0

UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
COMPLAINANT: Officer - - Uniformed OPR #: 2 l-023A
Services Bureau (USB), Senate Division, Section Three (SD-3)

SUBJECT OF INVESTIGATION:
Rule BI : Unsatisfactory Performance

Respondent:

I. Lieutenant • • •- P~ Uniformed Services Bureau, Senate Division,

Section Three (USB-SD-3 ).

Allegation:

I. That Lieutenant violated USCP Directive 2053.013, Rules of Conduct,

when she allegedly failed to take appropriate action during an insurrection 1 at the US Capitol
Building on January 6, 2021.

Background:

On Wednesday, January 6, 2021, a joint session of the United States Congress convened in the
US Capitol Building. During the joint session, elected members of the United States House of
Representatives and the United States Senate were meeting in separate chambers of the US
Capitol Building to certify the vote count of the Electoral College of the 2020 Presidential
Election.

The joint session began at approximately 1300 hours. Shortly thereafter, the House and Senate
adjourned to separate chambers to resolve a particular objection. Vice President Mike Pence was
present and presiding, first in the joint session, and then in the Senate Chamber.

As the proceedings continued in both the House and the Senate, and with Pence present and
presiding over the Senate, a large crowd gathered outside the US Capitol Building. Temporary
and permanent barricades were in place around the exterior and United States Capitol Police
(USCP) sworn personnel were present and attempting to keep the crowd away as the proceedings
were underway inside.

1 Wikipedia defines an insurrection as " a limited form of rebellion, an armed uprising."

CAPD_000000779
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USCP attempted to maintain order and keep the crowd from entering the US Capitol Building;
however, shortly after 1400 hours, individuals in the crowd forced entry by breaking windows
and assaulting members of the USCP, as others in the crowd encouraged and assisted those acts.

At approximately 1420 hours, members of the House and Senate, including Pence, were
instructed to evacuate the chambers. Accordingly, the joint session of the United States Congress
was effectively suspended until shortly after 2000 hours.

During national news coverage of the aforementioned events, video footage which appeared to
be captured on mobile devices of persons present on the scene depicted evidence of violations of
local and federal law, including scores of individuals inside the US Capitol Building.

On January 13, 2021 the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) established a tip line for
USCP personnel to report any misconduct by USCP employees that occurred during the events
on January 6, 2021: [EXHIBIT l]

On January 14, 2021 at approximately 1054 hours, Officer - (SD-3) sent the
following email to the OPR tip line: [EXHIBIT 2]

"Please find attached a report of misconduct by Senate Division # Lieutenants, as well as

unacceptable lapses by other USCP officials during the events of0J/06/21. I lookforward to
discussing these and any other matters with you at your earliest convenience. "

included an attachment to the email which stated the following: [EXHIBIT 3]

"Misconduct by USCP employees on 01-06-2021

This report is being submitted on behalf of myself in some instances, and by Senate Division
Section 3 bargaining unit employees in other instances.

Actions of USCP Officials during the course of0J-06-2021

• SD3 Lt.

Lt. was commander of Senate Division CDV units assigned to the area of
Constitution Ave/New Jersey Ave NW CDV officers assigned to this area immediately
recognized the threat to the US Capitol and immediately respond to the Lower West Terrace with
great risk to their personal safety.

Officers assigned to Lt. command heard over the radio that the West Front
snow fence was breached. Lt. • • • • had multiple CDV squads in her area. One of the
squads responded to the West Front immediately. The remaining approximately 25 officers were
ordered by Lt. • • • • to line up along the already broken fence line along Constitution
Avenue. Lt. • • • • scolded these officers for bunching up. Officers pleaded with Lt.
to allow them to respond to the West Front. All of these officers had been issued
CDV helmets and were within line ofsight of the West Front.

CAPD_000000780
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Officers describe Lt. as unable to make a decision and fiwttically maf..ing

phone calls. After a few minutes the officers on the line made a plan and then told Lt.
they were going to find their sergeant, and responded to the Capitol via Del Ave
Door RSOB. The actions of Lt. • • • • after the officers left is unknown.

In the days following the events of 1-6-21, including after the passing ofSD3 officer
Liebengood, Lt. • • • • has not made any statements or been seen by Senate Division
officers.

• SD3Lt. - -

Lt. - was commander ofSenate Division CDU units assigned to the area of
Constitution Ave/New Jersey Ave NW. Lt. - had a clear view of the hundreds of
individuals who were gathered in the 200 block of Constitution Avenue NW when they made a
coordinated effort to approach the NW walkway of the West Front. CDU officers assigned to this
area immediately recognized the threat to the US Capitol and immediately respond to the Lower
West Terrace with great risk to their personal safety.

SD officers in direct proximity to Lt. - were instructed to remain on the fence line
along Constitution Ave NW. Officers told Lt. - that the situation was dire and they were
going to respond to the Capitol through the Del Ave Door of the Russell SOB. Lt. - told
the officers "oka}/' but that he was going to retrieve his CDU helmet and PR-24 baton. The
location ofthese items was unknown to the officers, and the officers responded to the Capitol
without Lt. -

The actions ofLt. - after this time is unknown.

