Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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Respondent:
Witnesses:
Allegation(s):
Background:
On January 11, 2021, the Office of Professional Responsibility was made aware of multiple
social media videos involving United States Capitol Police (USCP) employees and their conduct
during the attack on the United States Capitol Building that occurred on January 6, 2021. The
social media videos showed unauthorized individuals entering through the Upper West Terrace
(UWT) emergency exit door, while five USCP employees are standing off to the side. The
unauthorized individuals continue into the building and proceed up the stairs towards the Capitol
Rotunda. Sergeant ••- Operational Services Bureau, Special Operations Division,
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Section Two (OSP-SOD-2) was identified in one or more of the social media videos.
[EXHIBITS 3 & 4]
The case was assigned to Sergeant Brent M. Hitz (OPR) for investigation on January 11, 2021.
The OPR reviewed USCP Closed Circuit Television 1 (CCTV) Camera #0157, #0920, #0912 and
#0126, which revealed the following events occurred in chronological order on January 6, 2021:
[EXHIBIT 6]
2:33:23 - - •
and • • are observed opening the UWT secondary doors 3, which leads to
•
the UWT Door. • • is observed pointing at the UWT Door to have unauthorized individuals
exit. • • and -• appear to be talking to a group of unauthorized individuals. Some
unauthorized individuals leave and exit out the UWT Door. Protesters that are outside of the
UWT Door are observed entering the building through that door. #0126, #0912
•
2:34:19 - • • steps forward into the threshold of the UWT secondary door and stops three
unauthorized individuals from continuing further into the building. - and - are
•
observed with • • during this timeframe. Approximately 15 more unauthorized individuals
enter the UWT Door. More protesters are observed at the UWT Door and outside of the UWT
Door. #0126, #0912, #0920.
2:35:00 - A large group of protesters are observed on the north side and middle of the UWT
(outside the building) attempting to enter the building through the UWT Door. #0920
2:35:54 - Approximately 60 unauthorized individuals entered the UWT Door and moved past
the officers that are standing by the UWT secondary door. At this point, • • comes through •
the UWT secondary door shaking his head. - - and - are behind him.
Unauthorized individuals are stopped beyond the UWT Door entrance. #0126, #0912
2:36:23 - Approximately thirteen unauthorized individuals are observed just inside the UWT
Door, with a larger group of protesters outside the UWT Door. #0912
2:36:50 - The unauthorized individuals appear to be chanting and then push through the officers
and past the UWT secondary door. #0912, #0126
1
CCTV is a closed circuit television system, including cameras placed throughout the Capitol Complex
2 To reduce confusion throughout the ROI "UWT Door" refers to the "UWT emergency exit door."
l To reduce confusion throughout the ROI, "UWT secondary doors" refers to the "UWT interior doors."
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C QPR Case #21-006 B
2:37:00 - 2:39:04 - Approximately 104 unauthorized individuals enter the UWT Door. #0126
2:39:04 - is observed listening to and/or using his radio. Approximately ten more
unauthorized individuals enter through the UWT Door. #0126
2:40:07 - steps closer to the UWT Door and confronts the protesters that are just inside
the doorway. - ••• - and - are standing across the hallway blocking the
protesters from entering further into the building. A large group of protesters are observed
outside the UWT Door. #0912
2:42:20 - Protesters are observed aggressively arguing with officers. Unauthorized individuals
are observed behind the officers at the UWT secondary doors. #0912, #0126
2:44:17 - - says something to • • • then pulls him back by the shoulder; then pulls
- back by the shoulder. The officers start to back up towards UWT secondary doors.
Officers walk through the UWT secondary doors with the unauthorized individuals following
behind them. #0126, #0912
The OPR reviewed USCP audio and audio transcripts provided by Communications for the
incident at the UWT Door, which revealed the following information: [EXHIBITS 7 & 8]
Dispatch: "Any unit (inaudible) copy. Upper West Terrace Door is being breached as well. Any
unit can respond to there to assist. Any unit. " - Approximately 1434 hours.
Dispatch: "544. Say your message again. " - Approximately 1434 hours.
Officer: "(/11a11dible) Charlie, I'm at the Upper West Terrace Door. I've got three officers with
me. We (inaudible) breach." - Approximately 1435 hours.
Dispatch: "/ copy. Upper West Terrace Door needs assistance ... " - Approximately 1435 hours.
Officer5: "970A, I need somebody with a key to the Upper West Terrace Door. If we can
resecure the lock, we could close it. " - Approximately 1440 hours.
Dispatch: "Again, any unit with the keys Upper West Terrace to respond to secure that door
now. " - Approximately 1440 hours.
The OPR reviewed USCP radio mic key-ups 6 provided by Communications for the incident at
the UWT Door. [EXHITBIT 9]
The QPR obtained a map of the first floor of the Capitol Building and identified the location of
this incident. [EXHIBIT 1O]
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Discussion:
On January 28, 2021, - (SD-I) was interviewed and provided a written statement.
[EXHIBIT 11 & 12]
When asked to explain what was happening at the 2:34:40 mark on the CCTV footage, -
stated, "/ mean Just what you see. Trying to stop the people. I think at some point we realized we
weren 't going to be able to, so ... my thought at that point was get to the door. I was thinJ...ing at
that point to try and close the door, after we get to the door and get them stopped. You 'JI see
Sergeant •-• vump out again, he tries and we get them stopped at the actual exit door. And
then ... they were arguing back and forth, you know, hold them there. And I was thinking if we
could get them pushed backJust a little bit more, we could get the door closed but then I realized
if we get that door closed, it's not locked. "Additionally, - stated, "Can I say something
here? I mean, you can sit here and count them all day. I could see out that door and there were
thousands ofpeople. And in my perspective, at that point, they were Just pouring in. So, I mean,
it's nice for you to like, this is like the third time you've counted protestors. And then like you had
this number here, this number there, it seemed like a lot more. "
OPR: "At any point, did somebody in that group call out what you guys had, the situation, um,
right here, specifically with the door being open?"
"Before you see me in this video, I can't recall if the call came out over the radio for
door breach at the Upper West Terrace Door or if I initiated it. I put out over the radio - I was
at the Upper West Terrace Door, I had four or five officers with me, I needed more people to
stop the breach. Cause like I said, when I looked 0111 the hallway and out the door, it was just a
sea ofpeople and it looked like they were allfimneling right in that door. I mean, obviously
loo/..ing back that wasn't the case, but that's what it looked like. I called out for - I know I put out
over the radio, I think I called it the second time. Um, but at no point, could I hear a response or
one that was coherent to me at that point?
When asked to explain why he and the other officers were standing to the side as unauthorized
individuals entered the UWT Door, - stated, "With only jive officers, there was only so
much we could do. Obviously, we tried to stop ii, it didn't last very long. We just waited for an
opportunity and Sergeant . . i l l iumps right on when the flow slows down again ... hejumps
back in front and we kinda stop them there for a while. "
"On Janua,y 06, 2021, I arrived at the Capitol to begin my shift at approx. 1400 hours.
An active riot was already in progress. I responded to the Lower West Terrace Door
where rioters were attempting to breach. Upon arrival I found CDU officers engaged
with rioters but holding. Almost immediately after my arrival a breach of the North Door
was broadcasted. Myself and several officers responded up the stairs and met rioters in
the Crypt. A severely undermanned police line was formed.
Shortly after the line was formed rioters surged and forced the police line back and
through the Crypt. I was pinned in a corner as the crowd surged through and out of the
Crypt. As the crowd thinned I was able to escape through the west entrance to the Crypt.
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Myself and several officers moved south in an attempt to meet up with another police
line.
We stopped in the OAP hallway just south oft/ze Crypt where we held rioters for a short
time. When it became obvious holding the rioters in the OAP hallway was useless as
rioters were already behind us. we ret11rned along the OAP hallway in another attempt to
find a police line.
We stopped at the Upper West Terrace Door which was in alarm and open. Rioters were
entering through the open door. I advised dispatch and requested back up. I was unable
to determine if anyone was responding. The officers with me were able to stop the rioters
ji-om entering for a short time, however with only 5 ofus at tire door we wouldn't be able
to hold for long.
A call came over the radio for "Shots Fired Oil the House Floor" and I was unable to
determine from radio traffic if anyone was responding. The situation at the Upper West
Terrace Door was worsening. Rioters were becoming more agitated and ang,y; more
and more rioters behind us were taking an interest in what we were doing. Based on the
numbers ofrioters and their action I believed we wouldn't be able to hold the door. I
prioritized the Shots Fired call as more important and pulled eve,yone back to respond to
the House Floor, where I understood the shots were fired. "
On January 29, 2021, (PSB-ID-CIS) was interviewed and provided the following written
statement: [EXHIBIT 13 & 14]
"On Janua,y 6, 2021, I was assigned to the /11a11g11ral Task Force (ITF) responsible for
various duties in preparation for the 59th Inaugural Ceremonies. I was in the ITF office
located at the Government Printing Office (GPO) monitoring the USCP radio and
observing current events on the local news broadcast. Myself along with other ITF
members monitored the deteriorating conditions from the demonstration march and
concluded after the police line Oil the West Front was broken that we would self-deploy to
the Capitol if the Capitol building were breached. Shortly after formulating this plan, a
priority for a breach of the Senate Door was broadcast, myselfalong with Sgt. -
Sgt __ _ _ _ _ Sgt. - - •- Sgt. - •
- - Captain
- - Inspector • • • responded priority lo the - Loading dock where we
then made our way to the Capitol.
Ourfirst contact with the crowd occurred in the Capitol Crypt where we became involved
in a physical confrontation with approximately I 50 rioters. There were approximately 40
USCP Officers attempting to hold a police line in the middle ofthe Crypt. The aggressors
used mace and bear spray against the police line which then collapsed. I was pinned
against a wall in the crypt, bearing all effort in an attempt to not be crushed, I was able
to slip past the wall during a crowd surge and was pushed into the OAP corridor. While
in the OAP corridor, a large contingent of rioters began wal/..ing into the hallway. I
immediately began giving verbal orders for the crowd to leave and began efforts to
deescalate the situation from another round ofphysical violence. While in the back and
forth with the group, Ofc. - tells me that there is a CDU squad waiting around
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the corner and that we need to lead the group there. We began to fall back to the area
inside the upper west terrace door where there were no support elements. When the
group arrived at the door, I began attempting to direct the crowd to the nearest exit
which was the upper west terrace door. I believed the door to be in alarm and to have
been breached. Several people exited out of the door from the group where then I
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engage another effort to remove these people from the Capitol. Shortly after/ailing back
to regroup, a shots fired call with officer in distress was broadcast over the radio where
then either Oft. - or said we need to get to the House Floor and
defend it. From this point, /found my way to the Capitol Rotunda where I was unable to
progress further to the House Floor due to police lines holding back the crowd at the
hallway into the House corridor.
From this point forward, I found myself looking for problems to solve and was involved
in a number of efforts to further retake the building and safeguard and protect life. I
aided in the evacuation of Congressional stafffrom the Capitol. I connected Virginia
State Police CDU resources with MPD and USCP elements at the lower west terrace
door where they were able to retake the inaugural platform. I coordinated investigative
efforts concerning the Officer involved shooting and further assisted our partner
agencies with the initial efforts of the investigation into what occurred.
/11 summa,y, I self-reported the video clip to OPR because I knew that it was edited and
taken out ofcontext to appear to make me and the department look as bad as possible in
this event. Under no circumstances do I respect or in any part agree with the people that
intentionally and violently invaded the Capitol. "
- confirmed he was one of the individuals present, when shown the social media video of
this incident. - stated that he was in the Crypt just prior to being pushed into the OAP
hallway. According to - when the group of officers arrived at the UWT secondary doors,
by way of the OAP hallway, the UWT Door was closed, but already in alarm.
According to they held the group of unauthorized individuals in the OAP hallway, until
- tells them to fall back. - stated, "/ remember at some point, they told us there
was CDU. I don't remember if it's here or the Upper West Terrace and it could have been both
places honestly. I think there was an impression there was a CDU group able to assist, I mean in
both cases there weren 't ... "
OPR: "So right there specifically - was there a plan, what was the plan if there was?"
"I don 't think there was a plan the entire day. I think - truthfully speaking, from even
the short calculations from things I tried to figure out, none ofthem seemed to work out. I don 't
think there was a plan. There wasn 't an arrest plan. Later in the day, I assisted some
officers ... handcuffing a suspect ... couldn't get them out the south door, north doors barricades
blocked, tried to send to the CVC tunnel, they couldn't get out because VPOTUS was in a hold.
Had to find some officers and have them go through the tunnel back to the Russel Building and
have the wagon get them from there. Not really ideal, couldn 't really secure the crime scene at
the House Chamber, same thing at the House Door ...I don 't think we had one. "
When asked to explain what was happening at the 2:33:23 mark on the CCTV footage, -
stated, "/ think the naive part ofme was hoping that, when we backed up to that point where the
door was, that some would take the opportunity to leave - not so successful in that, a few people
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did, the majority went back to the rotunda, which is not ideal in what we would have wanted to
happen. Some did leave though, so that helped bw some leaving also gave the indication that the
door was able to open for anyone to come back in, so. I guess a no win idea - and there was no
help there. "
According to - •
he remembered • • asking for a key to resecure the UWT Door, but
does not remember ifthere was a response. - stated that the only way to secure the door, is
with a key. Additionally, - stated that he was looking for a lock-down button for the UWT
Door, but did not find one.
