Bachelor of Arts (Honours)

POLITICAL SCIENCE

BAPS
DSE-03

INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY IN A

CHANGING WORLD

Block-03
INDIA- CHINA RELATION, INDIA AND SOUTH ASIA

UNIT 9: INDIA-CHINA RELATION: PRE-INDEPEDENCE

ERA
UNIT 10: INDIA-CHINA RELATION: POST-INDEPEDENCE
ERA
UNIT 11: INDIA-SOUTH ASIA: SAARC
UNIT 12: LOOK EAST POLICY, ACT EAST POLICY
Course Writer Course Editor

Prof. Niranjan Barik Dr. Sitakanta Mishra

Visiting Prof. of Political Science, Associate Professor (International Relations)
Ravenshaw University, Cuttack School of Liberal Studies (SLS)
(Unit- 12) Gandhinagar, Gujarat (Unit- 9, 10, 12)

Dr. Ramakrushna Pradhan Prof. Anil Ku. Mohapatra

Assistant Prof. Political Science, Associate Professor, (Political Science),
Fakir Mohan University, Balesore Fakir Mohan University (Unit-11)
(Unit-9 & Unit-10)

Dr. Antaryami Beriha

Academic Consultant
Odisha State Open University (Unit-11)

Course Coordinator

Ms.Tulasi Ray
Academic Consultant (Political Science)
Odisha State Open University, Sambalpur

Material Production
Prof. (Dr.) Manas Ranjan Pujari
Registrar
Odisha State Open University

© OSOU, 2021. Development process and social movements in

contemporary India is made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike
4.0http://creativecommons.org/licences/by-sa/4.0
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UNIT-9: INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS: PRE-
INDEPENDENCE ERA
Structure
9.1 Objectives
9.2 Introduction
9.3 Ancient Period
9.4 Medieval Period
9.5 Modern Period
9.6 Trade Ties and Tribulations
9.7 Border dispute between British India and Kuomintang China
9.8 Summary
9.9 Exercises
9.10 References

9.1 OBJECTIVES

This chapter will enable the students to know and understand the deep-rooted
civilizational, spiritual and cultural connection between India and China. It will help
students in developing:
 Understanding the Sino-Indian relations during the ancient period.
 Understanding the role of Buddhism in establishing a cultural connection
between the two neighbours.
 Understand the factors that disconnected China and India politically,
economically, and religiously.
 Understanding their relationship during the Colonial period.

9.2 INTRODUCTION

India and China are the two oldest living civilizations in the world. The interaction
between these two historic neighbours at least dates back to 2000 years. Indian
civilization flourished on the river banks of Sindhu and Ganges and the Chinese
civilization on the banks of river Huangghe (also known as Yellow River) and the
Yangtze have established trade and cultural relations since time immemorial. It is
believed that these two civilizations have actively interacted with each other for ages
both in terms of trade and spirituality. The historical evidence available from the
written records is testimony to the fact that there was two exchange of syncretic
philosophies, silk and trade in goods between them. Since both civilizations have

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maintained close relations since ancient times, this chapter attempts to understand the
foundations that laid this relationship to bloom and examines the period from ancient
to modern through the medieval phase to comprehend the dynamics of their
relationship.

9.3 ANCIENT PERIOD

Being the neighbours India and China have interacted mainly in material and cultural
areas of mutual exchange. It is believed that these exchanges have taken place at least
via four main routes of communication namely the Central Asian route or very
famously known Silk Route, the Southern Silk Route, the Assam-Burma-Yunnan route,
Tibet-Nepal route, and the Maritime silk route. Many historical findings further state
that cultural linkages between India and China are older than the material exchanges.
One such evidence can be corroborated to establish this fact that the archaeological
excavations at Etched Carnelian beads of Indus valley in various archaeological sites
in China dating early half of the 1st century BCE to the Han and Jin dynasties indicate
frequent cultural exchanges between the two civilizations. Reflections of Indian epics
provide enough evidence of India-China relations even before the spread of Buddhism.
In ancient Indian literature, the frequent reference to a people called ‘Chinas’ perhaps
attributes to present-day China. Even the 5th century Indian epic Mahabharata makes
mentions China which is assumed to be of the era of the Qin dynasty in China.
Chanakya too in his Arthashastra mentions ‘cinamsuka’ referring to Chinese silk and
‘cinapatta’ referring to Chinese silk bundles.

However, the first credible and recorded information about India-China interaction in
ancient times is provided by the great Chinese historian Si Maqian in his historical
masterpiece Records of Historian: Foreigners in Southwest written between 145 BCE
and 90 BCE. This record narrates that the first records of contact between India and
China were established around the 2nd century BCE. Zhang Qian, an envoy of the Han
emperor Wu Di placed before the king’s court in 122 BCE that Sichuan Silk and
Bamboo Sticks found in the western Chinese markets were procured from the Indian
markets. Later on, another Chinese historian named Ban Gu (32 AD to 92 AD) in his
book ‘Early Han Annals’ provided the state of affairs in Kashmir. In this book, he has
mentioned that silk was the primary product India traded with China while trade in
goods such as pearls, corals, and lapis lazuli among others was traded between the two
civilizations. Importantly, the first evidence of communication between India and
China through sea routes was mentioned by Ban Gu. In his book states that the Indian
city Kanchipuram was in trade and diplomatic relationship with China. Further, the
Greco-Roman text Periplus of the Erythraean Sea makes mention of cultural exchanges
between the north Indian cities with China through annual festivities of the China
tribes.

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Further, the trade relations between India and China have grown manifolds during the
reign of the Tang (618-907), Song (960-1279), and Yuan (1279-1368) dynasties.
Indian, Sri Lankan, and Persian ships in the Chinese canton were testimony to the
intense trade relationship between the two countries. Consequently, Indian astronomy,
calendar, medicine, music and dance, and manufacturing technologies for sugar
productions had made their way to China. During the Ming dynasty which ruled China
from 1368-to 1644, maritime trade relations with India increased unprecedentedly. The
mention of names of Indian port cities like Calicut, Cochin, Calcutta, Mahabalipuram,
Goa, Nagapattam, Nicobar, Quilon in Chinese literature establishes trade in goods
between the two oldest civilizations in the world.

Apart from the trade in goods and material exchanges what transformed the India-
China relations to a new height was their cultural interactions and exchange of spiritual
ideas. Buddhism was the cultural chord that linked India and China since ancient days.
Although, the exact time when Buddhism made its entry to China from India is
debatable yet there is agreement that the dissemination of Buddhism widely contributed
to growing cultural connections between India and China. However, the most
acceptable version of the introduction of Buddhism to China can be traced to the very
famous dream of the ‘Golden Buddha’ by the mighty king of the Han Empire, Ming Di
who ruled China between 58 AD and 75 AD. To translate his dreams into reality, Di
has dispatched a Chinese search team to India, and the two most prolific Buddhist
monks namely Kashyapa Matang and Dharmaraksha were taken to China. The very
famous ‘White Horse Monastery’ at Luoyang was built for them. It is believed that the
first wave of Indian Buddhist scholars and monks to visit China lasted until the 3rd
century AD. The second wave is believed to have taken place during the 4th and 5th
centuries AD. As per the records available, until the rule of Sung Empire in China from
960 AD to 1127 AD, a large number of Indian Buddhist monks visited China for
missionary activities while streams of Buddhist pilgrims from China visited India.
Among the venerable Buddhist scholars who went to China the name of Kumarajiva
deserves special mention. His frequent visits to China from 343 AD to 413 AD enable
him to establish a great foot in the history of India-China cultural exchange. Because
of his immense contribution to India-China cultural relations, the emperor of the Qin
dynasty emperor Yao Xing accorded the highest honour of Rajyaguru to Kumarajiva.
As B. R Deepak estimates at least 6000-7000 fascicles of sutras were disseminated to
China from India and were translated into Chinese between the 2nd and 13th century
AD. Importantly, Kumarajiva alone translated 74 scriptures in 384 fascicles. Another
Indian scholar who was immensely popular in China and highly contributed to the
promotion of Buddhism in China was Bodhidharma. He went to China during the 6th
century AD. He was believed to have founded the Shaolin martial art in Luoyang which
still stands as the great Indian cultural ambassador to China.

Similarly, several Chinese scholars also have visited India in search of Buddhist sutras
and to study Indian culture. Very famous among all were Fa-Hien (Fixian) Huen-Tsang

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(Xuanzang) and I-Tsing (Yijing). Fa-Hien was the first Chinese scholar to visit India
in 399 AD. As recorded, he travelled to India via the Central Asian route widely known
as the Silk Route. He visited northern, southern, central, and eastern India before
departing for China via the sea route in 412 AD. His travel details to India were
recorded in his book ‘Accounts of a Buddhist Country’ written in 414 AD. Huen-Tsang
visited India in 628 AD under the patronage of Tang emperor Taizhong and Empress
Wu Zetian. Huen-Tsang and I-Tsing both have received their education at Nalanda
University and emerged as prolific Sanskrit scholars of Chinese origin. Huen-Tsang’s
travel accounts on India enable to strengthen the diplomatic relationship between the
two countries. Inspired by Huen-Tsang’s Chinese narrative Emperor Harshvardhana
dispatched an emissary to the court of Chag’an in 641 AD. In response, Chinese
emperor Taizhong sent his emissaries to India. Huen-Tsang’s travel account ‘The
Journey to west during great Tang’ is a vivid impression of Buddhist cultural exchanges
between India and China. These spiritual interactions not only laid the very foundation
of India-China relations during the ancient and medieval period but also influenced the
mind, culture, ideology, and way of life both of the Chinese and the Indians.

Apart from Buddhist linkages, the Hindu religion and its cultural practices also made
inroads into China. The archaeological excavation of idols of Lord Krishna and Shiva
in Quanzhou and Dali; portraits of Hindu gods and goddesses like Lord Hanuman,
Ganesh, Laxmi, Vinayak, and Shakti housed in Kizil and Dunhuang, and discoveries
of Hindu cultural relics at the sites such as Lopnor in Xinjiang, Kizil, and Dunhuang in
China corroborates Indian-China cultural linkages through Hinduism as well.
Furthermore, Indian stories, drama, art, music, and medicine made their impact in
China. Fairy tales from Panchatantra and Jataka influenced the Chinese literary forms
greatly.

China and India also share deep strategic traditions common to their culture. Kautilya’s
Arthashastra and Sun Tzu’s The Art of War depict the art of statecraft, a treatise on
war, diplomacy, and empire-building were written approximately at the same time in
India and China respectively. It is believed that the Chinese policy of ‘Concentric
Circles’ was heavily drawn from Kautilya’s Arthashastra. Although Political relations
between both the neighbours were not that deep, the religious-cultural interaction that
remained the fountain of India-China relations in the ancient period started to cease
after the 10th century AD coinciding with the Moghual invasion of India.

9.4 MEDIEVAL PERIOD

It was the period of the Mongol invasion of Asia. Although Mongols were not Chinese
yet Mao considered them half brothers. The Mongols raided India several times
between 1221 to 1327 with the intent to establish their rule in Delhi by overthrowing
the Sultan. However, they failed to establish their suzerainty in Delhi. It should also be
noted here that several powerful dynasties ruled both China and India during the
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medieval period. China was under the rule of the Song (960-1279) and Qing (1644-
1912) dynasties which propelled China to a superpower in the world. Similarly, in
India, the reign of the Guptas (320-550) and the Mughals (1526-1857) led India to excel
in military, economic, and cultural fields. The historical record suggests that before the
arrival of Europeans on the world stage (age of colonialism) world’s manufacturers of
goods are dominated by China and India accounting for 33 percent and 25 percent of
world goods respectively. But bilateral relations between China and India under the
Mughals weren’t that great. The attacks on Chinese missionaries by the successors of
Harsvardhan led to a war in which the Chinese had emerged victorious resulting in a
decline of cultural connections between the two countries. Further, the priority of the
Song dynasty was on the northern and southeastern directions of China. Under the reign
of the Qing dynasty, China established itself as a superpower in world politics. Even
during this time, China’s relationship with India wasn’t good. The rule of Mughals and
their religious onslaught on Hindu and Buddhist practices further distanced China from
India. Even during the imperial rule over India and China both countries have
experienced a cultural disconnect. However, both extended political support towards
each other’s freedom struggle against the colonial masters.

9.5 MODERN PERIOD

The anti-imperialistic efflorescence of the Indian and Chinese people manifested in a

major way as a challenge to the colonial order for the first time during the First War of
Indian Independence (1857-59) in India and the Taiping Uprising (1850—1864) in
China. The reaction of the Chinese and Indian people against their common enemy was
the same. For the very first time, Indian troops were deployed in China and switched
allegiances, fighting on the side of the Taipings opposing imperialists and the Qing
government. The nationalists and revolutionaries of India and China had strong mutual
contact that grew into friendship during their anti-imperialist struggle due to the
complementarity between their cultures. They became close allies and tried a variety
of methods to get rid of the intruder.

They backed Tilak, the militant nationalist leader, and carried out actions like Shivaji's
anniversary assemblies as far as Tokyo to spread the Indian anti-imperialist voice
beyond India. Apart from Borohan, Surendermohan Bose, Rash Behari Bose, M.N
Roy, Barakatullah, Lala Lajpat Rai, and many more notable pioneers of the Indian
liberation movement, Sun Yat-Sen maintained good ties and friendships with them.
Nonetheless, the cross-cultural ties that existed between India and China progressively
faded into obscurity. Due to severe disruptions in people-to-people interaction, ongoing
domestic crises, the forcible imposition of western colonialism on India, and the growth
of feudalism in China, this estrangement occurred.

Both the countries in their colonial struggles have supported each other valiantly. With
the rise of Gandhi in Indian politics, the entire Indian freedom movement turned into a
5
mass movement. His spiritual means of Satyagraha and Amisha appealed to mass
participation in the Indian freedom struggle and earned India the distinction of the flag
bearer of world peace. His weapon of non-violence earned him the distinctions of
Mahatma or messiah worldwide while in China he was upheld by people as a symbol
of eastern civilization. Importantly, the Chinese media took a keen interest in India’s
freedom struggle and gave extensive coverage and the greatest attention to covering
events taking place in India and eulogizing the Indian heroes leading the freedom
struggle against the Britishers. Similarly, the Indian support for the Chinese people in
their war against imperial Japan in 1938 can be echoed as sharing each other’s pain and
celebrating one another’s victory. India during this war dispatched a medical mission
to help and support the injured Chinese soldiers in their war of resistance. Nehru’s visit
to China amidst the resistance war in 1939 further brought these two countries together
and strengthened their friendship. The period from 1905-to 1947 was a period of
friendship, superb bonding, and sympathy towards each other.

The constant and cordial interactions between India and China during the first half of
the 20th century made this phase of their relationship as most vibrant. Apart from their
cultural similarities and deep historical links, the introduction of steamships, the
globalization of the cotton and wool trade, and the rapid development of migration
across boundaries have all contributed to the deepening of India and China's friendship
even before their independence. The demise of the Qing Empire in 1911, the debate on
Tibet between British, Chinese, and Tibetan delegates in 1913–1914, and Nobel
laureate Rabindranath Tagore's journey to China in 1924 are all seen to have sparked
these ties. Not only between the Guomindang (GMD) and the British Indian
administration but also between GMD delegates and leaders of the Indian National
Congress, there were diplomatic exchanges (INC).

