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4
Formation of Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation
Introduction
This chapter examines the conditions and circumstances that led to APEC’s
creation in 1989 and its early years, focusing particularly on the structural
forces and processes that generated middle power behaviour in Asia Pacific
multilateralism. Launched amid the end of the Cold War, APEC was
a significant advancement for the regional multilateral architecture. As
superpower and military tensions decreased in the late 1980s, the launch
of APEC reflected the acknowledgment by regional countries of the need
for greater and more inclusive cooperation on economic issues. Certainly,
the idea for APEC did not emerge out of the blue. Its inauguration in
1989 was a culmination of three decades of efforts to boost economic
cooperation in the Asia Pacific, including the Pacific Trade and Development
Conference (PAFTAD) and the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC),
both established in the 1960s. From 1980, the quasi-governmental Pacific
Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) also assumed a vital role in laying
the foundations for APEC (Drysdale, 2009, p 18). Nevertheless, APEC’s
importance lies in the fact that it was the first regional organization in this
field at the government level when it was inaugurated in 1989 (Keating, 2001;
Park and Lee, 2009, p 98). Its ability to annually convene the political elites
of regional countries at a time of significant international political change
moreover imbued the economic forum with strategic and political intent. In
the late 1980s and early 1990s, APEC was the only venue where multilateral
talks could be conducted among policymakers and leaders of key regional
countries such as Japan, China and the US, among others.
The success in getting APEC off the ground illustrated the ability of middle
powers, such as Australia, Indonesia and South Korea, to shape the regional
multilateral architecture. On the one hand, the behaviour of these three middle
powers diluted stratification in the Asia Pacific by diffusing power away from
the major powers. On the other, their behaviour also strengthened functional
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Formation of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
differentiation in the Asia Pacific as they took on initiatory and mediatory

roles in the APEC initiative. While the origins of APEC could be traced to
the combined efforts of Australia and Japan, due to various reasons Australia
became the public face of the initiative. Former Australian Prime Minister
Bob Hawke proposed to form APEC in 1989, and his successor, Paul Keating,
worked to elevate the meeting of economic, trade and foreign affairs ministers
to a leaders’ level summit in 1993. Despite fierce objections from Malaysian
Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, who counter proposed an EAEG that
excluded western countries such as Australia and the US, Australia’s vision for
APEC prevailed. This was in part due to support for APEC from Indonesia,
which had the largest economy and population among Southeast Asian states
and was regarded as primus inter pares in ASEAN. Although initially wary
of APEC’s potential impact on ASEAN and its member states, Indonesia
eventually backed the APEC process over the EAEG proposal. Significantly,
APEC was the first regional multilateral institution to include China, Hong
Kong and Taiwan –all three economies were admitted in 1991, two years after
the first APEC ministerial meeting. Their entry into APEC has been credited
in part to South Korea’s diplomatic and mediatory efforts (Beeson, 2009,
p 41). The launch of APEC and its membership composition highlighted the
political and strategic implications for the nascent post-Cold War multilateral
architecture in the Asia Pacific.
The three middle powers sought not only to gain for themselves a seat at
the table in regional decision making but to also reflect their valuable roles
in regional multilateralism. These behavioural outcomes were generated
from the existence of differentiation in the Asia Pacific political structure.
The undercurrents of both stratificatory and functional differentiation were
clearly reflected in the region at this time, as the US emerged as the sole
superpower alongside Japan and China as major or rising (economic) powers.
Despite not being –or precisely because they were not –major powers,
Australia, Indonesia and South Korea were able to contribute significantly
towards shaping APEC’s development in its formative days. The behaviour
of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea and their subsequent outcomes
demonstrated the negotiations of social, relational and relative power
politics that characterized APEC dynamics. Consequently, even as China,
Japan and the US remained influential in the region, the three middle
powers nevertheless succeeded in moulding the shape and form of regional
multilateralism to their own benefit.
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses the regional
circumstances and structural conditions in the late 1980s and early 1990s that
contextualized the establishment of APEC. Understanding the context in
which APEC was formed is important as it offers an explanatory basis for the
subsequent developments that occurred. The views of Australia, Indonesia
and South Korea regarding the ongoing trends will also be highlighted. The
57
MIDDLE POWERS IN ASIA PACIFIC MULTILATERALISM
third section then proceeds to examine the behaviour of Australia, Indonesia

and South Korea in the formative days of APEC. The focus is specifically
on Australia’s proposal of APEC, Indonesia’s response towards APEC and
the EAEG, as well as South Korea’s facilitation of the entry of China, Hong
Kong and Taiwan into APEC. While this chapter is focused mainly on
empirically laying out the APEC case study, the concluding section will
briefly raise the theoretical implications of the discussion here.
Regional dynamics and structure in the late 1980s and

early 1990s
Through the late 1980s and early 1990s, several important regional and
global developments shaped the approaches of Australia, Indonesia and
South Korea towards multilateralism in the Asia Pacific. One of the most
significant developments was the decline of Cold War tensions between
the superpowers, as well as among ideologically diverse countries. This
winding down of military tensions occurred amid high growth rates of
several Asian economies and increasing economic interdependence among
regional countries. The increasing salience of the economic agenda was
accompanied by fears about the potential failure of the Uruguay Round,
trade tensions between the US and Japan, and the emergence of economic
blocs in North America and Europe. From the perspectives of Australia,
Indonesia and South Korea, these developments underscored the need for an
effective platform that could facilitate and strengthen economic cooperation
in the Asia Pacific.
Declining Cold War tensions and emerging unipolarity

In the second half of the 1980s, ideological and military tensions between
the major powers declined significantly. The Soviet Union would not
formally dissolve until December 1991, but relations between the Soviet
Union and the US, as well as between China and the Soviet Union, were
on the mend. Many of these changes occurred following the appointment
of Mikhail Gorbachev as the General Secretary of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union and de facto ruler of the country, in 1985. Soviet
economic growth had deteriorated throughout the 1960s and 1970s, and
by the time Gorbachev assumed the leadership position, the Soviet Union
remained ‘a superpower only in the military sense’ (Zubok, 2007, p 307; see
also Easterly and Fischer, 1995). Realizing the dire situation that the Soviet
economy was in, Gorbachev implemented economic and political reforms
that introduced market-oriented principles into the Soviet economy, as well
as greater freedom of information and speech for Soviet citizens. While some
analysts have attributed the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union to these
58
policies, they had implications for Moscow’s foreign policy as well (Zubok,
2007; Grachev, 2008).
Initially, Gorbachev considered a stable external environment as a
prerequisite for the success of his domestic reforms (Grachev, 2008, p 3).
This meant improving relations with the US and the non-communist world,
as well as with China, which would allow the Soviet Union to reduce its
military presence abroad and consequently ease some of the pressure on the
economy (Birgerson, 1997, p 223). Later, as the reforms failed to achieve
their desired effect and the Soviet economic and political situation continued
to worsen, Gorbachev worked towards a quick end of the Cold War ‘to
compensate for his declining prospects at home with breakthroughs in foreign
policy’ (Zubok, 2007, p 317). The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Treaty between the US and Soviet Union, the Soviet decisions to withdraw
from Afghanistan and significantly cut its military presence in eastern Europe
in 1988, as well as US President Ronald Reagan’s retraction of his earlier
characterization of the Soviet Union as the ‘evil empire’, were all evidence
of a turnaround in superpower relations (‘Reagan offers’, 1988).
Relations between the Soviet Union and China were improving as well,
following their ideological split in the 1950s. Following efforts to address
what China perceived as the three major obstacles in bilateral ties –namely,
Soviet troops on the Chinese border, Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and
Soviet support for Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia –a landmark summit
was held in May 1989 in Beijing (Zagoria, 1988, p 122). Additionally,
Moscow decided to reduce its forces at Vietnam’s Cam Ranh Bay, which
had been the Soviet Union’s largest overseas military base outside the Warsaw
Pact countries (Storey and Thayer, 2001, pp 456–7). The Soviet Union
also sought to advance diplomatic and trade relations with non-communist
countries in the Asia Pacific, and by the end of 1988 exchanges had taken
place with Japan, South Korea, Australia and several of the Southeast
Asian countries (Zagoria, 1988, pp 125, 129–30; Birgerson, 1997, p 224).
Coupled with Vietnamese troop withdrawals from Cambodia following a
10-year occupation, it was clear that military tensions in the Asia Pacific had
diminished considerably as the decade ended. To be sure, even as communism
crumbled across Europe, communist governments continued to rule in Asia
Pacific countries such as China, North Korea and Vietnam. Nevertheless,
ideological differences had become less of an issue in interstate relations.
Even the Chinese leadership’s use of force to crush pro-democracy protests
at Tiananmen Square in June 1989 caused relatively minimal disruption to
the overall progress of China’s foreign relations with the US and Southeast
Asian countries (Lee, 1991, pp 37–8; Skidmore and Gates, 1997, pp 523–5).
Amid these developments, then Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans
described the international environment as ‘becoming less ideological, more
pragmatic [and] increasingly interdependent’ (Evans, 1989a, p 1). He noted
59
the ‘more positive atmosphere for international relations generally’, and

expressed optimism that the changes in the Soviet–US relationship would
‘increase the chances of resolution of many regional conflicts; give real hope
of major progress towards arms control and disarmament; and allow the
world to turn its attention to other massive and pressing social, economic
and political problems’ (Evans, 1989a, pp 2–3). While Evans expected the
international system to remain primarily bipolar –this was prior to the fall
of the Soviet Union –he nevertheless regarded Washington as ‘incomparably
ahead’ of Moscow across ‘virtually all’ dimensions of power (Evans, 1989a,
p 2). Following the Soviet Union’s dissolution, Australian Prime Minister
Paul Keating referred to the US as the world’s ‘only superpower’ (Keating,
1992a). From Canberra’s perspective, it was thus clear that in stratificatory
terms, Washington was at the top based on capabilities and leadership.
South Korean President Roh Tae-woo likewise highlighted Washington’s
role as ‘a leader of the free world’ and acknowledged ‘the need for the
United States to continue its leading role if regional stability is to prevail’
(House and Darlin, 1989; Roh, 1992, p 247). To South Korea, which had
recently undergone a democratic transition, it was clear that the Cold War
had been won by countries with democratic multiparty systems that had
brought them prosperity (Roh, 1990, p 41). Although the Korean peninsula
remained divided, Roh welcomed the ‘new wave of reconciliation’ that was
sweeping across East Asia and ‘thaw[ing] the Cold War regime characterized
by confrontation and conflict’ (Roh, 1990, p 258). South Korea’s embrace of
the new global environment was also reflected in its hosting of the Summer
Olympics in 1988, which was celebrated as a symbol of the Cold War’s
end. Described by Roh as ‘a grand festival of East-West detente’, the Seoul
Olympics attracted the highest participation level thus far in Olympic history
and avoided the larger boycotts that previous Olympics had encountered
(Roh, 1990, p 136; see also O’Neill III and 38 North, 2018). As we will see
later, its hosting of a more reconciliatory Olympics was one of the catalysts
that enabled South Korea to take on a mediating role between communist
China and the rest of APEC in the period leading up to Beijing’s admission
into the forum.
Indonesia’s view of the changing global and regional environments was not
very much different from that of Australia and South Korea. As Cold War
tensions eased in the late 1980s, its then foreign minister, Ali Alatas, noted
a ‘growing disposition towards conciliation and mutual accommodation
among states, especially between the major powers’, and that ‘the East-
West divide [was] progressively losing its ideological connotation’ (Alatas,
2001, pp 34, 36). As one of the drivers of the Non-Aligned Movement
(NAM) founded in 1961, Indonesia was anti-communist but not a formal
treaty ally of the US. Nevertheless, Jakarta recognized the US as one of
the four major powers of the world, alongside China, Japan and Russia
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(Alatas, 2001, p 86; Suryadinata, 1996, p 3). Similar to Australia and South
Korea, Indonesia also regarded the US as being ‘a decisive factor for global
peace and stability’, with ‘tremendous responsibilities that it cannot shirk
without risking unhappy consequences on the cause of world security
and prosperity’ (Alatas, 2001, p 368). Moreover, the US–Japan alliance
was the ‘pivotal relationship’ underpinning stability in the Asia Pacific
(Alatas, 2001, p 88).
In stratificatory terms, it was thus increasingly clear that there was no
other country that could rival the US as the Soviet Union edged towards
dissolution. The failure of Gorbachev’s political and economic reforms
‘destroyed the Soviet capacity to act like a superpower on the international
arena’ and it could no longer ‘present itself as an equal partner to the United
States in negotiations’ (Zubok, 2007, p 308). To be sure, there were views
in the region that the US was also ‘a great power in decline’, particularly
given that its growth rates lagged behind some of the emerging economies
in the Asia Pacific (Greene, 1989, p 90; see also The World Bank, 2021b).
Nevertheless, the US remained the number one economy in the world,
with the second largest economy –Japan –about half of its size (The World
Bank, 2021a). In military terms, the gap between the US and the other
countries was equally, if not more, considerable. Not only was the US the
top military spender by far, its technological superiority also reinforced its
‘decisive preponderance’ over the rest of the countries (Wohlforth, 1999, p
7). US soft power was further bolstered by the decline of the Soviet Union
and the collapse of communist regimes in Europe, which validated the liberal
democratic and capitalist values that the US represented in the ideological
dimension of the Cold War. In both material and ideational aspects, the
US thus emerged as the preponderant power in the international system.
As the sole superpower, the US was viewed as having special responsibilities
in the region. For many regional countries, US military presence in the Asia
Pacific was necessary for peace and stability (Clift, 1989; Katigbak, 1989;
Zagoria, 1991, p 4). The wide gulf in military capabilities between the US
and the rest of the countries, coupled with its generally ‘benign’ image –
thanks to the liberal principles it advocated –meant that it was by and large
viewed as the best guarantor for regional security (Gray, 1988; Catley, 1997).
Even Mahathir, who was usually vocal in his criticisms of the US and other
western countries, had from time to time expressed support for continued
US military presence in Southeast Asia, and on at least one occasion said
that Malaysia would be willing to provide repair facilities and other services
to US troops (Richburg, 1989). The US was an ‘extraregional balancer’,
helping to curb ‘the competitive jockeying that might otherwise trigger
war’ in the Asia Pacific (Kupchan, 1998, p 62). Consequently, the roles of
US allies such as Japan, South Korea and Australia would be to anchor US
presence in and commitment to the region.
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With the collapse of the Soviet Union in the final days of the Cold War,
the US remained as the only superpower in the world. As ideological
and military tensions declined, pragmatism emerged as the key principle
driving foreign policies and for regional countries, socioeconomic growth
and political stability came to be as important as military superiority in
maintaining national security (Evans, 1989a, p 1; Zagoria, 1991, p 4;
Cooper et al, 1993, p 21). The following sub-sections discuss the growing
importance of the economic agenda, both at the regional and global levels,
during this time period.
Increasing salience of economic agenda and economic rise of Asia

Economic cooperation was certainly not an unfamiliar area for Asia Pacific
states. As early as the 1960s, academics and businesses participating in the
PAFTAD and PBEC had already been promoting economic collaboration
and dialogue. ASEAN, formed in 1967, also made economic cooperation a
key part of its agenda. These efforts laid the foundations for the formation of
the quasi-governmental PECC in 1980, which, in turn, played a crucial role
in the founding of APEC (Drysdale, 2009, p 18). Nevertheless, the changing
global dynamics of the 1980s introduced a ‘window of opportunity’ for a
government-level forum that encompassed the market economies in the
region (Ravenhill, 2001, p 65). According to a World Bank report, between
1965 and 1990, East Asia was the fastest growing region in the world, thanks
to the ‘seemingly miraculous growth’ of eight economies, namely Japan;
the four ‘Asian Tiger’ economies of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea
and Taiwan; as well as the newly industrializing economies of Indonesia,
Malaysia and Thailand (Birdsall et al, 1993, p 1).
Japan, in particular, had become a major ‘supplier, investor and aid-
giver in Asia’, a profile bolstered by its status as the world’s second largest
economy (Blustein, 1991; see also Hartarto, 1994, p 47). As the only Asian
country in the G7, Tokyo also assumed a bridging role between Asia’s newly
industrialized economies and the West (‘Third-world’, 1988). Some have
argued that Japan failed to translate its economic weight into military and
political clout given its peace constitution, and thus could not be considered
a ‘comprehensive, overarching power’ (Deng, 1997, p 366). Nevertheless,
given the increasing salience of the economic agenda at the time, Japan’s
status as an economic powerhouse put it in the upper stratum of power
in the Asia Pacific. China and India were the next in line in the regional
stratification, given their economic sizes and growth rates in the late 1980s
(The World Bank, 2021a; The World Bank, 2021b). It was acknowledged
at the time, however, that while the potential existed for these countries to
become major powers, there was still a lot of uncertainty over their ability
to exercise leadership at the regional and global levels. This was due to
62
various constraints, including developmental challenges and political stability

(Abramowitz, 1993, pp 261–2; Yahuda, 1993, p 572; Ganguly, 2003/04, pp
41–2). It was nevertheless evident that Asia’s economic rise was occurring
alongside the rapid growth of these major economies.
Former US Ambassador to the Philippines Stephen W. Bosworth noted
in an article that the Asian economies had gone from producing less than 5
per cent of the world’s output in 1960, to exceeding 25 per cent by 1990
(Bosworth, 1993, p 104). This encouraged a sense of optimism among
regional countries as they pursued economic prosperity. The dynamism in
economic production moreover led to increasing interdependence among
regional countries, as Japan, followed by the four ‘Asian Tiger’ economies,
sought to relocate labour-intensive industries to elsewhere in Southeast
Asia (McCall, 1995, pp 404–5). As intra-East Asian trade and investment
grew, regional countries agreed on the importance of an open multilateral
trading system (Emmers et al, 2010, p 7). Even communist governments in
the Asia Pacific, such as in China and Vietnam, began to introduce market-
oriented reforms for their economies. Previously excluded from multilateral
cooperative efforts in the region, these countries were now being invited
to join forums such as the PECC.
During this time, tensions over trade also intensified between Japan
and the US, the top two economies in the world. As Japanese businesses
outperformed their American counterparts, the US trade deficit with Japan
grew from US$9.1 billion in 1979 to US$37 billion in 1984 (Johnston,
2017; Boxwell, 2018). This strained bilateral ties between the allies, as
each side perceived the other as protectionist and taking insufficient action
to address the trade imbalance (Bergsten, 1982, pp 1059–60; Kreisberg,
1990, pp 20–2; Bosworth, 1991, p 125). Consequently, views emerged in
the US that Japan, despite its increasing economic weight, was failing to
assume a corresponding role for security issues, including its own defence
(Kreisberg, 1990, pp 20–1). Beyond trade tensions with Japan, growing
sentiment among the US policy community that the multilateral trading
system was disadvantageous to US interests led to the Omnibus Foreign
Trade and Competitiveness Act in 1988, which was meant to address large
trade deficits that the US had with other countries, including the four
‘Asian Tigers’ (Greene, 1989, p 90; Brainard, 2001, p 4). This legislation,
coupled with US protectionist measures on items such as cars, steel and
semiconductors, shaped anxieties around the world about US unilateralism
in global economic issues (‘ASEAN protest’, 1989; Brainard, 2001, p 4).
Such unilateralism was also reflected in US threats to withdraw from the
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
negotiations –launched in September 1986 to set new rules for global
trade –if its key demands were not agreed to (‘US repeats’, 1986). Originally
planned to end in December 1990, the Uruguay Round became deadlocked
63
by differences over agricultural trade and was only concluded in 1994.

The delay in the GATT talks reinforced the idea that regional economies
needed an alternative channel for trade cooperation, in the event of the
global trading system’s fragmentation (Funabashi, 1995, p 105).
The urgency to establish a regional platform to cooperate on trade and
economic issues was keenly felt by Australia, as Asia transitioned ‘from
battlefield to marketplace’ (Goldsworthy, 2003, p 7). As Evans observed,
events of the 1980s demonstrated the limits to military power and the
importance of economic performance that was built on ‘private ownership,
competition and a market economy’ (Evans, 1989a, p 2). While the US-
led free market system had emerged victorious in the Cold War, it was
also evident that Washington had ‘progressively lost its relative post-War
economic dominance’ by 1989 as Japan and Europe gained more prominence
in the global economy (Evans, 1989a, p 2). In light of its view that the
hub of world production had shifted to the Asia Pacific, and with about
half of its trade being with countries on the western Pacific rim, Australia
saw the need to integrate more closely with the region economically
(Hawke, 1988, p 3; Evans, 1989a, p 5). Officials also expressed concern
about the US Omnibus Foreign Trade and Competitiveness Act, as well as
the deadlock in the Uruguay Round (Durie, 1987; Hawke, 1989a, p 5).
Both these developments would negatively affect Australia’s interests in free
trade. Along with others, Australia was disappointed at the inability of the
European Community and the US to agree on agricultural reforms, with
a commentator at The Australian Financial Review arguing that ‘the majors
don’t stick to the rules when it doesn’t suit them’ (Durie, 1987; see also
Crane, 1988; Frost, 2016, p 80). As a ‘medium sized’ economy heavily
reliant on free and open trade, Australia was thus deeply concerned about
its economic future given these developments (Hawke, 1987, p 13; see also
Hawke, 1989a, p 3).
As one of the four ‘Asian Tiger’ economies undergoing rapid economic
growth, South Korea was generally optimistic about the increasing economic
interdependence and the economic rise of Asia, although it faced its fair share
of challenges such as domestic labour disputes and wage inflation (Weisman,
1989). South Korea was also one of the countries that held up the Uruguay
Round talks due to its initial resistance to compromising on opening farm
trade (Auerbach, 1990). For its trade restrictions, Seoul faced much criticism,
which was exacerbated by its wide trade surpluses with various countries
(Frith, 1988; Ong, 1989). As a result, South Korea was reportedly one of
the initial target countries of Washington’s Omnibus Foreign Trade and
Competitiveness Act (Ong, 1989). In response, South Korean Trade Minister
Han Seung-soo said that the US move was ‘regrettable’ and could disrupt
Seoul’s democratic transition and economic liberalization (Ong, 1989; see
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also Trautman, 1989). At the same time, South Korea sought to reduce its
trade deficit with Japan, which it attributed to Tokyo’s import restrictions
(Hong, 1987). Given these problems that South Korea faced with the major
economies, the country started to pursue trade relations with countries
in the communist bloc, including with North Korea. South Korea’s then
Deputy Prime Minister Rha Woong-bae proposed forming a ‘common
economic community’ with the North –a significant divergence from
Seoul’s previous policy that allowed for the prosecution of South Korean
businessmen who were caught importing North Korean goods (‘South
Korea lifts’, 1988). Having been a part of East Asia’s economic rise, South
Korea now looked towards diversifying its trade relations and continuing to
benefit from regional initiatives.
Indonesian officials at the time acknowledged the ‘fundamental shift of
economic activity and economic power from the Atlantic to the Pacific’ and
the trend of increasing interdependence (Alatas, 2001, p 9; see also UNGA,
1987, p 79). Both Alatas and his predecessor, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja,
however, cautioned that global economic problems such as imbalanced
relations and reduced growth needed to be addressed (UNGA, 1987, pp
74–7; Alatas, 2001, pp 9–11). Alatas also noted the ‘differences in stages of
economic development and in economic and political systems among the
countries of the Pacific’, and added that such disparities would ‘be a major
impediment in the development of uniform, region-wide structures and
modalities to deal collectively with common economic problems’ (Alatas,
2001, p 10). As a member of the ‘Third World’, Indonesia’s focus was on
equitable economic development and South–South collaboration (Alatas,
2001, pp 213–14). From Jakarta’s view, rising interdependence had the
potential to ‘create new forms of dependency relationships between the
North and the South’ given that the latter countries may not be equipped to
manage the closer economic linkages (Alatas, 2001, p 333). Consequently,
even as countries became more interdependent, the richer economies
would continue to reap most of the benefits at the expense of the poorer
countries (Thatcher, 1990). While Indonesia welcomed deepening economic
cooperation in the region, it was thus with the caveat that such cooperation
had to benefit both the advanced and emerging economies.
Amid the global environment in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Australia,
South Korea and Indonesia sought to promote economic and trade
cooperation. Certainly, their different immediate concerns spawned slightly
different agendas. It was nevertheless clear that all three countries shared an
interest in ensuring, first, that major economies such as Japan and the US
did not retreat to unilateralism, and second, that they were well positioned
to benefit from the Asia Pacific’s economic growth. Let us now turn to the
third trend relevant to our discussion, the rise of extra-regional trade blocs.
65
Rise of extra-regional trade blocs

As economic imperatives rose to the fore in the late 1980s, countries in
Europe and North America began to seek ways towards greater integration
within their respective regions. In February 1986, members of the European
Economic Community signed the Single European Act. The Act aimed to
‘add new momentum to European integration and to complete the internal
market’ by 1993. The single market would remove barriers to trade and
allow the free movement of goods, people, services and capital within the
area (‘The Single’, 2018). Moreover, new economic connections were being
developed with eastern European countries (Crone, 1992, p 73). Meanwhile
in North America, negotiations were underway for a North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) comprising Mexico, Canada and the US. The
latter two countries had signed a bilateral trade deal in 1988, and two years
later Mexico and the US launched free trade talks that eventually expanded
to include Canada. NAFTA was signed in 1992, establishing a free trade
zone in North America.
In contrast to the developments in Europe and North America, there
was little momentum towards a free trade area in the Asia Pacific during
that time. Despite its efforts in economic cooperation, ASEAN remained a
political organization, and any institutionalization of economic integration
within ASEAN was ‘sluggish’ and ‘far more successful in words than in
reality’ (Schellhorn, 1992, p 61; see also Stubbs, 2000, p 300). This has
been attributed to several factors, including indifference from the ASEAN
governments, the low volume of intra-ASEAN trade, as well as economic
competition among the ASEAN member states (Ravenhill, 1995, pp 851–2;
Bowles, 1997, pp 221–2; Stubbs, 2000, p 300). The wider Asia Pacific
region similarly lacked an institutionalized free trade mechanism, albeit some
countries were reportedly beginning to push for a ‘European-style free-trade
zone’ in ASEAN to facilitate businesses (‘Japan seeks’, 1987). Nevertheless,
the movement towards regional trade blocs in Europe and North America
generated concern among Asia Pacific countries that their economic
interests would be disadvantaged in the global trading system. With the
exchange of goods and services made easier among the signatory countries
of the respective free trade deals, Asia Pacific countries feared that trade and
investment would be diverted away from the region (McCall, 1995, p 390;
Emmers et al, 2010, pp 6–7). This was a valid fear –after all, important
drivers of Asia’s dramatic economic growth included the openness of the
US market to Asian exports as well as US investment in the manufacturing
industries of regional countries (McCall, 1995, pp 390–1, 412–13). Likewise,
there were also anxieties from the rest of the world that the European single
market, when realized, would turn into an inward-looking ‘fortress Europe’
(McCartney, 1988; Palmer, 1988).
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Indeed, Australian officials such as Evans and Lindsey Duthie, special trade
representative to Europe, in 1989 raised concerns about the formation of
a ‘fortress Europe’ and argued that it posed a threat to the global trading
system (‘Fortress Europe’, 1989; Narbrough, 1989). Australia was particularly
concerned about the formation of region-based trading blocs in Europe and
North America. While it had close security, cultural and historical links with
the countries in those regions, its exclusion from economic groupings such as
the Single European Market, ASEAN and NAFTA reinforced the perception
that ‘in a world of emerging regional associations and blocs, Australia was
disadvantaged by having no region to call its own’ (Goldsworthy, 2003, p 7).
Citing the example of Argentina –which was suffering economically –an
article in the Sydney Morning Herald in 1988 concluded that ‘all the natural
endowments in the world are not enough to sustain living standards’ if a
country was excluded from ‘trading blocs’, and warned that Australia was at
risk of following Argentina’s path (Wlash, 1988). In light of the fact that the
country was being shut out of trade groupings in Europe, North America
and potentially East Asia, any fragmentation of the global economy would
be detrimental for Australia, a country reliant on the open and multilateral
trading system.
While South Korea shared Australia’s interest in an open and multilateral
trading system, it appeared less alarmed about the discriminatory ramifications
of the Single European Market and NAFTA. Unlike Australia, South Korea’s
belonging in East Asia was also less of a question and it was unlikely to
be excluded from any future East Asian trading bloc. For the most part,
it seemed that South Korea, as a developing economy, was instead facing
criticisms from the developed economies of the European Community and
the US for its imposition of trade barriers (‘Roh says’, 1988; ‘South Korea
seeks’, 1989). Subsequently, when faced with the prospect of NAFTA,
South Korea saw it as a new channel for exporting its products to Canada
and the US via Mexico (‘South Korean’, 1991). To be sure, Roh had raised
concerns that Europe’s establishment of a single market would have negative
effects on South Korea, which was the 10th largest trading country in the
world at the time (‘Unified European’, 1989). South Korean businesses also
expressed similar worries that their exports would be at a disadvantage in a
unified European market (Lim, 1991). Moreover, while South Korea saw
investment and trade opportunities in the opening up of eastern European
economies, Foreign Minister Choi Ho-Joong voiced ‘apprehension … that,
in the process of this evolution [toward integration], Europe could become
so preoccupied with its own problems as to turn inward despite its repeated
assurances to the contrary’ (as cited in Funabashi, 1995, p 67, addition in
original). In this sense, even as South Korea was not as unsettled as Australia
by the establishment of trade groupings in other parts of the world, it was
nevertheless wary of the implications for its own economic growth.
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Indonesia was also worried about the creation of exclusionary trade

groupings, although –as a member of the Global South –officials framed it
in terms of a widening North–South divide. With the decline of East–West
tensions, the North–South divide now stood as ‘the central, unresolved issue
of our time’ and was being exacerbated by the ‘increased protectionism in
the developed market economies’ (Alatas, 2001, pp 10, 15; see also ‘Suharto
fears’, 1991). Commenting on ‘the formation of powerful economic
groupings among developed countries’, Alatas said that initiatives such as the
Single European Market and the Canada–US free trade agreement (FTA)
could provide ‘a major stimulus to global economic progress’ but only if they
‘remain[ed] open and outward-looking and [did] not result in additional
external barriers’ (Alatas, 2001, pp 14–15). The integration of eastern
European economies with their western counterparts was also a cause for
concern for Jakarta, as there was the possibility of aid, investment and trade
flows being redirected from Southeast Asia to eastern Europe (Alatas, 2001,
p 348). Indonesia was additionally cognizant of the struggles facing ASEAN
economic cooperation, and called for the removal of intra-ASEAN trade and
investment barriers to encourage Southeast Asia’s economic integration and
growth (Clift, 1988; Jacob, 1989b). For Indonesia, more equitable economic
cooperation between the advanced and emerging economies –the latter
which included itself and its fellow ASEAN member states –was thus of
paramount importance.
Based on the discussion thus far, it is evident that Australia, South Korea
and Indonesia were all disconcerted by the economic trends in Europe and
North America. The formation of geography-based, exclusionary trade
blocs would have potentially detrimental effects on the economic prosperity
of all three countries.
With the concept of national security expanding to include the economic
dimension as Cold War military tensions wound down, a different set of
challenges came to the forefront of the global and regional agendas. Fears
that the largest economies in the world would end up in a spiralling trade
war, anxieties about the fractures threatening to destroy the open multilateral
trading system, as well as concerns about US unilateralism were the main
external preoccupations of Asia Pacific countries. At the same time, the
economic rise of Asia –driven in particular by Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore,
South Korea, Taiwan and other newly industrializing economies –meant
that for regional economies, the maintenance of an open multilateral
trading system was vital. Growing interdependence in the region also
underlined the need for better avenues to manage economic cooperation
and collaboration, building on existing platforms such as the PECC. These
trends and developments reflected some form of stratificatory and functional
differentiation that were present in the Asia Pacific during the late 1980s.
This differentiation focused, in particular, on delineating the major powers
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and their behaviour vis-à-vis the rest of the regional states. Given this
context, non-major powers such as Australia, Indonesia and South Korea
leveraged the conducive circumstances and played key roles in shaping the
APEC platform in its early days.
Formation of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

