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Economic Methodology
 cono 』C e 00010
Understanding Economics as a Science

2nd edition

Marcel Boumans
and

John B. Davis
with contributions from Mark Blaug,
Harro Maas and Andr可 Svorencik

macmillan RED GLOBE

international PRESS
HIGHER EDUCAT ION
。 Marcel Boumans and John B. Davis 2016
Contributions © Mark Blaug, Harro Maas and
Andrej Svoren己ik 2016, under exclusive licence
to Springer Nature Limited 2019
All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this
publication may be made without written permission .
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Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication
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The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this
work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First published 2016 by
RED GLOBE PRESS
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For Mark Blaug
Contents

X
Preface to the Second Edition
Preface to the First Edition
] uun-

X
Acknowledgments

11256
Introduction
The structure of the book
Three comments on the nature of economic methodology
The aims and nature of this book
How to use this book

902581135
1 The Received View of Science
1111222223
Analytic and synthetic a posteriori propositions
Theories and evidence
The nature of scientific explanation
Further difficulties in the logical positivist program
Looking ahead
Exercises
Focus 1.1 Axiomatization
Focus 1.2 孔1odels
Focus 1.3 Formalism
Universal knowledge ... so what?

56792
33334
2 Methodologies of Positive Economics
The new discipline of econometrics
The Keynes-Tinbergen debate
Laws in economics
The measurement-without-theory debate
The Cowles Commission and Milton Friedman ’ s
民 V 气 UQ ／ OU 句3 民 VQ ／句 3
A斗

methodology of positive economics

ζJζJ ／O ／O ／O ／O 叮／

Samuelson and the descriptivism debate

Looking ahead
Exercises
Focus 2.1 Methodologies before Friedman
Focus 2.2 Measurement
Focus 2.3 Experiments
Predictions ... so what?
叮／ 0000
寸 ItIA 斗

3 Popper’s Logic of Discovery

The logic of scientific discovery
Conjectures and refutations: the growth of scientific knowledge

vii
viii Contents

0000oonynynyny

“ U 叮／ OOAV匀 “
The poverty of historicism
Looking ahead
Exercises
Focus 3.1 The Duhem-Quine Thesis
Focus 3.2 Popper ’ s Situational Analysis

， 气 J00
Focus 3.3 Testing
Rigor or relevance ... so what?

4 Kuhn and Lakatos 103

Thomas Kuhn 103
Scient悦c Revolutions 106
Imre Lakatos 118
A sophisticated falsificationism 119
Looking ahead 121
Exercises 121
Focus 4.1 Research Programs in Economics 123
Focus 4.2 Scientific Revolutions in Economics? 124
Focus 4.3 Facts 127
Synthesis ... so what? 130

5 The Sociology of Scientific Knowledge 135

The sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) 135
The Edinburgh Strong Programme and the laboratory
studies approach 137
Relativism, realism, and values 139
The economics of scientific knowledge (ESK) 142
Looking ahead 147
Exercises 147
Focus 5.1 Economics as a Discipline 150
Focus 5.2 Case Study Research 152
Focus 5.3 Feminist Philosophy of Science and
Feminist Political Economy 155
Auditing science ... so what? 15 8

6 Rhetoric, Postmodernism, and Pluralism 163

The rhetoric approach 163
Postmodemism 170
Pluralism 172
Looking ahead 174
Exercises 175
Focus 6.1 Analogy and Metaphor 178
Focus 6.2 Paul Feyerabend 180
Focus 6.3 Realism and Causal Explanation in Economics 183
Communication and conversation ... so what? 185
 Contents ix

7 Value Judgments in Economics 189

Methodological value judgments 190
The value-ladenness of economic concepts and explanations 193
The ethical commitments of rational choice explanations 196
Accommodating ethical values and norms 201
Economics as a useful subject 203
Looking backward: looking forward 204
Exercises 205
Focus 7.1 Logical Positivism and Ordinalist Utility Theory 207
Focus 7.2 Neutral Science? 210
Focus 7.3 Naturalistic Legitimation 212
Professional ethics ... so what? 215

Glossary 221
Name Index 225
Subject Index 229
Preface to the Second Edition

Mark Blaug, one of the founding fathers of economic methodology, and

our colleague and friend, died on November 18, 2011. His focus sections
of this textbook appear to be his last contributions to economic method-
ology. One of the main themes he had worked on throughout his academic
life was “ rigor versus relevance.” Presented as a trade-off, he argued
strongly in favor of emphasizing “ relevance ” and criticized recent eco-
nomics for placing too much emphasis on “ rigor.” Relevance refers to
two different but according to him closely related criteria for economic
knowledge: it should be empirically tested knowledge and it should pro-
vide reliable guidance for policy makers. Because these criteria are also
greatly valued by us, we decided to extend each chapter of the first edi-
tion by adding an application section. These additional sections discuss
the relevance of debates in economic methodology to current debates
in economics. To write these sections we benefited from the comments,
suggestions, and encouragements of Zohreh Emami, Freeke Mulder, and
Koen Vermeylen, and we are grateful to them. We have also taken the
opportunity this second edition provides to coηect eηors and confusions,
and to restructure the argument where needed. We also would like to thank
Aleta Bezuidenhout, Associate Editor of Palgrave, and Kirsty Reade,
Senior Publisher, Palgrave, for their high-quality professionalism, which
made our lives much easier.
岛1ARCEL BOUMANS AND JOHN B. DAVIS
LEIDEN AND MILWAUKEE, 2014

x
Preface to the First Edition

We see science as an inherently social activity. This applies 巳ven more

to a textbook such as this, which is the product of a decade of teaching
economic methodology at the University of Amsterdam, and so must be
seen as a joint product of our past and curr巳nt colleagues. On the on巳
hand this is reflected in th巳 contributions to the book by Mark Blaug,
Harro Maas, and Andrej Svorencik; on the other it reflects the detailed
and constructive suggestions and comments by Dirk Damsma, Floris
Heukelom, Murat Kotan, Edith Kuip巳r, Ti ago Mata, Julia Mensink,
如1ary Morgan, Ge巳rt R巳uten, and Peter Rodenburg. Earli巳r versions
or parts of the book were read carefully by our coll巳agu巳S from oth巳r
institutions: Sohrab Behdad, Ted Burczak, Sheila Dow, Zohreh Emami,
Nancy Folbre, Wade Hands, Kevin Hoover, Uskali Maki, and Andrew
Mearman. We are grateful for their comments and support. We of course
are grateful to our stud巳nts over the y巳ars. We also would like to thank
Jaime Marshall, Managing Director, Palgrave Higher Education, for his
trust and encourag巳ment.
MARCEL BOUMANS AND JOHN DAVIS
AMSTERDAM

xi
Acl<nowledgments

The authors and publisher wish to thank the following for permission to
reproduce copyright material:
Springer Science+Business Media for the quotation in Chapter 1 from
Wissensch iftliche 胁ltai价ssung: Der Wiener Kreis by Otto Neurath,
1973, p. 305; Cambridge University Press for the quotation in Chapter 1
from “ The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money,” in The
Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes: Volume 7. The General
Theory; John Wiley & Sons, Inc. for the quotation in Chapter 2 from
Prine伊les of Econometrics by Henri Theil, 1971, p. vi; American
Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) for the quotation in
Chapter 3 by Wassily Leontief from “ Academic Economics ,” Science 217
(9 July), 1982, pp. 104, 107; Economisch Statistische Berichten (ESB)
for the quotation in Chapter 4 by Jan Tinbergen from “ De noodzaak van
een synthese," Economisch St，αtistische Berichten 67 (3383), 1284-5; The
American Economic Association (AEA) for the quotation in Chapter 6
by Paul Samuelson from “ Economic Theory and Mathematics - An
Appraisal,” The American Review 42, pp. 56-66; and David Colander
for the quotation in Chapter 7 from his 2009 Testimony submitted to the
Congress of the United States, House Science and Technology Committee
for the Hearing:“fhe Risks of Financial Modeling: VaR and the Economic
Meltdown,” September 10.

xii
Introduction

Economic methodology is the philosophy of science for economics.

Philosophy of science investigates the nature of the assumptions, types of
reasoning, and forms of explanation used in the sciences, and economic
methodology investigates the nature of the assumptions, types of reason-
ing, and forms of explanation used in economic science. Yet not only do
the issues and concerns that dominate today ’ s discussions of economic
methodology in many ways mirror those in contemporary philosophy of
science, but economic methodology ’ s emergence as a recognized field of
economics in the 1980s was strongly influenced by reactions that were
occurring at that time in the philosophy of science against logical posi-
tivism (see Chapter 1), particularly in connection with the ideas of Karl
Popper, Thomas Kuhn, and Imre Lakatos.
This book uses this historical development in philosophy of science to
frame its introduction to the field of economic methodology. Though there
have been important contributions to economic methodology in the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, the relatively late emergence of eco-
nomic methodology as a distinct field of specialization within economics
was very much associated with the philosophy of science ’ s response to
logical positivism - and then by its further response to Poppe飞 Kuhn, and
Lakatos. We believe that it is important to refer back to these historical
origins to understand how many of the cu盯ent concerns and issues in eco-
nomic methodology came about. We also believe that it is important to
understand the questions that face economics as a science in light of the
questions that are faced by science in general.