When asked to explain what was happening at the 2:37:00 mark on the CCTV footage, -
stated, "It's really trying to figure what our next plan should be. We don 't have the numbers to
stop this group, we can 't secure this door. We can make another attempt to form a line, but at
some point we nm that same risk ofgetting run over like we did in the C,ypt. I mean, it's a -
hallway I get it, but the numbers wise, even from this angle right here ... is probably a ten to one
minimum, I mean without some support, 1101 sure where we 're going to push these people to. And
especially as the people behind us are gonna lly to get olll, even if it's one or two. That's the
goal is to get people out of the building. I don't think an arrest plan really works here, there is
nowhere to take them. All it does is take our pair ofcuffs and take one of the five people standing
here out of tlze circle ... I mean thoughts, I don't think there were any clear ones ... there's nothing
immediate that seems like a good option. "
OPR: "That was identified as Lieutenant did he say anytl,ing to you when he grabbed
your shoulder and pulls you back?"
''He just said to fall back, is all I remember. But again my tunnel vision I think probably
keeps me from actually hearing all the dialogue ... "
OPR: "Wizen you guys vacate that door right there (UWT Door) ... do you know where you went
at that point. Wiza/ you guys did after that?"
"I feel like after that is when the shots fired call came. I believe.
OPR: "Did you guys realize that by leaving the Upper West Terrace Door, that it would allow
more protesters into tire building?"
"/ mean, I guess that makes sense. I don 't necessarily know if I thought ... that leaving
the door, people would be coming in ... "
OPR: "Did you or someone notify communication of the silllation, advise t/rem of the incident,
your location, obsen1ations at the Upper West Terrace Door?"
"/ think it was just advised about the door being unsecured and the need for the key and
I don't think there was a response. "
OPR: "Was there a failure to take appropriate police action by yourself. during this incident at
the UWT Door?
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"I guess you can say there is, I'm not sure I know what the appropriate action is. I
mean, if we talk about hying to affect an arrest - I've got nowhere to go with this person in this
crowd ... resources ... and eve,y time we thought there was CDU there wasn't, it's just us. Even to
t,y and use some type offorce, we can 't get a standoffdistance for OC spray and even that
wo11ldn 't be warranted ... tactics wise. I don't even think we have a scenario that sets us 11p to be
fo11r guys at a door verses 100 people determined on getting in, who 's already proven that
earlier in the day. I mean, I'm willing to go lo any training to tactically learn what to do here but
I don 't think that there was a clear action.
When asked if deadly force was an option - stated, "No, I mean, for, for deadly force, we
would have to articulate that, you know, there was an immediate danger to life, but sans starting
this confrontation with them and attempting to physically go hands on and restrain somebody,
it's gonna be difficult to test that. Um, if there's a Member in my vicinity and I can articulate that
they're going to immediately get to this Member unless 1 make this action right now. I think it's
gonna be difficult to justify a deadly force. It's what I see here - 1mlawfid enhy, which is great,
we would normally arrest for unlawful enhy, we cuff the person, do a search and call for a
transport, which is just not a viable play right here. Its jive people, its jive sets of cuffs. Um, and
none of which can get enough distance to safely do such and search without being 11111 over by
the crowd. Um, I don't think that the deadly force applies here sans some tangible threat to a
Member, like I said, ifthere's a Member behind its and I think they're going to get this Member
and tear them to shreds, I think I can articulate something different in that manner, but 1 don't
think we have it here. "
OPR: "Do you believe your cond11ct brought discredit to yourself or the department during this
incident at the Upper West Terrace Door?"
"I think the videos, you know, gives that appearance. I don't, I don't think that the
conduct with the fit/I sto,y, um, does so. I think there's are a lot of, a lot of layers to the dynamics
of that scene that aren 't conveyed in that video. Um, so I get the optics of it. I do understand the
optics of it do look poor. I think entirety as a whole, I think with the resources we had and the
time we had to think about it and even communicate, you /mow ... in retrospect. you can always
say you could do something better. I don't argue that, I will say, in real time, I could not come up
with any ofthose options."
"011 January 6. 2021, I was assigned to the Inaugural Task Force at GPO building.
Upon hearing the protest situation at the Capitol become dire, I responded over to assist.
I entered thro11gh the Lower Delaware Door ofthe Russel right as the lockdown went
into effect. Responded through the subway to the Capitol. Entered the crypt of the
building and was met by several protestors. Attempted to hold the police line preventing
access to House Side. Protestors advanced 011 line, and I was caught cmshed in a corner
before reaching the door. Crowd pushing eventually landed me near OAP hallway.
Group ofprotestors gathered, while other officers and I attempted to hold a line.
Protestors advised they 'could take us ifthey wanted to. · Advised by colleagues to fall
back Arrived at Upper West Terrace door. Protestors were entering and exciting door.
Door was in fire alarm mode. Sgt. • • • called over radio and asked for a key to
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secure. No radio response. I looked for a lockdown button but nothing but a phone was
nearby. The door is a push bar, opening outward, with no way to even stick an object in
the handles to prevent opening. Attempted to hold a line at the door to prevent further
entry. Protestors fonned on the outside. Other protestors inside appeared at our rear to
exit or remained at rear. Crown size significantly outnumbered officers. Decision was
made to fall back. I was under the impression that CDV was nearby inside. We did not
have the resources to effect any arrests, as only a Jew officers, few pair of handcuffs
between the officers, significantly more protestors, no way to safely get the protestors if
arrested to a transport. An attempt to go hands on with the protestors would have yielded
injwy to officers and no achievable objective. Crowd flow entered building. Additional
protestors exited, which again allowed protesters outside to recognize the door was open.
Additional protestors entered. Began to make another attempt at a police line. Was able
•
to hold crowd temporarily. Sgt. • • tried to rationalize with the crowd to 110 avail.
Rear of crowd began pushing, causing front ofgroup to advance on the line. Another
decision was made to fall back. With no safe and achievable objectives, the goal was to
find a larger contingent of officers and push the crowd outside the building. Moved back
to the OAP hallway, and responded to the House Chamber for the call of 'shots fired. ·"
- stated, "From what I can recall, we were waiting by that door (UWT seconda,y doors)
and as the video shows, we walked through to the outer door and that's when we were standing
•
there. I can 't recall if it was Lieutenant • • up front - Sergeant •-• But Sergeant
was spea/..ing with a few ofthe rioters. Just sounded like he was hying to reason with
them, like not to come in. I was in the back - head on a swivel. checking six, just to make sure
there wasn 't anyone /tying to ambush us from behind. I couldn't really hear what was going 011
in the conversation ...people shouting and screaming. I believe at that time, the door alarm was
going off... "
- is shown CCTV footage from the 2:36:50 mark, when the group of unauthorized
individuals pushed passed the officers.
OPR: "Were there any discussions or anything made about what you guys are hying to do at
this point?"
"Not to my knowledge no. Not with me. I was in the back, I was across from
- was just looA.ing back and forth. And eventually I just saw them try and push. I
thought we were going to try and hold them there but it was a big crowd. I that's when he said
get back, the official said just get back, let em go. "
When asked why - pulled the group back at the 2:44: 17 mark on the CCTV footage, -
stated that he didn't know if - saw something and that unauthorized individuals were
coming up behind them asking how to exit because tear gas was being deployed in the Crypt or
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the Rotunda. According to - after leaving the UWT Door, he ended up in the Rotunda and
started pushing out a large group of unauthorized individuals.
OPR: "Tell me your thoughts, how do you think it would have played out, ifyou guys would
have actively tried to start pushing back against that group (unauthorized individuals) there?"
"/ mean personally, I wanted to hold the line there, I wanted to fight them so at least we
would give time so if members needed to get out or if things need to be secured, maybe another
door could have been secured while we held those people back. But I know tactically speaking
there was jive of us. it hundreds in a - door. I was out on the West Terrace so we were
getting pushed back by thousands ofpeople so I /mow it wouldn't have gone how we would have
planned. So I understand ifit was a tactical decision but you know.for me as an officer in that
situation especially I would have tried my best to hold them back, at least to get the door
closed."
OPR: "During this incident at the Upper West Terrace Door, did you or someone in the group
notify communication ofthe situation, advise them of the incident, your location, obse1·vation? "
"I did not. I can 't recall exactly but I believe one of the o_ffecials was calling it out ...fi·om
what I recall, I remember hearing something about the Lower West Terrace Door over the
radio."
"Or. I'm not familiar with the, the, doors down there, it's the door that was. "
OPR: "Do you know ifany attempts were made to get the key, to reset that door at any point?"
"I don 't know but in all honesty, J 'm not surprised that we couldn 't. Everyone was
running around everywhere ... "
OPR: "Do you believe there was failure to take appropriate police action during the incident at
the Upper West Terrace Door?"
- "Personally, yes, I do. But seeing it fi·om an official's standpoint that was there. I
understand the decision. Based on the day, based on what was going on, other locations at the
Capitol, we were vastly outnumbered. Who knows whether we would have gotten hurt or worse if
we tried to stop them there. But I personally was frustrated that at least we didn 't t,y. "
OPR: "Did you hear anything about a shots fired call, specifically right at that timeframe where
you guys fell back? "
"/ remembered the shots fired call being put out, I can 't recall exactly when it was or
when I heard it. It was just obviously a lot going on but I did hear there were shots fired. At first
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I thought they said the House Floor, then 1 thought I heard someone say Senate Floor but it was
the House Floor... "
OPR: "Do you believe your conduct, specifically with this incident, brought discredit to yourself
or the department?"
"I don 't think so. I think we did what we could and given the circumstances and the
resources we had. I think we went above and beyond with the resources we had and the
preparation we had ... we only have five officers at that door, holding back hundreds, thousands
ofpeople so I believe we didn't have any discredit on us or the department. "
OPR: "As far as use offorce - with the situation at the Upper West Terrace Door and using
deadly force ... what are your thoughts 011 that, at that time ... was that an option? "
"I mean, yes. It's obviously in our heads - if I saw a knife or a gun or somebody t1ying to
use it or they 're trying to come in with it visible, I felt like that would have been justified. In this
situation, were it was just people with flag poles, stick and such, based 011 what I had already
seen, I feel like it would have just made things worse... "
According to - when he walked through the UWT secondary doors, the UTW door
was in alarm and open.
OPR: (2:35:54) "So there is three people at first and then eve,yone starts pouring in. Can you
go through, kinda what's going on right here? "
- "I don 't remember exactly like what was said. I mean, I know there was people
coming in and going out ofthat area but at that point like there's so many of them and only five
of us. There's not a whole lot that we can do about it and we can 't relock those doors without the
keys. "
OPR: "Do you remember the protester pushing passed you or was it was just the fact that there
too many to handle I guess?"
- "I mean at this poi/11, there not really fighting us. So it's - you have to take into
consideration here, if they 're not fighting, there are some in there that are fighting you. We have
no tactical advantage at this point, like nothing, we are by ourselves. "
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- was shown CCTV footage of the 2:36:50 - 2:44:06 mark, which showed the
unauthorized individuals pushing passed the officers and the officer forming a police line once
the flow of unauthorized individuals slows down. - was upset that his actions at the
UWT Door were being brought into question and stated, "There's 110, I mean, even ifyou look at
our use offorce, I mean you 're a sergeant, use offorce, what would you do there ... because
there 's nothing that you can do. You can 't use lethal force, look at how many there are nor do
you have Justification for doing ii. What happens when you hit slide lock - they 're gonna take the
gun from you. You can't use OC. you can't use batons here, where's that going to get you. In my
opinion we won this, because every one of us when home - we lost three officers as a result of
that day but all of here went home that day. And "This is a result of the department's failures 011
so many levels here. "
- was asked what happened at the 2:44: 17 mark on the CCTV footage, when -
pulls the group back and they leave the UWT Door. - stated, "No, I mean you could
barely hear each other when this happened because the amount ofpeople that were in there ... "
OPR: "So where did you guys go after this, do you remember?"
I remember going back out through those doors. like the seconda,y doors but I think
I went up to the Rotunda because I think they called out shots fired somewhere... "
OPR: "Did you realize that when you guys left the Upper West Terrace Door - that that was
going to allow more protesters to come into the building ... was that a thought?"
- "No, not when you hear a shots fired. Like obviously we 're leaving there with
intention not just meandering around at that point. "
OPR: "Did you or someone notify communication ofthe situation that you guys had at the
Upper West Terrace Door, advise them of the incident, your location, observations - anything
like that?"
- "I didn't. I didn 't get on the radio and do anything with it. "
OPR: "Were there any attempts made to resecw·e the Upper West Terrace Door?"
- "I know at some point, somebody was trying to get a key ... "
When asked if there was a failure to take appropriate police action during this incident at the
Upper West Terrace Door, - stated, "No. - stated that he has never been
trained in a scenario like he faced during this incident.
OPR: "Do you believe your conduct brought discredit to yourself or the department?"
CAPD_000000156
14 CPR Case #21-006 B
- "No, all those guys went home that day. Again. buildings can be replaced, people's
lives can 't. "
Conclusion(s):
Department policy, USCP Directive 2053.013, Rule Bl states, "Employees will maintain
sufficient competency to properly perform their duties and assume the responsibilities of their
positions. Employees will pe,form their duties in a manner which will maintain the highest
standards ofefficiency and integrity in car,ying out the functions and objectives of the
Department. U11satisfact01y pe,formance may be demonstrated by. but will not be limited to: ...
