I.

Citizenship

So v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 170603, January 29, 2007

Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body
of a nation by clothing him or her with the privileges of a citizen. Under current and
existing laws, there are three ways by which an alien may become a citizen by
naturalization: (a) administrative naturalization pursuant to R.A. No. 9139; (b)
judicial naturalization pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as amended; and (c) legislative
naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine
citizenship to an alien.

C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate and distinct laws – the former covers all
aliens regardless of class while the latter covers native-born aliens who lived here in
the Philippines all their lives, who never saw any other country and all along thought
that they were Filipinos; who have demonstrated love and loyalty to the Philippines
and affinity to the customs and traditions. To reiterate, the intention of the legislature
in enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make the process of acquiring Philippine citizenship
less tedious, less technical and more encouraging which is administrative rather than
judicial in nature. Thus, although the legislature believes that there is a need to
liberalize the naturalization law of the Philippines, there is nothing from which it can
be inferred that C.A. No. 473 was intended to be amended or repealed by R.A. No.
9139. What the legislature had in mind was merely to prescribe another mode of
acquiring Philippine citizenship which may be availed of by native born aliens. The
only implication is that, a native born alien has the choice to apply for judicial or
administrative naturalization, subject to the prescribed qualifications and
disqualifications.

Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, GR No. 221697, March 8, 2016

The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is

DEMONSTRABLE. The statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines
in that decade is natural-born Filipino was 99.83%. Other circumstantial evidence of
the nationality of petitioner's parents are the fact that she was abandoned as an infant
in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City. She also has typical Filipino features:
height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face.
There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the
ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. All of the foregoing evidence,
that a person with typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church in a
municipality where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos
such that there would be more than a 99% chance that a child born in the province
would be a Filipino, would indicate more than ample probability if not statistical
certainty, that petitioner's parents are Filipinos.

As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935
Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language
which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity
in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of
the framers.

Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos.
These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather,
the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted. The most basic of such
laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides that "[l]aws relating to family
rights, duties, status, conditions, legal capacity of persons are binding on citizens of
the Philippines even though living abroad." Adoption deals with status, and a
Philippine adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino.

Under Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship." In the first place, "having to perform an act" means that the
act must be personally done by the citizen. In this instance, the determination of
foundling status is done not by the child but by the authorities. Secondly, the object of
the process is the determination of the whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship
of the child. Lastly, the process is certainly not analogous to naturalization
proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by
one born of an alien father and a Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution, which
is an act to perfect it.

Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987
Constitution, an international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law
either by transformation or incorporation. Generally accepted principles of
international law include international custom as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law, and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.
International customary rules are accepted as binding as a result from the combination
of two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of
States; and a psychological element known as the opinionjuris sive necessitates (opinion
as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in
question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. "General
principles of law recognized by civilized nations" are principles "established by a
process of reasoning" or judicial logic, based on principles which are "basic to legal
systems generally," such as "general principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of
fairness and justice," and the "general principle against discrimination" which is
embodied in the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention Against
Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in
Respect of Employment and Occupation." These are the same core principles which
underlie the Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Bill of Rights.
 II. National Economy and Patrimony

Narra Nickel v. Redmont Consolidated, GR No.195580, April 24, 2014

Sec. 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which focuses on the State entering into
different types of agreements for the exploration, development, and utilization of
natural resources with entities who are deemed Filipino due to 60 percent ownership
of capital is pertinent to this case, since the issues are centered on the utilization of our
country’s natural resources or specifically, mining. Thus, there is a need to ascertain
the nationality of petitioners since, as the Constitution so provides, such agreements
are only allowed corporations or associations "at least 60 percent of such capital is
owned by such citizens."

