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LongWalton2019-Green Berets Rebuilding the Guerrilla Leader Identity v6

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Authors

Dr. Joseph Long is a retiring Special Forces officer and leadership scholar. He has conducted extensive
research in understanding Guerrilla Leadership and the strategic impact of Unconventional Warfare.

Dr. David Walton is a professor of national security strategy at the National Defense University. With
Special Forces expertise in Latin America and the Middle East, his work and research focus on the nexus
of operationalizing great strategy for better results. The views expressed are the author’s and do not
reflect official NDU, DOD, or USG positions.

Green Berets: Rebuilding the Guerrilla Leader Identity

Direct Action and Unconventional Warfare: one is in the movies, and the other is in the history
books. Perhaps oversimplified, the differences between these two mission sets are at the heart of the
Green Beret’s identity crisis. Both are clearly doctrinal Special Forces missions, but one dominates our
cultural zeitgeist, while the other is relegated to a few weeks in the Q course and knowing glances at
Semi-Annual Training Briefs. Nearly two decades at war have forced Special Forces into a corner. Special
Forces has been so busy doing its job that they may have forgotten how to do their job. An entire
generation of Green Berets has only known the Global War on Terror (GWOT), and the following
generation has been recruited on the promise of door-kicking raids, dynamic entries, and kill/capture
methodologies. But the roots of Special Forces are in the OSS, not the GWOT. These resistance skills will
atrophy, from the individual through the institutional levels, if not resurrected and revitalized for
tomorrow’s conflicts. Guerilla Warfare is a perishable skill and left unexercised it will deteriorate. The
popular aphorism that an ideal Green Beret is a Ph.D. who can win a bar fight may soon face the stark
reality that Green Berets can only win bar fights. To help understand where Special Forces must go it is
important to understand how they got where they are today.

This change in cultural identity did not happen overnight. In the last decade and a half of
counterinsurgency-based conflict in multiple theaters, special operations forces (SOF) have led the way
in developing successful processes for conducting contemporary military operations. The success of SOF
operations has arguably influenced United States (US) political and military leaders to the degree that
SOF-like methods are being duplicated in conventional circles as a new way of war. Concepts such as
multi-domain operations, regionally aligned forces (RAF) and Security Forces Assistance Brigades (SFAB)
with language training and distinctive berets are but some examples of SOFs most recent influence on
the American way of war.
 However, the increasing influence of the SOF umbrella remains problematic for the Special
Forces (SF) branch. Specifically, the use of the term SOF in the media has diluted the input of SF within
the SOF umbrella resulting in a disjointed sense of identity in the SF Regiment. News outlets and
influential media personalities often confuse the terms SOF and SF to dilute the significance of SF
operations against other SOF tribes. Consequently, the dilution of the SF-specific identity is increasingly
impacting the SF Regiment’s ability to recruit sufficient numbers to maintain the force. Given that SOF
refers to all units in the unified US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and is frequently couched
as SF in the media, how can future SF members grasp the specifics of the SF mission? That said, the
purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, the authors endeavor to ignite a conversation within the SF
Regiment about its enduring identity and to move toward clarity and union. Second, we propose a
framing for the SF identity as a unique "triple threat" of skills that highlights distinctions of the SF branch
from other SOF and conventional units, and the rebranding of the Special Forces branch as our most
iconic and identifying term: Green Berets. This discussion serves only to emphasize the unique selling
proposition that Green Berets maintain; it does not serve as a call for competition amongst SOF. The
debate about who, what, when, where, and why the US conducts Unconventional Warfare is nearly
endless. This discussion is the specific of how; only Green Berets are skilled in Guerilla Leadership.

Even if the discussion of the specific future operating environment and accompanying mission
set remains unclear, there is little doubt that the most critical Special Forces skillset resides in the ability
to identify, analyze, and utilize human networks (Meredith, 2019). Whatever the mission this network-
centric mindset is best incubated in the Unconventional Warfare petri dish.

Why Identity Matters

As an organization, identity matters. From a scholarly perspective, building and maintaining

identity is a task that must be deliberate from senior leadership on down and impacts organizational
culture across multiple sub-fields. In leadership literature, identity is critical to developing organizational
culture by combining the individual identity with social and organizational ones to create meaning for
people within institutions (Alvesson, 2011). From a social movement perspective, collective identity is
thought to be a critical component for mobilization and collective action (Polletta & Jasper, 2001;
Tarrow, 1994). It also plays a role in cross-cultural leadership to underscore relational aspects of identity
through understanding divisive cleavages that can prevent unity.