On the morning of 1-8-21 or 1-9-21, Lt. - came to a morning roll call in the
Senate Division roll call room 011 the fourth floor. Sgt. - and Sgt. - were also present at
the roll call. Officials asked the officers if they had any questions. Lt. - was asked the
status ofgetting CDU helmets for all officers and also other questions regarding the events of 1-
6-21. The roll call became spirited and confrontational with officers wanting questions answered
by officials. Lt. - said he would check and then, in the middle of a heated debate, he
walked out of the room in front ofall officers and the sergeants, and did not come back. Sgt. -
and Sgt. - stood in front of the officers answering questions and professionally addressing
the officers concerns. It is the opinion of the shift that in stressful situations Lt. - cannot
make leadership decisions and will disappear. Since this incident, Lt. - has not addressed
officers in any capacity.

• Events on the West Front 01-06-21

A crowd of about 200 agitators approached Peace Circle from the 200 block Constitution
Ave NW. No radio calls or advisement from USCP Watch Command was heard on the radio.
This group violently breached a police line at the NW Walkway ofthe West Front. I arrived to
the Lower West Terrace about a minute after the walkway police line was breached. It was

CAPD_000000781
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immediately apparent that the group was going to attempt to violently breach the US Capitol.
Officials could be heard discussing our lines being actively overrun. Individuals in the crowd
approached me on the police line and told me that unless USCP communicated to the growing
crowd the severity of the situation, violent agitators were coordinating efforts to breach the
police lines. I relayed this message to - - •
- - who was attempting to hold the line
with officers on the West Front.

It seemed at that time that no one was able to make a decision about the next steps and
coordinate a response to the realities on the ground. I do not recall any coordination of units but
rather units fighting side by side to hold the ground beneath them. On a positive note, the
leadership ofSenate Division units on the West Front by Sgt. - and Sgt. - was
exceptional and should be noted.

• Events in the Senate basement of the US Capitol

Officers in the Senate basement of the US Capitol were actively attempting to secure the
basement and the Senate Subway. This area was the main evacuation route ofMOC's and was
also a vital e1111y point for support.

I do not recall any USCP officials in command ofthis effort. Officers were coordinating
the securing of the Capitol basement and the removal of injured persons through the tunnel to
the Senate Office Buildings where emergency personnel were located. I do recall an unlmown
USCP higher official responding to the scene ofan injured officer in the basement. The official
was having trouble understanding that EMS were not going to respond inside the basement of
the Capitol at that time, or that several other injured officers were already being carried through
the Subway to the Senate Office buildings. Without the quick thinl-.ing and tremendous efforts of
individual Officers, the basement of the Capitol could have easily been compromised and
prevented evacuation of MOCs.

• Events at Lower West Terrace Door of the US Capitol

The Lower West Terrace Door of the US Capitol was being held by about 25 USCP and
MPD officers. Some had full CDU Hard Gear, some had helmets, and some had no protective
equipment at all. This door was holding back the entire crowd on the West Front from entering
the US Capitol. I and other officers who held this door did not see any USCP officials at this
door for the duration of the siege once the West Front was lost to the mob. At least JO MPD
commanders were seen in this area and were actively coordinating the effort of officers to repel
repeated and coordinated efforts to violently injure officers and breach the US Capitol. MPD
commanders were asking USCP officers where USCP officials were. USCP officers operating in
this area were being violently assaulted by suspects armed with chemical irritants, fireworks,
pipes, beams, pales, etc. in a loud and dangerous environment. I do not believe any USCP
officials are aware of this.

In conclusion, I do not take pleasure in pointing out the deficiencies of USCP employees
during the unprecedented attackof0J-06-21. In writing this report, I am attempting to represent
the views of the Senate Division officers who willingly and selflessly conducted operations vital

CAPD_000000782
 0 5 vr'R Case# 21-023A

to restoring law and order to the Capitol complex without leadership fi·om USCP Lieutenants
and above. During the siege and since, it has become abundantly clear that some USCP officials
are unwilling, unprepared or unable to lead USCP officers. The officers that I observed were
repeatedly making critical decisions in real time without any coordination, direction or
leadership [,-om supervisors such as Lt.•--•• and Lt. - who remain Senate Division
and CDU commanders. While some Senate Division officials have proven themselves in the most
difficult circumstances, unfortunately others have shown unacceptable conduct as supervisors
and leaders.

I look forward to discussing these matters ofmisconduct and ineffective leadership with
you at your earliest convenience.

Respectfully,

Office,· - #-
Senate Division 3 Shop Steward"

On January 14, 2021 the OPR suspended all administrative investigations into incidents relating
to the January 6, 2021 Insurrection so these cases could be reviewed by the USCP Criminal
Investigation Division (CID) and the Office of the General Counsel (OGC).

On January 26, 2021 this case was cleared of any criminal violations and the OPR began the
administrative investigation. This case was assigned to Sergeant April Aranyosi (OPR).

Discussion:

Officer - (SD-3) was interviewed and provided a written statement on February

25, 2021: [EXHIBIT 4 & EXHIBIT 5]

reiterated the information he provided in his initial complaint.

At the conclusion of the interview, provided the following additional information in

his written statement:

"In addition to the written complaint I emailed to the OPR Tip Line, I would like to add the
following that was discussed today in my inten1iew on 2-25-21.

On about 2-1-21, Lt.

th
been injured on Janua,y 6 • When I refused to do so, Lt. ••••I
demanded that I provide the names ofofficers who may have
stormed into the Senate
break room/roll call room in HQ and yelled at the officers that they had already been told once
to fill out paperwork if they were injured on duty and left the room. The officers told me they
didn't understand why the Lt. would yell at them and show no compassion or effort to supervise
them.