And 4. The failure to take appropriate action on the occasion of a crime, disruption, or other
condition deserving police attention. "
• Department Police, USCP Directive 1030.001, "Securing the Capitol Complex During
Active Threats" states, "During an active threat, required action will be dictated by
tactical circumstances and not all steps may apply in eve,y instance. Officers will take
the necessa,y precautions to ensure life safety when an active threat immediately affects
their area ofresponsibility. "And "Direct via a priority radio call that doors ... in the
affected area be secured when an active threat occurs ... notify Communications of the
situation and advise of the incident location and observations ... Begin taking steps to
respond to and/or mitigate the threat. " And "Maintain a tactical position, control the
area, and respond to any threat that may emerge. " The CPR determined that - and
the other officers involved in this incident took appropriate police action, based on this
directive.
• Social media videos show protesters and unauthorized individuals entering the Capitol
Building via the UWT Door, while - and four other USCP officers are seen standing
off to the side.
• Based on CCTV footage, the UWT Door, which is an emergency exit door, had already
been deactivated prior to - and the other officers arriving at that location.
According to testimony from •-••••- and -
was already in alarm when they arrived at that location.
the UWT Door
CAPD_000000157
15 OPR Case #21-006 B
and the radio mic key-ups from this event. The OPR detennined that the UWT Door
could not be resecured without a fire door key.
• - stated, "/ put 0111 over t/ze radio - I was at the Upper West Terrace Door,
I had four or five officers with me, 1 needed more people to stop the breach. "
• stated, "At some point I got on the radio and asked for the key,
dispatch ... should have it, it comes from my radio from my PIN. I answered up, I
said, ·we need a key at the upper west terrace door to resecure tl,is door and stop
the breach. '"
• Based on CCTV footage, and - are observed at the UWT secondary doors,
assisting unauthorized individuals with exiting the building via the UWT Door. As the
unauthorized individuals exit the building via the UWT Door, protesters that are outside
on the UWT, start to enter the building. - - - - •- - and -
enter the UWT secondary doors and confront the unauthorized individuals. The group of
unauthorized individuals push passed the officers and continue into the building. The
officers stand against the wall as a large group of protesters enter the building. When the
flow of unauthorized individuals entering the building slows down, the officers confront
the unauthorized individuals a second time.
• - stated, " With only five officers, there was only so much we could do.
Obviously, we tried lo stop it, it didn't last ve,y long. We just waited for an
opportunity and Sergeant • • •uumps right on when tlzejlow slows down
again ... he jumps back in front and we kinda stop them there for a while. " And "/
was thinA.ing if we could get them pushed back just a little bit more, we could get
the door closed but then I realized if we get that door closed, it's not locked. "
• - stated, ''I'm not sure I know what t/ze appropriate action is. I mean, if we
talk about hying to affect an arrest - I've got nowhere to go with tl,is person in
this crowd ... resources ...and eve,y time we thought there was CDU there wasn 't,
it 's just us. Even to t,y and use some type offorce, we can't get a standoff
distance for OC spray and even that wouldn't be warranted ... tactics wise, I don't
even think we have a scenario that sets 11s ttp to be four guys at a door verses 100
people determined 011 getting in, who 's already proven that earlier in the day. I
mean, I'm willing to go to any training to tactically learn what to do here but I
don 't think that there was a clear action. "
CAPD_000000158
16 OPR Case #21-006 B
limited options to repel them after already trying to fight and after having
already tried to go to physical force to do so. "
• - stated, "/ think we did what we could and given the circumstances and the
resources we had. I think we went above and beyond with the resources we had
and the preparation we had ... we only have five officers at that door. Ito/ding
back hundreds, thousands ofpeople so I believe we didn 't have any discredit on
us or the department. "
• - stated, "I mean, I know there was people coming in and going out of
that area but at that point like there's so many of them and only five of us.
There 's not a whole lot that we can do about it and we can't relock those doors
without the keys. "
• - stated, "We would have stayed there as long as possible, but the shots
fired call came out ... in my head that was the more serious threat - that's where I
went."
• stated, "/ believe shots fired was just called at that point. Shots fired on
the floor and our immediate reaction - somebody says it and ii may have been
says 'we gotta get to the House Floor, that's where we need to be.'"
The OPR detennined that the alleged acts of misconduct did not occur. - took appropriate
police action based on the circumstances he faced during this incident. - and the officers
involved, took the necessary precautions to ensure life safety. Communications was advised that
a breach had occurred at the UWT Door and that a key was needed to resecure the door. -
and the officers involved in this incident confronted the group of unauthorized individuals
entering the building two different times. - and the other officers maintained a tactical
position to control and area and ultimately responded to a call for "shots fired. "
Exhibits:
1. USCP Directive 2053.013, Rules of Conduct, effective November 19, 2012 (3 Pages).
2. USCP Directive l 030.001, Securing the Capitol Complex During Active Threats, effective
4/5/2018 (4 Pages).
3. Youtube Social Media Video #1, Upper West Terrace Incident, 1/6/2021 (1 Disk)
4. Twitter Social Media Video #2, Upper West Terrace Incident, 1/6/2021 (1 Disk).
5. CBSNNouTube Social Media Video #3, Crypt Incident, 1/6/2021 (1 Disk).
6. CCTV Video Recording of incident, 1/6/2021 (5 Disks).
7. Radio Recordings from Main Ops. 1 & 2, 1/6/2021 (1 Disk).
8. Radio Transcripts from Main Ops. l & 2, 1/6/2021 (20 Pages).
CAPD_000000159
(
17 QPR Case #21-006 B
Complaints:
A review of OPR records revealed the following Command Discipline on file for Sergeant
Other Matters:
None.
Recommendations:
CAPD_000000160
18 OPR Case #21-006 B
Authorizing Officials:
Investigating Official:
Appr;ved: I Uyi
4~z
Investigator
Office of Professional Responsibility
f"/L Lz Brandy Pringle
_;;-- Assistant Commander
Office of Professional Responsibility
Concur
~#----
f/'
Commander
Office of Professional Responsibility
Date A p p r o v e d : ~
CAPO_000000161
I a
SECTION TWO
EXHIBITS
STATEMENTS
FORM CP-1009
INVESTIGATOR QUESTIONS
CAPD_000000162
2053.013
Directive
II
!
Rules of Conduct
az II: Directive t. 2053.013 Effective Date: 11/19/2012
D
lnttiating Unit: Office of Professional Review Dote: 11/19/2013
~
z
:II
l
II Responsibility
CALEA: 1.2.7, 11 .3.1 , 11 .3.2,
12.1.3, 26.1.1, 261.3,
SINCUU:
26.1.4, 26.1.5
CAPO_000000163
2 of 8 • Dir 2053.01 3
18 General Policy 56
57
Employees are required to obey all Departmental
rules, regulations, Directives, orders, policies and
58 procedures. Lawful orders from a supervisor, including
19 The policy of the Department is to ensure that all
59 orders relayed from a supervisor by an employee of
20 employees, both sworn and civilian, maintain an
60 equal or lesser rank, will be obeyed promptly.
21 exemplary standard of personal integrity and the
22 highest professional standards of conduct in both their
61 Rule A4: Conflicting Orders
23 private lives and in their official capacities This policy
24 is embodied in the Department's Values. The 62 Should a supervisor issue an order which conflicts with
25 Department will promote adherence to professional 63 a previously issued order, rule, regulation or Directive,
26 standards of integrity and ethics and foster an 64 the employee should respectfully call attention to the
21 environment that emphasizes civility and 65 conflicting order and, if not rescinded by the
28 professionalism. 66 supervisor, the order will stand and will be carried out
67 promptly. The responsibility for the order will rest with
29 The Rules contained herein are designed to serve as GB the issuing supervisor and the employee will not be
30 professional standards governing employee conduct. 69 answerable for disobedience of the previously issued
31 Any employee, who is found to be In violation of one or 10 order.
32 more of these Rules, will be subject to such
33 disciplinary action as deemed appropriate by the Chief 71 Rule A5: Improper Orders
34 of Police. The Department will absolve employees who
35 are found not to be in violation of Department rules, n Supervisors will not issue any order which they know,
36 administer appropriate corrective action, or defer to the 73 or should know, would require a subordinate to commit
37 appropriate authority for criminal prosecution, if 74 any illegal or unethical acts. Employees will not obey
38 appropriate, when improper acts are confirmed. 75 any order which they know, or believe, would require
76 them to commit illegal or unethical acts. If in doubt as
77 to an order being illegal or unethical, employees will
78 respectfully request the issuing supervisor to clarify the
79 order or to confer with higher authority.
CAPD_000000164
Dir 2053.013 • 3 of 8
2 Employees will not refuse to obey, by words or 42 Employees who fail to appear for duty at the date,
3 actions, any lawful order of a supervisor, and will not 43 time, and place specified without consent of a
4 utter any disrespectful, rebellious, insolent, or abusive 44 supervisor are •Absent Without Leave".
5 language to or toward a supervisor.
45 Rule 84: Reporting for Duty
6 Rule A7: Truthfulness
46 Employees will report for duty on time, and at the time
7 Employees will make truthful statements at all times, 47 and place required, or they will be tardy. They will be
8 written or verbal, pertaining to official duties or matters 48 properly equipped and cognizant of information
9 affecting the Department Employees are required to 49 required for the proper performance of duty so that
10 cooperate fully and truthfully during Department 50 they may Immediately assume their duties.
11 investigations.
51 Rule B5: Carrying of Credentials and Identification
29 4 . The failure to take appropriate action on the 71 4. Employees will not lend their badges, credentials,
30 occasion of a crime, disruption, or other condition 72 or Identification to any other person.
31 deserving police attention.
73 Rule 86: Malingering
32 5. Repeated poor evaluations or a written record of
74 Employees will not feign illness or injury, falsely report
33 repeated infractions of the rules, regulations,
75 themselves or others ill or injured, or otherwise
34 Directives or orders of the Department
76 deceive or attempt to deceive any supervisor of the
35 6. Repeated sustained complaints of misconduct 77 Department, or any other governmental agency or
78 Individual authorized to conduct such an inquiry, as to
36 Rule B2: Personal Appearance 79 the condition of their health or the health of others.
CAPD_000000165
0
l 030.001
2 Authority and Coverage ............................................... 1 14 Jncldent Commander (IC}. The Individual responsible
3 Definition(s) ........................................ .......................... 1 35 for managing Incident response and recovery
,i General Policy ............................................................. 1 36 activities, Including the development of strategies and
5 Responsibilities/Procedures .................•.. .........•....... ... 2 37 tactics, and the order and release of resources. The IC
6 Initial Responding Officer......................................... 2 16 has overall authority and responsibility for conducting
7 Officers Posted at Affected Building Access Paints. 2 39 incident operations and is responsible for the
a TIMPff/P Posts .................... .................................... 3 40 management of all operations at the Incident site.
g Watch Commander .................................................. 3
1o Communications ...................................................... 3 <11 Incident Command System (ICS). A system for
11 Incident Commander................................................ 3 42 command, control, and coordination of a response that
12 Additional lnfonnation .................................................. 3 43 provides a means to coordinate the efforts of
t3 Cancellation ................................................................. 3 ,4 individuals and agencies as they work toward the
,~ Appendices .................................................................. 4 45 common goal of stabilizing an incident while protecting
46 life, property, and the environment. The ICS is used for
7 all kinds of emergencies and Is applicable to small as
46 well as large and complex incidents. The ICS is used
,s Authority and Coverage 49 by various jurisdictions and functional agencies, both
so public and private, to organize field-level incident
16 The Chief of Police is the chief executive officer of the 51 management operations.
7 United States Capitol Police (USCP) and is
e responsible for the day-to-day operation and 52 Internal Relocation Site. Pre-Identified areas within
HJ administration of the USCP. 5.i Congressional Office Buildings that provide enhanced
54 respiratory protection from airborne threats.
20 This policy may be revised at the discretion of the
21 Chief of Police, consistent with applicable law, rule, 55 Rapid Deployment. The swift and immediate
22 and regulation. 56 deployment of law enforcement resources to ongoing,
57 critical or life-threatening situations where delayed
511response by law enforcement personnel could
23 Definition{s) 59 otherwise result in death or serious physical injury.
r:XHIBl1
~1.. -
CAPD_000000166
2 of 4 • Dir 1030.001
' Immediately Jeopardize life, safety, and/or cause 3!) 2. Physically check the access point to ensure that
significant damage to Congressional Buildings. 10 the locking mechanism has activated properly and
Officers will follow the USCP Polley Directives 41 that the access point is secure.
1020.004, "Use of Force· and 1052.003, "Incident
Command System" when responding to active threats. ·12 3. One unit will remain at the access point to allow
<lJ entry of police and authorized support agencies
c All officers will remain alert for possible secondary 44 (e.g., DC Fire) ONLY and provide guidance and
Incidents. ~5 protection for any Individuals in the Immediate
4G area. Other units will initiate rapid deployment
47 tactics and respond directly to the active threat, if
6 Responsibilities/Procedures 48 necessary.
!l During an active threat, required actions will be 49 4. Using discretion, allow the necessary use of any
10 dictated by tactical circumstances and not all steps 50 access point as follows:
11 may apply in every instance. Officers will take the
2 necessary precautions to ensure life safety when an 51 a. Entry is only to be allowed to pollce and
13 active threat immediately affects their area of 52 authorized support agency resources, unless
14 responsibility. For active threats that do not 53 otherwise directed by the IC.