The structure of the bool<

This book is organized along both chronological and conceptual lines.

It is organized chronologically in that earlier historical developments in
philosophy of science and economic methodology are examined first, and
later developments are shown to build on these - often as reactions or
alternatives. Many of these developments did indeed occur first within the
philosophy of science, but there were also important early developments
in economic methodology. Thus while we often consider economic meth-
odology through the lens of philosophy of science, we also try to set out
the distinctive concerns of economic methodology.
2 Economic Methodology

The conceptual approach can be seen in the way we introduce many

of the most basic concepts and theories of scientific explanation first and
follow their various refinements, departures, and extensions in both phil-
osophy of science and economic methodology. This reflects our view that
the conceptual development gains deeper meaning when it is also seen as
a historical development. It also shows that changes in thinking about the
nature and goals of the philosophy of science and economic methodology
from the logical positivism of the 1930s to the present need to be seen as
an evolution in thinking.
There is one significant departure from this chronological and concep-
tual method of organization, found in the final chapter of the book, which
looks at the role of value judgments in economics. The issue of value
judgments in science is not absent from the twentieth-century philosophy
of science, but it is rarely seen as a prominent theme. Nor is the issue
prominent in economic methodology as it has developed since the 1980s.
However, it is our view that the role of value judgments in economics is a
crucial issue for economic methodology, and one which connects to many
other central issues in the field. Accordingly, we have placed this discus-
sion at the end of the book as a kind of capstone discussion in lieu of a
conclusion. Since economics is very much a policy science (an aspect that
is emphasized by its older name, political economy), we believe it to be
important that the book should close on a discussion of the links between
the science and specific policy recommendations.
Of course, in such a short introduction to economic methodology there
has to be a degree of selectivity about the areas that are to be included. The
field of economic methodology has continued to change in the years after
the cut-off point for the discussions in this volume, and in some respects
its 1980s origins are less visible in contemporary economic methodology
than they were even a decade ago. Indeed, as economic methodology has
developed as a separate field of investigation, it has taken on many more
concerns specific to contemporary economic research such as experi-
mental economics. Consequently, in order to provide a sense of some of
these recent distinctive concerns, the end of each chapter has a number of
short sections - foci - that extend the discussion and provide additional
applications and topics of interest. They may be skipped as desired without
interrupting the main narrative of the chapters themselves.

Three comments on the nature of economic

methodology

First, economic methodology should be distinguished from economic

method, though the two terms are often used interchangeably. Economic
methodology investigates the nature of economics as a science. To explain
 Introduction 3

what this means, for the sake of convenience we will define science as the
result of scientific research. The term scientific research covers various
scientific practices such as classification, description, explanation, meas-
ureme时， prediction, prescription, and testing. Research, then, is scientific
when it meets specific criteria that are associated with these practices.
Economic methodology investigates these criteria by considering ques-
tions such as the following:

• Should all scientific activities satisfy the same criteria, or should, say,
a scientific explanation be expected to fulfill different criteria from a
scientific description?
• Should a distinction be made between criteria for the social sciences
and those for the natural sciences?
• Where do these criteria come from: from scientific research that is gen-
erally considered to be successful, like physics?
• Is the determination of these criteria a specific task for philosophers of
science or should it be determined principally by practitioners?

This book will look at these questions in relation to the investigation of the
nature of economics as a science.
A useful starting point for understanding the distinction between meth-
odology and method is to see explanations in science and economics as
attempts at answering why questions. This means that economic meth-
odology examines the basis and grounds for the explanations economists
give to answer why questions about the economy. For example, econo-
mists use the shifting of demand and supply curves to answer the question
of why prices change. Economic methodology attempts to understand the
specific role these relationships play in an explanation.
By contrast, economic method attempts to provide answers to how
questions, and concerns the techniques and tools that are used by econo-
mists when making their explanations and descriptions. This can be illus-
trated using a particular example: maximization analysis - the assumption
that agents maximize some function such as utility or pro缸－ is a par-
ticular technique or tool that is used in economics to explain or describe
choice behavior. Learning about this tool is a matter of learning how
calculus techniques provide a certain type of explanation of the choices
people make. However, if we ask which criterion this use of maximiza-
tion analysis addresses in producing a scientific explanation or description
in economics, one would be asking a question in the field of economic
methodology.
Another example can be drawn from the field of econometrics, which
involves the use of mathematical and statistical tools to draw conclu-
sions from economic data. Studying econometrics is a matter of learning
how to employ its techniques and methods. However, an examination of
4 Economic Methodology

econometrics from the point of view of economic methodology will take

the methods of econometrics as given, and will focus instead on the ques-
tion of which criteria mathematical and statistical analysis addresses in
producing good explanations or predictions of economic data.
Second, economic methodology makes use of both descriptive and pre-
scriptive approaches. Descriptiνe economic methodology aims to describe
the different types of economic research practices and their results. For
example, one type of explanation uses econometric models to explain
relationships in economic data on the grounds that relationships in eco-
nomic data reflect cause-and-effect relationships in economic behavior.
In philosophy of science, descriptive methodology is often denoted as
positive methodology, where “ positive”(like “ position”) comes from the
Latin positus, the past participle of ponere, which means “ put” or “ place.”
So, positive methodology concerns the question of how science is actu-
ally practiced. Note that this characterization does not necessarily mean
that descriptive or positive economic methodology is value-free - an issue
which we first encounter in connection with the thinking of the philoso-
pher of science Thomas Kuhn (Chapter 4), and discuss more fully in the
final chapter in terms of the relationship between values and description.
In contrast, prescriptive economic methodology distinguishes between
good and bad explanations in economics and considers how good explana-
tions should be formulated. For example, one view of a good explanation
(that advanced by Karl Popper- see Chapter 3) has survived severe testing,
on the grounds that good explanations stand up to empirical data, while
the rule for producing good explanations prescribes one that makes every
effort to falsify them. Prescriptive methodology in philosophy of science is
denoted as normative methodology and concerns the question of how sci-
ence ought to be practiced. Despite this, the line between descriptive and
prescriptive economic methodology has not always been drawn clearly.
At the same time, since the 1980s there has been a change in the relative
interest in descriptive and prescriptive approaches in the field of economic
methodology, with a greater emphasis in recent years being placed on the
descriptive approach. This turning point is emphasized in chronological
terms in the book as we move from Chapter 3 to Chapter 4.
Third, there exists a tension in economic methodology, hinted at above,
in that philosophy of science on which economic methodology has drawn
since the 1980s has been strongly influenced by reflections on the natural
sciences, especially physics, whereas economics - as a social science -
has many different characteristics. As a result, one of the most important
questions in economic methodology is whether an explanation of the
status and character of economics as a social science involves issues that
are significantly different from those involved in explaining the status and
character of the natural and physical sciences. Some philosophers have
suggested that there are no fundamental differences in respect of the nature
 Introduction 5

of scientific explanation between the natural and social sciences. Others

argue that social sciences in general - and economics in particular - face
additional issues that affect how they arrive at acceptable explanations.
This question also begins to take on a particular significance as we move
from Chapter 3 to Chapter 4, and remains important through the later
chapters of the book.

The aims and nature of this bo。k

This book has two main aims:

• It aims to strengthen students' understanding of the status and character

of economics as a science so that they will be able to reason more
clearly as both economists and social scientists. In this sense, economic
methodology is a means to ca盯ying out better economics and better
social science.
• It aims to introduce students to the wider philosophical issues surround-
ing our understanding of science and, in particular, economics as a sci-
ence. That is, economic methodology is an end in itself associated with
human curiosity about the nature of the world and how we come to
understand it.

It is important that students also appreciate that because economic

methodology is the philosophy of science for economics, the approach of
this book is essentially philosophical. Unlike many scientific questions,
philosophical questions often have no final and unambiguous answer.
This can prove frustrating for economics students who are used to courses
which aim to reach clear conclusions.
For this reason economic methodology offers a slightly different view
of what it means to achieve mastery of the subject matter: in this particular
context “ getting it right'' means achieving an understanding of the diι
ferent types of assumptions and reasoning that are involved in economic
explanations, determining the respective merits of these explanations, and
examining how we justify our conclusions in this regard.
Finally, this book provides an introduction to economic methodology
that will give students an understanding of the common ground across
which economic methodologists have traveled. Of course, methodolo-
gists have used different paths to cross this common ground, reflecting
their different starting points and the changing nature of economic meth-
odology and philosophy of science since the 1980s. Because of this, and
also because of the changing nature of economics itself, present-day eco-
nomic methodology is a highly diverse and increasingly complex area of
investigation. It is important that students remain aware that economic
6 Economic Methodology

methodology is in a constant state of development. In these pages we have

done our best to record what we believe constitutes the common ground
that has been traveled so far.
A story about the famous physicist Werner Heisenberg illustrates how
we see ourselves as caηying out this task. Heisenberg is chiefly associated
with what has come to be known as the Heisenberg uncertainty principle
in quantum mechanics, namely that an electron ’ s position and velocity
cannot be determined simultaneously. On one occasion, Heisenberg was
hurrying to a lecture he was due to give at Cambridge University when he
was stopped by the police for speeding. Asked if he knew how fast he was
going, he replied that all he could say was where he was at that moment.
This book hopes in a similar manner to state where economic method-
ology is at this moment.

