 1992, p 2;
López and Scott, 2000, p 1). Nevertheless, the constitutive elements of
structure –in particular, international structure –has been a topic of much
debate among IR scholars. In this section, we will first examine mainstream
conceptualizations of structure, before turning to the reframing of structure
that is premised on differentiation.
Structure in international relations

The dominant understanding of structure in IR has been framed mostly
by the neorealist school of thought. Defining structure as ‘the arrangement
of the system’s parts and … the principle of that arrangement’, Kenneth
N. Waltz establishes a three-part formulation of the concept (Waltz, 1979,
p 80). The first aspect looks at the structure’s ordering principle, for instance,
if the structure is hierarchical or anarchical (Waltz, 1979, pp 81, 88–93). The
second aspect of this definition focuses on the functional differentiation of the
units within the structure, and the third aspect focuses on the ‘distribution
of capabilities across those units’ (Waltz, 1979, p 82).
Based on this formulation, Waltz argues that domestic political structures
are hierarchically ordered, with units differentiated by functions and
capabilities (Waltz, 1979, pp 81–8). On the other hand, international systems
are anarchic, meaning that each state ‘is the equal of all the others’ and there
is an ‘absence of agents with system-wide authority’ (Waltz, 1979, p 88).
Anarchy, moreover, implies that states are ‘alike in the tasks that they face’
(Waltz, 1979, p 96). Through competition and socialization, states become
functionally undifferentiated (Waltz, 1979, pp 74–7). Given that all states
are assumed to perform the same tasks, the only difference among them is
attributed to the capabilities they have to perform these tasks (Waltz, 1979,
pp 96–7). In ranking states by their capabilities, Waltz asserts that all of the
following elements need to be considered: population size, territorial area,
amount of resources, economic capacity, military strength, and political
stability and competence (Waltz, 1979, p 131). Consequently, a theory of
international politics has to be necessarily based on the major powers –
‘the states that make the most difference’ as measured by the distribution
of capabilities (Waltz, 1979, p 73). Structural change in the international
system occurs only following alterations in the distribution of capabilities
or ordering principle.
This understanding of structure has had its fair share of critiques. First,
given that structure is viewed as ‘a set of constraining conditions’ to ‘limit
and mold’ actors –resulting in similar outcomes –social factors or the
actual mechanisms of power have little or no explanatory value (Waltz,
1979, pp 73–4; see also Barkin and Weitsman, 2019, pp 26–7). In response
34
to this shortcoming, Alexander Wendt argues that the social structure of

international politics comprises three elements, namely, material conditions,
interests and ideas (Wendt, 1999, p 139). He adds that international structure
is ‘exactly what Waltz says it is not: a social rather than material phenomenon’
(Wendt, 1999, p 20). Neorealism overemphasizes the distribution of
capabilities across states, and disregards the social aspects of the international
structure. While capabilities are certainly important –they indicate the
resources available for a state to carry out its various tasks –the shared
understandings surrounding these material phenomena are crucial as well.
For Wendt and other constructivists, the foundation of a social structure
is in intersubjective ideas, and it is only through interactions with shared
ideas that material elements acquire meanings and effects (Wendt, 1999,
pp 20, 112; Onuf, 2013, p 11–17). These meanings and effects would depend
on which of the three ‘cultures of anarchy’ –Hobbesian enmity, Lockean
rivalry or Kantian friendship –is dominant in international politics (Wendt,
1999, pp 246–312). As an example, Wendt suggests that ‘500 British nuclear
weapons are less threatening to the United States than 5 North Korean
nuclear weapons, because the British are friends of the United States and
the North Koreans are not, and amity or enmity is a function of shared
understandings’ (Wendt, 1995, p 73). Consequently, unlike the neorealist
understanding of structural change as a change in ordering principle or
distribution of capabilities, Wendt contends that structural change entails a
change in the ‘cultures of anarchy’.
The problem with Wendt’s formulation of structure, however, is that he
has gone too far in pursuing ideational forces as a causal variable. Critics
of Wendt argue that he has clearly relegated material forces to a secondary
role and, contrary to his own claims, his formulation of the international
political structure is indeed ‘ideas all the way down’ (Wendt, 1999, pp 96,
110–13, emphasis in original; see also Wight, 2006, pp 155–7; Donnelly,
2012b, p 630). One reason for this ambiguity could be that Wendt’s
theory uses Waltz’s neorealism as a foil, thus resulting in an account of
structure that focuses more on how the deterministic effects of anarchy
on international politics could be overcome (Wendt, 1999, p 41; Zehfuss,
2001, p 56; Barkin, 2003, p 336). In light of these shortcomings, a more
suitable approach would be to treat structure as a set of relations that
establishes the linkages between the material and the ideational (Wight,
2006, pp 175–6). The international political structure comprises both
material and ideational elements, and to privilege one’s causal effects over
the other’s establishes a false dichotomy (Wight, 2006, p 175; Barkin,
2010, p 32). Framing structure as a set of relations would help to highlight
the intersections between materiality and ideational force. Consequently,
structural change would entail a change in the relations that link together
the material and ideational elements.
35
Another criticism of the dominant neorealist view of structure calls out

its assumption that only the major powers matter in international politics.
As others such as Donnelly have pointed out, structure is not represented
solely by its most powerful constituents:
The class structure of a society is not defined by its ruling class. An

army’s structure is not a matter of the number of generals and their
relations to one another. We cannot discern the structure of a slave
system by attending solely to the large slave-owners. In addition to the
privileged we must also consider the deprived (and those in between).
Ranking, being relative, cannot be understood by looking only at
those at the top of a hierarchy. … That some, many, or most have
relatively few capabilities is essential to any adequate understanding
of the distribution of capabilities. Ignoring the weak is a radically
inappropriate way to understand relations of coordination and
superordination, and thus the structure (arrangement of the parts) of
international systems. (Donnelly, 2009, p 56)
Although the environment within which middle powers operate may be