CAPD_000000783
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On 2-3-21, I was told that Lt. went home sick from work. This was apparently
after receiving an outdoor assignment for the funeral procession of Officer Sicknick. Officers
told me they were extremely offended that the Lt. would leave work during this time and was
not the behavior ofa commander.

Since filing this complain and being notified that an OPR investigation was underway, Lt.
has been attempting to gain accountability of officers under her command on Jan
th
6 • These officers state that Senate Division Sergeants have been contacting them for their sto,y
from that day, only to find out that Lt. • • • • is pus/ring for them and on some occasions
listening in unannounced when the Sgt. Calls them.

I also noted that since Jan 6th I do not recall Lt. - or Lt. addressing the shift
in any way, nor making themselves available to officers or providing assistance to Senate
Sergeants in performing their duties. "

Lieutenant (SD-3) was interviewed and provided a written statement on

March 2, 2021: [EXHIBIT 7 & EXHIBIT 8]

confinned that on January 6, 2021 she was assigned as a CDU platoon commander
and that her area of responsibility was Constitution A venue, NW for crowd control.
stated her platoon consisted of four squads with an officer assigned to each squad as an acting
sergeant. • • • • stated that she initially assigned one squad to patrol the entrances of the
Senate Office Buildings and one squad to the West Front of the US Capitol Building.
explained she kept two squads on Constitution Avenue, NW to control the large
crowd ofprotestors. • • • • denied "scolding officers because they were bunched up."
stated at no time did "officers plead with her to respond to the West Front."

stated she made many decisions regarding her squads throughout the day with little
or no guidance. According to - the statement that she was "unable to make a
decision and frantically making phone calls" was false. • • • • stated she called Captain
- - Special Operations Division (SOD) because • • was acting as the CDU
Commander and she also called Captain • • • - Hazardous Incident Response
Division (HIRD) to advise- that a suspicious package had been reported by a citizen.

stated she was in the process of completing CP-1200s (Honorary Awards

Nominations) for the officers assigned to her platoon. • • • • explained, since she only had
acting sergeants assigned to her squads, she asked SD-3 sergeants to contact her officers and
have them write a statement of the actions they took on January 6, 2021 so she could include that
•
infonnation in the CP-1200s. • • • • believes this is what • • • is referring to when he
stated, "Since filing this complaint and being notified that an OPR investigation was underway,
Lt. • • • • has been attempting to gain accountability ofofficers under her command on Jan
6th • These officers state that Senate Division Sergeants have been contacting them for their
story." • • • • denied "listening in tmannounced when the sergeant calls."

CAPD_000000784
 ( 7 vr'R Case# 2 l-023A

stated the SD has not been conducting nonnal roll calls since the beginning of the
COVID-19 pandemic. • • • • stated the only time SD-3 has required officers to attend a
nonnal roll call is when the USCP Chief and the Office of Employee Assistance (OEA) wanted
to address the officers about the insurrection.

At the conclusion of the interview, provided the following written statement:

"On January 6, 2021, at approximately 1200 hours, CDU was deployed/or a scheduled protest
in support of a perceived stolen election.

Officers in Platoon #7, commanded by Lt. - were assigned to t/ze typical

crowd control along the middle perimeter, Constitution Avenue. Lt. - •
• • • • assigned
the officers in Acting Sergeant ' squad to respond back to the Senate to assist as Pre-
Screeners. Inspector - requested additional resources at the West Front so Lt
5
ordered Acting Sergeant ~ to respond to assist at the West Front. Inspector -
• 6
requested an additional squad so I sent Acting Sergeant • • squad to assist the Senate. Tlze
remaining squad was led by Acting Sergeant • • • 7. I ordered his squad to respond to the
West Front Drive to assist with crowd control. A short while later, maybe 10-15 minllles, an
additional call came over the air/or assistance on the East Front. At the same time, a protester
said there was a suspicious item on the West Front. My officers /zad already ran up the hill to
assist the officers on the East Front. I went to the possible 10-1008• I called Captain - to
inform her; however, manpower was scarce. She said to set-up a perimeter as best that I could to
keep people away from the item. Since it was just I and some of the other protesters there t1ying
to set the perimeter, the perimeter was completely inadequate. The gentlemen ended up picking
up the item (metal water bottle) and wal/..ing away. I went to assist on t/ze East Front. Later, I
was able to gat/zer tlze squad with Acting Sergeant - to assist with clearing t/ze US Capitol
Building and Grounds. "

Conclusion:

1. violated USCP Directive 2053.013, Rules

u e B 1: Unsatisfactory Perfonnance, be

Rule Bl states, "Employees will maintain sufficient competency to properly perform their duties
and assume tlze responsibilities of t/zeir positions. Employees will perform t/zeir duties in a
manner which will maintain the highest standards of efficiency and integrity in carrying out the

2
Officer - (SD-2).
3
Inspector - Capitol Division Commander.
4
Officer - (SD-2).
5
6
Inspector - •
- - Senate Division Commander.
Officer - - - (SD-2).
7
Officer - - - (SD-2).
8
Suspicious Package.

CAPD_000000785
 8 __,r>R Case# 2 l-023A

functions and objectives of the Department. Unsatisfacto,y performance may be demonstrated

by, but will not be limited to:

1. A lack ofknowledge of the application of laws required to be enforced.

2. An unwillingness or inability to perform assigned tasks.

3. The failure to conform to work standards established for the respective ranks, grades, or
positions.

4. The failure to take appropriate action on the occasion of a crime, disruption, or other
condition deserving police attention.

5. Repeated poor evaluations or a written record of repeated inji·actions of the rules,

regulations, Directives or orders of the Department.