How to use this bool<

The book is based on a seven-week course that has been taught for more
than a decade to bachelor ’ s-level students of economics by a large number
of different individuals in the History and Methodology of Economics
Group at the University of Amsterdam. Most of these students had com-
pleted at most only a small number of economics courses, and thus the
challenge has been to teach both basic philosophy of science and eco-
nomic methodology to individuals who are only just beginning to consider
the role of explanation in economics.
In the course of our teaching we have used a variety of books, articles,
and other resources. We have found that most of the available materials
were too specialized, assumed too much background knowledge, or were
too difficult for students beginning their studies, not only at the bachelor’ s
level but also often even for postgraduate students with a sound knowledge
of the field.
As a result, a few years ago we decided to write our own accessible
introduction to the subject. The text has been revised on a number of occa-
sions to reflect our teaching experience. This version, written by Boumans
and Davis, is written with a single voice but builds on the contributions of
many group members. Our experience with students at the University of
Amsterdam is that once they have started to get to grips with the particular
nature of the subject, they are generally able to gain a reasonable under-
standing of the field and its relation to the philosophy of science, even if
some issues remain difficult.
The seven chapters of the book allow one chapter to be covered each
week in this short term format, but also allow the book to be used in longer
courses when supplemented with or when accompanying other materials.
 Introduction 7

The focus sections at the end of each chapter provide extensions of the
material and may be used as starting points for further discussion. Indeed,
we have left the links between the focus sections and the chapters them-
selves loose enough that they may be addressed as desired. The main
thread of the book is to be found in the chapters themselves, and we thus
recommend that the chapters be followed in their chronological/concep-
tual order.
Each chapter closes with an application section entitled “ So what ?”
designed to bring out the relevance of the chapter to cu盯ent debates in
economics, such as regarding the causes of the recent financial crisis and
its consequences for economics. The goal is to show how economists'
thinking often depends on their views - implicit or explicit - about phil-
osophy of science and economic methodology. Each application has three
subsections that, in order, address: (a) a debate in philosophy of science or
science studies; (b) a debate in economic methodology; and (c) a debate
in economics which may draw on (a) and (b). Each debate has its own
questions and issues, but the debates should be seen as interconnected. We
provide suggestions for organizing student participation and questions for
discussion to complete each chapter ’ s application. We believe that phil-
osophy and economic methodology are best learned through active student
involvement, participation, and dialogue. We thus also encourage students
to produce their own “ So what ?” applications of economic methodology
to economics to help advance their understanding of each.
The book includes a number of features that are designed to o旺er fur-
ther help to readers. A glossary of important terms is to be found at the end
of the book (see pp. 221-4), and each of these terms appears in bold when
it first appears. Each chapter is also followed by a set of study questions
that are intended to help students test their understanding of the chapter.
Many of these questions have been used in examinations at the University
of Amsterdam. The readings cited at the end of the chapters also include a
brief annotation to explain their relevance to the chapters. These readings
sometimes act as historical signposts to the development of the subject and
sometimes offer opportunities for further studying the field of economic
methodology.

Relevant readings
Bird, Alexander (1998) Philosophy of Science, London: Routledge.
A comprehensive introduction to philosophy of science, but only as applied to
natural science.
Blaug, Mark (1992) The Methodology of Economics, or How Economists Explain,
2nd edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Originally published in 1980, it is the first book on economic methodology,
creating the field, but only from a Popperian-Lakatosian perspective.
8 Economic Methodology

Davis, John, D. Wade Hands, and Uskali Mala (eds) (1998) The Handbook of
Economic Methodology, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Although it is called a handbook, this is more like an advanced level encyclo-
pedia. A very useful supplement to this textbook.
Dow, Sheila (2002) Economic Methodology: An Inquiry, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
An introduction to economic methodology by a leading post-Keynesian
economist.
Hands, D. Wade (2001) Reflection without Rules: Economic Methodology and
Contemporary Science Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
An advanced-level survey of recent developments in economic methodology
and a survey of contemporary science theory.
Hausman, Daniel (ed) (2008) The Philosophy of Economics: An Anthology, 3rd
edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
A collection of classic texts in philosophy of economics with a comprehensive
introduction by Hausman. It includes several texts that are also discussed
in this book.
Maas, Harro (2014) Economic Methodology. A Historical Introduction, Oxon:
Routledge.
Introduction to economic methodology by discussing historical research prac-
tices from the nineteenth-century discussions of economics as an inductive
science until late-twentieth-century experimental economics.
Reiss, Julian (2013) Philosophy of Economics. A Contemporary Introduction,
New York: Routledge.
Introduction to philosophy of economics by discussing such main current
themes as rationality, causality, and models in economics.
Ross, Don (2014) Philosophy of Economics, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Advanced analysis of the “ structure” of economics in comparison with psych-
ology and sociology.
Chapter 1

The Received View of Science

When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc

must we make? If we take in our hand any volume of divinity or school
metaphysics, for instance, let us ask, Does it contain any abstract rea-
soning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experi-
mental reasoning concerning matter of户ct and existence? No. Commit
it then to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.
(David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding)

Sauberkeit und Klarheit werden angestrebt, dunkle Femen und uner-

griindliche Tiefen abgelehnt. In der Wissenschaft gibt es keine ,,Tiefen, ''
iiberall ist Oberflache ...
(Purity and clarity are aimed at, dark distances and unfathomable
depths declined. In science there are no “ depths ,” all over is surface ... )
(Wissenschaftliche Weltaujfassung: Der Wiener Kreis I A Scientific
Worldview: The Vienna Circle)

We begin our study with a discussion of a famous interwar movement in

the philosophy of science that set the stage for many of the developments
that were to occur over the course of the following half-century. What
came to be known as the received view, also the standard view, derives
from the program of logical positivism in philosophy of science, a broad
philosophical movement that originated in Berlin and Vienna in the 1920s
and was to last into the 1950s in the United States. In the first half of the
twentieth century the logical positivists dominated thinking about phil-
osophy of science. Indeed, much of the current direction in philosophy of
science is, in important respects, a reaction against the views of the logical
positivists, as we shall see later in this book.
The first key document in the development of logical positivism was the
1929 manifesto of the Ernst Mach Society, A Scient｛卢C Worldview:.
The 1任ennα Circle (l斗Tis’‘5’
The members of what came to be known as the Vienna Circle and signa-
tories to the manifesto included the philosophers Rudolf Carnap (1891-
1970), Moritz Schlick (1882-1936) and Viktor Kraft (1880-1975), the
sociologist Otto Neurath (1882-1945), the mathematician Hans Hahn
(1879-1934), and the physicist Philipp Frank (1884-1966). The label

9
10 Economic Methodology

“ logical positivism” offers a fair description of the Vienna Circle ’ S philo-

sophical program, since the members sought actively to combine aspects
of logicism (by which is meant that all scientific language, including
mathematics, is an extension of logic) and positivism (which meant
empiricism - in particular, the idea that knowledge arises out of sense
experience).

Analytic and synthetic a posteriori propositions

The main aim of the logical positivist program was to demarcate scientific
knowledge, to distinguish science from pseudo-science, and to remove any
kind of metaphysical or imagined content from scientific knowledge. Its
demarcation criterion rule was to accept only analytic and synthetic a
posteriori propositions or statements as scientific knowledge. Analytic
propositions are tautological - that is to say, they are true by definition.
For example, the statement “ All bachelors are unmarried males'' is true
by definition. Moreover, valid mathematical and logical propositions
are analytic. For example,“1 + 1 = 2” and “ A • A ”(where the logic
symbol “→” means “implies’、 All other, non-analytic, propositions are
called synthetic. If these propositions are shown to be true by empirical
research, they are called synthetic a posteriori propositions. Examples of
such statements might be :“My neighbours' dog is aggressive ” and ''The
color of the coffee I am drinking is light brown." They are true in light of
our experience of the real world.
The eighteenth-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-
1804) also introduced a third category of propositions whose truth is not
shown by empirical research and that are not true by definition. These
were called synthetic a priori propositions. According to Kant, this cat-
egory included propositions such as Newton ’ s laws and the proposition
that the geometry of our space is Euclidean (for example, that the sum of
the angles of a triangle is 180°). Kant regarded these propositions as being
universally true.
However, Kant ’ s assertion that such propositions were universally true
was to be challenged by developments in mathematics and physics at the
end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury. First it was shown that non-Euclidean geometries are mathemat-
ically possible and, subsequently, contrary to the teachings of Newton,
Albert Einstein ’ s general relativity theory assumed a curved physical
space, a theory which would be later confirmed by Sir Arthur Eddington ’ s
observations during the solar eclipse of May 29, 1919. These scientific
breakthroughs were crucial events for the logical positivists, but also
for philosophers such as Karl Popper (Chapter 3) and Thomas Kuhn
 The Received View of Science 11