shaped by the number of major powers in the system and their relations, the
concept of structure –defined as the arrangement of the parts of a system –
would also need to take into account the presence and behaviour of the
non-major powers (Waltz, 1979, p 80; Holbraad, 1984, p 5). For such a task,
the neorealist understanding of structure is thus inadequate as it privileges
major powers at the expense of other actors. This also goes back to the earlier
point about the necessity of considering both the material and ideational/
social dimensions of structure. Examining the connections between these
two elements is important to more fully comprehend the intricacies of
middle powers and their behaviour (Manicom and Reeves, 2014, p 33; de
Swielande, 2019, pp 20–1). Even though the capabilities of middle powers
lag behind those of the major powers, they still tend to be materially better
equipped than most of the other states in the international system. The
ideational and social aspects are equally important because (intersubjective)
ideas and beliefs about the middle power’s interests and behaviour would
determine how its activities are received by others. A multidimensional
account of structure would thus help to better explain the opportunities
for middle power behaviour and how such behaviour in turn impacts the
structure of international politics.
Interestingly, there are several inconsistencies in Waltz’s formulation that
lead us to this alternative account of structure. For one, although Waltz
frames (international) anarchy and (domestic) hierarchy as oppositions, his
argument that states are differentiated by capability suggests that some form
of hierarchy is present in the international system. Other scholars have also
36
highlighted that the presence of hierarchy and Waltzian anarchy are not
mutually exclusive (Donnelly, 2015, pp 408–9; McConaughey et al, 2018, pp
184–5). Moreover, Waltz acknowledges that major powers shoulder ‘special
responsibilities’ in international politics (Waltz, 1979, p 198). Although
these ‘special responsibilities’ are attributed to the presence of ‘units that are
functionally similar but of different capability’, the identification of specific
tasks that major powers have both the incentive and ability to undertake
chips away at the assertion that states are functionally undifferentiated (Waltz,
1979, p 198). By recognizing that hierarchy is an element of the international
structure and accepting that major powers serve distinct functions, this line of
reasoning opens up the possibility that middle powers could exist as a distinct
category in the international system of states and also fulfil certain functions
in international politics that the other states are unable or unwilling to.
The existence of middle powers and the acknowledgement that they have
a distinct form of behaviour (that is, middlepowermanship) brings us to the
concept of differentiation. Specifically, it is structure as a set of differentiated
relations connecting the material and the ideational that conditions middle
power behaviour in international politics.
Structure of differentiation in international politics

Differentiation ‘creates and fills the positions that comprise structures’,
and differentiation theory throws light on ‘how to distinguish and analyse
the components that make up any social whole’ (Buzan and Albert, 2010,
p 316; Donnelly, 2013, p 91). Partly in response to the shortcomings and
inconsistences in the neorealist formulation of structure, leading theorists
making the case for a differentiated structure have –building on earlier
studies of sociologists such as Niklas Luhmann and Talcott Parsons –
identified three main forms of differentiation in the international structure.
These are, namely, segmentation (or unit differentiation), stratification (or
vertical differentiation) and functional differentiation (Donnelly, 2009;
Buzan and Albert, 2010; Albert et al, 2013; Donnelly, 2013). As we will
see later, elements of differentiation are embedded, implicitly or explicitly,
in several IR paradigms; nevertheless, differentiation theory facilitates the
bringing together of these diverse yet related elements within a single
framework. Indeed, Zürn et al note the potential for differentiation theory
to contribute significantly to IR by allowing IR scholars to ‘see familiar
things from a new perspective’ (Zürn et al, 2013, p 243; see also Buzan and
Albert, 2010, p 316). Given the knowledge gap surrounding the processes
and mechanisms underlying middle power behaviour in multilateralism,
the value of differentiation theory for this book is its ability to offer ‘an
alternative taxonomy, yet one that fits with, and up to a point unites, existing
IR taxonomies’ (Zürn et al, 2013, p 243).
37
Before we delve into the elements of the differential framework for

middle power behaviour, it is useful to briefly acknowledge the absence of
a homogenous approach in the application of differentiation to IR. The
main divergence is between the ‘type’ and ‘dimension’ approaches. Type
approaches have traditionally dominated the debates on structure in IR (see
Donnelly, 2013). This is evident in both the accounts of structure by Waltz
and Wendt, in which the former considers the international system as being
only of one type (that is, anarchically ordered) and the latter identifies three
types of international anarchy (namely, Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian)
depending on the degrees of ‘cultural internalization’ and cooperation (Waltz,
1979, pp 88–93; Wendt, 1999, pp 246–312). Buzan and Albert adopt a
similar ‘type’ approach and suggest that ‘different types of social structure
can be classified according to their dominant principle of differentiation’
(Buzan and Albert, 2010, p 317; Donnelly, 2012a, p 153). Type approaches
thus regard segmentation, stratification and functional differentiation as
‘idealized representations of forms of social order’, and reference sociology’s
premise that functional differentiation is the dominant type characterizing
contemporary society (Donnelly, 2013, p 95; see also Buzan and Albert,
2010, p 318). While type approaches are useful in the context of comparative
analysis or as a starting point to unpack the assumptions of anarchy, they
also contain several limitations (Donnelly, 2013, p 93). For instance, they do
not address ‘variations within types (which often are analytically important)’
(Donnelly, 2013, p 93). Moreover, as Donnelly points out, the idea that
there is a dominant type of differentiation is often misplaced when it comes
to IR (Donnelly, 2013, pp 94–5).
In contrast, a dimensional perspective embraces a more ‘open-ended
approach to the relationship between dimensions of differentiation’ and thus
provides a framework to systemically investigate ‘dimensions and pathways
of both continuity and change’ (Donnelly, 2013, pp 109, 111). In Donnelly’s
framework, for instance, he conceives of segmentation, stratification and
functional differentiation –along with geography and technology, and norms
and institutions –as co-existing elements that, depending on the specific
combinations, shape different types of multidimensional social and political
structures (Donnelly, 2013, pp 99–103). Consequently, Donnelly’s approach
is less inclined towards the notion that there exists a prevailing type of
differentiation governing international relations, much less the argument that
international society is predominantly functionally differentiated (Donnelly,
2013, pp 93–4, 97). For dimensional approaches, it is the ways that ‘multiple
interrelated elements hang together’ and the effects of that coherence that
are the main subjects of structural analysis (Donnelly, 2012a, p 165). This
is a point made also by Albert et al when they emphasize the importance
of ‘inquir[ing] into the specific ways in which different forms of differentiation
overlap and interact with each other’ (Albert et al, 2013, p 4, emphasis in
38
original). As Donnelly himself underscores, however, dimensional analyses