Western imperialism and colonialism interrupted existing patterns of engagement

between India and China in many ways, but they also generated new networks, places
of interaction, and communication routes between the two. From the early twentieth
century, these aided and conditioned the creation of new patterns of interaction.
Trading networks, steamships, and the emergence of new port cities such as Hong
Kong, Calcutta, Bombay, and Shanghai, as well as Singapore, Penang, and other
Southeast Asian countries, all played a role in the movement of merchants, sailors, and
other people seeking economic opportunities between China and India. They prompted
troops and police officers to move, as well as political activists, exiles, intellectuals,
and others. The telegraph, the modern press, and new education also played a role in
generating awareness about other countries in both India and China. From the early
twentieth century, anti-imperialism, movements for national renewal, and rising
consciousness of the ‘oneness of Asia’ further contributed to the forging of new ties
between Indians and Chinese, both amongst individuals and organizations. In addition,
the first half of the twentieth century saw the growth of territorial and boundary
disputes between India and China. The importance of Tibet and the Himalayan states

6
in the relationship between India and China has been highlighted by the geopolitical
ambitions of powers such as Britain and Russia, as well as the attempts of various
Chinese governments to establish de jure and de facto control over areas on China's
periphery. All of these developments indicate the early twentieth century's immense
significance in the modern evolution of India-China ties. Certainly, a thorough
examination of this time is required to gain a better understanding of how the India–
China relationship came to be in its current state. It's a good sign that professors and
researchers are becoming more interested in this topic. The articles in this issue are the
result of a groundbreaking conference on 'India-ROC ties before 1949' held under the
auspices of Taiwan's National Tsing Hua University. China was in a commanding
position vis-à-vis India in the early period, thanks to its reputation as one of the
triumphant great powers at the end of the War. This changed very quickly as the
Guomindang administration came under increasing attack from its Communist
opponents, and the new government of independent India wasted no time in attempting
to assert itself on the international stage. It's worth noting that during Luo Jialun's term,
the issues of Tibet and Pakistan, both of which have dogged India–China ties in later
decades, played a key role. ‘From 1943 until 1949, the diplomatic musings of India's
envoys in China reveal how the early diplomatic contacts between India and China
were developed in extremely difficult circumstances. India was transitioning from
being a British colony to becoming an independent country, while China went through
stages of being a country fighting a terrible war of resistance, then a triumphant Allied
power, and eventually a society engulfed in civil strife and revolution. However,
politics was far from the only area in which India and China developed ties at this time.
This period was also significant in the intellectual, cultural, and social realms.
Furthermore, the 'Indianisation of China,' or the discourse on India in the early
twentieth century, influenced Chinese intellectuals' perceptions of their own indigenous
culture and China's place in the world, as well as their quest for modernity. India and
Indian culture were in many respects a terrible example for intellectuals like Hu Shih,
but they couldn't ignore the shared affinities between India and China, as well as the
similarity of their modern-day dilemma. The social dimension of India–China relations,
on the other hand, was established during this time by stressing the experience of the
Chinese population that had developed in India at the time. The Chinese community in
India was 'actively self-segregated during the colonial period and not just ‘passively
marginalized’ from the host society.

9.6 TRADE TIES AND TRIBULATIONS

Gujarat in India for Chinese tea, silk, and porcelain marked the start of Britain, India,
and China's triangular commercial links. During this time, British and Indian traders
such as Jamsetjee Jejee Bhoy profited handsomely from the cotton trade. The British,
on the other hand, had to pay in silver for a considerable volume of tea imports from
China. Initially, the British were forced to look for other items to ship to China due to
the scarcity of silver. Opium was found as a highly valuable substance at that time.
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Opium became China's principal import from India after 1820. Opium was first farmed
by Indian farmers in Bengal and Bihar, but it was then expanded to the Malwa region
in western India. Ironically, Malwa Opium was frequently sold in China due to its lower
cost. The direct trade between the port of Bombay on India's west coast and Guangzhou
(Canton) increased dramatically around the end of the 18th century, primarily for the
sale of raw cotton and later for the export of opium from India to China. Private Indian
and Western traders, as well as the British East India Company, conveyed these
exports. The attempted consolidation of a new Asian and world order for global
capitalism by Britain through the commodity called opium linked India, China, and
Britain. This contributed to British dominance in the East by increasing consumer
demand for British goods. The Chinese prohibition on opium could not be avoided
without a close-knit network of agents, traders, bureaucrats, and merchants from
Britain, India, America, and China. The Chinese government found it incredibly
difficult to manage the opium trade because of its addictive and covert character.
Opium's popularity as an addictive narcotic developed in the 1820s, even though it had
been sold to China for a long time. There were only about 2000 of them when it was
utilized for therapeutic purposes. However, by the 1820s, the number had risen to more
than 20,000 chests, and by the 1840s, it had risen to 40,000 chests. The deleterious
impact of the influx of Opium on the Chinese people, including authorities, soldiers,
and workers, was enormous, with poor health effects, productivity losses, and even
deaths. When the Chinese replied by attempting to prohibit the opium trade, Britain
launched a naval campaign on China in 1840, defeating it in the first Opium war. The
war was sparked when Lin, the Canton's Commissioner, ordered the confiscation of
nearly 20,000 chests of opium from British ships. The first Opium War lasted two years
and ended with China ceding Hong Kong to Britain in exchange for a treaty.

Foreign traders were also allowed to enter five Chinese ports, including Canton and
Shanghai. Because the wars were fought outside of India's borders, the memory and
connection to the Opium wars are not well known in India. The British wrecked
devastation not only in China, where thousands of Chinese died but also in India, where
rural peasants and their landholdings were destroyed. The poppy plants were grown in
India, which was the first and most obvious Indian connection to the opium trade.
Cotton growers were forced to give up their land to grow poppy, which was
subsequently processed in Bihar's opium factories. Surprisingly, while the farmers were
abused by the British, the lucrative commerce led to the rise of Parsi businesspeople.

Opium revenue was a significant source of profit for the British in India, accounting
for a significant portion of both overall British revenues and total Indian exports. The
opium trade was assessed using two economic indicators: the annual record of
government funds received and the number of chests exported. The data on opium
revenues was compiled by British India's Opium and Customs Departments during this
period. The information gathered, according to John F. Richards, was mainly accurate.
Opium earnings accounted for around 15% of India's overall revenue on average

8
between 1842 and 1880. Opium became India's second-largest source of revenue in
1843, generating more revenue than customs and stamp duties combined. Opium
accounted for 31.5 percent of all Indian exports from 1842 until 1859, after which it
fell to approximately 18.66 percent. Opium was the single most important factor in
India's export excess. This was the second time the India connection had manifested
itself. The Indian soldiers who were used by the Britishers were the third Indian
connection in the Opium Wars. In the battles of Canton, Amoy, Tinghai, and Chin-
Kiang Fu, Indian sepoys were also brought in to fight alongside the British. The role of
India and Indians in gaining fortune through releasing opium addiction, as well as
pictures of Indian warriors fighting alongside Britishers against the Chinese, has left an
indelible mark on the Chinese psyche. In the words of Mira Sinha Bhattacharjee,
“When we began to oppose British in our interest, then we looked to other supporters
(example China) and we overarched the British colonial era by going back to our
ancient cultural linkages. But that was the only thing that could help us to overcome
the colonial era. Because in the colonial era, the British were the aggressors for China,
and Indian soldiers, Indian policemen, and Indian bureaucrats, were well-known to be
servitors of the British. So their image in China was not very good. In fact mothers in
Shanghai, for instance, would frighten their children by saying that bearded Sikhs
(Indians) would come, certainly we were there fighting on the behalf of British.”

The image of the ruthless Indian army, as well as the wealth amassed by a few wealthy
Indian families, harmed India's reputation. The Qing government was forced to legalize
the Opium Trade after the second Opium War in 1860. Those in India and China who
are familiar with and understand the complexities of India's role in the Opium Wars
look at each other in a more sympathetic and benign light. According to Chang, the
Opium War of 1840–1842 marked the start of China's current century of humiliation.
Chang's book puts the conflict in historical context while also detailing the daily
difficulties that led up to hostilities. This Opium trade, which was a source of raising
money for the British and was highly desired to the extent that wars were fought, is
lucidly described by Chang through not only events as they occurred but also the
tactics, motives, eyewitness accounts, and documents. Inevitably, it is thus an important
resource on the subject which had a triangular connection.
To clear up misunderstandings between India and China, Indian scholars have to focu
s more onhow India was exploited to feed the coffers of the Britishers through the opi
um trade. In truth,the extent to which India was destroyed, particularly its states of Be
ngal and Bihar, which havebeen left far behind in the country's development process,
receives little attention to this day.
Thus, the Opium Wars should be viewed within the framework of the British Empire’s
unrestrained hidden agendas in which it appropriated the land, labour, and capital assets
of India to destroy China. It was left to individuals who believe in the virtue of
establishing India–China civilizational links to decipher, document, and communicate
the underlying destruction produced by opium production in India. Many of these
thinkers (some of whom formed the Institute of Chinese Studies in 19697) have aided

9
readers in traversing the footsteps of individuals on both sides, bringing increased
sensitivity to the study of India in China and China in India.

9.7 BORDER DISPUTE BETWEEN BRITISH INDIA AND KUOMINTANG

CHINA

The Sino-Indian border dispute is a legacy of colonial rule. Chinese historians and
commentators never fail to point out that the government in Beijing, even when it was
at its weakest, had refused to accept the ad hoc border imposed by the British
colonialists. The British organized a conference in Shimla in 1914, which the
representatives of China and Tibet attended. The conference’s objective was to
negotiate a treaty that would demarcate the border between Tibet and British-ruled
India. The British plan was to put pressure on the weak Chinese central government to
grant more autonomy to the Tibetans and redraw the border in India’s favour.

There was a bigger imperial British plan: to gradually dismember China, by first cutting
off Tibet and then Xinjiang. Britain expected China, which was then under a weak
central government and was being dictated to by European powers, to capitulate easily.
The Chinese delegation refused to be browbeaten and succumb to the machinations of
the British. But the British went ahead and signed an agreement with a handpicked
Tibetan delegation delineating the northern border, which came to be known as the
McMahon Line. It was named after a British colonial officer working in India by the
name of Henry McMahon.

China vehemently rejected the ad hoc border that the British sought to thrust down its
throat. The British warned the Chinese government that there would “be great trouble”
if Beijing did not accept the McMahon Line as the border between Tibet and India. Sir
Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary at that time, warned: “If China does not
sign but resorts to an aggressive policy, the consequences must be disastrous for
China.”

Both the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists under Mao Zedong
refused to recognize the McMahon Line, arguing that Tibet was not an independent
country and therefore had no right to sign a separate border agreement with the British.
Independent India and Communist China established good relations that lasted almost
until the end of the first decade of Indian Independence. The Chinese side tried to
prevail on the Indian government to negotiate an acceptable solution to the impasse on
the border, but Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru swore by the sanctity of the McMahon
Line bequeathed by the departing colonial power.

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9.8 SUMMARY

The relationship between India and China is the defining event of the Asian century. In
every sense of the word, these two Himalayan neighbors are Asian tigers. India and
China are the world's only two live civilizations, being physically massive,
demographically gargantuan, economically resurgent, and strategically the most
powerful compared to any other neighbors in Asia and the world.

The India-China relationship is divided into two narratives. One drank from the
wellsprings of civilization, history, and culture, all of which speak of harmonies and
creativity. For centuries, scholars and statesmen with rich and diversified connections
in all walks of life exchanged visits, leaving pleasant and empowering impressions of
one another. They shared Buddhism, the world's most "peaceful religion," and learned
human values, social standards, and statecraft from one another. Between the 1st and
the 18th centuries, they dominated global economic expansion and prosperity. India led
until the 15th century when China conquered India and held it till the development of
the West. During this time, they had peaceful competition and cohabitation,
notwithstanding a few minor squabbles. They never fought a significant battle. Because
of the spread of Buddhism from India to China, the latter sought inspiration and
instruction from the former. The civilizational strands of constructive coexistence
continued to inform their different approaches to one another in the form of Panchshila,
even after being disrupted by the traumatic experience of British and other European
colonial domination. During the first and second world wars, this story of peaceful
existence allowed them to keep their autonomy and strategic space from being
encroached upon by global division and rivalries. Even after their independence, these
two Asian giants' strong historical nostalgia drives them to build the Asian century on
the principles of peace and coexistence.

9.9 EXERCISES
1. Explain the role of civilizational and spiritual factors in India-China relations
during the ancient period.
2. What is your opinion has disrupted the Sino-Indian relations during the medieval
age?
3. What were the main reasons for the 1st Opium War?
4. Describe the relationship between India and China during the modern period.

9.10 REFERENCES
1. Arif, M Sheikh (2013), A History of Sino-Indian relations: From conflict to
cooperation, International Journal of Political Science and Development, Vol. 1,
No. 4, pp. 129-137.

2. Bajpayee, Kanti, Ho, Selina and Miller M Chaterjee (2020), Routledge Handbook
of China-India Relations, Routledge: London.
11
3. Deepak, B. R (2010), “India-China Relations: A Historical and Civilizational
Perspective,” Chennai Centre for China Studies, Dec 10.
4. Saran, Samir and Deo, Akhil (2019), Pax Sinica: Implications for the Indian
Dawn, Rupa Publications: New Delhi.
5. Sen, Tansen Sen (2020), Relations between the Republic of China and
India,1937–1949 in Bajpayee, Kanti, Ho, Selina and Miller M Chaterjee (eds)
Routledge Handbook of China–India Relations, Routledge: London.
6. Sikri, Rajiv (2011), “The Tibet Factor in India-China Relations”, Journal of
International Affairs, Vol. 64 (2), Summer/Spring, pp. 55-71.
7. Sinha, Shakti (2020), One Mountain, Two Tigers – India, China and the High
Himalayas, Pentagon Press: New Delhi.

12
UNIT-10: INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS: POST-
INDEPENDENT ERA

Structure
10.1 Objective
10.2 Introduction
10.3 Relations between 1947 and 1961
10.3.1 Panchsheel
10.3.2 Tibet Issue
10.3.3 Boundary Dispute
10.4 Confrontation in 1967
10.5 Relations between 1971-1977
10.6 India-China relations during the Janata Government (1977-1979)
10.7 India-China Relations in the 1980s
10.8 India-China Relatons in 1990s
10.9 India-China Relations during 2000-2010
10. 10 India-China relations between 2011-2022
10.10.1 Doklam Standoff
10.10.2 Galwan Clash
10.11 India-China Relations under Globalization
10.12 Emerging trends in Indo-China Relations
10.12.1 CPEC
10.12.2 String of Pearls
10.12.3 South China Sea Dispute
10.12.4 BRICS
10.12.5 SCO
10.12.6 RIC
10.13 Summary
10.14 Exercise
10.15 References

13
10.1 OBJECTIVES

This unit will help the students to understand:

 India-China relations after independence

 Changing dimension of India-China relations over the years.

 Tibet factor in India-China relations

 Territory and globalization factor in India-China relations.

 Recent trends in India-China relations

10.2 INTRODUCTION

India and China two Asian giant neighbours sharing a common colonial past and
persecution have owned their autonomy of decision-making at about the same time.
India and China established their diplomatic relations on 1st April 1950. India was the
first non-socialist country to establish a political and diplomatic relationship with
China. The deep cultural linkages both the neighbours shared for millennia helped them
shape their political relations through peaceful coexistence after their independence. In
1954 both the countries have signed the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence
famously known as the Panchasheel Agreement. Barring the initial few years, the
relations between the two neighbours had never been smooth. The rivalry turned so
bitter that the two have fought a bloody war in 1962 leading to enmity, discontent,
antagonism, and suspicion both in New Delhi and Beijing since then have derailed
every peace process. Since this war Indo-China relations were purely based on
territorial considerations until the commencement of globalization. With the opening
up of India into globalization, the relationship with China has started to take an
economic orientation. Despite border disputes and tumultuous political relations under
globalization their trade and economic relations took a giant leap forward enabling the
two neighbours to understand their complementarities for each other. In 2020 both the
countries have celebrated the 70th anniversary of their diplomatic relationship although
border skirmishes appeared between the two in the Doklam tri-junction and recently in
Galwan valley.