(Chapter 4), and they will therefore be discussed in more detail in these
respective chapters.
As a result of these scientific developments, the logical positivists denied
the existence of synthetic a priori propositions in science, and asserted that
all propositions that are not true by definition should be subjected to investi-
gation by empirical research. Their intention in doing so was, as mentioned
above, to purify science of all “ metaphysical” or philosophical claims about
the world that were neither analytic nor synthetic a posteriori. Indeed their
experience in Germany and Austria in the period between the two world
wars reinforced this goal, since that period was one in which a variety of
propositions referring to ''Nation” and “ Nature” and the like were claimed
to be true about the world without evidence, and were used to justify all
kinds of xenophobic and discriminatory social policies in those countries.
In their program the logical positivists drew on the work of earlier phi-
losophers, in particular David Hume (1711-1776) and Ernst Mach (1838-
1916). These two thinkers had stressed the importance of empiricism,
which is the view that experience, especially from the senses, is the only
source of knowledge. For the logical positivists, empiricism consisted of
two related theses: (1) all evidence bearing on synthetic statements derives
from sense perception, in contrast to analytic statements, which are true by
definition; and (2) predicates are meaningful only if it is possible to tell
by means of sense perception whether something belongs to their exten-
sion, that is, predicates must be empirically verifiable. Predicates include
expressions such as “ is re町’ or “went home." In grammar a predicate is
a part of a sentence or a clause stating something about the subject, such
as the predicate “ went home'' in “ John went home ,' ’ or “ is red” in “ This
tomato is red.” The extension of a predicate is the set of all those things
of which the predicate is true, e.g. the set of all red things. As a result, the
proposition “ This tomato is red” is meaningful because by looking at it,
one can see that this proposition is true.
So, the logical positivist ’ s interpretation of empiricism was that syn-
thetic statements must be meaningful. A synthetic statement is meaningful
if it can be judged to be true or false by sense perception, or in other words,
when it is empirically verifiable: a non-analytic statement is meaningful
only if it is empirically veri且able. This criterion for meaningfulness was
called the verifiability principle. Note that as a result of this principle,
various statements in ethics and religion must be considered meaningless
in science. For example, the statement “ God created the world in six days ’,
has no scientific meaning.
The ultimate goal of the Vienna Circle, which was stated most clearly in
their manifesto A Scient泸c Worldview, was to purge science of all propo-
sitions that contain terms that are not meaningful. They believed that the
only aspects of the world about which we can acquire scientific knowledge
12 Economic Methodology

are those that are directly accessible by sense perception (that lie on the
“ surface” of things). They therefore felt that scientific theories should be
formulated so that the bearing of empirical evidence is precise and trans-
parent (the “ purity and clarity'' that they are aiming for). The logical
positivists thus regarded scientific knowledge as possible only insofar as
sensory experiences are systematically related to one another.
In their investigations of particular scientific propositions, the logical
positivists drew a clear distinction between syntactics and semantics.
Syntactics deals with the formal relations between signs or expressions in
abstraction from their signification and interpretation. Semantics deals with
the signification and interpretation of the signs or expressions. The distinc-
tion between syntactic notions such as well-formed statements, proof, or
consistency and semantic notions such as truth and meaning was important
to the logical positivists. They saw formal logic as liberating empiricism
from psychological and metaphysical garb and as permitting one to distin-
guish analytic statements, which are tautological, from synthetic statements
that must pass the test of observation. The logical positivist view of the task
of the philosophy of science was to clean up various conceptual messes
inherited from past science by pointing out what were - and what were
not - meaningful propositions in a properly formulated empirical science.
The aims of the logical positivists can therefore be summarized as
follows:

1. To formulate precisely such central philosophical notions as a cri-

terion of meaningfulness (the verifiability principle) and the distinc-
tion between analytic claims (that are true by definition) and synthetic
claims (that must be testable).
2. To develop precise definitions of central scientific notions such as
theory, explanation, confirmation, etc.

Theories and evidence

The logical positivists also made a distinction between what they termed
the context of discovery and the context of justification, a point that was
later emphasized by Hans Reichenbach (1891-1953). This means that a dis-
tinction should be drawn between the way in which a theory is discovered
(which could be for a variety of accidental reasons) and the context of its
justification, which involves a rational reconstruction of the theory accord-
ing to the tenets of logical positivism (on the part of the discoverer and/or
anyone else developing the theory) for the pu叩ose of its justification.
The logical positivists argued that philosophy of science should really
only concern itself with the context of justification. For them, the con-
text of discovery was irrelevant to establishing the scientific value of a
 The Received View of Science 13

theory. This means that whether or not Newton arrived at the Universal
Law of Gravitation because an apple fell on his head, or Kekule found the
molecular structure of benzene by dreaming of a snake with its tail in its
mouth, was of no relevance to the meaningfulness of both discoveries. For
the logical positivists, biographical and historical data about the lives of
great scientists should have no place in any serious history of the subject.
Another fundamental distinction drawn by the logical positivists was
between theories and the evidence, facts, and data, since theories depend
upon the latter for their justification (see Focus 4.3 for more about facts
and observation and their relation to theories). Scientific theories were
accordingly seen as systematic collections of concepts, principles, and
explanations that organize our empirical knowledge of the world. In the
advance of scientific knowledge, theory and evidence are given different
weights and they play different roles: the main problem for philosophy of
science, and also for economic methodology based on logical positivist
thinking, is to explain the relation between them.
Let us go a little further in assessing what is involved in such a process.
According to the logical positivist understanding of theory, also referred
to as the syntactic view, the proper characterization of a scientific theory
consists of an axiomatization in first-order formal language.
A first-order formal language consists only of symbols representing
variables (denoted by x, y, z, ... ), function symbols (denoted by A(·), B(·),
C(·), ... ), predicate symbols (denoted by A, B, C, ... ), and the symbols 「
(''not” v (''o
3 (''for some individuals”).
An axiomatization reduces a theory to a set of axioms in the manner of
Euclid ’ s treatment of geometry (see Focus 1.1 for a more elaborate discus-
sion of axiomatization). The axioms are formulations of logical laws that
specify relationships between theoretical terms. These theoretical terms
are implicitly defined by the syntactics, that is, the logical structure of
the theory. As a result, the language of the theory is divided strictly into
two parts: (i) observation statements (or “ protocol sentence”) that describe
observable objects or processes; and (ii) theoretical statements. The mean-
ing of the theoretical terms is given by their observational consequences.
Any theoretical terms for which there are no corresponding observational
terms are regarded as meaningless. The theoretical terms are identified
with their observational counterparts by means of correspondence rules,
which are rules that specify admissible experimental procedures for apply-
ing theories to phenomena.
When theoretical terms are defined completely in observational
terms, they are said to be operationalized. According to the received
view, for a proposition to be meaningful it is necessary that all the the-
oretical terms are operationalized. To clarify this idea of operation-
alization, we take as an example the term “ unemployment ,” which is
14 Economic Methodology

defined theoretically as the number of people who are jobless, looking

for jobs, and available for work.
In this case it is easy to say who is jobless. However, the definition
of the terms “ looking for jobs'' and “ available for work'' involves human
motivation, and thus cannot be observed as if it were a physical fact, such
as oranges being orange. This means that in order to measure unemploy-
me时， both “ looking for jobs” and “ available for work'' need to be opera-
tionalized. This is done by defining “ unemployed persons” as:

• All persons without a job during the survey week who have made spe-
cific active efforts to find a job during the preceding four weeks, and
were available for work (unless they were temporarily ill).
• All persons who were not working but were waiting to be called back to
a job from which they had been laid off.

Next,“actively looking for work'' is further operationalized by listing the

following “ specific active efforts'' that can be made “ to find a job during
the preceding four weeks ”:

1. Contacting:
an employer directly or having a job interview;
a public or private employment agency;
friends or relatives;
a school or university employment center;
2. Sending out resumes or filling out applications;
3. Placing or answering advertisements;
4. Checking union or professional registers;
5. Some other means of active job search.