run the risk of overemphasizing the ‘parts’ at the expense of understanding
the ‘whole’ (Donnelly, 2013, p 93). In this sense, it may be more useful to
regard dimensional and type approaches as offering complementary sets
of analytical tools, rather than viewing them as competing and mutually
exclusive approaches.
Nevertheless, it is beyond the scope of this book to delve deeply into the
debate on type and dimensional approaches. For the framework proposed
here, it is sufficient to note the simultaneous presence and interlinkages
among segmentation, stratification and functional differentiation in the
international system, and that they interact with each other without following
a zero-sum logic (Zürn et al, 2013, p 233). These forms of differentiation
are moreover shaped by material and ideational content that, for example,
result in the recognition of ‘major powers’ with their concomitant obligations,
or, in this book’s case, ‘middle powers’ with a particular set of behavioural
expectations. In this sense, it is the relationship and interactions between the
various forms of differentiation that explain how and why structure provides
the basis for middle powers to behave in particular ways. Using differentiation
theory as a heuristic also allows us to acknowledge the prospect that other
structural forces, beyond anarchy, could generate middle power behaviour
in international politics. Through the lens of differentiation theory, a more
inclusive account of how structure generates middle power behaviour in
multilateralism could be put together. Let us now proceed to examine how
segmentation, stratification and functional differentiation constitute the
international political structure.
Segmentary or unit differentiation ‘generates social actors and distributes
them across positions’ (Donnelly, 2013, p 99). This involves delineating the
units of analysis of the international system. In the case of international
politics, this would refer to the partitioning of territorially sovereign states
within an anarchic –defined as the absence of government rather than
the absence of hierarchy –international system (Waltz, 1979, p 88; Albert
et al, 2013, p 6). For most IR theories, segmentation forms the basis of
differentiation, with stratification and functional differentiation then taking
place across the individual segments of states. The rise of transnational actors,
economic interdependence and globalization may have appeared to diminish
the significance of the territorial state, but it is important to note that this is
not simply about the irrelevance of segmentation. As Zürn et al observe, ‘the
responses to both the global war on terror since 2001, and the economic crisis
since 2008 [illustrate that] the state can seize back control over areas’ that non-
state actors were dominant in (Zürn et al, 2013, p 237). Given that middle
powers are very much state actors, the segmentation of units into sovereign
states is assumed to remain as the basis for other forms of differentiation.
Certainly, the differential framework in this book acknowledges that middle
39
power behaviour is driven by the different self-centred national policies and

attributes of each state; these are examined in the cases of Australia, Indonesia
and South Korea in Chapters 4 and 5.1 Nevertheless, given that the book’s
main aim is to explain how a differentiated international structure generates
middle power behaviour vis-à-vis other states in multilateral contexts and
the outcomes of this process, the analytical focus of the framework here
concerns chiefly stratification and functional differentiation.
Stratificatory or vertical differentiation is ‘where some persons or groups
raise themselves above others, creating a hierarchical social order’ and
establishing relations of superordination and subordination (Albert et al,
2013, p 2; see also Donnelly, 2009, p 55). The idea of a stratified system
of states, layering on top of segmentation, has been advanced in several
IR theories. This is evident, for instance, in realism and neorealism, both
of which advocate for some sort of capability or resource ranking among
states (see, for example, Waltz, 1979, p 131; Morgenthau, 2006, pp 122–
62). Such a stratification of states is also reflected in the composition and
operations of the UNSC, in which the power to veto collective decisions is
held only by the five permanent members, namely, China, France, Russia,
UK and US. English School theorists stress the hierarchical features within
the anarchic international structure, although in contrast to neorealism, this
paradigm considers the social elements and processes that shape perspectives
of authority and legitimacy (see, for example, Dunne, 2003; Goh, 2013).
An additional perspective of stratification in the international system is
provided by liberal institutionalism. In this view, international institutions
and organizations that ‘develop authority of their own’ are believed to be
‘of a higher order than the states’ that participate in them (Zürn et al, 2013,
p 242). One example is the European Union (EU), in which the governments
of member states transfer certain decision-making powers to EU institutions.
In both theory and practice, stratificatory differentiation is evidently present.
The notion of a stratified system –both in terms of a hierarchy of states,
as well as in terms of redirecting authority away from states to institutions –
fits well with a study on middle powers. The existence of a stratified system
of states implies the presence of countries above and below this category of
‘middle’ powers. At the same time, middle powers have sought to ensure that
major powers are not the sole decision-making authority in global affairs. As
discussed in Chapter 2, middle powers have also typically gravitated towards
institutions and multilateralism because they, unlike the major powers, are
assumed to need to rely heavily on collective rules and norms to address
problems. The efforts of Australia and Canada in the mid-1940s to ensure
that their interests would not be sidelined by the permanent five members
in the UNSC, for instance, illustrate this inclination (see Chapter 1). For
middle powers, a dilution of major-power stratification would be to their
advantage in international politics. They would aim to diffuse power and
40
authority away from the major powers down the hierarchy of states, for
example, through the formation of multilateral institutions. This weakening
of stratification, however, would only be to the extent that middle powers
are still able to preserve their material and ideational advantages over the
rest of the non-major powers. Gilley and O’Neil point out that it is in the
interest of middle powers to have an international system framed around
a multipolar ‘G20’ rather than a bipolar ‘G2’ (Gilley and O’Neil, 2014a,
p 13). Equally, it would also be in the interest of middle powers to have an
international system framed around a ‘G20’ rather than a ‘G100’ where their
own influence may be weakened.
The third form of differentiation – functional – could be further
subdivided into two types. The first is ‘where the subsystems are defined by
the coherence of particular types of activity and their differentiation from
other types of activity’ (Albert et al, 2013, p 2). This refers to the idea that
the international system could be broken down into different subsystems or
sectors that each has their own institutions, actors and ‘logic’ (Albert et al,
2013, p 5). For example, the political system operates according to power,
the economic system according to wealth and the legal system according
to law (Albert et al, 2013, p 10). Although sociology generally views such
functional differentiation as the ‘essential characteristic of modernity’ that
displaces other types of differentiation, in most areas of IR theory such a
view has yet to take a strong hold and the political sector continues to hold
sway over other sectors of the international system (Buzan and Albert, 2010,
p 318). One IR school of thought that may come close to refuting this line
of argument is liberalism, which underscores economic interdependence as
a constraint on military conflict. Within the international economic sector,
organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World
Trade Organization (WTO) focus on promoting security in economic,
rather than military, terms. However, even within this liberal view, the
political sector continues to have an influential role across the other sectors.
Moreover, a study on middle powers and how they secure their interests
through multilateralism is, in large part, about the exercise of power –the
central variable in the political sector (Morgenthau, 2006, p 29; Albert et al,
2013, p 10). For these reasons, the framework for middle power behaviour
in this book will focus in particular on the international political sector.
The second type of functional differentiation that Albert et al put forth
refers to the ‘more narrow sense of role differentiation’, which involves,
for instance, some countries ‘serving as leaders or providers of collective
goods, others as followers or neutral states’ and so on (Albert et al, 2013,
p 6). This is different from niche diplomacy as explained in Chapter 2,
which puts the focus more on individual state initiative to take up certain
tasks. Agency certainly plays a part, although in functional differentiation,
as Donnelly explains, the definition and allocation of social functions to
41
actors ‘is a feature … of the system, the structure of which is characterized