This section examines the behaviour of Australia, Indonesia and South
Korea, which shaped APEC’s development in its formative days. Alongside
the conducive circumstances that accompanied the end of the Cold War and
the emergence of a more unipolar world, all three middle powers sought to
ensure that they had a say in how APEC would progress and evolve. As a
multilateral platform, APEC offered the opportunity for Australia, Indonesia
and South Korea to facilitate the diffusion of power and influence, so that
regional decision making would not be solely in the hands of the major
economies such as Japan and the US. Their efforts here were also based on
their distinctive attributes as middle powers, such as their non-threatening
profiles or, in Indonesia’s case, its recognized leadership of ASEAN. The
presence of such differentiation contributed towards their behaviour
and approaches regarding APEC. The following discussion is primarily
descriptive, with most of the theoretical analysis taking place in Chapter 6.
Let us begin with Australia’s proposal to form APEC.
Australia and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

Australia’s leadership role in the formation of APEC was a result of several
factors, including Canberra’s own concerns about its economic vulnerability,
its embrace of middle power activism in its foreign policy during that time,
as well as the regional aversion towards any major power leadership in the
initiative. For many regional countries, it was precisely because Australia
was a non-major –and therefore non-threatening –power that made
it appropriate for it to take the lead in launching APEC. The inaugural
meeting in November 1989 saw the participation of economic and foreign
ministers from 12 countries, including the US and the then six ASEAN
member states. Two years later, Australia persuaded the US to host APEC’s
first leaders’ level summit. This sub-section examines the circumstances
motivating Australia’s proposal and surrounding the launch of the APEC
process. Before proceeding, however, the section will first discuss Australia’s
middle power status through the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Australian leaders and diplomats during this time certainly saw their
country as a middle power or medium-sized state and sought to project this
identity in its foreign policy, setting it apart from countries such as the US
and Japan (see, for example, Hawke, 1987, p 13; Evans, 1989c; Keating,
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1992b, p 8). As then Foreign Minister Gareth Evans asserted, ‘for a country of
Australia’s size and weight in world affairs … it is not wise to have exaggerated
ideas of influence beyond our station’ (Evans, 1989a, p 6). Australia was
‘manifestly not a great or even major power; nor, however … are we small
or insignificant’ (Evans, 1993c). Evans was a crucial figure in shaping the
image of Australia as a middle power that, by virtue of its resources and
accumulated goodwill, and through coalition building with ‘like-minded’
countries, would be able to influence specific issues in international affairs.
Particularly with Evans at the helm of Australian diplomacy, the late 1980s
and early 1990s were the ‘golden years’ of the country’s middle power
identity and activism (Ravenhill, 1998, p 322). In a book written by Evans
and former diplomat Bruce Grant on Australia’s foreign relations in the
1990s, they argued that the number of middle powers across the world
would be ‘a dozen to twenty at most’, based on ‘balancing out GDP and
population size, and perhaps military capacity and physical size as well, then
having regard to the perceptions of others’ (Evans and Grant, 1995, p 344).
In the few years preceding the APEC proposal, Australia had been around
the fifth to sixth biggest economy in the Asia Pacific, and the 14th largest
in the world (The World Bank, 2021a).
Beyond material capabilities, Australia’s middle power status during this
time was also associated strongly with the notion of ‘good international
citizenship’. Stressing that good international citizenship is ‘not the foreign
policy equivalent of boy scout good deeds’, Evans explains that this concept
is ‘best described … as an exercise in enlightened self-interest: an expression
of idealistic pragmatism’ and reflects recognition that global problems
require global solutions (Evans, 1989a, pp 12–13). In the pursuit of good
international citizenship, Australia sought to build on its active and creative
diplomacy, international credibility, liberal democratic principles, as well as
strong commitment to multilateralism and institutions (Evans, 1993a; Evans
and Grant, 1995, p 37). There was also awareness that the middle power
status brought with it a set of advantages and disadvantages for Australian
foreign policy. Unlike the major powers, Australia would not have unilateral
influence on important global issues, but it could, on the other hand, rely on
its non-threatening profile to build like-minded coalitions that would help
to advance its interests (Hawke, 1987, p 13; Evans, 1993b). In this sense,
multilateralism and institution building were crucial elements of Australia’s
middle power diplomacy. As Evans explained in a speech to promote then
Prime Minister Bob Hawke’s APEC initiative:
Each [regional country] can have influence. Each [regional country]

can have leverage. But as small or medium sized nations we are in
constant competition for attention and influence in the capitals of the
great powers and major economies. Collectively, however, we can exert
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more influence than if the ASEAN nations, or Australia, or even Japan

were to act alone. (Evans, 1989b)
More importantly, Australia saw a window of opportunity for non-

major powers to take the lead in regional multilateral initiatives amid the
‘extraordinarily fluid international environment’ in the late 1980s (Evans,
1989a, p 6).
During a speech to Korean business associations in Seoul on 31 January
1989, Hawke called for ‘a more formal intergovernmental vehicle of
regional co-operation’ in economics and trade (Hawke, 1989a, p 4). As an
‘econom[y]‌of medium size’, Australia was vulnerable to the fluctuations in
the international trading system and was without the ability to unilaterally
shape events to its own advantage (Hawke, 1987, p 16). From Australia’s
perspective, it was thus imperative to strengthen the multilateral trading
system that prioritized rules rather than material strength. Given that about
half of Australia’s trade was with the countries on the western Pacific rim by
1988, the success of the newly industrialized or industrializing economies
in the region was interlinked with Australia’s prosperity. Yet, as observed by
several analysts and government officials, Australia was not a natural member
of the Asian bloc (Ravenhill, 2001, pp 82–3; Goldsworthy, 2003, p 7). As
such, it was important for Canberra to seize the opportunity in setting up an
Asia Pacific (as opposed to an East Asian or Asian) platform, to ensure that it
had a voice in regional economic affairs that would affect its own interests.
Australia’s initiative on APEC was also made possible by the fact that it
was not considered a major power by other regional countries. Throughout
1987 and 1988, both Japan and the US had been considering, separately,
the convening of government-level forums to strengthen economic and
trade cooperation in the Asia Pacific (Funabashi, 1995, pp 58–9). However,
fears of having ‘these two economic giants … dominate any transpacific
regional organisation’ meant that neither of them could take the lead on
the APEC initiative (Dent, 2016, p 120). As Evans surmised, ‘each side
may have feared the worse of the other, and the smaller powers may well
have felt that their own interests were at risk’ (Evans, 1993c). The Japanese
government was moreover aware that the memories of its ‘Greater East Asia
Co-Prosperity Sphere’ (the official name for Japan’s occupation of regional
countries during World War II) still lingered, with some in the region
remaining distrustful and suspicious of Japan’s political ambitions. It was
thus considered diplomatically practical for Australia, which had also been
considering similar ideas for regionalism, to be the public face of the initiative
if it were to succeed (Deng, 1997, p 361; Dalrymple, 2003, p 85; Dent,
2016, p 120). As a non-major power, Australia did not appear threatening
to its regional neighbours (Funabashi, 1995, p 60). Yet, as a middle power,
Australia had sufficient material resources and political weight to garner
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support from other countries and get the initiative off the ground (Evans,
1993c; Evans and Grant, 1995, p 354; Ravenhill, 2001, pp 88–9). Given
this context, Australia was better placed than Japan or the US to take the
lead in forming APEC.
To be sure, Australia’s proposal was still, initially, received with some
doubts particularly from the ASEAN countries. In addition to concerns
that APEC might relegate ASEAN to the sidelines in regional multilateral
cooperation, some member states were also apprehensive that the new
platform might reinforce the influence of Japan and the US in the Asia
Pacific to the detriment of smaller countries (Cooper et al, 1993, p 92;
Bowles and MacLean, 1996, p 340). Following a meeting of its economic
ministers in September 1989, ASEAN expressed support for the principles
behind APEC but added the caveat that ASEAN should be at the centre of
any regional economic cooperation initiatives (Sargent, 1989b). Australia’s
desire to improve relations with ASEAN countries and be an ‘insider’ of
the region meant ‘a willingness to make concessions’ (Beeson, 2009, pp 40,
43). Moreover, realizing that support from Indonesia was key to obtaining
ASEAN’s backing for APEC, Canberra was careful to accommodate
Jakarta’s sensitivities (Young, 1990; Elek, 2005, p 72; Frost, 2016, p 82).
Australian officials were also quick to reassure that the country had been
‘a steadfast supporter of ASEAN from its earliest days’, and committed to
having ASEAN at the core of the APEC process (Evans, 1989b; see also
Hawke, 1989b, p 4). This allowed ASEAN ‘to have a considerable impact
on the APEC agenda’ in its formative days, including having an ASEAN
member state chair every other APEC meeting (Cooper et al, 1993, p 104;
see also Pitty, 2003, p 27). Following several rounds of negotiations among
the regional countries –spearheaded by Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade Secretary Richard Woolcott –the inaugural APEC ministerial meeting
was convened on 6 November 1989 in Canberra, with the participation of
economic and foreign ministers from the six ASEAN countries (Brunei,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Singapore), Australia, Canada,
Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and the US.
Australia continued to be invested in APEC’s success through the early
1990s, and when Paul Keating took over the prime ministership from Hawke
in 1991, he proposed the addition of a leaders’ summit to ‘add political weight
and status’ to the process (Keating, 1992b, p 4). By this time, China, Hong
Kong and Taiwan had also become members of APEC. To Keating, it was
the perfect opportunity for APEC to bring together in one organization
the leaders of China, Japan and the US and help to facilitate the ‘triangular
economic, political and security relationship that will determine Asia’s
future’; this would be the first multilateral platform in the post-Cold War
Asia Pacific to do so (Keating, 2001). Keating’s proposal of holding a leaders’
summit alongside the APEC ministerial meeting drew ‘a non-committal
72
response’ from then US President George H.W. Bush (Keating, 2000, p 82).
Fortunately for Keating, Bill Clinton, who took over the presidency from
Bush in January 1993, was more welcoming of an APEC leaders’ summit
(Funabashi, 1995, p 80). Clinton’s interest played a part in advancing the
timeline for the inaugural summit, which was eventually held a year earlier
than originally planned (Hartcher, 1993). Certainly, Keating also obtained
sufficient support from Indonesia, Japan and China to follow up on the
initiative with other APEC members (Keating, 2000, pp 87–8; Pitty, 2003, p
32). The responses from the three countries were particularly important for
the success of the leaders’ summit. Indonesia’s de facto leadership of ASEAN
would determine the association’s attitude towards the proposal. Japan had
worked closely with Australia on the establishment of the APEC process and
remained an economic powerhouse, and China was emerging as a regional
power in post-Cold War Asia. All three countries appeared supportive of
the leaders’ summit –although Beijing opposed the participation of Hong
Kong and Taiwan –and others subsequently came on board as well (Keating,
2000, p 87).
Having obtained support from the other APEC members, Keating
successfully convinced Clinton to host the first APEC leaders’ summit
in Seattle in November 1993. The only objection came from Mahathir,
who had initially countered Hawke’s APEC proposal with the EAEG that
excluded western countries such as Australia and the US, and now perceived
the launch of the APEC leaders’ summit in Seattle as a US attempt at neo-
colonialism (Dosch, 2015, p 117; see also Mohamad and Ishihara, 1995,
pp 47–8). Consequently, Mahathir declined to attend the Seattle summit.
The addition of the leaders’ meeting to the APEC process, nevertheless,
suggested that the forum’s agenda would go beyond economic and trade
liberalization issues to include political and strategic discussions. Keating was
thus of the view that, with APEC, Australia ‘for the first time … would have
a seat at a very big and powerful table … and one which is entirely within
our region and suits our own economic purposes’ (as cited in Callick, 2001).
Interestingly, Hawke’s initial proposal in January 1989 had apparently
excluded the US (along with Canada). The exact reasons for this are unclear,
although some analysts have attributed the exclusion to Australia’s intention
of dispelling fears about possible US domination, as well as the view that
US protectionist measures were part of the problem that APEC was meant
to address (Crone, 1992, p 76; Cooper et al, 1993, p 92). Evans himself had
reportedly suggested that US participation in APEC would not have been
welcomed by regional countries if it had been pre-emptively foisted upon
them by Australia, while Woolcott explained that Australia’s delayed inclusion
of the US was to avoid having the superpower take on the leadership
role in APEC as it would likely hamper the forum’s prospects for success
(Funabashi, 1995, pp 62–3). In his memoirs, Hawke debunks claims that
73
he had intended to exclude the US –‘the major economic power’ –from

APEC (Hawke, 1994, p 431). Regardless, most of the regional countries
expressed their preference for US participation in APEC, and by May 1989
Canberra was unequivocally committed to having both the US and Canada
in the economic cooperation forum (Evans, 1989b).
With the introduction of APEC in the regional multilateral architecture,
Australia thus successfully institutionalized an ‘Asia Pacific’ conceptualization
of the region that gave it a seat at the most important table in the Asia Pacific
during that time. This occurred against the backdrop of active Australian
middle power diplomacy, the rising importance of the economic agenda,
as well as the rapid economic growth of Asia. While acknowledging that
Australia would never be able to match up to the major powers in terms
of material strength and strategic influence, Australian leaders and officials
were also aware that being a middle power meant that the country could
achieve certain things that the rest of the non-major powers could not, for
example, taking the leading role to initiate and launch APEC. As Evans and
Grant point out, for a country like Australia that is ‘of a size and weight of
less than major power proportions’, the ideal regional and global architecture
would be one based on institutions and principles of equality (Evans and
Grant, 1995, p 354). This would be, in principle, achieved by the multilateral
nature of APEC, which would offer ‘educative and constraining influences’
against major power dominance in the regional architecture (Cooper et al,
1993, p 115). Let us now move on to discuss Indonesia’s response to and
subsequent leadership of APEC.
Indonesia and ASEAN centrality

While Indonesia had initially responded cautiously to Australia’s proposal
to convene APEC, the Southeast Asian country later became one of
APEC’s strongest proponents. Jakarta had shared the concerns of its fellow
ASEAN member states that APEC would entrench the dominance of major
powers over the emerging economies and sideline ASEAN in regional
multilateralism. Despite these fears, Indonesia objected strongly to Malaysia’s
counter proposal of the EAEG. Indonesia regarded such an exclusionary
platform as antithetical to the interests of both itself and ASEAN, and
subsequently succeeded in persuading Malaysia to modify the EAEG into
a ‘caucus’ within the APEC framework, albeit an independent one led by
ASEAN. Given its recognized status as ASEAN’s de facto leader, Indonesia’s
chairing of APEC in 1994 and its hosting of the second APEC Summit
further reinforced the organization’s place in regional multilateralism in the
early post-Cold War days.
Unlike Australia and South Korea, views of Indonesia as a middle power
had yet to fully emerge from Jakarta in the late 1980s and early 1990s. To
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be sure, Indonesia’s GDP hovered between the 22nd and 30th largest in
the world during this time and it was Southeast Asia’s largest economy
(The World Bank, 2021a). Its growing economy also prompted observers
to highlight the likelihood that Indonesia could become one of the next
‘Asian Tiger’ economies, following in the footsteps of Hong Kong,
Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan (Mihaly, 1990, p 162; Emmerson, 1991,
p 187). Nevertheless, Indonesia’s trailing infrastructure and socioeconomic
development –especially when compared to other regional countries –
corresponded with its policymakers’ views of it as a developing country
(Sumarlin, 1986; Ali, 1991; Jacob, 1991). As late as April 1994 –just a few
months prior to Indonesia’s hosting of the second APEC Summit –Alatas
acknowledged that Indonesia was ‘the most sizable economy in Southeast
Asia’ but continued to refer to it as a ‘developing country’ (Alatas, 2001,
p 529). Interestingly, however, external sources were starting to regard
Indonesia as a ‘middle power’ –a label associated with its considerable
economic size and population, as well as its political maturity (‘Our media’,
1989; Mehta and Morais, 1990). This was certainly aligned with statements
from Jakarta that it was ‘time for Indonesia to play a more active and assertive
role’ in international issues and that Indonesia’s progression towards an
advanced country would ‘have an impact on world politics’ (Kassim, 1989;
as cited in Suryadinata, 1996, p 177).
To a large extent, perceptions of Indonesia as a significant actor –and
indeed, as a middle power –in regional and global affairs were bolstered by
its roles in multilateral institutions such as ASEAN and NAM. The latter
had its origins in the seminal Bandung Conference of 1955, with then
Indonesian President Sukarno among the founding leaders of the movement
comprising newly independent states of Asia and Africa, which sought
non-alignment between the Soviet Union and the US. As NAM chair from
1992 to 1995, Indonesia led the grouping in charting a new purpose and
role in the aftermath of the Cold War. Indonesia also assumed a leadership
role in ASEAN. In fact, as a reflection of how influential Indonesia was in
shaping developments in Southeast Asia, ASEAN’s establishment in 1967
was in part ‘an effort to constrain Indonesian hegemony in Southeast Asia’
in the wake of Sukarno’s hostile Konfrontasi policy from 1963 to 1966
towards the newly formed Malaysia (Roberts and Widyaningsih, 2015,
p 264). Subsequently, Indonesia has had an outsized role in influencing
ASEAN’s mode of operations and processes. It chaired the first ASEAN
summit in 1976, from which emerged foundational documents such as the
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). The extent of
Indonesia’s diplomatic clout in Southeast Asia was also on display in the
decade-long conflict between Cambodia and Vietnam, as Indonesia led
ASEAN’s response and was the co-chair of the Paris peace conferences that
resulted in the official end of the war (Alagappa, 1993). In this sense, even as
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Indonesia lagged Australia and South Korea in some material capabilities, it

nevertheless pursued a role in international politics comparable to the other
middle powers or even as a ‘major state in Southeast Asia’ (Suryadinata, 1996,
p 8). Notwithstanding challenges to its big power aspirations, Indonesia was
able to leverage its profile as one of the more influential countries of the
Global South to advocate its own interests –a strategy that was similarly
illustrated in its contributions to APEC in the platform’s formative years.
Initial Indonesian responses towards Hawke’s proposal were not particularly
enthusiastic. Among Jakarta’s primary concerns were the possibility that
APEC might take the form of a closed trading bloc that would deepen
fragmentation in the global economy, as well as the likelihood that APEC
would consign ASEAN to the backbenches of regional economic cooperation
and exacerbate the North–South divide (Sargent, 1989a; Soesastro, 1996,
p 25). Suharto reportedly expressed apprehension that the different levels of
national development among regional countries would ‘[make] formation
of a single regional forum extremely difficult’, while Trade Minister Arifin
Siregar cautioned that the formation of a trade bloc would lead to a trade
war (‘Japan, Indonesia’, 1989; see also Jacob, 1989a). In an interview with
journalist Yoichi Funabashi, Woolcott recalls that in securing regional support
for APEC’s establishment, ‘the most important country was Indonesia’ (as
cited in Funabashi, 1995, p 56). This was because ‘Indonesia was the major
influence in ASEAN’ and the association ‘[did] not react to any particular
proposal or policy without ascertaining Indonesia’s view’ (Funabashi, 1995,
p 56; Woolcott, 2003, p 235). Consequently, Jakarta was Woolcott’s first
stop in Southeast Asia –second after Wellington –as he embarked on a
tour of regional capitals to discuss Hawke’s proposal. Following Woolcott’s
visit, Alatas voiced his agreement with the underlying economic principles
of the Australian initiative and pledged support for the first APEC meeting,
but noted that Indonesia’s preference was to utilize existing arrangements
such as the ASEAN Secretariat and the annual Post Ministerial Conference
(PMC) involving ASEAN and its dialogue partners (‘Reps to’, 1989). From
the perspectives of Indonesia and its fellow ASEAN member states, this
approach would ensure ASEAN’s continuing relevance and role in regional
multilateralism. In contrast, APEC was expected to be led by non-ASEAN
countries that were much more powerful and influential than the ASEAN
member states, a scenario that did not bode well for the prospects of ASEAN.
While Australia and other non-ASEAN powers were willing to accord
ASEAN a central place in the APEC process, the concerns remained.
Subsequently, at APEC’s inaugural ministerial meeting in November
1989, Alatas set out six principles encapsulating ASEAN’s position on the
development of the new forum. First, ‘ASEAN’s identity and cohesion
should be preserved’ in APEC, and ‘its cooperative relations with its dialogue
partners and with other third countries should not be diluted’. Second,
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APEC cooperation should be based on ‘equality, equity and mutual benefit’,

taking into account the disparities in levels of economic development and
socio-political systems among regional countries. Third, APEC should not
seek to establish ‘an inward-looking economic or trading bloc’. Fourth,
APEC cooperation should be based on consultations rather than ‘mandatory
directives’. Fifth, APEC should contribute towards capacity building and the
promotion of common interests. Sixth, APEC should ‘proceed gradually
and pragmatically’, and not be too hasty in its institutionalization (Alatas,
2001, pp 343–4). Meant as a way to protect the interests of the emerging
economies such as Indonesia against the larger developed economies in
APEC, these principles were formalized as the ‘Kuching Consensus’ at an
ASEAN ministerial meeting in February 1990.
Indonesia was certainly not the only ASEAN member state to voice its
uneasiness about the potential impact of APEC on the Southeast Asian
countries. Viewing APEC as a platform that enforced western hegemony and
allowed western countries to benefit at the expense of the weaker economies
in the region, Mahathir counter proposed the EAEG in December 1990.
Comprising the six ASEAN countries, China, Japan and South Korea, the
EAEG was meant to provide these ‘East Asian’ countries with ‘the leverage
and a platform to act in concert and speak with one voice’ vis-à-vis the
protectionist measures of the richer European and North American countries
(Mohamad, 2004a, p 127; see also Mohamad, 2004b, p 163; Dhillon, 2009,
p 224). Countries such as Australia and New Zealand –which Mahathir
described as ‘always favour[ing] the European viewpoint’ –were excluded
from the EAEG (Mohamad, 2011, p 612). Despite Malaysia’s affirmation that
the EAEG would ‘revolve around ASEAN’, not all the ASEAN countries
supported Mahathir’s proposal (Lai, 1991). Indonesia, in particular, was
reluctant to back the EAEG (Crone, 1992, p 77; Higgott and Stubbs, 1995,
p 522). Reports noted Jakarta’s annoyance that it had not been consulted
beforehand, given that it considered itself the leader of the Malay world
and ASEAN – both of which Malaysia was a part (Chuensuksawadi,
1991; Suryadinata, 1996, p 73). Suharto and Alatas also warned against
the formation of an inward-looking trade bloc and conveyed support for
APEC’s open regionalism (‘Cool response’, 1990; Kagda, 1991). Indonesia’s
wariness of the EAEG additionally arose from its reliance on US assistance
and investment, and its hope that the US could counterbalance Japan’s
economic influence in Southeast Asia (Kassim, 1992b; Suryadinata, 1996,
p 73). Although Alatas denied sharing ‘the misgivings of other countries’
about the EAEG, its exclusion of the US arguably did not align with
Indonesia’s preference (‘Jakarta has’, 1992).
At an ASEAN economic ministers’ meeting in October 1991, Indonesia
succeeded in persuading Malaysia to change the name of the EAEG to
a consultative East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) (Milne and Mauzy,
77
1999, p 130). The ASEAN economic ministers, moreover, agreed that

the EAEC would ‘not be an institutionalized entity and would not be
a trading bloc’, and would only convene ‘as and when the need arises’
(‘Joint press statement’, 1991). This was arguably a significant downgrade
from Malaysia’s original initiative. Nevertheless, despite this name change,
Indonesia remained hesitant to concretize the EAEC given the group’s
exclusion of the non-East Asian countries (Pura, 1992). The differences
between Indonesia and Malaysia were also illustrated in their respective
visions of the EAEC’s role. Malaysia preferred for the EAEC to be linked to
the annual ASEAN Economic Ministers’ Meeting, but Indonesia favoured
the incorporation of the caucus within APEC. From Indonesia’s view, it
was necessary for the EAEC to be incorporated within or adjusted in line
with the APEC framework to be acceptable to Japan –which had been
reluctant to endorse the EAEC despite being deemed by Malaysia as the
key player to lead the grouping –and the US (Kassim, 1992a; Pura, 1992).
A compromise was eventually made and in July 1993 –more than two
years after the idea was first mooted –ASEAN foreign ministers agreed
that the EAEC would be an independent caucus within APEC, and have
its agenda supported and directed by the ASEAN Economic Ministers’
Meeting (Chalermpalanupap, 2005, pp 58–9 ). Even with ASEAN’s
official endorsement, however, the EAEC continued to falter in the
face of differing views about its functions and modalities (Thaitawat and
Thapanachai, 1993).
Although Indonesia had become more openly supportive of the APEC
process by the early 1990s, it was nonetheless wary of Keating’s proposal for
a summit and Clinton’s offer to host the inaugural meeting. In his memoirs,
Keating recalls his initial assumption that the first summit would be held
during Indonesia’s chairing of APEC in 1994 (Keating, 2000, p 84). While
the timeline was eventually brought forward to the year when the US was
chair, Keating was mindful that Indonesia’s response to the proposal would
be ‘critical’ and ‘decisive within ASEAN’ (Keating, 2000, p 88). Jakarta did
not explicitly object to the idea to convene the leaders’ meetings, but urged
caution against a hasty institutionalization of the grouping (Ali, 1992; Kitney,
1992). Jakarta’s response could be attributed to two main reasons. First, a
formal summit involving the leaders of major powers such as China, Japan
and the US would add even more significance to the APEC process, and
likely overshadow ASEAN’s significance in the region. Second, Indonesia
was aware of the political sensitivities surrounding Keating’s initiative
especially where Malaysia was concerned (Ali, 1992; Kitney, 1992). These
reasons also explained Indonesia’s reluctance to endorse the APEC Eminent
Persons Group’s recommendation for APEC to transition from a loose and
consultative forum to an ‘economic community’ (Chan, 1993; ‘Indonesia,
others’, 1993).
78
Jakarta’s support for Australia’s initiative, nevertheless, also translated into

its hosting of the second leaders’ meeting in Bogor in 1994 despite its initial
concerns about APEC’s institutionalization. This was something that Keating
had broached with Suharto in seeking his support for the establishment of the
summit (Keating, 2000, p 88). Describing the invitation to Suharto to host
the second APEC summit as ‘particularly astute’, John Ravenhill explains
that this ‘appeared to pay tribute to Soeharto’s role as the elder statesman of
ASEAN, and to Indonesia’s long-standing claim to be the most important of
the ASEAN countries’ (Ravenhill, 2001, pp 106–7). In line with Indonesia’s
interest in narrowing the North–South gap, the Bogor summit focused
on bridging differences between the advanced and emerging economies
in APEC. Officials noted that given its membership, APEC represented a
microcosm of North–South relations in the global economy (Alatas, 2001,
pp 357–8). From Jakarta’s viewpoint, it was critical to help emerging
economies catch up to their developed counterparts before APEC proceeded
to discuss trade liberalization arrangements, so that the benefits would be
equally shared (Jacob, 1994; Nainggolan, 1994, p 64; Soesastro, 1995, p 484).
To be sure, Indonesia’s chairing of APEC was not completely smooth
sailing as some ASEAN member states disagreed with Indonesia’s agenda.
In a significant change of its attitude, Indonesia went from having one of
the more cautious responses towards the APEC Eminent Persons Group’s
recommendation of establishing a timetable for free trade, to fixing target
dates for the process (Baker, 1994a; Suryadinata, 1996, pp 180–1). Jakarta’s
initial draft of what would come to be known as the Bogor Declaration for
trade liberalization in the Asia Pacific, however, was strongly resisted by others
such as Malaysia and China. As several observers noted, Suharto played a
proactive role in ensuring that an agreement would be reached on APEC’s
free trade goals (Suryadinata, 1996, pp 181–2; Frost, 2016, pp 86–7). Ahead
of the summit in Bogor, Suharto held bilateral meetings with other APEC
leaders to ‘reconcile outstanding differences’ over the free trade timetable and
‘seek a consensus’ (Lee, 1994). In an attempt to propose a possible solution
that would be acceptable to all, he suggested that the advanced economies
would implement free trade by 2010, while the emerging economies would
do so by 2020 (Suryadinata, 1996, p 181).
Suharto also introduced the notion of ‘flexible consensus’, which allowed
member economies to join the trade liberalization process at their own
pace (Baker, 1994b). This idea of ‘flexible consensus’ was reflected in his
management of Malaysia’s dissent. In response to the 2020 deadline for
emerging economies to achieve free and open trade and investment, Mahathir
argued that they would be unlikely to catch up with the developed economies
and that it would be unfair to expect countries such as Malaysia to stick to
a specific timeline in opening up their economies (Tan, 1994). At Suharto’s
suggestion, Malaysia submitted an annex to the Bogor Declaration conveying
79
its interpretations of the trade liberalization timeline as ‘indicative’ and ‘non-

binding’, and noting that the process would be undertaken by member
economies ‘on a best-endeavour basis’ (as cited in Soesastro, 1995, p 489).
Although there continued to be disagreements over whether the annex was
an official part of the Bogor Declaration, Suharto’s suggestion ensured that
Malaysia was able to express its reservations without disrupting the overall
Indonesian agenda for APEC (Funabashi, 1995, pp 92, 146). Indonesia
had also rejected calls by Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines to hold an
informal ASEAN summit prior to the APEC Summit in Bogor. According
to Hadi Soesastro, a member of the Indonesian National Committee for
PECC, Suharto as the host of the APEC Summit ‘did not want to give the
impression that ASEAN leaders are ganging up against the others’ (Soesastro,
1995, p 476).
Indonesia’s chairing of APEC in 1994 has been credited with substantively
advancing the platform’s progress, with the Bogor summit ‘produc[ing] an
ambitious and concrete goal for the hitherto deliberately vague programme
of economic cooperation’ (Bisley, 2012, p 354; see also Garnaut, 2012,
p 19). APEC’s subsequent struggle to achieve the Bogor goals does not
negate Indonesia’s key role in shaping the formative days of APEC. As
then Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong observed, the proposal
for trade liberalization ‘can only be done in Jakarta with President Suharto’
given Indonesia’s ability to bring together diverse regional states (as cited
in Funabashi, 1995, p 90). Likewise, Indonesia played a significant role in
determining the outcomes of the various proposals set forth by Australia
and Malaysia. As an emerging economy in Southeast Asia, Indonesia had
initially been wary of APEC as an institutionalized platform that would work
to the detriment of the weaker regional economies and sideline ASEAN.
It thus sought to safeguard ASEAN’s central role in the APEC process as a
way to ensure its own interests. The success of its chairing of APEC in 1994
and hosting of the second APEC Summit was also built upon its combined
attributes of being both an emerging economy and ASEAN’s de facto leader.
In this sense, Indonesia’s efforts regarding APEC demonstrated its distinct role
in the region and ensured that the ASEAN member states had a say in the
first intergovernmental multilateral forum in the post-Cold War Asia Pacific.
South Korea and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation’s first expansion