According to this process, only at this stage of operationalization can

unemployment be measured, as is done, for example, by the United States
Bureau of Labor Statistics from which the above definitions are taken.
Related to this idea of operationalization and emphasizing very much
the idea of meaningfulness, Percy W. Bridgman (1882-1961) developed
an extreme form of empiricism, which came to be called operationalism.
Bridgman was strongly influenced by Einstein ’ s new physics, which he
saw as leading to a radical new view of theoretical concepts.
In his Logic of Modern Physics (1927), Bridgman stated that:“In gen-
eral, we mean by any concept nothing more than a set of operations; the
concept is synonymous with the coηesponding set of operations.'’ This
means that the true meaning of a terr丑 is to be found by observing what a
scientist does with it, not by what a theory says it does or what its author
thinks it does. The operations to which Bridgman refers are the ways the
term is measured. The consequence of this view is that a term will have a
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 nou eigenlijk was, daar begreep ie niet veel van.—
Lezen had ie nooit geleerd. Z’n moeder was ’r ’n paar
maal mee begonnen, heel in ’t begin van z’n ziekte,
aan z’n bedje. Maar ’t lukte niet. Gebeden had ze’m
ingestampt, ’n brok hier en daar uit den katechismus,
en die zei ie maar altijd in-zich-zelf òp. Ze hadden ’m
gezeid, moeder en de kapelaan, op z’n vraag, waar ie
heen ging, als ie dood was, dat ie in den geluksstaat
zou komen. Op dàt idee bedacht ie allerlei vreemde
dingen, heerlijke kinder-zaligheidjes. Maar toch had hij
soms hevigen angst voor ’t sterven, omdat ie niet altijd
zeker voelde, of ie daarna z’n vader en moeder en z’n
zusjes, al z’n zusjes, die ie zoo stil lief had, wel
dadelijk zou zien. Den laatsten tijd zelfs schreide ie
veel meer in z’n ledekantje dan vroeger, omdat ie zich
zoo uitgeput voelde, niet meer in staat was, nu en dan
op te zitten. En dàt juist wou ie zoo graag, want hij had
gezien, hoe dol veel plezier ’t z’n vader deed; en hoe
ruwer, angstiger Kees raasde, als ie weer
achteruitgegaan was.

Dagen en nachten vooral, zoo turend in ’t donker,

slapeloos en peinsklaar, liet ie zich omstreelen van z’n
teed’re, diepe kinderverbeelding over den geluksstaat.
Tusschen gebedjes in, prevelde z’n fantazie: dat ie
zou zitten in ’n krans van gouden engeltjes, allemaal
mooie menschjes, met stille zacht-trillende vleugeltjes,
waarop heel zacht licht neerzilverde; dat ie met hen
zou bidden voor z’n vader, moeder en zusjes. Dat z’n
vader niet meer zoo gruwelijk driftig zou worden, niet
meer zulke rooie oogen zou krijgen, die ’m
beangstigden; en dat ie niet meer z’n moeder zou
slaan.
 Maar als ze ’m dan later weer in ’n onbezonnen
ontsteltenis, vlak in z’n gezicht zeiden, hoe vreeselijk
mager en slecht ie uitzag, dan grepen z’n ontvleesde
vingertjes naar ’t rozenkransje op z’n [398]borst, bad ie
snikkend nog wat te kunnen blijven leven, aan God en
Jezus en alle heiligen, om z’n vader te zien, z’n
moeder, z’n zusjes, z’n grootvader.—’n Poosje later
weer vond ie dat toch zondige gedachten, bad ie om
toch maar liever in de eeuwige gelukzaligheid te
komen, liever dan zooveel pijn te hebben; bleef ie
bidden en zingen tusschen ’t gerochel van Ouë Rams,
vloek en raas van Ant en z’n vader, armoe-gewurm en
krijsch om wat centen, tusschen gezwijn, gemors en
vervuiling der stinkende kinders in ’t donk’re krot.

Dieper ingedoken, in z’n bedje bekeek ie stilletjes z’n

pralende plaatjes; zag ie den Heer op ’n hoogen troon,
aan een kant Gods Zoon, aan anderen kant Moeder
Maria, omstraald van blauw, goud en jubeling van
zilver en licht. Dan zong er in z’n doodskopje ’n
woordlooze melodie van zielsverrukking en rustig
stervensgeluk. Nou zag ie zich al opstijgen midden in
die azuren wereld van gouden fonkelstarren, en
blauw, eeuwig blauw, midden in die kleurwemelende
pracht, heel hoog in den Hemel, waar alles jubelde ter
eere Gods.

Het was alles heel vaag en heel vreemd voor ’m, maar
toch lichtend en glanzend in z’n kinder-verbeelding.—
Z’n gepeinzen over God den Heere, Jezus, en den
Heiligen Geest overdauwden met wond’ren stillen
luister z’n kindergeluk van ’t sterven. In z’n donker
hoekje, waar z’n ledekant rammelde, en z’n
 zandzakken aan de beenen sadderden, glansde en
regende ’t voor zijn zielsverrukte oogjes, warmgoud
licht. Z’n mystieke geloofsgloed, omweefde ’m van z’n
lichtend binnen uit; hij voelde zich stijgen in ’t
goudgestard azuur, en handwuiven deed ie naar z’n
vader, z’n moeder en zusjes. En hooger, hooger
zweefde ie òp, door engeltjes gestuwd in een trillende
sfeer van dampend goud, omwolkend z’n handen, z’n
oogen, z’n beentjes in wond’ren nevel; hooger, al
hooger in ’t wemelende azuur; verstèrvend van de
aarde, maar òplevend naar den Heere.

In z’n mystiek-naïef en teeder breintje zwierf hij daar

rond, in zielsverrukking, in vromen luister, en niets dan
zag ie meer van ’t kamerke, en z’n duister hoekje. —
Met eindelooze teederheid was ie weggezweefd, alles
kussend en handbewuivend, met innigste
[399]zachtmoedigheid vroomde z’n verrukking door,
uren op uren. —

’n Poos later, uit z’n eenzame extase en hallucinaties

gestooten, door krijschende hurrie en gekijf van
grootmoeder en Ant om Kees, overrompelde z’n
gewoon kindernatuurtje z’n eigen droomselen; brak ie
met ’n smak van onthutsing door ’t kristalweb van z’n
nevelige illuzietjes heen.—Toch voelde hij niet dat ie
uit teemrige woorden van kapelaan en zoete
beloftetjes van Ant over eeuwige gelukzaligheid, die
heilige droompjes om z’n ziek karkasje geweven had
als ’n broos web van geluk, want z’n kindergeloof was
ècht, stond in ’n aureolend gesternte van
ongeschondenen teed’ren goudstillen luister.—Maar
wel begreep ie toch ook ’n jongen te zijn. Dan wou ie
 lèven, spelen, stoeien, spitten in den tuin, en werken
als z’n vader, als de jongens in de buurt. Soms wou ie
mee op strooptocht en schreide ie stelpeloos en
wreed-lang dat ie ziek was, groeide, maar metéén
verzwakte in bed. Nou lag ie weer door Ant in z’n
hoekje gedragen, vèr nu van ’t herfstraam waar ’n
roode zon dampig om heen tooverde. Kees had ’n
hoogtetje gemaakt van planken onder z’n bed, dat ie
boven den postrand uit kon zien, als ie voor ’t raam
lag, net in de goudbruine kastanjelaan van Jonkheer
van Ouwenaar’s landgoed. Maar Ant wou ’t niet
hebben, had den dood voor tocht, duwde ’m liever in
z’n duister hoekje terug.

Nou lag ie weer in ’t donkre kamerdiep te staren,

bepeinsde ie wat ’t toch eigenlijk was dat z’n vader
zoo woedend deed worden, als ie hen bidden zag, en
wat Kees dan wel dacht in dien tijd, en of ie dan toch
niet bad in zich zelf. Hij durfde niet goed, maar toch
wou ie ’t z’n vader toch eens pardoes vragen. Z’n
moeder schimpte wel dat z’n vader ’n goddelooze
ketter was, maar daar begreep ie niks van. En telkens
in stilte bad hij dan voor z’n vader aan den Heere, dat
Hij ’m geen kwaad zou doen.—En vromer doopte ie
z’n vingers in ’t wijwaterbakje dat ze ’m voorhielden,
verprevelde ie z’n: In noam des Voaders, des Soons,
en des Hailigen Geestes.. Oàmen! [400]

Vrouw Zeune was wèg. Ant morste en ploeterde op ’t

achterend. De kinderen speelden op ’t pad en Dien
ging weer uit venten. Z’n grootmoeder schuifelde heen
en weer. Diè kon ’t manneke nog niet zetten. Hoe
zwakker, ellendiger ie zich voelde, hoe meer afschuw
 hij van ’r kreeg. Nou lag ie te turen op ’t kruis, dat z’n
moeder bij ’t onweer gisterenavond dwars voor z’n
bedje op den steenen vloer getrokken had. En telkens
schoot hem ’n schietgebedje in: Geloof den Heere..
Ieder keer zag ie de logge voeten van z’n
grootmoeder en overheen schuiven, huiverde ie van
afschuw en schreide lang en stil van bange smart.

Ouë Rams rochelde en stikte weer half in hoestbuien,

dat ie soms z’n geel gezicht zag opschimmen, bijzij in
’t schuwe raamlicht, en de holle doodsnood-oogen
kijken, den strot hoorde slikken ’t slijm.—Dan draaide
ie zich met z’n mond naar den muur, en wachtte ie z’n
vader maar òp met stillen juich dat dìe zou hooren van
z’n wandelingetje langs de tafelhoeken, al kon ie niet
spreken van hevige dijpijn en smartelijke afgematheid.
[401]

[Inhoud]
 ELFDE HOOFDSTUK.

Laat September glanslichtte over de akkers van

Wiereland. Pluk van snijboonen ging nog rond. Wat er
opgehaald kon worden na den verwoestenden
boonenstorm was in den nazomerenden herfst mooi in
vrucht gezet.