by however functions are defined and distributed across social positions’
(Donnelly, 2013, p 100, emphasis in original). Here, however, mainstream
IR literature has tended to put the spotlight more on the roles of major
powers –thus linking functional differentiation with stratification –rather
than the rest of the states. As mentioned earlier, Waltz’s claim of states in the
international system being functionally undifferentiated is challenged by his
own assertion that major powers ‘undertake tasks that other states have neither
the incentive nor the ability to perform’ due to their ‘extraordinary positions
in the system’ (Waltz, 1979, p 199). These tasks are: ‘the transforming or
maintaining of the system, the preservation of peace, and the management of
common economic and other problems’ (Waltz, 1979, p 199). Meanwhile,
Hedley Bull claims that major powers serve two primary functions in the
international order, namely, ‘managing their relations with one another’ and
‘exploiting their preponderance in such a way as to impart a degree of central
direction to the affairs of international society’ (Bull, 1977, p 207). Unlike
Waltz, however, Bull recognizes the role of socially negotiated processes in
the formulation of major power functions (Bull, 1977, p 202).
Turning to an analysis that includes the non-major powers, Paul Schroeder
contends that strategies for state survival throughout the Westphalian era
have comprised not only balancing or bandwagoning, but also ‘specializing’
(Schroeder, 1994). This involves ‘[q]‌uestions of how functions and roles were
assigned to individual actors within the international system, whether these
roles were necessary and justified, and how well the actors were fulfilling
them’ (Schroeder, 1994, p 125). States that are successful in specializing
within the international system would be able to ‘exist and prosper long after
they were unable or unwilling to defend themselves, while states that failed
to specialize … might be destroyed’ (Schroeder, 1994, p 125). A middle
power, for instance, could through functional differentiation construct a
‘recognizable and distinct international identity’ that highlights its ‘necessity
and relevance’ to international politics (Lennox, 2008, p 49). The success
or failure of states to specialize could thus explain broad outcomes in the
international system (Schroeder, 1994, p 125). To be sure, the characteristics
of a state would affect, to some extent, the roles that it could undertake.
Without possessing some kind of economic and military strength, for
example, how could the US sustain its leadership in various aspects of global
affairs? Yet, capabilities do not account completely for these functions; it
is necessary to also consider ‘relationships and interactions’ that the state is
involved in (Donnelly, 2000, p 98). In this sense, middle powers qualify as
such not only because they possess a certain level of material capabilities,
but also because their relationships and interactions with other international
actors affirm their status as ‘middle powers’. The discussion here also
further emphasizes the connections between functional differentiation and
42
stratification (see Zürn et al, 2013, pp 233–4). For instance, the development
of functional differentiation could deepen forces of stratification as some
states come to be regarded as leaders in certain areas of global affairs. The
allocation of functions and roles, as well as the ability of states to carry out
these functions and roles effectively, thus hold important consequences for
international politics.
In putting forward a new framework for middle power behaviour in
international politics, an important first step is to recognize that differentiation
constitutes structure. Differentiation theory thus offers a heuristic to explain
middle power behaviour. As this section has demonstrated, all three forms
of differentiation –segmentary, stratificatory and functional –are present
in the international political structure. It is this differentiated structure that
enables the emergence of middle power behaviour. Given that segmented
states remain the primary actors in international politics, the analytical focus
here is on stratification and functional differentiation. The expectations of
middle power behaviour generated by the differential framework are that
such states would seek to dilute major-power stratificatory forces and assume
functionally differentiated roles in international politics. It is important to
note, however, that structure conditions, rather than determines, middle
power behaviour. Moreover, developments at the structural level are typically
unobservable. Thus, the final piece in the framework for middle power
behaviour involves the process of power politics that middle powers engage
with, under particular circumstances. This process ultimately determines the
outcomes of middle power behaviour within a specific context and allows
for the observation of empirical effects that would highlight the presence of
the differentiated structure in international politics. This will be the focus
of the next section.
Power politics
The emphasis on power politics follows from the notion that power is
regarded as the key variable in the international political sector (Morgenthau,
2006, p 29; Albert et al, 2013, p 10). ‘Power politics’, Martin Wight writes,
‘is a colloquial phrase for international politics’ (Wight, 1995, p 23). He
adds that the presence of power politics entails two conditions. The first is
that there are independent and sovereign political units, and the second is
that ‘continuous and organized relations’ exist among these units (Wight,
1995, p 23). The former would refer to states while the latter would refer
to the various relationships –diplomatic, military, economic and so on –
that govern the interactions among states. Following Anders Wivel and T.V.
Paul, this book defines power politics as ‘the contestation among individual
states using their particular resources and bargaining strengths to influence
the structure of relations and the conduct of other actors’ (Wivel and
43
Paul, 2019, p 10). When it comes to middle powers, the process of power
politics within a specific context would determine if such states are able to
actualize the possibilities of their behaviour that have been generated by the
differentiated international structure. In so doing, middle powers seek to
strengthen their ‘power’ in international politics. This section first considers
how processes of power politics could be examined, before looking at how
multilateral platforms serve as sites of power politics.
The concepts of power and power politics are ubiquitous in IR, with
various ways to approach them. The two dominant schools of thought in
evaluating power are ‘power over resources’ and ‘power over outcomes’
(Keohane and Nye, 1998, p 86; Wivel and Paul, 2019, p 9). In the power-
over-resources approach, a state’s power is measured based on its possession
of material capabilities. Accordingly, the state that has the largest amounts
of economic and military resources is considered to be the most powerful
in the international system. With its focus on the distribution of material
capabilities, neorealism is premised on this understanding of power.
Nevertheless, while material capabilities are useful as a first-cut assessment
of power (see Chapter 2), they are ultimately a measurement of potential
power –if a state does not leverage or exercise the potential of its capabilities,
or is not perceived to be doing so, there is no exercise of power. This brings
us to the power-over-outcomes approach, which measures power based on
a state’s ability to influence and prevail over other actors. This aligns closely
with Robert A. Dahl’s oft-cited formulation of power as ‘the extent that
[A] can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do’ (Dahl, 1957,
p 203). In this sense, power is a relation involving not just the deployment of
material capabilities but also an awareness of the interest and preferences of
the other actors, expectations and the ability to convince or persuade (Dahl,
1957, p 203; Keohane and Nye, 1998, p 86). Michael Beckley additionally
points out that a ‘power-over-outcomes’ approach is more applicable in a
context-specific study –given that ‘different countries, at different times,
want different things’ –rather than to assess the overall balance of power
(Beckley, 2018, p 13). The framework for middle power behaviour proffered
in this book assumes the importance of context as well; it is the conduct
of power politics under particular circumstances that determine the extent
to which middle power behaviour trigger the effects of the differentiated
structure. What these circumstances are, in turn, depend on factors such as
the actors involved and the intersubjective expectations about power.
Related to the power-over-outcomes approach, others have framed the
exercise of power through social structures or institutions. Parsons argues
that power is generated through social systems and has value only when its
exercise is recognized and accepted by others (Parsons, 1963, pp 236–42).
Meanwhile, Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall establish a taxonomy
of four types of power: compulsory power, which involves direct control of
44
another actor; institutional power, which involves indirect control through