Unlike Indonesia and Australia, South Korea was neither a leader nor an
initiator as far as visions of regional multilateralism were concerned in the
late 1980s and early 1990s. Rather, South Korea facilitated APEC’s first
expansion, which saw China, Hong Kong and Taiwan joining the APEC
process in 1991. The induction of these three member economies at the
APEC ministerial meeting in Seoul in November 1991 ‘strengthen[ed]
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APEC’s stature as the single largest forum speaking on the subject of trade
liberalisation’ and reinforced its importance in the regional multilateral
architecture (Shim, 1991, p 27). Reaching an agreement acceptable to all
three members on issues such as political status and protocol procedures was
certainly a complicated task. South Korea’s shuttle diplomacy was given a
boost by its relatively neutral and non-threatening image, as well as the fact
that it was the only APEC member to still have diplomatic ties with the
ROC by the end of 1991 and that its relations with the People’s Republic
of China (PRC) were also improving. Similar to the preceding sub-sections,
we begin by examining South Korea’s middle power status during this time.
The first official description of South Korea as a ‘middle power’ came
from President Roh Tae-woo in June 1991, while he was on a visit to the
US. In a speech on South Korea’s role in a ‘[n]‌ew Pacific [o]rder’, Roh said
that the country ‘may have become a “middle” power’ given its economic
size, trade volume and per capita wealth (Roh, 1992, pp 243, 249). This was
actually a rare pronouncement of South Korea’s middle power identity under
the Roh administration. Instead, Roh preferred to promote the narrative
that South Korea was emerging from the ‘peripher[y]’ to ‘propel itself into
the ranks of the industrialized nations’ and assume ‘a central position in
the international community’ (Roh, 1992, pp 208, 298). Regardless, Roh
certainly acknowledged that South Korea was ‘neither a superpower nor
an affluent advanced country’ (Roh, 1992, p 248). South Korea’s rise to
middle power or industrialized country status was initially driven by its
rapid economic growth from the 1960s through the early 1990s. While it
had emerged from the Korean War as one of the poorest countries in the
world with a GDP per capita of US$67 in 1953, by 1989 this figure had
increased to US$5,817 (Chung, 2007, p 12; The World Bank, 2021c). As
a result of its post-war economic growth, by the late 1980s South Korea’s
GDP size had risen to be the sixth or seventh biggest among the Asia Pacific
countries, and it ranked between 15th and 19th in the world (The World
Bank, 2021a). South Korea’s rapid socioeconomic growth –dubbed by its
leaders as the ‘Miracle on the Han River’ –enabled the country to become
one of the four ‘Asian Tiger’ economies, along with Hong Kong, Singapore
and Taiwan.
South Korea’s economic rise was additionally closely linked to its
democratization process in the late 1980s. In 1987, the country held its
first direct presidential election in 16 years, from which Roh emerged as
the victor. A ‘successful showcase of market economics and democracy’,
South Korea was regarded as a developmental model for the emerging
economies (Roh, 1992, p 131; see also Wood, 1993, p 188). Its unique
‘midway’ position between the advanced and emerging economies during
this time also enabled it to promote itself as a bridge between these two
groups (Roh, 1992, p 147; see also ‘ESCAP session’, 1991). South Korea’s
81
economic and political achievements were certainly on full display when it

hosted the Summer Olympics in September 1988, and Seoul saw this event
as signalling its ‘arriv[al] at the threshold of the developed world’ (Roh,
1992, p 309; see also Han, 1989, p 34). Then Chinese Foreign Minister
Qian Qichen concurred that Seoul’s successful staging of the Olympics
boosted South Korea’s international influence (Qian, 2005, p 110). As will
be discussed later, the Seoul Olympics were also a watershed for relations
between South Korea and the communist world. Despite acknowledgement
that South Korea’s status and material power were certainly not on par with
countries such as Japan and the US, Roh declared that the country was
nevertheless now ‘ready and willing to fulfill its international obligations …
commensurate with its new status and capabilities’ (Roh, 1992, p 211; see
also Roh, 1992, pp 248–9). Amid these developments, the establishment of
APEC and the membership dilemma over China, Hong Kong and Taiwan
provided an opportunity for South Korea to assume a mediatory role in the
regional multilateral architecture.
During negotiations to launch APEC, Australia, Japan and the US had
expressed interest to include China, Hong Kong and Taiwan in the grouping
(Elsner, 1989; Woolcott, 2003, pp 239–40). Prior to the first ministerial
meeting in November 1989, Woolcott had broached the idea of Chinese
participation in conversations with Premier Li Peng, but these plans were
derailed by Beijing’s opposition to the inclusion of Hong Kong and Taiwan
in APEC (Woolcott, 2003, pp 239–40). At the same time, ASEAN countries
were reportedly concerned that the heavyweight Chinese economy might
result in their interests being sidelined. Another concern was that China’s
participation might put pressure on ASEAN member states that had yet
to establish diplomatic relations with Beijing (Steketee et al, 1989). The
Tiananmen incident in June 1989 subsequently put the issue of Chinese
membership on hold, and without China’s participation in APEC, Taiwan
and Hong Kong’s memberships were also out of the question. By the
second ministerial meeting in July 1990, however, APEC ministers were
in agreement that the three economies should be invited to participate
in the forum, given their significance for the Asia Pacific ‘both in terms
of present economic activity and their importance for the region’s future
prosperity’ (‘1990 APEC’, 1990). As such, consultations should commence
towards a mutually acceptable formula that would allow all three economies
to participate, ideally at the next ministerial meeting to be held in 1991.
South Korea, which was to host this third ministerial meeting, subsequently
began negotiations with China, Taiwan and Hong Kong on their admission
to APEC.
South Korea’s mediating role in the issue was complemented by the Roh
administration’s nordpolitik at the time. With calmer superpower relations
and a more positive strategic climate, Roh saw a chance to improve the
82
situation on the Korean peninsula. The main goal of nordpolitik was to ‘secure
stability and peace’ in inter-Korean relations by maintaining good relations
with Pyongyang’s friends, such as China and the Soviet Union (Roh,
1992, p 155; see also Park, 1993, p 219). Establishing diplomatic ties with
countries in the communist bloc would also help to enhance South Korea’s
trade networks and economic prosperity (Kim, 1993, p 258). South Korea’s
approach dovetailed nicely with the economic development aims of China
and the Soviet Union, which required an expansion of economic cooperation
with more countries. The Seoul Olympics, held just seven months after
Roh’s inauguration, catalysed the progress of nordpolitik. The Soviet Union,
China and eastern European countries sent large contingents of athletes, as
well as trade and cultural delegations (Han, 1989, pp 34–5). Consequently,
dialogue on trade, investment and people-to-people exchanges blossomed.
In particular, government-level contact between China and South Korea
went from being almost non-existent, to the beginning of indirect trade in
the late 1970s, to a trade volume of US$3.2 billion in 1989 (Chung, 1988, p
1033; Kim, 1993, p 262). In working towards formal diplomatic ties, South
Korea and China agreed in October 1990 to set up trade offices, with some
consular functions, in each other’s capitals. Significantly, amid normalizing
relations with China, South Korea was the only APEC country to still
have relations with the ROC through 1991. All the others had established
official relations with the PRC and in accordance with the ‘One China’
policy, could not simultaneously have diplomatic ties with the ROC.
With the existence of official ROC–South Korean relations on the one
hand and improving PRC–South Korean ties on the other, South Korea
had the diplomatic pull it needed to conduct shuttle diplomacy with the
disagreeing parties. Political representation was the key point of conflict,
particularly between Taiwan and China. Seeking to participate in APEC ‘on
an equal footing to Beijing’s representation’, Taipei wanted to be officially
designated as the ‘ROC’ and send its foreign minister to the meetings (Chu,
2016, p 177). This was unacceptable to China, who asserted that, based on
the ‘One China’ principle, only it could join APEC as a sovereign country,
while Taiwan and Hong Kong should participate as regional economies that
were not independent of the PRC (Qian, 2005, p 108). In this regard, China
said that Taiwan should be represented under the name ‘Taipei-China’ or
‘Taiwan-China’ –a formulation that was rejected by Taiwan (Chu, 2016, p
177). China additionally insisted that Taiwan should be represented by only
its economic minister and not its foreign minister (Qian, 2005, p 109). The
impasse was eventually resolved following ‘[p]‌ersistent Korean diplomacy’
that was largely credited to Assistant Foreign Minister Lee See-young, who
was also the chair of the APEC senior officials’ meeting (Funabashi, 1995, p
73). Lee proposed that Taiwan be represented as ‘Chinese Taipei’ –adopting
Taiwan’s designation in the Olympics –which both the ROC and PRC
83
were amenable to (Chu, 2016, p 177). Taiwan was also persuaded to only
send ‘ministers in charge of APEC-related economic affairs’ to the meetings
(Chu, 2016, p 177; see also He, 2009, p 32). With a consensus reached and
the negotiations concluded, APEC welcomed China, Taiwan and Hong
Kong as the platform’s newest members at the third ministerial meeting in
Seoul in November 1991.
According to academic and former Taipei Times reporter Ming-chin
Monique Chu, in total South Korea conducted nine rounds of negotiations –
separately with Taiwan and China –from October 1990 to October 1991.
Officials from Beijing and Taipei never actually met throughout this process;
South Korea was effectively the go-between (Chu, 2016, pp 175–6). While
Lee has emphasized that his talks with Beijing and Taipei were conducted
in his capacity as chair of the APEC senior officials’ meeting, rather than as
a South Korean official, Funabashi points out that Lee’s efforts benefitted
from Seoul’s improving relations with China (Funabashi, 1995, p 74). In
addition to its unique relations with China and Taiwan at the time, Seoul
was also perceived as having certain qualities that made it suitable to be a
mediator in the issue. Based on interviews conducted with US officials,
both Chu and Funabashi conclude that Washington viewed South Korea
as a ‘less confrontational’ and ‘nonthreatening’ mediator for China, than if
the US or Japan had attempted to assume that facilitating role (as cited in
Funabashi, 1995, p 74; Chu, 2016, p 184). Indeed, Foreign Minister Qian,
who represented China at its first APEC meeting in Seoul, recalls that South
Korea ‘did all it could to help China become a member’, with Lee working
tirelessly to develop a compromise that was acceptable to all parties (Qian,
2005, pp 108–9). The perception of South Korea as a benign and neutral
intermediary was likely reinforced by its relatively weaker power status –
particularly when compared against the US and Japan –and its enthusiasm
towards improving ties with China as part of nordpolitik. Moreover, any
kind of high-profile US role in this issue would have been complicated by
Washington’s policy towards Taiwan (Chu, 2016, p 175). As such, it was
more appropriate and suitable for South Korea to take a central role in
the negotiations.
Described by a senior South Korean foreign ministry official as ‘a coming-
out party for [Seoul’s] foreign relations’, the country’s hosting of the first
APEC meeting that included China, Hong Kong and Taiwan in 1991
undoubtedly helped to enhance its regional and international profile (as
cited in Shim, 1991, p 27). Thanks to its distinctive qualities and unique
foreign relations at the time, South Korea was able to assume a role in this
issue that other, greater, powers would unlikely be effective in. At the same
time, by utilizing its diplomatic resources and taking on a leadership role in
the negotiations, South Korea set itself apart from the rest of the non-major
powers. The reduction in military and ideological tensions in the late 1980s,
84
as well as Seoul’s hosting of the Summer Olympics in 1988, also offered

opportunities for South Korea to diversify its foreign policy and expand its
engagement with communist countries, including China. With the inclusion
of China, Hong Kong and Taiwan in APEC, South Korea helped to widen
APEC’s membership composition. As South Korean Foreign Minister Lee
Sang-ock declared at the Seoul meeting, ‘APEC has now come to embrace
all of the major economic players of the region’ (as cited in Starr, 1991).
Australia’s efforts in launching the APEC process, Indonesia’s pursuit
of ASEAN centrality in the new organization, as well as South Korea’s
facilitation of the memberships of China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, all
contributed towards the shape and form of APEC. Material resources
played a part, but the social and ideational dimensions of each country’s
approach were important as well. The success of their strategies illustrated
that power politics was not simply about which countries had the largest
economies in the world, but crucially, about how certain countries were
able to leverage their relevant strengths within this instance of multilateral
institution building to serve their own interests. To be sure, material power
still mattered. Without Japan and the US supporting Australia’s various APEC
initiatives, for instance, it is unclear if its efforts would have found success.
Likewise, without the larger (non-ASEAN) powers backing Indonesia’s
efforts to maintain ASEAN centrality, it is unclear that ASEAN would
have gained a central place in the APEC process. It is evident, nevertheless,
that all three middle powers enjoyed certain profile attributes that bolstered
their persuasiveness and credibility among their regional counterparts. This
accounted for their ability to navigate the power politics characterizing
APEC dynamics to their benefit.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the circumstances and conditions that shaped
APEC’s evolution through the late 1980s and early 1990s. As the first
region-wide multilateral platform in the post-Cold War era that brought
together foreign ministers, as well as economic and trade ministers –and
later leaders –of China, Japan, the US and the rest of the regional countries
to the same table, the inauguration of APEC was a notable moment in the
regional multilateral architecture. Amid declining Cold War tensions and
the collapse of global bipolarity, Asia’s economic rise, as well as the anxieties
over extra-regional trade blocs, APEC’s value was not merely economic, but
also strategic and political. A quick comparison of the behaviour of Australia,
Indonesia and South Korea in the formative days of APEC highlights that
all three middle powers were quite successful in diluting major-power
stratificatory forces and assuming functionally differentiated roles that neither
major nor smaller powers would be able to perform as effectively. Indeed,
85
when activated by the process of power politics, the differentiated structure

helped to generate the behaviour of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea
towards APEC.
To a large extent, all three countries were driven by the need to weaken
the extensive influence of major powers in regional economic affairs,
by ensuring that other smaller and medium-sized countries had a voice
in decision making alongside the larger economies. The launch of the
multilateral APEC as well as the insistence on ASEAN centrality in it were
attempts by the respective middle powers to safeguard their own interests.
Australia’s focus was on entrenching an Asia Pacific conceptualization of
the region that would validate its place in the region. This was important
for Australia, which often had its place in the Asian region questioned. As
Asian economies grew in importance to Australia’s own prosperity in the late
1980s, however, Canberra sought to institutionalize a multilateral economic
cooperation platform that would secure its place, and consequently economic
interests, in the region. In contrast, Indonesia’s place in the region was rarely
in doubt. As ASEAN’s de facto leader, it was often regarded as an important
actor in the broader region too. Nevertheless, Jakarta’s concern about being
dominated by the more developed economies and the potential sidelining of
ASEAN in the region –both of which would portend adverse consequences
for its interests –pushed it to strengthen APEC over Malaysia’s inward-
looking EAEG, and ensure that the advanced economies accommodated
their emerging counterparts in the APEC process. Meanwhile, South Korea
relied on its distinctive diplomatic relations at the time to open APEC’s door
to Chinese participation in APEC, along with Taiwan and Hong Kong. The
inclusion of China, Taiwan and Hong Kong in APEC meant a greater level
of power diffusion as more voices were added to the APEC agenda. Such
efforts contributed towards ensuring a more inclusive and equal decision
making in the region, which was to the advantage of middle powers as they
now had seats at the multilateral table.
The functions of middle powers as initiators of or mediators within
multilateralism were also reflected in the approaches and responses of
Australia, Indonesia and South Korea towards APEC. Building on their
ideational and social attributes, all three countries managed to persuade others
to support their efforts. Whereas the major powers had the capacity to impose
their preferences on others relatively easily, middle powers such as Australia,
Indonesia and South Korea had to rely on other, more diplomatic, tools to
garner support for their agendas. This meant some form of compromise, as
evident in Australia’s accommodation of ASEAN in APEC and Indonesia’s
negotiations with Malaysia over the EAEG/EAEC. In Australia’s case, its
profile as a non-threatening middle power also put it in a better position than
Japan or the US to take the lead on this new cooperative grouping, given
that it was meant to offer stability amid the behaviour of the world’s top two
86
economic powers. Similarly, South Korea’s role in facilitating the entry of

China, Taiwan and Hong Kong into APEC in 1991 was made possible thanks
to its non-threatening and non-antagonistic image, particularly from the
perspectives of China and the US. Admittedly, Seoul’s role here was in large
part a matter of circumstance, given that it was the only APEC member to
retain diplomatic ties with the ROC through 1991, which put its officials in
a good position to conduct shuttle diplomacy and mediate the disagreements
between Beijing and Taipei on the latter’s status in APEC. Nevertheless,
the behaviour of South Korea, Australia and Indonesia in shaping APEC
illustrated their ability to utilize both their material and ideational strengths
to their advantage. In terms of social, relative and relational power politics,
all three countries were able to leverage their resources and profiles to ensure
support for their roles from both the major and smaller powers.
As a consequence of the power politics surrounding the formation of
APEC, the behaviour of the three middle powers were activated within
the differentiated structure in the Asia Pacific. This analysis will be taken
up in more detail in Chapter 6, following a similar discussion of the EAS
in the next chapter.
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5
Shaping the East Asia Summit
Introduction
This chapter examines the conditions and circumstances surrounding the
formative days of the EAS that was launched in 2005, focusing on the
structural forces and processes that generated middle power behaviour in Asia
Pacific multilateralism. The time period for this case study stretches over a
relatively long period of time, from the late 1990s to 2011. This is due not
only to how the EAS and its membership evolved, but also to the fact that
the platform’s establishment was linked to the East Asian community debate
that occurred particularly robustly through the late 1990s and 2000s. Strictly
speaking, however, the analysis narrows down to three specific points within
this time period. The first is the late 1990s, when South Korean President
Kim Dae-jung convened the EAVG following the Asian financial crisis,
for regional policymakers to provide recommendations on strengthening
regional cooperation and community building. It was in the EAVG report
that the creation of an EAS was first mentioned. The second point in time
is the inauguration of the EAS itself, in 2005. In the period leading up to
the platform’s launch, a debate emerged over its membership composition.
Some countries expressed the preference for the new forum to only include
the APT members, while others sought to also bring in Australia, India
and New Zealand. It was in large part due to Indonesia’s efforts, supported
by others, that the EAS launched as a 16-member forum. The third and
final point in time under study for this case is the late 2000s to early 2010s,
when both Indonesia and Australia attempted to secure US participation in
the changing regional multilateral architecture. This vision was ultimately
realized in 2011, when Indonesia chaired the first 18-member EAS that
included Russia and the US.
The establishment of the EAS was an important moment because it
institutionalized the annual gathering of leaders representing the key countries
that would shape the regional strategic environment going forward. While
the summit initially started off as a cooperative platform for non-traditional
88
security issues such as finance, energy, education, avian flu prevention and
disaster management, Indonesia took the initiative to add issues such as the
South China Sea disputes when it was chair in 2011. This expansion of the
EAS’ agenda, coupled with its ability to annually gather regional leaders,
has raised its profile to a strategic forum crucial for regional cooperation
and stability. The introduction of the EAS to the alphabet soup of regional
multilateral organizations reflected the evolving power dynamics in the Asia
Pacific –with China and India being included as founding members, and
the US absent from the first six years of the process. This was in contrast to
APEC, which had the US as a founding member, with China only joining
two years after its launch and India yet to be included. Moreover, whereas
APEC comprised economies (rather than states) and its later inclusion of
geostrategically further-flung members such as Mexico and Chile meant a
certain difficulty for the forum to deal collectively with regional concerns,
the EAS consisted only of sovereign states and its membership composition
reflected a clear regional context.
Much of the literature on the formative days of the EAS has focused on its
surprise emergence amid the Sino-Japanese rivalry for regional leadership, the
central role that ASEAN played in deciding its form, as well as the changing
interests and approaches of the US in the region during this time (see, for
example, Malik, 2006; Cook, 2008; Teh, 2011). The analysis in this chapter
builds on these works by examining the contributions of South Korea,
Indonesia and Australia towards shaping the form and function of the EAS,
as well as the drivers that resulted in those behavioural outcomes. While the
EAS was ultimately an ASEAN-centred process targeted at managing major
power dynamics, the behaviour of the three middle powers –two of which
were not ASEAN members –contributed significantly towards the final
shape and form of the platform. To a large extent, their behaviour and the
consequent outcomes were generated from the presence of differentiation
in the Asia Pacific. Trends and developments leading up to the EAS, such
as the Asian financial crisis, US policy towards the region after the terrorist
attacks on 11 September 2001 (thereafter the 9/11 attacks), the Sino-Japanese
rivalry, as well as the growth of ASEAN-centred multilateralism, reflected
both the stratificatory and functional differentiation in the region during
this time. China’s political and economic growth, in particular, resulted
in it challenging not only Japan, but also the US, for regional leadership.
Through negotiations of social, relational and relative power politics, South
Korea, Indonesia and Australia diffused power away from the major players
and assumed distinct functions in regional multilateralism to varying extents.
South Korea’s establishment of the EAVG, Indonesia’s pursuit of a broader
East Asia Summit, and Australia’s efforts in ensuring US participation in
regional multilateralism contributed towards shaping the eventual form and
agenda of the new institution.
89
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses the regional
circumstances and structural conditions from the late 1990s to the mid-2000s
that contextualized the establishment of the EAS. Understanding the context
in which the EAS was formed is important as it offers an explanatory basis
for the subsequent developments that occurred. The views of Australia,
Indonesia and South Korea regarding the ongoing trends will also be
highlighted. The third section then proceeds to examine the behaviour
of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea in shaping the EAS. The focus
is specifically on South Korea’s EAVG initiative, Indonesia’s leadership in
determining membership of the EAS, and Australia’s APC proposal. While
this chapter is focused mainly on empirically laying out the case study,
the concluding section will briefly raise the theoretical implications of the
discussion here.
Regional dynamics and structure from the late 1990s

to mid-2000s
From the late 1990s to mid-2000s, several important regional and global
developments shaped the approaches of South Korea, Indonesia and Australia
towards multilateralism in the Asia Pacific. Major events included the Asian
financial crisis that began in 1997, the 9/11 attacks on the US, the rivalry
between Japan and China for regional leadership, as well as intensifying
regionalism that was largely driven by ASEAN through the late 1990s and
2000s. From the perspectives of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea, these
developments underscored the need for an effective platform that could
secure the interests of non-major powers like themselves, integrate and
socialize a rising China into the region, and at the same time manage the
destabilizing effects of major power dynamics. Indeed, these trends initially
contributed towards closer cooperation and regionalism among ‘East Asian’
countries –in essence, the ten ASEAN member states, as well as China,
Japan and South Korea –but subsequently the preference for including states
such as Australia and the US became more prominent.
Asian financial crisis 1997–98

The origins of the Asian financial crisis are often traced to early 1997, when
several banks and companies in the region encountered economic difficulties
and closures (Desai, 2003, pp 120–1). In July, the Thai government decided
to float the baht following the aggressive selling of the currency by speculative
investors. This led to the baht’s devaluation and resulted in a financial
meltdown across the Asia Pacific. Other than Thailand, countries that were
hardest hit by the crisis included Indonesia and South Korea (Djiwandono,
1999, p 115; Emmers and Ravenhill, 2011, p 135). The financial crisis
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came as a shock because prior to 1997, most regional economies had been
enjoying strong growth, moderate inflation, as well as high savings and
investment rates (Glick, 1999, p 33; Desai, 2003, p 86). The effects of the
Asian financial crisis reverberated beyond economics, with domestic political
changes in Indonesia, South Korea and Malaysia. At the regional level, the
crisis was also the catalyst for several crucial developments. First, the speed
at which the financial turmoil spread from country to country demonstrated
the interdependent nature of regional and global economies. In particular,
the crisis illustrated the ‘negative aspect of closer interdependence, where
domestic problems in one country could –if left unchecked –spread to
affect other regional states’ (Curley and Thomas, 2007, p 9). The currency
crisis began in Thailand, spread to the rest of Asia, and by 1998 had also
affected countries as far as Brazil. The crisis moreover revealed the close
economic links between ASEAN and the Northeast Asian countries. These
considerations would come to shape discussions on the need for better
financial and economic coordination not just among the ten ASEAN states,
but also involving China, Japan and South Korea (Terada, 2003, p 255).
To be sure, when the crisis hit, regional and global arrangements such as
APEC and ASEAN processes, as well as the IMF and World Bank, were
already in place. The IMF, World Bank and Asian Development Bank
(ADB) intervened and provided bailout packages (Desai, 2003, pp 213–14).
Critics have charged, however, that the IMF had mismanaged the crisis,
and worsened the situation instead (Katz, 1999; Desai, 2003, pp 212–40;
Curran, 2017). The IMF and the US also rejected Japan’s proposal for an
Asian Monetary Fund. Consequently, questions were raised about whether
supposedly international organizations were simply aimed at protecting US
or ‘Western’ interests at Asia’s expense (Higgott, 1998, pp 346–50; ‘IMF
criticism’, 1998). The deteriorating state of affairs gave rise to regional
frustration and resentment over the ‘heavy-handed’ and ‘unsympathetic’
approach of western countries and organizations (Emmers and Ravenhill,
2011, p 139; Curran, 2017). In contrast, China, whose economy remained
largely intact, emerged as a ‘responsible international economic player’ by
refraining from devaluing the renminbi and offering assistance to Southeast
Asian countries (Tanaka, 2007, p 62). Meanwhile, existing regional
arrangements also failed to deal effectively with the crisis. Assessing the
responses of APEC and ASEAN, Michael Wesley writes that these institutions
lacked ‘a solidarity, a resolution, and a commitment to the recovery of
afflicted economies’ (Wesley, 1999, p 64). ASEAN was ‘powerless’ against the
economic predicament of its member states, while APEC was perceived as a
US-led organization that aligned its responses with Washington (Emmers and
Teo, 2018, p 162; see also Higgott, 1998, pp 341–2). The failure of APEC to
come up with concrete solutions to the crisis deepened the divide between
its western (mainly Australia and the US) and Asian members (Higgott, 1998,
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pp 341–2; Emmers and Ravenhill, 2011, pp 136–8). These circumstances

accentuated the need for new or enhanced ‘self-help’ platforms that would
better protect the interests of regional countries vis-à-vis the US and other
western powers (Higgott, 1998, p 353; see also Yahuda, 2014, pp 88–9).
In South Korea, the financial crisis put a halt to three decades of
high economic growth rates –over 8 per cent annually –and resulted
in a depreciating won, falling stock prices and a fourfold increase in
unemployment (Kwon, 1998, p 331; Reddy, 2010, p 38). Initially, the South
Korean government was reluctant to approach the IMF for help. Officials
held the view that the IMF would impose harsh conditions on Seoul that
‘would carry a high political cost and deprive it of its economic sovereignty’
(Garran, 1997). By November 1997, however, the worsening situation
prompted South Korea to seek out IMF assistance and a few weeks later
both sides agreed on a record US$57 billion bailout package in exchange for
Seoul’s implementation of tough reforms such as limiting economic growth
and increasing taxes (Choe, 1997). Jaewoo Choo and Sophie Boisseau du
Rocher point out that, for Seoul, the crisis also ‘exposed [Washington’s]
incapability and sheer unwillingness’ to act, and resulted in the emergence
of ‘a general sense of untrustworthiness and disloyalty toward the United
States’ (Choo and du Rocher, 2007, p 100). Notably, China also did not
offer South Korea any form of direct assistance –a contrast to its provision
of aid to Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia and Thailand (du
Rocher and Nicolas, 2007, p 3; Chung, 2008, p 164). The financial crisis
certainly had political consequences for the South Korean government.
President Kim Young-sam fired his top two economic advisers, and Kim
Dae-jung subsequently won the first-ever election victory for an opposition
party presidential candidate in December 1997 (Choe, 1997). As explained
later, the new president would go on to make a significant contribution
to the EAS through the EAVG, which was aimed at addressing the gap in
regional economic cooperation (Kim, 2006, p 11). These correspond to
what Anthony Milner observes as the two opposing narratives characterizing
South Korean perception of the crisis –that the country was simultaneously
a ‘shrimp between whales’ and ‘a nation that … will show the rest of the
world the way’ (Milner, 2003, p 290).
Indonesia also struggled to manage the repercussions of the economic
meltdown. Amid the free-falling rupiah and soaring inflation, Indonesia
requested assistance from the IMF, World Bank and ADB in October 1997
(Gopalakrishnan, 1997; Bird, 1998, p 175). In response, the three institutions
pledged to provide more than US$30 billion to Indonesia, on the condition
that the latter implemented sweeping economic reforms (Gopalakrishnan,
1997; ‘Govt shuts’, 1997). Despite this agreement, Indonesia’s annual budget
announced in January 1998 led some analysts and IMF officials to question
the country’s commitment to the reforms (Gopalakrishnan, 1998; Walters,
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1998a). During a subsequent visit by IMF Managing Director Michel