6. Repeated sustained complaints ofmisconduct. " [EXHIBIT 1OJ

• actions on January 6, 2021, during an insurrection at the US Capitol

Building, were performed in a manner which maintained the highest standards of
efficiency and integrity in carrying out the functions and objectives of the
Department. The actions or• • • • were justified, legal, and proper.

Exhibits:

1. USCP Bulletin #21.13 "Office of Professional Responsibility Tip Line" dated January 13,
2021 (1 page).
2. Email from • • • to OPR Tip Line, dated January 14, 2021 (l page).
3. Attachment from • • • <3 pages).
4. Audio recording of interview - Officer - dated February 25, 2021 (1 disk).
5. Written statement - Officer - dated February 25, 2021 (1 page).
6. CP-1009 signed by Officer - dated February 25, 2021 (1 page).
7. Audio recording of interview - Lieutenant - dated March 2, 2021 (1 disk).
8. Written statement - Lieutenant - dated March 2, 2021 (l page).
9. CP-1009 signed by Lieutenant - dated March 2, 2021 (1 page).
10. USCP Directive# 2053.013, Rule of Conduct, effective date November 19, 2012 (8 pages).

Recommendation:

1. This report be Approved and the case Closed.

CAPD_000000786
 0 9 (v.1'R Case # 21-023A

A review of the QPR records revealed the following cases on file for Lieutenant

Case Number Violation Disposition

10-027 Conduct Unbecoming Unfounded
11-081 Courtesy Sustained
14-099 None Dismissed
16-067 Abuse of Process Not Sustained
Courtesy Not Sustained

A review of the QPR records revealed no Command Discipline on file for Lieutenant

CAPD_000000787
 C 10 uPR Case# 21-023A

Authorizing Officials:

?f'/ffici : A14~k
Sergeant April L. Lieutenant Brandy A. Pringle
Investigator Assistant Commander
Office of Professional Responsibility Office of Professional Responsibility

Concur:

m~~
Commander
Office of Professional Responsibility

Date Approved: __3-+f-~_,_/_2..,_(_

' i

CAPD_000000788
 0

UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
COMPLAINANT: Officer - - Uniformed OPR#: 21-023B
Services Bureau (USB), Senate Division, Section Three (SD-3)

SUBJECT OF INVESTIGATION:
Rule B 1: Unsatisfactory Performance

Respondent:

1. Lieutenant - - PIN . Uniformed Services Bureau, Senate Division, Section

Three (USB-SD-3).

Allegation:

1. That Lieutenant - - violated USCP Directive 2053.013, Rules of Conduct, when

he allegedly failed to talce appropriate action during an insurrection' at the US Capitol
Building on January 6, 2021.

Background:

On Wednesday, January 6, 2021, a joint session of the United States Congress convened in the
US Capitol Building. During the joint session, elected members of the United States House of
Representatives and the United States Senate were meeting in separate chambers of the US
Capitol Building to certify the vote count of the Electoral College of the 2020 Presidential
Election.

The joint session began at approximately 1300 hours. Shortly thereafter, the House and Senate
adjourned to separate chambers to resolve a particular objection. Vice President Mike Pence was
present and presiding, first in the joint session, and then in the Senate Chamber.

As the proceedings continued in both the House and the Senate, and with Pence present and
presiding over the Senate, a large crowd gathered outside the US Capitol Building. Temporary
and permanent barricades were in place around the exterior and United States Capitol Police
(USCP) sworn personnel were present and attempting to keep the crowd away as the proceedings
were underway inside.

1 Wikipedia defines an insurrection as "a limited form of rebellion, an armed uprising."

CAPD_000000789
 (
2 vr'R Case# 21-023B

USCP attempted to maintain order and keep the crowd from entering the US Capitol Building;
however, shortly after 1400 hours, individuals in the crowd forced entry by breaking windows
and assaulting members of the USCP, as others in the crowd encouraged and assisted those acts.

At approximately 1420 hours, members of the House and Senate, including Pence, were
instructed to evacuate the chambers. Accordingly, the joint session of the United States Congress
was effectively suspended until shortly after 2000 hours.

During national news coverage of the aforementioned events, video footage which appeared to
be captured on mobile devices of persons present on the scene depicted evidence of violations of
local and federal law, including scores of individuals inside the US Capitol Building.

On January 13, 2021 the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) established a tip line for
USCP personnel to report any misconduct by USCP employees that occurred during the events
on January 6, 2021: [EXHIBIT l]

On January 14, 2021 at approximately 1054 hours, Officer - (SD-3) sent the
following email to the OPR tip line: [EXHIBIT 2]

"Please find attached a report of misconduct by Senate Division # Lieutenants, as well as

unacceptable lapses by other USCP officials during the events of0J/06/21. I lookfonvard to
discussing these and any other matters with you at your earliest convenience. "

included an attachment to the email which stated the following: [EXHIBIT 3]

"Misconduct by USCP employees on 01-06-2021

This report is being submitted on behalf ofmyself in some instances, and by Senate Division
Section 3 bargaining unit employees in other instances.

Actions of USCP Officials during the course of0J-06-2021

• SD3 Lt.

Lt. was commander ofSenate Division CDV units assigned to the area of
Constitution Ave/New Jersey Ave NW. CDV officers assigned to this area immediately
recognized the threat to the US Capitol and immediately respond to the Lower West Terrace with
great risk to their personal safety.