formal and informal institutions; structural power, which involves the internal
relations that constitute social positions and identities; and productive power,
which involves more generalized systems of meaning and networks of social
forces (Barnett and Duvall, 2005, pp 49–57). They add that ‘in most social
contexts all [four types of power] are operating simultaneously, intersecting
with and reflecting off of each other’ (Barnett and Duvall, 2005, p 67).
Such a view thus considers the possibility that power produces ‘effects that
shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate’
(Barnett and Duvall, 2005, p 42). Consequently, even countries without
great economic or military resources would have the potential and ability to
assert power in international relations. To do so, however, they would have
to engage in ‘politics’, which refer to those activities that involve or affect
the power of an actor in relation to others (Carr, 2001, p 97; Morgenthau,
2006, pp 29–30).
Power politics is a central concept of realism. While differences in emphasis
may occur across the various realist approaches, Barkin argues that, at its
core, a classical realist reading of international politics boils down to power
politics; everything else, such as the primacy of military force or the priority
on state survival, derive –rightly or wrongly –from this fundamental notion
of power politics (Barkin, 2010, p 21). Hans J. Morgenthau’s seminal work
on realism, for instance, declares that:
International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever

the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the
immediate aim. Statesmen and peoples may ultimately seek freedom,
security, prosperity, or power itself. They may define their goals in
terms of a religious, philosophic, economic, or social ideal. They
may hope that this ideal will materialize through its own inner force,
through divine intervention, or through the natural development of
human affairs. They may also try to further its realization through
nonpolitical means, such as technical cooperation with other nations
or international organizations. But whenever they strive to realize
their goal by means of international politics, they do so by striving for
power. (Morgenthau, 2006, p 29)
E.H. Carr likewise puts forward the claim that ‘power is always an essential
element of politics’, even if politics ‘cannot be satisfactorily defined
exclusively in terms of power’ (Carr, 2001, p 97). For a framework that
explains how middle powers are able to differentiate themselves from other
states and strengthen their ‘power’ in the international system, it thus makes
sense to rely on classical realist insights about power politics. In particular,
the framework follows Barkin’s concise encapsulation of classical realist
45
power politics as ‘relative, relational, and social’ (Barkin, 2010, p 18). As

the following discussion will show, Barkin’s framework of power politics
incorporates constructivist elements as well. This is based on the assumption
that shared ideas and knowledge could affect the exercise of power in
international politics, and also condition the responses of other actors towards
that exercise of power. In turn, power politics affect the development and
acceptance of shared meanings and interpretations (Barkin, 2010, pp 165–73;
Gow, 2017, pp 261–76).
The social aspect of power politics, for Barkin, means treating the state
as a ‘corporate actor’ and ascribing state power to social institutions, rather
than to individuals (Barkin, 2010, p 20). The claim is not so much that states
are persons, but rather, that a state possesses the ability or capacity to act as
a collective whole to achieve its objectives. This ability or capacity to act
is reflected in the behaviour of the state’s politicians and officials, and –in
the case of foreign affairs –diplomats. Morgenthau points out that these
are the individuals who represent the state at the international level: ‘[t]‌hey
speak for it, negotiate treaties in its name, define its objectives, choose the
means for achieving them, and try to maintain, increase, and demonstrate its
power’ (Morgenthau, 2006, p 114). In essence, they ‘wield the power and
pursue the policies of their nation’ (Morgenthau, 2006, p 114). Social power
politics suggest the importance of intersubjectivity too. An example from
Audie Klotz and Cecelia Lynch illustrates this: the exchange of paper bills or
tokens would not have any meaning unless there was a ‘shared acceptance’
that these bills and tokens could be exchanged for goods and services, and
that such a meaning becomes the dominant interpretation associated with
this activity (Klotz and Lynch, 2007, p 8; see also Barkin, 2010, p 28).
In the context of middle powers, Catherine Jones notes that behaviour
such as coalition or bridge building ‘inherently requires an acceptance
or acquiescence of this role by other states’ (Jones, 2019, p 101). Indeed,
without acceptance by others of the middle power’s role, neither bridges
nor coalitions could be built. An apt example of this was when Australia and
Canada failed to garner sufficient support to codify their middle power status
in the UN Charter during the discussions for the organization’s formation
in the mid-1940s (see Chapter 1). Yet, the lack of a codified term did not
mean a wholesale rejection of the middle power concept. As Neack argues,
Australia and Canada subsequently ‘internalized the idea of the middle power
and began conforming their external behaviors to role expectations’ (Neack,
2003, p 164). Over time, the notion of a middle power began to take on
certain meanings regarding the diplomacy and behaviour of those states. It
follows from this that, to examine power politics between states, it would
be necessary to pay attention not only to rhetoric and behaviour, but also
to the shared meanings and discourses among these actors that shed light
on the possibilities for a state’s behaviour.
46
The second dimension of power politics put forward by Barkin –

relativity –refers to the idea that the power of an actor is meaningful only
when compared against another actor (Barkin, 2010, p 18; Morgenthau,
2006, pp 166–8). ‘It makes no sense’, Barkin argues, ‘to speak of the power
of a state without the context of the object with respect to which or whom
that power may be used’ (Barkin, 2010, p 18). The mere knowledge that
a state has the largest economy in the world, for instance, is generally
meaningless for the analysis of power politics, without examining how the
economic resources could be deployed against other actors. Moreover, as
E.H. Carr remarks, to understand a ‘political’ issue, it is essential to know
not merely the content of the issue, but also ‘between whom it has arisen’
because that will have implications for how the issue develops (Carr, 2001,
p 97). Certainly, a military or economic conflict between China and the US
would play out very differently from a similar conflict between, for example,
Singapore and the US.
It is pertinent to point out that power in this view is not based exclusively
on material capabilities. In their respective formulations of state power,
Morgenthau and E.H. Carr include factors such as the extent to which
citizens support the government’s foreign policy, charisma and ideology,
as well as the ability of the government to manage resources and influence
popular opinion (Carr, 2001, pp 120–30; Morgenthau, 2006, pp 147–52,
156–62). Morgenthau himself has called out the ‘misunderstanding of the
central element of power … to be equated with material strength, especially
of a military nature’ (as cited in Williams, 2005, p 110). This view of power
is also reflected in the arguments of Michael C. Williams, who argues
that classical realist theory ‘has always been defined by a concern with the
construction of political orders’, and Richard K. Ashley, who highlights
the significance of recognition in power relations (Ashley, 1984, pp 271–2;
Williams, 2005, p 207). This inclusive approach is important for a study on
middle powers because their behaviour and consequent outcomes could
not be attributed solely to the level of material capabilities they possess.
Rather, explanations would likely involve a mix of elements including
economic and diplomatic resources, normative expectations, political will,
as well as opportune circumstances. An assessment of material resources and
common ideas regarding the ranking of states –including the framing of
certain countries as stronger or weaker than others –would thus be useful
to understand relative power politics.
Last but not least, power politics is also relational, which for Barkin refers to
the idea that power involves ‘getting other actors to do what you want them
to do’ (Barkin, 2010, p 19). ‘In any context in which ends cannot reasonably
be achieved by physically destroying an adversary’, he writes, ‘political
power is ultimately about persuasion, about convincing rather than forcing’
(Barkin, 2010, p 19). Similarly, E.H. Carr identifies ‘the art of persuasion’
47
and propaganda as a form of power (Carr, 2001, p 120). Nye offers more
specificity to the notion of relational power politics by operationalizing it
as ‘commanding change, controlling agendas, and establishing preferences’
(Nye, 2011, p 11). His concepts of soft power and smart power also exemplify
relational power politics. Soft power is about ‘getting others to want the
outcomes that you want’ through co-option rather than coercion, while smart
power is ‘the ability to combine hard and soft power resources into effective
strategies’ (Nye, 2004, p 5; Nye, 2011, pp 22–3). Both soft and smart power
rely not just on military or economic capabilities but also persuasion and
attraction. The deployment of power capabilities thus ‘requires clarity about
goals (preferred outcomes), resources, and tactics for their use’ (Nye, 2011,
p 208). A state may be unrivalled in military capability, but whether or not
it deploys that capability against another actor depends on its objectives, as
well as how the potential target might respond.
Understanding the relational aspect of power politics means paying
attention to how actors define their place in the social group, how they define
relations with other actors and how they define their behavioural possibilities
within a particular context. The significance of context is underscored by
Stefano Guzzini, who writes that:
Power does not reside in a resource but stems from the particular
relation in which abilities are actualized. Hence, in order to find out
whether a certain action (not just the possession of the resource) indeed
realizes an instance of (social) power, the distribution of resources says
quite little independently of the specific conditions which apply to
the social relation at hand. Power is situation-specific. (Guzzini, 2006,
p 123, emphasis in original)
Context is also important for ideas. The generation of meanings and

