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2nd Deo Mangal Memorial National Moot Court Competition, 2023 (TC-NSL41)
TEAM
TEAMCODE-NSL41
CODE -NSL41
2nd DEO MANGAL MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT

COMPETITION, 2023
BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF ARYAVART
PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION (PIL) NO….../2023
(UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF CONSTITUTION OF ARYAVART)
IN THE MATTER OF IMPLEMENTATION OF UNIFORM CIVIL CODE IN THE

COUNTRY OF ARYAVART
IN THE MATTER BETWEEN
TRANSCOUPLE AND NGO - SAMRIDHI..................................PETITIONERS

V.
GOVERNMENT OF ARYAVART…………………………RESPONDENT
AND
ALL INDUS MUSLIM PERSONAL LAW BOARD……...…IMPLEADING PETITION
SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE THE SUPREME COURT OF ARYAVART
MOST RESPECTPULLY SUBMITTED BY THE COUNSELS APPEARING ON THE

BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
(MEMORANDUM ON THE BEHALF OF RESPONDENT)
0
Memorandum on the behalf of Respondent
TABLE OF CONTENT
S. PARTICULARS PAGE
NO.
NO.
1. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 2
2. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 3
1) Books Referred
2) Statutes Referred
3) Websites Referred
4) Cases Referred 4
3. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 6
4. STATEMENT OF FACTS 7
5 STATEMENT OF ISSUES 10
6. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 11
7. ARGUMENTS ADVANCE
ISSUE 1:
Whether the PIL is maintainable in the Supreme Court of Aryavart or not and is it 12
feasible to implement Uniform Civil Code in a country like Aryavart?
ISSUE 2:
Whether UCC is violative of one’s Fundamental rights and other personal rights
19
guaranteed under the Constitution of Aryavart and is it the States’s interference in
the realm of the personal laws of the subjects?
ISSUE 3:
Whether the non-issuance of the Birth Certificate for the child born from a
24
LGBTQIA couple is violation of the Child’s right by the State?
ISSUE 4:
Whether the Constitution power of Court to frame laws has led to the scenario
28
where Legislature have become the Executive wing of the judiciary?
8. PRAYER 35
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
1
SC Supreme Court
Hon’ble Honourable
Const. Constitution
UCC Uniform Civil Code
PIL Public Interest Litigation
Art. Article
Ors. Others
Anr. Another
SCC Supreme Court Cases
AIR All India Reporter
UOI Union of India
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
w.p Writ Petition
CJ Chief Justice
AIMPLB All India Muslim Personal Law Board
PL Personal law
2
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
BOOKS REFERRED
1. Durga Das Basu, the constitution of India 107 (26th ed. 2022).
2. Dr. J.N. Pandey, constitutional law of India 66-88 (58th ed. 2021).
3. Rachana Kaushal, women and human right in India 32 (Kaveri books 2012).
4. P. Ishwara Bhat, law and social transformation 500-503 (2nd ed. 2022).
5. Dr. S. S. Dhaktode, human rights and Indian constitution: Dr. B.R. Ambedkar’s enduring
legacies 478 (Bhasya Prakashan 2012).
STATUTES REFERRED
1. Constitution of Aryavart, 1950………………………………………………….passim

2. Special marriage Act, 1954……………………………………………………...passim
3. Hindu marriage Act, 1955……………………………………………………….passim
4. Aryavart Citizenship Act,1955…………………………………………………..passim
5. The code of criminal procedure, 1973…………………………………………..passim
6. Muslim women (protection of rights on divorce) Act,1986…………..................passim
WEBSITES REFERRED
1. Lexis Nexis, https://www.lexisnexis.com

2. Manupatra Online Resource, https://www.manupatra.com
3. SCC Online, https://www.scconline.com
4. Indian Kanoon, https://indiankanoon.org
5. Supreme Court Observer, https://www.scobserver.in
6. Supreme Court of India, https://main.sci.gov.in
7. Oxford Dictionary, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com.
8. CaseMine, https://www.casemine.com/
Cases Referred
3
1. Laxmi Khandsari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 873………………………...…Pg.

12
2. Suresh Kumar Koushal and Anr. v. Naz Foundation and Ors., (2014) 1 SCC 1………….Pg.
12
3. Gobind v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1975bSC 1378……………………………………Pg.
12
4. De Armond v. State, Okl. Cr., 285 P. 2d 236……………………………………………...Pg.
13
5. Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P., (1973) 1 SCC 20………………………………….........Pg.
13
6. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR (1978) 597………………………………………Pg.
13
7. Kharak Singh v. State of UP and Ors., (1964) 1 SCR 332………………………………..Pg.
13
8. Union of India v. Paul Manickam, AIR 2003 SC 4622…………………………………...Pg.
13
9. Kanubhai Brahmbhatt v. State of Gujarat………………………………………………...Pg.
13
10. Nivedita Sharma v. Cellular Operators Association of India……………………………..Pg.
14
11. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Chhabil Dass Agrawal………………………………….Pg.
14
12. Union of India v. TR Verma, AIR 1957 SC 207…………………………………………..Pg.
14
13. Louise Fernandes v. Union of India, (1988) 1 SCC 201………………………………….Pg.
15
14. P.N. Kumar v. Municipal Corporation Delhi, (1987) 4 SCC 609…………………………Pg.
15
15. Satish Chandra v. Registrar of Cooperative Societies, (1994) 4 SCC 332………………..Pg.
15
4
16. Ashok Babarao Patil v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., No. 575 0f 2017………………...Pg.
15
17. Punnakkal Suresh v. Saraswathi, OP(C). No. 814 of 2016………………………………Pg.
15
18. Razia Begum v. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum, AIR 1958 SC 886…………………………..Pg.
15
19. Venkata Subramaniam v. M.K. Mohan Krishnamachari, (2009) 10 SCC 488……………Pg.
15
20. Indra v. Rajnarayan, AIR 1975 SC 2299…………………………………………………Pg.
16
21. S. R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1………………………………………...Pg.
16
22. Sneh Lata v. V.K. Mittal and Ors., 29 (1986) DLT 298, 1986 RLR 209………………….Pg.
16
23. Bal Patil and Anr. v. Union of India, Appeal (civil) 4730 of 1999………………………..Pg.
16
24. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 853…………………………........Pg.
17
25. Aruna Roy v. Union of India, (2002) 7 SCC 368…………………………………………Pg.
17
26. Abhiram Singh v. CD Commachem, (2017) 10 SCC 1…………………………………...Pg.
17
27. Ahmedabad Women's Action Group (AWAG) v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 573……Pg.
21
28. Pannalal Bansilal Pitti v. State of AP, (1996) 2 SCC 498…………………………………Pg.
21
29. Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India, AIR 1999 SC 228……………………………Pg.
21
30. State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali, AIR 1952 Bom 84………………………………Pg.
22
5
31. Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir, (1981) 4 SCC 421………………………………………Pg.

23
32. Madhu Kishwar v. State of Bihar, (1996) 5 SCC 125…………………………………….Pg.
23
33. Maharshi Avadhesh v. Union of India, (1994) 1 SCC 713……………………………….Pg.
23
34. Ram Janmbhoomi & AS Narayana Deekshitulu v. State of AP, (1996) 9 SCC 584……...Pg.
24
35. X,Y and Z v. the United Kingdom ECtHR 21830/93 (1997)…………………………….Pg.
25
36. Devadasan v. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 179………………………………………….Pg.
26
37. Thiru Muruga Finance v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2000 Mad 137……………………...Pg.
26
38. Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, (2002) 4 SCC 388…………………………………...Pg.
28
39. Indian Young Lawyers Association and Ors. v. State of Kerala and Ors. (2017) 10 SCC
689………………………………………………………………………………………..Pg.
30
40. Divisional Manager, Aravali Golf Course v. Chander Haas, (2008) 1 SCC 683…………Pg.
30
41. Prem Chand v. Excise Commissioner, AIR 1963 SC 996………………………………...Pg.
31
42. A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, AIR 1988 SC 1531………………………………………...Pg.
31
43. Prakash Singh v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 1………………………………………..Pg.
32
44. Swaraj Abhiyan v. Union of India & Ors., (2018) 12 SCC 170…………………………..Pg.
32
6
45. Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record-Association v. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC

441………………………………………………………………………………………..Pg.
33
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Petitioner herein has approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Aryavart and humbly
submits this memorandum for the petition filed before this Hon’ble Court. The Writ Petition
invokes its the writ jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Aryavart under Article 32 of the
Constitution of Aryavart as an PIL (Public Interest Litigation).
The respondent humbly submits to the jurisdiction of the hon’ble court
7
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Aryavart is a Sovereign Country in Asiana consisting of 28 States and 8 Union territories and
is by and large conservative country. The Population of Aryavart is around 140 crores. Hinduism
is the major religion and 70% of the population practice Hinduism, 20% practice Islam, and
other 10% practice other religions. Only the State of Kankan which was a Portuguese colony has
successfully implemented Uniform Civil Code in Aryavart.
2. Mrinal who is a Hindu trans-man is in a relationship with Akram who is a Muslim trans-
woman. They both are residents of Avanti State which doesn't have Uniform Civil Code. They
both have been in a relationship since 2010 at a time when same-sex relationships were
considered taboo and unacceptable by the society. They were unable to openly proclaim their
relationship because of the social set up of the Country & State.
3.The couples waited for a very long to disclose their relationship in Public. In the year 2018, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court of Aryavart decriminalized homosexuality, which had infused a sense of
confidence among the LGBTQ+ community in the Country. Though the harassment by the
8
authorities had stopped due to decriminalization of homosexuality by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
yet the homosexual couples still faced discrimination and stigma in the society.
4.There was a misconception in the society about the gender identity of the individuals. The
societal norm had only male and female stratum and entire government machinery ran around
recognizing only these genders. Though, in recent times there were identification of transgender
rights in some areas, there were still huge lacunae in recognizing their rights in most of the field
especially that of marriage.
5. The couples in the present case decided to open up regarding their relationship and to get
officially married. In admission to the fact that both of them belong to LGBTQ+ community but
also were of different religion. They respected each other's faith and decided to get married under
their respective Customs. Their wedding was attended by their near and dear ones.
6. Though, friends and family supported their marriage, they were unable to get their marriage
officially registered as neither of them fell under the definition of "bride" and 'groom" and
moreover they belonged to two different religions.
7. In the meantime, Mrinal gets pregnant and gave birth to a healthy baby boy. Their problem got
complicated as they were unable to get birth certificate issued for their son as the same required
name of father and mother and in their case though Mirnal gave birth to the child, Mirnal
identified to be a male and therefore the father. Moreover, since their marriage itself could not be
registered, they were unable to get birth certificate for their child.
8. Their application was rejected by the authorities in the State of Avanti. Further, they also tried
to get their marriage registered, which was also rejected by the authorities in the State of Avanti.
They find that they were in a legal conundrum. Because of lack of a Uniform Civil Code to
govern the personal laws, they were stuck in a limbo. Hence, they decided to approach the
Hon'ble Supreme Court of Aryavart vide filing a writ petition under article 32 of the constitution
of Aryavart with plea of issuance of birth certificate to their child and recognition of their
marriage and consequently sought to implement a UCC which recognizes both same sex
marriage and inter- religious marriage and grants equal rights to all irrespective of sex and
religion.
9. Meanwhile, an NGO - Samridhi working for the welfare of Muslim women has been fighting
to implement UCC across the Country. They have been providing free legal aid to Muslim
women so as to assist them fight for their rights. Though there were various legislations
9
governing law of maintenance and other secular issues, it was seen that by and large Muslim
women were unable to access them. In order to provide access to justice and legal rights, the
NGO had filed a Public Interest Litigation seeking to implement UCC throughout the Country of
Aryavart before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
10. The same was pending consideration by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The main ground taken
by the NGO was that the Muslim women are treated poorly and they do not have legal weapons
to claim maintenance, or file such claims before the Courts. Their rights which are enjoyed by
women of other community are being curtailed by their personal laws. Hence, the NGO wants
the implementation of UCC across the country of Aryavart wherein women irrespective of
religion will have equal rights. The All-Indus Muslim Personal Law Board is opposing
Implementation UCC as they claim that it infringes their personal right and the same is in
violation of the rights granted under the Constitution. Hence, the All-Indus Muslim Personal Law
Board has filed Impleading Petition in both the Public Interest Litigations filed by the NGO and
the Trans-couple along with violation of secular structure of the Aryavart.
11. The Government of Aryavart whose ideology is based out of the majoritarian religion
supported to impose Uniform Civil Code and has made it as their election agenda. However, the
Government is opposing a Uniform Code which recognizes LGBTQIA community stating that
such marriages are not recognized in any religions. And The Government of Aryavart is opposing
the PIL filed by the Trans-couple on the ground of maintainability as they have an alternative
remedy.
12. The Trans-Couple are opposing the Impleading Petition filed by All Indus Muslim Personal
Law Board as they find them not to be a necessary party to the proceedings. These cases have
garnered huge media attention and have become topic of debate. The Supreme Court recognizing
the importance of the case had permitted live telecast of the hearings and posted all applications
together along with the question of maintainability of PIL and necessity of impleading Indus
Muslim Personal Law Board for hearing.
10
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
ISSUE 1
Whether the PIL is maintainable in the Supreme court of Aryavart or not and is it feasible to
implement Uniform Civil Code in a Country like Aryavart?
ISSUE 2
Whether UCC is violative of one's' Fundamental rights and other personal rights guaranteed
under the Constitution of Aryavart and is it the States's interference in the realm of the personal
laws of the subjects?
ISSUE 3
11
Whether the non-issuance of the Birth Certificate for the child born from a LGBTQIA couple is
violation of the Child's right by the state?
ISSUE 4
Whether the Constitutional power of Court to frame laws has led to the scenario where
Legislature have become the Executive wing of the Judiciary?
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ISSUE 1: The PIL is not maintainable in the Supreme court of Aryavart and it is not
feasible to implement Uniform Civil Code in a Country like Aryavart.
The counsel for the Respondent humbly submits before the Hon'ble Court that the instant matter
is not maintainable before the Court of Law. The petitioner lacks the essential ingredients to
maintain the matter before the apex Court. And it is not feasible for implementing Uniform Civil
Code in a Country like Aryavart. Uniform Civil Code breaks the nation into a hysterical
jubilation and frantic wailing. Aryavart is a country of great religious, ethnic, and caste diversity.
As a result of this cultural diversity, it is practically impossible to develop uniform rules for
personal issues such as marriage,
12
ISSUE 2: UCC is violative of one's Fundamental rights and other personal rights
guaranteed under the Constitution of Aryavart and the States's cannot interference in the
realm of the personal laws of the subjects.
The counsel for the Respondent humbly submits that UCC is violative of Fundamental rights and
other personal rights guaranteed under the Constitution of Aryavart. And the State have
limitations in interference with Personal laws and also can't regulate it directly, or by direction of
interpretation of courts or violation of basic human rights.
ISSUE 3: The non-issuance of the Birth Certificate for the child born from a LGBTQIA
couple is not a violation of the Child's right by the state.
The counsel for the Respondent humbly submits that the non-issuance of the Birth Certificate for
the child born from a LGBTQIA couple is not violation of the Child's right by the state. The state
does not perform any malicious act which describe the evil intention of the state.
ISSUE 4: Whether the Constitutional power of Court to frame laws has led to the scenario
where Legislature have become the Executive wing of the Judiciary?
The counsel for the respondents humbly submits that the Legislature is Law making body and
Court have been separated from Overreach of its jurisdiction towards Framing laws and
Executions.
ARGUMENT ADVANCED
1. The PIL is not maintainable in the Supreme court of Aryavart and it is not
feasible to implement Uniform Civil Code in a Country like Aryavart.
1.1. The PIL is not maintainable in the supreme court of aryavart.