15 immediately affect their area of responsibility, officers
1f will follow the direction of the Incident Commander 54 b. The officer is responsible for challenging and
17 (IC), Field Commander, Watch Commander, or their 55 verifying the identity of all individuals before
18 officials. SC entry is granted.
19 Active threats that require the seruring of an access 57 C. Exit is only permitted to move individuals out
20 point, a Congressional Buildlng(s), or the entire Capitol 58 of danger (e.g., during active shooter
21 Complex will proceed as follows: 59 situations).
CAPD_000000167
Dir 1030.001 • 3 of 4
1 Vehicle Perimeter Access Points 37 the cause of the threat and direct officers not to
38 allow entry/exit under any circumstances.
1. Ensure the barricades are raised when affected by
J an active threat or as directed. 4. Request the activation of additional Department
1 and outside support agency resources as
4 a. If it Is safe to do so during the Initial response, 41 necessary.
s permit vehicles traversing the Capitol Grounds
6 to exit the perimeter. 1 5. Ensure appropriate information is relayed to the
Congressional community and to outside support
., 2. Restrict access to only authorized emergency and 44 agencies via approved communication methods .
support vehicles after verification.
~ Communications
,:, 3. Maintain a tactical position, control the area, and
10 respond to any threat that may emerge. a 1. Ensure the event is simulcast across all radio
1 channels.
1 TIMP/TIP Posts
2. Ensure responding units have priority over the
1. All Truck/Unauthorized Vehicle Interdiction J radio.
Monitoring Program (TIMP) and
1-: Truck/Unauthorized Vehtcle Interdiction Program 'iu Incident Commander
,s (TIP) checkpoints will deploy their barriers by
16 using Condition Yellow procedures. Establish incident command and ensure the
c ~
necessary lncident objectives are implemented as
17 a. If it is safe to do so during the Initial response, "J directed in USCP Policy Directive 1052.003,
,s permit vehicles traversing the Capitol Grounds s 1 "Incident Command System."
10 to exit the perimeter and then raise the
20 outbound barricades.
2 1 3. Maintain a tactical position, control the area, and 58 1. USCP Policy Directive 1020.004, "Use of
s respond lo any threat that may emerge. 5() Force•
CAPO_000000168
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1 [long pause)
2 UNIT CF3: CF3 I got a breach of the north
3 door of the Capitol.
4 OPER. 1: Copy that, north door of the
5 Capitol has been breached.
6 OPER. 2: ITF units have confirmed, ITF
7 units confirmed north breach -- breach of the north
8
21 [pause)
22 UNIT 416: 4-16, the Senate chambers are
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1 secure.
2 [pause]
3 OPER. 2: Have you lock down Senate
4 chamber, lock dock Senate chamber.
5 UNIT CF3: ICDF 3 we're beginning to push
6 the group from the front -- back to where they came
7 from the north door. Additionally I need additional
8 assets to south door on the first floor so that this
9 does not occur on this again.
10 OPER. 1: Copy, need additional units for
11 the south door and north door to assist with pushing
12 the crowds back. Any units available --
13 [pause]
14 OFFICER: We got another breach over west
not
15 t errace by the Senate chamber a rea. (~n-i~~T t;.;_ ~
u..WT Coer)
16 OPER. 1: Copy, another breach upper west
17 terrace.
18 OFFICER: I don't know what -- what the
19 door is but it's on the first floor, would be near
20 the Senate chamber upper west terrace Senate side.
21 OPER. 1: I copy, sir, we got another
22 breach on the -- all units should be responding to
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1 the Rotunda --
3 for the co - --
6 (pause]
9 this area.
11 assistance?
14 [pause]
19 door lockdown --
22 door.
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5 [pause]
12 [pause]
15 OPER. 1: Go ahead.
20 OPER. 2: Unit 8.
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9 OPER. 2: 4-0-5 B.
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1 [pause]
2 OPER. 2: Unit 8 you had a priority, go
3 ahead with yours.
4 [pause]
5 OPER. 2: Unit 8 you had a priority, go
6 ahead.
7 [pause)
I
20 UNIT 8: Unit 8.
21 OPER. 2: Unit -- the air is yours Unit 8.
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18 [pause]
19 UNIT 630: 6- 30 priority . It
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4 [pause]
12 [inaudible]. I
13 OFFICER: [inaudible] retreat to the
21 [pause]
--
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1 [pause]
2 OPER. 1: 5-4-4-4 say your message again.
IL-i 35 ~ C-.1 1~ o...t +ke.. ~~• 1.-ve-st T~(""
3 OFFICER: [iuaodible] uest stairs door.
~: I g: •o 4 I've got three officers with me. We [inaudible]
5 breach. -.;::1- G,: Ir~2 S"
T -e-rre,._C,Q..
6 OPER. 1: I copy. Upper west ~air~ door
7 needs assistance. You know, Schmidt I -- I -- I
8 don't know where the --
9 OFFICER: Are you -- all the (inaudible] in
10 the Rotunda.
11 OPER. 1: I copy, you need re- --
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1 re- --
2 UNIT 91 7: [inaudible) [inaudible) in
143~~ '1:.:to.43 the Rotunda, I don't know what that is.
1439 :: ~: 2..1: <(o q10A
1ifljO z to ,2.:Z.'.~O 4 OFFICER: ~ I need somebody with a key
t erro.cR.... re.,<;~ C?..~
5 t o the uppe r west trl::-airs door. If we can read, the
thQ.,
6 s:.au.r ~ l oc k, we could close it. •-:-. G,:2-Z:o \
7 OPER. 1: Any unit --
8 [talking, inaudible)
9 OPER. 2: Again, any unit with the keys
Ter~c~
10 upper west sta1~s to respond to secure that door
11 now.
12 The unit with 10-4-6-4-4 open and stock. 4-
13 6, 4-4 open and stock. 4-6-4-4 open and stock your
14 clear mic.
lt.f'f I~ 4 : l ; \f () 15 [pause)
20 come and turn back around into the CVC. FedEx jacket
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6 [pause]
Pft.{1.-:t '1tVl:~o 7
UNIT 630 : Unit 6-30 .
20 [pause)
22 OPER. 1 : 440 .
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7 UNIT 8: Unit 8.
11
12 OFFICER: [inaudible]
16 the CVC?
21 chamber.
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7 need it ASAP.
11 UNIT 7: Unit 7.
14 UNIT 7: 7, Unit 7.
15
17 OPER. 1: 917.
18 UNIT 917:
19
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0
Resource Start Time Duration
P..r- ..[
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 14:13:29.0 00:00:02.S
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/202114:13:30.2 00 :00:07.9
MAIN OPS l 1/6/202114:13:39.7 00:00:07. 0
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 14:13:46.1 00 :00:00.S
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/202114: 13:47.1 00:00:02.5
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/202114 :13:47.7 00 :00 :21.8
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 14: 14:00.5 00:00 :00.0
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/202114:14:10.l 00:00:00.6
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/202114:14:10.5 00 :00:01.2
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 14: 14: 11.4 00 :00:01.1
MAlN OPS 1 l/6/202114: 14:12.2 00:00:10.1
MAIN OPS 1 l/6/202114:14:14.9 00:00:03.1
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/202114:14:19.0 00:00:03.4
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 14: 14:23.3 00:00:00.
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 14:14:24.5 00:00 :06.5
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 14: 14:24.B 00:00 :00.5
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 14:14 :27.0 00:0 :
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 14: 14:29.0 00 :00 :00.5
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 14: 14: 30.4 00 :00:00.9
MAIN OPS l 1/6/202114:14:33.l 00:00:00.5
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 14:14 :34.7 00:00:00.2
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/202114:14:35.8 : : .6
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 14: 14: 37.0 00:00 :00.7
MAIN OPS l l/6/202114 :14:37.2 00:00:01.7
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 14:14:38.3 0 : :00.7
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 14: 14:39.9 00:00:04.1
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/202114:14:39.9 00:00 :00.4
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 14: 14 :41.1 00:00:00.6
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/202114:14:42.7 00:00: 00.6
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 14:14:43.9 00 :00:01.6
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 14:14:46.4 00:00:00.2
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 14: 14:47 .2 00:00:03.l
MAIN OPS l 1/6/202114:14:47.7 00:00:01.4
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/202114: 14:52.S 00:00 :02. 2
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 14:14 :55.1 00:00:01.7
MAIN OPS l 1/6/202114 :14 :56.1 00:00:04.l
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 14: 15:00.8 00 :00:01.3
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 14: 15:01.8 00:00:01.4
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/202114:15:03.3 00:00:00.7
MAIN OPS l 1/6/202114 :15:04.9 00 :00: 0S.1
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 14: 15:04.9 00 :00:00.5
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 14: 15:07.4 00:00:03.1
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/202114:15:11.l 00:00:02.3
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/202114:15:11.2 00 :00 :02.8
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/202114: 15:14.0 00:00:00.5
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 14:15:14.1 00:00:09.1
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 14 : 15:21.6 00:00 :01.4
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 14:15:24.2 00:00:11.S
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 14:15:36.8 00:00:01.6
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/202114:15:39.0 00 :00 :05.8
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 14: 15:45.2 00 :00 :04.0
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 14: 15:46.4 00:00:02.9
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/202114: 15: 50.1 00 :00 :01.9
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/202114: 15:52.0 00:00:00.7
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/202114:15:53.3 00:00:03.4
MAlN OPS 1 1/6/202114: 15:57.3 00:00:00.6
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/202114:15:57.7 00:00:01.8
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 14:15:58.5 00 :00:02.7
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 14: 16:02.S 00:00:00.6
CAPD_000000189
t1 ~ 1'1
Resource
MAIN OPS 1
SbirtTlme
1/6/2021 20:16:48.5
Duration
00:00:00.6
o.Ps
MAIN OPS 1
MAIN OPS 1
1/6/2021 20:17: 10.4
1 /2021 20:17:40.8
00:00:03.1
00:00:02.0
~ 7
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20: 17:48.0 00:00:02.0
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20:17:51.1 00 :00:06.7
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20:17:59.4 00:00:03.6
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/202120:18:01.9 00:00:02.7
MAIN OPS 1 1 /2021 20: 18:11.1 00:00:00.0
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20:18 :11.7 00:00:08.