10.3 RELATIONS BETWEEN 1947 AND 1961

India gained independence in 1947 and immediately established diplomatic relations

with Nationalist China, which was headed by the Kuomintang party at the time.
However, the relationship did not develop warmth because of diplomatic mishandling
between the two governments. When India acknowledged the Tibetan delegation at the
Asia relations meeting in March 1947, it caused a split in their normal diplomatic

14
relations. Similarly, China's hostile approach toward India in the aftermath of Pakistani
aggression in Kashmir sparked distrust and further strained the relationship.

The fall of the Kuomintang-led Nationalist Government at the hands of the

Communists, however, resulted in the foundation of the People's Republic of China on
October 1, 1950. India was quick to grant Communist China diplomatic recognition
and wished to build a friendly and cooperative relationship with them. Because Nehru
was a firm believer in peaceful coexistence, he hoped that by offering an olive branch
to China, he could help to foster peace and progress not just in their bilateral relations,
but also in the region and around the world.

China, on the other hand, was wary of India and did not respond favourably to its
diplomatic advances. For China, India is an extension of imperialism, and Nehru is an
imperial stooge or running dog. The Chinese fear that India is establishing itself as
Asia's leader was another element that fueled animosity between the two. The problem
of Tibet, as well as India's spiritual support for Tibetans in their fight for independence,
further strained relations between the two neighbors. The Chinese government intended
to acquire Tibet since it is considered a vital part of China. India, on the other hand, has
pressed China to resolve the issue through diplomacy and discussion, as well as holding
talks with Tibet's spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama. China reacted angrily to India's
proposal for Tibet autonomy within China, describing India's action as interference in
Chinese domestic matters. China not only disregarded Indian counsel but also used
military force to annexe Tibet.

India condemned the Chinese invasion of Tibet after China established complete
military control of the region in October 1950. India retaliated by sending a strong
message of protest to Beijing, to which the Chinese authorities retaliated harshly and
negatively. China immediately declared Tibet to be an integral part of China, prompting
Tibetan protests and the Dalai Lama to take the subject to the United Nations. To avoid
enraging the Chinese, India did not promote Tibet in the United Nations and instead
recommended that the issue be settled peacefully. After failing to gain international
support, the Dalai Lama signed the Sino-Tibetan Agreement on May 23, 1951. In
exchange for not interfering with Tibetan religious beliefs and practices, China agreed
to take control of Tibet's foreign affairs, trade, and communication. In exchange, China
has agreed not to interfere with Tibetan religious beliefs and customs, their political
system, or the powers and functions of the Dalai Lama.

10.3.1 Panchsheel

In 1954, India and China signed an agreement in which Tibet was formally
acknowledged as a part of China. This accord has put an end to the enmity that has
existed between China and Tibet since 1950. China and India have also decided to
control their relationship according to the Panchsheel, or Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence. These principles are i. Mutual respect’s territorial integrity and

15
sovereignty; ii. Mutual non-aggression; iii. Mutual non-interference in each other’s
internal affairs; iv. Equality and mutual benefit and v. Peaceful co-existence.

These principles have been the guiding principle of India-China relations from 1954-
to 1957. This period indeed has been regarded as the ‘Sino-Indian honeymoon’. Given
their cooperation, bilateral visits, and superb friendship between Nehru and Chau En-
lai, the euphoria of Hindi-Chin Bhai Bhai ruled international politics for some time.
During these years, India extended full support for China’s membership in UNSC and
supported the Chinese claim over Formosa and the islands of Quemoy and Matsu.
Similarly, China supported India’s claim over Goa and criticized the U.S resolution on
Kashmir at UNO in January 1957 even without being a member of the UN.

10.3.2 Tibet Issue

Tibet was a buffer state between India and China for thousand years until the Chinese
occupation of the spiritual state in 1950. India and China shared borders only after the
military occupation of China over Tibet. Therefore, the Sino-Indian border dispute for
the last seven decades is intrinsically linked to the Tibet factor. China’s military buildup
along the Indo-Tibetan border and infrastructure developments in the disputed region
has not just derailed the peace process in the region but also led to the development of
anxieties and apprehensions in the Indian quarters about the Chinese approach toward
New Delhi. With more than 120,000 Tibetan refugees residing in India, China felt
threatened and suspicious about India’s China approach. The presence of the Dalai
Lama in India and the formation of the Tibetan Government in exile in Dharmasala in
India has kept the Tibet question alive which further enrages China against India. Of
late, China’s aggressive position along the borders, the China-Pakistan axis against
India, and a shift in the Chinese position on Kashmir further hardened India’s stand on
Tibet. The recent confrontations in Doklam and Galwan region can be linked to the
Tibet factor in India-China relations as well.

16
10.3.3 Boundary Dispute

The New Indian Map, published in 1954, contained Aksai Chin. The development of
Chinese roadways near the Aksai Chin and Ladakh areas of Jammu and Kashmir has
resulted in periodic demonstrations and skirmishes along the border. By 1957, India-
China ties were strained due to a border dispute caused by a Chinese map from 1954
that depicted a major portion of Indian land as Chinese territory. When India brought
this flagrant infringement of India's territorial integrity to the Chinese authorities'
attention, they swiftly conceded that these were reproductions of old maps and
promised to modify them in due course. The Chinese, on the other hand, began building
military in border areas without the knowledge of Indian authorities, and troops were
on the lookout. Further, China also published maps of more Indian territories and
claimed them to be Chinese. In December 1958 wrote a letter to address the repeated
Chinese intrusion into Indian territories to the Chinese Premier Chou En-lai. In its
response, the Chinese Prime Minister reiterated that ‘the Sino-Indian has never been
formally delimited’. En-lai informed Nehru that China has never accepted the
McMohan Line and claimed 104,000 sqkm of Indian territory as Chinese. China
wanted rectification of the border region and wanted the Aksai chin in exchange for the
Northeast of India. This message was clear enough for the Indian authorities about the
Chinese intention concerning the border dispute. The tension further mounted when
China sent a strong contingent of the army into Indian territories in August 1959. This
detachment not only crossed into Indian territory to the south of Migyitun on the NEFA,
but they also arrested twelve members of the Indian army and tried to capture the Indian
outpost at Longju.

In 1959 China further claimed almost 50,000 square miles of Indian territory as its own.
In October 1959 the Chinese army ambushed 19 Indian patrol parties and killed 16 of
them in Ladakh. This has aroused a wave of anti-Chinese sentiment in India and evoked
strong protests against the Nehru government which has led to the snapping of
diplomatic ties with China. China also got annoyed as India gave political asylum to
14th Dalai Lama Tenzin Gyatso – the spiritual and temporal head of Tibet. In March
1959 thousands of Tibetans moved to Dharmasala and settled down there further
boiling the tension. Yet amid mounting public pressure in India, Nehru wanted to have
border talks with China. At least three rounds of negotiations were done without much
result. Ironically, China tacitly increased its army build-up and started intruding into
the Indian areas even during border negotiations. This has compelled the Indian
authority to strengthen its security along the Chinese border which many claims as
Nehru’s ‘Forward Policy’. This Forward Policy gave the Indian military the green light
to set up military outposts in the Indian territories forcibly occupied by the Chinese
PLA. Indian response to Chinese intrusion sparked off the conflict with China. India’s
conviction of Chinese nefarious design along the Indian borders and China’s military
highhandedness led to the 1962 Sino-Indian border war. On 8th September 1962, China
crossed the McMohan Line in the eastern sector and launched a massive military
invasion both in the eastern and western sectors. This sudden Chinese attack surprised
17
the unprepared Indian forces and led to the routing of Indian forces in NEFA. Although
on 21st November 1962, China announced a unilateral ceasefire attributing to
international pressure but didn’t vacate the Indian areas it has occupied. The PLA
effectively pushed the unprepared and inadequately equipped Indian forces to 42
kilometers inside Indian territories in the Assam plains and occupied strategic points in
Ladakh and has withdrawn only 20 kilometers after the unilateral ceasefire occupying
the remaining major chunk of Indian territory to date.

This unfortunate incident has unsettled India-China relations for times to come.
Diplomatic relations between the two seriously deteriorated in the 1960s which moved
Pakistan and China closer to developing an anti-India axis in the 1970s. Similarly,
owing to border disputes in the far-east between the Soviet Union and China their
relations too deteriorated giving way to Sino-American rapprochement. But this also
cemented India-Soviet Union relations through inking the very famous 1971 Treaty of
Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation. This has adversely affected India-China relations
further. To state, Sikkim only had to face two battles in 1967 at ‘Nathula’ and ‘Chola’
respectively.

10.4 CONFRONTATION IN 1967

Another round of aggressive border military clash took place between India and China
in 1967 in the middle sector of the Himalayan border near Sikkim. This war lasted for
a month and allowed China to make deep inroads into Indian territories. The scuffle at
Nathula and Chola sectors in Sikkim has led to a full-fledged war between the two
neighbours. This has replaced the Mc Mohan Line with the Line of Actual Control
(LAC). Although, China has gained territorially in this war had to suffer heavily as it
lost a large number of its troops whereas only 140 Indians were killed.

10.5 RELATIONS BETWEEN 1971-1977

Amid these developments, India has established very good and cordial relations with
the Soviet Union. Both the countries signed the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and
Cooperation in 1971 which was disliked by China as Beijing looked upon this treaty as
an anti-China grouping. As a result, China became even more critical of India and
openly supported and used Pakistan as a low-cost deterrence against India. For the first
time, China supported Pakistan on the issue of Jammu and Kashmir. Beijing’s open
support to Pakistan in the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war resulted in a very hostile and tense
relationship between India and China.

India was also not happy over the political developments and the existing state of affairs
with China and somehow wanted to improve the relationship. Then Foreign Minister
of India Shri Swaran Singh arguing in favour of better relations between the two
neighbours stated that “geography has placed us as neighbors of this great country, we
can’t wish away China any more than China can wish away from us. Border problems

18
have existed between many countries throughout the ages and were settled peacefully.
As such we see no reason why India and China shouldn’t be able to do the same.”
Similarly, China has given positive signals to improve its relationship with India
genuinely. In their message to the U.S ambassador to India J. K. Galbraith, China
acknowledged its desire to develop positive and proactive relations with India.
However, no actions were taken to complement this sloganeering by the Chinese side.
Instead of improving ties, Chinese criticism of India’s nuclear tests in 1974 and the
accession of Sikkim into the Indian Union in 1975 further led to set back in the
relationship.

In 1975 however, India made a serious move to restore diplomatic ties with China, and
K. R. Narayanan was sent as Indian ambassador to China. This was well reciprocated
by China by reactivating its Indian mission in New Delhi. Consequently, the diplomatic
relations gave way to positive trade and cultural cooperation. These all helped the
relationship to be normalized between the two Himalayan tigers but the border dispute
has been an irritation in their relationship from time to time.

10.6 INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS DURING THE JANATA GOVERNMENT

(1977-1979)

In its attempt to normalize its relationship with China, the Janata Government has
promoted trade, sports, and cultural exchanges between the two countries. In April
1977 both India and China has signed a trade agreement of Rs. 13.2 crores which have
led to close cooperation in other areas such as sports, culture, science, and technology.
In 1978 a sixteen members Chinese delegation visited India for exploring possibilities
for greater trade relations with India. The mission met Indian Foreign Minister Shri
Atal Bihari Vajpayee and extended an invitation to him to visit China. In response,
Vajpayee paid a visit to China in February 1979 and hold talks with the Chinese
leadership. This goodwill visit ended on a soar note as China attacked Vietnam and in
protest India terminated the visit of Vajpayee. The fall of the Janata government in
1979 further derailed the peace process between the two countries.

10.7 INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS IN THE 1980S

With the return of Smt. Indira Gandhi as Prime Minister after the fall of the Janata
Government created apprehensions in the minds of the Chinese that the Indo-Soviet
close and cordial relationship would return which was missing its warmness during the
Janata Government. However, Mrs. Gandhi assured to development of a constructive
relationship with China, and trade and cultural relations started to grow during her
tenure. But political relations suffered miserably due to differences of opinion and
perception on issues of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Sino-Indian
border disputes. India’s golden silence during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan didn’t
go well with the Chinese. On the issue of India’s support to Cambodia and Vietnam
China criticized India. On the other hand, Chinese activities in the Sino-Indian border
19
areas invited sharp criticisms from the Indian side. For instance, the opening of
Karakoram and other highways between China and Pakistan which passes through
India’s territories occupied by Pakistan looked by India with great apprehension.
Moreover, the most irritating factor between India and China was the boundary dispute.
Despite several rounds of negotiation, no remarkable breakthrough on the border issue
between India and China could be made. In this relation, the Tribune in its editorial of
3rd February 1983 observed that “the trickiest issue standing in the way of normal
neighbourly relations is the demarcation of the 4200 km long border at the foot of
Himalayas. There have been favourable noises from Beijing and Delhi about quickly
improving cultural, educational, scientific, and commercial relations. The border
problem however is likely to defy solution for years to come.” From the several rounds
of negotiations held it can be observed that the border dispute couldn’t be resolved
owing to the divergent stand of the two neighbours. India wants a separate discussion
on each sector of the disputed border while China wanted a package deal whereby both
sides would make concessions. In the eastern sector, China wanted the recognition of
the Mc Mohan Line in return for the Aksai Chin and the areas it had occupied in the
1962 war. In a nutshell, China favours a settlement along the existing line of control
while India didn’t want to recognize the status quo in the western sector. During the
1980s several negotiations were held to diffuse the tension yet the border issue couldn’t
be resolved. However, the trade and cultural relations have taken an upward surge
owing to the several rounds of negotiations held between the two for normalizing the
relationship. The visit of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to China in 1988 further
stepped up the process of resolving the border dispute. Two sides at the end of the visit
signed the joint communiqué and expressed their faith in the five principles of Peaceful
Co-existence and desire for the promotion of good friendly and neighborly relations
based on these principles. Thus, the period of the 1980s can be seen as a period of
resolutions and peace in the bilateral relations between China and India.

10.8 INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS IN THE 1990S

The 1990s was the period of globalization that heavily impacted India-China relations
in positive directions. A distinct improvement in their bilateral relations can be
observed during this phase between the two countries. The Chinese Prime Minister Li
Peng paid a visit to India in 1991 and he was the first Chinese Prime Minister to come
to India in a gap of 31 years. It was resolved in their meeting to solve the border disputes
through friendly consultation and cooperation. Three important agreements signed
during this visit were intended to improve their bilateral relations. These agreements
are explained below in a nutshell.

1. The first agreement was related to the resumption of border trade related to
overland trade and the exchange of commodities by the residents along the
border between the autonomous region of Tibet of China and Uttar Pradesh.

20
 2. The second agreement provided for the re-establishment of Consulates General
at Bombay and Shanghai after a gap of 29 years. The representatives of both
the countries have codified the privileges and immunities to be enjoyed by the
personnel working in the above Consulates.

3. The third agreement was related to bilateral cooperation in the fields of space
research, technology, and applications.