Achter en om de akkers van ouë Gerrit stonden de

dahlia’s in bloei en als liktongende vlammen over ’t
vergoudend groen gloeiden de hel-roode gladiolen in
den alom wonderenden herfstbrand; braamvuur van
nooit blakerende kleuren, legendarisch verwevend de
stilte en ’t licht, herfstig goud-rood en goudbruin,
doorgloeid van hemelpracht, hoog en stil bloemend en
vonkend onder de zilverende luchten.

Over de verkwijnende gewassen speelden

vochtglanzen en zwammige rottigheid, en elken dag
werd de rooi op bollenakkers drukker, rondom de
stervende tuinderijteelt.

Ouë Gerrit treuzelde door z’n akkers op de Beek, waar

de kerels nog aan ’t plukken waren. ’t Kon ’m niks
meer schelen. Nog één maand, en hij was d’r voor
goed hier wèg, en op z’n eigen land ook gebonjourd.
Daar kon ie nou kalmpjes over praten, in zich-zelf,
omdat ie ’r mee verzoend was. De heeren zou ie óók
niet meer nijdig maken, want dan zouden ze ’m
misschien bij de Bekkema’s nog laten ophoepelen;
had ie die paar centjes ook niet meer.—
 Vóór ’m bloeiden tusschen rooigrond, witte, gele en
hel-roode gladiolen in de blauw-floersige fijn-zoete
herfstlucht, als fiere hanekammen overeind
vlammend. En vlak àchter z’n akker, fleurde ’n heerlijk
akkertje stokdahlia’s, tintelend dooreenbloeiend in ’t
zachte zonnevuur, als ’n brandende dans van
schitterlichte [402]lampjes, kleurige vlammetjes
verspelend.—Bij brokken lagen de Wierelandsche
herfstakkers vol van dahlia’s en gladiolen,
herfstkoloriet van ’t land, doordampt van fijn
schitterend en zacht-innig glanslicht, zilvering
rondspuiend onder ’t laan-lommer, wonder-intiem.—

Toch kon ie chagrijnen ouë Gerrit, want dat lapje

dahlia’s àchter ’m, was van zijn gelukkigen broer, dien
rijken schurk, veeboer en tuinder, paardenhandelaar
en mestverkooper, die maar heel weinig schade had
ondervonden met den boonenstorm, voor hèm
genadeloos. Naast ’m schreeuwde Willem Hassel
tusschen de dahlia’s inhurkend naar Klaas Koome op
’t pad.

—Net aa’s ik je f’rkondig.… nou stong ikke tog gister

bai main koole.… in ’t duin … en f’rek! komp d’r
p’rdoes ’n skot deur main veurhoag haine!

—Haha! gierde Hazewind wreed-uitgrinnikend, op dá’

terain.… mo je uitkaike met de jachtbeweging hee?

—Nou.… wacht d’r is.. ka je merke wá’ hullie

krankjorum binne! ikke skraiw d’r haine! jullie sel d’r
tog wel waiser weuse.. main op main aigeste grond ’n
bom in de hiele te skiete hee? mit die f’rvloekte jacht
 skiete de haire moar roak! enne aa’s sullie de boel
loate opdraife is d’r vast gain houwe àn!

—Op dà terrain mo je de paa’s merkeere hee? Ikke

had gister wel in de snuifer.. ’t Stonk dur bai jou in de
buurt.… ikke docht wel … kaik da oufe bier werreke …
en ’n reukbeweging.… nou ikke konsteteer van daa’t
èstera noar enaisolie lucht hep! Die oliebeweging.…
mi oostewind.… daas ’n oufe kennes hee?.… da
luchie is dur soo blikskoaters sterk; da goan nie op de
reutel! Vroàg Kees de Strooper.… die hep d’r ’n snuif
van op dà terain!.… enne je kraigt d’r soo prêchtig de
langoore op àf.. dá’ likke de haire aa’s koek!… Enne …

—Nou joa, onderbrak Willem, woelend in de kleur-

brandende dahlia’s, ik lief da nie … snof’rjenne.. selle
je mi hullie jacht de baine onder je laif f’rskiete … Enne
aa’s hun op tuine van wá’ skorum wille joage … loa
hullie dan uit d’r lampies kaike.. je hoort dur overal van
da hùn moar roak skiet! [403]

Ouë Gerrit hoorde Willem klagen, grinnikte dat ze ’m

t’met in z’n hiel hadden geschoten.. Hij haatte dat tuig,
dat maar ’n beetje had van den boonenstorm, nou
weer konkelde met z’n zoons, maar ze ’t licht in de
oogen niet gunde.—

.. Hoho.… dá’ sel d’r lol van hewwe.. aa’s hoort wort
dá’ s’n huis, s’n grond an de poal komp! hoho!

Iederen dag dichter naar z’n openlijken val voelde Ouë

Gerrit zich gejaagder. De bollen overal lagen open en
bloot. Manden goudgebronsde en koper-bruine
 bolletjes gingen ’m voorbij, op schouders van kerels
en helpertjes.—Hij kòn grijpen, maar ’t was nog te
druk op ’t land. Meèr in October zou ’t gaan. Maar wat
had ie eigenlijk aan bòllen. De greep, de greèp, dat
was de eeuwige zaligheid, en ’t bewaren, ’t zien.

Z’n jongens waren aan ’t inplanten; wat savooitjes

bepoeren, wat aarbeibedden wieden en hagen
knippen.—De paar duitjes van z’n bolletjes kòn ie
bewaren voor zich-zelf …

De jongens werkten onder helschen wrevel. Ze

hadden de terugkomst van den Ouë afgewacht en
gehoord wat notaris wilde.—’t Kon ze niet meer
schelen waar ze naar toe hokten, als ze over wat
weken toch van hun stuk grond getrapt wieren.

In hun nijd-drift beschuldigden zij Ouë Gerrit dat ie de

centen van aardbeien en groentenopbrengst
verhanseld had; dat ie loog, ’t met meiden hield. Maar
ouë Gerrit haalde loom-sarrend de schouders op òm
hun praatjes en klomp-klepperde den tuin af.

Dirk was nog stugger en stiller geworden. Alleen Piet

deed soms of hem de heele mikmak weinig meer
schelen kòn. Onder ’t rijzen-opknoppen galmde ie
kermiszang uit, vergetend z’n wrevel. Zag hij weer ’t
zure gezicht van Dirk, dan vloekte hij mee op den
Ouë, op den notaris en de heele deftige rotzooi.

Elken dag liep ouë Gerrit gejaagder rond, nadat ie ’s

morgens van z’n „plaatsje” afkwam, waar z’n tuinwerk
weer druk begon. ’t Prettigst nog voelde ie zich als ie
wat dèed; als ie de bak-boompjes wegreed in de
 winterkasten, de gevallen bladeren opkruide, z’n
gewas snoeide en intusschen z’n kopje leut weer
dronk bij den fotograaf, die, meende ie, den
[404]laatsten tijd weer veel vrindelijker tegen hem
geworden was.—Geen wonder ook! Alle Wierelanders
hadden gehoord van zijn vreeselijke
boonenverwoesting, en dat hij, met nog ’n sestig
sjofele pachters, den hevigsten knauw had gekregen.
Als ’n vuurtje was ’t rondgesinteld dat ouë Gerrit’s boel
met November aan den paal zou komen. Blommepot
op de valreep! Er werd gezucht, gevloekt, gescholden
tegen den notaris, maar zooveel groenboeren waren
bij den boonenstorm verarmd dat ’t geval van ouë
Gerrit, wèl meelij, geen steùn vond. Er werd
verkonkeld dat er nog wel twintig verkoopingen
zouden zijn, al scheen de notaris te helpen, uitstel te
geven, behalve bij Ouë Gerrit.

En plots had Hassel bemerkt dat de fotograaf

vriendelijk tegen ’m geworden was.—Hij kreeg weer
z’n vertrouwen.—

Dat vond ie heel prettig omdat ’t ’n rijke vent leek.—En

’t juichte weer in ’m, dat de fotograaf z’n rommel open
liet staan, en hij nou z’n slag moèst slaan, met die
prachtige groote lens, die ’r tegen de groote kast
stond, waarin al die glibberige komieke plaatjes en
omgekeerde poppetjes.… naifgetiefers.—geloofde ie,
zwommen.—.… Hoho.… die lens.… die hai sain d’r es
had sien loate.. en die hai wel vaif moal langerst
moakte … uitdroaie … nog rais uitdroaie en weer
uitdroaie hew.. dat ie dur in ’n skater van waas skote!
Hoho.… prêchtig aas da weust waa’s … mit al die
 kop’re skroefies! ’n fain stuk werk! fain werk! ’t waa’s
dur puur om daas te worde aas tie dà stuk, da
prechtwerk nie nog vatte sou.… Soo lang op loerd.…
En dan nog.. aa’s ’t donkere hokkie opestong t’met de
loodpot! de loodpot! Die waas d’r nou van paa’s, mit
sain arremoe op haide! ’t Stong in ’t donkere
koamertje sel die moar segge.… bofe op ’n plankie.…
had ie alletaid sain kissie sien.… most sain ’n vrachie
weuse alevel!… allejesis! Veur die eene kair most d’r
moar bai.…

Nou waa’s die tug ’n dief hee? Nou joa! dà geld.… die
eene kair! moakt niks! kan sain tug soo veul nie-en-
skaile aas die lens! dà prêchtige stuk!