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20:18:26.6 00 :00:02.6
MAIN OPS 1 1 I 0 :18:27.S : :01.6
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/202120:18:30.3 00:00 :02.6
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20:18:33.3 00:00:06.5
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20:18:46.2 00:00:02.5
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20: 18:48.8 00:00:0l.4
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20 :18:SS.6 00 :00 :02.0
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20 :19:10.3 00 :00 :02.S
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20:19:13.3 00:00:00.9
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20: 19 :23.4 00 :00 :03.2
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20:19 :43.2 00 :00:01.3
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20 :19:44.9 00:00:03.0
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20:19:48.4 00 ,00:04.0
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20:19:53.2 00 :00:02.3
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20:20 :01.4 00 :00 :04.7
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20:20:10.7 00:00 :01.7
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20:20:11.5 00:00:02.2
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20:20: 14.8 00 :00:03.9
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20 :20 :28.0 00:00 :05.6
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20 :21 :19.1 00:00 :00.4
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20 :21 :38.4 00: 00:03.1
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20:21:48,5 00:00 :02.0
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20:21:50.5 00 :00 :00.1
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20:21 :50.9 00:00 :09.1
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20:22:01.0 00 :00:04.0
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20:22 :0S.O 00 :00 :03.7
MAIN OPS l 1/6/2021 20:22 :32.0 00:00 :01.8
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20 :22:34.5 00:00:02.1
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20:22:37.7 00 :00:08.l
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20:22:47.3 00:00 :02.9
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20:23 :53.8 00:00:01.7
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20:23:55.6 00 :00:00.4
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20:23:56.6 00 :00 :15.3
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20:24 :34.2 00:00 :01.6
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20:24 :36.5 00:00:04.1
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20 :24 :40.6 00 :00 :06.7
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20:24:47.4 00:00:04 .3
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20:24:52.1 00:00:01.3
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20 :25:28.9 00 :00:00.4
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20 :27:47.9 00 :00:00.4
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20:27:59.9 00:00:00.2
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20:28:08.7 00:00:00.0
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20:28:09.5 00:00:04.7
MAIN OPS l 1/6/2021 20:28:22.3 00 :00:01.4
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20:28: 25.8 00:00:01.9
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20:28:57.5 00:00:00.4
MAIN OPS l 1/6/2021 20:30:06.7 00 :00 :00.5
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20:30:10.7 00:00 :00.6
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20:30: 15.5 00:00:02.2
MAIN OPS 1 1/6/2021 20:30:18.6 00:00:03. 1
EXHIBI
3¥ q
CAPD_000000190
Resource SbutTlme Duration Indlvl!fu~IAllas
0;0, 2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:20: 11 ,9 00 :00 :00.6
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:20:25.3 00 :00:00.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14 :20:33,3 00:00:00.4
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:20:34.4 00:00:00.7
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114 :20:59.B 00:00:03 ,1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:21 :06.5 00:00 :01 .1
MAIN OPS 2 l/6/202114 :21 :15.1 00:00:03.1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:21:40,7 00:00:01.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:21 :42.6 00 :00:00.5
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:22:06.4 00:00 :00.6
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14 :22: 11.0 00 :00 :01.4
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114 :22:14.7 00 :00:03.1
MAIN OPS 2 1/ / 14:22:19.1 00 :00 :03.1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:22 :24.4 00 :00 :03,1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:22:28.7 00:00:00.6
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:22:32.3 00 :00:01.9
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:22:34.4 00:00:05.1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:22:39.7 00:00 :07.7
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:23:00.3 00:00:03.5
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:23:10.4 00:00:03.7
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:23:16.6 00 :00:03.6
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:23 :21.7 00 :00 :03.5
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:23 :24.1 00:00 :00.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:23 :33.9 00 :00:00.4
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:23:43.9 00:00:0l.9
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:23:44.8 00:00:03,1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:23:48.B 00 :00:02.3
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:23 :51,B 00 :00:00.8
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:23 :53.6 00 :00:02.5
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:23:58.5 00 :00:04.1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:24:02.7 00:00:01.3
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:24:03.4 00 :00 :01.1
MAIN OPS 2 l/6/202114:24 :06.9 00 :00:00.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:24 :11.3 00: 00:01.1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:24:13.1 00 :00:00.8
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114: 24:14.6 00:0 :
00:00:14.6
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114 :24 :31.4 II II I ·
Page33 of 80
EXHIBI
CAPD_000000191
Resource Start Time Duration
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:26:16.6 00:00:02.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:26:19.7 00 :00:02.7
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:26:24.5 00:00:01.5
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:26:34.4 00:00:01.7
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:26:34.8 00 :00:01.7
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:26:37.1 00 :00 :03.1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:26:41.8 00 :00:03.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:26:45.2 00 :00:01.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:26:47.1 00:00:06. 1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:26:54.1 00:00:04.7
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:26:59.4 00 :00:01.4
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:27:01.6 00:00:02.1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:27:02.6 00:00:00.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:27:06.7 00:00:07.3
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:27 : 12.9 00:00 :01.8
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:27:25.6 00:00:03.1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:27:30,5 00:00:0 •
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14 :27:40,8 00:00 :03,l
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14 :27:44.7 00:00:01.1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:27 :46.2 00:00:00.6
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:27:48.6 00:00:00.5
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:27:48.8 00:00 :02.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:27 :50.2 00 :00:01.4
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:27:54.8 00:00:00.6
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:27:58.6 00:00:00.5
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:28:01.4 00:00:02.l
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114 :28:13.4 00 :00 :03.1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:28:18.8 00:00:03.1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:28:24.4 00:00:02.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:2B:25.5 00:00:03.l
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:28:29.2 00:00:00.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:28:30.0 00:00:01.6
MAIN OPS 2 l/6/202114 :28:32.9 00:00:01.4
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:28:35.l 00:00:02.2
MAIN OPS 2 l/6/202114:28:41.4 00 :00:02.1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:28:44.3 00:00:03.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114 :28:48.0 00 :00:02.5
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:28:51,6 00 :00:01.4
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:28:53.6 00:00:05.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:28:59.7 00:00 :00.9
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:28:59.7 00 :00:01.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:29:02.4 00 :00:01.4
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:29:08.7 00:00:00.6
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:29:10.6 00:00:01.8
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:29 : 12.6 00:00:02.0
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:29:15.7 00 :00:07.7
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14: 29:30.3 00:00 :00.S
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:29:34.1 00 :00 :00.6
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:29:35.6 00:00:00.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:29:37.4 00 :00 :03.1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:29:45.9 00 :00:00.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:29:52.1 00:00:00.6
MAIN OPS 2 l/6/202114:30 :01.4 00 :00:00.6
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:30:03.8 00:00:00.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:30:04.6 00:00:00.6
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:30:07,0 00 :00:00.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:30:08.3 00:00:03.2
MAIN OPS 2 l/6/2021 14:30:11.2 00:00:00.4
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:30:16.0 00 :00:00.3
Page34 of80
CAPD_000000192
Resource Start Time Duration
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:30:16.2 00 :00:00.5-
MAIN OPS 2 l/6/202114:30:17,l 00 :00 :01.1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:30:18.9 00:00 :00.4
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:30:20.1 00 :00 :09.4
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:30:31.6 00:00 :09.1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:30:41.2 00:00:00.6
MAIN OPS 2 l/6/202114 :30:43,7 00:00:07.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:30:52.1 00:00:01.0
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:30 :54.1 00 :00:01.0
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:30:55.4 00:00:01.9
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:31:03.7 00 :00:03.1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:31:12.1 00:00 :00.6
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:31:16.1 00:00:00.6
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:31:18.9 00:00 :00.6
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:31:21.2 00 :00:00.5
MAIN OPS 2 l/6/202114 :31:22.4 00:00:04.0
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:31 :25.1 00 :00:01.0
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:31 :32.1 00 :00:04.2
MAIN OPS 2 l/6/202114 :31 :37,5 00:00 :01.5
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:31 :38.0 00:00 :04.5
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:31:43,l 00 :00 :02.8
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14 :31:44.8 00:00:03.1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14 :31 :48.4 00 :00:00.6
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:31:55.3 00:00:00.6
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:32:30.S 00 :00 :00.6
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:32:31.7 00:00:01.1
MAIN OPS 2 l/6/2021 14:32:34.1 00:00:00.4
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:32 :42.B 00 :00:11.6
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/ 21 14 :32 .56.2 00 :00 01.4
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:32:58.4 00:00 :00.9
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:33 00.1 00 00:07.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:33:
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:33:19.5 00:00:03.7
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:33:23.6 00 :00 :01.0
MAIN OPS 2 l/6/202114 :33 :29.1 00: : 2.
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:33:32.7 00:00 :01.3
MAIN OPS 2 l/6/202114 :33:35.6 00:00:03.l
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:33:39.4 00:00:01.8
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:33:40.B 00:00:00.0
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14 :33:41.4 00:00 :01.3
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:33:43.5 00:00 :01 .4
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114 :33:43.7 00:00 :01.1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:33:47.5 00 :00:00.S
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:33:49.4 00 :00:01.5
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:33 :52.6 00:00 :00.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14 :33 :53.0 00:00:05.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:34 :07.5 00:00:00.7
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:34:08.2 00:00 :00.0
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14 :34:08.3 00:00:00.0
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:34:09.4 00:00:02.3
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:34: 10,6 00:00 :02.3
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:34:28.7 00:00 :03.1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:34 :31.3 00 :00:06.4
MAIN OPS 2 l/6/202114 :34 :39.6 00:00:01.9
MAIN OPS 2 l/6/202114:34:42.8 00:00:01.3
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:34:44.8 00:00 :01.8
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:34:45.3 00:00:00.6
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:34 :49.7 00 :00:05.8
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:34:54.3 00:00:00.5
Page 35 orso
CAPD_000000193
Resource Shirt Time Duration
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:34:57.2 00 :00:01.l
MAIN OPS 2 l/6/202114 :34:59.3 00 :00:04.1
MAIN OPS 2 l/6/202114 :35:04.4 00:00:04.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:35:10.7 00:00:01.B
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:35:13.2 00:00 :00.9
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:35:15.0 00 :00:04.7
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:35· 21.6 00:00:0l.B
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:35:22.3 00:00:00.0
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:35 :32.1 00 :00 :02.3
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14. 35:35.9 00:00:05.9
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:35:42.4 00:00:02.5
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:35:45.2 00 :00:04,3
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114 :35 :48.7 00 :00:03.1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:35:52.9 00:00 .04 .3
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:35:57.6 00:00 :09.8
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:36:07.0 00:00:01.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:36:11.0 00:00:01,8
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:36: 13.3 00 :00 :01.6
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:36:16.6 00 :00:06.5
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114 :36:24.3 00 :00:0l.B
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:36:25.0 00:00:03.l
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:36:30.0 00 :00:03.1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:36:38.3 00:00:00.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:36:39.1 00:00 :02.0
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:36:42.1 00:00:01.0
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:36:44.0 00 :00:07.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:36:52.9 00 :00:01.6
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:36:53.3 00:00:00.6
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:36:58.6 00:00 :04.7
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:37:04.3 00 :00:01.3
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:37 :12.5 00:00: 01.7
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:37: 12.7 00:00:01.l
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:37 :15.0 00 :00:00.3
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:37:25,9 00:00:00.5
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:37 :40.7 00:00:07.1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:38:04.0 00 :00:00.5
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:38:04.5 00:00:01.6
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:38 :08.9 00 :00:01.3
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:38:18.0 00 :00:01.6
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:38 :47.7 00:00 :01.4
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:38 :49.9 00 :00:01.5
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:38:52.4 00 :00:08.6
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:39:03.3 00:00:03.1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:39 :05.4 00 :00:04.0
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:39: 10.4 00 :00:00.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:39:11.1 00 :00:01.8
MAIN OPS 2 l/6/202114 :39:11.8 00 .00 OS 6
MAIN OPS 2 l/6/202114 :39: 17.8 00:00:02.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:39 : 18.9 00 :00:06.5
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:39:24.1 00 :00:04.3
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:39:32.3 00:00:09.9
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:39:43.6 00 :00:00.5
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:39:44.0 00 :00:00.4
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:39:46.1 00 :00:00.5
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:39 :51.4 00:00 :00.5
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:40: 12. 7 00:00:03, 1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:40:38.8 00 :00 :02.9
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:40:41.5 00:00:00.9
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:40:43.8 00:00:14.2
Page 36 of 80
CAPD_000000194
Resource Start Time Duration
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:40:58.4 00:00:08.9
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:41:06.3 00 :00:0S.0
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:41: 15.1 00:00:01.4
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:41 :24.7 00:00:00.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:41 :30.3 00:00:00.8
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:41:33.8 00:00:04.S
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:41 :36.9 00:00:01.0
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14 :41:47.4 00:00:02.3
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14 :41:53.1 00:00:03.1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:42 :12.5 00:00:00.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:42:15.8 00:00 :00.9
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:42: 17.3 00:00:00.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:42:18.1 00:00:03.1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:42:22.6 00:00:03.1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:42:27.3 00:00:00.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:42:31.1 00:00:00.6
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:42:34.1 00:00:03.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:42 :42.5 00:00:03.3
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114 :42 :44.6 00:0D :03.6
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:42 :47.0 00:00 :00.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:42:49.9 00:00:00.S
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:42:51.9 00:00:00.5
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:42:58.5 00:00:00.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114 :43 :00.2 00:00 :00.4
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:43:03.2 00:00:03.1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:43:15.6 00:00:00.6
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:43:26.6 00 :00:04.S
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114 :43 :31.3 00:00 :02.9
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:43:34.3 00:00:02.S
MAIN OPS 2 l/6/202114:43:35. 7 00:00:00.6
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:43:38.1 00:00:01.4
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14 :43 :46.4 00 :00 :00.7
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/20 1 14:43:50.1 00:00:00.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:43:51.1 00 :00:02.0
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:43:57.5 00:00 :03.1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:44:06.9 0:00:03. l
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:44 :15.S 00:00:01.8
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:44: 18.2 00:00 :00.7
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:44:21.8 00 :00 :18.9
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:44:45.1 00 :00:01.4
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:44:45.4 00 :00:01.3
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:44:51.3 00:00:01.6
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:44:52.9 00 :00:03.1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:44:56,0 00:00:05.0
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:45:01.7 00 :00 :02.3
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:45:02.9 00 :00:00.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:45:07.9 00:00 :01.3
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:45 :12.2 00:00:01.6
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:45:14.1 00 :00:01.0
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:45:14.6 00:00 :05.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:45 :20.8 00:00 :04.7
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:45:27.6 00:00:03.4
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:45:32.8 00:00:00.6
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:45:35.9 00 :00 :20.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:46:05.7 00 :00:00.6
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:46:06.3 00 :00:02.7
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:46:10.9 00 :00 :14.6
MAIN OPS 2 l/6/202114:46:28.1 00:00:02.0
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:46: 29.0 00:00:03.7
Page37 of 80
CAPD_000000195
Resource Start Time Duration
MAIN OPS 2 l/6/202114 :46:31.5 00:00:04.0
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14 :46:34.3 00:00:00.6
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:46:47.7 00:00 :03.1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:46 :51.9 00 :00:01.4
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:46:54.2 00:00:01.9
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:46:56.9 00 :00:06,1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:47:04.8 00:00 :01.7
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:47:05.4 00:00:00.4
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:47 :08.7 00 :00:01 .e
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:47:15.8 00 :00 :03.1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:47:19.6 00 :00 :00.5
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:47:28.4 00:00:01.4
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:47:30.4 00 :00:00.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:47:31,2 DD :00:01.1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:47:32.9 00:00:01.3
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:47:36.2 00:00:01.1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:47:43.6 00:00 :21.4
MAIN OPS 2 l/6/202114 :48:05.5 00:00:03.1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:48:09.4 00 :00:03.1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:48:11.3 00 :00:03.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:48: 18, l 00:00:02,3
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:48:20.5 00:00:02.B
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:48:22.4 00:00 :05,6
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:48:26.7 00:00 :00.8
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:48:27.8 00:00:06.5
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:48:35.2 00:00 :02.3
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:48 :38.8 00:00 :00.6
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14 :48:39.5 00 :00:00.8
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:48 :42.7 00:00 :01.1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14 :48:44.6 00:00 :05.4
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:48:50.4 00 :00 :01.3
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:48 :52.9 00 :00 :01.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14 :48:55.9 00 :00:05.9
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:49:04.5 00:00 :06.3
MAIN OPS 2 l/6/202114:49 :11.2 00:00 :04.1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:49: 15.0 00:00:03.1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:49: 19.5 00 :DO:OS.8
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:49:25.6 00:00 :01.3
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:49:27 .1 00 :00: 12.5
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:49:40.9 00 :00:02.3
MAIN OPS 2 l/6/202114 :49 :44.1 00:00 :05.1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114 :49:57.S 00 :00:00,2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:49:58.7 00:00:01.9
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:50:01.5 00 :00:01.5
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14 :50:05.0 00 :00:07.3
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14 :50: 18,3 00 :00 :01.6
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:50:20.1 00 :00 :01.0
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14 :50:22.1 00 :00:07.4
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:50:30.1 00:00:04.0
MAIN OPS 2 l/6/202114:50:34.7 00 :00 :02.7
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14 :50:36.4 00 :00:03.1
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:50:43.9 00 :00:00,S
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:50:45.3 00 :00:03.5
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:50:58.3 00:00:01.6
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:51:00.B 00 :00:04.9
MAIN OPS 2 l/6/2021 14:51:08.5 00:00:02.2
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:51:11.8 00 :00 :04.7
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/202114:51:17,4 00 :00 :03.5
MAIN OPS 2 1/6/2021 14:51:21.9 00:00:03.2
Page 38 of 80
EXHIBI'
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CAPD_000000196
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FIRST (GROUND) FLOOR PLAN SCAlf·
0 AS OF JUNE. 1997
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0
OFFICIAL STATEMENT
On January 06, 2021 I arrived at the Capitol to begin my shift at approx. 1400 hours. An
active riot was already in progress. I responded to the Lower West Terrace Door where
rioters were attempting to breach. Upon arrival I found CDU officers engaged with
rioters but holding. Almost immediately after my arrival a breach of the North Door was
broadcasted. Myself and several officers responded up the stairs and met rioters in the
Crypt. A severely undermanned police line was formed.