Officers assigned to Lt. command heard over the radio that the West Front
snow fence was breached. Lt. • • • • had multiple CDV squads in her area. One of the
squads responded to the West Front immediately. The remaining approximately 25 officers were
ordered by Lt. • • • • to line up along the already broken fence line along Constitution
Avenue. Lt. • • • • scolded these officers for bunching up. Officers pleaded with Lt.
to allow them to respond to the West Front. All of these officers had been issued
CDV helmets and were within line ofsight of the West Front.

CAPD_000000790
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(
vrR Case# 21-023B

Officers describe Lt. as unable to make a decision andJi·antically making

phone calls. After a few minutes the officers on the line made a plan and then told Lt.
they were going to find their sergeant, and responded to the Capitol via Del Ave
Door RSOB. The actions ofLt. • • • • after the officers left is unknown.

In the days following the events of 1-6-21, including after the passing ofSD3 officer
Liebengood, Lt. • --•• has not made any statements or been seen by Senate Division
officers.

• SD3Lt. - -

Lt. - was commander ofSenate Division CDU units assigned to the area of
Constitution Ave/New Jersey Ave NW. Lt. - had a clear view of the hundreds of
individuals who were gathered in the 200 block of Constitution Avenue NW when they made a
coordinated effort to approach the NW walkway of the West Front. CDU officers assigned to this
area immediately recognized the threat to the US Capitol and immediately respond to the Lower
West Terrace with great risk to their personal safety.

SD officers in direct proximity to Lt. - were instructed to remain on the fence line
along Constitution Ave NW. Officers told Lt. - that the situation was dire and they were
going to respond to the Capitol through the Del Ave Door of the Russell SOB. Lt. - told
the officers "oka}/' but that he was going to retrieve his CDU helmet and PR-24 baton. The
location of these items was unl,,71own to the officers, and the officers responded to the Capitol
without Lt. -

The actions ofLt. - after this time is 1111/,,71own.

On the morning of 1-8-21 or 1-9-21, Lt. - came to a morning roll call in the
Senate Division roll call room on the fourth floor. Sgt. - and Sgt. • • were also present at
the roll call. Officials asked the officers if they had any questions. Lt. - was asked the
status ofgetting CDU helmets for all officers and also other questions regarding the events of 1-
6-21. The roll call became spirited and confi·ontational with officers wanting questions answered
by officials. Lt. - said he would check and then, in the middle of a heated debate, he
walked out of the room in J,-ont ofall officers and the sergeants, and did not come back. Sgt. -
and Sgt. • • stood in J,-ont of the officers answering questions and professionally addressing
the officers concerns. It is the opinion of the shift that in stressful situations Lt. - cannot
make leadership decisions and will disappear. Since this incident, Lt. - has not addressed
officers in any capacity.

• Events on the West Front 01-06-21

A crowd ofabout 200 agitators approached Peace Circle from the 200 block Constitution
Ave NW. No radio calls or advisement from USCP Watch Command was heard on the radio.
This group violently breached a police line at the NW Walkway of the West Front. I arrived to
the Lower West Terrace about a minute after the walkway police line was breached. It was

CAPD_000000791
 0 4 ('-'r'R Case# 21-0238

immediately apparent that the group was going to attempt to violently breach the US Capitol.
Officials could be heard discussing our lines being actively overnm. Individuals in the crowd
approached me on the police line and told me that unless USCP communicated to the growing
crowd the severity of the situation, violent agitators were coordinating efforts to breach the
police lines. I relayed this message to - - •
• • who was attempting to hold the line
with officers on the West Froltl.

It seemed at that time that no one was able to make a decision about the next steps and
coordinate a response to the realities on the ground. I do not recall any coordination of zmits but
rather units fighting side by side to hold the ground beneath them. On a positive note, the
leadership ofSenate Division units on the West Front by Sgt. • • and Sgt. - was
exceptional and should be noted.

• Events in the Senate basement of the US Capitol

Officers in the Senate basement of the US Capitol were actively attempting to secure the
basement and the Senate Subway. This area was the main evacuation route of MOC's and was
also a vital enhy point for support.

I do not recall any USCP officials in command of this effort. Officers were coordinating
the securing of the Capitol basement and the removal of injured persons through the tunnel to
the Senate Office Buildings where emergency personnel were located. I do recall an unknown
USCP higher official responding to the scene of an injured officer in the basement. The official
was having trouble understanding that EMS were not going to respond inside the basement of
the Capitol at that time, or that several other injured officers were already being carried through
the Subway to the Senate Office buildings. Without the quick thinking and tremendous efforts of
individual Officers, tire basement ofthe Capitol could have easily been compromised and
prevented evacuation of MOCs.

• Events at Lower West Terrace Door of the US Capitol

The Lower West Terrace Door of the US Capitol was being held by about 25 USCP and
MPD officers. Some had full CDU Hard Gear, some had helmets, and some had no protective
equipment at all. This door was holding back the entire crowd on the West Front from entering
the US Capitol. I and other officers who held this door did not see any USCP officials at this
door for the duration of the siege once the West Front was lost to the mob. At least JO MPD
commanders were seen in this area and were actively coordinating the effort of officers to repel
repeated and coordinated efforts to violently injure officers and breach the US Capitol. MPD
commanders were as/...ing USCP officers where USCP officials were. USCP officers operating in
this area were being violently assaulted by suspects armed with chemical irritants, fireworks,
pipes, beams, poles, etc. in a loud and dangerous environment. I do not believe any USCP
officials are aware of this.