Camdessus to Jakarta, President Suharto agreed to more reforms, ‘including
an end to special arrangements associated with his family and close business
associates’ (Walters, 1998b). The outcome of these negotiations was most
famously captured in a photo that showed Suharto hunched over a table
signing the agreement as Camdessus looked on with his arms folded. Several
observers noted that Indonesians would have regarded the imagery of their
country ‘surrendering’ or ‘bow[ing]’ to the IMF as humiliating and reflective
of the organization’s ‘imperial arrogance’ (Kassim, 1998; Bird, 1999, p 28;
see also Mydans, 1998). The improvements in Sino-Indonesian relations
during this time have been attributed both to Indonesia’s unhappiness
with the US and western institutions during the financial crisis, as well as
China’s economic assistance (Sukma, 2009, p 601; Shekhar, 2018, pp 201,
204). As the economic situation continued to deteriorate amid ongoing
political tensions, violent riots that targeted mostly the ethnic Chinese for
their perceived wealth erupted in parts of Indonesia. Protestors also called
for Suharto to step down. Concluding his 30-year-long presidency, Suharto
resigned in May 1998 and handed over the reins to his vice president, B.J.
Habibie. This marked the start of Indonesia’s turn inwards for the next several
years, although it would emerge to resume its leading role in ASEAN from
the early 2000s.
Australia was not as badly affected by the financial crisis as some of its
regional counterparts, and it offered assistance to struggling economies.
Australia and Japan were the only two countries that contributed to all three
IMF rescue packages for Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea, and Canberra
additionally lobbied the IMF on Jakarta’s behalf (Wesley, 2001, pp 305–6).
The economic crisis had come on the heels of the rhetoric of Independent
Member of Parliament Pauline Hanson, who warned in 1996 that Australia
was ‘in danger of being swamped by Asians’ (‘Pauline Hanson’s’, 2016).
Hanson’s anti-Asian sentiments certainly unsettled Australia’s neighbours
(see, for example, Anggraeni, 1996; Ho, 1996). In this sense, the economic
crisis provided the John Howard government with an opportunity to counter
Hanson’s comments and bolster its credentials in the region (Scott, 1998,
pp 230–1; Milner, 2003, p 300). Prime Minister Howard made the observation
in 1998 that Australia was ‘more respected in Asia now than it was five years
ago because we’ve done well and we’ve been able to help’, while his foreign
minister, Alexander Downer, declared that it was the differences between
Australia and other regional economies that made it possible for the former
to ‘contribute strongly in seeing our region through these difficult times’ (as
cited in Dodson and Grattan, 1998; as cited in Ngoo, 1999). Interestingly,
Australia’s ability to withstand the Asian financial crisis ‘encouraged Australians
to identify less rather than more with “Asia”’, and prompted Australians ‘to
think on a global rather than regional scale’ (Milner, 2003, p 300). This was
93
a turnaround from its policy of the early 1990s, with Australia’s regret over
its past ‘fawning approach to Asia’ illustrated in the Howard administration’s
initial disinterest towards the EAS (Milner, 2003, p 300).
The Asian financial crisis and responses to the crisis reflected differentiation
within the region. Amid arguments about whether ‘Asian values’ or ‘western
values’ were superior, the failure of Asian economies to overcome the crisis
on their own skewed the debate in favour of western models of political
and economic development. To be sure, the conditions attached to the IMF
bailout packages, as well as the rejection of Japan’s Asian Monetary Fund
proposal by the IMF and Washington, also led some in the region to see the
need for an ‘East Asian’ modality of economic cooperation and integration.
The speed at which the financial crisis spread through the region ‘galvanized
[ASEAN] into deepening its integration and projecting its socialization and
managerial processes into Northeast Asia’ (Jones and Smith, 2007, p 148).
The extension of ASEAN-centric cooperation to include China, Japan and
South Korea had been in the works for some time, following the ‘acclimation’
of ASEAN member states to Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad’s
EAEC/EAEG concept (Terada, 2003, p 256). In 1997, the three Northeast
Asian countries were invited to participate in an ASEAN meeting, kicking
off the APT process.
It was clear, nevertheless, that for all the talk of a multipolar world, the
international system remained one that was stratified, with the US at the top
(He, 2008, p 507). The US was not only the biggest economy in the world
in the late 1990s; it maintained a GDP that was about twice as big as the
second largest economy –Japan –during that period (The World Bank,
2021a). Subsequently, it was the US and other western economic actors
that drove regional responses to the crisis. Kai He notes, moreover, that
US indifference towards the economic woes of the ASEAN member states
made the latter ‘aware of the danger of a unipolar world’ and they began
looking for ways to ‘reduce economic dependency towards the outside
powers, especially the US’ (He, 2008, p 507). The crisis also highlighted
China’s increasing economic power. Its economic growth had caught up
to Japan’s over the 1990s and 2000s, and its decision not to devalue its
currency during the financial turmoil contributed to the portrayal of it
as a responsible power in the international economic sector. In this sense,
the Asian financial crisis revealed and reinforced differentiation in regional
politics in both stratificatory and functional terms. Such differentiation was
deepened following the 9/11 attacks on the US.
9/11 attacks and US-led war on terror

On the morning of 11 September 2001, four commercial aircraft bound
for the US were hijacked. Two of the planes were intentionally flown into
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the north and south towers of the World Trade Center in New York City,
leading to their collapse. The third plane hit the Pentagon, while the fourth
crashed in Pennsylvania. The death toll numbered almost 3,000, making it
the deadliest terrorist attack on US soil. The attacks on the World Trade
Center (a symbol of US economic power) and the Pentagon (the base of US
military strength) were viewed as ‘an assault on institutions that represented
core US values’ (Murata, 2009, p 221). In the weeks that followed, US
investigation and intelligence agencies uncovered links between the hijackers
and al-Qaeda, an Islamist organization led by Osama bin Laden that was
based in Afghanistan. The fight against terrorism was thus framed, from
the US perspective, as the defence of ‘American nationhood’ and western
values against Islamic extremism and fundamentalism (Murata, 2009,
p 221). During a speech to Congress a week after the tragedy, US President
George W. Bush declared that every country across the world would have
to decide where their allegiances lay: ‘[e]‌ither you are with us or you are
with the terrorists’ (Bush, 2001). Subsequently, failing to secure the arrest
of Osama from the Taliban government, the US and a coalition of its allies
invaded Afghanistan in October 2001.
The 9/11 attacks had a profound impact on the US approach to its foreign
relations, including towards the Asia Pacific. At the first two APEC summits
following the attacks, for instance, Bush made terrorism a key agenda item
at the expense of the forum’s original economic and trade focus, reportedly
exasperating some regional leaders (Camroux and Okfen, 2004, p 165).
While the 9/11 attacks had suddenly catapulted counterterrorism to the
highest of US security interests, not all Asia Pacific countries shared this
concern. On the one hand, many Southeast Asian countries had been
combatting terrorism long before the attacks (Vicziany et al, 2004, p 19). On
the other hand, regional countries found themselves facing urgent economic
recovery, political stability and social development challenges following the
Asian financial crisis, leaving them little scope to intensify counterterrorism
cooperation (Lee, 2003, p 111). The complexity of US counterterrorism
strategy in the Asia Pacific was compounded for Muslim-majority countries
such as Indonesia and Malaysia, whose governments faced pressure from
domestic Islamist constituents to condemn what was perceived to be western-
led aggression on the Muslim world (Capie, 2004, pp 227–33).
Certainly, then Indonesian President Megawati had condemned the
‘brutal and indiscriminate attack’ on the US and committed to international
counterterrorism cooperation in the immediate aftermath of 9/1 1
(‘Indonesia’s Megawati’, 2001). Hardline Islamic groups in the country,
however, warned that US retaliation on Afghanistan would be ‘tantamount
to a crusade against Islam’ and threatened to attack the US embassy in
response (‘Indonesian Muslim’, 2001; Soetjipto, 2001). Anti-US protests
subsequently erupted. A survey conducted by the Pew Research Center in
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2002 found that 64 per cent of Indonesians polled opposed the US-led war
on terrorism while 49 per cent felt that US foreign policy did not take the
interests of others into account (Pew Research Center, 2002, p 60). Such
sentiments from Indonesian voters meant that Indonesia was constrained in its
counterterrorism cooperation with the US, even as it remained reliant on US
financial assistance for its post-crisis economic recovery. During negotiations
for a joint statement condemning the 9/11 attacks at the October 2001
APEC Summit, Indonesia (along with fellow Muslim-majority countries
Malaysia and Brunei) sought to omit references to Osama and US military
strikes on Afghanistan (Knox, 2001; ‘RI, post-Shanghai’, 2001). In this
sense, while 9/11 had elevated Indonesia’s importance to the US in the
context of the latter’s counterterrorism strategy, Indonesia was hesitant in
demonstrating full support for US attacks on Afghanistan (Smith, 2003,
pp 455–6). Nevertheless, as a leading Indonesian expert in foreign policy
pointed out, it was also clear that although the US ‘alone could not solve
all these new challenges’ including terrorism, it was ‘still the “primus inter
pares” among the big powers … because her participation and leadership
in many instances are requisites to finding the solution’ (Wanandi, 2008,
p 312). From this perspective, Washington remained the foremost actor in
global affairs.
In contrast to Indonesia’s wariness, Australia strongly backed US anti-terror
efforts and followed its major power ally into Afghanistan in October 2001.
The 9/11 attacks also shifted the focus of Australia’s security concerns, from
traditional interstate conflicts to transnational or stateless actors based in
areas with weak state governance (Wesley, 2007a, p 62). From Canberra’s
perspective, the global war on terrorism had implications for its near region,
which it started to regard as an ‘arc of instability’ (Dobell, 2007, p 86; Wesley,
2007a, p 62). This was due not just to terrorism, but also the socioeconomic
and political turmoil wreaked by the Asian financial crisis in Indonesia
and the violence surrounding East Timor’s fight for independence in the
late 1990s (Dobell, 2007, p 86). Additionally, Canberra’s intervention in
Jakarta’s policymaking on East Timor and the Australian leadership of the
International Force East Timor (INTERFET) to restore peace and security
in the country was perceived by Indonesia as distasteful and ‘arrogan[t]‌’
(Cotton, 2001, p 228; Goldsworthy, 2001, p 18). The 9/11 attacks deepened
the differences between Australia –as a member of the western world and a
US ally –and its Muslim neighbours. Following raids by Australian security
agencies on some Muslim homes in 2002, Mahathir said that Australia was
‘unsafe for Muslims’ and Megawati called on Australia to ‘not go overboard’
in their anti-terror campaign (‘Indonesian president’, 2002). Although
counterterrorism cooperation between Australia and some Southeast
Asian countries was strengthened in the wake of 9/11, Australia’s regional
relations remained troubled. Howard’s declaration of Australia’s right to take
96
pre-emptive action against terrorist threats in other countries, as well as his

agreement with an interviewer that Australia was the US’ ‘deputy sheriff’ in
the Asia Pacific, drew consternation from regional leaders (‘The reluctant’,
2005; Wesley, 2007a, pp 58–9). These developments and attitudes shaped
Australia’s dismissive approach towards the emerging regionalism of the time,
although Canberra was ultimately a founding member of the EAS in 2005.
Like Australia, South Korea pledged ‘unreserved support and cooperation’
for the US-led counterterrorism campaign, which materialized in Seoul’s
provision of a medical unit and transport to Washington’s war in Afghanistan
(‘President pledges’, 2001). South Korea’s attitude towards the global war
on terror, however, remained relatively ambivalent, similar to most other
East Asian countries that prioritized economic recovery and political
stability in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis. As Lee Shin-wha
further notes, Islam was not a major element in Northeast Asia’s dynamics,
except in the western provinces of China (Lee, 2003, p 107). Instead, South
Korea’s foremost concern arising from the 9/11 attacks and subsequent
US counterterror campaign was the impact on the inter-Korean peace
process. This was particularly so after Bush’s State of the Union address in
January 2002, in which he described North Korea, Iran and Iraq as forming
an ‘axis of evil’ that ‘threaten[ed] the peace of the world’ (Bush, 2002).
Observers pointed out that Washington had diverged from President Kim’s
reconciliatory ‘Sunshine policy’ towards North Korea, with Seoul wary that
Bush might be ‘bringing his crusade on terror to the Korean peninsula’ (‘Is
Bush’, 2002; see also Romei and Lunn, 2002). Such sentiments fanned
anti-US attitudes in South Korea, which were further inflamed when a US
military vehicle accidentally crushed two South Korean schoolgirls to death
in June 2002 and the soldiers in the vehicle were acquitted later that year.
Subsequently, the presidential election at the end of 2002 saw the victory
of Roh Moo-hyun, who said that he would not ‘kowtow to the Americans’
(as cited in Choe, 2002).
US supremacy and penchant for unilateralism were evident. Bush’s
statement that ‘the course of this nation does not depend on the decisions
of others’, backed up by US actions in Afghanistan and, later, Iraq, were
reflective of such unilateralism (Bush, 2003). In quantitative terms, the gap in
defence spending between the US and the rest of the countries was sizable.
In 2001, for instance, US military expenditure exceeded the collective
spending of the next 15 countries (Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute [SIPRI], 2021). US ability to project military power beyond its
shores also continued to be something that not many states could match.
Charles Krauthammer argues that the 9/11 attacks deepened this asymmetry
of power by demonstrating ‘heretofore latent American military power’ and
the US ability to recover quickly from the attacks, as well as ‘accelerate[d]‌
the realignment of the current great powers’ – including China and
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Russia –behind the US (Krauthammer, 2002/03, pp 7–8). To be sure, US

soft power and liberal democratic values were not accepted unquestioningly
across the globe. However, even though some Asian countries differed from
the US in values and priorities, the broad consensus was that the US was
the most powerful country in the world and its constructive engagement
with the region was important for stability. Even Malaysian leaders, who
were often wary of ‘unrivalled US hegemony, and the purposes to which
its preponderant power is put (or not)’, had ‘long recognised that the US
military presence was indispensable for regional stability’ (Nesadurai, 2004,
p 24; Heng, 2015, p 406). Similarly, Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen
in 2002 described both China and the US as ‘great powers with world
influence’ and highlighted their ‘common responsibility … in preserving
regional and world peace’ (‘Chinese Vice-Premier’, 2002).
Notwithstanding continued US dominance in the region, responses to the
US-led counterterror campaign clearly underscored the differing priorities
and approaches between the US and Australia on the one hand, and several
Asia Pacific countries –such as Indonesia and South Korea –on the other.
While Australia demonstrated its staunch support of the US strategy, others
were ‘rankled’ by US threats of ‘“regime change” and “pre-emption” on
sovereign states where it deemed necessary’ (Pablo-Baviera, 2007, p 235).
The inclination of the US towards unilateralism and its apparent disregard
of the domestic sensitivities in some regional countries deepened the divide
surrounding its counterterror strategy. Along with the disappointing western
responses to the Asian financial crisis, the US approach to counterterrorism
in the Asia Pacific thus contributed to a rising call for the establishment of a
high-level regional multilateral platform that would focus on the concerns
of ‘Asian’ countries.
Rise of China and Sino-Japanese rivalry for regional leadership

The emergence of the Sino-Japanese rivalry for regional leadership could
be attributed to the economic, military and political rise of China alongside
Japan’s stagnating growth (Calder, 2006, p 129; Yahuda, 2014, pp 82–3).
In the post-World War II period, Japan’s economy underwent a period of
rapid growth, and by the 1980s it had become the second biggest economy
in the world. This allowed it to establish a strong economic and political
presence in Southeast Asia. Japan became a dialogue partner of ASEAN in
1977, and its trade, investments and aid were crucial for Southeast Asia’s
socioeconomic development (Singh et al, 2017, p 107). In addition to
being the only Asian country in the G7, Japan had also made important
contributions to early attempts at regional cooperation including in the
PECC and APEC. Japan’s status as a regional economic leader was affirmed
by Prime Minister Mahathir’s designation of it as the ‘first among equals’
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in the EAEC (Mohamad, 1995, p 37). Japan’s leadership role in Southeast

Asia, however, became increasingly challenged by domestic economic and
political problems, as well as a rising China. In the 1990s, Japan experienced
a prolonged recession. Its year-on-year GDP growth fell from 6.8 per cent
in 1988, to a low of −1.3 per cent in 1998 (The World Bank, 2021b).
Subsequently for the next decade, Japan’s annual economic growth ranged
from −0.3 to 2.8 per cent; in contrast, China’s annual GDP growth rate over
the same time period ranged from 7.7 to 14.2 per cent (The World Bank,
2021b). Predictions at the turn of the century highlighted expectations
that China could overtake Japan as the world’s second largest economy by
2020 –this ultimately occurred much earlier, in 2010 (Richardson, 2001;
The World Bank, 2021a). Such developments marked a transition period
where China rose to supplant Japan’s position as the dominant Asian power.
While Prime Minister Junichirō Koizumi’s (2001–06) shifts in defence
policy enhanced Japan’s role in international security post-9/11, its pacifist
constitution limited reforms (Tang, 2007, p 25; Singh, 2013, pp 89–93).
Meanwhile, China began spending more on defence, and its military
expenditure was estimated to have exceeded Japan’s from the mid-2000s
(SIPRI, 2021). Beijing also embarked on a naval expansion programme that
included the purchase and refurbishment of what would eventually become
its first aircraft carrier (Myers, 2018). In October 2003, China became the
third country in the world –after the US and the former Soviet Union –to
launch a manned space mission, which a Japanese media outlet described as ‘a
major step toward realizing its national goal of becoming a great power both
economically and militarily’ (Saeki, 2003). The instability in bilateral ties was
fuelled by historical and political disagreements between the two countries,
arising mainly from past Japanese invasion and occupation of Chinese
territories, as well as the sovereignty dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.
Such tensions were reflected prominently in President Jiang Zemin’s visit to
Japan in 1998, during which the two countries –despite initially positive
expectations –failed to agree on matters relating to their wartime history
and both leaders subsequently declined to sign the joint statement.
From the early 2000s, Chinese scholars and officials also started promoting
the idea of China’s ‘peaceful rise’ premised on the country’s economic
development alongside participation in economic globalization, institutional
innovation, as well as the formation of mutually beneficial relationships with
other countries (Zheng, 2002, pp 5–6). While the phrase was later modified
to ‘peaceful development’ to dial down its confrontational tone, the concept’s
substantive elements and vision of China as a future major power endured.
The dynamics between a rising power vis-à-vis a stagnating power contributed
towards the Sino-Japanese strategic competition for regional leadership.
One aspect of this rivalry manifested in the engagement of China and
Japan with regional multilateral institutions. Amid deepening economic ties
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with ASEAN member states, China became the first country to propose
an FTA with ASEAN in 2000, and two years later both sides concluded
a framework agreement that called for the FTA’s establishment within
10 years. The announcement of an ASEAN-China FTA ‘came as a major
shock to Japan’ and Tokyo proposed its own ASEAN-Japan FTA in 2002
(Chung, 2011, p 414). In 2003, China reached another milestone in its
regional relations by becoming the first dialogue partner of ASEAN to sign
the TAC. Subsequently, Japan –which had thus far refrained from signing
the TAC due to concerns about its ability to promote human rights and
democracy in the region –acceded to the treaty in 2004 (Terada, 2006,
pp 12–13). Beyond investing in ASEAN-led processes, China and Japan
also attempted to institutionalize their preferred composition of the region.
China worked actively to strengthen ‘East Asian’ cooperation within the
APT framework. On the other hand, Japan was more inclined towards an
‘Asia Pacific’ conceptualization of the region that included the US, so as to
balance China’s expanding influence in the region.
Being sandwiched between China and Japan was certainly not an
unfamiliar situation for South Korea, given its history and geography. The
growth of China’s economy and its integration into the global economy
was accompanied by a rise in bilateral trade with South Korea. By 2000,
South Korea’s trade with China accounted for 9.4 per cent of its total
trade volume –an increase from 2.1 per cent in 1990. Over the same
period, South Korea’s trade with the US and Japan dropped from 26.9
per cent to 20.1 per cent, and 23.1 per cent to 15.7 per cent respectively
(ASEAN-Korea Centre, 2011, p 46). Analysts highlight that the South
Korean public had tended to view China favourably since the normalization
of diplomatic ties, although there were some concerns –especially from
the policy elite –about the potentially destabilizing effects of China’s rise
(Chung, 2001, pp 783, 785–6; Han, 2007, p 12). Meanwhile, despite the
landmark accord in October 1998 in which President Kim and Japan’s
Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi pledged to ‘squarely face the past’ and
‘build solid, good-neighborly and friendly relations in the twenty-first
century’, historical disagreements continued to frustrate bilateral relations
(‘Japan-Republic of Korea’, 1998). In the late 1990s and early 2000s,
South Korea’s attitude towards China, Japan and the Sino-Japanese rivalry
was also linked to Kim’s Sunshine policy on North Korea. Compared to
Tokyo and Washington, Beijing was more supportive of the engagement-
oriented Sunshine policy (Rozman, 2007, pp 203–4; Chung, 2008,
p 165). As Gilbert Rozman observes, the Japan–South Korea–US ‘alliance
triangle … reced[ed]’ in favour of a closer Sino-South Korea relationship
regarding North Korea (Rozman, 2008, p 191). Ultimately, this had the
effect of reinforcing China’s role as a major player on the Korean peninsula,
dovetailing with its rise on the global stage.
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Australia similarly began to recognize the growing strength and influence

of China in the region, even as Japan remained one of its closest economic
and security partners –the latter particularly after Tokyo’s defence reforms
post-9/11. ‘From an Australian perspective’, David Walton writes, ‘the
emergence of adversarial camps in Asia based on rising tensions between
Japan and China ha[d]‌the potential to polarize the region and disrupt trade
flows’ (Walton, 2008, p 81). Australia’s economic relations with China had
grown rapidly since the early 2000s and by 2005 China was Australia’s
second largest trade partner after Japan (Zhang, 2007, p 101). Canberra
also began to regard Beijing as a constructive actor in international affairs
(Zhang, 2007, p 104). In its 2003 White Paper on foreign and trade policy,
the Howard administration acknowledged that China’s rise would be ‘the
most important factor shaping Asia’s future’ and was thus eager to strengthen
the relationship (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia, 2003,
p 79). In this context, Canberra was understandably not keen to get caught
in the middle of Sino-Japanese rivalry even if China’s ‘shadow … loom[ed]
over the bilateral relationship’ between Australia and Japan (Walton, 2007,
p 78). Despite establishing the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue with Japan
and the US in 2002, Australia’s motivations at the time were thus more to
socialize Tokyo and Washington into constructive roles in regional security
and address transnational challenges, rather than solely to balance China
(Medcalf, 2008, p 27). This positivity towards China shifted visibly in the
late 2000s under Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s administration. Among other
incidents, Australia’s flagging of China’s military modernization as a ‘cause
for concern’ as well as Beijing’s arrest of four executives from Australian
mining company Rio Tinto on bribery and espionage charges sparked a
downturn in bilateral relations (Department of Defence, Australia, 2009, p
34). As the chapter will later discuss, it was in the context of these evolving
circumstances that the Australian government sought to (re)shape the regional
institutional architecture.
As a beneficiary of China’s economic assistance during the Asian financial
crisis and given the disappointment over Japan’s failure to follow through
on its Asian Monetary Fund proposal, Jakarta was conscious of the evolving
Sino-Japanese dynamics in the region (Shekhar, 2018, pp 209–10). It was
evident, for instance, that although Japan remained the biggest economy
in the region (the US notwithstanding), this standing was increasingly
challenged by China’s rise (Subianto, 2003, p 7). Consequently, while
Indonesia–Japan relations remained consistently strong and anchored in
economics, the post-Suharto period also saw active Indonesian engagement
with China, as bilateral trade, political exchanges and military interactions
grew (Smith, 2000, p 513; Sukma, 2009, p 596; Shekhar, 2018, pp 208–9).
Rizal Sukma observes that since 1998, ‘[m]‌ost Indonesians no longer
see China as a threat to national security’ –a reference to past fears of
101
communism –and instead regard the Northeast Asian power ‘more as both an
economic opportunity and a challenge’ (Sukma, 2009, p 603). Nevertheless,
even as Indonesia became ‘more comfortable and confident toward China’ at
the bilateral level, there remained ‘a degree of wariness’ in terms of China’s
regional ambitions (Sukma, 2009, p 607). Jusuf Wanandi observed in 2000
that China’s journey towards ‘great power’ status had ‘become a regional
(and even a global) problem’, and urged Beijing to exercise responsibility
in its foreign policy (Wanandi, 2000, p 373). From Jakarta’s perspective, the
Sino-Japanese rivalry for regional leadership was a matter of concern for the
potential instability that it could bring about (Wanandi, 2000, pp 373–4).
Some Indonesian intellectuals also noted the importance of US regional
presence –as the ‘existing single superpower’ –in reining in the ambitions
of other regional powers (Wanandi, 2006, p 347; see also Rezasyah, 2004,
pp 101–2; Wanandi, 2004b, p 110). Indonesia ultimately sought to enmesh
major powers in ASEAN-led institutional arrangements and norms, in order
to commit them to Southeast Asia’s stability.
If the US was the undisputed major power in the region during this
time, Japan and China followed closely behind as second-tier powers of
the region. This was evident not just based on economic and military
indicators, but also in their respective approaches towards their Asia Pacific
neighbours and regional multilateralism. While Japan’s leadership status in
the region was comparatively long established and it would continue to
retain its role as a significant actor, the Bush administration’s labelling of
China as a ‘strategic competitor’ had the effect of designating the latter as an
equal to the US (Storey, 2000). Moreover, China’s economic and political
rise and the perceptions of it emerging as a responsible and constructive
major power gradually became recognized by regional actors. In response,
countries such as Australia, Indonesia and South Korea sought to expand
and deepen engagement with China. In this sense, even as the US remained
stratificatorily and functionally distinct as the global hegemon, China and
Japan were also regarded as regional leaders that provided public goods and
came close behind Washington in terms of capabilities and influence. One
of the consequences of the Sino-Japanese rivalry for regional leadership was
that ASEAN –as a neutral organization between the two major powers –
became firmly entrenched in the driver’s seat of regional community building
and, specifically, the EAS. ASEAN’s central role in the regional architecture
during this time was complemented by the trend of rising ASEAN-led
multilateralism –a topic that the next sub-section focuses on.
Proliferation of ASEAN-centred multilateralism

While ASEAN had been formed in 1967, its institutional development was
relatively slow-going in its early years. ASEAN’s first summit was held a decade
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after its founding, in 1976, with the then five members (Indonesia, Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) acceding to the TAC that outlined the
‘ASEAN Way’ of cooperation. Although ASEAN ‘bolstered its international
credibility for its role in opposing Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia’ in
the 1980s, it was only from the 1990s that ASEAN’s institutional structures
began to take shape into today’s familiar form (Acharya, 2017, p 275). The
Singapore Declaration of 1992 marked a turning point for ASEAN –then
comprising six members with Brunei as the latest addition. With the end of
Cold War tensions, ASEAN declared ‘a new will to move to a higher plane
of cooperation’ and ‘to place [itself] at the center of the region’s post-Cold
War strategic architecture’ (Beeson, 2009, p 32; Weatherbee, 2009, p 102).
The ASEAN FTA agreement was signed in 1992, and the ARF met for
the first time in 1994 to ‘foster constructive dialogue and consultation on
political and security issues’ (ASEAN, n.d.). Subsequently between 1995 and
1999, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia joined ASEAN, making it a
ten-member organization. In 1997, ASEAN issued the ASEAN Vision 2020,
which called for ‘a concert of Southeast Asian nations, outward looking,
living in peace, stability and prosperity, bonded together in partnership in
dynamic development and in a community of caring societies’ by 2020
(ASEAN, 1997). The Hanoi Plan of Action for realizing the vision was put
into place the following year.
Despite these milestones, developments in the late 1990s also posed
challenges for ASEAN. A prominent example was the Asian financial crisis,
which resulted in the turn inwards of several ASEAN member states that were
struggling to cope with the effects. This included Indonesia –traditionally
regarded as the de facto leader of ASEAN –which had to focus its attention
more on the socioeconomic and political problems within the country.
Jakarta would only resume its leadership of ASEAN in the early 2000s,
and particularly during its chairing of ASEAN in 2003. The expansion of
ASEAN to include Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam also raised some
important questions for the organization’s future. While the gaps between
the newer and older ASEAN member states have been played down by
former ASEAN Secretary-General Rodolfo C. Severino, he nevertheless
acknowledges that the enlargement led to concerns about the creation
of a ‘two-tier ASEAN’ split between the six older and more developed
members, versus the four newer and less developed members (Severino,
2006, p 67). Several observers further highlighted that ASEAN cooperation
and cohesion could run into problems given that the newer member states
did not necessarily share similar political goals, threat perceptions or norms
with the older ASEAN members (Gates and Mya, 2001; Acharya, 2014,
pp 111–14).
In the early 2000s, ASEAN-led initiatives to enhance regional integration
and community building among the ten member states were put
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forward –first by Singapore for the economic sector, followed by Indonesia

for the security sector and the Philippines for the sociocultural sector.
Subsequently, a key development in ASEAN’s regional integration efforts was
the adoption of the ASEAN Concord II (also known as the Bali Concord
II) in 2003, which, for the first time, detailed a framework for an ASEAN
Community. The ASEAN Community would be built upon three pillars,
namely, ASEAN Security Community (later renamed ASEAN Political-
Security Community), ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN Socio-
Cultural Community. The ASEAN Concord II reaffirmed the ‘fundamental
importance’ of ASEAN principles, including non-interference in another
state’s domestic affairs and consensus in decision making (ASEAN, 2003).
These initiatives went some way in rejuvenating ASEAN’s role as the central
organization in the regional multilateral architecture.
The notion of ASEAN centrality in the Asia Pacific was also strengthened,
as the association grew to become the hub of overlapping and multi-layered
networks and arrangements that facilitated regional cooperation. In addition
to forums that were exclusively for the ten member states, ASEAN also
established a series of dialogue and cooperative platforms that involved other
Asia Pacific countries, including the aforementioned ARF and APT, as well
as the various ‘ASEAN Plus One’ meetings with its dialogue partners. The
APT arrangement, especially, was targeted at ‘a bigger vision of building an
East Asian community’ based on economic, sociocultural and non-traditional
security cooperation (Lee, 2015, p 175). Between 2003 and 2005, several
of ASEAN’s dialogue partners also acceded to its TAC –a condition for
participating in the EAS. ASEAN-centric platforms and processes operate
according to principles of the ‘ASEAN Way’ –which prioritizes process over
results, non-interference in domestic affairs and consensus building –not
all of which have sat well with some of its extra-regional partners, although
they have generally indicated their commitment. Moreover, given that
ASEAN comprises ten of the smallest or weakest countries in the region, it
is surprising that bigger and more powerful countries have been happy to
support –at the very least in rhetorical terms –ASEAN’s approach towards
multilateral cooperation. Some observers, however, have argued that it is
precisely ASEAN’s weaknesses that have made the other powers comfortable
with the notion of ASEAN centrality in the regional architecture (Kausikan,
2017; McCarthy, 2017). Regardless, through the 1990s and mid-2000s,
ASEAN evolved to become a central aspect of Asia Pacific multilateralism.
From Indonesia’s vantage point, a strong ASEAN serving as the hub
of regional multilateralism was certainly in its interest. Then Foreign
Minister Hassan Wirajuda proclaimed on several occasions that ASEAN
was the cornerstone of Jakarta’s foreign policy (‘New ministers’, 2001;
‘President Megawati’, 2001). As Indonesia emerged from the depths of its
socioeconomic and political problems and sought to bolster its international
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stature, ASEAN was a natural platform for the Southeast Asian country
to amplify its influence and reassert its traditional leadership role in the
region. This was evident during its tenure as ASEAN chair in 2003. As
chair, Jakarta garnered agreement for the Bali Concord II which called for
the establishment of an ASEAN Community. Indonesia was instrumental
in putting forth the concept of an ASEAN Security Community, which it
envisioned would deepen non-traditional security cooperation and ensure
that Indonesia would not be the only democracy in a neighbourhood of
mostly non-democratic governments (Unidjaja, 2003b; Natalegawa, 2018,
p 206). In the wake of the Asian financial turmoil, the East Timor crisis,
and what officials perceived as a divided ASEAN response to the US-led
global war on terror, the Indonesian government was keen to (re)claim its
primus inter pares status in ASEAN and Southeast Asia by leading the way to
greater regional stability (Timberlake, 2003; Unidjaja, 2003a; Weatherbee,
2005, pp 150–1). Indonesia was strongly supportive of ASEAN ‘being in
the “driving seat” in shaping the region’s political, diplomatic and economic
architecture’ beyond Southeast Asia, although there were some concerns on
whether ASEAN could hold its own against bigger powers (Natalegawa,
2018, p 70; see also Subianto, 2003, p 9). Describing the APT as ‘one of
the most significant of the ASEAN-led processes’, former Foreign Minister
Marty Natalegawa underscored ASEAN’s role in ‘plant[ing] the habit of
cooperation … where none had existed before’ –a reference to the sensitive
relations among China, Japan and South Korea (Natalegawa, 2018, pp 78–9).
In many aspects, the elevation of ASEAN and its associated processes in the
regional architecture was thus embraced by Indonesia.
South Korea has been a generally passive actor in broad Asia Pacific
multilateralism, although there have been instances of proactivity –the
EAVG being one example. Seoul’s passivity could be attributed to two main
reasons. First, South Korea is not an ASEAN member state, and by default
is often regarded as an external partner in ASEAN-centred multilateralism.
Second, South Korea is compelled by geostrategic considerations in its
foreign policy. Given the fragile relations among China, Japan and South
Korea, as well as the periodic flare-up of tensions on the Korean peninsula,
Seoul’s priorities had been unsurprisingly focused on Northeast Asia rather
than the wider Asia Pacific where ASEAN played a more central role.
Several scholars observe that compared to ASEAN-Japan and ASEAN-China
relations, ASEAN-South Korea ties have appeared ‘relatively neglected’ on
both sides (Ho, 2007, p 1; see also Hernandez, 2007, pp 41–3). To be sure,
South Korea’s relations with ASEAN and its member states became more
substantial post-Asian financial crisis (Lee, 2015, pp 181–2). The gathering
of the APT leaders which started informally from 1997, for instance,
provided a sideline opportunity for ASEAN and South Korea to hold annual
summits –something that Lee Jaehyon argues ‘would not have been easy’ to
105
do otherwise (Lee, 2015, p 182). As a dialogue partner, Seoul was supportive