Shortly after the line was formed rioters surged and forced the police line back and
through the Crypt. I was pinned in a corner as the crowd surged through and out of the
Crypt. As the crowd thinned I was able to escape through the west entrance to the Crypt.
Myself and several officers moved south in an attempt to meet up with another police
line.
We stopped in the OAP hallway just south of the Crypt where we held rioters for a short
time. When it became obvious holding the rioters in the OAP hallway was useless as
rioters were already behind us, we returned along the OAP hallway in another attempt to
find a police line.
We stopped at the Upper West Terrace door which was in alarm and open. Rioters were
entering through the open door. I advised dispatch and requested back up, I was unable
to determine if anyone was responding. The officers with me were able to stop the rioters
from entering for a short time, however with only 5 of us at the door we wouldn't be able
to hold for long.
A call came over the radio for "Shots Fired on the House Floor" and I was unable to
determine from radio traffic if anyone was responding. The situation at the Upper West
Terrace door was worsening. Rioters were becoming more agitated and angry; more and
more rioters behind us were taking an interest in what we were doing. Based on the
numbers of rioters and their action I believed we wouldn't be able to hold the door. I
prioritized the Shots Fired call as more important and pulled everyone back to respond to
the House Floor, where I understood the shots were fired.
41/z1 / Lo z,
By my signature below, I acknowledge that l have read and understood my statement consisting of this
page and P other pages. I have made all the changes and corrections I desire to make.
On January 6, 2021 I was assigned to the Inaugural Task Force (ITF) responsible for
various duties in preparation for the 59th Inaugural Ceremonies. I was in the ITF office
located at the Government Printing Office (GPO) monitoring the USCP radio and
observing current events on the local news broadcast. Myself along with other ITF
members monitored the deteriorating conditions from the demonstration march and
conclude after the police line on the West Front was broken that we would self-deploy to
the Capitol if the Capitol building were breached. Shortly after formulating this plan, a
priority for a breach of the Senate Door was broadcast, myself along with Sgt. -
Sgt. Sgt. - - - Sgt. - - - Captain -
- • Inspector • • • responded priority to the • Loading dock where we
then made our way to the Capitol.
Our first contact with the crowd occurred in the Capitol Crypt where we became involved
in a physical confrontation with approximately 150 rioters. There were approximately 40
USCP Officers attempting to hold a police line in the middle of the Crypt. The
aggressors used mace and bear spray against the police line which then collapsed. I was
pinned against a wall in the crypt, bearing all effort in an attempt to not be crushed, I was
able to slip past the wall during a crowd surge and was pushed into the OAP corridor.
While in the OAP corridor a large contingent of rioters began walking into the hallway. I
immediately began giving verbal orders for the crowd to leave and began efforts to de-
escalate the situation from another round of physical violence. While in the back and
forth with the group, Ofc. •••• tells me that there is a CDU squad waiting around
the corner and that we need to lead the group there. We began to fall back to the area
inside the upper west terrace door where there were no support elements. When the
group arrived at the door, I began attempting to direct the crowd to the nearest exit which
Lt-
was the upper west terrace door. I believed the door to be in alarm and to have been
breached. Several people exited out of the door from the group where then I observed
people from the crowd outside begin to enter the door. I along with Sgt. - -
Ofc. • • • • Ofc. - and made an initial effort to repel the group of
people that were entering the door. A physical confrontation occurred where we began
pushing and hitting the leading edge of the crowd in an attempt to expel them from the
building. There was an older lady in the front of the group carrying a protest sign that
began to scream in pain as she was crushed between us. The group stopped their physical
effort to push into the building and this is where I made a second attempt to de-escalate
the situation and attempted to convince the group to leave. At some point I specifically
told the group that the building was closed and that's why they were not allowed in.
During this dialogue, the main individual in the group is using language to provoke me to
respond with physical force. He's stating and repeating all the political rhetoric that the
By my signature below, I acknowledge that I have read and understood my statement consisting of this
page and other pa . I have made all the changes and corrections I desire to make.
I
I EXHIBI1
_\\:,\'\
CAPD_000000199
• OFFICIALSTATEMENT
election was stolen, that the process was unconstitutional, that President Trump told us to
come here and occupy the building that we (police) were on the wrong side of history.
The group began chanting to let us in. Throughout the entire dialogue with the group I
used techniques to attempt to calm the group, I told the group that what they were doing
was wrong, that in their arguments of defending the constitution that they were
disrespecting the building (The Capitol) and disrespecting the process. At this point, an
Lt.-
individual in the group ask if I was ready to die to protect these people, I immediately
attempted to deflect the question and de-escalate when the same individual asked for a
second time if I was ready to die for this place at which point I responded that I swore
and oath to protect this place and that's what I'm going to do. At this point,
grabs me by the shoulder, and pulls me back away from the crowd where the people at
the door then begin to enter the building. I· believe at this point I voiced a request over
the USCP radio to have the key bought to the door to re-secure it. As the crowd begins to
enter, I recall standing there looking for weapons and did not see any. It's at this point
that is captured in media and social media videos that someone from the crowd thanks me
for supporting their cause which then prompted me to respond "I don't support you, but
respect it, respect the building". The video that was captured edits and removes the
question that was asked as well as the clarifying point of "respect the building" which
was then attached to a headline falsely asserting that I showed respect for the rebellious
action the group was taking. At this point the group is entering, those ofus at the door
have exhausted all levels of force with the exception of deadly force in an attempt to
expel the group. My mindset at this exact moment was a plea that those who were
entering would respect the building and not physically harm it. l believe mindset is also
key in the actions I took at the upper west terrace door. I was prepared to fight, I
recognized that we were outnumbered by an adversary that was provoking a violent
confrontation. I resolved that had a second confrontation to expel this group occurred,
that the end result would have been lethal force. When Lt.lllllmlled me back, it
caused me to break the cycle of thought of preparing to fight where I then transitioned in
my mind to do what was necessary to preserve life. This included a strategic fall back
and regroup to a position where we had better numbers and were in a better position to
engage another effort to remove these people from the Capitol. Shortly after falling back
to regroup, a shots fired call with officer in distress was broadcast over the radio where
then either Ofc. - or Lt. ••• said we need to get to the House Floor and defend
it. From this point I found my way to the Capitol Rotunda where I was unable to
progress further to the House Floor due to police lines holding back the crowd at the
hallway into the House corridor.
From this point forward, I found myselflooking for problems to solve and was involved
in a number of efforts to further retake the building and safeguard and protect life. I
aided in the evacuation of Congressional staff from the Capitol. I connected Virginia
State Police CDU resources with MPD and USCP elements at the lower west terrace door
where they were able to retake the inaugural platform. I coordinated investigative efforts
By my signature below, I acknowledge that I have read and understood my statement consisting of this
page and _ _ _other pages. I have made all the changes and corrections I desire to make.
CAPO_000000200
• OFFICIAL STATEMENT
concerning the Officer involved shooting and further assisted our partner agencies with
the initial efforts of the investigation into what occurred.
In summary, I self-reported the video clip to OPR because I knew that it was edited and
taken out of context to appear to make me and the department look as bad as possible in
this event. Under no circumstances do I respect or in any part agree with the people that
intentionally and violently invaded the Capitol.
By my signature below, I acknowledge that I have read and understood my statement consisting of this
page and _ _ other pages. I have made all the changes and corrections I desire to make.
CAPD_000000201
• OFFIC!ALSTATEMENT
On January 6, 2021, I was assigned to the Inaugural Task Force at GPO Building. Upon
hearing the protest situation at the Capitol become dire, I responded over to assist. l
entered through the Lower Delaware Door of the Russell right as the lockdown went into
effect. Responded through the subway to the Capitol. Entered the crypt of the building
and was met by several protestors. Attempted to hold the police line preventing access to
House Side. Protestors advanced on line, and I was caught crushed in a corner before
reaching the door. Crowd pushing eventually landed me near OAP hallway. Group of
protestors gathered, while other officers and I attempted to hold a line. Protestors advised
they "could take us if they wanted to". Advised by colleagues to fall back. Arrived at
Upper West Terrace door. Protestors were entering and exiting door. Door was in fire
•
alarm mode. Sgt. • • called over radio and asked for a key to secure. No radio
response. I looked for a lockdown button but nothing but a phone was nearby. The door is
a push bar, opening outward, with no way to even stick an object in the handles to
prevent opening. Attempted to hold a line at the door to prevent further entry. Protestors
formed on the outside. Other protestors inside appeared at our rear to exit or remained at
rear. Crowd size significantly outnumbered officers. Decision was made to fall back. I
was under the impression that CDU was nearby inside. We did not have the resources to
effect any arrests, as only a few officers, few pair of handcuffs between the officers,
significantly more protestors, no way to safely get the protestors if arrested to a transport.
An attempt to go hands on with the protestors would have yielded injury to officers and
no achievable objective. Crowd flow entered building. Additional protestors exited,
which again allowed protestors outside to recognize the door was open. Additional
protestors entered. Began to make another attempt at a police line. Was able to hold
•
crowd temporarily. Sgt. • • tried to rationalize with the crowd to no avail. Rear of
crowd began pushing, causing front of group to advance on the line. Another decision
was made to fall back. With no safe and achievable objectives, the goal was to find a
larger contingent of officers and push the crowd outside the building. Moved back to the
OAP hallway, and responded to the House Chamber for the call of"shots fired".
By my signature below, I acknowledge that I have read and understood my statement consisting of this
page and ~ other pages. I have made all the changes and corrections I desire to make.
---
Signature and Date
CAPD_000000202
(
• OFFICIALSTATEMENT
Refer to audio.
By my signature below, I acknowledge that I have read and understood my statement consisting of this
page and fS? other a es. I hav ade all the changes and corrections I desire to make.
CAPD_000000203
OFFICIAL STATEMENT
See recording
By my signature below, I acknowledge that I have read and understood my statement consisting of lhis
page and 2"Q olher pages. I have made all lhe changes and corrections I desire to make.
1B11
--z..o
CAPO_000000204
OPR Case #21-006 C
Lieutenant PIN - Interview Questions
• This interview will focus on the January 6, 2021 incident. Specifically, your involvement at the Upper
West Terrace Door, the surrounding area, etc.
• As a reminder if you need a break, just let me know since we are going to go through a lot of video from
this incident.
• First video I'm going to show you is from social media. It shows the protesters walking through the
Upper West Terrace door. Protesters continue up the stairs and into the Rotunda. You are seen along
•
with Sgt. • • Sgt. - Ofc. -
1.4 ,t_
and Ofc. -
.... '(,..('c.v'--i: j"-----)
- Show video first part of video.
.. ~p i"----.
• Get confirmation from - that he is the one in the video. '/.,,. e_
3. You can see a Jot of people enter the building here- Specific to the video I just showed you - can you
explain what's going on here - just prior to, during, and just after this video clip?
a. Your involvement? -
• Go through timeline of the CCTV footage - Start camera #0157 @ 2:29: 15 hours. Office of Attending
Physician hallway which leads to ... either crypt or the hall of columns
Soc..,'c-.. , ~\'....
4. What were you doing prior to this? L Y'"f ~+-. v·1 ~a
5. Camera# 0157 @2:30:00 - Again you, Sgt. Sgt. - Ofc. - and Ofc. - are
•
seen on camera. Sgt. • • appears to be the one talking and engaging with the protesters the most. Do
you know what he was saying to them at this point?
6. Camera# 0157 @2:30:52 - you receive a phone call - approximately 11 seconds. Who called you and
what was said?
CAPD_000000205
a. Was there a plan? - what was the plan?
b. What you told - - was that related to the phone call you received?