In conclusion, I do not take pleasure in pointing out the deficiencies of USCP employees
during the unprecedented attack of O1-06-21. In writing this report, I am attempting to represent
the views of the Senate Division officers who willingly and selflessly conducted operations vital

CAPD_000000792
 C 5 vrR Case# 21-023B

to restoring law and order to the Capitol complex without leaders/zip from USCP Lieutenants
and above. During the siege and since, it has become abundantly clear that some USCP officials
are unwilling, unprepared or unable to lead USCP officers. The officers that I observed were
repeatedly making critical decisions in real time without any coordination, direction or
leadership from supervisors such as Lt. • • • • and Lt. - who remain Senate Division
and CDU commanders. While some Senate Division officials have proven themselves in the most
difficult circumstances, unfortunately others have shown unacceptable conduct as supervisors
and leaders. •

I look forward to discussing these matters of misconduct and ineffective leadership with
you at your earliest convenience.

Respectfully,

Officer- -
Senate Division 3 Shop Steward"

On January 14, 2021 the QPR suspended all administrative investigations into incidents relating
to the January 6, 2021 Insurrection so these cases could be reviewed by the USCP Criminal
Investigation Division (CID) and the Office of the General Counsel (OGC).

On January 26, 2021 this case was cleared of any criminal violations and the OPR began the
administrative investigation. This case was assigned to Sergeant April Aranyosi (QPR).

Discussion:

Officer - (SD-3) was interviewed and provided a written statement on February

25, 2021: [EXHIBIT 4 & EXHIBIT 5]

reiterated the infonnation he provided in his initial complaint.

At the conclusion of the interview, provided the following additional infonnation in

his written statement:

"In addition to the written complaint I emailed to the OPR Tip Line, I would like to add the
following that was discussed today in my interview on 2-25-21.

On about 2-1-21, Lt. demanded that I provide the names of officers who may have
been injured on January 6111• Wiren I refused to do so, Lt. • • • • stormed into the Senate
break room/roll call room in HQ and yelled at the officers that they had already been told once
to fill out paperwork if they were injured on duty and left the room. The officers told me they
didn't understand why the Lt. would yell at them and show no compassion or effort to supervise
them.

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 0 6 vrR Case# 21-0238

On 2-3-21, I was told that Lt. went home sick ji-om work. This was apparently
after receiving an outdoor assignment for the funeral procession of Officer Officers
told me they were extremely offended that the Lt. would leave work during this time and was
not the behavior ofa commander.

Since filing this complain and being notified that an OPR investigation was underway, Lt.
has been attempting to gain accountability of officers under her command on Jan
11

••••lis
6 '. These officers state that Senate Division Sergeants have been contacting them for their sto,y
from that day, only to find out that Lt.
listening in unannounced when the Sgt. Calls them.
pushing/or them and on some occasions

I also noted that since Jan 6th I do not recall Lt. - or Lt. addressing the shift
in any way, nor maldng themselves available to officers or providing assistance to Senate
Sergeants in pe1formi11g their duties. "

Lieutenant - - (SD-3) was interviewed and provided a written statement on March 2,

2021: [EXHIBIT 7 & EXHIBIT 8]

- provided the following written statement:

"On Janua,y 6, 2021, I was assigned as the platoon commander for the Civil
Disturbance Unit (CDU) for the Senate Division. The platoon was comprised of nineteen (19)
hard squad CDU with two (2) hard squad sergeants (Sergeants - - and
- The rest of the platoon was soft squad CDU with nineteen (19) soft squad CDU with (2)
soft squad sergeants (Sergeants . . - ,nd

We had our roll call at 1000 hours. What was passed on was the usual intel information
on certain groups that may cause any problems, but not/zing about the violent insurrection as we
later found out that day. Shortly after roll call the Field Force Commander Captain
from Special Operations Division (SOD) gave me the order to take my soft squad CDU to
line up the north curb of Constitution Avenue between Delaware and New Jersey, NW. The order
was for the demonstrators to keep off Constitution Avenue and to keep them on the sidewalk. As
•
time went on Captain • • told me to spread my two soft squad CDU all the way down to 1 st
and Constitution, NW. We witnessed large crowds walking up the avenue going to both the East
and West fronts of the United States Capitol. At this time the hard CDU squads were staged on
the bus with their CDU equipment by USCP headquarters. At approximately 1300 hours I heard
a frantic radio transmission: "We lost Peace Circle!" A few minutes later I got a call from
•
Captain • • to have the hard squad gear up. A few minutes after that Sergeant - called
me to see if they could deploy and I said that I have not heard anything about the CDU hard
squad being deployed. I soon saw later that the CDU bus was self-deploying and went down
about halfway on the Northwest Drive of the Capitol. Then I saw CDU jog down towards the
West Front. At this time I could hear voices from a big crowd. At this time my CDU helmet was
being stored inside the Delaware and Constitution, Avenue, NE kiosk. Sergeant • • had •
designated that place for my helmet to be stored. I called Sergeant - to ask where he was
and I could tell that there was a lot ofcommotion when he told me he was somewhere out on the

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West Front. Aft.er I sensed that there was urgency for the CDU hard squad portion ofmy platoon
at the West Front of the Capitol I told my counterpart Lieutenant - · • • · that I was
•
responding. I also let Sergeant • • know I was responding.

I do not recall seemingly dismissing a question ofan officer on the sofl squad about
responding to the U.S. Capitol as discussed in the complaint. I do remember grabbing my
helmet, responding to the Capitol first to the West Front and leaving the CDU sofl squads on
Constitution Avenue because there was no cal/for them to leave their posts to respond later. I
found out much later that Sergeants - •
and• • did tak~ their squads to the Capitol
through the Russell Subway.