In a further bid to improve the relationship both the countries have agreed to establish
hotlines in February 1992. In May 1992 Indian President R. Venkataraman visited
China – one such first visit by an Indian President to China. In his remarks in China,
the President said that Tibet is an autonomous region of China and India doesn’t
support Dalai Lama’s political activities.

The Joint Working Groups decided to expand cross-border trade links between India
and China during their fifth meeting in 1992. In addition to Lipu Lekh, India and China
agreed in 1993 to allow another border crossing point at Shipki La pass in Himachal
Pradesh for trade. The Chinese festival in India and the Indian festival in China were
held in 1993 and 1994, respectively. It was resolved in September 1993 to form an
expert committee under the auspices of Joint Working Groups, comprised of military
and foreign ministry experts, to complete the entire delineation of the line of real
control. It was agreed that this expert committee would convene twice a year, in June
and October, to update each other on all relevant military developments.

Another important step in Sino-Indian ties occurred in 1995 when the two nations
agreed to withdraw their troops from the Sumdorng Chu valley in the eastern sector. In
1996, Chinese President Jiang Zemin paid a visit to India, which resulted in further
progress in relations. Both countries have pledged not to use force against one another,
not to violate the line of control, and to limit the number of troops and armaments on
the Sino-Indian border. Both parties have agreed on a fair, reasonable, and mutually
acceptable boundary settlement. Growing commercial trade links between the two
neighbors boosted relations in 1997 as well.

However, relations received a setback in 1998 when India’s defense minister Mr.
George Fernandez gave a statement stating China was India’s threat number 1. The
Chinese opposition to India’s nuclear test in May 1998 has led to further deterioration.
However, relations started to improve with the bilateral exchange of delegations in
1999.

INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS DURING 2000-2010

The year 2000 marked the 50th anniversary of India and China’s diplomatic
relationship. In 2000, Indian President Dr. K. R. Narayanan paid a visit to China to
commemorate the occasion. Several agreements were reached during his visit, leading
to the foundation of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) to aid in the development of
21
bilateral ties. Former Chinese Premier Li Peng visited India in January 2001 and
emphasized the necessity of Sino-Indian collaboration in the changing international
scenario. In 2002, India's External Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh, paid a visit to
China. Both countries agreed to start direct passenger flights between New Delhi and
Beijing during their visit, as well as to improve political and military ties. During his
visit both the countries have agreed to start direct passenger flights between New Delhi
and Beijing and agreed to strengthen political and military relations.

10. 10 INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS BETWEEN 2011-2022

This was a decade of relative peace involving cultural exchanges and close friendship
between two neighbours until the Doklam standoff in 2017 and the Galwan clash in
2020. In 2010 both the countries celebrated their 60th year of diplomatic ties. In 2011
the India-China exchange year was celebrated in pomp and splendor. A series of
people-to-people and cultural exchange activities were conducted. A memorandum of
understanding was signed by both the countries to jointly compile an Encyclopedia of
India-China cultural contacts. The year 2012 was celebrated as ‘Year of China-India
Friendship and Cooperation. Two countries also met on the sidelines of the 7th BRICS
summit held at Ufa in Russia and the Leaders’ meeting on East Asia Cooperation in
Malaysia. It was agreed to open the Nathula Pass in Sikkim for Indian pilgrims. In
2018, Indian Prime Minister Mr. Modi visited China to participate in the SCO summit
held at Qingdao. Both the leaders also met on the sideline of the 10th BRICS summit
held in Buenos Aires. In 2019 Jinping and Modi met at Mallapuram in India and
reaffirmed the Wuhan consensus. In 2020 both the countries have celebrated the 70th
year of their diplomatic relations. Yet sporadic border skirmishes and armed
engagement in the border region are certainly upset their otherwise growing
relationship on the economic and trade front. Let's discuss some of the border
confrontations that have stood as irritants in India-China relations of late.

10.10.1The Doklam Standoff

Doklam, also known as Zhoglam, is a small plateau that connects Bhutan, India, and
China. Doklam is about 15 kilometers southeast of the Nathu La pass on the Sikkim-
India border, which separates India and China. The Dok La pass, located on the western
side of the Doklam plateau, connects the Indian state of Sikkim with either Tibet in
China or western Bhutan. The tri-junction between India and China, where the border
standoff is taking place, is not even a line or an area; rather, it is a point 2000 meters
away from Mount Gipmochi, marking the end of what New Delhi considers a strategic
red line: the Jhamperi ridge, the starting point of descent into China.

Doklam became the site of a standoff between India and China in June 2017 following
an attempt by Beijing to construct a road from Yadong on the Doklam plateau to which
Bhutan has objected. Unlike China and Bhutan, India doesn’t have any claim over the
region in crisis. However, India supports the claim of Bhutan over the territory. As per

22
the 1949 Treaty between India and Bhutan, Thimpu agreed to let New Delhi guide its
foreign policy with border sovereignty. Furthering this agreement both Bhutan and
India signed a Friendship Treaty in 2007 stating to abide in close friendship and
cooperation with each other on issues relating to their national interests. Chinese
monopoly and hegemonic attitude and India’s hardening of stand in the Doklam
standoff further complicated the Sino-Indian relations since 2017.

10.10.2Galwan Clash

The two Himalayan neighbours have faced off against each other in 2020 along with
their disputed areas in the western sector of the border in the Ladakh region. This time
at least 20 Indian soldiers and several Chinese soldiers succumbed to death resulting in
heightened tension between India and China. The military buildup by both sides despite
several rounds of negotiations antes the tempo in the region and further deteriorated
their relationship having implications both for regional and global politics. While China
blames India for the unilateral change of the status of the Indian state of Kashmir after
the abrogation of Article 370, India blames China for building CPEC (China Pakistan
Economic Corridor) in the disputed areas of Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK). China’s
military highhandedness, open support to Pakistani terrorists acting against India, using
India’s neighbors against New Delhi through checkbook diplomacy, and its salami-
slicing policy on the Indian border also put India in dilemma as to how to deal with
hegemonic China.

10.11 INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS UNDER GLOBALIZATION

Prime Minister Shri P. V. Narasimha Rao and his finance minister was the architect of
India’s economic reform in the early 1990s. The structural changes in India’s
institutions and policy adjustments made allowed liberalizing of India’s economy
inviting global attention including that of China. This has allowed the expansion of the
Sino-Indian economic ties at an unprecedented rate from the 1990s to the 2020s. After
according the Most Favoured Nations (MFN) status to each other 1984, China and India
entered into full-fledged bilateral trade relations in 1992. Since then their trade relations
have grown by leaps and bounds. China surpassed the United Arab Emirates as India's
largest commercial partner in 2013. China is currently India's fourth-largest export
destination and its largest import source. India and China's trade figures increased
dramatically from USD 2.71 billion in 2001 to nearly 70 billion in 2016. Importantly,
China continued to benefit from the majority of trade, as it exported $60.48 billion and
imported $9 billion in 2016.

In 2016, China's portion of India's overall trade was roughly 11%. Furthermore, during
the same period, its part of India's total exports was 3.7 percent, while its share of India's
total imports was 16 percent. In comparison, India's imports from China grew at a
slower pace than its exports. Over the years, India's trade deficit gap has increased
tremendously.

23
Despite the growing presence of Chinese products in India, the four periods of India-
China commerce reflect a different tale. Imports from China grew at a 53.6 percent
annual rate from 2001 to 2006, but fell to 28.8 percent from 2006 to 2011, and then to
1.7 percent from 2011 to 2016. However, the trend in Indian exports remained bleak
during the same period, with the growth rate of exports to China adopting a negative
trend of -11.8 percent from 2011 to 2016. Surprisingly, India's proportion of China's
imports in 2016 was a meager 0.6 percent, indicating a negligible presence of Indian
goods in Chinese marketplaces.

India's reliance on trade has decreased in recent years, from 43 percent in 2013 to 27
percent in 2016, showing improved GDP inclusivity and, ceteris paribus, lower
susceptibility to external shocks and volatility. China's reliance on trade, on the other
hand, has dropped considerably from 61 percent in 2007 to 33 percent in 2016. Despite
both countries' larger footprints in the global ecosystem in terms of products, their trade
to GDP ratios have remained stable in recent years.

Although, trade relations were normal until the Doklam standoff political differences
gave way to trade restrictions leading to the banning of certain Chinese apps and goods
on security grounds, and Chinese hacking of India’s telecom sectors further boiled the
tension. As of 2022, India-China relations were not on track owing to bilateral political
differences, border standoff, Chinese tacit support to Pakistan and Nepal, India’s
joining of QUAD, and alignment with the west ruined their economic partnership and
derailed the peace process.

10.12 EMERGING TRENDS IN INDO-CHINA RELATIONS

Despite soaring political relationships, the economic and trade relations between India
and China undoubtedly put them in the global limelight. In the age of globalization,
Chinese assertions and India’s anxiety exhibited several new trends in their bilateral
relations. Let’s look at them as mentioned in the following paragraphs.

10.12.1CPEC

The Indian government, which has tense relations with Pakistan, views elements of the
CPEC project adversely since they travel through Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, which
India opposes. Former Indian ambassador Phunchok Stobdan claimed that China and
Pakistan wanted to build the corridor not just for economic reasons, but also for the
"strategic intent of besieging India," though he also stated that India can do little to stop
CPEC and that avoiding China's One Road One Belt project entirely would be to India's
detriment. During Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's 2015 visit to China, Sushma
Swaraj, the Indian Foreign Minister, reportedly reminded Chinese Premier Xi Jinping
that projects traveling through Gilgit-Baltistan are "unacceptable" because they violate
international law. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, India's Foreign Secretary said that the
subject had been raised with the Chinese authorities during the trip. During a meeting

24
with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in August 2016, Swaraj stated that India would
"resolutely oppose" the corridor in Kashmir. But unfortunately, this didn’t fall on the
deaf ears of hegemonic China leading to strain in their relationship further.

10.12.2String of Pearls

The String of Pearls is geopolitical speculation about China's possible ambitions in the
Indian Ocean. It refers to the network of Chinese military and commercial
infrastructure and relationships that run from the Chinese mainland to Port Sudan along
the country's marine lines of communication. Several significant maritime chokepoints,
including the Strait of Mandeb, the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Hormuz, and the
Lombok Strait, as well as other strategic maritime hubs in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and
Bangladesh, the Maldives, and Somalia are crossed by the sea lines. "Energy Futures
in Asia," an internal US Department of Defense research, was the first to utilize the
word as a geopolitical idea. Official Chinese government sources have never used the
word, but it is frequently used by the general public.

10.12.3South China disputes

The South China Sea is an important strategic location for China, as it connects China
to Middle Eastern oil-producing states by sea, making it a potential trouble spot for the
Chinese government. Chinese military warships monitor the South China Sea
extensively, and disputed territorial claims in the region have resulted in naval clashes
on several occasions. Chinese aspirations to control the South China Sea have so
figured prominently in suspicions regarding the Chinese central government's broader
ambitions in the creation of an Asia-wide power projection chain. Because China
intervenes in the Indian Ocean via a string of pearls, India is now preparing to intervene
in this conflict.

10.12.4BRICS

BRICS, or the regular summit meetings of five developing and energetic economies
around the world — Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa – is the most
important multilateral forum for the Indo-China dialogue. It is a representative body of
developing countries, not just a 'gang of five' to defend and promote their interests. It
also stood as an alternative to the Bretton-Woods system after launching its own
Development Bank at a recent conference in Brazil in 2014, which will be based in
Beijing. In fact, after the EU, BRICS is the most important new organization of the
twenty-first century, with the ability to shift the dynamics of the current world order.
With the good trajectory of the BRICS, India-China cooperation will be greatly
bolstered.

25
10.12.5 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization was founded in 1995 by Russia, China, and
four Central Asian nations. In the last decade, the SCO has evolved from a security
group to a multilateral framework that has become a significant international platform
in Asia. It is widely regarded as a diplomatic coup by China and Russia to protect their
strategic and security interests in the region. At a time when multilateralism is the rule
of the day, India wisely filed for full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) at its 2014 summit in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, for the following
reasons: India can play a significant role in the region, gaining regional support in the
fight against the three evils of terrorism, extremism, and separatism.

10.12.6 RIC

The Russia-India-China (RIC) triangle was proposed by Russian Prime Minister

Vladimir Primakov in the mid-1990s as a strategic alternative to Western hegemony.
For three basic reasons, the concept could not be realized at the time: India cannot form
a strategic alliance with China unless the two countries' border conflicts are resolved
amicably; India has no interest in joining any anti-western organization, and India has
stronger trading links with the West than Russia or China. The scenario is not the same
this time. India's largest trading partner in the world is China. It has excellent ties with
Russia. If both China and India are willing to establish ties in such an environment, the
RIC can be revived and used for more constructive objectives.

10.13 SUMMARY

Though competitive elements of the Indo-China relationship have outpaced the

cooperative tract in recent years, bilateral relations have not been devoid of
accomplishments. It’s notable that unlike in the past, Chinese leaders now not only
add India to the itinerary of every South Asia visit, they generally visit India first. (M.
Smith, 2016) Indeed, President Xi Jinping’s first visit to Pakistan took place six months
after his first September 2014 visit to Delhi following repeated security delays. While
Xi was in Delhi, he used the phrase “two major powers in the region and the world,” a
potentially significant evolution given China’s proclivity to characterize India as a
regional, rather than global, power. India-China military-to-military engagement has
maintained its modest course under Modi and XI. The two militaries began cooperating
only in 2007, when the Chinese and Indian armies held their first-ever joint exercise in
Kunming, China. The “Hand-in-Hand” exercise was held again the following year in
Belgaum, India before military-to-military relations were suspended in 2010. In 2013
joint army exercises resumed in Miaoergang, China, and the fourth and fifth iterations
followed in November 2014 in Pune, India, and in October 2015 in Kunming, China.

While the two countries’ navies and air forces have exercised together in multilateral
formats, and loosely coordinate their anti-piracy patrols, they have yet to conduct

26
bilateral drills. In 2013, the two sides announced joint naval drills would be held in the
“near future,” though there has been no movement since. Also in 2013, Delhi and
Beijing announced a bilateral maritime security dialogue, which convened for the first
time in January 2016.

10.14 EXERCISES

1. What is your opinion that governed Sino-Indian relations since 1947?

2. Critically analyze the role of Tibet in India-China relations.
3. Discuss Sino-Indian relations under Globalization.
4. How do you see the U.S and Pakistan factor in Sino-Indian relations?

10.15 REFERENCES

1. Bajpai, Kanti (2017), India in the World – Trials of the Republic, Times Group
Books: New Delhi.
2. Deepak, B. R (2010), “India-China Relations: A Historical and Civilizational
Perspective,” Chennai Centre for China Studies, Dec 10.
3. Dutt, V. P (2011), India’s Foreign Policy since independence, NBT: New Delhi
4. Ganguly, Sumit (2011), India’s Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect,
Oxford: London.
5. Pradhan, Ramakrushna (2015), “Resetting India-China Relations: Beginning of
a change,” World Focus, No. 426, pp. 95-106.
6. Pradhan, Ramakrushna (2017), “Doklam Standoff: Beyond Border Dispute,”
Mainstream Weekly, Vol. LV, No. 32, July 29.
7. Saran, Samir and Deo, Akhil (2019), Pax Sinica: Implications for the Indian
Dawn, Rupa Publications: New Delhi.
8. Sikri, Rajiv (2011), “The Tibet Factor in India-China Relations”, Journal of
International Affairs, Vol. 64 (2), Summer/Spring, pp. 55-71.
9. Sinha, Shakti (2020), One Mountain, Two Tigers – India, China and the High
Himalayas, Pentagon Press: New Delhi.