Basically, there are two acknowledged tests in determining the nationality of a

corporation: the control test and the grandfather rule. Paragraph 7 of DOJ Opinion
No. 020, Series of 2005, adopting the 1967 SEC Rules which implemented the
requirement of the Constitution and other laws pertaining to the controlling interests
in enterprises engaged in the exploitation of natural resources owned by Filipino
citizens, provides:
Shares belonging to corporations or partnerships at least 60% of the capital of which
is owned by Filipino citizens shall be considered as of Philippine nationality, but if the
percentage of Filipino ownership in the corporation or partnership is less than 60%,
only the number of shares corresponding to such percentage shall be counted as of
Philippine nationality. Thus, if 100,000 shares are registered in the name of a
corporation or partnership at least 60% of the capital stock or capital, respectively, of
which belong to Filipino citizens, all of the shares shall be recorded as owned by
Filipinos. But if less than 60%, or say, 50% of the capital stock or capital of the
corporation or partnership, respectively, belongs to Filipino citizens, only 50,000
shares shall be counted as owned by Filipinos and the other 50,000 shall be recorded
as belonging to aliens.

The first part of paragraph 7, DOJ Opinion No. 020, stating "shares belonging to
corporations or partnerships at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipino
citizens shall be considered as of Philippine nationality," pertains to the control test or
the liberal rule. On the other hand, the second part of the DOJ Opinion which
provides, "if the percentage of the Filipino ownership in the corporation or
partnership is less than 60%, only the number of shares corresponding to such
percentage shall be counted as Philippine nationality," pertains to the stricter, more
stringent grandfather rule.

The Grandfather Rule or the second part of the SEC Rule applies only when the 60-40
Filipino-foreign equity ownership is in doubt (i.e., in cases where the joint venture
corporation with Filipino and foreign stockholders with less than 60% Filipino
stockholdings [or 59%] invests in other joint venture corporation which is either 60-
40% Filipino-alien or the 59% less Filipino). Stated differently, where the 60-40
Filipino- foreign equity ownership is not in doubt, the Grandfather Rule will not
apply.
Wilson P. Gamboa v. Finance Secretary Margarito B. Teves, GR 176579, 28 June 2011

Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, like other provisions of the Constitution
expressly reserving to Filipinos specific areas of investment, such as the development
of natural resources and ownership of land, educational institutions and advertising
business, is self-executing. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-
executing provisions of the Constitution.

Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., a leading member of the 1986 Constitutional

Commission, reminds us that the Filipinization provision in the 1987 Constitution is
one of the products of the spirit of nationalism which gripped the 1935 Constitutional
Convention. The 1987 Constitution "provides for the Filipinization of public utilities
by requiring that any form of authorization for the operation of public utilities should
be granted only to ‘citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations
organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital
is owned by such citizens.’ The provision is [an express] recognition of the sensitive
and vital position of public utilities both in the national economy and for national
security." The evident purpose of the citizenship requirement is to prevent aliens from
assuming control of public utilities, which may be inimical to the national
interest. This specific provision explicitly reserves to Filipino citizens control of public
utilities, pursuant to an overriding economic goal of the 1987 Constitution: to
"conserve and develop our patrimony" and ensure "a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos."

The forty percent (40%) foreign equity limitation in public utilities prescribed by the
Constitution refers to ownership of shares of stock entitled to vote, i.e., common
shares. Furthermore, ownership of record of shares will not suffice but it must be
shown that the legal and beneficial ownership rests in the hands of Filipino citizens.

For stocks to be deemed owned and held by Philippine citizens or Philippine

nationals, mere legal title is not enough to meet the required Filipino equity. Full
beneficial ownership of the stocks, coupled with appropriate voting rights is
essential. Thus, stocks, the voting rights of which have been assigned or transferred
to aliens cannot be considered held by Philippine citizens or Philippine nationals.
Individuals or juridical entities not meeting the aforementioned qualifications are
considered as non-Philippine nationals.

Mere legal title is insufficient to meet the 60 percent Filipino-owned "capital" required
in the Constitution. Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital
stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is required. The legal and beneficial
ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock must rest in the hands of
Filipino nationals in accordance with the constitutional mandate. Otherwise, the
corporation is "considered as non-Philippine national[s]."
La Bugal-B’laan v. Ramos, GR No.127872, Dec. 1, 2004; Resident Marine Mammals
of the Protected Seascape of Tañon Strait v. Secretary Reyes, G.R. No. 180771, 21 April
2015

Paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

1. All natural resources are owned by the State. Except for agricultural lands, natural
resources cannot be alienated by the State.
2. The exploration, development and utilization (EDU) of natural resources shall be
under the full control and supervision of the State.
3. The State may undertake these EDU activities through either of the following:
(a) By itself directly and solely
(b) By (i) co-production; (ii) joint venture; or (iii) production sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens or corporations, at least 60 percent of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens
4. Small-scale utilization of natural resources may be allowed by law in favor of
Filipino citizens.
5. For large-scale EDU of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the President may
enter into "agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or
financial assistance according to the general terms and conditions provided by law x
x x."

Note that in all the three foregoing mining activities -- exploration, development and
utilization -- the State may undertake such EDU activities by itself or in tandem with
Filipinos or Filipino corporations, except in two instances: first, in small-scale
utilization of natural resources, which Filipinos may be allowed by law to undertake;
and second, in large-scale EDU of minerals, petroleum and mineral oils, which may be
undertaken by the State via "agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance" as provided by law.

It allows for the possibility that matters, other than those explicitly mentioned, could
be made part of the agreement. Thus, we are now led to the conclusion that the use of
the word "involving" implies that these agreements with foreign corporations are not
limited to mere financial or technical assistance. The difference in sense becomes very
apparent when we juxtapose "agreements for technical or financial assistance" against
"agreements including technical or financial assistance."

If the real intention of the drafters was to confine foreign corporations to financial or
technical assistance and nothing more, their language would have certainly been
so unmistakably restrictive and stringent as to leave no doubt in anyone's mind
about their true intent. For example, they would have used the sentence foreign
corporations are absolutely prohibited from involvement in the management or operation of
mining or similar ventures or words of similar import. A search for such stringent
wording yields negative results. Thus, we come to the inevitable conclusion that there
was a conscious and deliberate decision to avoid the use of restrictive wording that
bespeaks an intent not to use the expression "agreements x x x involving either
technical or financial assistance" in an exclusionary and limiting manner.
The conclusion is clear and inescapable -- a verba legis construction shows that
paragraph 4 is not to be understood as one limited only to foreign loans (or other
forms of financial support) and to technical assistance. There is definitely more to it
than that. These are provisions permitting participation by foreign companies;
requiring the President's report to Congress; and using, as yardstick, contributions
based on economic growth and general welfare. These were neither accidentally
inserted into the Constitution nor carelessly cobbled together by the drafters in lip
service to shallow nationalism. The provisions patently have significance and
usefulness in a context that allows agreements with foreign companies to include
more than mere financial or technical assistance.

Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and
other mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are
these requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that
will set standard or uniform terms, conditions and requirements, presumably
to attain a certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible insertion of
terms disadvantageous to the country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because,
supposedly before an agreement is presented to the President for signature, it
will have been vetted several times over at different levels to ensure that it
conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it
to Congress to give that branch of government an opportunity to look over the
agreement and interpose timely objections, if any.

Avon v. Luna, G.R. No. 153674 December 20, 2006

From the wordings of the Constitution, truly then, what is brought about to lay the
test on whether a given agreement constitutes an unlawful machination or
combination in restraint of trade is whether under the particular circumstances of the
case and the nature of the particular contract involved, such contract is, or is not,
against public interest.

Thus, restrictions upon trade may be upheld when not contrary to public welfare and
not greater than is necessary to afford a fair and reasonable protection to the party in
whose favor it is imposed. Even contracts which prohibit an employee from engaging
in business in competition with the employer are not necessarily void for being in
restraint of trade.

Plainly put, public policy is that principle of the law which holds that no subject or
citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or
against the public good. As applied to contracts, in the absence of express legislation
or constitutional prohibition, a court, in order to declare a contract void as against
public policy, must find that the contract as to the consideration or thing to be done,
has a tendency to injure the public, is against the public good, or contravenes some
established interests of society, or is inconsistent with sound policy and good morals,
or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights, whether of personal
liability or of private property.

From another perspective, the main objection to exclusive dealing is its tendency to
foreclose existing competitors or new entrants from competition in the covered
portion of the relevant market during the term of the agreement. Only those
arrangements whose probable effect is to foreclose competition in a substantial share
of the line of commerce affected can be considered as void for being against public
policy. The foreclosure effect, if any, depends on the market share involved. The
relevant market for this purpose includes the full range of selling opportunities
reasonably open to rivals, namely, all the product and geographic sales they may
readily compete for, using easily convertible plants and marketing organizations.

III. Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture and Sports

Tablarin v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 78164. July 31, 1987

The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education "
accessible to all who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional
school but rather merely to make such education accessible to all who qualify under
"fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements. "

The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as
a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. That the power
to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate
admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well
recognized. thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish
to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been
recognized as valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of
minimum medical educational requirements — i.e., the completion of prescribed courses
in a recognized medical school — for admission to the medical profession, has also been
sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. What we
have before us in the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to medical
schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of
regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of
the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the
student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the
process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission
to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and
eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of
maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical
schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic development, are
widely known.

The government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means
for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our]
medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country."
Pimentel vs. Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 230642, 10 September 2019

The State has a "high responsibility for [the] education of its citizens" and has an
interest in prescribing regulations to promote the education, and consequently, the
general welfare of the people. The regulation or administration of educational
institutions, especially on the tertiary level, is invested with public interest. Thus, the
enactment of education laws, implementing rules and regulations and issuances of
government agencies is an exercise of the State's police power.

As a professional educational program, legal education properly falls within the

supervisory and regulatory competency of the State. The legislative history of the
Philippine legal educational system earlier recounted evinces that the State, through
statutes enacted by the Congress and administrative regulations issued by the
Executive, consistently exercises police power over legal education.

The exercise of such police power, however, is not absolute.

Accordingly, the reasonable supervision and regulation clause is not a stand-alone

provision, but must be read in conjunction with the other Constitutional provisions
relating to education which include, in particular, the clause on academic freedom.

Academic freedom has traditionally been associated as a narrow aspect of the broader
area of freedom of thought, speech, expression and the press. It has been identified
with the individual autonomy of educators to "investigate, pursue, [and] discuss free
from internal and external interference or pressure." Thus, academic freedom of
faculty members, professors, researchers, or administrators is defended based on the
freedom of speech and press.

Academic freedom is enjoyed not only by members of the faculty, but also by the
students themselves

Jurisprudence has so far understood academic freedom of the students as the latter's
right to enjoy in school the guarantees of the Bill of Rights. For instance, in Villar v.
Technological Institute of the Philippines and in Non v. Dames II, it was held that
academic standards cannot be used to discriminate against students who exercise
their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech, in Malabanan v. Ramento, it was
ruled that the punishment must be commensurate with the offense, and in Guzman
v. National University, which affirmed the student's right to due process.

At its most elementary, the power to supervise and regulate shall not be construed as
stifling academic freedom in institutions of higher learning. This must necessarily be
so since institutions of higher learning are not mere walls within which to teach;
rather, it is a place where research, experiment, critical thinking, and exchanges are
secured. Any form of State control, even at its most benign and disguised as
regulatory, cannot therefore derogate the academic freedom guaranteed to higher
educational institutions. In fact, this non-intrusive relation between the State and
higher educational institutions is maintained even when the Constitution itself
prescribes certain educational "thrusts" or directions.

The element of accessibility under the Constitution pertains to both the elimination of
discrimination especially against disadvantaged groups and to the financial duty of
the State for, after all, the right to education is part and parcel of social justice. The
objective is to make quality education accessible by appropriate means.

Cudia v. PMA, G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015

Academic freedom or, to be precise, the institutional autonomy of universities and

institutions of higher learning, has been enshrined in our Constitutions of 1935, 1973,
and 1987. In Garcia, this Court espoused the concurring opinion of U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Felix Frankfurter in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, which enumerated "the
four essential freedoms" of a university: To determine for itself on academic grounds
(1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall be taught, and (4) who
may be admitted to study. An educational institution has the power to adopt and
enforce such rules as may be deemed expedient for its government, this being incident
to the very object of incorporation, and indispensable to the successful management
of the college. It can decide for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain
them, free from outside coercion or interference except when there is an overriding
public welfare which would call for some restraint. Indeed, "academic freedom has
never been meant to be an unabridged license. It is a privilege that assumes a
correlative duty to exercise it responsibly. An equally telling precept is a long
recognized mandate, so well expressed in Article 19 of the Civil Code, that every
'person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."'