2:32:35 - The group of officials/officers walk down the OAP hallway towards the UWT door with the
protesters following behind them. Approximately 55 protesters are seen following the officer and walking down
the ha1lway. #0157
2:33:23 - Sgt. - and Sgt. • • open the secondary doors that lead to the UWT door. Sgt. • • and
Sgt. - seen talking to some protesters who leave and exit out the UWT door. Protesters that are outside of
the UWT door start to enter that door. #0126
8. What happened with that group of protesters that followed you and the other officials/officers around to
the stairs and UWT secondary door?
a. Was there a plan to have them exit or to go into the Rotunda? Because it looks like some
protesters leave but most continue up into the Rotunda.
2:34:19 - steps fonvard into the threshold of the UWT secondary door and stops protesters from
continuing further into the building. - •
is seen with • • during this timeframe. There are three
•
protesters talking with • • and - - •
is also seen on camera just behind • • and
- #0126
9. At this point on the video I see you, - and - Do you know where Ofc. - is?
2:34:40 - Approximately 27 protesters start coming through the UWT door. At this time, protesters are seen
moving past the officers that are standing by the UWT secondary door. More protesters are seen coming
through the UWT door. UWT secondary doors close. #0912
T
l 0. What is going on here with the protesters coming into the building?
2:35:54 - is seen coming through the UWT secondary door shaking his head. You, - -
are behind him. - points and appears to say, "Go back out." Protesters stop just beyond the UWT door
•
entrance. • • is seen going up to the front of the UWT door and then returning and joining the other
officers. #0912
2:36:23 - Approximately thirteen protesters are seen just inside the UWT door, with a large group of protesters
seen outside the UWT door. #0912
CAPD_000000206
11. Obviously steps are being Laken by you and the other officials/officc1s but there was a delay to secure
the UWT door? Any reason for that?
2:36:23 - Approximately thirteen protesters are seen just inside the UWT door, with a large group of protesters
seen outside the UWT door. #0912
2:36:50 - Protesters are seen chanting and appear to say, "Let us in." Protesters are seen pushing back against
the group of officials/officers. Protesters start coming into the building moving past the officers and past the
UWT secondary door. #0912
2:37:00 - 2:39:04 - Approximately 104 protesters come in the UWT door. #0126
2:39:04 - seen on listening or using his radio. Approximately 10 more protesters enter through the
UWT door. #0126
12. At this point protesters are seen not entering and the flow of protesters has slowed, why didn't you try to
secure the doors at that point?
2 :40:07 - steps closer to the UWT door and confronts the protester that are just inside the doorway.
You, - - and - are standing across the hallway blocking the protesters from entering
further into the building. A large group of protesters is seen outside of the of the UWT doors. #0912
13. What steps were taken to respond to or mitigate the threat (main threat being the protesters entering the
building)
2:44:17 - - grabs and tells him something then pulls - back by the shoulder and officers start
to back up towards UWT secondary doors. Officers walk through the UWT secondary doors with the protester
following right behind. #0126, #0912
S \.-.a~ F ,' ~
14. What did you tell
15. What happened right here? Did someone tell you something? Did you hear something on the radio?
•
Why did you grab • • and - and walk back away from the UWT doors?
s ~~- .f-,.--Cl° & ..
a. Where did you go? ~
• You guys leave the UWT door and go down the OAP hallway towards the crypt/hall of columns
2:46:00 - Approximately 125 protesters entered through the UWT door after you and the officials/officers left
the UWT door at 2:44: 17 hours. Timeframe is 1 minute and 43 seconds. #0126, #0912
CAPD_000000207
2:46:00 - MOP / CDU officers 1:iperse protesters away from the UWT d v, and secure the door from the
outside. One or two MPD officers remained inside the building.
16. Why was that decision made to leave the UWT door? - 5"" +-
't:: s
I • ""-I
17. Did you realize that leaving the UWT door would allow more protesters into the building? •
..
18. Did you or someone notify communication of the situation and advise them of the incident, your
location, and your observations? . -
N"
19. Was there any attempts made to re-secure the UWT door? .
N .. . ,...
CAPO_000000208
OPK Case #21-006 A
Sergeant- - - - PIN- Interview Questions
• This interview will focus on the January 6, 2021 incident. Specifically, your involvement at the Upper
West Terrace Door, the surrounding area, etc.
P:;~
1. What is your current assignment on the department? -
•
/ . Get confinnation from • • that he is the one in the video.
v 3. In this clip, when the camera passes you - What is being said here? ,_ I l ,,
• · :;: C.\:!>._ 1::)..,.-.,..,__ -..."" "' , \ , b "'- ~._\. . \I-<- r;- . ·.L.- •.
~- Based on this video, you can see a lot of protesters are enter the building, obviously that's not a very
- perception - so tell me what's happening here. Specific just prior to, during, and just after this
video clip? •
• Go through timeline of the CCTV footage - Start camera #0157@ 2:27:00 hours. Office of Attending
Physician hallway
vf" Have you watched the CCTV footage from the UWT door during this timeframe?
J a. Where these protesters the same protesters that were just fighting with officers in the crypt?
yes.
7. Can you describe the protesters behavior at this time?
CAPO_000000209
2:31:56 - Lt. - leans in and tdls Ofc. - something. - relays that message to Sgt. -
and yourself. #0157
2:32:35 - The group of officials/officers walk down the OAP hallway towards the UWT door with the
/protesters following behind them. Approximately 55 protesters are seen following the officer and walking down
the hallway. #0157
2:33:23 - Sgt. - •
and Sgt. • • open the secondary doors that lead to the UWT door. Sgt. • • and
~- - seen talking to some protesters who leave and exit out the UWT door. Protesters that are outside of
the UWT door start to enter that door. #0126
11. What happened with that group of protesters that followed you and the other officials/officers around to
the stairs and UWT secondary door?
a. Was there a plan to have them exit or to go into the Rotunda? Because it looks like some
protesters leave but most continue up into the Rotunda.
0 t.>.,\: '
'/c.J, • . . tJ L""-- ~
•
v"i:34:19 - • • steps forward into the threshold of the UWT secondary door and stops protesters from
continuing further into the building. - •
is seen with • • during this timeframe. There are three
•
protesters talking with • • and - - is also seen on camera just behind • • and •
- #0126
• Protesters start coming through the UWT door. Protesters move past you and the other officials/officers.
2:35:54 - You are seen coming through the UWT secondary door shaking your head. - -
,,. - and - are behind you. - points and appears to say, "Go back out." Protesters stop just
beyond the UWT door entrance. •iii is seen going up to the front of the UWT door and then returning and
joining the other officers. #0912
13. What did you see when you went up to the front of the UWT door?
2:36:50 - Protesters are seen chanting and appear to say, "Let us in." Protesters are seen pushing back against
the group of official officers. Protesters start coming into the building moving past the officers and past the
UWT secondary door. #0912
2:37:00 - 2:39:04 - Approximately 104 protesters come in the UWT door. #0126
CAPD_000000210
2:JY:04 - seen on listening or using his radio.
(
• The flow of protesters slows down - at this point did anyone have a plan - what were you thinking at
this point?
J:40:07 - steps closer to the UWT door and confronts the protester that are just inside the doorway.
You, • • - and - are standing across the hallway blocking the protesters from entering
further into the building. A large group of protesters are seen outside of the of the UWT doors. #0912
2:44:17 - - grabs and tells him something then pulls - back by the shoulder and officers start
to back up towards UWT secondary doors. Officers walk through the UWT secondary doors with the protester
following right behind. #0126, #0912 .___
15. What did - tell you? Cth,,• ....._ .
a. What were you thinking at this point? ... .. ' ....:c... ~ \-.. ~
~ \...-o~ - ~ - '.'
• You guys leave the UWT door and go down the OAP hallway towards the crypt/hall of columns
16. Do you know why the decision was made to leave the UWT door? -
17. Did you realize that leaving the UWT door would allow more protesters into the building?
.. 1-X-+ 'l"l!'-..'"---t {\__~~ ,.,.. h.,..~ t ..
18. Did you or someone notify communication of the situation and advise them of the incident, your
location, and your observations? ... 0-_,.._~ ~ , , g .
19. Was there any attempts made to re-secure the UWT door? _
•
a. Would that have been possible?
CAPD_000000211
1o. Was there a failure to take appropriate police action during this inctut:nt at the UWT door?
21. Do you believe your conduct brought the discredit to yourself or the department?
/\), .. -
7
~ -· .
CAPD_000000212
OPR Case #21-006 B
Sergeant - PIN- Interview Questions
• This interview will focus on the January 6, 2021 incident. Specifically, your involvement at the Upper
West Terrace Door, the surrounding area, etc.
• First video I'm going to show you is from social media. Jt shows the protesters walking through the
Upper West Terrace door. Protesters continue up the stairs and into the Rotunda. You are seen along
with Sgt. I Lt. • • Ofc. - and Ofc. - - Show video first part of video.
\,/"
...,,,,.- Get confirmation from Sgt. - that he is the one in the video.
3. In a couple of the social media videos Sgt. and Ofc. - are heard saying something to the
individuals entering the UWT door. Do you know what was being said?
a. Did you discuss with the group of officers/officials you were with - what was being said?
b. Did you say anything to the individuals entering the UWT door
4. Based on this video, you can see a lot of protesters are enter the building, obviously that's not a very
- perception - so tell me what's happening here. Specific just prior to, during, and just after this
video clip?
a. Your involvement? -
5. Have you watched the CCTV footage from the UWT door during this timeframe?
_..- ~o .
a. Where these protesters the same protesters that were just fighting with officers in the crypt?
ocAi-,.,. ~ c-.,_,__ .
7. Can you describe the protesters behavior at this time?
"~, G4--.. -\t.. t::::::.... \,,. s ; -..f
8. What's happening right now?
CAPD_000000213
9. Camera# 0157 @ 2:31 :30 - Just over five minutes go by. Camera shows you, Sgt. Lt.
Ofc. and Ofc. - •
are seen on camera. Sgt. • • appears to be talking with the
protesters the most. I see you talking some. Do you remember what was being said at this point?
2:31:56 - Lt. - leans in and tells Ofc. - something. - relays that message to you and
Sgt. - - #0157
2:32:35 - The group of officials/officers walk down the OAP hallway towards the UWT door with the
um>testers following behind them. Approximately 55 protesters are seen following the officer and walking down
the hallway. #0157
•
L,2-133:23 - You and Sgt. • • are seen at the secondary doors that lead to the UWT door. You and Sgt.
are seen talking to some protesters who leave and exit out the UWT door. #0126
A.J.. I....., ,. .
11 . Do you remember at this point what was being said? What was happening? _
~:33:23 - Protesters that are outside of the UWT door start to enter that door. #0126 ...
12. What happened with that group of protesters that followed you and the other officials/officers around to
/ the stairs and UWT secondary door?
Was there a plan to have them exit or to go into the Rotunda? Because it looks like some
~ - protesters leave but most continue up into the Rotunda.
2:34: 19 - steps forward into the threshold of the UWT secondary door and stops protesters from
continuing further into the building. - •
is seen with • • during this timeframe. There are three
•
protesters talking with • • and - - is also seen on camera just behind - and
- t:c"\l.) ~ ~,~ .fc..,-- ..__ ~
• Protesters start coming through the UWT door. Protesters move past you and the other officials/officers.
2:35:54 - Sgt. is seen coming through the UWT secondary door shaking his head. - -
- and - are behind you. - points and appears to say, "Go back out." Protesters stop just
CAPD_000000214
beyond the UWT door entrance. - is seen going up to the front of the uWT door and then returning and
joining the other officers. #0912
2:36:50 - Protesters are seen chanting and appear to say, "Let us in." Protesters are seen pushing back against
the group of officials/officers. Protesters start coming into the building moving past the officers and past the
UWT secondary door. #0912
2:37:00 - 2:39:04 - Approximately 104 protesters come in the UWT door. #0126
-
2:39:04 - seen on listening or using his radio. -.:>
4"'«:'W t-- f Jl.A.,,. , ~ Y\1-)r- ~ , I.,.
14. Did you utilize your radio at this point? ,')...~ s / ~ A. ~
• The flow of protesters slows down - at this point did anyone have a plan - what were you thinking at
this point?
2:40:07 - steps closer to the UWT door and confronts the protester that are just inside the doorway.
You, • • • - and - are standing across the hallway blocking the protesters from entering
further into the building. A large group of protesters are seen outside of the of the UWT doors. #0912
✓
2:44:17 - - grabs and tells him something then pulls you back by the shoulder and you all start to
back up towards UWT secondary doors. Officers walk through the UWT secondary doors with the protester
following right behind. #0126, #0912 - -1_ 1 ~ .
"TO-\<;->.' -
• You guys leave the UWT door and go down the OAP hallway towards the crypt/hall of columns
16. Do you know why the decision was made to leave the UWT door?
17. Did you realize that leaving the UWT door would allow more protesters into the building?
t"\.c:..\:.cs S~r-r.
CAPD_000000215
18. Did you or someone notify communication of the situation and advise them of the incident, your
location, and your observations? ·- ,:...,
,.,....e.-,.( ""-n.Sc...c::.-r-< ~ • • uc:r
19. Was there any attempts made to re-secure the UWT door?
USCP-004 CcJ I -
~ 20. Was there a failure to take appropriate police action during this incident at the UWT door?