of ASEAN-centred multilateralism in the late 1990s and early 2000s. South
Korea launched discussions for an FTA with ASEAN in 2003, and a year
later established a ‘comprehensive cooperation partnership’ with ASEAN
and acceded to the TAC. The entry of North Korea into the ARF in 2000
was also welcomed by South Korea given its Sunshine policy at the time
(Pandey, 2000). Seoul’s interest in broader regional multilateralism, however,
waned after the Kim Dae-jung administration as its foreign policy returned
to focus on what it regarded as the ‘big four’ –China, Japan, Russia and
the US –and North Korea.
Australia was arguably even more institutionally distant to ASEAN than
South Korea was in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Although Australia was
ASEAN’s oldest dialogue partner, it was not a participant in the nascent
APT and its role in the East Asian community-building process was less
prominent. The Howard administration’s ‘Asia first but not Asia only’
rhetoric –coupled with its ‘uncritical embrace of the American alliance’
and scepticism of regional multilateralism –further deepened its divisions
with its regional neighbours (Sheridan, 2002; Bell, 2007, p 47; see also
Cotton and Ravenhill, 2007, pp 8, 10). ‘[B]‌y 2001’, Michael Wesley writes,
‘Australia faced probably its highest ever level of resistance from ASEAN states
determined to block it from membership of broader regional institutions’
(Wesley, 2007a, p 66). Canberra’s efforts to strengthen economic integration
with ASEAN and through APEC also hit temporary roadblocks (Wesley,
2007a, pp 55–7). Amid this downturn in relations, Foreign Minister Downer
advanced a distinction between ‘practical’ and ‘cultural’ regionalism, and
argued that Australia’s relations with Asia were rooted more in the former
than the latter (as cited in Kelly, 2000). In what Wesley aptly describes as the
‘the Howard paradox’, however, the then prime minister ‘ma[de] Australia
a member of every regional grouping it has sought to join’ and attained
‘a level of Asian engagement his great rival [Paul] Keating never achieved’
(Wesley, 2007b, p 23). Under Howard’s successor, Kevin Rudd, Canberra
returned to explicitly advocating for a greater role for Australia to shape
regional multilateralism. Rudd’s proposal for an APC is discussed later in
this chapter. Nevertheless, in stark contrast to Indonesia and South Korea,
Australia’s relations with ASEAN-centred multilateralism continued to be
dogged by identity issues and its unequivocal followership of its ‘great and
powerful friend’, the US (Hartcher, 2003).
As reflected in the discussion here, another form of differentiation that
became increasingly evident from the late 1990s to mid-2000s involved
regional organizations in the Asia Pacific. ASEAN’s attempts to place
itself as the central organization in the regional architecture and the
acknowledgement of ASEAN centrality from other actors elevated it to a
superordinate position in Asia Pacific multilateralism. Developments such
106
as the Asian financial crisis, 9/11 attacks and the Sino-Japanese rivalry also
had an impact on the rising ASEAN-centred multilateralism. These events
stressed the necessity for an ASEAN-led response towards sources of regional
instability. If ASEAN was considered the premier multilateral organization
in the region during the time period under study, then Indonesia –as the
first among equals in the organization –was logically the leader of ASEAN-
centred multilateralism. Non-ASEAN countries, such as Australia and
South Korea, were regarded more as external partners to the association.
Nevertheless, with the push for East Asian community building, Seoul was
arguably viewed as a more engaging partner than Canberra. For the time
period covered by this chapter, ASEAN was thus a core element of regional
multilateralism, and the institutions and practices it put into place were
crucial to the formation of the EAS.
Taking collectively the trends and developments in this section, it is clear
that stratificatory and functional differentiation were present in the Asia
Pacific through the late 1990s and mid-2000s. The focus was, on the one
hand, on delineating the major powers and their obligations, vis-à-vis the
rest of the regional states, and on the other, highlighting the prominent role
of ASEAN in the regional multilateral architecture. The US continued to
be the foremost major power and public goods provider in the region, with
several of its regional allies –most conspicuously Australia –supporting
its continued primacy. Alongside its economic and political rise, China’s
profile as an emerging power in East Asia gradually became recognized by
regional actors. Its regional leadership role also came to the fore when it
went head-to-head with Japan in engaging with ASEAN institutions. At
this point, then, an Asia Pacific stratification of states would have the US as
the number one power, followed by China and Japan (on relatively equal
terms), and then the rest of the regional countries.
This section has discussed four key developments in the Asia Pacific from
the late 1990s to mid-2000s that set the context for the formative days of
the EAS. The Asian financial crisis, along with the frustrating responses from
western countries and international institutions towards the crisis, highlighted
the need to strengthen cooperation between Southeast and Northeast Asia.
Likewise, the evolution of US strategy towards the Asia Pacific following the
9/11 attacks also drew attention to the differences in interests and priorities
between western countries –such as the US and Australia –and East Asian
ones. Together with China’s rise and the consequent Sino-Japanese rivalry for
regional leadership, as well as intensifying ASEAN-centred multilateralism,
these developments spurred regional countries towards establishing a regional
platform that would be to the benefit of ‘East Asian’ countries. Against this
background, Australia, Indonesia and South Korea took the opportunity
to accentuate their necessity and relevance in the region through the EAS
and its associated initiatives.
107

This section examines the behaviour of South Korea, Indonesia and
Australia which contributed towards the emergence of the EAS as well
as shaped its subsequent form and membership composition. Amid the
growing sentiment towards ‘East Asian’ regionalism and community
building, China’s rise and its increasingly prominent regional role, as well
as the rapid institutional development of ASEAN, all three middle powers
sought to ensure the formation of an EAS that would accord them a seat
at the regional table. This was not just in comparison to the major powers.
For Australia and South Korea, it was also about elevating their roles vis-
à-vis ASEAN. In addition, Australia was also concerned about its regional
(or ‘East Asian’) belonging. The process of establishing the EAS, and
the platform itself, offered Canberra, Jakarta and Seoul the opportunity
to diffuse power and influence towards themselves. In leveraging the
conducive regional dynamics of the time, their efforts were also facilitated
by distinctive attributes associated with their ‘middlepowerness’. While
the specific qualities (and behaviour) of each middle power varied, in
general these included their non-threatening profiles, reputation for
institution building, and credibility as committed supporters of regional
multilateralism. The following discussion is primarily descriptive, with
most of the theoretical analysis taking place in Chapter 6. Let us begin
with South Korea’s EAVG initiative.
South Korea and the East Asia Vision Group

South Korea’s formative role in the EAS is typically traced to its convening
of the EAVG that was proposed in 1998, and the follow-up East Asia Study
Group (EASG) that was established in 2001. Seoul’s activism in Asia Pacific
multilateralism during this time was due to the visionary leadership of
President Kim Dae-jung, as well as conducive circumstances in the region
for promoting closer economic integration and community building (Han,
2018, pp 161–2). Following the presentation of the EAVG and EASG reports
at the respective APT meetings, however, South Korea’s activism in Asia
Pacific multilateralism diminished. This could be attributed, domestically, to
a change in its government in 2003 and, externally, to the intensification of
rivalry between Beijing and Tokyo. Nevertheless, South Korea’s behaviour
regarding the EAVG and EASG offered ‘an intellectual launch pad for the
EAS’ (Cho and Park, 2014, p 584). This sub-section examines the factors
that motivated South Korea’s EAVG proposal, as well as the circumstances
that surrounded the convening of the EAVG and subsequent EASG. Before
proceeding, however, the section first explores South Korea’s middle power
status during this time.
108
In the late 1990s, South Korea was ranked fairly high up in terms of
economic resources among regional countries. Other than in 1998 when its
GDP was overtaken by India and Australia –presumably due to the Asian
financial crisis –South Korea had consistently ranked fourth in the Asia
Pacific for GDP from 1997 to 2001, coming in just below the US, Japan and
China (The World Bank, 2021a). At the global level, South Korea’s economy
ranged from being the 11th to 15th largest (The World Bank, 2021a). Within
two years of the start of the Asian financial crisis, South Korea was on the
road to recovery (Lee, 1999, p 361). Building on its economic capabilities,
South Korea also adopted and projected a middle power identity. As an
article in The Korea Times pointed out in 2002:
Korea is a middle power country in the world. It has the 13th largest
economy in the world, with a per-capita GDP approaching $10,000
again. It is a member of the well-to-do countries club, the OECD
[Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development]. At
the UN General Assembly last year, Korea’s Foreign Affairs-Trade
Minister Han Seung-soo was named the president. This means the
international community acknowledges Korea’s status and economic
power. (‘Is Korea’, 2002)
Unlike in the late 1980s and early 1990s when explicit mentions of South
Korea’s middle power status by its government officials on the international
stage were rare, under the Kim administration (1998–2003) the country’s
diplomats, officials and media were much more open about South Korea’s
capacity and role as a middle power in regional and international affairs
(‘Cabinet endorses’, 1999; Kim, 1999). This narrative was accompanied
by the notion that given South Korea’s rise to global prominence, the US
ally should now pursue a more independent foreign policy (Choi, 1999;
‘South Korea to’, 1999). The decision to dispatch peacekeeping troops to
East Timor in 1999 as part of a UN contingent, for instance, was partly
rationalized in terms of South Korea’s profile as a middle power that could
contribute towards regional and global security (‘Cabinet endorses’, 1999).
South Korea’s middle power status was also affirmed by other actors,
including then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (‘Kim attends’, 2000).
Nevertheless, Seoul acknowledged the limitations of being ‘a middle power
situated between the world’s most powerful nations’ (Hong, 1998). Foreign
Minister Hong Soon-young cautioned that South Korea ‘must not presume
to be a main player in the global theatre’ and should ‘seek a “life-size”
diplomacy befitting [its] national resources and strength’ (Hong, 1998; Choi,
1999). As a ‘trusted’ middle power, South Korea could build a ‘wide range
of multifaceted diplomatic relations with countries across the world’, project
a ‘responsible voice … to actively take part in the cooperative projects to
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nurture the abilities of the developing countries’, and contribute towards

‘establishing international rules and norms’ (‘History repeats’, 2000; Lee,
2000; Han, 2001). These expectations that South Korea had of its foreign
policy behaviour were in part premised on the idea that having received aid
and assistance from others in the past, the country was now able to ‘repay
the debt’ to the international community (‘Is Korea’, 2002). Considering the
constraints facing South Korea’s foreign policy, multilateralism was viewed
as an opportunity for Seoul ‘to have greater leverage in the international
arena’ (Han, 2001). Within the Asia Pacific, Kim’s EAVG proposal was
associated with South Korea’s middle power diplomacy as well (‘ROK
welcomes’, 2000).
The idea to form an EAVG was raised by Kim during an APT meeting in
December 1998. In Kim’s words, the EAVG was meant to ‘study concrete
ways to nurture East Asia into a single community of cooperation, serving
as the basis for the countries of the region to start the discussion on the
related issues in earnest’ (as cited in Severino, 2006, p 267). The group would
comprise only private citizens, including economic experts, from China,
Japan, South Korea and the ASEAN member states (‘Kim suggests’, 1998).
A confluence of various factors had prompted this suggestion. The first
was the coming to power of Kim himself. Kim had assumed the presidency
in February 1998, and the December meeting where he made his EAVG
proposal was his first ASEAN meeting. South Korea’s regional activism
during his term was ‘very much linked to [his] own personal leadership and
his vision for East Asia’ (Vio, 2015, p 139). Shin-wha Lee, the EAVG chair’s
advisor, also observed that ‘[a]‌mong regional leaders, [Kim] was the one to
express his perceptions of the region in the most systematic manner’ (Lee,
2008, p 238). In fact, Kim had already conceptualized such a vision for an
East Asian regionalism since the 1960s (Lee, 2008, p 238).
The timing was also opportune. Following the Asian financial crisis, Kim
saw a chance to boost South Korea’s regional status by assuming a leadership
role in East Asian regionalism (Han, 2018, p 161). The formation of the
EAVG was to address the region’s inability ‘to mount an effective collective
response’ to the economic meltdown, and in proposing the EAVG, Kim
stressed the necessity of establishing a forum in which the APT states could
‘seek ways of injecting vitality’ into the region (as cited in ‘Kim suggests’,
1998; Kim, 2006, p 11). For South Korea, the financial crisis underlined
the importance of its relations with its neighbouring countries, and the
EAVG was meant to offer recommendations on enhancing the resilience
of relations among regional countries, as well as strengthening economic
linkages between Southeast and Northeast Asia. Due to chronic mutual
distrust, neither China nor Japan would accept the other taking a leadership
role in the regionalism process (Cheong, 2008, p 64). Similarly, as Inkyo
Cheong notes, it would also have been ‘difficult for the ASEAN countries
110
that were affected by the financial crisis to play any role in the international
arena’ (Cheong, 2008, p 65). The proactive approach of South Korea, and of
Kim in particular, in ‘set[ting] the future direction of East Asia cooperation’,
was thus accepted by other regional countries (‘ASEAN praises’, 2001; see
also Severino, 2006, p 309).
Kim admits, however, that Southeast Asian countries had initially been
‘apprehensive’ that the EAVG was ‘aimed at expanding the influence of
Northeast Asian countries in Southeast Asia’ (Kim, 2006, p 11; see also
Chalermpalanupap, 2005, p 71). It was an unsurprising assessment, given
that the APT process itself would not be formally institutionalized until
1999, and that China, Japan and South Korea together had a GDP that
was around ten times larger than all of ASEAN combined (The World
Bank, 2021a). Even the group’s name –formulated as ‘East Asia’ rather
than ‘ASEAN Plus’ –suggested a distancing from the ASEAN-centric
multilateralism that characterized most Asia Pacific-wide platforms at the
time. Subsequently, former South Korean Foreign Minister Han Sung-joo
travelled to regional capitals to seek their cooperation in convening the
EAVG as soon as possible (Tanaka, 2017, p 205). The EAVG met for the first
time in October 1999 in Seoul, with ‘two knowledgeable private citizens’
as members from each of the APT countries (Tanaka, 2017, pp 377–8).
Members agreed to select Han as the chair of the group (Tanaka, 2017, p
378). The South Korean chair assumed an agenda-shaping role, and was
able to effectively ‘harmonis[e]‌different policy opinions’ and ‘coordinate …
policy recommendations’ (Choo, 2009, p 99). The EAVG report, issued in
2001, listed 22 key recommendations to realize the East Asian community
(EAVG, 2001). At the APT Summit that same year, Kim took the lead in
presenting the EAVG report and ‘Korea proposed six cooperation projects in
three sectors, including the conversion of the ASEAN+3 Summit Meeting
into the “East Asia Summit Meeting” and the establishment of an “East Asian
Forum” to be composed of East Asian governments and civilians’ (Cheong,
2008, p 76). Most significant for our purpose was the call for the ‘evolution
of the annual summit meetings of ASEAN+3 into the East Asian Summit’
(EAVG, 2001, p 17).
To examine the EAVG’s proposals, Kim convened the EASG in 2001.
Unlike the former, the EASG was an inter-governmental platform. It
comprised one senior official from each of the APT countries, as well as
the Secretary-General of ASEAN. Its objectives, as stated in its Terms of
Reference, were specifically to ‘assess the recommendations of the EAVG’ and
‘explore the idea and implications of an East Asian Summit’ (EASG, 2002,
p 64). The co-chairing of EASG meetings was rotated among the ASEAN
member states, on one side, and either China, Japan or South Korea, on
the other. Meanwhile, a working group set up to support the EASG was
co-chaired by an official from South Korea and an official from the ASEAN
111
Secretariat. The EASG presented its report to the APT Summit in November
2002. The report noted that while there was a need ‘for East Asia to continue
to build a durable institutional framework for region-wide dialogue and
cooperation’, the time was not yet ripe for an EAS (EASG, 2002, p 5).
This was attributed to concerns that ‘ASEAN may be marginalized if the
transition … moves too fast’, as well as whether the addition of another
summit process would burden regional countries with ‘too many meetings’
(EASG, 2002, p 5). Consequently, the EASG concluded that the formation
of the EAS should be a ‘part of an evolutionary and step-by-step process’ for
the medium to long term, with the APT framework ‘remain[ing] the only
credible and realistic vehicle to advance the form and substance of regional
cooperation in East Asia’ (EASG, 2002, p 5).
From the late 1990s, South Korea embraced its middle power status
and sought to reflect that status in its foreign policy, especially in terms
of expanding its diplomatic relations and contributing towards global and
regional challenges. As a middle power, South Korea was aware that it was
not a major strategic player in the same sense as China, Japan or the US; yet,
it could still play a useful role in the regional multilateral architecture. Kim’s
EAVG initiative, emerging after the Asian financial crisis had exposed the
weaknesses of regional economies, was built on these principles. In both the
EAVG and the subsequent EASG, South Korea created for itself ‘an equal
place at the table with larger powers and an opportunity to influence regional
discussions that otherwise would minimize its role’ (Snyder, 2008, p 92).
South Korea’s proactive approach in this instance of regional multilateralism
was demonstrated in its chairing of the EAVG, as well as the co-chairing
of the EASG working group. Interestingly, while the EAVG recommended
that the EAS would take shape based on the APT process, and the EASG
recommended for this evolution to be a long-term development, the first
EAS was held in 2005 –a mere three years after the EASG report was
released –and it was not linked to the APT. This surprising turn of events
is discussed in the next sub-section.
Indonesia’s push for an expanded East Asia Summit

While Indonesia had mostly retreated from its regional and global roles
following the Asian financial crisis, by the early 2000s it was on the
path to re-establishing its traditional leadership profile in Southeast Asia
and ASEAN. Under the presidencies of Megawati (2001–04) and Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–14), in particular, Indonesia aspired to be a key
player that was proactive in multilateralism and international organizations
(Fitriani, 2015, p 73; Thies and Sari, 2018, p 413). These attributes were
evident in Indonesia’s contributions in setting up the EAS. Along with a
few other countries –and in contrast to the inclination of some others for
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a more restrictive membership –Indonesia pursued an EAS that would

include Australia, India and New Zealand in addition to the APT countries.
Beyond the launch of the EAS in 2005, Jakarta continued to facilitate further
expansion of the platform’s membership to include Russia and the US. It
was also under Indonesia’s tenure as chair that the EAS agenda expanded to
include discussions on the South China Sea. Before examining in more detail
Indonesia’s approach towards this new multilateral arrangement, however,
let us first consider the country’s view of its place in the region through the
late 1990s and 2000s.
Indonesia recovered gradually from the economic fallout of the Asian
financial crisis, and it took about five years before its GDP figure bounced
back to pre-crisis levels (The World Bank, 2021a). Although it was still the
largest economy in Southeast Asia and the only Southeast Asian country
at the inaugural meeting of the G20 finance ministers and central bank
governors in 1999, it continued to struggle with domestic socioeconomic
challenges that prevented it from maximizing its influence on the world
stage (Emmers and Teo, 2018, pp 50–2). Observers point out, nevertheless,
that Indonesia made steady economic and political progress under President
Yudhoyono’s administration (Anwar, 2015, p 27; Karim, 2018, p 352). In
stark contrast to its experience during the Asian financial crisis, Indonesia
was able to weather the global financial crisis of 2008–09 and even recorded
positive economic growth during that time (Anwar, 2010, p 127; Anwar,
2015, p 27). By 2010, Indonesia’s GDP was the 18th largest in the world,
a move up from the 28th spot at the beginning of the decade (The World
Bank, 2021a). In addition to economic indicators, Indonesian media and
political elites in the early 2000s also took pride in the country’s standing as
the world’s largest Muslim-majority democracy and largest archipelagic state
(‘Free and’, 2001; UNGA, 2001, p 4; UNGA, 2003, p 16). These attributes
were used to justify Indonesia’s significance in regional and international
affairs, and especially at the time when Jakarta assumed the ASEAN chair
in 2003.
With its ‘robust economic growth, a stable domestic environment, and
the resilience of its newly established democratic political system’ from the
mid-2000s, Indonesian officials and academics began promoting the country’s
middle power status in global affairs during the later years of the Yudhoyono
administration (Emmers and Teo, 2015, p 195; see also Darmosumarto,
2009; Wihardja, 2011). The middle power image was also associated
with Indonesia’s ‘free and active’ approach that reflected its foreign policy
autonomy (‘Indonesia fits’, 2011). Admittedly, Indonesia’s middle power
profile during this time was arguably not as coherent or persistent as those of
Australia and South Korea. This could be in part attributed to the preference
of some Indonesians to describe their country as a potential ‘negara besar’
(big power), rather than ‘negara menengah’ (middle power) (Sukma, 2013).
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Regardless, it was clear that under Megawati and later Yudhoyono, Indonesia
aimed to regain its standing in ASEAN and Southeast Asia –something
that would be ‘commensurate with its size and with the expectations of the
region’ (Wanandi, 2004a). From Jakarta’s perspective, the fall of Suharto had
created a leadership vacuum in ASEAN, and Indonesia sought to demonstrate
that it still retained its ‘natural leadership qualities’ vis-à-vis Southeast Asia
(Suryodiningrat, 2003; see also ‘The relevance’, 2002). Such expectations
of Jakarta’s regional leadership were affirmed by political elites and observers
in other countries, with then ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan
noting that ‘Indonesia has a weight, an international legitimacy and a global
appeal’ to garner support for its ASEAN initiatives (‘Indonesia can’, 2010;
see also ‘RI moving’, 2003). It was in this context that Indonesia took a
proactive role in shaping the EAS.
As mentioned earlier, the EAS had been meant as an initiative for the
longer term that should evolve from the APT framework (EASG, 2002,
p 5). Rodolfo C. Severino, former Secretary-General of ASEAN, recalls
that until 2004 there had been a lack of regional momentum to launch
the EAS (Severino, 2006, p 269). From 2004, however, Malaysian officials
started lobbying for the EAS to be held the following year. Malaysia’s plan
caught the rest of the regional countries by surprise and even ‘prompt[ed]
several countries to begin to form a coalition to oppose the EAS proposal’
(Soesastro, 2006, p 51). According to a Jakarta Post report, Indonesia had
‘voiced the strongest objections’ to Malaysia’s proposal (‘ASEAN affirms’,
2004). Natalegawa, who was then director general for ASEAN cooperation
in Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, highlighted the vague distinction
between the existing APT and the new platform, and expressed reservations
that the latter might erode ASEAN centrality (Natalegawa, 2005).
Indonesia was especially concerned over talk that the EAS would be
the main foundation of East Asian community building, as this would
potentially undermine ongoing ASEAN community-building efforts that it
had initiated when it was ASEAN chair in 2003 (‘Formidable challenges’,
2005). This apprehension arguably deepened when the idea of an East Asian
Community secretariat based in Kuala Lumpur, separate from the ASEAN
Secretariat in Jakarta, was mooted (Natalegawa, 2018, p 87). Indonesia
was thus more in favour of retaining the APT arrangement –as a clearly
ASEAN-led process that would augment its profile in the region, in contrast
to the unclear form and scope of a potential EAS that may sideline its
role –as the building block of any emerging regional community (‘ASEAN
has’, 2004; Rahil, 2004). It was, eventually, the newly installed President
Yudhoyono who reportedly ‘capitulated to peer pressure at his first ASEAN
gathering’ and agreed to an EAS despite the foreign ministry’s reluctance
to endorse the proposal (Suryodiningrat, 2010; see also Suryodiningrat,
2005). Amid Sino-Japanese rivalry to dominate the EAS, ASEAN’s driving
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role in the new platform, by default, was ‘the least unacceptable alternative’
(Camroux, 2012, p 376).
The question of membership was more complex. Malaysia and China,
supported by Cambodia, Laos and Brunei, wanted to restrict membership
to the APT countries, while Indonesia, along with Japan, Singapore and
Vietnam, preferred the EAS to include Australia, India and New Zealand
(Wain, 2005). From Indonesia’s perspective, an EAS comprising only the
APT countries could sideline ASEAN centrality, given the combined
economic weight of China, Japan and South Korea vis-à-vis the ten ASEAN
countries (Natalegawa, 2018, pp 88–9). By this time, Jakarta’s relations with
Canberra had improved, helped in part by the latter’s aid to Indonesia in the
aftermath of the 2004 tsunami that devastated Aceh (Teh, 2011, p 349). As
an indication that both countries had repaired their tenuous relationship in
the late 1990s and early 2000s, then Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan
Wirajuda was described as Australia’s ‘most dedicated backer’ for admission
into the EAS (Kelly, 2005). Jakarta’s advocacy for a wider membership was
based on geographical and geopolitical factors. In terms of the former,
an EAS that included Australia, India and New Zealand ‘would have the
ASEAN region as the undoubted “centre” ’ (Natalegawa, 2018, p 89).
Geopolitically, wider membership would help to ‘dilute’ –Natalegawa was
careful to reject the term ‘contain’ or ‘balance’ –the ‘increasing influence of
any particular state’ and ‘safeguard ASEAN’s centrality’ (Natalegawa, 2018,
p 90). Yudhoyono also underscored that a 16-member EAS would reflect
ASEAN’s ability to respond to the ‘emergence of China and India as new big
powers in this region’ (‘ASEAN must’, 2005). The stance of Indonesia and
other like-minded actors such as Singapore and Japan eventually prevailed, as
ASEAN foreign ministers arrived at a consensus in April 2005 that non-APT
members could join the EAS if they met three criteria: substantive relations
with ASEAN, full dialogue partner status with ASEAN, and accession to
ASEAN’s TAC (Severino, 2006, p 271). The first EAS in December 2005
thus saw the participation of the ten ASEAN member states, China, Japan,
South Korea, Australia, India and New Zealand.
Later, Indonesia also became a key actor in expanding the EAS to include
Russia and the US, shifting away from its original policy of not admitting
new members to prevent the forum from becoming ‘a miniature version
of the United Nations’ (Wirajuda as cited in Khalik, 2007). Russia had
been present at the inaugural meeting as an observer, at the invitation of
the Malaysian chair. Having acquired full ASEAN dialogue partner status
in 1996 and signed the TAC in 2004, Moscow had expressed interest in
joining the EAS. ‘[F]‌or Indonesia’, Natalegawa rationalizes, admitting
Russia into the EAS without the concurrent entry of the US ‘ran the risk
of unsettling the calibrated “equilibrium” in the region’ (Natalegawa, 2018,
p 93). This was in reference to the concept of ‘dynamic equilibrium’, which
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Natalegawa conceptualized as an alternative to a ‘destabilizing “balance of

power”’ for the region (Natalegawa, 2018, p 99). A dynamic equilibrium
focused on the interactions among and intent of countries, the multifaceted
dimensions of power, as well as the surrounding context framing interstate
relations (Natalegawa, 2018, p 101). The concept called for the absence of
a preponderant power –and by association, the ‘dilut[ion]’ of any rising
power –and the ‘promotion of predictability of interstate behaviour based
on commonly agreed principles and norms’ (Natalegawa, 2018, p 101).
In a bid to maintain a dynamic equilibrium in the region and in light of
rising Chinese influence, by early 2010 Jakarta had raised with its ASEAN
counterparts the issue of expanding the EAS to include Russia and the US.
Around the same time, several other countries had also put forward their
visions for the regional architecture. Australia promoted its APC (discussed
in the next sub-section), Japan proposed an ‘East Asian Community’, and
Singapore suggested a new ASEAN+8 platform to engage Russia and the
US. Indonesia was not particularly enthusiastic about any of these proposals,
and expressed the view that ASEAN’s existing arrangements already served
the purposes that these new initiatives claimed to fulfil (‘Indonesian foreign’,
2009). Jakarta’s consideration remained ASEAN centrality in any regional
community-building efforts. The APC and East Asian Community had been
proposed by non-ASEAN countries, and even in the case of Singapore’s
ASEAN+8 formulation, Indonesia was concerned that the ‘+8’ countries
may end up playing the leading role in regional multilateralism (Yoshimatsu,
2012, p 405). Both Yudhoyono and Natalegawa stated that regional countries
should focus on strengthening the current ASEAN-led forums rather than
establishing new ones (‘Indonesian foreign’, 2009; Frost, 2016, p 156).
Natalegawa added that Indonesia ‘[would] lead ASEAN in responding’ to the
various community-building and regional architecture initiatives (Budianto,
2010). He warned that if Indonesia did not step up, ‘there [would] be a
vacuum of leadership’ in ASEAN (Budianto, 2010). Hence, Indonesia sought
to (re)assert ASEAN’s central role and leadership in the broader regional
architecture by inviting Russia and the US to join the EAS. It was fortuitous
that by mid-2010, the US approach towards engaging Asia had changed from
dismissive to interested. Under the new Barack Obama administration, the
US declared its intention to join the EAS and signed ASEAN’s TAC in July
2009. Two years later, Indonesia, as the prevailing ASEAN chair, formally
welcomed Russia and the US to the EAS.
At the 2011 EAS that it hosted in Bali, Indonesia put forward a 12-
point ‘Declaration of the EAS on the Principles for Mutually Beneficial
Relations’ (also known as the Bali Principles), which all 18 participating
countries adopted. This was ‘a conscious and deliberate attempt to project
and extrapolate the ASEAN experience to the wider EAS setting’ that
included major powers such as China, Japan and the US (Natalegawa, 2018,
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p 105). In line with the concept of dynamic equilibrium, the Bali Principles
aimed to ‘regulate’ the behaviour of regional countries via the promotion
of norms and mutually agreeable principles (‘ASEAN summit’, 2011). It
was also Indonesia that drove efforts to expand the EAS agenda beyond the
original focus on functional and non-traditional security issues, to include
more strategic issues so that it would remain relevant. Yudhoyono made the
case that the entry of Russia and the US would alter the atmosphere of the
EAS meetings, while Natalegawa expressed the view that regional leaders
should be able to discuss strategic issues at the forum (‘President: EAS’, 2010;
‘Indonesia takes’, 2011). Subsequently, the 2011 EAS chaired by Indonesia
had ‘robust discussions’ on South China Sea developments despite resistance
from China, which contested the appropriateness of raising the issue at the
EAS (Natalegawa, 2018, p 129; see also Thayer, 2011). Observers have
credited Yudhoyono’s ‘firm hand’ in overcoming Beijing’s opposition and
persisting with efforts to facilitate discussions of the contentious issue at
the meeting (Weatherbee, 2013, p 77; see also Thayer, 2011).
Having emerged from a period of domestic turmoil and foreign policy
challenges through the late 1990s and early 2000s, Indonesia (re)claimed
its status as first among equals in ASEAN. This started to become evident
when it took over as ASEAN chair in 2003, as well as in negotiations to
establish the EAS from late 2004. Despite fellow ASEAN member Malaysia
attempting to seize the first-mover advantage in initiating the EAS, Indonesia
leveraged its persuasive skills and regional profile to ensure that its preferences
prevailed. For the middle power, multilateralism in the form of ASEAN was
a vital element of Jakarta’s strategy to rein in the ambitions of other regional
powers. Not only did Jakarta introduce an alternative concept to maintain
regional ‘equilibrium’, it also took practical steps to get other regional
countries to buy into its vision for the regional architecture. Consequently,
Indonesia’s efforts were effective in diluting the influence of the major
powers and strengthening its own place and role among Asia Pacific states.
Certainly, Indonesia’s success with securing US participation was not a solo
effort. As we will see in the next sub-section, Australia also played a key
role facilitating US participation in the EAS.
Australia and the Asia Pacific Community

Australia’s role in helping to facilitate US membership in the EAS should
be seen in association with its APC initiative. Proposed in 2008 by then
Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, the APC aimed to create an overarching
regional institution that included all the key players in the Asia Pacific,
to encourage dialogue and cooperation amid China’s rise and uncertain
major power dynamics. While the APC as originally envisioned by Rudd
never materialized, it was one of the developments –along with Indonesia’s
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intervention as discussed earlier –that catalysed the expanded EAS in 2011.