When viewed through the culture and collective action lens, there is little debate that SF is in
need of a refresher. With dozens of widely publicized gaffs from the laughable through the ethically
disassociated, to the downright illegal, SF is losing confidence both publically and intrinsically. From the
perspective of a profession-at-arms, Green Berets require absolute confidence amongst themselves and
perhaps more importantly with their partners. An Ambassador who does not trust an SFODA simply will
not allow them to do what they need to do under his or her jurisdiction. Identity remains increasingly
important for understanding both the strategic role in conducting unconventional warfare (UW) and
other insurgency-related military operations, as well as how SF fit into the broader Department of
Defense across multiple phases of conflict. That said, years of population-centric counterinsurgency
operations (COIN) have muddied the waters between the SF-specific mission, SOF, and the conventional
military forces. Specifically, the interaction between military and civilian forces increasingly blurs the
lines between SF missions and other military operations involving civilian influence. This blurred
distinction has arguably remained "insufficient for understanding the unique context of indigenous
leadership” and unconventional warfare (Long, 2017).
 Lastly, recent conflicts continue to underscore the distinct complexity of an interstate conflict
that impacts more than American military forces. These conflicts challenge the understanding of the
future of armed conflict and the security dilemma for people in both powerful and developing states.
Classic models for sustaining global military and economic equilibrium are being challenged by emerging
dynamics and self-organizing structures (Boulton, Allen, & Bowman, 2015; Griffin & Stacey, 2005;
Stacey, 2012). Thus leadership in such complex environments must be reexamined to understand the
challenges to the Westphalian world order and the role of military forces in driving strong-state
behavior. Previously understood linear models are fast becoming insufficient for understanding
concepts of equilibrium and balances of power in favor of complexity and “rapid organizational
transformation” (Chiles et al., 2004, p. 501).

With complexity in mind, the uniqueness of the SF mission must remain the centerpiece of the
SF identity as distinct from other military organizations. A unified identity will help clarify future combat
roles so that the most impactful units will be chosen for the most appropriate missions, and so that the
SF role within larger DoD responsibilities remains clear. Other organizations do not have to deal with
challenges to identity: the maneuver branches role in the US Army “has remained constant since the
earliest days of American military history: to close with and destroy the enemy” (“U.S. Army Infantry
School Official Website,” n.d.). However, SF’s unique history can blur the lines and create destabilizing
competition between conventional missions and other SOF units.

Understanding the SF Identity

As a branch, SF units have similarities to other units within the broader US military, yet its
distinctiveness must also remain clear. SF Soldiers mostly come from the US Army infantry where they
derive much of their history, culture, and training. The close association with SF and the Army Ranger
School affirms this shared identity based on core skills of patrolling and small-unit tactics. Likewise, SF
units share a joint side focus on very high-profile direct action missions, as well as information and
population-oriented branches such as Psychological Operations (PO) and Civil Affairs (CA). Yet, what do
Special Forces do that make them truly special?

To begin with, there must be consensus on what does not make SF unique compared to other
units. One of the first claims is that SF is the force that works with foreign personnel or partner forces.
However, conventional units also historically work with partner forces and have the primary role in the
DoD’s Security Force Assistance mission. Although this claim is often supported by SF language
requirements and cultural awareness training, the Soldiers assigned to CA, PO, and the SFA brigades are
also trained in language and culture, and many of the members of the joint special operations
community also receive similar training. Likewise, SF cannot claim to be the only force that conducts
unconventional warfare, as CA and PO again have missions steeped in UW, as do several joint SOF and
Special Mission Units (SMU). That said, SF is not unique for working with foreign forces, for learning
languages, or for conducting UW, but for their unique mission of conducting special operations across
the range of military operations to “disrupt or eliminate threats unilaterally, with partners or friendly
indigenous forces” (Army Doctrine Publication 3-05: Special operations, 2012, p. 7).
 What makes the SF branch unique is less of a specific role than a unique capability. Although SF
units are not the only DoD force that works with foreign countries, SF units are the only force that works
with “indigenous forces.” Often called guerrillas, indigenous forces are defined as “irregular,
predominantly indigenous personnel organized along military lines to conduct military and paramilitary
operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory” (Joint Publication 3-05: Special operations, 2014).
This is the essence of the Green Beret distinction: SF is the only force that is specially selected and
trained to lead indigenous forces in “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or
insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or
with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force…to influence the indigenous population to support
the resistance movement or insurgency” (Army Doctrine Publication 3-05: Special operations, 2012, p.
9).

This understanding of Special Forces is not unknown to the members of the Regiment and
serves as the critical distinction between Green Beret formations and conventional and other SOF units.
In capitalizing on the uniqueness of SF, we propose reframing the unique SF identity as a triple threat of
maneuver, Direct Action, and information operation capability through the application of indigenous
leadership. Like the infantry, SF units conduct maneuver operations either independently as part of an
unconventional warfare campaign, or as part of larger combined arms coalition operations such as
Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan in 2002. However, as the first tier of the triple threat, SF is the only
unit that conducts maneuver operations in combat while in the direct leadership of indigenous forces.