It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the writ petitions are not
maintainable under Article 321 of the Const. of Aryavart. Firstly, it is not maintainable because
there has been no violation of the Fundamental Rights. Secondly, the petitioners could have
1
INDIA CONST. art. 32.
13
entertained their petition in the High Court or they could have sought any alternate remedy, there
the petitioners cannot seek remedy under Article 32 of the Constitution of Aryavart.
1.1.1 There has no violation of the Fundamental Rights
A. Under Art. 32 it has been held that if a right, other than a fundamental right is claimed to be
violated then such questions can be addressed only in the appropriate proceedings and not on an
application under Art. 32. In Present case, it is observed that no Fundamental Rights of the
Petitioners or the Communities in relation have been violated therefore, this petition must fail.
B. It is contended that Art.14 of the Const. is not violated as the classification is founded on an
intelligible differentia. Article 14 forbids class legislation; it does not forbid reasonable
classification of persons by the Legislature for specific ends. 2 The Supreme Court, in its recent
judgement in the matter of Suresh Kumar Koushal and Anr. v. Naz Foundation and Ors,3 held
that those who indulge in carnal intercourse in the ordinary course and those who indulge in
carnal intercourse against the order of nature constitute different classes.
C. It is contended that Art.15 of the Const. is not violated as it is not disproportionate and
discriminatory in its impact and there is compelling state interest involved. The Supreme Court
laid down in Gobind v. State of Maharashtra4 that privacy claims deserve to be examined with
care and to be denied only when an important countervailing interest is shown to be superior, or
where a compelling state interest is shown.
D. It is contended that there is no violation of Art. 19(2) and provides a reasonable ground to
impose restrictions on one's Freedom of Speech and Expression. Order of nature has been
defined as something pure, as distinguished from artificial and contrived. 5 The legislature has
treated carnal intercourse against the order of nature as an offence. The SC observed in
Jagmohan Singh v. State of UP6 mere acceptance of a way of life in another nation cannot be
the basis for change in our perceptions. Thus, in the context of Aryavart, non- performance of the
registration of Same Sex Marriage is crucial to maintain public decency and morality.
E. It is contended that Art. 21 of the Const. is not violated as it qualifies the test of substantive
due process, it does not violate one's Right to Privacy, and it is in the interest of public health.
The requirement of substantive due process has been read into the Const. through a combined
2
Laxmi Khandsari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 873.
3
Suresh Kumar Koushal and Anr. v. Naz Foundation and Ors., (2014) 1 SCC 1.
4
Gobind v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1975bSC 1378.
5
De Armond v. State, Okl. Cr., 285 P. 2d 236.
6
Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P., (1973) 1 SCC 20.
14
reading of Articles 14, 21 and 19. 7 The due process requirement was laid down by the SC in the
celebrated case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India8 which states that apart from the
prescription of some kind of procedure for curtailment of one's right, the procedure must be just
and reasonable. The scope of the Right of Privacy, as also the permissible limits upon its
exercise, have been laid down in the case of Kharak Singh v. State of UP9 and others which held
"Our Constitution does not in terms confer any like constitutional guarantee.” Thus, Right to
Privacy is not absolute.
F. Same Sex Marriage Registration and the Muslim women’s rights as there is no violation of
any of the Fundamental Rights, the said writ petitions are not maintainable in the Hon'ble court
of Law.
1.1.2. That the alternate statutory remedy was available.
A. It is understood under Article 21 that it is not an absolute right and is subject to some
restraints evolved by the judiciary. It has been held that since Article 32 confers "extraordinary"
jurisdiction, the same must be used wisely, sparingly and shall be brought into use under
circumstances where there is no alternate efficacious remedy is available. 10 Therefore, the
Petitioner is required to approach the High Court or alternate methods before approaching the
SC. In the case of Kanubhai Brahmbhatt v. State of Gujarat,11 where it said that a petitioner
complaining of an infraction of a Fundamental Right should approach the High Court first rather
than the Supreme Court in the first instance is inapplicable in the present matter. The decision
delivered by a two Judge Bench cannot be regarded as an authoritative pronouncement on an
important constitutional issue. In the case of Nivedita Sharma v. Cellular Operators Association
of India,12 the Supreme Court held that Petitioner must exhaust its alternative remedy before the
State Commission and should not directly come to High Court for challenging judgment of
District forum. In the case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. Chhabil Dass Agrawal,13 the
Supreme Court held that when the statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances,
7
Suresh Kumar Koushal and Anr. v. Naz Foundation and Ors., (2014) 1 SCC 1.
8
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR (1978) 597.
9
Kharak Singh v. State of UP and Ors., (1964) 1 SCR 332.
10
Union of India v. Paul Manickam, AIR 2003 SC 4622.
11
Kanubhai Brahmbhatt v. State of Gujarat
12
Nivedita Sharma v. Cellular Operators Association of India
13
Commissioner of Income Tax v. Chhabil Dass Agrawal
15
the writ petition should not be entertained ignoring statutory dispensation subject to certain
exceptions.
B. The Apex Court further opined that non-entertainment of petitions under the writ jurisdiction
by the High Courts where efficacious or alternative remedy is available is a rule of self- imposed
limitation. It is essentially a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law.
So it is evident that the petitioners should have approached the High Court as it is a self imposed
limitation. The Apex Court has also opined that undoubtedly, it is within the discretion of the
High Court to grant relief under Article 226 14 of the Constitution of Aryavart despite existence of
an alternative remedy. However, the High Court must not interfere if there is an adequate
efficacious alternative remedy available to the petitioner and in the present case there was a
efficacious remedy available to the petitioners.
C. The remedy available was that they could have approached the District Court under section
8(2) and section 17 of Special Marriage Act, 1954,15 where if the Marriage Officer upholds. the
objection and refuses to solemnize the marriage, either party to the intended marriage may,
within a period of thirty days from the date of such refusal, prefer an appeal to the district court
within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the Marriage Officer has his office. The petitioners
also could have approached the Family Court under section 7(b) of the Family Court Act, 1984.16
D. When an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to litigant, he should be required
to pursue that remedy and not to invoke the special jurisdiction of the writ courts which is
observed in Union of India v. TR Verma.17 Wherever the vires of the statute are capable of being
examined by the HC, the SC has usually redirected the petitioner to pursue that course of action,
before petitioning under Art 32 observed in Louise Fernandes v. Union of India.18
E. It is humbly submitted that In P.N. Kumar v. Municipal Corporation Delhi.19 The SC
redirected the petitioner to approach the HC under Art. 226 and reasoned that the scope of the
article was wider. Also, in Satish Chandra v. Registrar of Cooperative Societies20 the remedy
under Art. 226 were specially stated as the alternate remedy and the petition under Art. 32 were
consequently dismissed.
14
15
Special Marriage Act,1954, § 17, No. 3, Acts of Parliament, 1954 (India).
16
Family Court Act, 1984, § 7(b), No. 66, Acts of Parliament, 1984 (India).
17
Union of India v. TR Verma, AIR 1957 SC 207.
18
Louise Fernandes v. Union of India, (1988) 1 SCC 201.
19
P.N. Kumar v. Municipal Corporation Delhi, (1987) 4 SCC 609.
20
Satish Chandra v. Registrar of Cooperative Societies, (1994) 4 SCC 332.
16
1.1.3 That the Impleading petition is Maintainable
A. The counsel for the Respondent humbly submits that "Dominus litus" is the person to whom
a suit belongs. This also means master of a suit. This is the party who has a real interest in the
decision of a case. It is this person who will be affected by the decision in a case. This person
derives benefits if the judgment is in his favour, or suffers the consequences of an adverse
decision. if any third party is likely to suffer any injustice, on account of the outcome of the suit,
he is entitled to get himself impleaded.
B. The Bombay High court in Ashok Babarao Patil v. State of Maharashtra and Ors21 have
observed that the court has all power to add a party as defendant if necessary to decide a suit,
even if the plaintiff does not choose to implead said party, In Punnakkal Suresh v. Saraswathi22
in this case Kerala High Court have observed that additional defendant can be added in the suit
even if petitioner thinks the party is not necessary. In Razia Begum v. Sahebzadi Anwar
Begum,23 legal interest is interpreted to mean that the result of the Suit affects the third party
legally. A proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose
presence is necessary for a complete, effective and proper adjudication on the questions involved
in the proceeding. In D. Venkata Subramaniam v. M.K. Mohan Krishnamachari 24 this Court
held that an order passed behind the back of a party is a nullity and liable to be set aside only on
this score. Therefore, a person against whom an order is passed against him, he should be
impleaded as a respondent being a necessary party. From the above submission the counsel for
the Respondent humbly submits that the instant matter is not maintainable before the Court of
Law.
1.2. It is not feasible for implementing Uniform Civil Code in a country like
Aryavart?
The counsel for the Respondent humbly submits that it is not feasible for implementing UCC in a
country like Aryavart. UCC breaks the nation into a hysterical jubilation and frantic wailing.
Aryavart is a country of great religious, ethnic, and caste diversity. As a result of this cultural
21
Ashok Babarao Patil v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., No. 575 0f 2017.
22
Punnakkal Suresh v. Saraswathi, OP(C). No. 814 of 2016.
23
Razia Begum v. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum, AIR 1958 SC 886.
24
D. Venkata Subramaniam v. M.K. Mohan Krishnamachari, (2009) 10 SCC 488.
17
diversity, it is practically impossible to develop uniform rules for personal issues such as
marriage.
1.2.1The implementation of UCC go against the Concept of Secularism
A. It is humbly submitted that the UCC breaks the nation into a hysterical jubilation and frantic
wailing. The main reason of contention revolving around UCC has been secularism and the
freedom of religion enumerated in the Constitution of Aryavart.
B. The preamble of the Constitution states that Aryavrart is a "secular democratic republic" This
means that there is no State religion observed in Indra v. Rajnarayan.25 A secular State shall not
discriminate against anyone on the ground of religion. A State is only concerned with the relation
between man and man. It is not concerned with the relation of man with God. It does not mean
allowing all religions to be practiced. It means that religion should not interfere with the
mundane life of an individual. S. R. Bommai v. Union of India26 established the fact that
Aryavart was secular since the formation of the republic. It is humbly submitted that, the Lata
Mittal case27 of 1985 is a perfect example of this. She won a 20-year legal battle which led to
Hindu daughters being given equal rights in ancestral property. Before, joint-heirship in parental
property was not given to Hindu daughters. Article 44 of the Indian constitution says, "The state
shall endeavor to secure the constitution is directing the government to bring all communities
together on a Uniform Civil Code for the citizens throughout the territory of Aryavart." This
means that matters that are currently governed by their respective personal laws observed in Bal
Patil and Anr. v. Union of India.28
1.2.2. The implementation of UCC is practically difficult
A. It is humbly submitted that Aryavart is a country of great religious, ethnic, and caste diversity.
As a result of this cultural diversity, it is practically impossible to develop uniform rules for
personal issues such as marriage. Additionally, convincing each community to abandon
centuries-old traditions in favor of a new law is difficult. Religious minorities view the UCC as
an infringement on their right to religious freedom. The state should abstain from interfering in
personal matters, the constitution guarantees the right to practice any religion. UCC would
constitute a violation of that right.
25
Indra v. Rajnarayan, AIR 1975 SC 2299.
26
S. R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1.
27
Sneh Lata v. V.K. Mittal and Ors., 29 (1986) DLT 298, 1986 RLR 209.
28
Bal Patil and Anr. v. Union of India, Appeal (civil) 4730 of 1999.
18
B. At the moment, the introduction of UCC would exacerbate the problem by increasing
Muslims' insecurity and vulnerability to fundamentalist and extremist ideologies. In
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala,29 the Supreme Court held that that secularism was a
part of the basic structure of the Constitution.
C. The Court held that secularism is the basic structure of the Constitution and therefore cannot
be amended. Secularism is derived from the cultural principle of tolerance and ensures the
equality of all religions Aruna Roy v. Union of India30 and Abhiram Singh v. CD
Commachem.31 The right to follow personal laws is among the fundamental rights and it will be
tantamount to interference if the state decides to legislate on matters of religion and culture. This
secular State which we are trying to create should not do anything to interfere with the way of
life and religion of the people.
1.2.3. That the implementation of UCC will go against the Custom followed for
centuries
A. The counsel humbly submits that the issues of marriage, divorce and succession are civil,
chances are that even after enacting a UCC, many tribal and rural communities may not follow it
and continue with their own tribal or customary practices. Their dominant view was that the
implementation of UCC was M. Muhammad Ismail was the first member to propose amendment
to Article 35. He proposed the following proviso to be added. "Provided that any group, section
or community of people shall not be obliged to give up its own personal law in case it has such a
law."
B. The counsel humbly submits that the directive principles of the Constitution themselves
visualize diversity and attempt to foster uniformity among people of different faiths. A uniform
law, though is highly desirable, enactment thereof in one go perhaps may be counter-productive
to unity and integrity of the nation. In a democracy governed by rule of law. gradual progressive
change and order should be brought about. Making law or amendment to a law is a slow process
and the legislature attempts to remedy where the need is felt most acute. It would, therefore, be
inexpedient and incorrect to think that all laws have to be made uniformly applicable to all
people in one go. The mischief or defect which is most acute can be remedied by process of law
at stages.
29
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 853.
30
Aruna Roy v. Union of India, (2002) 7 SCC 368.
31
Abhiram Singh v. CD Commachem, (2017) 10 SCC 1.
19
C. The legislation has granted same-sex couples the same opportunities as that of heterosexual
couples to solemnize their marriage by way of a civil ceremony and also by way of a religious
ceremony provided that religious organization has opted in to solemnizing such marriages.
1.2.4. That the implementation of UCC will go against the Norms of the Nation:
A. The counsel humbly submits that the main argument against a UCC is that it violates the
constitutional freedom to practice the religion of choice which allows religious communities to
follow their respective personal laws. For example, Article 25 32 gives every religious group the
right to manage its own affairs. Article 29 33 gives them the right to conserve their distinct culture.
The framers of the constitution didn't intend total uniformity. Personal laws were placed in the
Concurrent List, entry number 5, giving both the Parliament and State Assemblies the power to
legislate on personal issues. If the framers of the Constitution intended uniformity in personal
laws, they would have put them on the union list, giving parliament all the power to legislate on
them.
B. It is humbly submitted that it is alleged that a UCC will impose a Hinduised code for all
communities. For example, a UCC could include provisions regarding personal issues like
marriage, that are in line with Hindu customs but will legally force other communities to follow
the same. In Aryavart, a UCC relating to marriage, divorce, and succession, in reality, is not
feasible because of its diversity of religions and their respective practices. Aryavart is not a
homogeneous society. In fact, it is heterogenous in many ways. UCC would not be an effective
means to secure equal rights for the entire populace of Aryavart. The effects of such a uniform
code would be felt in drastically different ways by each community and not always for the better.
C. By way of example, if the practice of polygamy was banned in a UCC, rights afforded to
Hindu women would likely not be much affected, since the Hindu Code Bill banned bigamy in
1955. On the other hand, Muslim women, who are part of a community that practices polygamy
and whose rights are protected under Muslim personal law, as 2nd, 3rd and 4th wives. would in
fact under a UCC, find themselves "illegal" and no longer entitled to the protections that they
currently have such as each wife being entitled to maintenance.
D. Since various communities exist in Aryavart, there are various different customary practices
that are followed. It is not possible for a UCC to reflect all these customary practices. Since a
32
33
20
UCC will be passed by a Hindu legislature on Muslim, Christian, Buddhist, Sikh, various tribal
etc. populations, it is to be expected that there would be keen resistance to such forceful change.
E. From the above submission the counsel for the Respondent humbly submits that it is not
feasible for implementing Uniform Civil Code in a country like Aryavart.
2. UCC is violative of one's Fundamental rights and other personal rights