The schools' power to instill discipline in their students is subsumed in their academic
freedom and that "the establishment of rules governing university-student relations,
particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not
merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very
survival." As a Bohemian proverb puts it: "A school without discipline is like a mill
without water." Insofar as the water turns the mill, so does the school's disciplinary
power assure its right to survive and continue operating. In this regard, the Court has
always recognized the right of schools to impose disciplinary sanctions, which
includes the power to dismiss or expel, on students who violate disciplinary rules.

The power of the school to impose disciplinary measures extends even after
graduation for any act done by the student prior thereto. Where it is shown that the
conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through fraud, a university has
the right to revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction it has thus conferred. This
freedom of a university does not terminate upon the "graduation" of a student, as the
Court of Appeals held. For it is precisely the "graduation" of such a student that is in
question. It is noteworthy that the investigation of private respondent's case began
before her graduation. If she was able to join the graduation ceremonies on April 24,
1993, it was because of too many investigations conducted before the Board of Regents
finally decided she should not have been allowed to graduate.

It must be borne in mind that schools are established, not merely to develop the
intellect and skills of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes;
nay, the development, or flowering if you will, of the total man. Essentially, education
must ultimately be religious, i.e., one which inculcates duty and reverence. Under the
rubric of "right to education," students have a concomitant duty to learn under the
rules laid down by the school. Every citizen has a right to select a profession or, course
of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic
requirements. The PMA is not different. As the primary training and educational
institution of the AFP, it certainly has the right to invoke academic freedom in the
enforcement of its internal rules and regulations, which are the Honor Code and the
Honor System in particular

IV. Amendment v. Revision

Santiago v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127325, 19 March 1997

Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of
this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

This provision is not self-executory.

R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505
and Senate Bill No. 17. The former was prepared by the Committee on Suffrage and
Electoral Reforms of the House of Representatives on the basis of two House Bills
referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497, which dealt with the initiative and
referendum mentioned in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b)
House Bill No. 988, which dealt with the subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as well
as with initiative and referendum under Section 3 of Article X (Local Government)
and initiative provided for in Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. Senate Bill
No. 17 solely dealt with initiative and referendum concerning ordinances or
resolutions of local government units. The Bicameral Conference Committee
consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was
subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate and by the House of
Representatives. This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.
Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought. That
word is neither germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to
initiative and referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances, and
resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out
earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The
people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole
or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with
respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."

Unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the
contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c)
requires, among other things, statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted,
approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be. It does not include, as among
the contents of the petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended,
in the case of initiative on the Constitution

While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II)
and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided
for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply
means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and
local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation
of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a
subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or
hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.

Lambino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153, 25 October 2006

The framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed
constitutional amendment" should be "ready and shown" to the people "before" they
sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that "before they sign there is already
a draft shown to them." The framers also "envisioned" that the people should sign on
the proposal itself because the proponents must "prepare that proposal and pass it
around for signature."

The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative

upon a petition" is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people.
This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and
thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf.
Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments
is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete
proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign on a petition that contains
the full text of the proposed amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the
petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such
attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories
to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing.
Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every
one of the millions of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments
before signing.

An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the
people the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can
operate as a gigantic fraud on the people.

Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution.
The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The
second mode is through a constitutional convention. The third mode is through a
people's initiative. in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a people's initiative
can only propose amendments to the Constitution since the Constitution itself limits
initiatives to amendments.

Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution,
like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-
balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the
constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution.
On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or
deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects
several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the
specific provision being amended.

In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the
constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the
quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the
proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the 'substantial
entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing
provisions." The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not
consider the degree of the change.

The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the
constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far
reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a
revision." Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper
subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan"
includes "change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its
Branches." A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes
changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check
and balances.

An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable

provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve specific
parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to
suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be
dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates
a re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the document which have
over-all implications for the entire document, to determine how and to what extent
they should be altered. Thus, for instance a switch from the presidential system to a
parliamentary system would be a revision because of its over-all impact on the
entire constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system to a
unicameral system be because of its effect on other important provisions of the
Constitution.