Given the similarity in form between the APC and expanded EAS, and the fact
that several regional leaders highlighted the links between the two initiatives,
Australian leaders and diplomats were quick to point out that the launch of
the expanded EAS represented the fulfilment of Australia’s APC objectives.
From Australia’s perspective, its middle power profile and characteristics
meant that it was among the best placed to seize the initiative on such a
multilateral, institutional platform. Certainly, the first Rudd administration
(2007–10) explicitly promoted Australia as a middle power that was committed
to ‘creative middle power diplomacy’ in its foreign policy (Rudd, 2010d).
When the Rudd administration came into office in December 2007, its
leaders and diplomats sought to emphasize the importance of Australia in
regional and global affairs. Australian officials defined the country’s middle
power status based on its standing as one of the top 15 economies in the world
and one of the top 20 countries in terms of income per capita, as well as its
relatively high living standards (Rudd, 2010c; Smith, 2008a). From Australia’s
perspective, its ‘robust parliamentary democracy’, as well as its status as a
‘founding member’ of key multilateral groupings –including the G20 and
APEC –and active participant in ‘practically all of the major councils in the
world’ appeared to be essential elements that bolstered Canberra’s middle
power profile on the international stage (Christie, 2008; Rudd, 2010b).
Based on these characteristics, Foreign Minister Stephen Smith described
Australia as ‘a significant and a considerable nation’ (Smith, 2008a). That
said, there was a clear sense of the limits regarding what Canberra could
achieve in its foreign policy. Australia did not belong to the club of ‘major
powers’ –which Rudd identified to be China, India, Japan, Russia and
the US (Rudd, 2009). Rather, Rudd drew parallels between the middle
power status of Australia and countries such as Indonesia and South Korea
(Rudd, 2011a).
Given Australia’s ‘not insubstantial’ national assets –certainly more than
those held by a majority of the states in the international system –and
taking into consideration that it did not possess major power capabilities
and influence, Rudd ‘sought institutional responses to the world’s problems’
(Rudd, 2008a; Gyngell, 2017, p 302). While unilaterally Australia ‘may not
be decisive in the way that the great powers might be’, Rudd noted that if it
cooperated with other like-minded powers, as a group they could ‘be more
agile than the great powers’ (Rudd, 2011a). Under the Rudd government,
Australia sought an activist foreign policy that would continue ensuring that
it had a seat at various tables of global decision making. Canberra was of the
view that it possessed distinctive skills, including good offices, persuasiveness
and nimbleness, that it could leverage when initiating ideas and building
coalitions (Rudd, 2011b). Rudd described his vision for Australia’s foreign
policy as a ‘creative middle power diplomacy’, which would involve ‘nudging
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international agendas forward’ where possible and ‘mak[ing] a difference

for the good’ (Rudd, 2010d; Uhlmann, 2008). This was certainly not pure
altruism at work; Australia, as a non-major power, would be better placed
to secure its own core interests if it had a respected and credible voice in
international affairs (Rudd, 2008a). The Rudd government’s foreign policy
was based on three pillars, namely, strengthening Australia’s alliance with
the US, enhancing its engagement with the UN, as well as deepening its
ties with the Asia Pacific (Rudd, 2008b). Most of these considerations were
reflected in the APC proposal.
Rudd announced the initiative during a speech at the Asia Society
AustralAsia Centre in Sydney in June 2008. Noting the changing
demographics, as well as economic and strategic relationships across Asia,
Rudd emphasized the need for ‘strong and effective regional institutions’
to reinforce the region’s capacity to manage challenges and strengthen
interstate ties (Rudd, 2008c). Given that Australia’s engagement with Asia
was the ‘coincidence of several imperatives –geographic, economic and
strategic’, it was in the former’s interests to shape a regional architecture that
would sustain stability and prosperity in the region (Rudd, 2008c; see also
Woolcott, 2009). Rudd administration officials often pointed out that while
there were several multilateral institutions –including APEC, ASEAN and
the EAS –that underpinned the regional architecture, there were gaps that
needed to be addressed. India was not a part of APEC, and the EAS did
not include the US (Smith, 2008b; Official Committee Hansard, Australia,
2010, p 105). For Australia, however, the inclusion of these two powers in
any regional institution was essential to counter rising Chinese influence.
As mentioned earlier, since the early 2000s China had become increasingly
proactive in the region, including with ASEAN and its member states,
fanning perceptions that it was competing with Japan for regional leadership.
Leaked diplomatic cables cited Australian officials explaining that Australia
wanted to avoid having Chinese dominance and US absence in the regional
architecture (Australia Canberra, 2009b; Secretary of State, 2009). Given
that China’s vision for the regional architecture remained confined to an
APT formulation, Australia knew that it could –despite being a founding
member of the EAS –still end up as an outsider to the region. Similar to the
developments during APEC’s formation, Canberra thus sought to pursue
an ‘Asia Pacific’ conceptualization of the region that would include the
US –and this time, India –in order to reinforce its own place in the region.
As a vision for the regional architecture that was targeted for the year
2020, the APC would encompass:
• A regional institution which spans the entire Asia-Pacific region –

including the United States, Japan, China, India, Indonesia and the other
states of the region.
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• A regional institution which is able to engage in the full spectrum of

dialogue, cooperation and action on economic and political matters and
future challenges related to security. (Rudd, 2008c)
Being a middle power, Australia was ‘well placed to begin this process of
discussion’ on the issue (Rudd, 2008d). Canberra believed that it could add
value to the regional architecture given its propensity for new and innovative
ideas, as well as its past accomplishments in regional multilateralism such
as the establishment of APEC (Frost, 2009, p 16; Rudd, 2011c). Canberra
was moreover of the view that such a proposal coming from Australia would
draw less suspicion about its intentions from other regional countries, than if
it had been initiated by China, Japan or the US (Australia Canberra, 2008;
Frost, 2009, p 17). Following Rudd’s announcement of the initiative, Richard
Woolcott –appointed as special envoy to promote the APC –visited 21
countries and held discussions with more than 300 people (Weller, 2014,
p 179). Kim Beazley, then Australia’s ambassador to the US, also had the
task of persuading the White House to back the proposal (Beazley, 2016a).
Despite Australia’s initial assessment that its middle power status offered it
an advantage over the bigger powers in such an initiative, regional reception
towards the APC was relatively lukewarm. In fact, following Woolcott’s
consultations, Australia from May 2009 started referring to the APC
with a small ‘c’ (that is, APc), meant to reflect a more informal and less
institutionalized process (Frost, 2016, p 154). While countries agreed on the
importance of strengthening the regional architecture and expressed interest in
learning more about Rudd’s proposal, few explicitly pledged support for the
APC (Frost, 2009, pp 11–13; Woolcott, 2009). South Korea was reportedly
‘the most important backer of the APC idea’ in its early days, but following
the reactions of others, Seoul’s enthusiasm apparently diminished (Sheridan,
2009; see also Callick, 2010). Singapore diplomats, in particular, were vocal
critics of Australia’s initiative. Ambassador Barry Desker described the idea as
‘dead in the water right from the very beginning’, while Ambassador Tommy
Koh accused Australia of trying to impose a predetermined outcome on
regional countries (Koh, 2009; as cited in Nicholson, 2008).
In general, ASEAN member states were concerned that the APC would
threaten ASEAN centrality in the regional architecture, despite Australian
reassurances to the contrary (Australia Canberra, 2009a). This was for two
reasons. First, given the lack of appetite for creating new institutions, Rudd
reportedly said that the APC could emerge through an evolution of APEC
or the EAS (Secretary of State, 2009). This nevertheless did not obtain
unanimous support from other regional countries, as some still saw the
APT as the basis of regional architecture building. Moreover, while Rudd
declared publicly that ASEAN should remain at the ‘core’ of the APC, leaked
diplomatic cables indicated that Australia was ‘less inclined’ towards using
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ASEAN-centric platforms (Australia Canberra, 2009b; Rudd, 2008e; see

also Japan Tokyo, 2009). Second, during a Sydney conference in December
2009 involving representatives from around the region to discuss the APC
idea, co-chair Michael Wesley suggested forming a concert of powers. This
would presumably involve Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Russia,
South Korea and the US (Acharya, 2010). This idea was quickly shot down
by Singapore given that such an arrangement would risk the marginalization
of smaller states like itself (Acharya, 2010).
Nevertheless, Australia’s plan to ensure US participation in the evolving
regional architecture subsequently coincided with Indonesia’s attempt
to bring Washington into the EAS. Admittedly, as Beazley notes, such
efforts ‘were pushing against an open door’ given that the new Obama
administration had also started to shift US attention towards Southeast Asia
and ASEAN (Beazley, 2019, p 135). Following ASEAN’s decision to invite
Russia and the US to join the EAS, Australian leaders were quick to declare
the objectives of the APC fulfilled. Rudd’s successor, Julia Gillard, said in
2010 that the expanded EAS was
something that Australia very much supported and indeed fought

for. We wanted there to be a place where the US, China, the major
countries of our region, would sit around a table and talk about
strategic questions, defence questions and economic questions. So this
East Asia Summit has authorised the US and Russia joining as parts
of the East Asia Summit from next year on and that does equip that
vision of having a table that brings together these major players in our
region, with the rest of the region. (as cited in Middleton, 2010; see
also Rudd, 2010a)
While direct links between Australia’s APC proposal and the expanded EAS
may appear tenuous, it is not too farfetched to say that Rudd’s proposal
had fostered discussions about regional institutions that eventually formed
a part of the efforts to expand the EAS (Carr, 2015, p 139; Tan, 2016,
p 47). Former Singapore Foreign Minister George Yeo noted that Rudd and
Australia had ‘contributed much to the discussion in ASEAN about how that
original architecture can be improved and strengthened’, while Natalegawa
acknowledged that ASEAN’s hastiness to consider US and Russian entry
into the EAS was ‘reinforced’ by the APC proposal (Natalegawa, 2018,
p 98; ‘Joint press conference with Singapore’s’, 2010). Then US Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton also acknowledged Canberra’s role in Washington’s
decision to join the EAS, stating that she was:
influenced by Kevin Rudd’s very strong argument on behalf of an

Asian-Pacific Community. … We certainly believed it was in America’s
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interests but we were very encouraged by Australia’s understanding

of the dynamics in the region and encouragement for us to become
more involved in helping to create the architecture of the 21st century.
(‘Joint press conference between’, 2010)
Beazley also recalls his conversation with Jeff Bader, the National Security
Council’s Senior Director for East Asia, in which the latter pointed out
Australia’s input in the US decision to join the EAS (Beazley, 2016b). Viewed
in this way, Rudd’s initiation of the APC evidently had some role –alongside
changing ASEAN and US interests –in the evolution of the EAS.
With its APC initiative, Australia thus helped to catalyse US entry into
the EAS. Admittedly, the success of Australia’s objectives here depended
to a large extent on other factors beyond its control, such as the fortuitous
change in administration in Washington and subsequently a shift in US
policy towards the Asia Pacific, as well as ASEAN’s own preferences towards
expanding EAS membership. Nevertheless, Canberra’s proactive diplomacy
in regional architecture building, as illustrated by its ideas and initiative
to begin negotiations with regional countries, contributed towards the
advancement of the EAS as well. As a middle power, Australia was clear about
the opportunities and limits of what it could do in regional and global affairs.
Branding its foreign policy as ‘creative middle power diplomacy’, the first
Rudd administration sought to draw upon Canberra’s diplomatic strengths
and capabilities in pursuing the APC initiative. The formal participation of
the US –along with Russia –in the EAS starting from 2011, in this sense,
could be attributed partly to Australia’s efforts.
As evident from the discussion thus far, all three middle powers
contributed towards shaping the EAS into its present form. South Korea
took on a central role in the EAVG and kickstarted the discussions that led
to the establishment of the EAS, Indonesia played a key role in deciding
the new forum’s membership in 2005 and subsequently in its expansion,
and Australia helped to catalyse US entry into the EAS in 2011. As with
their roles in the formation of APEC, both material and ideational/social
dimensions were important in determining the success of their respective
approaches. All three countries were cognizant that the best way to amplify
their voice and influence would be through multilateral platforms, and
were also able to leverage their diplomatic capabilities and clout to navigate
the power politics surrounding the EAS. Perhaps more clearly than in the
APEC case, this chapter on the EAS has also highlighted the importance of
domestic developments –such as a change in government or the coming
to power of certain individuals –as well as external circumstances in
contributing towards the effectiveness or sustainability of the respective
middle power initiatives.
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Conclusion
This chapter has examined the circumstances and conditions that led to
the EAS in 2005, including the establishment of the EAVG in 1999 –
from which emerged the recommendation to form an EAS –the debate
over its initial membership, and the summit’s expansion in 2011. The
platform was created against the backdrop of the Asian financial crisis, US
counterterrorism strategy post-9/11, Sino-Japanese rivalry and proliferation
of ASEAN-centred multilateralism. These developments led to the interest
in ‘East Asian’ community-building and regional integration initiatives
that not necessarily included western countries such as Australia and the
US, as well as imperatives from the ASEAN member states to keep the
organization at the core of regional multilateralism amid major power
dynamics. The EAS’ provision of an avenue for the leaders of 18 regional
countries to meet annually has made it an important pillar for the regional
multilateral architecture. Indeed, by 2011, the membership of the EAS
was arguably an appropriate reflection of the evolving power dynamics
in the region that would continue for the foreseeable future, with the
participation of key powers such as the US, China and India. To varying
extents, the behaviour of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea in shaping
the EAS were relatively successful in diluting major-power stratificatory
forces and in pursuing functionally differentiated roles for themselves in
regional multilateralism that neither major nor smaller powers would be
able to perform as effectively. The behaviour of the three middle powers
and their outcomes were also a result of the differentiated structure in the
region being activated by the process of power politics.
It was clear that through the EAS and its associated processes, all three
countries sought to moderate the overwhelming influence of major powers in
the region. South Korea’s EAVG focused on strengthening regional economic
cooperation among the 13 APT countries, Indonesia’s efforts to expand EAS
membership was targeted at maintaining a dynamic equilibrium and avoiding
the preponderant exercise of power, and Australia’s attempt to facilitate US
entry into regional multilateralism was meant as a counterbalance to rising
Chinese influence. To a large extent, their respective approaches were
similar to those during the formation of APEC. Seoul’s behaviour helped
to enhance relations between Northeast and Southeast Asian countries,
Jakarta aimed to maintain ASEAN centrality in regional multilateralism,
and Canberra pursued an Asia Pacific conceptualization of the region that
would include the US. Despite the different approaches, all three countries
were essentially seeking to navigate power dynamics in order to keep and
reinforce their own place in the region. It was through ASEAN, for example,
that Indonesia would be best able to assert its first-among-equals position
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in the region. Similarly, US participation in the regional architecture would

help to solidify Australia’s own place in the region.
The functions of middle powers as initiators of or facilitators within
multilateralism were also reflected in the approaches and responses of
Australia, Indonesia and South Korea towards the EAS. The roles played by
these three middle powers in shaping the new forum ultimately relied on both
their material and ideational/social attributes. Indonesia, perhaps reflecting
more its social and ideational sources of strength than material ones, was able
to leverage its de facto leadership of ASEAN to consolidate the organization’s
strategy towards the EAS. This meant, for instance, that along with some
other regional countries, Indonesia successfully opposed Malaysia’s preference
for a more exclusive EAS that would only include the APT countries. Later,
Indonesia also led ASEAN efforts to maintain centrality amid alternative
visions of the regional architecture, by inviting the US and Russia to join
the EAS. Likewise, Seoul was effective as the EAVG chair and convenor in
part because neither Chinese nor Japanese leadership during that time would
be collectively accepted by all in the region. Meanwhile for Australia, the
APC initiative demonstrated the Rudd administration’s capacity to advocate
for and invest in the strengthening of the multilateral architecture. While
the APC did not ultimately materialize in its originally envisioned form,
Canberra’s diplomacy played a part in facilitating US entry into the EAS –a
point acknowledged by its counterparts, including Washington. In terms of
social, relative and relational power politics, all three countries were able to
leverage their resources and profiles to ensure support for their roles from
both the major powers and smaller states.
As a consequence of the power politics surrounding the formation of the
EAS, the behaviour of the three middle powers were activated within the
differentiated structure in the Asia Pacific. The following Chapter 6 combines
and compares the findings from the two empirical chapters, and analyses
them in the context of the book’s theoretical framework.
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6
The Differentiation of Middle

Power Behaviour in Asia
Pacific Multilateralism
Introduction
This chapter presents a comparative analysis of the middle power behaviour of
Australia, Indonesia and South Korea in the formation of APEC and the EAS,
and traces the empirical developments back to the differentiated structure
of regional politics. Building on the works of Albert et al and Donnelly,
the understanding of structure here focuses on stratificatory and functional
differentiation (Donnelly, 2009; Buzan and Albert, 2010; Albert et al, 2013;
Donnelly, 2013). This structure forms the basis for middle power behaviour
in multilateralism, although the eventual effects would be activated through
negotiations of social, relative and relational power politics (Barkin, 2010,
pp 18–20). The key argument is that as a way to ensure their own place and
relevance in the region, middle powers have sought to dilute major-power
stratification and undertake functionally differentiated roles in regional
multilateralism. These are broad objectives across all three middle powers,
although, as we will discuss later, the specific details and considerations for
each middle power initiative vary. The discussion will also reinforce the
importance of context for middle power behaviour, by highlighting briefly
two other scenarios of Asia Pacific multilateralism in which middle power
initiative was apparently absent. The behaviour of middle powers in regional
multilateralism is thus conditioned, but not determined, by the structure
of differentiation.
This chapter is organized as follows.1 It starts off with a section that looks
at each middle power’s behaviour across both APEC and the EAS. The
analysis here will draw out similarities and differences for each middle power
in their approaches towards the two instances of regional multilateralism.
The objective is to find out if there are consistencies or discrepancies in
the strategies of each middle power in regional multilateralism at different
125
times, and what drives such considerations. This is followed by a section

that recalls the book’s theoretical framework proposed in Chapter 3. It will
discuss how the behaviour of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea could
be understood through the lens of differentiation, as well as explain how
all three countries tried to shape power politics to their advantage in the
formation of APEC and the EAS. Before concluding, the chapter will also
briefly explore middle power behaviour in the ARF and the ADMM-Plus
as cases where the context and power politics did not appear as conducive
for middle power initiative as a whole.
Examining middle power behaviour in the Asia-Pacific

Economic Cooperation and East Asia Summit
Based on the preceding two empirical chapters, this section examines the
differentiation and power considerations surrounding the approaches of
Australia, Indonesia and South Korea in APEC and the EAS. It will seek
to draw out the similarities and differences of each country’s strategy and
considerations in the two instances of regional multilateralism. This will offer
some insight into how each middle power has positioned itself in the post-
Cold War Asia Pacific, its drivers for behaviour, as well as the capabilities
and skills associated with its middle power profile that it has been able to
leverage. The following sub-sections will be organized by country.
Australia
Australia’s middle power profile was arguably the strongest among the three
countries examined in this book. It had embraced a middle power identity since
the end of World War II and possessed the requisite material capabilities to back
up such a status, and had also been proactive in multilateralism and institution
building at both the global and regional levels. In the lead-up to its proposals
of APEC and the APC, Australia positioned itself as a country that nestled
comfortably in the gap between the major powers and the smaller countries
in the ranking of states in the international system. Foreign policy officials and
political elites repeatedly described their country as a middle power or medium-
sized economy. Alongside this self-conception was the acknowledgement that
Canberra possessed limited capacity compared to the major powers, and
consequently lacked extensive influence over global affairs. Yet, Australia was
not insignificant. It had a greater amount of economic and diplomatic resources
at its disposal than a majority of the rest of the states. Its status as a founding
member of and the leading role it played in several multilateral groupings,
such as the UN, G20 and APEC, were also treated as the basis for its middle
power status. At this level of limited but still considerable material capacity,
Australian officials viewed multilateralism, institutions and coalition building
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The Differentiation of Middle Power Behaviour
as among the best options for the country to secure its interests amid changes
in the international political structure. These considerations drove Australia’s
approach towards establishing a regional economic and trade forum in the
form of APEC, as well as towards institutionalizing an APC that would help
to deal with the impact of a rising China.
To a large extent, Australia’s decision making was also shaped by fears of
major power unilateralism. Its APEC proposal, for instance, arose out of
concerns about Washington’s protectionist approach towards trade, as well as
the disagreement between the European Community and the US resulting
in the Uruguay Round deadlock at the expense of small and medium-sized
economies like itself. Similarly, its suggestion to create an APC emerged out
of its recognition that China was gaining in strength and influence in the
region, but there were no suitable regional platforms that could effectively
manage the changing power dynamics. It was thus important for Australia to
both engage constructively with China as a rising power, as well as to guard
against any exclusionary tendencies –especially against itself –that a Chinese
vision of the regional architecture might involve. Multilateral platforms such
as APEC and the APC would potentially constrain the unilateral tendencies
and overwhelming influence of the major powers in international politics;
more importantly, they would also allow their initiators to exert some
influence, to their own benefit, in terms of agenda setting or membership
composition. For a middle power like Australia, multilateral and institutional
approaches have thus been viewed as the most valuable ways to ensure that it
gets a say in regional decision making vis-à-vis the major powers, and, more
fundamentally, that it is acknowledged as a rightful member of the region.
As a country regarded to be culturally and geographically distinct from
many of its East Asian neighbours, Australia’s fear of regional exclusion
was consistently present. Its bid to establish APEC as a regional forum for
economic and trade cooperation was a response to regional integration
and trade liberalization initiatives in Europe and North America that it
was excluded from. Canberra was moreover aware that it was not naturally
viewed as a member of the Asian region, which meant that the likelihood
of it being left out of regional initiatives proposed by another country was
relatively high. As Asian economies grew in importance to Australia’s own
prosperity in the late 1980s, Canberra worked towards having a multilateral
economic cooperation platform that would secure its place, and consequently
economic interests, in the region. This was likewise also the case for its
APC proposal. The push for East Asian regionalism in the late 1990s to
mid-2000s reinforced debates about Australia’s regional belonging. Despite
being ASEAN’s oldest dialogue partner, Australia’s followership of the US
in the latter’s post-9/11 counterterrorism strategy, its role in the East Timor
crisis, as well as the John Howard administration’s dismissive rhetoric towards
regional multilateralism deepened the chasm between Canberra and its
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regional counterparts. While Australia was eventually included as a founding

member of the EAS, its role in the East Asian community-building process
hung in the balance. The APC proposal sought to address this problem, by
trying to replicate the success of APEC in outlining an Asia Pacific (rather
than East Asian) formulation of the region. An Asia Pacific region would,
more naturally, include Australia in terms of geography.
From Canberra’s perspective, strategic considerations also weighed in
favour of an Asia Pacific region. In contrast to some of the voices advocating
an East Asian region without US presence, the geographical boundaries
of an Asia Pacific region would be expected to encompass the US. In the
post-Cold War period, Australia regarded US presence and engagement in
the region as being in its own interests. For one, Washington’s participation
in regional multilateralism and the acceptance of it as part of the region
would help to secure Canberra’s own place in the region. After all, if the
US, which is located all the way on the other side of the Pacific Ocean, was
considered part of the Asia Pacific, then Australia should –based on both
geography and its status as a US ally –also be similarly treated as an Asia
Pacific country that rightly belonged in regional forums. US presence in
the region also served as a counterbalance to rising powers such as China,
which may behave in a way inimical to Australia’s interests. For example,
China’s vision for the regional multilateral architecture had been rooted in
an East Asian formulation, which meant that should this Chinese vision take
shape and become dominant, Australia would be excluded from the region.
Having its major power ally present in the region as a benign hegemon
would thus be a key element of Australia’s vision for the regional order. It
is not necessarily contradictory that Australia was seeking to maintain US
regional primacy on the one hand, while seeking to reduce major power
influence on the other. The point is that the middle power aimed to diffuse
power away from major powers, as a whole, to enhance its own relative
influence. Given its concerns about regional belonging, an effective way to
enhance Australia’s influence in the region was if the US continued to be
dominant. In this sense, Australia still wanted a stake in regional decision
making; it was simply that it was easier to achieve this goal with the US
also at the same table.
As a non-ASEAN member state, Australia also sought to promote non-
ASEAN-centric multilateralism through APEC and the APC. This made
sense, as in attempting to gain a seat for itself at the regional multilateral
table –at which ASEAN had been the central actor –Australia, as a non-
ASEAN member, would need to emphasize its own role in the multilateral
architecture vis-à-vis ASEAN centrality. In both APEC and the APC,
however, Australia’s efforts did not completely succeed in overcoming
ASEAN centrality. Due to Australia’s desire to improve relations with
Southeast Asian countries, for instance, it subsequently conceded to ASEAN’s
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request that the association be at the core of APEC. This commitment was
not merely rhetorical; it was agreed that every other APEC meeting would
be chaired by an ASEAN member state, allowing ASEAN to exert agenda-
setting influence in APEC. Meanwhile, Australia’s APC did not garner
sufficient regional support to materialize, although the APC’s key elements of
having a regional institution that would include the US and discuss strategic
matters was realized in the expanded EAS in 2011.
Australia’s diplomatic clout and persuasive skills as a middle power were
also demonstrated in negotiations over APEC and the APC. Its profile as a
non-threatening middle power put it in a better position than Japan or the
US to take the lead on APEC, given that the platform was meant to offer
stability amid the behaviour of the world’s top two economic powers at the
time. Japan and the US were then engaged in a trade dispute, and Australia’s
concern about an increasingly unilateral US were shared by others across
the region. Lingering memories of Japan’s aggression in World War II,
moreover, were a hindrance to Tokyo’s leadership in this case. Thus, having
the US or Japan take the lead in convening APEC would not have been as
effective given that the smaller regional countries feared that these economic
powerhouses would attempt to benefit at their expense. Consequently,
although Tokyo and Washington were also considering similar proposals to
promote regional economic cooperation in the late 1980s, it was agreed
that the initiative would have a better chance of success if spearheaded
by Australia, given that it was perceived to not harbour aspirations of
regional dominance.
Australia’s success with APEC certainly required some form of give-and-
take on its part, and its acquiescing to at least some demands of others. An
example would be Australia allowing ASEAN to take a central role in APEC
despite it being an Australian initiative. Canberra was cognizant of the fact
that if it wanted to achieve its goals regarding APEC, it would be necessary
to get ASEAN on its side. On ASEAN’s part, its member states were also
more open to Australia’s initiative given the latter’s non-threatening profile.
Certainly in the early stages of negotiations, ASEAN did express some doubts
over the APEC proposal; these were, however, directed more towards the
likelihood that Japanese and US dominance could be strengthened by their
participation in APEC, rather than towards Australia’s role as an initiator. In
launching APEC, Australia’s middle power status thus gave it an advantage
over major powers such as Japan and the US.
Interestingly, Australia was less successful in its attempts to gain regional
support for the APC. Like with APEC, Australia’s efforts with the APC
stemmed from its self-perception that it was neither a major power nor small
state. On the one hand, Australia had considerable economic and diplomatic
resources that allowed it to commit to institution building in the Asia Pacific.
On the other hand, Australia perceived its non-major power status as being
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to its advantage, because, as Rudd administration officials underscored, such

a proposal coming from China, Japan or the US would have been met with
suspicion from other regional countries. It was then ironic that this was
precisely the reaction that greeted Australia’s APC initiative in its early days.
More so than during APEC’s formation, the fissures in regional identity and
ASEAN centrality emerged as strong counterforces to Australia’s efforts to
initiate a new regional multilateral platform. The former was due to the
increasing prominence of an East Asian region (given the rise of China) vis-
à-vis the Asia Pacific, while the latter was because of ASEAN’s institutional
growth in the 1990s. As a result, the APC, which was seen as both a risk to
an ‘East Asian’ region and ASEAN centrality, was met with suspicion. While
the APC did not ultimately materialize in its originally envisioned form,
Canberra’s diplomacy nevertheless played a part in facilitating the debate
over US participation in the EAS. The outcomes that emerged regarding
Australia’s efforts with APEC and the APC also implied that support –
or at the very least, tacit acceptance –from the major powers remained
instrumental in such initiatives.
Australia’s proposals of APEC and the APC were attempts to maximize
its power advantage –not necessarily just in terms of material resources,
but more importantly, in terms of how power politics could be negotiated.
For example, while Australia –supported by others –may have succeeded
in putting in place an Asia Pacific conceptualization of the region that
would ensure US engagement, it could not overcome the forces of ASEAN
centrality. To a large extent, Australia’s behaviour with regards to the launch
of APEC and the suggestion of the APC was a response to what it saw as
the differentiated politics of the region, which shaped its approach towards
regional multilateralism, as well as the perception and acceptance of its
approach by its regional counterparts.
Indonesia
Compared to Australia and South Korea, Indonesia’s middle power status
tended to be premised much less on indicators of material strength, and more
on its normative and ideational underpinnings. Certainly, Indonesia had
since the end of the Cold War maintained its place as the largest economy
in Southeast Asia, with its global economic weight acknowledged by its
G20 membership. This, coupled with its comparably large territorial and
population size, as well as its historical relations with its neighbours, shaped
its portrayal as a regional power and leader in Southeast Asia and ASEAN.
Notwithstanding these credentials, Indonesia’s other indicators –such as
infrastructure and socioeconomic development –continued to lag that of
the other more established middle powers, as well as some Southeast Asian
countries. Perhaps it was not surprising that descriptions of Indonesia as a
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middle power emerged initially from external sources, with Jakarta explicitly
embracing the label –which was contested by the narrative of Indonesia as a
‘big power’ –only after a period of domestic stability and sustained economic
growth following the Asian financial crisis. Nevertheless, it was clear that
even if it did not explicitly describe itself as a middle power, Indonesia
pursued a proactive role in regional and global affairs on par with those
sought after by other middle powers. When it came to Southeast Asia and
ASEAN, Indonesia regarded itself and was likewise regarded by others as
the first among equals. Consequently, as ASEAN came to occupy a central
position in Asia Pacific multilateralism, Indonesia’s role in the wider region
also became amplified. In projecting its middle power influence in regional
multilateralism, Indonesia relied largely on normative sources of leadership
such as its reputation, foreign policy autonomy and longstanding diplomatic
clout in the Asia Pacific.
Indonesia’s approach towards regional multilateralism and other foreign
policy matters was in part driven by its concern over asymmetric interstate
relations. This concern corresponded with Indonesia’s ‘Third World’
status and its contributions towards the founding of the NAM. In the late
1980s, Jakarta’s apprehension to the unfolding trends of rising economic
interdependence and protectionism by some developed economies was
focused on the deepening global inequality that these developments would
bring about. This was to the extent that Indonesian officials designated the
North–South gap as one of the biggest problems in the post-Cold War
period. Similarly, Indonesia’s response to Australia’s APEC proposal in 1989
included questions about whether and how the forum would promote more
equitable economic cooperation and narrow the North–South divide. This
issue also took priority under Indonesia’s chairing of APEC in 1994, when it
worked to bridge differences between the advanced and emerging economies
in the organization. As a member of the Global South and a former colony,
Indonesia had experienced the marginalization and exploitation by countries
considered as part of the Global North. These experiences arguably pushed
Indonesia to pursue more equality in interstate relations, especially in
terms of North–South interactions. Debates about such inequality again
reared their head in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, when western-
led international institutions were perceived to be arrogant and indifferent
towards Indonesia’s plight.
Throughout the post-Cold War period, Indonesia acknowledged the
power differentials between itself and the major powers, and sought to make
it more balanced. One manifestation of this pursuit was in the concept
of dynamic equilibrium, formulated by then Foreign Minister Marty
Natalegawa as an alternative to the balance of power. In promoting a dynamic
equilibrium for the region through the EAS, Indonesia aimed to temper the
rising or predominant power of any country and establish predictability in
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interstate relations through setting principles and norms. These deliberations