Had ie nie sait dá tie driehonderd pop kost had?

Snof’rjenne! [405]da waas d’r ’n brok aite!.… aa’s tie da
moar pikte.… dà moar.. ’n kolfie noà s’n hand!

S’n boel waa’s tie tug kwait.… Nou had ie allainig sain
genot, veur sain.… heuldegoar veur sáin!.….….…..

’s Middags stond ie weer op de Beek. Dirk plukte

snijboonen, hurkte in armen- en beenenbeef van
inspanning, en Piet achter, op den grond, zat te
sorteeren, groepte de kromme en kleintjes met
slingerige worpjes handig in den halfmuds zak.—

—Nog moar ’n skroal ressie Dirk! strak-en-an stap

ikke ’n de andaifie! Dirk bromde wat, plukte voort,
stom in werkroes.

—Kerel, waa’k van waik ’n lol had mit de

harddroaferai! ik hep d’r puur ses pop wonne.… heb
 d’r perdoes op Peloone wed! woar heb jai d’r
hoànge?.….. Willem waa’s d’r mit Geert en Annie! sai
hebbe ook wed!

—Mi Geert! Geert, schorde Dirk, en Wierelandsch

zangerig vermijmerde ie stiller.. mi Gairt.… Gairt! die
paik! Heb se sàin nou wair vasthoakt!—

Den volgenden morgen hielp ouë Gerrit wat andijvie

snijden.

—F’rdomd, nog mooie struik! aa’s ikke nog marktte

gong, kraig ik t’met nog twee sint, zei Piet gulzig,
naast ’m hurkend, de andijvie die al pijp geschoten
had prepareerend.

—Je mot d’r moar plukke.. raip en onraip.. hoho! van

appel en pair; bromde ouë Gerrit verbitterd; over ’n
poar weekies sain wai d’raf.. sette hullie de kat an ’t
spek.. eenmoal andermoal!

—Daa’s net! je hep d’r nog wa boerekool, spruitjes,

roape.. en je vruchte.. Ouë Gerrit luisterde niet meer
naar Piet. Hij sneed maar teenen van de andijvie,
woelde de gele harten open, heelemaal weg in z’n
steelgenot-denking.

Hij had ’r weer beet had.…, ’n prechtrij bolletjes, ’n

nieuwe skoffel, ’n nieuwe spa, ’n plantroàm,
roodgeverfd, en ’n prêchtig rooiertje.. ’t Juichte weer in
’m dat alles zoo makkelijk gegaan was. Met ’n paar
grepen! Nou lag ’t rustigjes bij z’n spullen. Hij was ’r
weer pas geweest, ’n halve nacht. Wèl vloekte ie op
muizen die ’r an knabbelden. En ’t schimmelde zoo
 erg! [406]Dan had ie zich weer in zweet te poetsen.
Moar wat ’m ’t gejaagdst maakte was ’t overbrengen
van z’n boel. Daar had ie nog geen gat voor
gevonden. Dat moest alles heel stiekem, heel stiekem.
Op de Duulweg had ie ’n klein huisje gehuurd. Guurt
was wel woedend geweest, om z’n val, maar ze
zweeg toch, omdat ’r kansen van trouwen met ’r
heertje toch heel goed stonden. Ze was zoo mooi en
zoo fatsoenlijk! nou dacht ze heel gauw uit ’t nest te
springen.—Zij had ’t heertje alles gezegd van Gerrit’s
achteruitgang, maar hij deed of ’t ’m niet deerde. Dat
voelde ouë Gerrit ook, en nou kreeg ie geen buien,
geen uitbarstingen van Guurt meer. En al maar
draaide z’n denken terug op z’n spullen; op ’t krotje
daar op den Duulweg, één kamer met ’n achterend;
donker, klein, maar er was ’n brok kelder, waar hij voor
zorgen zou. Guurt, al smeriger in ’t huishouen, zou d’r
vast nooit heenzeilen en z’n wijf van zelf niet. Nou was
z’n plaatsje al verzekerd, maar ’t overbrengen!

.… Hoho.… da waa’s d’r ’n lailijk kattebakkie! soàfes!..

soafes! Dá most nie eèn d’r sien! Sel wel lukke.. wa
had die bai de partretairder ’n fain sigarebakkie gapt..
En niks dâ de fint morke hew!.. want.. hai blaift moar
frindelik.. nou waa’s ie d’r wair allainig; liep ie in en uit,
sonder da de man ’n stom woord sai.—Hij liet d’r soo
moar aige spulle ope.. God kristus wa dâ f’rsoeking
weust.. Allainig ’t donkere kamertje, da stong d’r alevel
op slot … Gistre had ie ’n sakkie stole!.. mi aldegoar
kogels en spuitjes d’r in.. Hij wist d’r sellefers nie waa’t
waas.—En dan ’n heul dik boek.. mit aldegoar
gesichte op Wiereland.. en goudsnaisel op de rànde …
prechtig! Moar nou die lens! die lens! Die mòst ie
hewwe, juistig omdâ ’t niet en-kon! die most ie hewwe!
Aa’s tie sain had. Da waa’s d’r nie soo veul moeite an
sain binne de mikke te brenge, aa’s mi da mooie
boek!.. Dà waa’s d’r ’n hallefe middag loere-en-weust,
om dà plekkie, al dichterst bai de kelder. [407]

[Inhoud]

II.

Tegen elf uur klomp-kloste ouë Gerrit uit den voortuin

van Bekkema, naar de overzij, bij den fotograaf. Op
z’n kousen poes-zacht sloop ie in. Er was niemand in
’t tooneelig hel-lichtende ateliertje.—Maar de deur
kraakte achter ouë Gerrit, en uit de diepte van ’t
donker kamertje baste de stem van den fotograaf:

—Bi jij ’t Hassel?

—Om uwes te diene mehair!

—Mooi, je bakkie staat al klaar, bij de deur.… ik ben ’r

met ’n paar minute klaar, nog twee plaatjes
ontwikkele.…

—Goan d’r uwes gangetje! en hoàs je nie! teemde ouë

Gerrit, met z’n gezicht naar ’t donker kamertje
gedraaid, waar de stem uitbaste.—

Stil sloop ie naar z’n bakkie koffie, dat ie gulzig

vastgreep in z’n vuilgroen bevlekten knuist, en staand-
slurpend, gluurde ie rond in oogenschitter, met zalig
gevoel alleen te zijn in zoo’n heerlijken rommel, waar
alles maar voor ’t grijpen lag. Hij slurpte, slurpte z’n
bakkie leeg, zònder te proeven. Van ’t donkere
kamerke uit, doften geruchten, geschuif van glas
tegen metaal en plassende geluidjes kwabbelden ’r
van handspoeling in water.—

Ouë Gerrit likte z’n baard, wreef zich in de handen,

vleide zich zijig over de zilveren lokken, en zacht liep
ie voort, tusschen plaatjes, bakken, droogrekken en
flesschen. Bij ’t groote raam rechts, zag ie ’n pracht-
grijs vaasje, waaruit ’n smarterood fluweelen dahlia,
slank stengelde.

Dat vaasje beviel ’m wel, maar kreeg ie nooit mee.—

Zou de man te gauw missen.… Maar die knijper kon ie
opgrabbelen.—Zacht tastten z’n morsige vingers
tusschen wat kopie-ramen, en sluw haakte hij ’n
grooten rood-koperen knijper op, gretig in z’n
achterzak vermoffelend.—

Plots kreeg ie ’n bloedrooie kop! Zag ie goed? keek ie

zuiver? Stong doàr nie die groote prêchtlens op ’t
toestel?.. nièt meer [408]in de hoek? achter alderlai?..
Joa, f’rduufeld.. snóf’rjenne joa!

Hij beefde, beefde van hevige ontroering. Langs den

beschilderden grijzen achtergrond liep ie, tastte met
de hand achteruit, om zich vast te houën.

Een juich, een gil had ie willen uitkrijschen. Als ’n bons

was ’t op z’n hart gestooten, de schrik.… Want hai
stong d’r.. vast woàr! vast woar! Aa’s de kerel d’r nou
 weggong, noar s’n sus als alletait.… effetjes.… had
hai sain d’r vast in s’n sak.… hoho!