27
UNIT-11 INDIA AND SOUTH ASIA: SAARC,
Structure

11.1 Objective

11.2 Introduction

11.3 South Asia: Background

11.4 Framework of South Asia Association of Regional Cooperation

(SAARC)

11.5 SAARC Summits

11.6 Role of India in the South Asia Region

11.6.1 Socio-Cultural Relation

11.6.2 India’s Political Relation

11.6.3 Economic ties

11.6.4 India’s Security concern

11.7 Regional Integration of South Asia

11.8 Summary

11.9 Exercise

11.10 Reference

11.1 OBJECTIVE

After reading this unit you will be able to understand:

 The regional organization of South Asia.

 The framework of SAARC
 The objectives of the South Asian Region
 The role of India in SAARC

11.2 INTRODUCTION

The unit will provide you with a clear understanding of the structural framework of the
South Asia Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC). It will also focus on the
objective and function of the regional organization. The concept of regional
organization has been evolved after the end of World War II. The countries of different
28
regions got independence from the colonial setup, regions like South Asia, South East
Asia, Latin America and Africa. The newly independent countries adopted the policy
of regional autonomy and separate identity in international politics. In the context of
emerging international politics, the regional countries of South Asia established the
SAARC regional institution in the year 1985. The objective of the regional organization
is to promote each other political, economic and cultural aspects of the region. The unit
will focus on the formation of SAARC, its objectives and the organ of the regional
organization. It will also focus on the role of India in SAARC.

11.3 SOUTH ASIA: BACKGROUND

South Asia as a region developed after the end of the Second World War. The newly
independent countries of the sub-continent from the British colonies during the time of
1950 were recognized as the South Asian. Moreover, the South Asia Association of
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was established on 8 December 1985, the headquarter
is located in Kathmandu Nepal. The members of South Asian countries have discussed
the idea of Cooperation at three conferences. The first conference in New Delhi, the
Asian Relation of Conference 1947, the Baguio Conference was held in the Philippines
in May 1950 and the Colombo power conference was held in Sri Lanka in April 1954.
These three conferences developed the idea of regional cooperation in South Asia.
The seven members such as Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and
Sri Lanka agreed to develop the trade bloc. The role of the trade bloc has provided the
platform to work mutually for the regional economic integration of the region. The
spirit of trust, friendship and understanding between the member countries developed
a sense of great opportunities for the prospect of the society and community. Moreover,
the government of member countries officially adopted its charter and promoted the
social, economic and cultural development within the South Asian region (Shaheen,
2013). The seven founding members of the organization were Bangladesh, Bhutan,
India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, later Afghanistan joined the bloc in
the year 2007. Further, there are also observer countries such as China, Japan, South
Korea, Myanmar, the USA, Australia, Mauritius, Iran and European Union.

11.4 FRAMEWORK OF SOUTH ASIA ASSOCIATION OF REGIONAL

COOPERATION (SAARC)

SAARC was established with the signing of the Charter in Dhaka on 8 December 1985.
There were seven founding members initially in the regional organization, later
Afghanistan joined as the newest member of SAARC in 2007. The headquarter and
Secretariat of the regional organization are located in Kathmandu in Nepal.

Principle

The framework of regional cooperation shall be based on the following aspects:

29
  Mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-interference in each
other home affairs, and political independence.
 The regional cooperation shall not be replaced through bilateral and multilateral
cooperation but shall achieve through regional integration.
 Cooperation shall not be incoherent with bilateral and multilateral obligations.

Member of SAARC

The founding members are Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and
Sri Lanka formed the regional organization later in 2007, Afghanistan became a
member of the organization. So currently there are eight permanent members and there
are nine observer members including namely Australia, China, the European Union,
Iran, Japan, The Republic of Korea, Mauritius, Myanmar, and the united state of
America.

Areas of Cooperation

 Agriculture and Rural Development

 Human Resource Development and Tourism
 Environment Natural Disasters and Biotechnology
 Economic, Trade and Finance
 Social Affairs
 Information and poverty Alleviation
 Energy, Transport, Science and Technology
 Education, Security and Culture and other

The Objective of the SAARC

 Improved the quality of life and develop the welfare scheme for the people of
South Asian countries.
 To develop the regional economic integration growth, accommodate the social
and cultural development in the region and present dignity and opportunity to
all individuals in the region.
 To promote and strengthen collective self-reliance among the countries in the
region.
 To develop mutual trust, a sense of understanding and address each other
problems in the region.
 To work on collaborative efforts and mutual support in economic, social,
cultural, technical and scientific fields.
 All the members’ countries of the region work together with each other in
International forums on the matter of common interest.
 To work cooperatively with international and other regional organizations with
the same objective.

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 Principle Organs

Heads of State or Government:

In the year 1997 during the ninth SAARC summit in the Maldives, all the members’
countries agreed to develop peace, stability, amity and regional economic integration
in the region.

Council of Ministers:
The council of ministers consists of all the Foreign ministers of the member countries.
The council of ministers meets two times a year. Moreover, they also meet in an
extraordinary situation by the consultation of all the states.

Standing Committee of Foreign Secretaries:

The Committee is in charge of general monitoring and coordination, as well as setting
priorities, mobilizing resources, and approving projects and funding. The committee
meet frequently as is required but in general meets, twice a year and the role of the
committee is to submit the reports to the council of Minister.
It may meet as often as deemed necessary but in practice normally meets twice a year
and submits its reports to the Council of Ministers.
 The Standing Committee may also set up Action Committees comprising Member
States concerned with the implementation of projects per Article VII of the Charter.
The Standing Committee is assisted by a Programming Committee, an ad hoc body,
comprising senior officials, to scrutinize the Secretariat Budget, finalize the Calendar
of Activities, and take up any other matter assigned to it by the Standing Committee.
The Programming Committee also has been entrusted to consider the reports of the
Technical Committees and the SAARC Regional Centers and submit their comments
to the Standing Committee.
 Secretariat: The SAARC Secretariat was established in Kathmandu on 16 January
1987. Its role is to coordinate and monitor the implementation of SAARC activities,
service the meetings of the association and serve as the channel of communication
between SAARC and other international organizations.
It comprises the secretary-general, seven directors, and the general services staff. The
secretary-general is appointed by the Council of Ministers on the principle of rotation,
for a non-renewable tenure of three years.

11.5 SAARC SUMMITS

There are 19th SAARC summit has been conducted to discuss the various issues and
challenges of the South Asia region.

First Summit: the very first summit was held in Dhaka, Bangladesh in the year 1985.
All the government representatives and the president of Bangladesh attended the
summit. The prime minister of India signed the SAARC charter and established the
regional association and study groups to plan counter-terrorism and drug trafficking. It
31
was also focused on the ministerial level meeting about the GATT and emphasis the
women's participation at the regional level.

Second Summit: The second summit was hosted by India in the year 1986. Head of
all the member countries welcomed the signing of the MOU of the establishment of the
SAARC secretariat by the council of ministers. The member countries also decided the
set the Secretariat in Kathmandu, Nepal. Abul Ahsan of Bangladesh was appointed as
the first Secretary-General of SAARC.

Third Summit: Nepal hosted the third SAARC summit in Katmandu in the year 1987.
Prime ministers of India and Pakistan, presidents of Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and
Maldives and Kings of Bhutan and Nepal were attended. The foreign ministers of all
the countries signed the SSARC regional convention on counter-terrorism. They also
agreed to set up South Asia Food Reserve.

Fourth Summits: In the year 1988, Pakistan hosted the fourth SAARC summit in
Islamabad the capital of Pakistan. All the high delegates at the summit declared the
year 1989 to be the “SAARC Year Against Drug Abuse”. Further the year 1990 to be
the SSARC Year of the Girl Child”. All the member countries also agreed to set up a
technical committee on education and developed a regional plan called SAARC 2000
A Basic needs to meet the such as food, shelter, education and environmental
protection.

Fifth Summit: The fifth summit was hosted by the small countries of the region, the
Maldives in Male in the year 1990. The member countries signed the two main agendas
first on the convention on Narcotic and psychotropic substances and the second on the
SAARC travel documents. The objective of the second agenda was to provide
flexibility in the travel of tourism in all the member countries, making it friendly for
students to study in the South Asian countries.

Sixth Summit: Sri Lanka hosted the sixth summit in Colombo the capital of Sri Lanka
in the year 1991. In the year 1991, India adopted a free economy to open up the market
to the rest of the world. India and other member countries adopted the Liberalization,
Privatization and Globalization to boost their economy.

Seventh Summit: The seven SAARC summit was held in Dhaka, Bangladesh in the
year 1992. It was postponed for a few months. The presidents of Sri Lanka and the
Maldives, the prime minister of India and Pakistan and the king of Bhutan and Nepal
attended the summits and discuss the various issues of the region, particularly the
security issues.

Eighth Summits: India again hosted the eighth summit meeting in New Delhi in the
year 1995 after the three years of leaf year from the summit meeting. The member
countries discussed the South Asia Preferential Trade Agreement broadly at this
summits and focus to liberalized the trade in the region.

32
Ninth Summit: The ninth summit was also held after the one year gap in the year 1997.
The Maldives hosted the summit. All the highly delegates discussed the better
opportunities for South Asian traders to smooth business in the region.

Tenth Summit: Sri Lanka hosted the tenth summit in the year 1988. The summit
addressed a few important issues, which SAARC countries had been facing serious
challenges to eradicate. At the summit, all the members’ countries stressed the issues
of poverty eradication and promoting collaboration.

Eleventh Summit: The eleventh summit was held in Kathmandu in the year 2002. This
was the time all the members were concerned about the rise of the USA in the South
Asian region.

Twelfth Summit: Pakistan hosted the twelfth SAARC summit in the capital Islamabad
in 2004. In the year 2004, all the SAARC members agreed to sign the South Asia Free
Trade Agreement (SAFTA). The summit provided opportunities for all the member
countries to access all the South Asian markets without any type of barrier.

Thirteenth Summit: Bangladesh again hosted the summit in the year 2005 in a
peaceful way. All the high profile delegates attended the meeting with a good spirit and
effective way for regional integration.

Fourteenth Summit: The fourteenth summit was hosted again by India in the year
2007. This year a new development was considered and Afghanistan became the new
member of the regional organization. Now the organization has eight members. The
summit was also focused on intra-regional connectivity. The intra-regional
connectivity in the region would have promoted trade and tourism in the region.

Fifteenth Summit: the fifteen SAARC summit was hosted by Sri Lanka in the year
2008. In the year 2008, the member countries raised various issues to discuss or
address. The most important issues were regional cooperation in form of the
development of people, it was also focused on the connectivity, energy, the
environment, water resources, poverty alleviation, the SAARC Development Fund,
transport information communication, science and technology development, tourism,
culture, the South Asian free trade area.

The most important issue was addressed the global food crisis. All the SAARC
members were concerned about the food security in the region. They discussed the
availability of global foods and the worldwide rise in food prices. Further, the
discussion at the summit provided a better solution for the regional member to develop
an institution, which is called regional strategy and collaborative projects. The project
began under the supervision of the agricultural ministers of SAARC members.

Sixteenth Summit: Bhutan hosted the sixteenth SAARC summit for the first time in
the year 2010. It was the year of the Silver Jubilee celebration and all the member
countries were serious about climate change. It was the central issue in the summit, the

33
regional organization developed a theme to concentrate on climate change, the theme
was Green and Happy South Asia. SAARC Convention on cooperation on the
environment to tackle the problem of climate change was signed between the SAARC
members. All the SAARC members had promised to plant at least 10 million trees in
five years. India proposed the climate innovation centre to develop sustainable energy
technology.

Seventeenth Summit: Maldives hosted the seventeenth SAARC summit in the year
2011. The summit showed the new ideas to member countries. In the inaugural address
of the summit, the President of Maldives stressed three important areas, which are
trade, transport and economic integration, security issues like piracy and climate
change and good governance. These issues were discussed broadly at the summit. The
president of Maldives also proposed to set up a commission to address the issues of
gender inequality in South Asia.

Eighteen Summit: The eighteenth summit was hosted by Nepal, in the year 2014 after
the three years of gap. The agenda of this summit was “Deeper Integration for Peace
and Prosperity”. It was also focused on the Legal permission for SAARC Satellite
Scheme.

Nineteenth Summit: Pakistan hosted the nineteenth SAARC summit in the year 2016.
The year was challenging for all the member countries of the regional organization.
India cancelled her participation in the summit due to conflict between India and
Pakistan. The URI attack happened in the year and was a difficult time for the region
to integrate. The prime minister of Pakistan addressed the security issues in the very
first session of the summit. after India’s boycotted the summit other members such as
Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan declined from the summit.

11.6 ROLE OF INDIA IN THE SOUTH ASIA REGION

India is the world's second-most populous country after China and the largest area in
South Asia. India is located in the centre of the Indian subcontinent, sharing a land
border with the four South Asian countries Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan
(Jain,2005). India is a growing economic country in the region with a 7.5 per cent of
economic growth rate from 2020-to 2021. It has a strong political alliance with the rest
of the world in general and regional members in particular. It has been growing very
strong in terms of military power and a large pool of science and technology manpower.
It has also contributed a large share in service sectors (information technology).

11.6.1 Socio-Cultural Relation

The south Asian countries have common historical relations and experiences of
colonialism under colonial rule. The countries have the same ethnic link and strong
historical legacy. The historical legacy has been playing a significant role in the nation-
building process in the region. South Asian society believes the Hinduism, Islam,
Buddhism and Sikhism (Amaresh, 2020). The strong historical legacy and cultural
34
relations of India with the member countries provide a sense of trust to better function
the regional organization. During the colonial period, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh
use to be one country with several different provinces. After the independence three
countries have been sharing the same ethnic relation and strong cultural bonding. These
three countries have the same cuisine; they have the same food habits, culture and
language because of the Indo-Aryan heritage. The Indian actors are famous in all the
South Asian countries, and the cinema and films of Bollywood are popular in the
region. Further, the Pakistani film actors are being seen in Mumbai, doing several
movies with Bollywood. The singer and music composer are also not left behind. They
are also taking opportunities to associate with Indian culture. Similarly, Bangladesh is
also sharing close cultural and ethnic relations with India. The Indira Gandhi Cultural
Centre (IGCC) of the ICCR of India is very popular to offer cultural courses to
Bangladeshi students.

Indian origin people were settling down in Sri Lanka during the colonial period. They
were taken from India to Sri Lanka as a form of tea labour. Both the countries have
been sharing ethnic similarities and practice similar religious sentiments in the region.
India and Sri Lanka signed the Cultural Cooperation Agreement in the year 1977; the
objective of this agreement was to promote the cultural program between the two
countries. Similarly, Nepal and Bhutan two hilly countries also share the same socio-
cultural relation with India. Both Nepal and Bhutan practice the Buddhist culture and
the Buddhist religion started in India in the historical period. Both the countries are
peace-loving states and India has been maintaining good relations.

India has been taking the initiative to provide or offer education facilities to students of
South Asian countries. The South Asian University has established in India (New
Delhi), and it has been offering several courses in various disciplines. A large number
of students from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, and Sri Lanka are studying
at the university.