led Indonesia to support a broader membership for the EAS amid China’s
rise –first advocating for Australia, India and New Zealand to join the new
forum, and subsequently embracing US and Russian membership. The Bali
Principles that it put forward during its tenure as EAS chair in 2011 were
also meant to set out behavioural norms and standards for all 18 member
countries, regardless of whether they were major powers or small states.
Earlier, during negotiations to form APEC, Jakarta’s role in formulating the
Kuching Consensus –as an encapsulation of ASEAN’s position on the new
forum –was similarly directed at ensuring that the concerns of ASEAN
member states were not sidelined vis-à-vis the bigger economies.
To a large extent, Indonesia’s efforts to narrow the power differential gap
was pursued through the maintenance of ASEAN centrality in broader
regional arrangements. Given that Indonesia was regarded as the de facto
leader of ASEAN, having the organization assume a central role in regional
multilateralism would, logically, reinforce Indonesia’s central role in the
region as well. In discussions about the respective forms of APEC and the
EAS, Indonesia attempted to highlight the utility of ASEAN and existing
ASEAN-led networks. For instance, even as Jakarta became receptive to
Australia’s APEC proposal, it continued to express preference for utilizing
ASEAN arrangements including the PMC. The Kuching Consensus had
also emerged out of discussions among ASEAN member states and was
reflected as the ASEAN position on APEC. Jakarta moreover urged against
a hasty institutionalization of APEC, presumably to ensure that it did
not overshadow ASEAN’s slow pace of institutional development. These
reflected attempts to keep ASEAN’s place at the centre of a non-ASEAN-
led initiative.
Indonesia’s priority on ASEAN centrality was likewise demonstrated
during negotiations over the membership composition of the EAS. Amid the
initial confusion over how the EAS would fit with ASEAN-led arrangements,
Indonesia was understandably concerned that the new platform may
sideline ASEAN’s role –and potentially its own importance –in regional
community building. A couple of years earlier, Indonesia as the ASEAN
chair had launched ASEAN community-building efforts and advocated a
role for the organization beyond Southeast Asia. Indonesia thus worked
to ensure that ASEAN would be in the driver’s seat of the EAS. Later, in
response to the APC and East Asian Community proposals from Australia
and Japan respectively, Indonesia stressed that ASEAN and its current suite of
platforms were already sufficient for the region. It was additionally mindful
that ASEAN should be the main driver of engaging the US and Russia in
the regional architecture, via the EAS. As EAS chair in 2011, Indonesia also
expanded the forum’s agenda to include the strategically pertinent South
China Sea disputes. Certainly, an ASEAN that was able to project its centrality
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and relevance in the wider region would help to amplify Indonesia’s own
influence and bolster perceptions about its regional significance.
Indonesia’s status as the first among equals in Southeast Asia and ASEAN
was acknowledged by its regional counterparts. Australia, for example,
knew that it had to obtain Indonesia’s backing for the APEC initiative –in
terms of both its initial launch in 1989 as well as the proposal for a summit
in 1993 –in the first instance before the rest of the ASEAN member states
would commit their support. Indonesia’s ASEAN counterparts also displayed
recognition and acceptance of its status in the organization, as evident in the
fact that without its support, Malaysia’s EAEG proposal and its inclination for
a more exclusive EAS did not take off. With regard to the EAEG, Indonesian
officials cautioned against its inward-looking nature, while in the case of an
exclusive EAS membership, Jakarta was apprehensive about the sidelining of
ASEAN and the potential for China to dominate the multilateral platform.
To be fair, Indonesia was not the only one resisting Malaysia’s initiatives;
without a significant number of others concurring with Indonesia’s view, its
preferences would arguably be unlikely to prevail. For instance, the US had
also opposed the EAEG, with Japan and South Korea likewise reluctant to
endorse it (Chalermpalanupap, 2005, p 59). Similarly, countries such as Japan
and Singapore supported Indonesia’s more inclusive approach towards EAS
membership. Nevertheless, based on the rhetoric and behaviour of regional
actors in discussions over APEC and the EAS, it would not be implausible to
say that Indonesia’s diplomatic stature as the longstanding leader of Southeast
Asia and ASEAN had been regionally accepted.
In backing up its regional leader status, Indonesia demonstrated its
possession of certain soft power capabilities. The fact that it was able to
gather support from all the other ASEAN member states for the Kuching
Consensus as initially set out by then Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, succeed
in persuading Malaysia to accept a reduced posture for the EAEG and
manage the differences among APEC members over the trade liberalization
timeline in the Bogor Declaration testified to the sway and persuasive skills
of Indonesia’s diplomats and officials in APEC discussions. This is not to
say that Indonesia’s efforts did not meet with resistance. Rather, the key
point here is that Indonesia was able to overcome pockets of disagreement
and arrive at mutually acceptable solutions. For instance, Indonesia had
been hesitant to fully support the EAEG –despite Malaysia framing it as
an ASEAN-centric platform –in part due to its exclusionary nature and
the reluctance of some regional countries to participate. Between its own
preference for incorporating the renamed EAEC within APEC and Malaysia’s
insistence on linking it to the ASEAN Economic Ministers’ Meeting, both
sides reached a compromise which resulted in an EAEC directed by the
ASEAN economic ministers within the APEC framework. By the same
token, observers also highlighted Jakarta’s unique standing, which allowed
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it to facilitate discussions on the South China Sea –amid opposition from

Beijing –during its term as EAS chair.
Indonesia further displayed particular intellectual creativity in its approaches
to and visions for regional multilateralism. During its chairing of APEC in
1994, its proposed free trade timetable had come up against resistance from
Malaysia and China, among others. In response, then President Suharto
advanced the notion of ‘flexible consensus’, to accommodate reservations by
some countries that they would not be able to fulfil the trade liberalization
timeline set out in the Bogor Declaration. Years later, Natalegawa would
put forward his concept of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ as an argument for the
EAS to expand its membership. These examples encapsulated Indonesia’s
normative and ideational power. It may not have completely matched up to
the other middle powers or its regional counterparts in material assets, but
its diplomatic ability, intellectual innovation and recognition of its regional
leadership have certainly backed up its primus inter pares position in the region.
Indonesia’s approaches towards shaping APEC and the EAS illustrated
attempts to ensure that it would continue to have a seat at the regional table.
For Indonesia, this meant working through ASEAN, an organization in
which it had de facto leadership. Consequently, Jakarta sought to maintain
ASEAN centrality in APEC and the EAS. This would, in turn, reinforce
Indonesia’s central role in the region even with the major powers. Similar
to Australia, Indonesia’s behaviour in the two multilateral processes was a
response to what it regarded as the differentiated politics of the region. Jakarta
was aware that it had to deal with countries more influential and powerful
than itself, but at the same time conscious that it occupied a distinct stature
in Southeast Asia and ASEAN, and by association the broader Asia Pacific.
Taken together, these considerations then shaped Indonesia’s approach
towards regional multilateralism and the reception of its efforts.
South Korea
For the time periods under study, South Korea’s self-association with
the middle power profile fell somewhere between Australia’s relatively
enthusiastic promotion of its middle power identity and Indonesia’s tentative
embrace of the label starting from the late 2000s. To be sure, the size of the
South Korean economy was comparable to that of Australia, with the former’s
GDP figures even overtaking the latter’s in some years. While South Korea
first described itself as a middle power in 1991, subsequent mentions of the
term in foreign policy pronouncements were few and far between. In the late
1980s and early 1990s, South Korea’s leaders displayed more inclination to
portray the country as joining the industrialized world and moving towards a
central role in world affairs. It was not until the Kim Dae-jung administration
that Seoul started to more frequently describe itself as a middle power on
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the international stage. These conceptualizations built not only upon South
Korea’s economic wealth but also on its contributions to regional security, as
well as soft power attributes such as its credible reputation. It was evident that
South Korea, much like Australia and Indonesia, viewed itself as belonging to
a different category of states as the major powers and smaller states. Even as
it faced limitations in its foreign policy, Seoul acknowledged that there were
certain international obligations that the country should take on given its
level of material capabilities and what it regarded as its increasing diplomatic
clout. There was a distinct sense that South Korea, while not a major power,
could nonetheless achieve certain tasks –such as bridging the gap between
the advanced and emerging countries –that smaller countries would find
difficult to do. Given these considerations, Seoul viewed multilateralism as
a suitable way through which it could advocate shared interests and enhance
its influence in regional and global agendas.
Unlike Australia, South Korea’s efforts at power diffusion in the region have
predominantly involved East Asian actors. To some extent, this was because
South Korea’s ‘East Asian’ status had not been disputed –a stark contrast to
what Australia had to deal with. Consequently, it was arguably easier and less
controversial for South Korea to spearhead East Asian multilateral initiatives.
Yet, one could also point out that this was partly a matter of the context
that South Korea found itself in at the time. In APEC, for example, South
Korea’s role was in bringing China, Hong Kong and Taiwan into what was
already an established platform. Rather than having an influence on APEC’s
founding membership –as Australia did –South Korea facilitated the entry
of new members. Moreover, the admission of China, Hong Kong and
Taiwan was an issue that countries such as Australia, Japan and the US had
already expressed interest in even before APEC was formally inaugurated
in 1989. Following agreement among all participants at the second APEC
ministerial meeting in 1990, South Korea –as the host of the third APEC
ministerial meeting –had the task of working out the details of admission.
In this sense, Seoul’s contributions were necessarily focused on the Northeast
Asian economies with the outcome being that power within APEC was
diffused as the forum expanded.
The EAVG’s membership composition was similarly predetermined since
it was convened within the APT framework. While South Korea could
certainly have established a forum independent of the APT and consequently
have more autonomy to shape its membership, its considerations –arising
from the Asian financial crisis –meant that the APT seemed the most
suitable vehicle for the EAVG. China had emerged relatively unscathed from
the crisis and had improved its image as a responsible stakeholder in global
affairs. Meanwhile, the US as well as international organizations such as the
IMF had been criticized for mismanaging their responses towards the crisis,
which were detrimental for regional economies. Hence, there was a push
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for an ‘East Asian’ platform that could cater better to the needs of regional
countries in the event of a similar crisis in the future. South Korea’s EAVG
reflected an attempt to ensure that the region’s future was not concentrated
solely in the hands of the biggest economies –US, Japan and China –and that
smaller and medium-sized countries would have a say in collective decision
making. In this instance, as it was with APEC, Seoul’s efforts consequently
involved adding more East Asian voices to the respective agendas.
As a non-ASEAN member state, South Korea’s approach towards regional
multilateralism was also expected to be premised on diffusing power away
from ASEAN as the core multilateral organization in the Asia Pacific.
This preference, however, was not visible in the APEC case study given
that APEC had been formed two years prior to Seoul taking on a more
prominent role. South Korea was essentially working within the contours
of an already-defined platform, that is, an APEC with ASEAN occupying a
central place. In this sense, it was unclear if South Korea would have wanted
to shape APEC as a non-ASEAN-centric organization. In contrast, the
EAVG came across –at least initially –as having the effect of weakening
ASEAN centrality in the regional architecture. While it may have been
based on the APT process, the EAVG aimed to promote not an ‘ASEAN-
plus-three’ community, but rather, an ‘East Asian’ community with relatively
equal ownership across the ASEAN and non-ASEAN countries of the
regional community-building process. Indeed, both ASEAN and South
Korean officials have acknowledged the apprehension of Southeast Asian
countries that the EAVG and its proposals would relegate ASEAN to the
sidelines of the regional multilateral architecture. Given that South Korea was
not a member of ASEAN, it thus sought other avenues that would help to
elevate its place in the region and allow it to exert its influence over regional
agendas. To be fair, South Korea had demonstrated relatively consistent –if
mostly low profile or passive –support for ASEAN-centred multilateralism
through the years, even as Seoul’s main priority understandably remained on
the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia where ASEAN tended not to play
a paramount role. South Korea’s leading role in the EAVG, in this regard,
could be viewed as an aberration in its foreign policy focus.
In both APEC and the EAVG, Seoul was able to leverage its middle
power profile as well as diplomatic credibility to achieve its objectives. South
Korea’s role in facilitating the entry of China, Taiwan and Hong Kong
into APEC in 1991 was made possible thanks to its non-threatening and
non-antagonistic image. These characteristics were recognized by the other
actors, including the major powers. US officials acknowledged that having
Washington or Tokyo as the mediator in this instance would have made the
process more difficult and challenging. Admittedly, Seoul’s role here was in
large part a matter of circumstance. It was the only APEC member to retain
diplomatic ties with the ROC through 1991, which put its officials in a
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good position to conduct shuttle diplomacy and mediate the disagreements

between Beijing and Taipei on the latter’s status in APEC. From China’s
vantage point, working with South Korea was also in its interest. Other
than the obvious benefit of securing APEC membership, Beijing also had
the opportunity to reciprocate South Korea’s nordpolitik strategy of seeking
to improve relations with communist countries amid declining Cold War
tensions. It would have been challenging otherwise for China to establish
diplomatic relations with South Korea, or even for their officials to meet,
without raising questions from its North Korean ally (Hao and Zhuang,
1992, pp 1146–7). The issue of Chinese entry at the third APEC meeting,
which Seoul was scheduled to host, thus provided a pretext for South
Korean officials to hold bilateral meetings with their Chinese counterparts
from 1990 to 1991, which hastened the normalization of relations (Cha,
1999, p 80). South Korea’s success was moreover attributable to its ability
to conduct separate negotiations with China and Taiwan on sensitive and
divisive topics, such as Taiwan’s political status in APEC, and subsequently
arrive at a consensus acceptable to all parties.
South Korea’s non-threatening profile and diplomatic skills likewise stood
it in good stead when it came to the EAVG. While the EAVG was not
strictly speaking an inter-governmental grouping, the fact that the proposal
came from South Korea, rather than China or Japan, contributed towards
its success. The Sino-Japanese rivalry for regional leadership at the time –
prompted by a rising China vis-à-vis an economically stagnating Japan –
meant that any proposal made by either Beijing or Tokyo to form and chair
a regional grouping would have drawn suspicion and opposition from the
other side. On the other hand, the smaller Southeast Asian economies that
were affected by the financial crisis would also have found it challenging to
play a proactive role at the regional level. As such, South Korea was among
the best placed to initiate and coordinate the EAVG. Former South Korean
Foreign Minister Han Sung-joo was given the task of travelling around the
region to canvass support so that the EAVG could convene at the earliest
date. Once the meetings began, South Korean representatives –as the chair
of the EAVG and subsequent EASG working group –worked to coordinate
the various interests of regional countries towards the advancement of the
multilateral architecture. To some extent, the acceptance of Kim’s EAVG
proposal by regional actors and the appointment of a former South Korean
foreign minister as the EAVG chair was an affirmation of South Korea’s
credentials as a credible facilitator in the region.
Much like with Australia and Indonesia’s efforts in regional multilateralism,
the success of South Korea’s initiatives also depended in part on either support
or the absence of opposition from the major powers, such as China, Japan
and the US. Without China agreeing to South Korea’s proposal for Taiwan
to be referred to as ‘Chinese Taipei’ in APEC, or without China and Japan
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being amenable to South Korea’s EAVG initiative, it would have been

more challenging for Seoul’s initiatives to take off. In these forums, South
Korea was thus able to leverage its non-threatening profile and persuasive
skills to take the lead without raising suspicion from other states about its
regional ambitions. The EAVG case further stressed the importance of the
domestic political leadership in South Korea, as Seoul’s activism in regional
multilateralism during that time was credited very much to the vision and
initiative of then President Kim Dae-jung. When his presidential tenure
concluded, South Korea returned to a backseat role in broader Asia Pacific
multilateralism as Kim’s successor, President Roo Moo-hyun, preferred to
focus on the country’s role in Northeast Asia.
South Korea’s contributions towards expanding APEC’s membership and
the advancement of East Asian community building via the EAVG built upon
its soft power attributes as well as material capabilities. In doing so, South
Korea’s behaviour maximized its middle power status and helped to ensure
that it could effectively assume distinct roles in regional multilateralism that
no other actors were expected to do as effectively. Alongside South Korea’s
post-Cold War economic rise in particular, its leaders and diplomats saw
that the country was well placed to contribute towards certain segments
of regional and global affairs. These factors, combined with opportune
circumstances such as the decline of Cold War tensions or the Asian
financial crisis, influenced not just the shape and form of South Korea’s
regional multilateral initiatives but also how they were received by other
regional actors.
This section has sought to present the considerations and approaches of
each of the three middle powers –South Korea, Indonesia and Australia –
in APEC and the EAS. It is evident that all three countries were mindful of
the differentiated politics in the region, with a clear recognition of who the
major powers and smaller states were. Given this regional hierarchy, Australia,
Indonesia and South Korea regarded themselves as occupying the ‘middle’
stratum, with the respective power and influence to carry out certain kinds
of initiatives but not others. These deliberations informed their strategies
towards regional multilateralism, as they gravitated towards multilateral
platforms that they felt would protect their interests best. In their strategies,
each of the three middle powers attempted to shape regional multilateralism
to their own advantage. For Australia, this meant platforms with an Asia
Pacific membership that included the US; for Indonesia, this meant platforms
that were premised on ASEAN centrality; and for South Korea, this meant
platforms that enabled the Northeast Asian countries to be regarded as
equal partners in multilateralism vis-à-vis ASEAN. Certainly, the success
of these strategies depended very much on the context and circumstances
of the specific time period. What worked in the formative days of APEC,
for instance, did not necessarily work for East Asian community-building
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efforts in the late 1990s and 2000s. Nonetheless, the objective of all three
middle powers was to create or maintain for themselves a seat at the regional
multilateral table. Attempts to achieve this aimed to dilute the stratificatory
forces of the major powers and highlight the functional differentiation of
middle powers in the region. The next section re-examines the book’s
theoretical framework in light of the empirical discussions, and analyses
how the behaviour of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea in regional
multilateralism support or contradict the theoretical expectations.
Revisiting the argument: differentiation, power politics

and middle power behaviour
This book’s objective has been to explore the structural forces and processes
that drive middle power behaviour in Asia Pacific multilateralism. The
proposed argument is that differentiation serves as a mechanism that, through
power politics characterizing a specific context, conditions middle power
behaviour and shapes outcomes of regional multilateralism. These behaviour
and outcomes involve diluting major-power stratification and highlighting
the functional differentiation of middle powers. This process is illustrated
in Figure 6.1.
In both APEC and the EAS, the behaviour of all three middle powers
indeed helped to dilute stratification of the major powers and highlight
the functional differentiation of middle powers in the region, to varying
extents. Broadly, their efforts diffused power away from individual major
powers by bringing more actors into multilateral decision making. This was
the case even for Australia, which –despite displaying a preference for US
dominance in regional multilateralism –had also sought to diffuse power
away from the US to some degree, as evident in its initial approach towards
APEC and its inclusion of countries such as China and India in the APC.
This would have the effect of reducing the collective influence of the major
powers. Australia, Indonesia and South Korea also took on initiator, facilitator
or mediator roles in regional multilateralism that built upon their material
and ideational attributes. Certainly, specific details played out differently
Figure 6.1: How middle power behaviour is generated in multilateralism
Mechanism: Action + Context: Outcomes:

International political Power politics at a • Dilution of major-power
structure as constituted by particular time and place stratificatory forces
differentiation • Pursuit of functionally
differentiated roles for
middle powers
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depending on the negotiations of relative, relational and social power politics

within the respective contexts. The social aspect of power means ascribing
state power to social institutions, such as the government, ministries or
diplomatic corps of a particular country. Relative power refers to the notion
that power is meaningful only when compared against another actor, while
relational power reflects the idea that the type of power required depends on
the particular situation (Barkin, 2010, pp 18–20). During the time periods
under study, Australia, Indonesia and South Korea held certain views of
their respective power status and influence in the world, and based on those
understandings formed an idea of what the best strategies for their foreign
policies were, including towards regional multilateralism. This reflected
social power politics, where each country understood that even though –or
precisely because –they were not considered powerful in the conventional
sense, their level of material resources and associated status would help to
accentuate their suitability for certain strategies.
The behaviour of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea in APEC and the
EAS, as well as the consequences on regional multilateralism could also be
attributed to relative power politics. Material capabilities, such as economic
or diplomatic resources, placed the middle powers at a stronger position
as compared to the other non-major powers. Their access to economic
resources in their outreach efforts would have contributed towards the success
of their respective initiatives. In the case of Australia’s efforts with APEC
and South Korea’s efforts with the EAVG, for example, both countries were
able to send special envoys around the region to canvass support. Beyond
material assets, relative power politics in terms of ideational narratives and
normative influence also played out in the middle powers’ favour to some
extent. Indonesia’s diplomatic clout as the traditional leader of ASEAN,
for instance, bolstered its efforts to ensure that the organization remained
largely cohesive and retained its central place in regional multilateralism.
This was particularly apparent in Indonesia’s success –admittedly, with the
support of other like-minded states –in overriding preferences for a more
exclusionary form of regional multilateralism. Jakarta’s standing in Southeast
Asia and ASEAN, and consequently in the wider region, was arguably the
main buttress for its success.
Meanwhile, views of South Korea and Australia as non-threatening middle
powers vis-à-vis the major powers meant that regional countries were
more open towards supporting their proposals. The US may be the world’s
hegemon, with Japan or China rising as its challenger (depending on the time
period), but these countries’ major power status ironically limited their roles
in the formation of APEC and the EAS. At the same time, when compared to
the smaller states, South Korea and Australia had comparably more resources
and credibility that they could leverage to demonstrate their commitment.
This was especially evident in Australia’s establishment of APEC, as well as
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South Korea’s attempt to mediate between China and Taiwan joining APEC
in the early 1990s and its initiative to convene the EAVG in the late 1990s.
Another illustration of relative power politics playing out, this time involving
the interaction of the three middle powers’ behaviour, would be in terms
of the ideational force posed by ASEAN centrality in the region. Although
the ten ASEAN member states were, individually, materially weaker than
Australia and South Korea, the latter two countries found themselves having
to acquiesce to ASEAN’s preferences in issues of regional multilateralism.
All three middle powers also attempted to (re)shape the broader
characteristics of the multilateral context, to ensure that power politics would
be to their advantage. Australia, most clearly, repeatedly sought to put in
place the contours of an Asia Pacific region. This would accord Canberra a
rightful seat at the regional table, in contrast to its likely exclusion from an
‘East Asian’ region. Indonesia’s insistence on ASEAN centrality in APEC
and the EAS could also be read in a similar way. Having ASEAN assume a
central role in regional organizations would enable Indonesia, as the de facto
leader of ASEAN, to amplify its own influence and importance in the wider
region. The diffusion of power that middle powers promote is thus not in
an unconstrained manner, but guided by their own considerations of how
they could still retain an advantage over the rest of the non-major powers.
In terms of relational power politics, for middle powers in the multilateral
context the ability to persuade is arguably most essential (see, for example,
Kim, 2015; Gyngell, 2019; Teo, 2022). This relates to the notion that
middle powers lack sufficient coercive capabilities –or lack the political
will to use them –to get other countries to do what they want, and their
most valuable diplomatic tool would lie in forging like-minded coalitions
to put forward a collective voice on regional and global matters. To be sure,
possessing a sufficient level of material capabilities also contributes towards
the success of persuasive strategies, in terms of shaping perceptions about the
middle power’s credibility and reputation. Both in the APEC and EAS case
studies, Australia, Indonesia and South Korea relied on their persuasive and
negotiating skills, backed up by their material sources of influence, to gather
support for their efforts. This was certainly so when it came to convincing
the major powers which –given their greater capabilities and strategic weight
in the world –could easily turn away from multilateral cooperation, and
also true of the middle powers’ approach towards countries perceived to
be materially weaker than themselves, such as the ASEAN member states.
For Australia and South Korea especially, it was precisely because they
were neither major economic nor military powers that they came across as
less aggressive and less likely to sideline the smaller countries’ interests in
collective decision making. As middle powers that were perceived not to
possess regional hegemonic ambitions, it was more acceptable for them to
take the lead on multilateral initiatives in the Asia Pacific. The ideational
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qualities associated with being a ‘middle power’ were thus very much shaped
by the material attributes of these countries. South Korea’s facilitation of the
entry of China and Taiwan into APEC offers another case in point. As the
only APEC member to still have official ties with the ROC at the time, South
Korea was in the unique position of having the ability to mediate between
Beijing and Taipei. In this situation, South Korea was the country with the
most appropriate ‘power’ to carry out this specific task. These characteristics
were not only promoted by the countries themselves but also acknowledged
by other actors, including the major powers. This is significant as it suggests
that even countries with the highest-ranked economic or military power
were aware that to achieve certain outcomes, others –with less material
capabilities –were better placed to take the lead.
Relational power politics also involves an understanding that, while major
powers may not be as well-suited for certain tasks as the middle powers, the
former’s support for middle power initiatives is nevertheless important to an
extent. The success of APEC vis-à-vis the EAEG, as well as the expansion
process of the EAS demonstrated the salience of major power backing, or at
the very least, an absence of major power opposition. Moreover, Australia’s
initiatives tended to aim at or result in stronger US engagement in regional
multilateralism. Australia had been among the US’ closest allies and Canberra
generally regarded Washington’s presence in the region as beneficial to its
own interests. Bolstering the US role in regional multilateralism would serve
to reinforce Australia’s own place in an Asia Pacific region, and would also
help to counter any hostile or exclusionary intentions that regional countries
may potentially display towards Australia. It was therefore no surprise that
Australia’s attempts at diluting major-power stratification collectively in the
region involved strengthening US influence at the expense of other rising
powers that may be hostile to its own interests.
Meanwhile, although South Korea was also a US ally and had a vested
interest in strengthening its relations with Washington, ensuring the latter’s
presence in the region appeared to have been less of a concern in Seoul’s
multilateral initiatives. Given the surrounding contexts of the time, South
Korea’s role in the enlargement of APEC and its EAVG initiative focused
more on enhancing the influence of Northeast Asian actors in regional
multilateralism. In both instances, support from major powers such as Japan
and China for South Korea’s role were certainly vital to its success. It is
useful to note, nevertheless, South Korea’s dismissal of concerns about its
EAVG being similar to Malaysia’s EAEG which –as a South Korean media
article described –had ‘an anti-American overtone with political intentions’
(‘Kim suggests’, 1998). Lee Shin-wha notes that President Kim’s vision of
East Asian cooperation had also been premised on South Korea’s strong
alliance relations with the US (Lee, 2008, pp 237–8). Last but not least,
Indonesia had embraced a non-aligned foreign policy and had traditionally
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been wary of the dominance of any one major power in the region. Yet,
even as Jakarta demonstrated a clear preference for a balance of major power
influence, its efforts to bring the US into the EAS and in issuing the APEC
Bogor Declaration for trade liberalization in the region would arguably not
have succeeded without the major powers and major economies agreeing
with its approaches.
The behaviour of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea in APEC and
the EAS processes also reflected the extent to which the performance and
effectiveness of middle power roles are very much dependent on context
and the opportunities it offered. Without declining military and ideological
tensions and a corresponding rise of the economic agenda, Australia’s
APEC initiative might not have materialized in 1989. Canberra’s attempt to
replicate this success with the APC in the late 2000s faced more obstacles as
a result of changing regional dynamics. Without the other APEC members
switching diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC before 1991,
the task of facilitating the entry of China, Taiwan and Hong Kong might not
have fallen to South Korea. Without the ascendancy to power of President
Kim –who had a strong vision for regional integration –amid the Asian
financial crisis and intensifying Sino-Japanese rivalry, South Korea might
not have been able to assume the key role it did in the EAVG. Without the
new President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono agreeing to inaugurate the EAS
in 2005 despite hesitancy from Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the
platform’s development may have turned out differently. Later, without a
change in US government and Washington’s subsequent change in its Asia
policy, Indonesia might not have succeeded in bringing the US into the
EAS. All these statements may be counterfactual, but they do not negate
the point about conducive circumstances. For both the APEC and EAS case
studies, the context played an important role in determining, first, whether
middle powers attempted to take action regarding regional multilateralism,
and second, whether these attempts were received positively by other regional
actors. These helped to create the possibility for middle power behaviour and
their outcomes. The negotiations and contestations occurring in the power
politics surrounding the respective middle power initiatives consequently
shaped the eventual form of APEC and the EAS. In this sense, the middle
powers were able to establish the terms for multilateral cooperation in ways
that enhanced their own ‘power’ within the region.
The approaches of all three countries in the two case studies also revealed
the differentiated politics that constituted the regional structure. This was
evident both in the circumstances leading up to the middle power initiatives,
as well as the altered context following the outcomes of those initiatives.
Prior to the APEC proposal, as well as the processes related to the EAS, there
was a clear sense of which countries were the major powers and the roles
that were associated with their status. The fact that US hegemony and its
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associated obligations were acknowledged by other actors, or that China was

deemed a rising power, are examples of this. Such structural conditions of
stratificatory and functional differentiation, as well as the interactions between
the various forms of differentiation, generated the possibilities for Australia,
Indonesia and South Korea to pursue their respective strategies towards
regional multilateralism. The three countries viewed themselves in certain
ways and through these narratives formed an idea of which other countries
they were most similar to, and which countries they were different from.
Such views were moreover used to justify certain elements in their foreign
policy; in this instance, their approaches towards regional multilateralism.
All three countries exhibited awareness that while they were not as powerful
in the same way that the major powers were, they nevertheless could still
extend their influence in specific areas given their resources and profiles.
Their behaviour and subsequent outcomes could be ascribed not just to
the attributes of the countries under study but also to the social relations
that they were embedded in. This means that the ability of middle powers to
dilute major-power stratification and assume functionally differentiated roles
were, in part, derived from their place in the regional structure, including
their ‘interdependent relations’ with other countries, regional organizations
and so on (Sayer, 2010, p 105). To be sure, the possession of economic or
diplomatic resources, or the projection of a middle power identity, would
be important in the conduct of middle power behaviour. Equally crucial
for the concept of middle powers, however, would also be the notion that
these states were located within social networks that (re)affirmed their middle
power roles or status as a distinct category from the other states. In contrast
to accounts that regard middle powers as having to overcome structural
constraints, this study has thus pointed out the possibility that structure
could also be enabling for middle power behaviour. By itself, however, the
effects of the differentiated structure would not be activated. It was through
the process of power politics that differentiation generated middle power
behaviour and outcomes.
At this point, it would be useful to underscore the interdependence of
structure and agency in international political outcomes. ‘Structure without
agency’, Donald Emmerson writes in the context of Indonesia’s foreign
policy, ‘is mere potential’ (Emmerson, 2012, pp 49–50). He adds that
‘[a]‌ctual outcomes will depend on what both local and foreign decision
makers see, say and do –and do not see, say or do’ (Emmerson, 2012, p 50).
Moreover, as Berth Danermark, Mats Ekström, Liselotte Jakobsen and Jan
Ch. Karlsson observe, ‘actions are never determined by a certain structure;
they are merely conditioned’ (Danermark et al, 2002, p 56). Likewise,
middle power behaviour in regional multilateralism were conditioned, but
not determined, by differentiation. Within the options made possible by
the structural relations of differentiation, Australia, Indonesia and South
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Korea, depending on various considerations, adopted certain strategies

that they thought would best achieve their respective interests in regional
multilateralism. This suggests that while structure may have primacy, agency
also plays an important role in accounting for outcomes. Consequently, there
is nothing ‘fixed’ or ‘eternal’ about middle powers (Sayer, 2010, p 105).
Robert W. Cox’s paraphrasing of John Holmes in 1989 that ‘the middle-
power role is not a fixed universal but something that has to be rethought
continually in the context of the changing state of the international system’
certainly continues to ring true (Cox, 1989, p 825). The motivations and
outcomes of middle power behaviour change depending on the context.
Thus far, the theoretical and empirical analyses have focused heavily on
the approaches of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea towards APEC and
the EAS. The study of those two instances of regional multilateralism has
illustrated the book’s core argument about how structural differentiation
and power politics shape middle power behaviour. It may be worth taking a
brief look at how this argument holds up in the strategies of the same three
countries beyond APEC and the EAS. This would indicate if the framework
and findings about middle power behaviour in regional multilateralism have
broader applicability across other organizations in the Asia Pacific.
Middle power behaviour in the ARF and ADMM-Plus