Wizen I arrived at the West Front by the north side of the Inaugural platform I saw
thousands of raucous protesters and a hard CDU squad commanded by Lieutenant -
Realizing that it was too dangerous for me to go through the crowd by myselfI walked back up
the hill and walked to the Upper West Terrace. From there I had an oveniiew of the sea of
demonstrators. I walked down the south steps to the base of the Inaugural platform to re-unite
with my CDU hard squads. I saw Sergeants - and - fighting alongside their officers
enduring verbal abuse and protesters pushing the line. My CDU hard squads formed a police
line behind the bike racks. I found olll later on that Sergeant - retrieved a Colt 45 that fell
out of a protester's waistband. The owner of the gun fled but it was processed as CPWL
(carrying a pistol without a license). There were also numerous Metropolitan Police (MPD)
also holding the police line. I saw metal rods, wooden planks and various other projectiles
being thrown over the police line. Some of these objects were aimed at my head but I was able
to dodge them. A full water bottle hit me in back ofmy leg. Wliile on the line I helped pull out a
MPD officer that was hit on the head to safety. I saw red liquid being sprayed at my officers.
Wizen I checked on Sergeant • • his helmet and gas mask were covered in red liquid. He told
me he couldn't see so I pulled him out of the line to safety. Just as this was happening I was
starting to choke on the gas that was dispersed. The line was starting to get pushed back. Soon
aft.er the police line collapsed from one side and then completely. Sergeant • • and I had to
fall back and retreat up the narrow wooden staircase on the Inaugural platform. We made it
back to safety up into the Lower West Terrace Door where my officers were starting to
•
decontaminate. I gave up my water bottle to Officer • • • • • from my CDU platoon who
I saw coughing and hacking. In this chaos and disorder I became separated from my hard
platoon. I tried calling both Sergeants - and - but they all went to voicemail. Aft.er
decontaminating myselfI made it down the ST level hallway Senate Side and ran into SOD K9
Officer who asked me with urgency: "Lieutenant, can you take us to S-138?" S-138
from my knowledge of the Capitol is the Senate Appropriations Room 011 the first floor of the
U.S. Capitol. - was accompanying approximately twenty (20) CDU officers from
Metro Transit Police. I led them to the - elevator that fit at the most eight (8) people at a
time and ended up doing multiple trips. I thanked the Metro Transit Police for helping us out as
they responded to S-138.

Aft.er that I made my way up the West Stairs to the Crypt to where many of the rioters
who had broken in were just walking around and ~ I encountered a Library Division
Officer and a Library Division Official (Sergeant - · The Library Division Officer
asked me what we should do and she thought they should be arrested but at this point this would

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 0 8 vt>R Case# 21-023B

be impractical since we probably didn't have the manpower to do mass arrest at this time. I
walked across the Crypt with Sergeant - and I say - •
- - - instructing
Capitol Division officers to man the Memorial Door. I asked the Chief what we were doing. He
told me that they will be escorted out the Memorial Door. I then asked if there was a transport
vehicle for an arrest but he told me that they were just being escorted out. At that time I saw
several FBI personnel responding in tactical gear up the stairs towards the area between
Statuary Hall and the Speaker's Officer. I then saw USCP officers escorting one to two people
out at a time. Some wanted to come back in but they were kept out of the Memorial Door.

I then responded to the Rotunda Door which had been breached. I saw at least forty (40)
or more USCP officers t,ying to secure the door.-/ saw Lieutenant •
• • climb up to t,y
to fix up a mechanism on the door. I also saw Captain - •
• • • I responded to
securing the door then Sergeant - • • • asked if anybody had any OC spray and I
immediately gave mine up. The OC spray was sprayed at the rioters outside the door who were
flying to get back in.

Later on that evening I reunited with my entire CDU hard squad. I witnessed an awe
inspiring speech from both • • and - worthy of a movie scene. I spoke last and explained
to my CDU hard squad that I was sor,y I came a little late to join them but that I had to set up
the CDU soft squad to line and secure the avenue. I also said they did a great job. A lot of gear
such as radios, Glock magazines, PR-24s and helmets were lost in the fight. But the important
thing was that we were unharmed and alive.

At this time the Capitol Building had been cleared of all rioters and we decamped and
stood down inside Statua,y Hall. I took care of administrative things such as contacting
property to replace the lost magazines and contacting HMRT to replace the gas mask filters. I
•
also kept in contact with • • and • • • to make sure they could break for
decontamination of their equipment. Several hours had passed and I called Captain • • if •
we could respond back to USCP Headquarters to stage but it appeared she was hesitant to do
••
so. I never got a response. I ended up calling Captain • - - •for a decision to release us
back to the Senate Division so that we could all go back home. It was a ve,y long day.

I do recall being in roll call fielding a question from Officer about officers
getting helmets. I could sense multiple feelings ofperhaps anger and disappointment by the way
asked me about the helmet. I recall walking out of the roll call room but it wasn't
because I could not handle the questions from seemingly ang,y officers or answer their
questions. /, at the same time, cannot blame the way they felt.