11.6.2 India’s Political Relation

India has been maintaining healthy political relations with all the South Asian
countries. As a democratic state and stable government, it is the responsibility of India
to maintain stability and prosperous regional organization. As far as India’s relations
with members state of South Asia is concerned, India has focused on the development
of the region to maintain warm relations with Bangladesh or the current political
regime. The recent visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has given a new way
to develop relations with Bangladesh. Both the countries have been focusing on better
land connectivity and transit facilities to India’s northeastern states. The visit also has
a landmark achievement in the implementation of the Land Boundary Agreement and
resolved the long land border dispute between the two countries. Prime minister of
India Narendra Modi and Sheikh Hasina has put the foundation stone on India-
Bangladesh Pipeline Project from the Siliguri district of West Bengal to Parbatipur the
frontline district of Bangladesh. The total cost of the project is 34.6 million Indian
35
currencies (Saha, 2019). Further, both the government has agreed to start the new
railway lines from Dhaka to West Bengal and a bus service between Kolkata, Dhaka
and Agartala.

Nepal and Bhutan are the natural partners in the South Asia region. India has a special
relationship with both countries. India signed a peace and friendship treaty with Bhutan
in the year 1949. Similarly, the peace and friendship agreement was signed between
India and Nepal in the year 1950. India has recognized and supported development the
of various projects in Bhutan. The recent, developmental projects were considered as
most important which are the building of the supreme court and the inauguration of the
600-MW Kholongchu Hydroelectrictri Project. During the Chinese intervention in the
Dokhlam Plateau in the year 2017, Bhutan objected and asked India to take serious
action on it. On the other hand, India has been maintaining strong political ties and
cultural relations with Nepal. The visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi has opened
up various political dialogues. India had supported and granted US$ 67 million as a
form of relief during the earthquake in the year 2015 (Saha, 2019).

India and Sri Lanka are two important actors in the south Asia region, both the countries
have been maintaining strong historical linkages and political ties. India signed the
peace accord in the year 1987, the objective was to control the civil war in Sri Lanka.
India signed the free trade agreement with Sri Lanka in the year 2000. Both the
countries had a clear objective to promote trade relations and strengthen the economy
bilaterally.

Further, India and Pakistan were created as separated states in the year 1947, Pakistan
was created based on religion and India accepted all the religions and developed a
democratic government. India and Pakistan were engaged politically to solve the
various issues after the independence. But the situation had changed; both the countries
were involved in political conflicts and fought four wars from 1947-48, 1965, 1971 and
1999. The several terrorists who attacked Indian soil made the relations more hostile
between India and Pakistan. Although in the year 2014, Nawaz Sharif attended the oath
ceremony of new Prime Minister Narendra Modi. And in return, Narendra Modi visited
the home tome of Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 2015.

The URI attack again changed the relations from friendship to hostile, and both the
countries engaged in the form of military. In response to this attack, the Indian Air force
conducted a Surgical Strikes in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir against terrorist camps.
After several military engagements, the year 2017 came with new hope and
development. The newly elected Prime Minister Imran Khan inaugurated the Kartarpur
corridor linking a Gurdwara in the city to India Gurdaspur district of Punjab. In the
initiative both the government is agreed to provide visa-free travel to the Gurdwara.

36
11.6.3 Economic Ties

India is a big economy in the South Asia region. India has been playing a significant
role to promote trade and economic relations among the member countries. South Asia
is an asymmetric economy, the member countries are small in terms of size and
economy. India is the only country in the region with a large market and the size of its
economy big as well. In the process of regional economic integration, India was the
first country to initiate an institution in the region in a form of the South Asia
Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) in the year 1993. The objective of SAPTA was
to provide the space or open up the respective market for economic integration. All the
member countries identified the preferential commodities to export or import in the
region. After several trade negotiations, the SAPTA failed to achieve the objective.
Behind the failure of the SAPTA was the Indo-Pak conflict, both the big economy in
the region was involved in political conflict. The 1999 Kargil war was the main reason
to cancel the trade agreement in the South Asia region. After a few years, all the
members again came and agreed to focus on trade and economic relations and agree to
establish a new trade institution called as South Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA)
in the year 2004. The objective of this agreement was different from the previous trade
institution. All member countries can export or import the commodities without any
type of trade barrier under the SAFTA framework. The market is open for trade and
economic integration. The institution promotes intraregional trade in South Asia.

Apart from the regional trade agreement, India also signed the bilateral trade agreement
with Sri Lanka in 2000 and Afghanistan in 2007 respectively. India has been provided
with preferential treatment to Sri Lanka and Afghanistan. Under this framework, India
has granted opportunities to Sri Lanka and Afghanistan to explore the Indian market.
India also signed a trade agreement with Nepal and Bhutan in the year 1950. It was the
oldest trade negotiation in the region.

11.6.4 India’s Security Concerns

Security is the major concern in the South Asia region in general and India in particular.
The two nuclear states in the region, India and Pakistan had fought four wars in history
and several other territorial disputes. The geo-strategically, India has surrounded by
Pakistan, Afghanistan and China. The friendly relationship of Pakistan with China has
made a security threat to India. China has initiated the “One Belt One Road” in the
collaboration with Pakistan to counter India’s developmental project in South Asia.
China has been constructing the seaports in Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Bangladesh to
inbox India in the South Asia region. The several strategic developmental projects of
China with the collaboration of Pakistan are a security threat to India. On the other
hand, the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan creates a space for Pakistan
extremist terrorist groups to reemergence in the region. The emergence of extremist
terrorist groups and the support of Pakistani intelligence have engaged in various
terrorist activities in India and the other part of the region.

37
11.7 REGIONAL INTEGRATION OF SOUTH ASIA

After several challenges, India alone with the members of South Asia has been trying
to strengthen regional integration. The withdrawal of India from the 19th SAARC
summit was the turning point to the dilution of the relevance of regional integration.
However, India has changed its approaches to regional integration. India has adopted
two policies to reestablish regional integration. The first policy of India is to develop
the bilateral relation with South Asian countries under the neighbourhood first policy
and the second is concentrated on the bilateral and multilateral engagement outside the
South Asia region.

India has been engaging with the members of South Asia such as Bangladesh, Nepal,
Bhutan, Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Afghanistan under the neighbourhood first policy.
India has focused on mutual trade, economic, humanitarian and developmental
assistance with these countries and bypassing the presence of Pakistan. During the
pandemic COVID-19, India supplied medical equipment and hydroxychloroquine to
the South Asian countries. India has also supplied the vaccine to Nepal, Bhutan and
other members of the region (Manjani, 2022). Moreover, India has also been engaged
in Afghanistan in developmental and reconstruction projects of Afghan society.

Apart from the regional organization, India has been involved with the sub-regional
organization such as BIMSTEC, which is the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-
Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation, BRICS, (Brazil Russia, India, China
and South Africa), G-20, QUAD, Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, the members of the
sub-regional group are Australia, India, Japan and the United States. The objective of
India’s engagement with the multilateral organization is to spread her horizon to
counter China and Pakistan alliance in the South Asia region.

11.8 SUMMARY

South Asian Association of Regional Organisations was established in the year 1985
with a clear objective. The main objective of the regional organization was mutual
respect for territorial integrity, cultural exchange between the member states, economic
integration in the region and the most important political alliance in the region. The
principal organ of the regional organization is playing important in the effective
implementation of the different plans and policies in the region. The SAARC summits
have provided the solution to fight against the various challenges such as eradication
of poverty, counter the terrorist, development of Information Technology, promotion
of tourism, integration of trade and economy, political stability, etc. The unit has given
a clear understanding of the role of India in the South Asia region. As a big economic
and politically stable nation, India has contributed a very optimistic way to the region.
India has opened up its market to all the member countries for trade and economy. India
has been sharing strong political affiliation and cultural links with the member

38
countries. Further security is a major concern for India. The absence of international
troops in Afghanistan has created a power vacuum in the South Asia region.

11.9 EXERCISE

1. Who are the members of the South Asia Association of Regional

Organizations?
2. What are the objectives of the regional organization?
3. What were the outcomes of the SAARC summits?
4. What is the role of India in SAARC?

11.10 REFERENCE

 Chattopadhyay, Pratip (2010), “India’s South Asian Neighbourhood: Policy

and Politics” The Indian Journal of Political Science, 71(4): 1251-1264.
 Jain, Romi (2005), “India and SAARC: An Analysis” Indian Journal of Asian
Affairs, 18(2): 55-74.
 Kher, Priyanka (2012), ‘Political Economy of Regional Integration in South
Asia’ Background Paper No. RVC 5.
 Kumar, Rajiv and Manjeeta Singh (2009), “India’s Role in South Asia Trade
and Investment Integration” Asian Development Bank, Working Paper Series
on Regional Economic Integration No-32.
 Lahiry, Sujit (2013), “India’s Relationship with Its South Asian Neighbours”
World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues, 17 (4): 70-79, Accessed on
22 April 2022.
 Lodhi, Maleeha (2001), “Security Challenges in South Asia” The Non-
Proliferation Review/Summer.
 Marjani, Niranjan (2022), “Is Regional Integration Still Relevant for India in
South Asia?” Diplomacy.
 Reddy, C. Ramana (2020), “India’s Role in the SAARC” Journal of Emerging
Technology and Innovation Research, 7(11): 106-112.
 Shah, Kriti. M (2019), “India in Pivotal Geographies: South Asia” Observer
Research Foundation, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/india-in-
pivotal-geographies-south-asia-54281.
 Sharma, Suman (2001), “India and SAARC” India Quarterly, 57(2): 99-120.

39
UNIT-12: LOOK EAST TO ACT EAST: ANALYSING
INDIA’S CHANGING APPROACH TOWARDS
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Structure

12.1 Objectives
12.2 Introduction
12.3 Look East Policy
12.4 ASEAN in India’s Foreign Policy
12.5 India and BIMSTEC: Bay of Bengal Community
12.6 Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC)
12.7 Look East to Act East
12.8 Summary
12.9 Exercise
12.10 References

12.1 OBJECTIVES

By studying this unit, you will be able to:

 Understand the context in which India’s look east policy evolved.

 Know the historical significance of the Southeast Asian region for India.
 Make out the expectations of Southeast Asian countries from India.
 Explain India’s evolving foreign policy towards ASEAN.
 Identify the key differences between the look east and act east policy.
 Recognize the key objectives of India’s act east policy.
 Analyze the key challenges to India’s act east policy.

12.2 INTRODUCTION

India has a rich tradition of maintaining multilateral relations, which gets reflected in
its foreign policy. In this light, it makes all efforts to preserve friendly relations with
almost all countries in the international arena and tries to provide a solid geopolitical
foundation for its foreign policy. When it comes to Southeast Asia, witnessing its and
Southeast Asian region’s significant economic growth in the 1990s, India was eager to
integrate its financial strategy with that of the latter to take advantage of its largely
unexplored market. To accomplish this objective as well as to actualize its ambition of
establishing multilateral links with the Southeast Asian region, New Delhi formulated
40
the ‘Look East Policy’in 1991 but in 2014, this foreign policy strategy toward Southeast
Asia was given a fresh lease of life which is called ‘Act East Policy’.

Before any official agreement, the strong cultural and religious connectedness between
India and the Southeast Asian region had an impact on their relations. Their ancient art,
architecture, and language have had similarities with those of India. Further, the spread
of Hinduism and Buddhism led to the emergence of a religious and cultural synthesis
between India and these regions, whose footprint we can see even today. Ashoka the
great initiated the act of spreading Buddhism in Laos, Burma and Cambodia, etc, and
these countries have declared Buddhism as their official religion. The reflections of
Hindu traditions are still present in the regions of Java which had traveled from India
centuries back. Apart from this, commerce is another factor that manifested in ancient
trade relations. “The spice trade route from West Asia and the Persian Gulf stretched
over to Indonesia and even beyond, bringing in traders and travelers from one part of
Asia to another” (Muni, 2011). Buddhist influence is found across the Southeast Asian
regions, and Bali is still a Hindu-dominated society. The yearly festival of “Bali Jatra”
in Odisha, India, recalls the memories of many traders who braved the seas of the Bay
of Bengal, Straits of Malacca, and the South China Sea to transport commerce and
culture to the Indian Ocean’s eastern borders. Thus, even though they look east policy
as a product of the 20th century, the relations between India and Southeast Asian nations
can be traced back to past centuries.

India’s foreign policy is based on the ideas of anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, and

anti-racism. After independence, India sought to liberate the world from dominance
without joining any power blocs sponsored during the Cold War, mainly demonstrating
Asian countries’ ability to influence world affairs. Independent India quickly realized
that socio-economic advances in a developing region like Southeast Asia are critical to
regional peace and security and conversely peace is also the most crucial factor in a
region’s overall development. As a result, India was eager to expand collaboration with
Southeast Asian countries to strengthen a ‘region of peace.’ The first Prime Minister of
India, J. Nehru proclaimed: “We in India have ventured to talk about an area of peace;
we have thought one of the major areas of peace might be Southeast Asia” (Sharma &
Morarji, 2015). Considering the ancient relations as the foundation for future strategic
relations, India had taken many initiatives after its independence. Nehru focused on
strengthening India’s relationships with East Asia. This motivation was manifested in
India’s decision to convene the Asian Relations Conference in 1947 to strive for a
bright future for Asian countries.

In 1949, India convened another conference on Indonesia to fulfill its anti-colonial

philosophy. India was a peacemaker for Southeast Asian countries, as evidenced by its
chairmanship of the International Control Commission on Indochina, established
following the 1954 Geneva Accord. Malaysia, a Southeast Asian country, was the only
one that publicly and openly supported India during the India and China border War in
1962. To assist India, Malaysia’s then-Prime Minister, Tengku Abdul Rehman,
41
established the ‘Save Democratic Fund’. “The first Afro-Asian Conference held in
Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955, was the culmination of these early Indian initiatives and
efforts to promote Asian resurgence” (Muni, 2011). It was during Nehru’s tenure that
significant efforts were made to lay a solid foundation for India’s eastward drive. Later,
the initial efforts of Prime Minister Nehru were revived by the subsequent Prime
Ministers to enhance India’s ties with the nations. During Rajiv Gandhi's regime,
official visits to Indonesia, Myanmar, Vietnam, and Thailand came with several
diplomatic exchanges. Added to this, “Southeast Asian leaders such as Indonesia’s
Suharto, Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew, Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohammad, Vietnam’s
Van Linh, Cambodia’s Hun Sen, and foreign and other ministers and junior officials
visited India.” (Muni, 2011). However, “With the gradual improvement of relations
with Southeast Asian countries and domestic economic growth in the 1980s, India
became less fearful of Chinese interference in insurgencies in Northeast India and more
confident of exerting influence in the region through road construction and
infrastructure development”(Barua, 2020).

12.3 LOOK EAST POLICY

The end of the Cold War in 1991 ushered in a dramatic shift in most Asian countries’
economic and strategic strategies, forcing them to adopt necessary policy reforms to
deal with the region’s shifting economic and security realities. India was no different.
In 1991, after Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination and congress’s defeat in the 1989 general
elections, Narasimha Rao became the Prime Minister and took the erstwhile initiatives
forward, which resulted in the historical policy called “Look East Policy”. Since 1991,
India’s diplomatic strategy of “Look East” has been improving India’s existing
relationships with the ASEAN region and promoting trade, investment, tourism,
scientific, and technology linkages. Policies in India are striving to restore deep
historical and cultural links that had been shattered during the colonial period. “It may
be kept in mind that Rao had joined Rajiv Gandhi‟s government as a foreign minister
towards the later years and accompanied Gandhi on his China visit” (Muni, 2011) The
Look-East policy was initiated in 1992, shortly after the Cold War ended and the Soviet
Union fell apart. It was a very crucial foreign policy choice made by the administration
after the onset of liberalization when “the share of the investments coming from
ASEAN was almost nothing in 1991 and reached $US2.5 billion in the 1990s”
(Jaffrelot, 2003).