guaranteed under the Constitution of Aryavart and the States's cannot
interference in the realm of the personal laws of the subjects
2.1. UCC is violative of one’s fundamental rights and other personal rights
guaranteed under the Constitution of Aryavrat.
The counsel for the Respondent humbly submits that UCC is violative of Fundamental rights and
other personal rights guaranteed under the Constitution of Aryavart. It is humbly State has no
religion and the State has to treat all religions and religious people equally and with equal respect
without in any manner interfering with their Individual rights of religion, faith and worship.
2.1.1 That the implementation of UCC is against the Religious Freedom
A. It is humbly submitted that, the matter of retaining personal law is nothing new; we have
precedents in European countries. Yugoslavia, for instance, that is, the kingdom of the Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes, is obliged under treaty obligations to guarantee the rights of minorities," he
said. certain aspects of the Civil Procedure Code which have already interfered with our personal
laws and very rightly so. But during the 175 years of British rule, they did not interfere with
34
certain fundamental personal laws. The SC has ruled in Bal Patil and Anr. v. Union of India
that the State has no religion and the State has to treat all religions and religious people equally
and with equal respect without in any manner interfering with their Individual rights of religion,
faith and worship.
B. The counsel humbly submits that they have been imposed gradually as occasion arose and
they were intended to make the laws uniform although they clash with the personal laws of a
34
Bal Patil and Anr. v. Union of India, Appeal (civil) 4730 of 1999.
21
particular community. But take the case of marriage practice and the laws of inheritance. They
have never interfered with them. It will be difficult at this stage of our society to ask the people
to give up their ideas of marriage, which are associated with religious institutions in many
communities.
C. It is humbly submitted that, People seem to have very strange ideas about secular State.
People seem to think that under a secular State, there must be a common law observed by its
citizens in all matters, including matters of their daily life, their language, their culture, their
personal laws. That is not the correct way to look at this secular State. In a secular State, citizens
belonging to different communities must have the freedom to practice their own religion, observe
their own life and their personal laws should be applied to them.
D. The counsel for the Respondent humbly submits that, the Britisher, having conquered this
country, has been able to carry on the administration of this country for the last 150 years and
over was that he gave a guarantee of following their own personal laws to each of the various
communities in the country. That is one of the secrets of success and the basis of the
administration of justice on which even the foreign rule was based.
2.1.2. That the UCC implementation will not ensure substantive equality
A. It is very easy to copy sections from other constitutions of countries where the circumstances
are entirely different. There are ever so many multitudes of communities following various
customs for centuries or thousands of years. By one stroke of the pen you want to annul all that
and make them uniform. We have ourselves further on provided for concurrent jurisdiction to the
provinces as well as to the Centre in matters of succession, marriage divorce and other things.
How is it possible to have uniformity when there are eleven or twelve legislative bodies ready to
legislate on a subject according to the requirements of their own people and their own
circumstances.
B. The counsel humbly submits that Secular State does not mean that it is anti-religious State. It
means that it is not irreligious but non-religious and as such there is a world of difference
between irreligious and non-religious. The right to freedom of practice of religion also includes
the right to manage affairs in the matters of religion by respective religious denomination. So,
every religion has a set of its own personal laws according to which a person of that religion is
governed. Personal laws have been part of the society from centuries in the form of customs or
usages.
22
C. In Ahmedabad Women's Action Group (AWAG) v. Union of India,35 a PIL was filed
challenging gender discriminatory provisions in Hindu. Muslim and Christian statutory and non-
statutory law. This time the Supreme Court became a bit reserved and held that the matter of
removal of gender discrimination in personal laws involves issues of State policies with which
the Court will not ordinarily have any concern.
D. In Pannalal Bansilal Pitti v. State of AP36 the court pointed out: The first question is whether
it is necessary that the legislature should make law uniformly applicable to all religious or
charitable or public institutions and endowments established or maintained by people professing
all religions. In a pluralist society like Aryavart in which people have faith in their respective
religions, beliefs or tenets propounded by different religions or their off-shoots, the founding
fathers, while making the Constitution, were confronted with problems to unify and integrate
people of Aryavart professing different religious faiths, born in different castes, sex or sub-
sections in the society speaking different languages and dialects in different regions and provided
a secular Constitution to integrate all sections of the society as a united Aryavart.
2.1.3. That the UCC is not needed in the present scenario
A. The counsel for the Respondent humbly submits that Personal law has seen modernisation in
the past due to judicial activism and initiatives by the community. In Githa Hariharan v.
Reserve Bank of India37 (1999), struck down the provision of Hindu Minority and Guardianship
Act, 1956, which holds the father to be born the natural guardian of a Hindu child as
unconstitutional. The court held that the father cannot have a preferential right over the mother in
the matter of guardianship. This example is given to show that the absence of UCC has not
meant that personal laws are not being modified at all. Although change can be slower and at the
will of the community, gradual development continues.
B. It is humbly submitted that even women from these communities prefer to go to the local
panchayats rather than formal courts as they are alien, distant, and expensive and decisions take a
very long time and are not always decided in favor of women. Since issues of marriage, divorce
succession, etc. are civil in nature, even if a UCC is enacted, many rural and tribal communities
may not follow it and continue with their own tribal and customary practices.
35
Ahmedabad Women's Action Group (AWAG) v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 573.
36
Pannalal Bansilal Pitti v. State of AP, (1996) 2 SCC 498.
37
Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India, AIR 1999 SC 228.
23
D. Thus, it is imperative that the demand for Uniform Civil Code should come from all sections
of society, especially minority communities. The pros and cons of Uniform Civil Code should be
thoroughly discussed and debated by all. Enlightened and responsible Statesperson should come
forward and promote the need and necessity of Uniform Civil Coed amongst the commoners and
motivate them towards a common consensus that aims at establishing a Uniform Civil Code for
the entire Republic of Aryavart. Further, we believe that formal equality under law does not
translate into substantive equality in practice.
C. Therefore, from the above submission the counsel for the Respondent humbly submits that the
implementation of UCC will violate Fundamental Rights and other personal Rights guaranteed
under Constitution.
2.2. Whether the state can interfere in realm of personal laws?
State Has Limitations in Interference with Personal Laws. Personal Law can't come under the
Purview of Article 13.
A. The counsel for the respondents humbly submits that the case of the State of Bombay v.
Narasu Appa Mali.38 The court clarified that the personal laws are not susceptible to the
Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution. Before answering this
contention, the Court looked into whether personal laws mean "law" or a "law in force" as stated
in Article 13. In the division bench, Justice Gajendragadkar and Justice Chagla, with their
differing rationale, concluded that personal law is not "law"or a "law in force" under Article 13.
Justice Gajendragadkar based his reasoning on a narrow interpretation of Article 13, stating that
the word "law" in the article contemplates only a statutory law vis-à-vis one duly passed by the
Legislature. Since personal laws are not statutory laws, they are excluded from the ambit of
Article 13. He stated thus, "But the expression "laws in force" is, in my opinion, used in Article
13(1) not in that general sense. This expression refers to what may compendiously be described
as statutory laws. It is necessary to note that in this case, it was also argued that personal laws are
considered laws because importantly of the words "custom or usage" used in Article 13(3)(a).
However, this contention was rejected by J. Chagla who stated that the Constitution drafters did
not intend the personal laws to be subject to the rigors of the Constitution as otherwise they
could have specifically provided for them. So, while J. Gajendragadkar held that personal laws
38
State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali, AIR 1952 Bom 84.
24
do not fall within the ambit of "customs & usage" within "laws in force" in Article 13(1), J.
Chagla ruled to the contrary despite reaching at the same conclusion that personal laws are not
within the ambit of Article 13. Hence, it's humbly submitted that the High Court held that
personal laws were not to be tested on the touchstone of Part III of the Constitution. This
proposition was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir39. In other
words, according to the SC, religious commandments dealing with issues such as marriage and
divorce could not be challenged for constitutional violations. In Madhu Kishwar v. State of
Bihar,40 the Supreme Court held that customary laws would be subject to Part III.
B. Secular State Can't Interfere in Religious Affairs of Petitioners. In Maharshi Avadhesh v.
Union of India41 the Supreme Court reiterating this idea stated that personal laws are the sole
subject matter of policy of the State and were not for the Courts to decide. The Aryavart
Constitution allows individuals the freedom to live by their religious beliefs and practices as they
interpret these. In keeping with this idea of religious freedom for all, Aryavart also adopted a
strategy of separating the power of religion and the power of the State. Secularism refers to this
separation of religion from the State.
C. Governments should not interfere with personal faith and religious practices except when
there is a violation of basic human rights as enshrined in the Aryavart Constitution. The right of
the State to legislate on questions relating to marriage cannot be disputed. Marriage is
undoubtedly a social institution an institution in which the State is vitally interested. Although
there may not be universal recognition of the fact, still a very large volume of opinion in the
world today admits that monogamy is a very desirable and praiseworthy institution.
D. The Supreme Court itself in the seminal case of S.R. Bommai v. Union of India42 rejected, in
no unclear terms: The wall of separation between law and the religion with a wider camouflage
to impress control of what may be described as exploitative parading under grab of religion.
E. After Bommai, the Supreme Court itself has preferred to define secularism in more religious
terms, by placing reliance on the Indian religious traditions, as if religion and tradition itself
lends legitimacy to the concept43 .Thus, the court has under-stood religious values to create a
space for secularism in the Indian polity.
39
Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir, (1981) 4 SCC 421
40
Madhu Kishwar v. State of Bihar, (1996) 5 SCC 125.
41
Maharshi Avadhesh v. Union of India, (1994) 1 SCC 713.
42
S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1.
43
Ram Janmbhoomi & AS Narayana Deekshitulu v. State of AP, (1996) 9 SCC 584.
25
F. The nature of the permeability of "religion" by the state is more complex. There is no doubt
that the role of the court in secularism and adjudication of constitutional rights is a complex one,
and one which involves balancing religious rights against the power of the state to regulate and
control, and the religious rights of one group against the others.
2.3 State should uphold Minority rights
The Indian Constitution recognizes religious minorities as well as linguistic minorities. There are
specific provisions in the chapter on fundamental rights that recognizes the right of every
religious denomination or any section thereof to have the right to establish and maintain
institutions for religious and charitable purposes and to manage their own affairs in matters of
religion. Articles 2544 and 2645 of the Constitution, which protect both individual religious
freedom as well as the freedom of religious denominations to manage their own affairs in matters
of religion.
3.The non-issuance of the Birth Certificate for the child born from a
LGBTQIA couple is not a violation of the Child's right by the state.
The counsel for the Respondent humbly submits that the non-issuance of the Birth Certificate for
the child born from a LGBTQIA couple is not violation of the Child's right by the state. It is
contendent so for the reason that the non-issuance of the Birth Certificate does not violate the
equal protection doctrine of Article 1446, differentiation on the basis of sex under Article 15 47 and
protects the right to life under Article 2148.
3.1 Attested reason of non-issuance of birth certificate mentioned in statement
of facts
It is clearly mentioned in para 6 that the marriage of the couple was not registered as neither of
them fell under the definition of “bride” and “groom” and the most important one the both the
couples belonged to two different religions. This case is exceptional reason the both the couples
as mentioned are transgender and also from the different religion.
44
45
46
47
48
26
Furthermore in birth certificate there is a requisite of the name of the father and mother which is
in present case is filled full of ambiguity. In para 7 as mentioned there is a wider complexity of
the name of the father and mother and also the actual categorization of biological father and
mother is missing.
3.2 Birth certificate is not a complete document
In X,Y and Z v. the United Kingdom ECtHR 21830/93 (1997)49 decided that the United Kingdom
was not violating Art. 8 of the ECHR by not recognizing a transgender man as the father of his
child for similar reasons. The court recognized that the family was a “traditional family” in every
other sense, and that the law did not deny the applicant from acting in the social role of the
father. However, the court reasoned that the birth documents were not used as much as other
identity documents, and the disadvantages suffered by the child and the transgender parent would
be minimal compared to the interest of the community in “maintaining a coherent system of
family law
3.3 Non issuance of birth certificate is not a violation of child’s right of
citizenship
It is clearly mentioned in under Article 5 50 of the Constitution that Persons who are was born in
the territory of Aryavart, or either of whose parents was born in the territory of India, considered
as Indian and hence they have all the fundamental and legal rights which were issued by the
state.
3.4 Non issuance of Birth Certificate is not a violation of Fundamental Rights