I.JJ~ ./~ ~ ._V- ~C~~ ~ - ~ L_ ~ r.-.fl-s,._~ \ S ~ C.\'3¥J'-ty'>f"Z"\-¾_
-"'~ ~~ ~'i( ~ft"---- ~ ~ \> 0 ~ , to~ !"-'-'\- h_,_._ ~
21. Do you believe your conduct brought discredit to yourself or the department?
v,..:L,..._ ..,..,.;A-4-S ..
CAPO_000000216
QPR Case #21-006~ \:.. 0
- ~ Interview Questions
• This interview will focus on the January 6, 2021 incident. Specifically, your involvement at the Upper
West Terrace Door, the surrounding area, etc.
• First video I'm going to show you is from social media. It shows the protesters walking through the
Upper West Terrace door. Protesters continue up the stairs and into the Rotunda. You are seen along
✓ •
with Sgt. • • Lt. • • Sgt. - and Ofc. - - Show video first part of video.
3. In one of the social media videos you are heard saying something to an individual entering the UWT
door. Do you remember what you said?
~-
v--4, Based on this video, you can see a lot of unauthorized individuals are enter the building, obviously that's
not a very - perception - so tell me what's happening here. Just stay specific to this incident and
what the video clip shows?
'i:=c.\\ev'..,'j -
a. Your involvement?
5. Have you watched any footage from the UWT door during this timeframe - either the departments
CCTV footage or other social media videos? _ . -
• Go through timeline of the CCTV footage - Start camera #0157@ 2:27:00 hours. Office of Attending
Physician hallway - Don't speculate - just tell me what you remember and be honest
6. What were you doing prior to this? ( "'Y pL - SG...:o\ ~ .Q. ~~-w "'-,:.__.
a. Where these protesters the same protesters that were just fighting with officers in the crypt?
CAPD_000000217
9. Camera# 0157 @2:31:3u - Just over five minutes go by. Camera :,,1ows you, Sgt. Sgt.
Lt. •-• and Ofc. - •
are seen on camera. Sgt. • • appears to be talking with the
protesters the most. Do you remember what was being said at this point? The interaction between the
officers and the protesters?
2:31:56 - Lt. - leans in and tells Ofc. - something. - relays that message to you and
Sgt. - - #0157
2:32:35 - The group of officials/officers walk down the OAP hallway towards the UWT door with the
protesters following behind them. Approximately 55 protesters are seen following the officer and walking down
the hallway. #0157
2:33:23 - Sgt. - •
and Sgt. • • are seen at the secondary doors that lead to the UWT door. A few of the
protesters leave and exit out the UWT door. #0126
11. What happened with that group of protesters that followed you and the other officials/officers around to
the stairs and UWT secondary door?
a. Was there a plan to have them exit or to go into the Rotunda? Because it looks like some
protesters leave but most continue up into the Rotunda.
2:34:00 - Protesters that are outside of the UWT door start to enter that door. #0126 ... -
2:34:19 - steps forward into the threshold of the UWT secondary door and stops protesters from
continuing further into the building. - •
is seen with • • during this timeframe. There are three
J •
protesters talking with • • and - - is also seen on camera just behind • • and•
- #0126
2:35:54 - Sgt. is seen coming through the UWT secondary door shaking his head. You, -
- and - all come through the UWT secondary door. - points and appears to say, "Go back
•
out." Protesters stop just beyond the UWT door entrance. • • is seen going up to the front of the UWT door
and then returning and joining the other officers. #0126 & #0912
2:36:50 - Protesters are seen chanting and appear to say, "Let us in." Protesters are seen pushing back against
the group of officials/officers. Protesters start coming into the building moving past the officers and past the
UWT secondary door. #0912
CAPO_000000218
2:37:00 - 2:39:04 - Approximak,y 104 protesters come in the UWT doo1. #0126
13. The flow of protesters slows down - at this point did anyone have a plan-what were you thinking at
this point?
steps closer to the UWT door and confronts the protester that are just inside the doorway.
You, - and - are standing across the hallway blocking the protesters from entering
further into the building. A large group of protesters are seen outside of the of the UWT doors. #0912
14. Do you recall what was being said at this point? ~ 5 \., 11 he.,., i'"' pn..~\..-S. ~--.... b(.h lJ _
2:44:17 - - grabs and tells him something then pulls Sgt. - back by the shoulder and you all
start to back up towards UWT secondary doors. Officers walk through the UWT secondary doors with the
protester following right behind. #0126, #0912
b. Did you talk about it or find out why after that fact?
f\.J.,__
• You guys leave the UWT door and go down the OAP hallway towards the crypt/hall of columns
16. Do you know why the decision was made to leave the UWT door? ... .
- '~ -
17. Did you or the group of officers realize that leaving the UWT door would allow more unauthorized
individuals into the building?
18. During this incident at the UWT, did you or someone in your group notify communication of the
situation - advise them of the incident, your location, observations? ,._j~.._ ........__ \o~ ~
u .l(V-- o";c,, ..
CAPO_000000219
19. Was there any attempts made to re-secure the UWT door?
20. Was there a failure to take appropriate police action during this incident at the UWT door?
21. Do you believe your conduct brought discredit to yourself or the department?
N .. 't -
CAPD_000000220
OPR Case #21-006 D
Officer - - PIN - Interview Questions
• This interview will focus on the January 6, 2021 incident. Specifically, your involvement at the Upper
West Terrace Door, the surrounding area, etc.
2. Did you have a specific assignment on January 6 th? C-0-.>-. - µ,c..-J, ...
• First video I'm going to show you is from social media. It shows the protesters walking through the
Upper West Terrace door. Protesters continue up the stairs and into the Rotunda. You are seen along
•
with Sgt. - - Lt. - - Sgt. - and Ofc. - - Show video first part of video.
3. Based on this video, you can see a lot of protesters are enter the building, obviously that's not a very
- perception - so tell me what' s happening here. Specific just prior to, during, and just after this
video clip?
✓ a. Your involvement?
4. Have you watched any footage from the UWT door during this timeframe - either the departments
✓ CCTV footage or other social media videos?
• Go through timeline of the CCTV footage - Start camera #0157@ 2:27:00 hours. Office of Attending
Physician hallway - Don't speculate - just tell me what you remember and be honest
a. Where these protesters the same protesters that were just fighting with officers in the crypt?
,Vc:rr SC,A-e-c .
6. Can you describe the protesters behavior at this time?
8. Camera# 0157 @2:31:30 - Just over five minutes go by. Camera shows you, Sgt. Lt.
Ofc. - and Ofc. - •
are seen on camera. Sgt. • • appears to be talking with the
protesters the most. I see you talking some. Do you remember what was being said at this point?
CAPD_000000221
2:31:56 - Lt. - leans in and tells you something. You relay that message to Sgt. - and Sgt.
#0157
../2:32:35 - The group of officials/officers walk down the OAP hallway towards the UWT door with the
protesters following behind them. Approximately 55 protesters are seen following the officer and walking down
the hallway. #0157
•
2:33:23 - You and Sgt. • • are seen at the secondary doors that lead to the UWT door. You and Sgt.
are seen talking to some protesters who leave and exit out the UWT door. #0126
10. What happened with that group of protesters that followed you and the other officials/officers around to
/
the stairs and UWT secondary door?
✓ 2:34:00 - Protesters that are outside of the UWT door start to enter that door. #0126
•
2:34:19 - • • steps forward into the threshold of the UWT secondary door and stops protesters from
•
continuing further into the building. You are seen with • • during this timeframe. There are three protesters
talking with - and - - •
is also seen on camera just behind you and • • #0126
• Protesters start coming through the UWT door. Protesters move past you and the other officials/officers.
v 11 . What causes the protesters to continue past you guys right here?
✓ 2:35:54 - Sgt. is seen coming through the UWT secondary door shaking his head. You, - -
and - are following behind. You are seen pointing and appear to say, "Go back out." Protesters stop just
•
beyond the UWT door entrance. • • is seen going up to the front of the UWT door and then returning and
joining the other officers. #0912
2:36:50 - Protesters are seen chanting and appear to say, "Let us in." Protesters are seen pushing back against
the group of officials/officers. Protesters start coming into the building moving past the officers and past the
UWT secondary door. #0912 j
CAPD_000000222
2:37:00 - 2:39:04 - Approximately 104 protesters come in the UWT doo1. #0126
2:40:07 - steps closer to the UWT door and confronts the protester that are just inside the doorway.
You, •-• - and - are standing across the hallway blocking the protesters from entering
further into the building. A large group of protesters are seen outside of the of the UWT doors. #0912
2:44:17 - - grabs and tells him something then pulls back Sgt. - by the shoulder and you and
the group of officers start to back up towards UWT secondary doors. Officers walk through the UWT secondary
doors with the protester following right behind. #0126, #0912 -
b. Did you talk about it or find out why after that fact?
• You guys leave the UWT door and go down the OAP hallway towards the crypt/hall of columns
15. Do you know why the decision was made to leave the UWT door? -
16. Did you realize that leaving the UWT door would allow more protesters into the building?
- ~'---~~ -f~
17. Did you or someone notify communication of the situation and advise them of the incident, your
location, and your observations? .... ~ L -
CAPO_000000223
18. Was there any attempts made to re-secure the UWT door?
19. Was there a failure to take appropriate police action during this incident at the UWT door?
.«..la . -
a. Depending on answer - By you or by the group?
20. Do you believe your conduct brought discredit to yourself or the department?
CAPD_000000224
"Jr'j rna..,( ~6-+e 5'
-
~-======
The OPR reviewed USCP Closed Circuit Television' (CCTV) Camera #0157, #0126, and #0912,
which revealed the following events occurred in chronological order on January 6, 2021:
[EXHIBIT 3]
2:27:06 - and - cut off and get in front of protesters that are heading down the
hallway towards the Office of Attending Physicians (OAP). #0157
2:28:25 - - appears on camera at the end of the hallway. He gestures to someone, then
walks towards iiiil and - to assist. #0157
2:29:17 - - and unkn. officer appear on camera at the end of the hallway. They walks
towards - - and - to assist. #0157
2:30:52 - - receives a phone call, which lasts approximately 11 seconds. #0157 (Who
called? what was said???)
2:31 :11 - Group of 17 or more protesters are seen on camera. Protesters are in front of
- - and the unkn officer. who are standing across the hallway. Protesters
and officers are seen engaging in verbal conversations/altercations. #0157
2:32:35 - The group of officials/officers walk down the OAP hallway towards the UWT door
with the protesters following behind them. Approximately 55 protesters are seen following the
officer and walking down the hallway. #0157
2:33:23 - - and are seen on camera opening the secondary doors that lead to the
Upper West Terrace (UWT) door. • • and - • are seen talking to protesters who leave
and exit out the UWT door. Protesters that are outside of the UWT door start to enter that door.
#0126
2:34:19 - steps forward into the threshold of the UWT secondary door and stops
protesters from continuing further into the building. is seen with • • during this •
timeframe. There are three protesters talking with and - - is also seen on
camera just behind • • and - #0126
2:34:40 - Approximately 27 protesters start coming through the UWT door. At this time,
protesters are seen moving past the officers that are standing by the UWT secondary door. More
protesters are seen coming through the UWT door. UWT secondary doors close. #0912
2:35:54 - is seen coming through the UWT secondary door shaking his head.
- - and - are behind him. - points and appears to say, "go back
•
out." Protesters stop just beyond the UWT door entrance. ill• is seen going up to the front of
the UWT door and then returning and joining the other officers. #0912
1 CCTV is a closed circuit television system, including cameras placed throughout the Capitol Complex
CAPO_000000225
(
2:36:23 - Approximately thirteen protesters are seen just inside the UWT door, with a large
group of protesters seen outside the UWT door. #0912 Look at the other camera for crowd
outside the doors.
2:36:50 - Protesters are seen chanting and appear to say, "Let us in." Protesters are seen pushing
back against the officers. Protesters start coming into the building moving past the officers and
past the UWT secondary door. #0912
2:37:00 - 2:39:04 - Approximately 104 protesters come in the UWT door. #0126
2:39:04 _ _ ,een on listening or using his radio. Approximately ten more protesters enter
through the UWT door. #0126
2:40:07 - steps closer to the UWT door and confronts the protester that are just inside
the doorway. - ••• - and the unkn officer are standing across the hallway
blocking the protesters from entering further into the building. A large group of protesters is seen
outside of the of the UWT doors. #0912
2:42:00 - Protesters are seen aggressively arguing with officers. Protesters are seen at the UWT
secondary door. #0912, #0126
2:44:17 - - grabs and tells him something then pulls - back by the shoulder
and officers start to back up towards UWT secondary doors. Officers walk through the UWT
secondary doors with the protester following right behind. #0126, #0912
2:44:42 - Protesters go through the UWT secondary doors and continue up the stair, which leads
to the Capitol Rotunda. #0126
2:45:17 - runs around the comer heading away from the OAP offices approximately 55
seconds after leaving the UWT door. Unkn officer, - and - are following
behind • • • •-• is listening/holding his radio right next to his ear. #0157
2:46:00 - Approximately 125 protesters entered through the UWT door after officers left the
UWT door at 2:44: 17 hours. Timeframe is l minute and 43 seconds. #0126, #0912
2:46:00 - MOP / CDU officers disperse protesters away from the UWT door and secure the door
from the outside. One or two MPD officers remained inside the building.
2:49:44 - MOP officer opens the UWT door from the inside. 16 MPD officers in riot gear enter
the UWT door, continue through the UWT secondary door, and up the staircase towards the
Capitol Rotunda.
CAPD_000000226