interpretations, and more importantly the determination of which meanings
and interpretations are accepted and become dominant, are dependent
upon the specific context. Both E.H. Carr and Morgenthau, for example,
highlight that understandings of ethics and morality are contributing factors
in a state’s decision to deploy its capabilities (Carr, 2001, pp 130, 135–53;
Morgenthau, 2006, pp 12–13). Indeed, contemporary expectations of what
middle powers are, and how they behave in global affairs, would be at least
slightly different compared to, say, the 16th century, given the dissimilar
circumstances of international politics. Similarly, a middle power seeking
to play a role in the international stage would presumably face different
dynamics from a middle power seeking to play a role within its own region.
In other words, the ‘political and cultural context’ of the specific situation
is important when it comes to the process of power politics (Morgenthau,
2006, p 11).
48
In terms of the framework for middle power behaviour advanced in this

book, power politics that is relative, relational and social activates the effects
of the differentiated structure in order to produce middle power behaviour.
Let us now turn to examine how power politics plays out in multilateral
forums, which provide the broad context for our study.
Multilateral platforms as sites of power politics

Defined as ‘the practice of co-ordinating national policies in groups of three
or more states, through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions’,
multilateralism has served as a key pillar of the post-World War II global
order (Keohane, 1990, p 731). International institutions such as the UN,
World Bank and the IMF, as well as regional organizations such as ASEAN
and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have been important
players in international politics. Multilateralism in the Asia Pacific has been
a relatively recent phenomenon. Although ASEAN was established in 1967
with five founding members, its first summit was held only in 1976. While
its second summit was held a year later, it was another decade before its
leaders met for a third time, in 1987 (Caballero-Anthony, 2005, p 56). Prior
to ASEAN’s formation, other post-World War II initiatives for regional
multilateral cooperation –especially in security –were unsuccessful due to
intramural tensions and mistrust (Caballero-A nthony, 2005, p 52–3; Emmers
et al, 2010, p 5). Indeed, it was only as Cold War tensions wound down
in the late 1980s that a nascent multilateral architecture emerged in the
region, with the formation of APEC in 1989 and the growth of ASEAN-
led platforms such as the ARF that was launched in 1994, the APT that was
institutionalized in 1999, as well as the EAS that was inaugurated in 2005.
Subsequently, the now ten-member ASEAN has pursued a central role in the
regional multilateral architecture, alongside ongoing debates about ASEAN
centrality and the association’s effectiveness in managing regional affairs.
IR approaches, certainly, differ in their assessments of multilateralism.
Liberal institutionalism regards multilateralism and institutions as pathways
for states to share information, enhance interdependence, and focus on
enhancing absolute gains within an anarchic environment (Keohane, 1998;
Haggard, 2014). Constructivism emphasizes the ability of multilateral
platforms and institutions to shape behavioural norms and establish shared
identities among participants (Katzenstein, 1996; Adler and Barnett, 1998).
The strategies emphasized by both these schools of thought involve reducing
the uncertainty arising from global anarchy. Applying constructivist and
liberal institutionalist tenets to the Asia Pacific have involved examining the
interdependence, socialization processes and norms that underpin regional
multilateralism (see, for example, Simon, 1995; Acharya, 1997; Tan, 2013).
In evaluating whether ASEAN is a ‘powerful actor’ in the region, Sarah Eaton
49
and Richard Stubbs note the differences between the constructivist and
neorealist understandings of power. If we accept the constructivist assumption
that ‘power in the context of ASEAN is a distinct social construction’, then
the organization could be regarded to have been a powerful actor in Asia
Pacific multilateralism and community building (Eaton and Stubbs, 2006,
p 146). In contrast to these more optimistic appraisals of multilateralism,
neorealism regards these platforms as epiphenomena of major power
politics (Mearsheimer, 1994/95). ‘The most powerful states in the system’,
writes John J. Mearsheimer, ‘create and shape institutions so that they can
maintain their share of world power, or even increase it’ (Mearsheimer,
1994/95, p 13). Under anarchy, any kind of sustained cooperation among
states is ultimately hindered by concerns about relative gains and cheating
(Mearsheimer, 1994/9 5, p 12). Such a reading of Asia Pacific multilateralism
would accord little agency to ASEAN –an organization comprising ten
of the weakest or smallest countries in the region –and attribute regional
developments to the behaviour of major powers such as China and the US.
As Michael Leifer observes, a multilateral arrangement like the ARF is ‘a
valuable adjunct to the workings of the balance of power’ (Leifer, 1996,
p 57). Consequently, materially stronger states remain disproportionately
influential in the evolution of Asia Pacific multilateralism.
To be sure, power does matter for multilateralism. Constructivists and
liberal institutionalists acknowledge this point too, even as they make the case
for common interests, shared norms and collective identity as both drivers and
outcomes of multilateral cooperation (see, for example, Finnemore, 2005;
Keohane, 2006). Keohane explains that in a typical multilateral organization:
[w]‌eak states collectively can outvote the strong. But inequalities