However, 21st century introduced a second phase in the Look East Policy (LEP) which
was crafted by Yashwant Sinha, the then foreign minister. The first phase of India’s
Look East policy was primarily concerned with commercial and investment links with
ASEAN. The new phase underlined shifts from trade toward more significant economic
and security problems, such as cooperation measures to safeguard sea lanes, extensive
institutional frameworks, shared strategic objectives, and coordinated counter-
terrorism activities. The second phase of India’s Look East program also included the
development of the country’s remote northeast region. India’s pursuit of a new
42
economic connection with Southeast Asia is no longer motivated by concerns about
globalization but rather by a desire to assist the northeast in growing by enhancing its
connectivity to the rest of the world. New Delhi presently recognizes the importance of
forging business relations with Southeast Asia rather than striving to isolate the
northeast from external influences as it once did. India’s Act East policy was
formulated for the first time in 2014 by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Nay Pyi Taw-
the capital of Myanmar. Several plans of action were conceived and adopted under the
new policy framework to enhance peace, progress, and prosperity among the nations.
Needless to say, the Act East policy has given a new impetus to strengthening
economic, strategic, and diplomatic ties with countries that share India’s concerns
about China’s expanding economic and military power and its ramifications for the
emerging regional order. India’s ‘Act East policy is a diplomatic effort aiming to
improve economic, geopolitical, and cultural connections with the vast Asia-Pacific
region on various levels. Since 1992, the country has been moving eastward,
emphasizing the region’s importance in the country’s present foreign ties. ‘Act East’
and its predecessor, ‘Look East,’ are not opposed; rather, they represent two distinct
but parallel periods in India’s policy towards the Asia-Pacific region. Burma, Brunei,
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and
Vietnam are the ten countries in the Southeast Asian region. The key principles and
objectives of the “Act East Policy” are to promote economic cooperation, cultural ties,
and development of strategic relations with countries in the Asia-Pacific region through
continuous engagement at bilateral, regional, and multilateral levels, thereby improving
connectivity between the States of the North Eastern Region and other countries in our
neighborhood. It has focused on the activation of broader spatial coordination and
collaboration, as opposed to the Look East Policy. Act East policy focused on three
characteristics of the relationship, known as the 3-C’s. Culture, Commerce, and
Connectivity are the three aspects. It is time now to consider the three D’s: Diversity,
Democracy, and Defense. Expanding links beyond trade and commerce can result in
stronger defense linkages. Given the favorable political climate in the region, the
opportunity to develop intense political-level relationships should be pursued further
by New Delhi.

Furthermore, India’s strategy has focused on the ASEAN as a central body. As a result,
“India has prioritized ASEAN in its relations with Southeast Asia. As this centrality
remains uncertain, India will need to recalibrate its relations, both at the bilateral and
multilateral levels” (Mishra 2015). Besides, ASEAN lacks strategic sovereignty
because the region’s top leaders are engrossed in complex geopolitics, requiring
ASEAN to look to several leaders rather than just one to go forward. This shortcoming
resulted in a lack of trust in India, putting the country’s ties with the organization in
jeopardy. Another fact that needs to be mentioned is that these countries perceive a
threat approaching from the north-south direction rather than the east-west direction.
This perception has China in the background, which views these countries as
subordinates rather than equals in a political framework.

43
12.4 ASEAN IN INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

A strategic shift was seen in India’s foreign policy towards Southeast Asia in the post-
Cold War period. India took the initiative of economic reforms and strategic
partnerships with the ASEAN nations. The country took the historical step to renew
and revitalize the Indo-ASEAN relationship, under the banner of a new policy
framework known as the “Look East Policy”. Look East policy seeks to define India’s
renewed relations with the ten Southeast Asian countries such as Brunei, Cambodia,
Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
In October 1995, the Secretary for Economic Affairs in the Ministry of External Affairs
declared that ASEAN is at the heart of India’s reworked strategy. Due to New Delhi’s
vigorous efforts, India was given the status of a “Full Dialogue Partner” of ASEAN in
1995 and membership of ARF in 1996.” (Sharma & Morarji, 2015).

From 1992 onwards, the subsequent Indian Prime Ministers visited ASEAN countries
regularly. In 1992, Narasimha Rao paid official visits to Indonesia and Singapore,
Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, and South Korea, respectively. Such visits provide
opportunities for Indian leaders to develop familiarities with other policymakers of
Southeast Asian countries. India not only participated in the ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF) meeting and Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) for the first time in 1996, it
was trying to get connected with the ASEAN countries through a Summit-level
relationship. And in 2001, ASEAN also wanted to develop its ties with India to the
summit level. At the 7th summit of ASEAN, India signed the treaty of Amity of
cooperation at Brunei in 2003. It has chosen to serve as the part of East Asian Summit
since its inception in 2005. New Delhi has also signed bilateral free trade agreements
with Singapore and Thailand and joined sub-regional groupings like the Bay of Bengal
Initiative for Multi-Sectorial Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and
the Mekong - Ganga Cooperation (MGC). ASEAN and India have also concluded an
ASEAN – India Free Trade Agreement in Goods (AIFTA) in May 2009. All these
developments signal how each realized the importance of the other. India’s significance
to ASEAN can be gauged from the fact that “India signed MoUs on defense
cooperation, provided training to MiG-29 fighter pilots, and supplied spare parts and
services to these air crafts”. India considered this as an opportunity and thus initiated
measures to “develop cooperation at the ASEAN-level and the level of individual
countries of Southeast Asia”. (Sharma & Morarji, 2015). The beginning of the twenty-
first century witnessed the most rapid phase of development in this evolving
relationship. Since 2002, 30 Dialogue Mechanisms are cutting across all the sectors,
including seven ministerial-level meetings. And India has annual Summits with
ASEAN along with China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. To enhance the level and
intensity of engagement, the Indo-ASEAN Partnership for Peace, Progress, and Shared
Prosperity, was signed at the third ASEAN-India summit in 2004, and the plan of
Action for the period 2004-2010 was undertaken to boost the partnership. By now
while most of the objectives of the 2nd POA also have been implemented, the 3rd POA

44
(2016-20) has been adopted by the ASEAN-India Foreign Ministers Meeting held in
August 2015.

“In 2012, ASEAN and India commemorated 20 years of dialogue partnership and ten
years of Summit level partnership with ASEAN holding a Commemorative Summit in
New Delhi under the theme ‘ASEAN-India Partnership for Peace and Shared
Prosperity on 20-21 December 2012. The Commemorative Summit was attended by
the leaders from all the 10 ASEAN countries and they endorsed elevating the
partnership to ‘Strategic Partnership’. The leaders also adopted the ‘ASEAN-India
Vision Statement’, which charts the future of ASEAN-India cooperation. Two major
events organized in 2012 in the run-up to the Commemorative Summit include the 2nd
ASEAN-India Car Rally and Shipping Expedition of INS Sudarshini to ASEAN
countries. During the summit, the heads of the government recommended the
establishment of the ASEAN-India Centre (AIC) to undertake policy research,
advocacy, and networking activities with organizations and think tanks in India and
ASEAN, intending to promote the ASEAN-India Strategic Partnership. The AIC has
been serving as a resource center for the ASEAN Member States as well as for India
since its establishment in 2013, strengthening ASEAN-India strategic partnership and
promoting India-ASEAN dialogue and cooperation in mutual interests. AIC has
provided valuable inputs to policymakers of India as well as of ASEAN member states
on the implementation of projects for greater ASEAN-India connectivity by organizing
seminars and roundtables. AIC also organizes workshops, seminars, and conferences
on divergent issues relevant to ASEAN-India strategic partnership. It undertakes
regular networking activities with relevant public/private agencies, organizations, and
think tanks of India, ASEAN, and East Asian Summit (EAS) countries to provide up-
to-date information, data resources, and sustained interaction for strengthening
ASEAN-India Strategic Partnership (India, 2016). “The Second ASEAN-India
Workshop on Blue Economy1 was held in New Delhi on 18 July 2018” (Economic
Research Institue for ASEAN and East Asia(ERIA), 2018). The workshop offered
practical and useful ideas on issues such as enhancing maritime connectivity,
leveraging technology to help the Blue Economy, and examining areas where ASEAN
and India may collaborate to create the Blue Economy. Apart from this, India was
committed to connectivity cooperation with ASEAN in line with the master plan on
ASEAN connectivity by 2025.
Trade and investment relations have steadily grown between India and ASEAN.
Presently, the latter has become India’s fourth-largest trading partner. The annual trade
registered an average growth of 22% per annum in the decade up to 2011-12 and it
stood at approximately US$ 76.53 billion in 2014-15. ASEAN India-Business Council
(AIBC) was set up in March 2003 in Kuala Lumpur as a forum to bring key private

1
The exploitation, protection, and regeneration of the marine environment are referred to as the
"blue economy". The extent to which it can be interpreted varies per organisation. This can include a
wide range of economic sectors, from traditional fisheries, aquaculture, maritime transport, coastal,
marine, and maritime tourism or other traditional uses, to more emerging areas like coastal
renewable energy, marine ecosystem services (i.e. blue carbon), seabed mining, and bioprospecting.
45
sector players from India and the ASEAN countries to a single platform for business
networking and sharing of ideas. ASEAN and India have also been working on
enhancing private sector engagement.

Since the very beginning, India has been collaborating with the ASEAN countries in
many fields, such as agriculture, science and technology, trade and investment, climate
change, connectivity, exchange of culture, and renewable energy.. “Programme and
projects totaling over US$ 48.85 million have been proposed since September 2011 till
date to ASEAN through the ASEAN Secretariat. Some of the prominent projects,
which are either ongoing or in the final stages of approval, are as follows: Space Project
envisaging the establishment of a Tracking, Data Reception/Data Processing Station in
Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, and up-gradation of Telemetry Tracking and Command
Station in Biak, Indonesia; Setting up of Centers of Excellence in Software
Development & Training in CLMV countries are some of the major projects under
implementation.” (India, 2016). India has made a considerable contribution towards
connectivity projects such as India, Myanmar, and Thailand trilateral highways. As far
as agriculture is concerned, ASEAN-India Fellowships for Higher Agricultural
Education both for students of India and ASEAN countries, Exchange of Agriculture
Scientists, and projects such as Exchange of Farmers, Empowerment of ASEAN-Indian
Women through Cooperatives are noteworthy.

India became a sectoral dialogue partner of the ASEAN in 1992 and a full dialogue
partner in 1996. It was after that the relations began to receive further impetus. The
core sectors identified for cooperation are trade, investment, tourism, science and
technology, IT, biotechnology, and human resources. India is a member of the ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF), which enabled India and ASEAN member states to cooperate
in security matters as well. In this context, India has participated in the ASEAN post-
ministerial meetings and ARF meetings and contributed to confidence-building and
peacemaking in the region. When Pokharan-II was conducted in 1998, America, Japan,
and Australia displayed annoyance, and some of the ASEAN countries expressed
appreciation of India’s move towards becoming a nuclear power. Compared to
countries of other regions, the ASEAN countries have displayed a better understanding
of India’s problems in Kashmir as well as in the seven states of the northeast. Unlike
the Cold War compulsions, they are no more supporting polemics against India. An
examination of India’s relations with ASEAN, Japan, South Korea, and Australia
demonstrates how a vast network of institutional structures has supported expanding
bilateral engagements between India and these states. India is now an active member
of the ARF, the EAS, and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus. Presently,
more than 30 sectoral dialogue mechanisms and seven Ministerial-level interactions
in addition to annual summit-level meetings define the strategic partnership between
India and ASEAN.
In the Cold War era, the relationship between India and ASEAN took a slump when
the treaty of Indo-Soviet peace and friendship cooperation was signed in 1971. The
ASEAN intention towards the Soviet Union was not benevolent, and singing this treaty,
46
India negatively impacted relations with ASEAN members. Some constructive steps
were taken by India to mend the relationship. For instance, India responded positively
to ASEAN’s proposal for a Zone of Peace, Friendship, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). It
demonstrated a high degree of support for the 1976 ASEAN summit held in Bali. In
1977, the coalition government led by Morarji Desai also took earnest steps to improve
India’s relationship with the Southeast Asian countries. Many foreign delegates,
including the foreign minister of Malaysia and prime minister of Singapore, made
official visits to India. India returned the gesture by taking the initiative to establish a
formal relationship with ASEAN. And during this phase, Indonesia played a
preeminent role in shaping ASEAN’s response to India’s request. In 1979, Kassaim
Hussain, the then director-general of the ASEAN national secretariat, said that the
foreign ministers of ASEAN members would decide on India’s appeal. Again in 1980,
India recognized the regime of the People’s Republic of the Kampuchea that was
propped up in Vietnam. However, this ran contrary to the stance of the ASEAN and
resulted in a decline in the evolving cordial relations between India and ASEAN.
However, this strained relationship ended after India signed the Paris peace accord in
1991 and this step was greatly appreciated by ASEAN member states preparing the
stage for a robust India-ASEAN partnership which culminated in India becoming the
sectoral dialogue partner in 1992 and a full dialogue partner in 1996. “Emphasizing the
relevance of ASEAN, In 2015 Modi said, “ASEAN as the ‘anchor of our Act East
Policy’”.(Palit, 2016).

Apart from ASEAN, India has taken other policy initiatives in the region that involve
some of the members of the ASEAN such as BIMSTEC and MGC. BIMSTEC and
MGC are regarded as the two prongs of India’s look east policy that brings together
India with ASEAN countries including Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and
Vietnam. Therefore, we need a discussion on these organizations to have a brief idea
about India’s look east policy.

12.5 INDIA AND BIMSTEC: BAY OF BENGAL COMMUNITY

Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Thailand make up the BIMSTEC sub-regional
economic bloc. This is the first time two ASEAN partners have joined forces with three South
Asian countries to pursue economic cooperation. This organization, founded in 1998, has
already identified critical areas for collaboration, including communications, infrastructure,
energy, commerce and investment, tourism, and fisheries. The Asian Highway Link, Asian
Railway Network, and a Natural Gas Pipeline Grid are among the main projects under
consideration by the forum. Each country takes on a specific duty for coordination. BIMSTEC,
based on the Bay of Bengal Rim, intends to utilize the tremendous potential of natural and
human resources in this sub region. A BIMSTEC Chamber of Commerce and Industry has been
established, and it has been decided that BIMSTEC Economic and Trade Ministers would meet
annually to monitor the implementation of economic cooperation projects. In addition, the
BIMSTEC Senior Economic Officials Committee (SEOC) has been formed.

47
BIMSTEC has its roots in the post-Cold War era when many regional and sub-regional
groupings emerged. In June 1997, a sub-regional grouping called BIST-EC (Bangladesh, India,
Sri Lanka, and Thailand-Economic Cooperation) was formed. Some extensive objectives of
this cooperation included collaboration in transportation, connectivity, trade and investment,
human resource development, agriculture, fisheries, and tourism. In Dec 1997, when Myanmar
joined this organization BIST-EC turned into BIMST-EC (Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri
Lanka, Thailand-Economic Cooperation). Again this name was re-designated as BIMSTEC,
which is an abbreviation of ‘The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and
Economic Cooperation’. At the end of the first summit, the members of BIMSTEC noted: “that
the geographical location of our countries and our rich natural and human resources provide a
sound basis for mutually beneficial cooperation; Recognised, that the pluralist nature of our
societies, our shared cultural heritage and the rich diversity of languages, arts, crafts, and
traditions provide ample opportunity for multidimensional cooperation within our region;
Resolved, to foster a sense of community that will lead to the economic and social, development
of the entire region.” (Sharma & Morarji, 2015). The members agreed to create a BIMSTEC
free trade area and expand the grouping’s functions to include trade and investment, education,
culture, health, management, community development, information and communication
technology, and weather and climate research. BIMSTEC has been able to fulfil the aspirations
of some of the small countries of South Asia which were searching for a massive economic and
political space in world affairs. BIMSTEC represents 21 % of the world’s population and deals
with economic engagements of around 43 to 49 billion dollars annually.