3.4.1 Article 14
The non issuance of the birth certificate for the child does not violate the equal protection clause
under Article 14 of the Cons. Article 14 states the principle of equality before the law which does
not require absolute equality or equality among unequal. 51 Mere differentiation or inequality of
treatment does not per se amount to discrimination and before considering inequality of
treatment, the object of the legislation has to be considered. 52 Not giving a birth certificate
49
X,Y and Z v. the United Kingdom ECtHR 21830/93 (1997).
50
51
Devadasan v. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 179.
52
Thiru Muruga Finance v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2000 Mad 137.
27
applies to child either boy or girl in regards with parents who indulge in carnal intercourse
against the nature, no class has been targeted and no classification has been made. In the
instantaneous matter, the government has made classification only to treat unequal differently
and causes no unreasonable differentiation. Those who indulge in carnal intercourse in the
ordinary course and those who indulge in carnal intercourse against the order of nature constitute
different classes and the child whose parents are falling in the matter category cannot claim that
they suffer from the vice of arbitrariness and irrational classification. Thereby, it is humbly
submitted that non issuance of the birth certificate for the child has a substantial basis and is
neither discriminatory not arbitrary and hence child rights under 14 are not violated.
3.4.2 Article 15
The non issuance of the birth certificate for the child does not violate child’s right under Article
15 of the Cons. The right to birth certificate can always be restricted on the principle of morality
and health. Not giving the birth certificate when comes to morality was a state legitimate State
interest. The legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people That it
laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discrimination is based
on adequate grounds, that legislature is free to recognize degrees of harm and may confine its
restriction to those cases where the need is deemed to be clearest. The discrimination on the
ground of “sex” under Articles 15, therefore includes discrimination on the ground of gender
identity. The expression “sex” used in Articles 15 is not just limited to biological sex of male or
female, but intended to include people who consider themselves to be neither male nor female. It
is most respectfully submitted that by the authority and certain other sections of the society
towards the petitioner was not in violation to Article. 15 of Constitution of Aryavart giving a
birth certificate has a reasonable and substantial basis and is neither discriminatory nor arbitrary
and hence the child right not violated under Art. 15.53
3.4.3 Article 21
A. Article 21 envisages a right to life and personal liberty of a person, which not merely
guarantees the right to continuance of a person’s existence but a quality of life, and therefore,
State is casted upon a duty to protect the rights of the citizen in discharge of its constitutional
obligation in the larger public interest, guaranteed as a fundamental right under Article 21 of
the Constitution. In the present case, there has been no violation of Article 21 of the
53
28
Constitution. To establish the violation of Article 21, the Act should be subjected to the
equality test of Article 14 and test of reasonableness under Article 19. Article 14 ensures
fairness and guarantees against arbitrariness. It provides that every action of the government
must be informed by reasons and guided by public interest. As it has been proved above that
the Child rights does not violate either the test of Arbitrariness under Article 14 or the test of
Reasonableness under 19 and hence The non issuance of the birth certificate for the child
does not violate child’s right under Article 15 of the Cons.
B. It is submitted that the Right to privacy can be curtailed by following due process of law and
the Code of Criminal Procedure prescribes a fair procedure, which is required to be followed
privacy is not treated as absolute and is subject to such action as may be lawfully taken for
the prevention of crime or disorder or protection of health or morals or protection of rights
and freedoms of others. The right, however, is not absolute and may be lawfully restricted for
the prevention of crime, disorder or protection of health or morals or protection of rights and
freedom of others, In Gobind v. State of MP the Court observed: There can be no doubt that
privacy-dignity claims deserve to be examined with care and to be denied only when an
important countervailing interest is shown to be superior. The question then would be
whether a state interest is of such paramount importance as would justify an infringement of
the right Obviously, if the enforcement of morality were held to be a compelling as well as a
permissible state interest, the characterization of the claimed rights as a fundamental privacy
right would be of far less significant. In the instantaneous matter the Right to Privacy of
homosexual’s parents and their child is restricted for protection of state interest which does
not suffer from any vice.
3.5 Right to Vote
Article 326 guarantees that every citizen above the age of 18 years has the right to vote. This
right may be curtailed if a person is subject to certain disqualifications due to non-residence,
being of unsound mind, or crime, corrupt, or illegal practice. The absence of birth certificates
(for age proof) does not fall within the mentioned disqualifications. Hence the non-issuance of
birth certificate for the child is not the violation of his right to Vote.
29
4. The constitutional power of court to frame laws has led to the scenario
where legislature have become the executive wing of the judiciary.
4.1 Legislature is the Law-Making Body