Within the Asia Pacific, other multilateral forums that incorporate all three
middle powers would be the ARF and the ADMM-Plus. Applying the
book’s argument to the formation of the ARF and ADMM-Plus, we see
that developments played out slightly differently from the APEC and EAS
case studies.
The ARF’s inauguration in 1994 occurred in much the same circumstances
that had characterized the early days of APEC. Anxieties over US withdrawal
from the region and the potential for instability, uncertainty over China’s
rise, as well as the emergence of new ways of thinking about security post-
Cold War, drove some regional countries to see the value in multilateral
security cooperation. While the APEC process had already acquired political
significance as the first intergovernmental meeting in the post-Cold War Asia
Pacific –and even more so with a leaders’ meeting added in 1993 –there was
a gap in the regional architecture for an arrangement that would focus more
obviously on security issues. Around the same time of APEC’s establishment,
Australia was also advocating for a multilateral security dialogue for the
region. On separate occasions throughout 1990, Foreign Minister Gareth
Evans highlighted the usefulness of a process akin to the Conference of
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), for Asia –a ‘Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Asia’ (CSCA), as it were (as cited in Frost,
2016, pp 92–3). The reasoning behind Evans’ CSCA proposal was similar
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to the case that Australia had made for APEC. ‘[A]‌t a time of rapid and
fundamental change in the international and regional environment’, Evans
stated in parliament, Australia should embrace a ‘multidimensional policy …
to help shape a security environment which is favourable to Australia’s
interests’ (Evans, 1989d). He added that it was ‘very much in [Australia’s]
interests to be seen as a significant partner to the region, an accepted and
natural participant in regional affairs’ (Evans, 1989d).
Australia was certainly not the only one of ASEAN’s dialogue partners to
push for a regional security dialogue. Canada also floated its own suggestion
for such an arrangement. These ideas, however, found little affirmation with
ASEAN and the US. ASEAN was wary of what it regarded as ‘Western-style
legalistic institution-building’ and the challenge that a second Australian
regional initiative –after APEC –might pose to its relevance in the region,
while Washington feared that regional security multilateralism would
undermine its bilateral security alliances (Evans, 2017, pp 162–3; see also
Lim, 1998, p 121). Acknowledging that the most effective way forward
would be to ‘accommodate ASEAN’s concerns’ and ‘accept … ASEAN
centrality’, Evans dropped references to a ‘CSCA’ but continued to call
for ‘a multilateral dialogue and confidence-building process’ for the region
(Evans, 2017, p 163). In this respect, Australia’s approach here was similar
to what it did with the APC and EAS.
To be sure, the need for a framework for multilateral security dialogue
was something that ASEAN member states, including Indonesia, agreed
on. However, rather than establishing new arrangements –and the aversion
was presumably reserved especially for those proposed by non-ASEAN
members –ASEAN preferred to rely on its existing platforms (Severino,
2009, p 8). Alatas stressed that the ASEAN approach remained ‘of central
validity and relevance’ (as cited in Katsumata, 2009, p 62). Later, building
on a suggestion by Japan to utilize the ASEAN PMC that brought together
ASEAN member states and the dialogue partners, ASEAN decided in 1992
to add security issues to the PMC agenda that had thus far been limited to
economic matters (Leifer, 1996, p 21). The importance of opportunity is
once again highlighted here, as by this time, the US had become much more
open to the idea of regional security multilateralism (Leifer, 1996, pp 27–8).
In this sense, the circumstances were conducive for the establishment of ‘a
new forum for security discussions, based on the ASEAN PMC but with a
wider membership’ that would include countries such as China, Russia and
Vietnam (Frost, 2016, p 95). Indonesia’s approach to regional autonomy
also evolved. Shifting away from its previous policy preference to exclude
the major powers from Southeast Asia, Jakarta accepted the notion that
‘regional security would be best ensured … through “equilibrium among
them and between them and Southeast Asia”’ (Acharya, 2014, p 169). Still,
as some scholars observe, Indonesia was ‘less than comfortable within the
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ARF’ given that it was now ‘locked into a security institution [with] major
non-Southeast Asian powers’ such as China, Japan and the US (Leifer, 1996,
p 50; Suryadinata, 1996, p 84). Arguably in light of the power asymmetries,
Jakarta emphasized that the ARF should be focused on facilitating norms
building and consultations rather than problem solving –essentially what
was described as the ‘ASEAN Way’ of cooperation (Suryadinata, 1996, p
84; Acharya, 2015, p 64). Indeed, even though the ARF was launched as a
forum to discuss regional security issues beyond Southeast Asia or ASEAN,
Natalegawa notes that the use of the term ‘ASEAN’, rather than ‘Asian’, in
its name was deliberate ‘to underscore the ASEAN-centred and ASEAN-led
nature of the forum’ (Natalegawa, 2018, p 79). This allowed Indonesia, as
the leader of ASEAN, to assume a more significant role in the wider Asia
Pacific region.
It was perhaps not surprising that despite ASEAN’s insistence on its
centrality in the ARF, some non-ASEAN countries attempted to carve out
a more equal role for themselves. South Korea, for instance, was reportedly
among the countries ‘which felt their own regional agendas were being
neglected’ and ‘resented ASEAN’s diplomatic assertiveness and proprietary
role within the ARF’ (Leifer, 1996, p 41). Seoul was particularly ‘irritated
by its inability to promote formally its own priority of a North-east Asian
dialogue’, and Foreign Minister Gong Ro-myung emphasized that both
ASEAN and non-ASEAN members should ‘make common efforts to
develop the ARF on an equal footing’ (Leifer, 1996, p 41; as cited in Soh,
1996). Michael Leifer reveals that both Japan and the US also privately
believed that ASEAN centrality should be ‘transitional’ (Leifer, 1996, p 41).
Ultimately, however, the major powers were ‘not sufficiently troubled’ by
ASEAN’s central role in the ARF to derail the process (Leifer, 1996, p 41).
Nonetheless, and in response to appeals from non-ASEAN participants in
the ARF to share the chairpersonship, ASEAN implemented a co-chairing
system in the ARF inter-sessional meetings and support groups (Morada,
2010, p 19).
While the analysis of the ARF here remains at a very superficial level, it is
clear that the differentiated structure was similar to what had characterized
the circumstances surrounding APEC’s launch –given the similar time period
and context –and this resulted in similar motivations driving Australia,
Indonesia and South Korea in regional multilateralism. To varying extents,
the three middle powers aimed to dilute major-power stratification and
undertake functionally differentiated roles to serve their respective interests,
but the outcomes played out differently from the APEC case study. This
was a consequence of the specific power politics that surrounded the ARF’s
formation. More than in APEC, ASEAN centrality was arguably a greater
force in the establishment of the ARF. Neither Australia nor South Korea
had the opportunity to assume significant roles in this instance, although
147
Canberra –much like its involvement with the expanded EAS –contributed
intellectually to the forum’s creation. While the ARF as a multilateral
platform certainly helped to dilute the collective stratificatory forces of the
major powers, it is hard to attribute this dilution to the efforts of Australia
and South Korea. In contrast, Indonesia’s efforts in shaping the ARF was
more apparent and enabled the Southeast Asian middle power to ensure its
relevance in the wider region.
Turning now to the ADMM-Plus, the regional circumstances for its launch
in 2010 were arguably similar to those leading to the EAS’ inauguration
in 2005 and expansion in 2011. The proliferation of ASEAN-centric
multilateralism, as well as what some regional countries saw as the need for
a security forum led by ASEAN (in contrast to the Shangri-la Dialogue that
was organized by the UK-based International Institute for Strategic Studies)
and the defence sector (in contrast to the foreign-ministry-led ARF), provided
the basis for the ADMM-Plus (Capie, 2013, pp 17–18; Kuik, 2016, p 93).
A brief investigation of the ADMM-Plus’ beginnings, however, suggests
that the three middle powers did not play particularly instrumental roles as
compared to the EAS. This was due to how the ADMM-Plus originated. The
platform was a natural offshoot of the ADMM, which had been inaugurated
in 2006, and the convening of the ADMM itself was an objective laid out
in the 2004 Plan of Action for the ASEAN Security Community. While
the ASEAN Security Community had been an Indonesian initiative, the
ADMM-Plus appeared to be driven by several other ASEAN member states.
During the first ADMM hosted by Malaysia, then Deputy Prime Minister
Najib Razak had already shared his vision for an ADMM-Plus process that
would include ASEAN’s partners (Teo, 2008). The subsequent ASEAN/
ADMM chairs, such as the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, led
efforts to establish the membership criteria and modalities for the ADMM-
Plus (Teo, 2008; Chiang, 2014). Chiang Chie Foo, who was former senior
adviser to Singapore’s Ministry of Defence, recalls the importance for the
ADMM-Plus to ‘start right and be inaugurated with the right configuration
and composition of countries’ (Chiang, 2014). Following discussions among
the ASEAN defence ministers, it was agreed that the ADMM would invite
Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Russia and
the US to form the ADMM-Plus in 2010. Unlike in APEC and the EAS,
the establishment of the ADMM-Plus was very much an ASEAN-driven
process. The roles of non-ASEAN countries such as Australia and South
Korea were more passive, with little space for them to take the initiative. In
the case of Indonesia, it also did not appear as active as some of the other
ASEAN member states in shaping the ADMM-Plus. This was arguably for
two reasons. First, the ADMM-Plus was already envisioned at the time of the
ADMM’s establishment. Second, negotiations over the ADMM-Plus were
led by the respective ASEAN/ADMM chairs of the time, which did not
148
include Indonesia. At the broad level, the argument could thus be made that
the context in this instance of regional multilateralism was not particularly
conducive for middle power behaviour and their effects to emerge.
Depending on the context and power politics involved, the success of
middle power strategies in regional multilateralism may thus vary even if they
maintain certain capabilities and attributes. What remains clear, nevertheless,
is that all three middle powers, being conscious of their non-major power
status, have sought to ensure their own relevance and place in the region
through multilateral platforms.
Conclusion
Building primarily on the empirical data in the APEC and EAS case studies,
this chapter has weaved together an account of how the differentiated
structure of regional politics generated middle power behaviour in Asia
Pacific multilateralism, with the outcomes depending on the process of
power politics that surrounded the particular initiatives. In this analysis,
differentiation theory has served as a heuristic to enrich explanations of
middle power behaviour in multilateralism. The options available to middle
powers in the context of regional multilateralism, as they sought to carve for
themselves a seat at the various tables, were made possible by the presence of
differentiation in the regional structure. The specific strategies and outcomes
of middle power behaviour, however, were shaped by their respective
considerations, resources and attributes, as well as the social relations they
were embedded in. The effects of the differentiated structure are thus
activated by the social, relational and relative power politics that surround
middle power behaviour in a particular instance of multilateralism. The
specifics of such negotiations of power politics would vary across the three
middle powers not just due to their differences in material capabilities but
also considering the different ways that they perceive regional developments
and actors, as well as the different ways that they are perceived by others in
the region. The attributes and strategies of middle powers thus have to be
understood in light of the context and shared meanings that surround their
deployment of power.
Moreover, both structural and agential factors play a part in driving middle
power behavioural outcomes. As we have seen, structure conditions middle
power behaviour, but agency and the ability to seize opportunities are equally
crucial to determine the final form and success of middle power initiatives.
The brief exploration of middle power behaviour (or lack thereof) in the
ARF and the ADMM-Plus emphasize this point. Overall, nevertheless,
middle power initiatives aim to dilute major-power stratification and
highlight functional differentiation to the middle power’s benefit. This is a
way for middle powers to maintain their relevance in international politics.
149
This would also demonstrate the ability of middle powers to shape the
multilateral environment within which participating states operate. Bearing
in mind the oft-cited claim that middle powers prefer and are better able
to leverage multilateralism, the analysis here thus adds to such accounts by
outlining the ways that middle powers –as a distinct category of states vis-
à-vis the major powers and smaller states –utilize multilateral platforms to
their advantage.
150
7
Conclusion
Contributing towards the study of middle powers

This study has made the case for a new approach to explain middle power
behaviour in multilateral platforms, focusing in particular on the Asia Pacific.
In contrast to views that non-major powers do not matter in international
politics, the book has aimed to demonstrate the value of an alternative
structural perspective –specifically one based on differentiation –in the
study of middle power behaviour, and highlighted how the differentiated
structure may interact with power politics to generate middle power
behaviour in multilateralism. In turn, such middle power behaviour shapes
the environment within which other states operate. Through negotiations
of power politics, the outcomes of middle power behaviour are manifested
in the dilution of major-power stratificatory forces and the middle powers
taking on functionally differentiated roles. This process contributes towards
maintaining the relevance and standing of middle powers in regional
multilateralism. The book has illustrated this argument by examining the
behaviour of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea in the creation of APEC
from the late 1980s to early 1990s, as well as in the formative days of the
EAS from the late 1990s to early 2010s.
The findings of the book contribute towards two bodies of literature,
first, on middle power theory more broadly, and second, on middle
powers in Asia Pacific multilateralism. The introduction of differentiation
theory to the study of middle powers has enabled the incorporation of a
concept which, although implied in many analyses of middle powers, has
not appeared to feature prominently in the literature. Indeed, the current
position, identity and behaviour approaches to middle powers reflect the
notion of differentiation, but do not explicitly theorize it. This gap in the
middle power literature is puzzling, given the extent to which the middle
power concept is premised on the notion of how such states are differentiated
from the major powers and smaller states. By putting differentiation at the
centre of the analysis, the book’s framework takes a fundamental aspect of
151
the middle power concept and demonstrates how middle powers could be
a distinct category with material and ideational/social characteristics rarely
possessed by other types of states, upon which their behavioural strategies
are built. Reframing middle power behaviour through the analytical lens of
differentiation has facilitated an understanding not simply of what middle
powers seek to achieve in international politics, but also of the contextual
circumstances and structural conditions that make those outcomes possible.
The combination of differentiation theory with power politics has
additionally shed light on the multidimensional aspects of middle power
behaviour and their outcomes. Whether middle powers are effective in
their initiatives depend not only on the differentiated structure but also how
the negotiations of social, relative and relational power politics play out in
specific contexts. This reinforces extant arguments that the study of middle
powers should be approached from the combined perspectives of various IR
paradigms. As highlighted in the case studies, negotiations of power politics
have been crucial in explaining middle power behaviour and whether they
achieved their desired outcomes in Asia Pacific multilateralism. Questions
such as what kind of power is suited for a particular context and whether
such power is accepted by the other stakeholders would matter for middle
powers seeking to exercise their influence in multilateral platforms. This
book has also highlighted the relations between the material and ideational
aspects of middle power status. On the one hand, middle powers are viewed
by the smaller states as less threatening than the major powers, due to their
perceived lack of hegemonic ambitions and major-power-level resources.
Yet, middle powers still have sufficient capabilities and diplomatic clout to
carry through their initiatives, enhancing their profiles as credible and reliable
initiators, facilitators or mediators. This sets them apart from many of the
smaller countries. The case studies also indicate the close relations between
stratificatory and functional differentiation. For example, the position of
middle powers in terms of stratification contribute towards their functions
in international politics. In turn, the kinds of functions they assume in
international politics feeds back into whether they occupy a higher or lower
position in the stratification of states.
The book’s analysis further supplements existing literature that makes the
claim that middle powers are more inclined towards multilateral diplomacy,
by taking a deep dive into middle power contributions towards Asia Pacific
multilateralism. While the behaviour approach towards middle powers has
frequently argued for the importance of multilateral channels for middle
powers to secure their interests, it is not so clear how middle powers interact
with multilateralism. By constructing and applying a theoretical framework
oriented around differentiation to middle power behaviour in Asia Pacific
multilateralism, the findings here have illustrated that the behaviour of
Australia, Indonesia and South Korea has had an impact in terms of
152
Conclusion
diluting major-power stratificatory forces and middle powers performing

particular roles that other types of states could not do as effectively. Amid
the instrumental roles played by ASEAN and major powers such as China,
Japan and the US, these middle powers have also demonstrated their ability
to significantly contribute towards the formation of specific multilateral
initiatives in the region. Their agency and attributes are certainly an
important factor, as the preceding chapters have shown. Equally important,
however, are the structural forces of differentiation that have conditioned
the multilateral diplomacy of the three middle powers. Here, we see how
the middle powers fundamentally interact with multilateralism and the
conditions under which middle power behaviour can hence influence
regional dynamics. The argument here thus contributes to the existing
middle power literature in terms of offering a novel conceptual language
to capture what it is, exactly, that middle powers do when it comes to
multilateralism, and the kinds of outcomes their behaviour could achieve.
Policy-wise, the findings of this book also offer several implications.
For one, while middle powers may not be as influential or strategically
important as the major powers, it is unhelpful to simply dismiss the notion
that middle powers could make significant contributions in international
politics. Certainly, the influence of middle powers should not be overstated.
The lack of hard power capabilities and diplomatic clout vis-à-vis the major
powers may logically limit the effectiveness of middle power strategies to
some extent. But even as we acknowledge that middle powers may not be
as influential or strategically important in the same way that major powers
are, the book has demonstrated that middle powers could under certain
circumstances be better suited than the major powers for particular tasks. In
some cases, the lack of hard power capabilities has also worked in the middle
powers’ favour and bolstered their non-threatening profiles. As we have
seen in the APEC and EAS case studies, middle powers do have the ability
to shape the environment within which major powers operate. Through
efforts to dilute major-power stratificatory forces and seek out functionally
differentiated roles, middle powers were able to reinforce or alter specific
aspects of multilateralism in the Asia Pacific.
To be sure, the book’s findings also suggest that any middle power
initiatives in the Asia Pacific environment would need to obtain the support
of the major powers, as well as ASEAN. Particularly regarding the former,
it is not that middle powers were simply being used by the major powers
to fulfil tasks that the latter did not want to take on. This suggests that
middle powers lacked agency, which was not the case. Rather, going back
to the point about power politics, it reflects the idea that middle powers
have to take into account the geopolitical context they are located in, and
navigate those circumstances by using their material and ideational/social
traits. Moreover, for Australia and South Korea –neither of which are an
153
ASEAN member state –getting the association’s support would be essential

for multilateral initiatives that seek to encompass the whole Asia Pacific
region. By effectively deploying their material resources, as well as making
use of the narratives surrounding their status and strategies, there is thus
potential for middle powers to make a difference in international politics.
In this sense, international politics are not necessarily defined only in terms
of the major powers.
The value of multilateralism for middle power diplomacy, moreover,
goes beyond forming like-minded coalitions or the amplification of non-
major power voices in collective decision making. How these objectives are
achieved should also be part of policy-making considerations. In this regard,
the dilution of major-power stratification and allocation of functionally
differentiated roles contribute towards the understanding of what middle
powers could do in multilateral platforms and how they could pursue
their objectives. For middle powers seeking to illuminate their relevance
in international and regional affairs, the availability of opportunities and
visionary leaders are also important. The end of the Cold War in the late
1980s and early 1990s, as well as the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis
in the late 1990s and the growth of ASEAN-led multilateralism amid Sino-
Japanese rivalry in the early 2000s, all provided opportunities for Australia,
Indonesia and South Korea to put in place initiatives that enhanced their
own roles and standing in regional multilateralism. These circumstances
were complemented by the visions of particular leaders and diplomats,
such as Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, Indonesian Foreign
Minister Marty Natalegawa as well as South Korean President Kim Dae-
jung, who understood the ways in which their respective countries could
contribute towards shaping Asia Pacific multilateralism and pursued the
corresponding strategies.
Overall, the book has sought to advance a new way of thinking about
middle powers and their behaviour in multilateralism. The differential
framework presented here builds on and adds to the existing works by
middle power theorists. The empirical findings regarding middle powers in
the Asia Pacific also contribute towards the current body of knowledge on
what explains the behaviour of countries such as Australia, Indonesia and
South Korea in regional multilateralism.
Areas for further research

To strengthen the explanatory value of a differential framework for middle
power behaviour in multilateralism and international politics, there are several
areas of further research that should be undertaken. Such research would
build on the book’s findings and analysis, and reinforce the importance of
differentiation in the study of middle powers.
154
Conclusion
The first area stems from the research design in this book, which
determined Australia, Indonesia and South Korea as the quintessential middle
powers for study. Considering the claims of middle power distinctiveness,
it would be necessary to also examine the approaches of major powers and
smaller states towards Asia Pacific multilateralism. The objective would be
to find out if, for example, a country that possesses less material resources
compared to the three middle powers and perceives itself to be a smaller or
less influential state, adopts behavioural strategies akin to that of the middle
powers when it comes to multilateralism. And if so, would the outcomes
be similar? The same parameters could also be applied to study a country
that has greater material resources and has been regarded as a major power.
A thorough study of the major powers and smaller states’ approaches towards
regional multilateralism would reveal if seeking to dilute major-power
stratification and pursuing functionally differentiated roles are unique to
middle powers. It would also trace how processes of power politics play out
in the initiatives of the major powers and smaller states. Such an investigation
would highlight the differences between middle powers and other types of
states in multilateralism. Should the findings reveal that the major powers
and smaller states are unlikely to achieve the same outcomes as the middle
powers, this would help to reinforce the notion that middle powers indeed
occupy a distinctive place in regional multilateralism. On the contrary, if
the major powers and smaller states are successful in achieving those same
outcomes, it would then be necessary to relook the framework and argument
that has been proposed in this book.
The second area for further research would be to look more deeply at
middle power behaviour in other instances of Asia Pacific multilateralism.
This has been done briefly in Chapter 6, where the approaches of Australia,
Indonesia and South Korea in the ARF and ADMM-Plus were outlined. The
purpose here has been to compare middle power behaviour in the ARF and
ADMM-Plus with APEC and the EAS, but a more comprehensive study of
middle power behaviour in other regional multilateral platforms would be
valuable in terms of establishing a broad argument about how and why such
countries behave the way they do in Asia Pacific forums. It would certainly
facilitate a better understanding of how consistent middle powers are in
their multilateral strategies. This would then add to the knowledge on how
the differentiated structure interacts with potentially different circumstances
of power politics to generate middle power behaviour in multilateralism.
A third avenue for research, which overlaps with the elements in the
preceding two research directions but could remain a separate study, is
to examine the multilateral behaviour of Canberra, Jakarta and Seoul in
their near neighbourhoods. Australia’s approach towards multilateralism in
Oceania, or South Korea’s approach towards multilateralism in Northeast
Asia, or Indonesia’s approach towards multilateralism in Southeast Asia alone,
155
may be different from their strategies towards broader Asia Pacific forums. For
example, South Korea’s behaviour in the Northeast Asia Trilateral Summit
(involving also China and Japan), or the Six Party Talks (involving also China,
Japan, North Korea, Russia and the US) may not necessarily be similar to
its contributions in shaping APEC and the EAS. After all, within those
membership compositions, South Korea is a comparatively smaller power
compared to the other countries involved. Similarly, Australia’s behaviour in
the Pacific Islands Forum –where it possesses the largest economy among
the grouping’s member states –is likely to also be different from its strategies
towards Asia Pacific multilateralism. In Indonesia’s case, restricting the study
to its near Southeast Asian neighbourhood, where it is more clearly regarded
as negara besar (big power), may also evoke a different set of power dynamics
as compared to in the wider Asia Pacific. Consequently, the behavioural
outcomes affecting regional multilateralism should also be different as these
countries may not even be regarded as ‘middle powers’ within their near
regions. This would reinforce the importance of context –particularly in
terms of how it frames and facilitates power politics –for the differential
framework outlined in this book.
Last but not least, such a study could also be extended to middle powers
in other regions, or at the international level. This could include, for
instance, looking at how European middle powers have acted in the EU or
NATO, or even how middle powers have acted in the UN and other similar
bodies. The findings would be instructive of whether the book’s argument
and framework could be applicable beyond the Asia Pacific. Certainly,
it would be expected that, broadly, notions of differentiation and power
politics would still remain a core part of the explanation of middle power
behaviour. The focus of these other investigations would be to highlight
how the differentiation mechanism and other processes emerge and take
shape under different contextual circumstances.
This book began with the account of how countries such as Australia
and Canada attempted to carve a place for middle powers in the newly
established UN in the mid-1940s. They did not achieve their desired aims,
but the middle power concept has endured and undergone modifications to
keep up with the changing geopolitical dynamics. The findings here have
demonstrated the importance and value of the middle power concept in
international politics, focusing particularly on Asia Pacific multilateralism.
Moving forward, there remains much to be done to further comprehend
the complexities of the middle power concept and the types of behavioural
strategies that middle powers could carry out in international politics. An
appreciation of the contributions of middle powers towards global and
regional agendas, as well as of the opportunities for middle power initiatives,
would undoubtedly be useful in understanding the dynamics of international
relations at the broader level.
156

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4

differentiation in the Asia Pacific as they took on initiatory and mediatory

third section then proceeds to examine the behaviour of Australia, Indonesia

Regional dynamics and structure in the late 1980s and

Declining Cold War tensions and emerging unipolarity

the ‘more positive atmosphere for international relations generally’, and

Increasing salience of economic agenda and economic rise of Asia

various constraints, including developmental challenges and political stability

by differences over agricultural trade and was only concluded in 1994.

Rise of extra-​regional trade blocs

Indonesia was also worried about the creation of exclusionary trade

Formation of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

Australia and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

Each [regional country] can have influence. Each [regional country]

more influence than if the ASEAN nations, or Australia, or even Japan

More importantly, Australia saw a window of opportunity for non-​

he had intended to exclude the US –​‘the major economic power’ –​from

Indonesia and ASEAN centrality

Indonesia lagged Australia and South Korea in some material capabilities, it

APEC cooperation should be based on ‘equality, equity and mutual benefit’,

1999, p 130). The ASEAN economic ministers, moreover, agreed that

Jakarta’s support for Australia’s initiative, nevertheless, also translated into

its interpretations of the trade liberalization timeline as ‘indicative’ and ‘non-​

South Korea and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation’s first expansion

economic and political achievements were certainly on full display when it

as well as Seoul’s hosting of the Summer Olympics in 1988, also offered

when activated by the process of power politics, the differentiated structure

economic powers. Similarly, South Korea’s role in facilitating the entry of

Shaping the East Asia Summit

Regional dynamics and structure from the late 1990s

Asian financial crisis 1997–​98

pp 341–​2; Emmers and Ravenhill, 2011, pp 136–​8). These circumstances

1998a). During a subsequent visit by IMF Managing Director Michel

9/​11 attacks and US-​led war on terror

pre-​emptive action against terrorist threats in other countries, as well as his

Russia –​behind the US (Krauthammer, 2002/​03, pp 7–​8). To be sure, US

Rise of China and Sino-​Japanese rivalry for regional leadership

in the EAEC (Mohamad, 1995, p 37). Japan’s leadership role in Southeast

Australia similarly began to recognize the growing strength and influence

Proliferation of ASEAN-​centred multilateralism

forward –​first by Singapore for the economic sector, followed by Indonesia

do otherwise (Lee, 2015, p 182). As a dialogue partner, Seoul was supportive

Shaping the East Asia Summit

South Korea and the East Asia Vision Group

nurture the abilities of the developing countries’, and contribute towards

Indonesia’s push for an expanded East Asia Summit

a more restrictive membership –​Indonesia pursued an EAS that would

Natalegawa conceptualized as an alternative to a ‘destabilizing “balance of

Australia and the Asia Pacific Community

intervention as discussed earlier –​that catalysed the expanded EAS in 2011.

international agendas forward’ where possible and ‘mak[ing] a difference

• A regional institution which spans the entire Asia-​Pacific region –​

• A regional institution which is able to engage in the full spectrum of

ASEAN-​centric platforms (Australia Canberra, 2009b; Rudd, 2008e; see

something that Australia very much supported and indeed fought

influenced by Kevin Rudd’s very strong argument on behalf of an

interests but we were very encouraged by Australia’s understanding

in the region. Similarly, US participation in the regional architecture would

Rise of extra-regional trade blocs

More importantly, Australia saw a window of opportunity for non-

he had intended to exclude the US –‘the major economic power’ –from

its interpretations of the trade liberalization timeline as ‘indicative’ and ‘non-

Asian financial crisis 1997–98

pp 341–2; Emmers and Ravenhill, 2011, pp 136–8). These circumstances

9/11 attacks and US-led war on terror

pre-emptive action against terrorist threats in other countries, as well as his

Russia –behind the US (Krauthammer, 2002/03, pp 7–8). To be sure, US

Rise of China and Sino-Japanese rivalry for regional leadership

Proliferation of ASEAN-centred multilateralism

forward –first by Singapore for the economic sector, followed by Indonesia

a more restrictive membership –Indonesia pursued an EAS that would

intervention as discussed earlier –that catalysed the expanded EAS in 2011.

• A regional institution which spans the entire Asia-Pacific region –

ASEAN-centric platforms (Australia Canberra, 2009b; Rudd, 2008e; see

it to facilitate discussions on the South China Sea –amid opposition from

Middle power behaviour in the ARF and ADMM-Plus

diluting major-power stratificatory forces and middle powers performing

ASEAN member state –getting the association’s support would be essential