12.6 MEKONG GANGA COOPERATION (MGC)

Following the liberalization of the Indian economy in 1991, the economy registered
spectacular growth, and the country’s entrepreneurs began to perceive gain from
investment and economic engagements with other countries in the region. This
persuaded India to announce at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Bangkok in July
2000, the formation of a new cooperative forum with five of its eastern neighbors –
Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam- called the Mekong- Ganga
Cooperation (MGC) forum. MGC is a sub-regional organization with the potential to
collaborate in areas including education, health, and transportation. Through MGC,
India believed it would be able to establish healthy relationships with CLMV
(Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam) countries of ASEAN, which are
geographically very close to India. But unfortunately, because of some reasons, it has
failed to gain from the sub-regional organization to its expectations. . MGC since its
formation has been facing many problems like insufficiency of funds, clarity of
timeline, inadequate implementation and revered mechanism to mention a few which
keep dissuading its members from putting their weight behind the organization. For
instance, “Thailand lost interest in MGC after it set up the Ayeyawady–Chao Phraya–
Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS) that brings together the same
group of countries, minus India. The attention of all the non-Indian members of MGC,
who are also members of the older established Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS)
together with China’s Yunnan province, is more focused on the GMS.” (Sikri, 2009).

48
India wants to establish robust connectivity between MGC members and its Northeast
region. “These over-land linkages have the potential to provide new opportunities to
speed up the economic development of India’s northeast. One of the projects called the
Asian Highway Project under MGC is expected to link Singapore with New Delhi via
Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia), Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon), Phnom Penh
(Cambodia), Bangkok (Thailand), Vientiane (Laos), Chiang Mai (Thailand), Yangon
and Mandalay, Kalemyo (Myanmar), Tamu, Dhaka and Calcutta (India). India has
already taken up the road building linking Tamu (Manipur) to Kalemyo, a key
communication junction in the center of Myanmar.” (Sharma & Morarji, 2015). The
projects underway can go a long way in integrating northeast India with the Mekong
region. Therefore, MGC initiatives have become central to India’s foreign policy
towards Southeast Asia in recent years.

12.7 LOOK EAST TO ACT EAST

In the past few years, India has been working not only to look at its eastern neighbors
but to act in a productive way to enhance its relationship with Asia in general and
Southeast Asia in particular. India’s search for economic space resulted in the ‘Look
East Policy’. The Look East Policy has matured into a dynamic and action-oriented
‘Act East Policy. India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi formally enunciated the Act
East Policy at the 12th ASEAN India Summit and the 9th East Asia Summit held in
Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar, in November 2014. The government, headed by Prime
Minister Modi, has made India’s relations with Southeast Asian countries a foreign
policy priority. In 2014, the foreign minister of India, Sushma Swaraj, introduced a
new phase in the look east policy which came to be known as the “Act East Policy”.

The relationship between India and ASEAN has gone through several ups and downs.
Hillary Clinton, the then US Secretary, came to India in 2011. and remarked that India
should not merely ‘look’ towards the East; it should ‘act’ and ‘engage’ with the East.
Through the Act East policy, India has been trying not only to restore its historic
relations with ASEAN but to expand the country’s engagement beyond the region, such
as Korea in the North to Australia and New Zealand in the South, and from neighboring
Bangladesh to Fiji and Pacific Island countries in the Far East as well. ASEAN plays a
central role in India’s Act East Policy. This is well demonstrated by the frequent
regional visits by leaders from the ASEAN countries to India over the past few years.
Prime Minister Modi went to Myanmar to participate in the East Asia Summit and in
the India-ASEAN Summit in November 2014. He also went twice to Singapore, first
to attend the funeral of Singapore’s Prime Minister and then to attend the 50th
anniversary of the establishment of bilateral relations when he sought to forge a
strategic partnership with the country as well. He also traveled to Malaysia in
November 2015 for a bilateral visit and then to attend East Asia and the India-ASEAN
summits. The then External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj also visited Indonesia,
Vietnam, Singapore, Thailand, and Myanmar during the same period. ASEAN leaders

49
visited India, such as Vietnam Prime Minister NguyễnTấn Dung’s visit in October 2014
and Singapore’s President Tony Tan’s visit subsequently. The leaders joined the
celebrations marking the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations in India as well.
(Sajjanhar, 2016).

Myanmar occupies a unique position in India’s ties with ASEAN. It shares a boundary
of 1700 km with four North-East Indian states. They are Mizoram, Nagaland,
Arunachal Pradesh, and Manipur. The India Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway
can prove to be a game-changer in connecting India’s Northeast with ASEAN. It may
be wishful thinking for India to gain the full potential of the Act East Policy. However,
besides the northeastern states, Bengal is also likely to benefit from the policy. The
Kaladan multimodal project, which started in 2008, aims to connect Kolkata with
Sittiport in Myanmar. This project presents a huge opportunity for ASEAN and India
to develop multidimensional ties.

Thailand also occupies a prominent place in the success of the Act East policy because
of the ancient cultural, maritime business, religious and linguistic ties between the two
countries. The policy presents a unique opportunity to India as well as Thailand to
nurture a rapidly expanding mutual relationship. After the highly successful visit of
Vice President of India Hamid Ansari to Bangkok and Chiang Mai in early February
2016, a visit by Prime Minister General PrayutChan-o-cha as well as visits by Crown
Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn, heir to the Thai throne, and Princess Maha Chakri
Sirindhorn, to receive the first International Sanskrit Prize were expected to further
India’s bilateral engagement and strengthen ties, providing greater substance to India’s
Act East policy. (Sajjanhar, 2016). As far as connectivity is concerned, the India-
Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway, which would stretch over 1,360 kilometers,
is one of the ongoing infrastructure projects. “The importance of future ASEAN
investment is seen as a strategically crucial step in alleviating regional frustrations
over not being able to profit from India’s economic and industrial
expansion”(Dewan, 2021).

Singapore is India’s second-largest source of foreign direct investment. It not only

maintains strong and vibrant trade and investment relations with India, but it is also the
first ASEAN nation to establish a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement
(CEPA) with India. “Singapore has always been supportive of stronger ties between
India and ASEAN. In 2004, the then prime minister of Singapore, Goh Chok Thong,
metaphorically described ASEAN as the body of a large airliner, with China as one of
the wings and the second, ASEAN’s strong relations with India” (Sajjanhar, 2016)

India’s relationship with Indonesia presented significant possibilities in the preceding

decade because both had new and dynamic leaders. In November 2014, at the East
Asian summit, Modi had a very impressive and conducive meeting with Indonesian
President Joko Widodo. After this Indian foreign minister paid a visit to the country in
April 2015, this process was repeated by India’s vice president during his visit in
November 2015. India realizes the significance of soft power and therefore seeks to
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explore and exchange cultural and literary activities with the Southeast Asian countries
along with maintaining bilateral commercial and economic ties with them. Vietnam
also stands as a significant trade, defence, and strategic partner of India. The
significance of the Southeast Asian region has grown globally and it is now considered
a core issue in India’s foreign policy as well because of China’s increasing
assertiveness in the South China Sea.

For instance, the allocation of $1 billion to promote connectivity between India and
ASEAN, announced by Modi during his visit to Malaysia in November 2015, was
intended to bring India and ASEAN closer together. Connectivity forms an
indispensable element of the 3Cs of “culture, commerce, and connectivity”, promoting
economic engagement and strengthening people-to-people, cultural, and civilizational
contacts between the two regions. (Sajjanhar, 2016). Further, because of the Indian
government’s initiatives, such as forming a dedicated Japan Plus desk at the Ministry
of Commerce and Industry to reduce bureaucratic barriers in clearing investment
projects, the volume of Japanese private investment in India has increased since
2014. Japan’s investment increased from 1.7 billion dollars in 2014 to 4.7 billion
dollars in 2016-17. Automobiles, telephones, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals were
among the Japanese investment industries. India’s North-East Region’s (NER)
connectivity projects have been designed to promote deeper integration within the
region as well as with the neighbors. After all, it is in India’s northeast that the
country’s Act East policy and Japan’s ‘Open and free Indo-Pacific strategy converge.
(Kesavan, 2020). Under India’s Act East Policy and Japan’s goal for a Free and Open
Indo-Pacific, the India-Japan Act East Forum was launched in 2017 to provide a
platform for India-Japan engagement in the North Eastern Region.

The status of India’s relations with ASEAN was upgraded to a Strategic Partnership in
2012, and it now covers investment, commerce, trade, tourism, and research and
technology. Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs), including the India-Singapore
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) in 2005, the India-South
Korea CECA in 2009, the India-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement in 2010, the India-
Japan CECA in 2011, and the India-Malaysia CECA in 2011 have boosted India’s
connections with the region. India’s commerce with ASEAN was $2 billion in 1992
when the country had just launched its Look East Policy, but it increased to $72 billion
in 2017-18 after signing a Free Trade Agreement with ASEAN in 2010. India also
eventually became an active participant in regional organizations such as the ASEAN
Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit.”(Wadud, 2021) “Samudra Shakti,’ a joint
naval exercise between India and Indonesia- a member of ASEAN was held in 2018.
The 25th Singapore-India Maritime Bilateral Exercise (SIMBEX) was a combined
maritime exercise between India and Singapore, another ASEAN member, that saw
the renewal of a defence cooperation pact to boost intelligence-sharing activities. As
part of the 28th SIMBEX, from August 2-4, 2021, the Indian Navy conducted a
bilateral maritime exercise with Singapore in the South China Sea. The 3rd edition

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of the bilateral exercise ‘Samudra Shakti’ with Indonesia was also witnessed in the
recent past. ( Augustine, 2021).

A proposal to formalize yearly meetings between ASEAN and the Indian Ocean Rim
Association (IORA), a regional organization whose members border the Indian
Ocean region, has also been made. “Modi has also sought to boost India’s Soft power
influence in the area through the promotion of Yoga and the revival of the old
Nalanda University,” says a former Indian ambassador and Secretary (West) in the
Ministry of External Affairs.” (Ahmed, 2019).

In summary, it can be asserted that India’s “Act East” policy has opened up many
possibilities primarily for the development of India’s North-Eastern region in the
areas of physical infrastructure, economy, and education, as well as employment. .
In August 2015, the ASEAN-India Plan of Action for the period 2016-20 has been
adopted, which identifies concrete initiatives and areas of cooperation along the three
pillars - politico-security, economic and socio-cultural. (Sen, Asher, & Rajan, 2004)

12.8 SUMMARY

India’s Act East Policy is a successor to its Look East Policy and has played a
prominent role in developing multifaceted ties between Southeast Asia and India.
However, the Act East Policy needs more foreign policy focus, and collaboration with
the ASEAN needs to be strengthened further. India must emphasize connectivity
between Southeast Asian countries and northeast Indian states as these regions are not
only an integral part of India but it is full of natural resources as well. The use of soft
power potential as planned by Indian Prime Minister Modi needs to be utilized more
seriously. All the significant projects, including the India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral
highway Project, Rhi-Tiddim Road Project, the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-
Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Kaladan Multi-modal
Transit Transport Project, and Border Haats, have not only been initiated to raise
economic development but also to build peace and prosperity in the region. It is to be
insured in the coming decades that economic integration and strategic partnership are
fully leveraged to avoid any clash of interests and values.

India must continue strengthening its ties with regional and multilateral organizations
such as ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the East Asia Summit, BIMSTEC, the
Asia Cooperation Dialogue, Mekong Ganga Cooperation, and the Indian Ocean Rim
Association. On the cultural front, Buddhist and Hindu ties should be rekindled to
foster new connections and bonding. Steadfast efforts should be considered to build
a cohesive strategy, particularly for connecting ASEAN with India’s North East,
which is one of the primary objectives of the Act East policy. To conclude, India’s
endeavors at conducting good neighborly relations with Southeast Asia are paying
dividends in economic and strategic terms. This is gaining increasing support from the
Indian government as well as from all the countries in the region so that the distant

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objective - Asia-Pacific might emerge as an important center for democracy, free trade,
and globalization is realized.

12.9 EXERCISES

1. Write an essay on the changing context which drove India’s look east policy.
2. Describe the evolution of India’s act east policy beginning from the look east
policy.
3. Explain India’s evolving relationship with ASEAN.
4. Analyze the key objectives of India’s act east policy.
5. Evaluate the key challenges to India’s act east policy.
6. Discuss how India and Southeast Asian countries can foster stronger
connectivity and bonding.

12.10 REFERENCES

Augustine, R. (2021, October 13). India’s Act East Policy: Warning to China or
Flawed Strategy? Retrieved May 18, 2022, from
www.geopoliticalmonitor.com: https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/indias-
act-east-policy-warning-to-china-or-flawed-strategy/

Ahmed, Z. (2019, September). India's Act East policy and North East India: A
Critical Review. International Journals of Multidisciplinary Research, 9(9),
2249-2496.

Barua, T. (. (2020). The Look East Policy/Act East Policy-driven Development

Model in Northeast India. Jadavpur Journal of International Relations, 24(1),
101–120.

Dewan, V. (2021, May 31). INDIA’S ACT EAST POLICY: STRATEGIC

RATIONALES AND MARITIME STRATEGY. Retrieved May 17, 2022, from
www.thesecuritydistillery.org: https://thesecuritydistillery.org/all-
articles/indias-act-east-policy-strategic-rationales-and-maritime-strategy

Economic Research Institue for ASEAN and East Asia(ERIA). (2018, July 24).
Second ASEAN-India Workshop on Blue Economy. Retrieved May 18, 2022,
from www.eria.org: https://www.eria.org/news-and-views/second-asean-
india-workshop-on-blue-economy/

India, G. o. (2016). India- ASEAN Relation. New Delhi: Government of India,

Ministry of External Affairs.

Jaffrelot, C. (2003). India's look east policy: an Asianist strategy in Perspective. India
Review, 2:2,, 35-68.

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Kesavan, K. (2020, February 14). India’s ‘Act East’ policy and regional cooperation.
Retrieved May 17, 2022, from www.orfonline.org:
https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/indias-act-east-policy-and-regional-
cooperation-61375/

Muni, S. (2011, February 01). India’s ‘Look East’ Policy: The Strategic Dimension.
(I. o. Studies(ISAS), Ed.) ISAS Working paper, 121, 1-25.

Palit, A. (2016). INDIA’S ACT EAST POLICY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR

SOUTHEAST ASIA. : Southeast Asian Affairs, 81-91.

Sajjanhar, A. (2016). Taking Stock of India's 'Act East Policy'. Observer Research
Foundation.

Sen, R., Asher, M. G., & Rajan, R. S. (2004). ASEAN-India Economic Relations:
Current Status and Future Prospects. Economic and Political Weekly, 3297-
3308.

Sharma, V., & Morarji, B. (2015). Shifting Trends in India and Southeast Asia
Relations. International Journal of Advanced Research in Management and
Social Sciences, 3(2).

Sikri, R. (2009). Challenge and Strategy:Rethinking India’s Foreign Policy. New

Delhi: SAGE Publications.

Wadud, M. A. (2021, January 31). Act East Policy from Look East Policy and Some
Pertinent Issues for India: An Analysis. Retrieved May 18, 2022, from
www.researchgate.net:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/353980040_Act_East_Policy_from_
Look_East_Policy_and_Some_Pertinent_Issues_for_India_An_Analysis

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