The allegation from Officer that I would "disappear" and cannot make a decision are
patently false. My reputation here for a little over twenty-one years on USCP has always been an
excellent one no matter which division I have worked. I as a hard CDU trained platoon
commander had to be part of the hard CDU squads. Yes it is true I left the CDU soft squad on
Constitution Avenue, not to leave the action, but to be part of the action where my CDU hard
squad was fighting hard. I even saw one officer with a scuffed up PR-24 that had to be replaced
with a new one. All in all, I made the best decision I could with the limited information I had on
that day. "

CAPD_000000796
 C 9 vt>R Case # 21-023B

Conclusion:

1. The allegation that Lieutenant - - violated USCP Directive 2053.013, Rules of

Conduct, Category B: Performance of Duty, Rule 81: Unsatisfactory Performance, be
classified as EXONERATED.

Rule Bl states, "Employees will maintain sufficient competency to properly pe,form their duties
and assume the responsibilities of their positions. Employees will pe,form their duties in a
manner which will maintain the highest standards of efficiency and integrity in canying out the
functions and objectives of the Department. Unsatisfacto,y performance may be demonstrated
by, but will not be limited to:

1. A lack ofknowledge of the application of laws required to be enforced.

2. An unwillingness or inability to perform assigned tasks.

3. The failure to conform to work standards established for the respective ranks, grades, or
positions.

4. The failure to take appropriate action on the occasion of a crime, disruption, or other
condition desen 1ing police attention.

5. Repeated poor evaluations or a written record of repeated infractions of the rules,

regulations, Directives or orders of the Department.

6. Repeated sustained complaints of misconduct. " [EXHIBIT 1OJ

• - actions on January 6, 2021, during an insurrection at the US Capitol

Building, were performed in a manner which maintained the highest standards of
efficiency and integrity in carrying out the functions and objectives of the
Department. The actions of - were justified, legal, and proper.

Exhibits:

1. USCP Bulletin #21.13 "Office of Professional Responsibility Tip Line" dated January 13,
2021 (1 page).
2. Email from • • • to OPR Tip Line, dated January 14, 2021 (1 page).
3. Attachment from • • • (3 pages).
4. Audio recording of interview - Officer - dated February 25, 2021 ( 1 disk).
5. Written statement - Officer - dated February 25, 2021 (1 page).
6. CP-1009 signed by Officer - dated February 25, 2021 (1 page).
7. Audio recording of interview Lieutenant - dated March 2, 2021 ( 1 disk).
8. Written statement - Lieutenant - dated March 2, 2021 (3 pages).
9. CP-1009 signed by Lieutenant - dated March 2, 2021 (l page).
10. USCP Directive# 2053.013, Rule of Conduct, effective date November 19, 2012 (8 pages).

CAPD_000000797
 10 -.,PR Case# 21-023B

Recommendation:

1. This report be Approved and the case Closed.

A review of the OPR records revealed no cases on file for Lieutenant

A review of the OPR records revealed the following Command Discipline on file for Lieutenant

Date Violation Discipline

03/11/16 Compliance with Directives CP-534 (16 hours)

CAPD_000000798
 11 UPR Case # 2 l -023B

Authorizing Officials:

;;~
Investigating Offici

{k-1
Sergeant April L. ranyosi Lieutenant Brandy A. Pringle
Investigator Assistant Commander
Office of Professional Responsibility Office of Professional Responsibility

c~~✓---
Inspector Michael D. haffer
Commander
Office of Professional Res onsibility

CAPD_000000799
 0 F'HONE· 202·224-5151

UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-7218

March 9, 2021

MEMORANDUM
. JJ... -,\'(\z.)
TO: Inspector Michael D. Shaffer .~
Commander
Officer of Professional Responsibility

THRU: Lieutenant Brandy Pringle

Assistant Commander
Officer of Professional Responsibility

FROM: Sergeant April L. Aranyosi

Investigator
Officer of Professional Responsibility

SUBJECT: Dismissal Request - QPR Case #21-023C

PURPOSE:

The purpose of this memorandum is to request the dismissal of QPR Case #21-023C.

BACKGROUND:

On January 13, 2021 the Office of Professional Responsibility (QPR) established a tip line for
USCP personnel to report any misconduct by USCP employees that occurred during an
insurrection at the US Capitol Building on January 6, 2021.

On January 14, 2021 Officer - (SD-3) sent the following email to the OPR tip line:

"Please find attached a report ofmisconduct by Senate Division 3 Lieutenants, as well as

unacceptable lapses by other USCP officials during the events of0J/06/21. I lookfonvard to
discussing these and any other matters with you at your earliest convenience. "

included an attachment to the email which stated in part the following:

"A crowd of about 200 agitators approached Peace Circle from the 200 block Constitution Ave
NW. No radio calls or advisement from USCP Watch Command was heard on the radio. "

Due to this statement, OPR assigned case #21-023C to an unknown employee.

Nationally At:aed~ed by the Commission on ACC'Uditation tor Law Enlorcement Agencies. Int:,

CAPD_000000800
 0
DISCUSSION:

• On February 25, 2021, OPR interviewed to obtain additional information

in order to identify the employee involved in this allegation.

• explained he was not referring to any specific employee, and was not
certain that the information had not been announced over the radio.

• believed whoever would have been responsible for putting the information
over the radio should be investigated by QPR.

RECOMMENDATION:

Due to the complainant's failure to disclose sufficient information to further the investigation,
the QPR will consider this matter CLOSED and QPR Case #2 l-023C will be classified as
DISMISSED

If you have any question or concerns, please feel free to contact me.

geant April L. Aranyosi

Investigator
Office of Professional Responsibility

ALA: ala
Cc: OPR Case #21-023C

CAPD_000000801