In ’t kamertje hoorde ie drukker gerammel en gespoel,

en dof gekuch van den fotograaf. Gauw liep ie weer
naar voren. Hij hoorde aan ’t gekuch, dat Van Gooyen
bijna klaar was met z’n platen. Heel onverschillig keek
ie ’t raam uit, op ’n brok bollenland … nou sou ie de
vent hewwe … en nou d’r kalmpies je gangetje ouë,
fain werk … domeni hiet.… brand je bekkie niet! fain.…
werk.. fain werk!—

Z’n wangen gloeiden, z’n hart mokerde! Er zat ’n beef

in z’n heele lijf en ’n gloeikoorts brandde door z’n
polsen. Hij voelde, dat ie ’t vandaag nog zou hebben!
vandaag nog!! Dat maakte ’m half-gek van genot.…..
Tug kalm, kalm an! hoho! fain werk Ouë.… fain
werk!.…

Fotograaf met veel gerommel stapte eindelijk uit z’n

hokje, keek met half verknepen oogen, duizelig ’t licht
in, ’n paar druipende platen in z’n handen. Hij bromde
wat, de dikke fotograaf, in z’n grof geruit-grijs pak, ’n
biertonnig Duitscher met Engelsche reis-allure.

Hassel had zich omgekeerd. Hij voelde dat z’n stem

beven zou, als ie wat zeggen ging, van na-ontroering
nòg. Daarom zweeg ie, zei ie alleen heel-zacht:
„gemurge buurmaàn.”—Hij keek, spannend of de vent
even ’n wippertje zou nemen. De fotograaf liep in en
uit z’n donker hokje, druk, nerveus. Ouë Gerrit, met
gloei-rooie wangetjes en schitter-kleine oogjes, loerde,
loèrde, waggelde zacht van aandoening, wàt de
fotograaf doen zou … weggaan of blijven. Telkens
gluurde ie naar ’t toestel of de lens ’r nog wel blonk, en
hevig bonkte z’n hart van bang-zalig genot.— [409]

Weer kwam fotograaf er uit. Z’n ronde pappig-weeke

kop stond triest en nerveus. De grootste plaat was
mislukt.—

—Hassel, schenk je nog ’n bakkie he? ik zal effe wat

andere speesie hale; ik ben in ’n kwartier terug.. Wil je
effe oppasse.. Als ’r iemand komt laat ze dan maar
wachte of terugkomme!

—Bestig mehair! bestig! ikke hep d’r meer aa’s ’n

kwetieretje tait.. gaan uwes gangetje, beefde ouë
Gerrit’s stem, klankloos van hevige ontroering, dat
alles nou ging zooals ie ’t wou. Fotograaf had ’m niet
aangekeken, greep z’n hoed van ’t hangertje en liep
vlug nerveus ’t atelier uit. Ouë Gerrit kon ’t eerst niet
goed gelooven. Z’n beenen trilden, zonder dat ie ze
kon tegenhouen. Z’n hart mokerde al erger, ’t bloed
suisde naar z’n hoofd, en hij duizelde, want nou stond
’r de groote lens soo maar op! Hij duizelde, schuifelde
voort, in soezerige grauwte van licht, dat inééns voor
z’n óógen golverig trilde. Niks kon ie zien.. alles
beverig en verzwartend achteruitdeinend en weer
opschommelend. Maar toch, hij moèst, moest! Over ’n
kwartier had je den vent terug! Alles was open! ’t
Donkere kamertje wijd open! Nou maar eerst ’t
gemakkelijkste, ’t geld-kissie.. en ’t bakkie.… dan.…
dàn.… de lens.…—

Hij liep al, erg zenuwachtig, toch heet genietend, maar

veel wilder en onrustiger dan anders. Bij ’t kamertje
schrikte ie òp in ’t donker, toen ie door ’t rood-
 bloedende raampje zag. Maar hij zoù, zoù. Met z’n
beenen hoog-opstappend, strompelde ie voort, trapte
in bakken met nattigheid. Hij beefde verschrikkelijk. En
hij begreep niet waarom. Zoo bang was ie nooit
geweest. Er zat tòch heerlijke angst in z’n keel, als
vuur te schroeien. En z’n kop vlamde; z’n knieën
trilden hevig. Heel kleintjes ademde ie, want z’n
luchtpijp leek zachtjes toegekneld. Z’n hand tastte
langs klefferige fleschjes, klamme bakken, trechters,
op de bovenste plank in ’t donker, waar ie den
fotograaf altijd z’n geldbakje had zien neerzetten.
Wacht?! wat greep ie daar vast? ’t kistje?.… Nee!.…
Wat nou?.. dan most ie hooger op sain!

’n Schok van heeten juich bonsde door ’m heen.—Nou

had ie ’t kistje vast; dat voelde ie.. Hij tilde ’t
voorzichtig van de [410]duistere plank, heel voorzichtig.
Om ’m verrinkelden fleschjes.. en ’t geld rammelde al,
in schuif naar éen hoekje. Nou was ’t van sain.… sain!
.… Hoho!.… da waa’s d’r t’met!.… Moàr noù de lens!

Niets ziend, niets hoorend, liep ie in koortsgloei naar ’t

toestel. Eerst wou ie kijken hoeveel centen in ’t kistje
waren, maar dat hield tijd op.. Eerst de lens.. de lens,
joeg ’t in ’m.—En gejaagd mèe de gedachte dat ie
stommiteiten deed, want dat de vent dadelijk zou zien
dat hij gegapt had. Maar ’t joeg in ’m; toch doen.. tòch
doen! Hij trapte z’n eigen waarschuwing dood; hij
kastijdde zich zelf in z’n bangheid.—Met een hand ’t
kistje omklemd, rukte ie met de andere aan de lens,
die ’r niet af kon. Hij schrikte, beefde van ontroering
weer. Want de lens moèst ie hebben, al kwam de
onderste steen boven.—Liever ’t geld gelaten dan de
lens! Met éen hand ging ’t niet! Dan zou ie eerst maar
’t kistje neerleggen. Eerst leegen, en op z’n plaats
schuiven. Dàn, met twee handen aan ’t werk!

Weer schoot ’m in, de kwellende gedachte dat de

kerel wel móest zien later, dat hij ’t gestolen had, want
geld en lens wàren ’r toen hij wegging. Nou aarzelde
ie, zette ’t kistje leeg op de plank, rammelde heel
zacht rijksdaalders en guldens in z’n klepzak, die, vol
en zwaar, tegen z’n beenen schuurde.—

—Hoho! doa’s ’n laileke praik! Moar aa’s tie ’t nou veul

loàter mòrk! dan.… aa’s hai d’r weg woá’s! Nou.… de
heule dag keek tie d’r nie noa sain toestel.… da wist
tie.… allainig Sondag woare d’r minse. Aa’s t’r
skoonmoak wier.. en minse kwoamme!.. aa’s hai d’r
allangst weg waa’s.. Konne die d’r tug ook gapt
hewwe!.. Waa’s d’r niks te beskuldige van sain!..

Enne kaik! neenet!.. da prechtding kaik!.. da’ mòst ie

hewwe.… Enne.… nou gauw an de gang!.… ’t Waa’s
aers.… vast te loat!

’t Kistje weer weggeduwd in ’t donker, en nou vlug

naar ’t toestel sloop ie.—Met twee handen rukte,
perste, trok, schoof ie, maar de lens wou niet los.—
.… Hoho! most ie nie ergens ’n dwarspennetje
lossnaie?..

Maar hij wist niet waar dat zat! Weer schroefde ie, dan
[411]rechts, dan links, handen in glibberig zweet,
onvast, en plots draaide de lens meè.—
Hij juichte even gesmoord van bang genot. Los.. los!
nou sou die d’r sain.… Maar weer onder ’t
losschroeven bleef de lens vastzitten. Nou gloeide
toch ’t koper glad in z’n zweethanden en sulde ie
glibberig over den cylinder. Muurvast zat ie weer. Hij
vloekte, trampelde.… Wat noù weer? Hij keek, maar
kon niets vinden. Alleen zat ’t ding met ’n vreemd
zijstangetje van onder in driehoek, nog maar ’n heel
klein eindje vast op den schroefdraad.

Z’n kop klamde in noodzweet. Telkens rukte ie z’n

baard naar achter, die ’m hinderde. Nou zat ’r toch
angstjacht in z’n morsige, knellende, rukkende vingers
en krakende, bevende klauwen. Elk oogenblik kon de
kerel d’r zijn, was ie ’r bij. Dan maar met ’n ruk. En
voor ie ’t zelf goed wist had ie de lens verbogen en
afgeknapt van den schroefdraad en ’n heel end, in ’n
woesten vloerkras de voorpooten van ’t zware toestel
mee òpgelicht. Hij schrok ervan, toen ie daar zoo
maar met ’t groote prachtbrok in z’n bezweete
verwrongen morsige beefhanden stond. Hij duizelde
weer. ’t Woog loodzwaar in z’n hand. Juichen wou ie,
juichen, maar toen ie opkeek, en achter toestel wou
uitwijken zag ie plots op ’t krijt-bleeke, kakensidderend
pap-gezicht van den fotograaf, die ’m al ’n paar tellen
op de handen had gezien. Achter Van Gooyen
stonden twee mannen, wit-verstoven metselaars, van
’n huis-in aanbouw, naast z’n atelier. Er zat dolle
stomme staroogende schrik in ouë Gerrit’s kop, en de
hand waarin z’n lens knelde beefde, als smakte ie in
beroerte neer. Als ’n bezetene sprong de fotograaf op
’m af, stootte hem in den nek, en donderde: