Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Lec 3 - Legal Proff Rules
Lec 3 - Legal Proff Rules
Lec 3 - Legal Proff Rules
INTRODUCTION
- Council of the Law Society (England & Wales) stated:
• Circumstances must exist in which the general public require protection
• To retain their own repute and standing and to retain public confidence in their abilities, these groups
imposed upon themselves a discipline and adopted ethical rules and restrictions
• Voluntarily submitting themselves to standards of ethical conduct
- Ormrod Committee:
• Profession involves a particular kind of relationship which deprives the client of the ability to make
informed judgments for himself and so renders him to a large extent dependant upon the professional
man
• A self-imposed code of professional ethics is intended to correct the imbalance in the relationship
between the professional man and his client
- President of Law Society:
• Urge you to observe the rules and principles of conduct and to be vigilant to ensure that others do so
• Through maintenance of high standards by individuals that justice will be served, the public will be
protected and the profession as a whole will thrive
- Rule 2(2) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules (Cap. 161, Section 71, R 1, 2000
Revised Edition) provides that regard should be had to the principle that an advocate and solicitor shall
not in the conduct of his practice do any act which would compromise or hinder the following obligations:
a) Maintain the Rule of Law and assist in the administration of justice;
b) Maintain the independence and integrity of the profession;
c) Act in the best interest of his client
d) Facilitate access to justice by members of the public
Outline of the sources of the Rules of Conduct which govern Professional Conduct of lawyers who hold
practising certificates:
Section 71 LPA
(1) Without prejudice to any other power to make rules, the Council may make rules for regulating the
professional practice, etiquette, conduct and discipline of advocates and solicitors.
(2) Such rules shall not come into operation until they have been approved by the Chief Justice who may if he
thinks fit consults any of the other Judges before giving his approval.
(3) Disciplinary proceedings may be taken against any advocate and solicitor who contravenes any rules made
under this section.
3. Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 1998 as amended on 1 September 2001 and 1 April 2005.
– subsid legislation
a. Understanding Amendments To The Professional Conduct And Publicity Rules In 2002
b. introduction of law corporations from 1 Oct 2000 necessitated consequential amendments to the
Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 1998 and the Legal Profession (Publicity) Rules 1998
Council also given stat power under s59 LPA to pass rulings on conduct and ethics – practice directions and
rulings of council so council can interpret rules and give guidance on rules
Binding on member of law society who is practicing at private bar
If lawyer in breacah of PDs, can be guilty of misconduct and basis found in s83(2)(b) LPA
8. Common Law – also impt – because lawyers in fid rr with client and see pg 53-57 manual
a. manual – secret profits by lawyers/ conflicts of interest/ gross overcharging is breach of fid duty
PYRAMID OF RESPONSIBILITY
Criminal prosecutor:
- DPP x members of law soc – but code stll needed because recogd tt a lot o stat tribunals engage lawyers
at private bar to prosecute for proff misconduct against professionals. Law soc instructs lawyers to act
as prosecutors in discipline proceedings
- Have to comply with code of conduct in PC rules final part
- Date of Commencement and Revocation of earlier Rules (Rule 1 and Rule 89
i)
General Ethical Statement
- Rule 2
- What paras a, b, c and d do is set out duties of sg lawyer. In interpreting rules, council and court shld not in any
way compromise the four genral ethical ststements. Nth done to limit four basic duties in interpretation.
Rule 2(2)
In the interpretation of these Rules, regard shall be had to the principle that an advocate and solicitor shall not in
the conduct of his practice do any act which would compromise or hinder the following obligations:
(c) to act in the best interests of his client and Private Bar – thus act in the best interests of Client(s). Fid duty of cl
to charge fairly for work done; and restated. One of ethical duties is pro bono. Paramount not that we get paid
but whether we are wlling to rep pple to promote access to justice. Fees not
impt.
(d) to facilitate access to justice by members of Facilitates access of justice: support of pro bono work
the public. Eg. Law Society’s provision of criminal legal aid
- Lie Hendri Rusli v Wong Tan & Molly Lim [2004] 4 SLR 594: “expectations of the profession must be tied to
reality … the real issue is whether the court views the standards applied and skills discharged by the particular
solicitor as consistent with the legal profession’s presumed responsibilities and obligations to its clients. This is
not a fossilized concept and standard”
Lie Hendri - Facts
The plaintiff was the principal director and shareholder of PT Bangun Persada Tata Makmur (“PTB”), an
Indonesian distributor of electronic goods. PTB had an important and close business relationship with a group of
related electronics distributors in Singapore (“the Alps Group”), which included Alps Investment Pte Ltd
(“Alps”).
In November 1999, PTB’s business met with difficulties as a result of the Asian financial crisis, and the Alps
Group pressed PTB to settle its debts. Agnes Goh, the principal officer in the Alps Group servicing PTB,
proposed that the plaintiff mortgage his apartment to Malayan Banking Berhad (“MB”) for Alps’ benefit, so that
PTB could obtain a higher credit limit using Alps’ letter of credit arrangements. The Alps Group would then also
deal with PTB’s debts benignly. The plaintiff agreed.
On the suggestion of Anthony Koh (“AK”), an officer in the Alps Group, the plaintiff agreed to engage the
defendant firm of solicitors to act for him. The plaintiff was aware that the defendant also represented the Alps
Group. Tan Yah Piang (“TYP”), the senior conveyancing partner with the defendant, received instructions from
AK to act for Alps in the restructured facility arrangement with MB. Around the same time, the defendant also
received instructions from MB to act for it in the restructured facility agreement with Alps. TYP prepared the
necessary documents to secure the proposed mortgage of the apartment (“mortgage documents”), which included
an “all moneys clause” making the plaintiff personally liable for all facilities extended by MB to Alps.
The plaintiff, AK and TYP met at TYP’s office on 21 December 1999. TYP used both English and Mandarin to
explain the legal implications of the mortgage documents to the plaintiff, who had a weak command of English
and preferred to use Mandarin. The plaintiff did not ask any questions or communicate any concerns to TYP
prior to and after signing the documents. TYP did not keep an attendance note of the meeting.
In 2002, the Alps Group met with serious financial difficulties. The plaintiff sought to redeem the apartment
from MB. Eventually, the apartment was discharged by way of a partial discharge of mortgage, while the
personal covenant undertaken by the plaintiff in the mortgage documents subsisted. MB later commenced
proceedings in 2003 against several parties, including the plaintiff, who settled MB’s claim against him for
$500,000.
The plaintiff thereafter commenced these proceedings, alleging that he had suffered a loss of $500,000 as a result
of TYP’s negligence in failing to explain to him and/or advise him on the potential consequences arising from
his signing the mortgage documents, as he had unwittingly become a surety for MB’s loan facilities to Alps.
Held, dismissing the claim:
(1) The plaintiff was aware that the proposed mortgage was intended to secure all credit facilities extended by
MB to Alps: at [24].
(2) The plaintiff was not concerned about the extent of the facilities or the possibility that the facilities would
be varied, as he did not expect or contemplate that Alps would be unable to repay its debts to MB: at [26].
(3) Contrary to the plaintiff’s claims, TYP had explained to him in some detail the intent and purport of the
mortgage documents. Indeed, when asked by TYP, he confirmed that he understood TYP’s explanation and had
no questions to ask. He did not communicate to TYP at any time any concerns about the transaction: at [28] to
[30], [39].
(4) TYP candidly admitted that he had not informed the plaintiff that he was also concurrently acting for Alps
and MB. However, this did not mean that TYP had been negligent. It was not a material omission, as the plaintiff
would have proceeded with the transaction regardless. The plaintiff had been fully aware of TYP’s representation
of Alps. Also, TYP did not let his representation of MB affect his conduct of the matter vis-à-vis the plaintiff: at
[68].
[Observation: While it was good practice for a solicitor to maintain contemporaneous attendance notes, the
absence of such notes did not inexorably mean that he was to be disbelieved in the event of a dispute. However,
he might find himself handicapped when the credibility of his evidence was assessed in court: at [36], [63] to
[64].
The risk of a conflict of interests arose when a solicitor (or an advocate) acted for multiple parties, and the
reluctance of many to act for multiple clients, did not call into question the actual legitimacy of the practice of
acting for multiple parties. Nevertheless, in the interests of the legal profession and the public, it had to be
considered if clearer policies and rules had to be formulated in approaching issues of conflicts of interests,
especially in conveyancing and loan transactions: at [48] to[57].]
- Alfons Tanumihardja v Thio Su Mien and others [2005] 2 SLR 445: “it spreads over such a wide sphere
… left to the client and his solicitor to regulate between themselves”
Alfrons Tanumihardja - Facts
The plaintiff was a director of Multico-Orchids (S) Pte Ltd (“Multico”). On 1 October 1990, RHB Bank Bhd
(“RHB”) granted Multico a loan facility for which the plaintiff executed a letter of guarantee dated 12 October
1990 (“the Guarantee”). The defendants, who were the plaintiff’s solicitors when he executed the Guarantee,
also acted for the plaintiff in the execution of a deed of settlement dated 26 August 1993 (“the Settlement Deed”)
between the plaintiff and Tradexim Ltd (“Tradexim”) as agent for the other main shareholders of the company.
Under the Settlement Deed, Tradexim was to procure the plaintiff’s release from the Guarantee after the plaintiff
fulfilled certain obligations. The relevant solicitor, Christopher Chuah (“Chuah”), rendered his final bill and
closed the plaintiff’s file on 1 October 1996.
On 21 June 2000, the plaintiff received a letter of demand from RHB for credit advanced under a facility letter
from RHB to Multico dated 17 January 1998, which RHB alleged the plaintiff had guaranteed. This letter was
sent through the defendants, who were now acting on behalf of RHB, but with a different solicitor in charge of
the claim. The plaintiff contacted Chuah, who advised the plaintiff to seek independent legal advice, which the
plaintiff did by consulting one Peter Chow. However, the plaintiff instructed Peter Chow not to proceed or
continue to act for him until specifically instructed to do so.
On 21 February 2002, RHB sent the plaintiff a second letter of demand and subsequently commenced action on
9 October 2002. The plaintiff reached an agreement with one of the main shareholders and signed a deed of
release dated 23 December 2002, whereby the plaintiff accepted a sum of money in exchange for his releasing
Tradexim and its principals from their obligations under the Settlement Deed. On 14 March 2003, RHB obtained
summary judgment against the plaintiff, who consented to the judgment as his present solicitors advised him that
he had no defence to the claim.
The plaintiff brought this action in negligence against the defendants. He alleged that when he contacted Chuah
on 21 June 2000, Chuah failed to advise him of his rights against Tradexim and its principals for not procuring
his release from the Guarantee, which rights subsequently became time-barred. The plaintiff argued that although
Chuah could not defend him against the suit brought by RHB, Chuah ought to have acted for him in taking legal
action against Tradexim and its principals.
Held, dismissing the case:
(1) Had Chuah been the plaintiff’s lawyer, Chuah would have had an undeniable duty to advise the plaintiff of
his rights against Tradexim and its principals. However, the plaintiff’s file with the defendants’ firm was closed
on 1 October 1996, even though the covering letter did not mention that they were closing the file. There was no
duty on a solicitor to state in his covering note that the file would be closed after payment of the bill. Although
the closing of a file did not in itself terminate a solicitor-client relationship, the closure of the file in this case
indicated that Chuah was of the (not unreasonably held) view that he had no further substantial service to
perform for the plaintiff in respect of that file: at [7] and [8].
(2) As the plaintiff did not issue express instructions to Chuah to ensure that Tradexim procured the release of
the Guarantee, whether Chuah was duty-bound to do so depended on whether it was reasonable to infer that he
had to carry out an implied duty in question. In this case, it was not envisaged that the solicitors had to ensure the
performance of the many obligations exchanged between the plaintiff and Tradexim. What implied or inferred
duties a solicitor owed had to be implied and inferred only by means of reasonable foresight, and not by perfect
hindsight: at [8].
(3) Even if Chuah was still regarded as the plaintiff’s solicitor in respect of procuring the plaintiff’s release
from the Guarantee, that relationship was surely terminated when the plaintiff sought independent legal advice
after Chuah informed the plaintiff that he (Chuah) was unable to act for him because of a conflict of interest. A
solicitor-client relationship between the defendants and the plaintiff could only come about from a fresh and
express agreement: at [9].
(4) A distinction could not be drawn between the suit by RHB against the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s rights
against Tradexim and its principals, so that Chuah could act for him in respect of the latter but not the former. No
reasonable solicitor would have advised the plaintiff to instruct someone else other than the defendants to sue
Tradexim, and yet another lawyer to defend him against the RHB claim. Chuah could hardly have given such
advice because it would have been advice against the interests of RHB that the defendants then represented:
at [10].
(5) In the circumstances, Chuah had acted properly and neither Chuah nor the defendants were in breach of
duty: at [11] and [13].
(6) Furthermore, the plaintiff’s detriment was not caused by, nor could it reasonably be attributed to, Chuah. If
the plaintiff chose not to instruct a new solicitor, or having instructed him, instructed him not to proceed, the
consequences were his to bear: at [11].
(7) By executing the deed of release, the plaintiff had assumed all liability in respect of RHB’s claim and
absolved Tradexim and its principals from any liability, and had surely lost all his rights against them. On the
evidence, the plaintiff had not shown that Tradexim had not already procured his release. The claim by RHB was
based on the facility letter dated 17 January 1998 in which the plaintiff’s Guarantee was not one of the listed
securities. It appears, therefore, that he had a reasonable defence, and cause for a third-party action against
Tradexim on 14 March 2003 when RHB’s application for summary judgment was heard. The defendants did not
cause the plaintiff’s loss or cause him to lose his rights against Tradexim and its principals: at [12] and [13].
Rule 2(1)
These Rules shall apply to every advocate and solicitor who has in force a practising certificate.
=> Self regulating; indep profession.
iii. The effect of Practice Directions and Rulings of the Council of the Law Society under these Rules
- Rule 2(3) – no PD of council inconsistent with rules will be recognized. So council cannot pass any PD
inconsistent with any of rules in proff conduct rules ie rules prevail over PDs.
Rule 2(3)
These Rules shall, to the extent of any inconsistency, prevail over the Practice Directions and Rulings 1989
issued by the Law Society or any additions or amendments thereto.
- If the Law Society issues a Practice Direction inconsistent with the Rules, the Rules shall prevail
- Thus, Council of the Law Society cannot undermine Rules
- If the directives issued before the 1st June 1998 are inconsistent with the Rules, they have no force
- See Practice Directions on 1st June 1998
iv. Definitions section of the PC Rules - Rule 3 –
Rule 3
In these Rules, unless the context otherwise requires —
"Court" means any court, tribunal, board or committee where an advocate and solicitor appears as a
representative of another person, whether or not for a fee;
"law firm" means a firm of advocates and solicitors and includes a sole-proprietorship and partnership of 2 or
more advocates and solicitors;
"Judge" means a Judge of the Supreme Court, a District Judge, Magistrate, Coroner or any person presiding
over a court or statutory tribunal.
- defn of ‘court’ – rules take wide intepreation of this expression can mean any tribunal, committee or board so
long as appear bfore it either as advocate or advocate and solicitor. Can be Public service comm tribunal, etc.
duty governed by rules.
- Defn of ‘firm’ very impt also – sg lawyers practise as sole props, partnerships, LLPs (later this yr) – soe
propr/partner – firm made up of partners or indiv props, but as limited liab law corporation etc – there is a
legal entity. But still made up of indiv adv and solicitors. Firm does not just mean entity but also includes the
indiv props and partners of tt entity and the directors and the partners of LLCs/ LLPs
- ‘judge’ – any person presiding over any tribunal or court
- rules confirm to lawyer that whenever he appears before anyone, he needs to comply with rules of conduct
(2) Any solicitor who contravenes subsection (1) shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction
to a fine not exceeding $5000.
- – lawyer cannt describe himself in connection with profession other than in manner approved by council fr
time to time/. But certain expression preapproved by council – lawyer/ legal consultant or adv and sol in
practice. Otherwise need approval.
- ‘Legal consultant (if qualified)’ - defn of legal consultant in LPA found in s75D – someone who must have at
least 10 yrs of private practice or 10 yrs as legal officer in legal service or lecturer in faculty of law in NUS or
combi of anyone of these and aggregates to 10 yrs.
- Statute does ensure that title not used presupposing the experience brought ot practice.
- Criminal offence to do so if not qualified and calls oneself legal consultant/
- Notary public/ commissioner for oaths – can be called if licensed by sg academy of law. otherwise cannot
describe urself as such
- Counsel – not preapproved. Need approval of law soc
- But expressions like directors/ MDs are approved for LLCs.
- Rules on professional stationery and signs for law practices - council controls or regulates profession.
Anything dealing with signplates etc set by council must be complied with. To ensure that when lawyers put
up stationery etc x affect integrity of profession, publicity of firm controlled
- must write to council if not approved
- see also Rule 6 (Publicity Rules) – Responsibilities for publicity within Singapore
claim to specialization
no mention of past cases, success rate, success rate,
iv. Arrangements for taking over practice during periods of absence – Rule 7
Rule 7
An advocate and solicitor shall make suitable arrangements for the running of his practice during any period of
his absence.
- This duty is most significant for a sole proprietor.
- Currently, around 380 sole proprietors now in legal practice
- Requirement to make arrangements for practice during periods of absence
- If fail to do so, Law Society will take disciplinary action – breach can amount to professional misconduct
- Making of “suitable arrangements” – scope varies on case-by-case basis
- Eg: Medical leave for 5 months, must find another lawyer to run your practice – this would require
contractual relations and an issue of a Power of Attorney to sign accounts, give responsibility of office
administration etc. Must also get client’s consent and insurance coverage to protect self from negligence
- Must inform Law Society in writing of such arrangements; However if leave is for 3-5 days, no need to
inform Law Society
- Must be “legal managers” with at least 3 years of practicing experience
- Discipline – responsibility of partners of the firm – since they run the firm
- Breach includes firms which do not apply for licences for their lawyers – sections 32, 33 LPA (Criminal
offence to practice without a licence)
- Duty of lawyers to supervise qualified and unqualified staff – Lwyer shall ex proper supervision over
employers and other stuff. employees include employed lawyers/ legal assistants
- The concept of a “designated supervising practitioner” for a locum solicitor in private practice
- to bring to attention of lawyers that management of law practice involves risk management. With employees,
they are doing work and if don’t supervise, will face issues of civil liab etc where no proper supervision.
- In absence of supervision, law soc may discipline the partners.
- Eg
failure to ensure that lawyers have PCs
Staff faxed confid info to opp side. In law firm, none of stuff had any training on client
confidentiality – r 24 PCR. Failure of firm to have system of training or supervision. Partners
disciplined.
- Law soc website – law soc has developed prime law – system of practice management developed for law
firms. Crated manual of processes and systems law firms hsld implement and if law firm adopts what has been
proposed, then rule 7 and 8 shld be complied with
- General rule – cannot share premises with non-lawyers – breach confidentiality to clients
- Unless non-lawyers are people who enhance or contribute to the legal practice
- 3 Principles for shared premises:
a) Cannot undermine dignity of the legal profession
b) Cannot unfairly attract work to you
c) Any sharing arrangement must not breach client’s confidentiality (includes physical barriers, joint venture
law firm)
- Council’s permission required to share premises with offshore law firm
- Approval for the sharing of office premises with non-lawyers – not allowed. Non lawyers – unqualified
persons. Need law soc approval
- rationale – client confidentiality. (fid rules and r24)
- also to ensure that dignity of profession not undermined
Rule 10
An advocate and solicitor shall not engage in any business, trade or calling which —
(a) derogates from the dignity of the legal profession;
(b) is likely to lead to the attraction of professional business unfairly; or
(c) is in any way prohibited by the Act or any subsidiary legislation made thereunder.
- Touts – breach of fid duty to client. If profession dominated by such practices, not in public interest. Also
undermines independence.
- 1999-2000 – council decided to create these rules. Inspired by English referral code which existed in 1990.
ix. Rule against touting, referral of work by Third Party – Rule 11A
Rule 11A
1. An advocate and solicitor, a law firm or a law corporation shall not tout for business or do anything which
is likely to lead to the reasonable inference that it is done for the purpose of touting.
2. Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (1), where there is reason to believe that a client is referred
to an advocate and solicitor, a law firm or a law corporation by a third party, the advocate and solicitor, law
firm or law corporation, as the case may be, shall —
Rule 11A(2) Comments
(a) maintain the independence and integrity of the • Ask developer not to publicise referror – ensures that
profession and not permit the referror to undermine the independence and integrity of the legal profession is
professional independence of the advocate and solicitor, not undermined
law firm or law corporation;
(b) not reward the referror by the payment of commission • Cannot offer referror rewards
or any other form of consideration;
(c) not allow the referral in any way to affect the advice • Does not affect advise given to clients; Thus when
given to such client; act for purchaser, cannot be looking out for
developer’s interests
(d) advise the clients impartially and independently and
ensure that the wish to avoid offending the referror does
not in any way affect the advice given to such clients;
(e) ensure that the referror does not in any way influence • Must not allow referror to influence your practice (or
any decision taken in relation to the nature, style or any decision relating to your practice)
extent of the practice of the advocate and solicitor, law
firm or law corporation; and
(f) communicate directly with the client to obtain or • Always communicate directly with your client for
confirm instructions in the process of providing advice instructions (not the referror)
and at all appropriate stages of the transaction.
- Rule 11A(2) – general principles – before accepting work referred by a Third Party, must ensure the following
subsections (a)-(f)
- No case law to date
- No definition of the term “touting” in the Rules
*Example:
If a debt collection agency refers clients to a law firm for recovery of their debts, the law firm cannot allow the
referror to dictate the legal steps taken for the recovery or accept that all instructions for the progress of the case be
communicated to the law firm by the referror only. Even if the referror produces a letter of authority on the client’s
behalf, the practitioner has a duty under rule 23 of the Professional Conduct Rules to verify the authority of the
agent to give instructions
- Section 79 LPA prohibits a lawyer from acting for both the developer and the purchaser
Section 79 LPA
(1) Where a solicitor acts for a housing developer in a sale of immovable property developed under a housing
development, no specified person shall, in the sale of any immovable property developed under the same
housing development, act for the purchaser of the property unless a certificate of fitness for occupation in
respect thereof has been issued by the Commissioner of Building Control or other relevant authority.
…
(4) Disciplinary proceedings may be taken against a solicitor who acts in contravention of subsection (1)
- Rule against Touting - Rule 11A(1) – law firm shall not tout for business or do anything which can lead to
reasonable inference that it was done for touting. See article. Touting is recognizable. Business comes to law
firm where third party asks for benefit in return for doing this work. Eg cut fr legal fees/ commission or some
other considerationf r law firm in monetary terms. There will be evid of fee sharing, etc
- see s83 (2) d,e, f - LPA – specific offences of touting. When lawyer prosecuted, will find evid to charge him
under those sections.
x. Requirement for written agreement for referrals for conveyancing services – Rule 11B
Rule 11B
(1) In addition to rule 11A, when an advocate and solicitor, a law firm or a law corporation enters into
agreements for referrals of conveyancing services, the advocate and solicitor, law firm or law corporation, as
the case may be, shall ensure that the agreement is made in writing and contains the following terms:
(a) the referror undertakes in such an agreement to comply • Comply with Publicity & Professional Conduct
with these Rules and the Legal Profession (Publicity) Rules Rules
(R 13);
(c) any publicity of the referror (whether written or • Any publicity referror does of legal services, he
otherwise), which makes reference to any service that may cannot say that conveyancing service is free, or
be provided by the advocate and solicitor, law firm or law suggest that conveyancing fees are different and
corporation, must not suggest any of the following: cannot tell purchaser that any perks/ prices on
property is dependent on instructing a particular law
(i) that the conveyancing service is free; firm
*Example:
A developer who has recently launched a residential development approaches your law firm with an offer to refer
all purchasers’ solicitors’ work to your firm, you must enter into a written agreement with them.
Before doing so, if you are informed that the offer to the purchasers who instruct your law firm would be that
they would receive a legal costs subsidy from the developer that would not be offered to purchasers who instructed
another law firm, then you must refuse this arrangement.
The publicity of the developer/ referror would certainly suggest that purchasers can obtain free or reduced legal
charges for conveyancing by instructing your law firm. This could influence the right of the client to appoint a law
firm of his choice.
Law Society of Singapore v Disciplinary Committee [2000] 4 SLR 413 (A very important case – advisable to
read!)
W, developers of a condominium project, had informed purchasers that they would settle legal costs, stamp
duties and disbursements in respect of their purchase only if certain law firms identified by the developers were
appointed. The solicitors concerned were charged for improper conduct (contravening section 83(2)(b), (h) LPA)
– that they had agreed to and participated in W’s scheme, which allowed W to retain their law firms, or
alternatively tout for business on behalf of their law firms.
In this case, the Council was dissatisfied with the Disciplinary Committee’s determination that, in accordance
with section 93(1)(a) LPA, there was no cause of sufficient gravity to render disciplinary action against either
solicitor concerned. The Council applied under section 97 LPA for an order directing solicitors to show cause
under section 98(1) or alternatively directing Council to apply under section 98 of the Act.
- Requirement for a written agreement between a law practice and third party for the referral of conveyancing
services – Rule 11B
- at this time, biggest area of touting was conveyancing. So in this field, additional resp – apart fr 6 stds
above, if referred conveancing work, referral arrangement must be in writing. This must specify tt referral
will honour rule 11A and 11B. the referor undertakes to comply with our publicity rules.
- if no written referral letter, then solicitor is automatically in breach.
- 11B(1c) – referor will NOT tell purchaers/ clients that they will not pay legal fees because they pay legal
subsidy. Again, consumer will feek that he does not get indep legal advice because referor is controlling the
legal fee. So conveyancing service cannot be free – msut be agred by client
- also 11B(2c) – referor agrees that diff charges will not be made if purchaser goes to law firm that referor didn’t
refer.
- 11B(2d) – referral grees not to impair right of client to refer to sol of his choice
- 11B(3) – law firm must terminate arrgnemt with referor if knows that referor is not complying with 11A and
11B
- Law Society of Singapore v Lau See-Jin Jeffrey [1999] 2 SLR 215: Singapore Court of Appeal held that the
respondent in that case had in fact agreed to a commission for successfully procuring his employment as
solicitor for a project, which is prohibited by s. 83(2)(e) Legal Profession Act
Facts
Shijiazhuang Fuqiao Real Estate Development Co Ltd (“Fuqiao”) was a developer of a China project. They
requested New Start International Trading Pte Ltd (“NSI”), to find a law firm to witness and arrange for the
authentication of the sale and purchase agreements between Fuqiao and their purchasers. NSI found Lau See-
Jin (“Lau”), sole proprietor of M /s Lau & Co. Subject to Lau being appointed by Fuqiao, Lau agreed to pay
NSI 30% of his legal fees for NSI’s consultancy and management service to the project. Lau described the
payment as a “service fee” and payable to NSI when Lau had received his legal fees and disbursement.
Through NSI’s efforts, Lau was appointed to act for Fuqiao. By a letter dated 14 August 1995, Lau informed
NSI that he was rescinding the agreement dated 5 June 1995.
On 4 April 1996, NSI solicitors demanded from Lau payment of the agreed “service fee”. NSI also
complained Lau’s conduct to the Law Society. Before the Disciplinary Committee, Law Society argued that
the sum which Lau agreed to pay NSI was a commission. The Disciplinary Committee found that Lau’s scope
of work under the project was limited to witnessing the execution of sale and purchase agreements, and on an
objective constuction of the 5 June 1995 agreement, the parties’ true intention was that Lau would pay NSI a
commission if NSI procured Lau to act for Fuqiao. Such agreement was in breach of s 83(2)(e) of the Legal
Profession Act.
The Law Society applied under s 98 of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161) to make absolute an order to show
cause pursuant to the Disciplinary Committee’s determination that there was cause of sufficient gravity for
disciplinary action under s 83 of the Act to be taken against Lau. The issue before the court was whether the
Disciplinary Committee’s determination should be upheld.
Held, granting the application and suspending the respondent for 5 years:
(1) The objective intention of the parties was vital in determining the true purpose of the payment. The
evidence showed that the fee was not a genuine payment to remunerate NSI’s services. First, the considerable
number of sale and purchase agreements which Lau handled after terminating the agreement with NSI showed
that NSI’s services and its knowledge of the locality of the project were not required for Lau’s work for
Fuqiao. Second, Lau’s charges for work done to the project should have been reduced after terminating the
agreement. Third, NSI must be paid for its service regardless whether Lau had received his.
(2) The Disciplinary Committee’s determination was upheld.
(3) Although Lau had not acted dishonestly, he fell short of the integrity and impartiality expected of a
solicitor. A mere censure would not suffice. A charge under s 83(2)(e) of the Legal Profession Act was a
serious charge. Lau was to be suspended from practice for five years with effect from 12 February 1999.
Practical Suggestions
- insert into a firm’s Warrant to Act, a suitably worded clause on agreement by client to submit a complaint on
Inadequate Professional Services to mediation
Rule 41
To protect his lien to release all documents and provide any assistance as is necessary to enable the
incoming advocate
Change from previous practice: Leo Abse & Cohen v Evan G Jones (Builders) Ltd present rule draws
no distinction between situations where the discharge of the former solicitors was with or without cause
Rule 49
Need not obtain the consent of another advocate and solicitor to provide a second opinion on a
matter to a client
Rule prohibits the second advocate and solicitor from attempting to influence the client to determine the
first advocate and solicitor’s retainer
Liberalizes the previous position stated in Rule 14 of PDR i.e.: “solicitor should not, however, act in a
matter in place of another solicitor whom he knows has been retained until that retainer has been
determined by the client or the consent of the first solicitor to the seeking of a second opinion adverse to
that of the first solicitor whilst he continues to act can only be calculated to undermine the client’s
confidence”
In this author’s view, an attempt to subtly or overtly undermine the standing and competence of the first
solicitor could amount to influence to determine the first solicitor’s retainer
Rule 70
Stipulating that 48 hours notice of intention to enter judgment in default must be given to another
advocates and solicitors
This rule revokes Rule 33(a) of the PDR stipulating a 24-hour notice period
There is still a grey area as to whether the Rule applies to a judgment to be entered in default of
appearance where prior to the action, the defendants have already been represented by solicitors in
correspondence
This issue is whether such solicitors are “on record” for the purposes of Rule 70(1)
Having regard to the mischief that the Rule seeks to cure i.e. the taking advantage of an opposing lawyer’s
oversight or inadvertence, this would probably extend to such judgments, especially where the
defendant’s solicitors had accepted service of the Writ of Summons on behalf of the defendants