of power intrude on the expression of preferences by states. Even if
weak states have the nominal ability to thwart the will of the strong
in international organizations, they may be unable to analyse complex
issues or make their voices heard. They may also be unwilling to defy
their powerful neighbours, creditors and trade partners. … Defenders
of multilateral institutions have to recognize this intrusion of power
politics. (Keohane, 2006, p 60)
The processes of multilateralism are in part affected by power politics, and

stronger states are expected to have the advantage because they have more
resources and tools to leverage. In a study on ASEAN’s socialization of its
external partners, David Martin Jones and Michael L.R. Smith indeed
find that ‘more powerful regional players [have] manipulate[d]‌ASEAN’s
shared norms and nonbinding processes for their own strategic advantage’
(Jones and Smith, 2007, p 184). Ralf Emmers likewise argues that balance
of power considerations have shaped the development of ASEAN and the
50
ARF despite their rhetorical rejection of conventional balance of power

politics (Emmers, 2003, p 175). As Martha Finnemore observes in light of
the power asymmetries that characterize multilateral organizations, a key
task of multilateralism has thus been to ‘devise rules that both accommodate
power (so the strong will “buy in”) but are accepted by others’ (Finnemore,
2005, p 198). The UNSC, which accords veto power to the permanent
five, is a reflection of this accommodation. In this regard, multilateral
organizations could be considered ‘sites of power [that] reflect and entrench
power hierarchies’ (Hurrell, 2000, p 4).
Diverging from neorealist expectations, however, the power dynamics in
multilateralism go beyond mere ‘reflections of the distribution of capabilities
in the system’ (Barkin and Weitsman, 2019, p 24). Rather, power politics
played out through multilateralism involves attempts to establish the terms and
frameworks for cooperation, such as having a say in matters of membership
composition, agenda, and the rules and norms of cooperation. These are
strategies that middle powers generally pursue, given their limited material
strength but relatively substantial diplomatic resources and clout. While
they may not be able or want to influence the preferences and behaviour of
other countries through coercive means or pressure, their ability to shape
the environment within which multilateral cooperation occurs would be
useful to achieve their interests. Multilateralism could thus be deemed as an
approach that middle powers rely on to strengthen their relative and relational
power position in international politics (see Barkin and Weitsman, 2019,
pp 23–4). Let us now build on the discussion thus far to establish a framework
that explains middle power behaviour in multilateralism.
Differentiating middle power behaviour in

multilateralism
This section links up the analytical insights from power politics and
differentiation theory, and outlines how we arrive at the outcomes of middle
power behaviour in multilateralism. As Georg Sørensen explains, ‘[w]‌hen
states are “unlike units” it becomes necessary to further analyse the kind of
differentiation that has taken place in the state system’ (Sørensen, 2008, p
16). Moreover, the presence of ‘unlike units’ creates ‘a different (material
and social) structure which redefines the context for interaction’ and this
structural change modifies the ‘purposes and methods in using power’
(Schroeder, 1994, p 127; Sørensen, 2008, p 24). The framework proposed
by this book expects middle powers to dilute major-power stratification
and pursue functionally differentiated roles in their favour. Although the
differentiated structure of international politics makes such behaviour
possible, the specific outcomes would depend on how middle powers
navigate the social, relative and relational power politics in a particular
51
situation. Conceptually, the framework thus treats differentiation as a

mechanism that has its effects activated by the power politics surrounding
middle powers.
A mechanism is defined as ‘the process, entity or state of affairs involved
in, or responsible for, an action, reaction, or outcome of a natural or social
phenomenon’ (Wight, 2004, p 288). In theorizing about an open and
complex social world, mechanisms are ‘claimed to exist’, with potential
outcomes dependent on how they interact with other forces and mechanisms
under a particular set of contextual circumstances (Wight, 2004, p 286,
emphasis in original). This means that the effects of the mechanisms should
be understood as tendencies, rather than regularities or generalities. Whether
a mechanism’s tendencies are triggered or not depends on the context as well
as its relations to other mechanisms that are at work (Sayer, 2010, p 122;
Wight, 2015, pp 52–6). Using the example of gunpowder, Colin Robson
explains how mechanisms operate to generate outcomes:
Does gunpowder blow up when a flame is applied? Yes, if the

conditions are right. It doesn’t ignite if it is damp; or if the mixture is
wrong; or if no oxygen is present; or if heat is only applied for a short
time. … the outcome (the explosion) of an action (applying the flame)
follows from mechanisms (the chemical composition of the gunpowder)
acting in particular contexts (the particular conditions which allow the
reaction to take place). (Robson, 2011, pp 32–3, emphasis in original)
Applying this to the book’s argument, the differentiated structure would

serve as the mechanism for middle power behaviour. Specifically, the
framework here anticipates that the presence of stratification and functional
differentiation in the international political structure creates the conditions
for middle power behaviour to manifest. As a result, middle powers would
seek to dilute stratification of the major powers, and take on functionally
differentiated roles in international politics. In order for these outcomes to
be actualized, however, there needs to be an ‘action’ –this is power politics –
that takes place within a particular context. As Stacie E. Goddard and Daniel
H. Nexon highlight, contextual conditions ‘help explain which power-
political maneuvers come into play, their effectiveness, and other aspects of
their dynamics. In crucial respects, they explain how processes, mechanisms,
and logics translate into specific outcomes’ (Goddard and Nexon, 2016,
p 14). The extent to which a middle power would seek to dilute major-
power stratification and assume functionally differentiated roles, and the
extent to which it would be successful, depends on how power politics plays
out at a particular time and place. For instance, if a middle power attempts
to reduce the influence of major powers in collective decision making and
enhance its own voice, its success would be contingent on which actors
52
Figure 3.1: How middle power behaviour is generated in multilateralism
Mechanism: Action + Context: Outcomes:

International political Power politics at a • Dilution of major-power
structure as constituted by particular time and place stratificatory forces
differentiation • Pursuit of functionally
differentiated roles for
middle powers
it is working with or against as well as whether it possesses the necessary

capabilities or persuasive skills to secure its aims in negotiations. When
middle powers engage in power politics within a particular context of Asia
Pacific multilateralism, the effects of the differentiation mechanism are thus
activated (see Figure 3.1).
Given their limited material capabilities and diplomatic clout vis-à-vis the
major powers, middle powers would attempt to dilute forces of major-power
stratification. This diffusion of power away from those at the top creates the
scope for others further down the hierarchy –such as middle powers –to
have a say in regional and global agendas. To be sure, this diffusion of power
may also work against middle powers, as it is accompanied by ‘a diffusion of
preferences [as well as] ideas and values’ from a variety of actors and sources,
which affects the responses towards middle power initiatives (Hurrell, 2010,
p 26). It would therefore be fair to expect that this dilution of stratification
is only to the extent that middle powers retain some kind of competitive
advantage over the rest of the non-major powers. After all, even if they are not
regarded as major powers or do not possess major-power-level capabilities,
middle powers nevertheless wield relatively significant resources and sway as
compared to many other states. Multilateralism, in this sense, offers middle
powers the opportunity to diffuse power away from the major powers and
exert some influence over the rest of the countries.
In the context of the Asia Pacific, middle powers would work towards
ensuring the participation of major powers in multilateral forums. In the
region, the group of key major powers would typically include China and
the US, both of which have extensive diplomatic weight and the ability to
act unilaterally in regional affairs. Up until the late 2000s or early 2010s,
Japan would also be considered a major power that, at various time periods,
competed with the US and China for regional leadership. To reduce the
potential for unilateralism from these major powers, middle powers such as
Australia, Indonesia and South Korea would seek to ensure these countries’
participation in and commitment to regional multilateral arrangements with
their associated rules and norms. It is also through multilateralism that these
middle powers obtain a seat at the table for themselves, as such platforms,
naturally, would encompass all or most of the regional countries that have
53
a stake in the agendas. Without these more inclusive channels of discussion

and decision making, it is likely that the major powers would be the only
ones determining the trajectory of regional issues.
In addition to diluting major-power stratificatory forces, middle powers
also undertake functionally differentiated roles in multilateral diplomacy.
The expectation is that middle powers would likely perform different roles
in multilateralism from that of the major powers or smaller states. This may
be due partly to material capabilities, but equally importantly, would also be
a result of ideational and social factors such as perceptions of credibility and
trust. In his argument that middle powers are more effective when they act
in coalitions, for instance, Keohane contends that such behaviour also has
to emerge out of leaders’ recognition of what their countries could or could
not do (Keohane, 1969, p 296). This is where materiality begins to take on
ideational force, as middle powers seek to portray themselves as possessing
certain behavioural characteristics that are not commonly associated with
other categories of powers.
While middle powers have certainly been associated with a variety of
roles, the roles identified in this book are particularly relevant in terms of
multilateralism. The specific roles of interest here involve middle powers
proposing or establishing new multilateral platforms in the Asia Pacific, or
being honest brokers to resolve disagreements among participants to advance
multilateral cooperation. These roles also build on the material and ideational
characteristics of middle powers. Given their lesser coercive strength
compared to the major powers, middle powers may be perceived to be less
threatening to smaller states, who may, in turn, be more responsive to middle
power initiatives. On the other hand, middle powers still have resources that
allow them to carry out these roles; they would thus be regarded as more
credible and effective here compared to the smaller countries. Such roles
would allow middle powers to maximize their competitive advantages in both
the material and ideational dimensions. As the discussion thus far illustrates,
while the framework takes structure as a starting point, it nevertheless follows
the proposition that ‘the properties of agents and those of social structures
are both relevant to explanations of social behavior’ (Wendt, 1987, p 338,
emphasis in original).
Conclusion
This chapter has set out a conceptual framework to investigate what
generates middle power behaviour in international politics, and more
specifically, in multilateralism. Departing from the dominant neorealist
understanding in IR that the international political structure comprises
functionally undifferentiated states that vary only based on the distribution
of capabilities, the framework here treats structure as segmented, stratified
54
and functionally differentiated. This lens opens the possibility for middle
powers to emerge as a distinct category of states in the international system,
in terms of their status and behaviour. Specifically, middle power behaviour
is produced when the effects of the differentiated structure are activated by
social, relative and relational power politics. Although the specific outcomes
would depend on the particular circumstances of the time and place, this
framework overall expects that middle powers would pursue a dilution of
major-power stratification and take on functionally differentiated roles in
multilateralism. The next two chapters use this framework to examine the
behaviour of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea in APEC and the EAS.
55

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1

Middle powers and multilateralism

maintain global stability, through multilateral diplomacy. The reason is that

and second, on middle powers in Asia Pacific multilateralism. The book

Making the implicit explicit: differentiation in the

regional multilateral institutions. This would include Australia, Brunei,

domination of any potential multilateral platform, Australia took on the

regularities or general patterns across cases (Danermark et al, 2002, pp 80–​1;

The Study of Middle Powers and

Approaches to middle powers

Middle power capabilities: the position approach

Middle power image: the identity approach

Middle power diplomacy and foreign policy: the behaviour approach

multilateral cooperation and institutions, the promotion of absolute gains,

An element of social obligation is arguably also at play here. Middle

cooperation. In an article tellingly titled ‘US unilateralism at the UN: Why

The desire to maximize the freedom to use their greater power

small states, making it hard to defend the distinct categorization of middle

Middle powers in the Asia Pacific

each of these dimensions in turn. It should be noted that the following

Year Countries (in descending order of GDP)

identity, the rhetoric adopted by policymakers, diplomats and government

Figure 2.1: The three aspects of middlepowerness

All other Asia

policy strategies for such countries, that is, multilateralism. Building on

Towards a Differential Framework

‘structural leadership’ of the US; and, Gilley and O’Neil distinguish

These possibilities for middle power behaviour are enabled by the

Re​framing structure in international politics

that social structure is typically regarded as a ‘taken-​for-​granted concept that

Structure in international relations

to this shortcoming, Alexander Wendt argues that the social structure of

Another criticism of the dominant neorealist view of structure calls out

The class structure of a society is not defined by its ruling class. An

Although the environment within which middle powers operate may be

Structure of differentiation in international politics

Before we delve into the elements of the differential framework for

original). As Donnelly himself underscores, however, dimensional analyses

power behaviour is driven by the different self-​centred national policies and

actors ‘is a feature … of the system, the structure of which is characterized

another actor; institutional power, which involves indirect control through

International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever

power politics as ‘relative, relational, and social’ (Barkin, 2010, p 18). As

The second dimension of power politics put forward by Barkin –​

Context is also important for ideas. The generation of meanings and

In terms of the framework for middle power behaviour advanced in this

Multilateral platforms as sites of power politics

[w]‌eak states collectively can outvote the strong. But inequalities

The processes of multilateralism are in part affected by power politics, and

ARF despite their rhetorical rejection of conventional balance of power

Differentiating middle power behaviour in

situation. Conceptually, the framework thus treats differentiation as a

Does gunpowder blow up when a flame is applied? Yes, if the

Applying this to the book’s argument, the differentiated structure would

Figure 3.1: How middle power behaviour is generated in multilateralism

Mechanism: Action + Context: Outcomes:

it is working with or against as well as whether it possesses the necessary

a stake in the agendas. Without these more inclusive channels of discussion

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regularities or general patterns across cases (Danermark et al, 2002, pp 80–1;

Reframing structure in international politics

that social structure is typically regarded as a ‘taken-for-granted concept that

power behaviour is driven by the different self-centred national policies and

The second dimension of power politics put forward by Barkin –