The Respondents humbly submits that There is no explicit mention of Judiciary (Supreme
Courts, High Court, or State/District Courts) as a State in Article 12. 54 However, the organs of the
judiciary cannot make rules that are in itself violative of the Fundamental Rights.
4.1.1 Court of justice, not court of Law.
In the Decision of Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra,55 SC reaffirmed that Fundamental Rights
cannot be violated by any judicial proceedings and also that Superior Courts of Justice do not fall
under the ambit of Article 12. It's also submitted that Article 13 56 of the Aryavart Const.
mentions, State to not make any law that violates the provisions under Part III. Implementation
of UCC violates fundamental rights. It’s contended that The SC judgment cannot be treated as "a
sort of legislation by Parliament" overlooking the binding nature of the law declared by it.
mandating under article 14157, every court subordinate to it to accept it. The law declared by the
Supreme Court binds courts in India but it should always be remembered that the Court does not
enact.
4.1.2 Unelected body
It's submitted that the Judiciary being the unelected body, does not enjoy the "General Will" of
the people, Judicial restraint is more apt for such an institution rather than dictation legislation.
Politicians remain "accountable" to the people in at least some sense, because they depend upon
them in order to continue in office after five years.
4.1.3 Against Constitution's mandate and Lack of Expertise
It's respectfully submitted that Judicial Review is a basic structure of the Constitution, however
enacting legislation is not. The Constitution prohibits the Court from enforcing a Directive
Principle of State Policy. Courts can look into the validity of the law, but not necessarily make a
law. Judiciary lacks both time and resources to enact legislation. Sometimes practical difficulties
of such enactments are not known to the courts.
54
55
Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, (2002) 4 SCC 388.
56
57
30
4.2 DPSP is a Policy matter of State which is Non-enforceable in Courts