On the second tier of the triple threat, Joint SOF, SMUs, and SF units each conduct Direct Action
and other raid-like operations. However, SF operations are unique to other SOF units because they are
conducted with indigenous forces on their right and left rather than other highly trained SOF forces. This
provides the same operational challenge as more dedicated raiding units, but also adds the significant
leadership challenge of operating with and through indigenous forces. Lastly, SF conduct information
operations and interact with foreign populations in similar ways as CA and PO units do, but SF
detachments do so in the context of UW and indigenous leadership at the point of greatest impact on
the battlefield. This military and leadership challenge represents the ultimate in complexity and remains
the sole domain of the SF Regiment.

In summary, the comparison of the SF triple threat serves to solidify the distinct and complex
nature of SF operations against the backdrop of other related but differently sourced units. This
observation is particularly salient now as the recent decision of the Army to develop regionally oriented
SFABs has many members of the community concerned that the SF mission is in decline. The reality is
that such fears are the farthest from the truth since the ability to work with indigenous, rather than
partner-nation and foreign military forces, remains the core task of Special Forces, and Special Forces
are the only units capable of completing it. As a result, the three lightning bolts on the SF patch more
accurately represent the guerrilla leadership of maneuver, Direct Action, and Information Operations as
much as land, sea or air. Unfortunately, poor identity and media branding continues to dilute and limit
the distinct Green Beret identity.

Reframing the Special Forces

 Empirical data shows that SF remains the most well-known branch of the Army SOF enterprise
compared to CA, PO, Special Operations Aviation, and the 75th Ranger Regiment. However, the use and
misuse of the term “Special” in media makes discerning the value of SF against other units increasingly
difficult. Studies of media framing show a high likelihood that the terms SF and SOF get congealed at
significant rates such that the use of the term “Special Forces” is essentially indistinguishable from
“Special Operations Forces.” That said, SF loses out on the specific framing that drives recruiting,
funding, and even operational assignments. Senior DoD decision makers are less likely than the average
citizen to be confused about what Special Forces is capable of, but in a business where risk mitigation is
part of the charter, Special Forces should work towards clarity and developing a deeper understating of
what they are best suited for, not just capable of.

In contrast, other formations under the USSOCOM umbrella are branded in more specific
terminology. SEALs and Rangers have a particular brand that is less confused with other SOF units, as
does CA and PO. That said, the SF branch's use of the term “Green Beret” remains a similarly identifying
brand associated with this distinct history and storied reputation. In fact, when reports are specifically
oriented to SF units, the term “Green Beret” is used to avoid confusion with other forces. However, the
opposite has happened, and the SF regiment should promote rather than degrade the unique distinction
of the title “Green Beret" to describe themselves and their unique capabilities.

Conclusion

The formation of an organization’s identity is a critical function of leadership and must be

approached as a deliberate activity with a known end state. As a Regiment, Special Forces have an
interest in acknowledging their uniqueness in among fellow maneuver, Direct Action, and Influence
Operations units. Unfortunately, nearly twenty years of indigenous leadership has been diluted by the
similarities between the SF and SOF terms, and competition for budgets and missions has incentivized all
branches to compete for relevance.

For these reasons, the time has come for the Special Forces Regiment to relook its identity and
reframe Green Beret skills to be as valuable and special as they truly are. The ability to function as a
strategic triple threat in insurgency-based military operations should be embraced with pride, even
against more fashionable emerging aims such as Security Force Assistance and regional orientation.
Even when SF conduct unilateral operations without indigenous forces, it should remember that the
true strategic value stems from the ability to lead guerrillas, and the strategic effects of those
indigenous forces will always be greater than SF acting alone.

Likewise, while Special Forces ties to indigenous forces can come at the expense of other
combat forces gaining operational experience or accomplishing vital tasks, the SF function helps the
entire US military win wars as part of a team. When they are the main effort, SF must demonstrate the
capabilities of this triple threat, and likewise remain adaptable to being useful when in support of other
units. Uniqueness is not an excuse for a “super soldier” mentality. When SF train to look, act, and
perform differently from other units, they must ensure that they see the big picture and avoid
divisiveness with other branches. The ability to lead combined teams of SF Soldiers, guerrilla, auxiliary
and underground forces, and indigenous populations of mostly developing countries suggests that SF
should remain the most capable team players when working with other DoD units. The unique SF jargon
of “G chief” and “getting in the G base” applies in almost everything they do. SF must embrace the
ability to treat every situation with the care and cultural savvy of a UW operation.
 Lastly, the strategic nature of the SF branch is seen as they are often called to serve at the
political level of conflict, and often where indigenous forces matter greatly. However, if SF fail to solidify
the core identity of unique leadership of those forces, then US political decision makers will remain
hesitant to send them into the fight. This is especially salient given the networked and unconventional
nature of adversarial efforts to build their own friendly government-like structures amidst competing
political and social groups. They are using “special forces” to undermine US interests, and it is high time
the US pushes back with its own Special Forces, a job specifically designed for Green Berets and their
triple threat capabilities.

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