A. It's humbly submitted that the framers of the Constitution deliberately placed the provision for
a uniform civil code in the unenforceable "Directive Principles chapter, thinking that it was too
divisive to be made a fundamental right. The limits to this role are twofold: first, the Court may
not strike down legislation for non-compliance with the DPSPs, and secondly, the Court may not
incorporate the DPSPs to a point that requires it stepping outside its designated role under
classical separation of powers theory-making policy choices and budgetary allocations.
B. There is at least some scope for the DPSPs in an interpretive enquiry that does not rise to the
level of "enforcement". According to Ambedkar himself, the proscription on enforceability was
to be as imposing no obligation upon the State to act upon the Directive Principles - not that the
principles themselves were irrelevant in understanding how the State had (legislatively) acted,
once it did. Ambedkar repudiated the objection that the DPSPs were no more than pious wishes,
arguing that no legal force did not imply no binding force. Part III embodies civil/political (or
"first generation" rights), whereas Part IV enshrines socio-economic, second-generation
guarantees.
4.3 With Narrow Approach Court Can't Uphold Liberals' Rights While
Government Restraint To Implement.
A. It's humbly submitted that there is a popular school of thought that asks the court to tread with
particular caution when questions of culture are at stake. As far as possible or so this school of
thought holds the court should avoid hearing and deciding such questions altogether. However, if
it must decide, then it should do so on the narrowest grounds possible.
B. Ideally, its reasoning should be limited to technical points of law, avoid constitutional
questions, decide only the case before it, consciously eschew establishing precedent, and, above
all, refrain from expressing any opinion on the validity of any personal belief or conviction. The
role of the court, in short, is to do everything it can to lower the stakes, and take a pragmatic,
problem-solving approach to the conflict rather than an ideal-oriented, expansive one.
C. It’s also submitted that in the Section 377 58 hearings, the government stated that it would not
oppose the "reading down" of Section 377 as long as it was confined to same-sex relations
between consenting adults in private. During oral arguments, every time the petitioners pressed
58
Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 377, No. 45, Act of Parliament, 1860 (India).
31
for something more, government counsel urged the court to limit itself to simple
decriminalization, and nothing more.
D. Similarly, in the Sabarimala59 hearings, what is at issue is the validity of a piece of
subordinate legislation on the basis of which women of a certain age are denied access to
Sabarimala. While arguments before the court have, of course, been pitched upon the touchstone
of religious freedom and non-discrimination, it is equally open to the court to simply hold that
the rule exceeds the scope of the parent law, and is therefore invalid on purely statutory grounds.
E. This would enable the court to avoid reaching any determination on whether Sabarimala is
entitled to invoke the authority of religion in order to deny girls women between the ages of 10
and 50 the right to worship at the shrine. Indeed, this is precisely what the narrow approach
would advocate.
4.4 Judicial Restraint Theory
A. The Counsels for Respondents humbly submits that There is no dispute on the fact that the
judiciary should also self-regulate itself. It should also put some restraints on its powers,
whenever it is required. The Supreme Court in Divisional Manager, Aravali Golf Course v.
Chander Haas60 observed that: "Judges must know their limits and must not try to run the
Government. They must have modesty and humility, and not behave like Emperors. There is
broad separation of powers under the Constitution and each organ of the State-the legislature, the
executive and the judiciary must have respect for the others and must not encroach into each
other's domains."
B. A significant aspect of the relationship between the government and the people is the
guaranteeing of certain Fundamental Rights to the people. Modern Constitutions lay a good deal
of emphasis on people's Fundamental Rights. The underlying idea is that there are certain basic
rights which are inherent in a human being and which no government should seek to take away
either by legislation or by executive action.
C. The judiciary is endowed with the function of protecting these rights and acting as the
guardian thereof. If the legislature passes any law or the executive takes an action, so as to
infringe any of the Fundamental Rights, then the courts may declare such a law or action as
59
Indian Young Lawyers Association and Ors. v. State of Kerala and Ors. (2017) 10 SCC 689.
60
Divisional Manager, Aravali Golf Course v. Chander Haas, (2008) 1 SCC 683.
32
unconstitutional. Some of these basic rights are: freedom of the person, freedom of speech, right
to equality, freedom of conscience and religion, etc.
D. It's most humbly submitted that The Court has cautioned: "It must be remembered that the
wider the amplitude of its power under Art.142, 61 the greater is the need of care for this Court to
see that the power is used with restraint."
E. Thus, the plenitude of power conferred on the Supreme Court under Art. 142 needs to be used
with care as not to interfere with the performance of their statutory duties and functions by other
authorities in accordance with law. The Apex Court has ruled that though its power under Art.
142 is broad, it cannot be exercised against a Fundamental Right. In Prem Chand,62 the Court
had suggested that its power under Art. 142(1) cannot be exercised against a definite statutory
provision. In A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak,63 the Supreme Court has observed in relation to Art.
142; however wide and plenary the language of the article, the directions given by the Court
should not be inconsistent with, repugnant to, or in violation of the specific provisions of any
statute. But, then, there are a number of cases, where the Court has expressed the view that the
scope of Art. 142, which is a constitutional provision, cannot be cut down by a statutory
provision.
4.5 The Judiciary Overreaches its Constitutional Power.
A. Under Article 13, the power of judicial review is evoked to protect and enforce the
fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution. Courts have to be careful to see that
they do not overstep their limits because to them is assigned the sacred duty of guarding the
Constitution. The Supreme Court should not encroach on the legislature field, The court had no
power to amend the Constitution by a judicial verdict and that it could not arrogate to itself the
power of the constitution and must maintain self-restraint. Judges cannot arrogate the powers of
the executive or the legislature. The Court functions under certain self- imposed limitations as a
matter of prudence and policy. Courts cannot create rights where none exists nor can they go on
making orders which are incapable of enforcement or violative of other laws or settled legal
principles.
B. With a view to see that judicial activism does not become judicial adventurism or judicial
overreach, the courts must act with caution and proper restraint It needs to be remembered that
61
62
Prem Chand v. Excise Commissioner, AIR 1963 SC 996.
63
A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, AIR 1988 SC 1531.
33
courts cannot run the government. The judiciary should act only as an alarm bell; it should
ensure that the executive has become alive to perform its duties. Judges must exercise judicial
restraint and must not encroach into the executive or legislative domain vide. Judiciary has no
power over sword or the purse nonetheless it has power to ensure that the aforesaid two main
organs of State function within the constitutional limits.
C. The Judges should not proclaim that they are playing the role of law maker merely for an
exhibition of judicial velour. The Court cannot direct the legislature to make a particular Jaw
vide. Of the three organs of the State, the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary, only the
judiciary has the power to declare the limits of jurisdiction of all the three organs. This is a great
power and hence must never be abused or misused, but should be exercised by the judiciary with
the utmost humility and self-restraint. In this case, there is a need for amendment, and the work
of judiciary is to interpret laws and strike down if necessary. Hence, the Legislature deals with
amendment part. If, there is need to bring amendment in the Special Marriage Act, 1954, then,
the legislature is responsible to do that; otherwise, it will come under Judicial Overreach.
4.5.1 Abuse of Power
A. It's humbly submitted that In Prakash Singh v. Union of India,64 the petitioners sought
directions against the Union of India and State Governments to constitute various Commissions
and Boards laying down the policies and ensuring that police perform their duties and functions
free from any pressure and also for separation of investigation work from that of law and order.
B. On May 11, 2016, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Aryavart in Swaraj Abhiyan v. Union of
India & Ors.,65 directed the Ministry of Agriculture in the Union of India to update and revise the
Drought Management Manual. The apex court also directed the Union government to set up a
National Disaster Mitigation Fund within three months. Nevertheless, Finance Minister, Arun
Jaitley expressed the difficulty to create a third fund outside the National Disaster Response
Fund and the State Disaster Response Fund, keeping in view that the Appropriation Bill is being
passed. He also raised concern about India's budget-making being subject to judicial review.
4.5.2 It's not Judicial Activism, it's Judicial Intervention which leads Arbitrariness
64
Prakash Singh v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 1.
65
Swaraj Abhiyan v. Union of India & Ors., (2018) 12 SCC 170.
34
A. It's humbly contended that The Supreme Court's rulings in Supreme Court Advocates-on-
Record-Association v. Union of India66, National Eligibility-cum-Entrance Test (NEET) i.e.,
single test for admissions in medical courses, reformation in Board for the Control of Cricket in
India (BCCI), filling up the judges' post, etc. have been considered as the judicial intervention by
the government.
B. The Respondents humbly contend that each organ of our democracy must function within its
own sphere and must not take over what is assigned to the others. Judicial activism must also
function within the limits of the judicial process because the courts are the only forum for those
wronged by administrative excesses and executive arbitrariness.
4.6 Separation Of Powers enshrined in Constitution
4.6.1 Powers Vested With Parliament
A. Under Art. 138(2)67, the Supreme Court shall have such jurisdiction and powers with respect
to any matter as the Government of India and any State Government may by special agreement
confer, if Parliament by law provides for the exercise of such jurisdiction and powers by the
Supreme Court. Under Art. 13968, Parliament may by law confer on the Supreme Court power to
issue directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus,
prohibition, quo warrants and certiorari, or any of them, for any purposes other than those
mentioned in Art. 32(2). Under Art. 32(2), the Supreme Court has power to issue these writs for
purpose of enforcement of Fundamental Rights. Under Art. 139, power to issue writs may be
conferred on the Supreme Court for purposes other than enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
B. Under Art. 14069, Parliament may by law make provisions for conferring upon the Supreme
Court such supplemental powers not inconsistent with any provision of the Constitution as may
appear to be necessary or desirable for the purpose of enabling the Court more effectively to
exercise the jurisdiction conferred on the Court by or under the Constitution.
4.6.2 Additional Jurisdiction of Parliament
A. The Supreme Court has ruled in in re. Special Courts Bill. 1973, that as regards conferring
additional jurisdiction on the Supreme Court provisions from Arts. 124 to 147 of the Constitution
are exhaustive and no more jurisdiction can be conferred on the Supreme Court outside those
66
Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record-Association v. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 441.
67
INDIA CONST. art. 138. cl. 2.
68
69
35
provisions. Parliament can con fer additional jurisdiction on the Supreme Court while exercising
its legislative power under Arts. 246(1)70 and (2).71 Thus. Parliament can confer jurisdiction on
the Supreme Court beyond what Arts. 133(3),72 134(2),73 138(1),74 138(2),75 139 and 140 provide.
These provisions are to be read in harmony and conjunction with, and not in derogation of other
constitutional provisions. Thus, the Court has ruled:
B. The Parliament, therefore, has the competence to pass laws in respect of matters enumerated
in Lists I and III notwithstanding the fact that by such laws, the jurisdiction of Supreme Court is
enlarged in a manner not contemplated by or beyond what is contemplated by the articles in
Chapter IV, Part V.
C. For example, preventive detention falls under entry 3 in List III. Parliament is competent
while legislating on that topic under Art. 246(2)76 to provide under Art. 246(1)77 read with entry
77, List I, that an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from an order of detention passed under a
preventive detention law.
4.6.3 State Should Separate Judiciary from Executive
A. It's most humbly submitted that the Article 50 78 of the Constitution contains The Directive
Principle envisages separation of judiciary from executive in the public Services of the State.
While there may be no strict water tight separation at least as between the Legislature and the
executive, the judiciary is separated from Executive in any Public services. Hence Court can't
issue guideline or as an Activist Judiciary is not a competent authority to issue order to
legislature by make it push and compel in Law making process as Independence of Judiciary
should be protected by the sole duty of the State enshrined as Doctrine of Separation of power in
Article 50.
C. Hence it's most humbly contended that Uniform civil code Implementation process is
solemnly policy matter of state, if court overreach its jurisdiction. It also violates Parliamentary
privileges.
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
36
Prayer
In light of the issues raised, arguments advances and authorities cited the council for the
Respondent humbly pray’s the Honorable court be pleased to adjudge, hold & declare that:
1. The PIL filed is not maintainable in the court of law.
37
2. The UCC is violative of one’s fundamental rights and other personal rights guaranteed under
the Constitution of Aryavart and hence state can interference in the realm of the personal laws of
the subjects.
3. The non- issuance of birth certificate for the child born from a LGBTQIA couple is not a direct
violation of the child’s right by the state.
And pass any order that this Honorable court may deem fit in the interest of equity and justice
And for this act of kindness, the council for the Respondent shall duty bound forever pray.
S.d-
(Council for Respondent)
38

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2nd Deo Mangal Memorial National Moot Court Competition, 2023 (TC-NSL41)

2nd DEO MANGAL MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF ARYAVART

PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION (PIL) NO….../2023

(UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF CONSTITUTION OF ARYAVART)

IN THE MATTER OF IMPLEMENTATION OF UNIFORM CIVIL CODE IN THE

IN THE MATTER BETWEEN

TRANSCOUPLE AND NGO - SAMRIDHI..................................PETITIONERS

ALL INDUS MUSLIM PERSONAL LAW BOARD……...…IMPLEADING PETITION

SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE THE SUPREME COURT OF ARYAVART

MOST RESPECTPULLY SUBMITTED BY THE COUNSELS APPEARING ON THE

(MEMORANDUM ON THE BEHALF OF RESPONDENT)

UCC Uniform Civil Code

PIL Public Interest Litigation

SCC Supreme Court Cases

AIR All India Reporter

UOI Union of India

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

w.p Writ Petition

AIMPLB All India Muslim Personal Law Board

1. Constitution of Aryavart, 1950………………………………………………….passim

1. Lexis Nexis, https://www.lexisnexis.com

1. Laxmi Khandsari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 873………………………...…Pg.

31. Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir, (1981) 4 SCC 421………………………………………Pg.

45. Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record-Association v. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC

The respondent humbly submits to the jurisdiction of the hon’ble court

1.1. The PIL is not maintainable in the supreme court of aryavart.

1.1.3 That the Impleading petition is Maintainable

2. UCC is violative of one's Fundamental rights and other personal rights

2.1.1 That the implementation of UCC is against the Religious Freedom

3.4 Non issuance of Birth Certificate is not a violation of Fundamental Rights

4.1 Legislature is the Law-Making Body

4.2 DPSP is a Policy matter of State which is Non-enforceable in Courts

1. The PIL filed is not maintainable in the court of law.

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