Case Digests Political Law

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 218969. January 18, 2021.]
FERNANDO PANTE y RANGASA,petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES,respondent.
DECISION
HERNANDO, J : p
This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court assails the February 6, 2015 Decision 2 and June 9, 2015
Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 36219 affirming
the January 23, 2013 Judgment 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),Branch 33
of Pili, Camarines Sur in Criminal Case No. P-3806 which found petitioner
Fernando Pante y Rangasa (Pante) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Theft. HTcADC
The Factual Antecedents:

An Information 5 dated June 1, 2005 was filed before the RTC of Pili,
Camarines Sur against petitioner Pante and his two minor co-accused,
charging them with the crime of Theft under Article 308, par. 2,
subparagraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) as follows:
That [sometime] on December 11, 2004, in barangay
Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of the Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring, confederating
and helping one another, without the consent of the owner, nor
force, violence or intimidation, after having found the amount of
US$4,550.00 or (P254,800.00) and P27,000.00, belonging to Dawson
D. Word, and without delivering the same to its owner or authority,
and once in possession of said amount, with intent to gain, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, convert the said
amount for their own personal use and benefits, to the damage and
prejudice of Dawson D. Word.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW. 6
Upon arraignment, Pante and his two co-accused entered separate
pleas of "not guilty."
Version of the Prosecution:
On December 10, 2004, Dawson Word (Word) dropped by the
People's Mart in Naga City, Camarines Sur with his househelper, Angie
Beroño (Beroño),to buy fish. He was carrying US$4,550.00 and P27,000.00
bundled together in a rubber band placed on his lap. Word gave Beroño
P1,000.00 to buy fish and arranged his remaining money while waiting
inside the car. When Beroño returned, Word placed the bundle of money
on his lap between his legs and drove back to his apartment. 7 He parked
his car in front of his residence and forgot the money that he placed on his
lap. 8 Apparently, upon alighting from the car, the bundled money fell on
the road near his vehicle.
At about 5:30 a.m. the following morning, a bakery worker noticed a
bundle of money lying on the ground near Word's car. Meanwhile, one of
Pante's co-accused, who was riding his bike outside, also noticed the
bundle of money and picked it up before going inside his house. 9
At around 8:00 a.m.,Word realized that the money that he had placed
on his lap was missing. 10 He began searching for it in his car but could no
longer find it. With the help of his landlord, Word learned that Pante's minor
co-accused picked up the bundled money near his car. 11
On December 21, 2004, Word sought the help of the police in the
recovery of his money. Upon investigation, it was found that Pante's minor
co-accused was indeed the finder of the money. The police headed to the
minor's residence where accused-minor admitted that he found the bundle
of money under Word's car. 12 He also averred that the money was shared
among his other co-accused, who is a cousin and also a minor, Pante, and
himself. His parents returned the US$1,300.00 to Word, as evidenced by the
receipt 13 signed by his father.
On the same day, the police went to the house of the other accused-
minor, who admitted getting US$500.00 but could no longer return the
same because he already spent it. 14 Thereafter, the police proceeded to
the house of Pante, who also admitted that he received US$1,700.00. He
was able to return US$300.00, P4,660.00, one unit of JVC component, and a
gas stove with a tank. Pante also gave a receipt 15 from Monton Hardware,
where he bought construction materials. Seeing that some of the materials
were already used, the police did not retrieve them anymore. Thereafter,
all the money and items recovered from the three accused were returned
to Word.
Version of the Defense:
The accused-minor testified that while riding his bike in the morning
of December 11, 2004, he found 30 pieces of US$100 bills near Word's car,
but no Philippine currency. 16 He kept the money in his pocket and
proceeded to deliver bread. Afterwards, he went to his co-accused cousin
to ask him what to do with the money. While they were talking, Pante
overheard their conversation. Being the only adult among them, Pante told
them to get the money and proceed to the tree house. On their way to the
tree house, Pante grabbed the money and counted it. Thereafter, he got 17
pieces of US$100 dollar bills for himself. His co-accused cousin received
US$500.00 while he kept US$2,350.00. Pante went home with his share and
never returned. 17
The other accused-minor admitted that his cousin gave him
US$500.00 on the same day Word lost his money. However, he gave it back
to his cousin so he could return it to Word.
On the other hand, Pante testified that on December 11, 2004 at
around 6:30 p.m.,he saw his two co-accused pass by the back of the bakery
where he was working. They were carrying items like Playstation and new
shoes. He asked them where they got the money to buy those things and
learned that one of them found a bundle of dollar bills. He admitted
receiving 10 dollar bills from his co-accused as his "balato." He kept the
money for a few days then exchanged them to Philippine currency. He used
the money to buy a JVC component, a gas stove with a tank, and a CD
cassette. 18 When police authorities came to his house on December 21,
2004 demanding return of the money, he told his wife to get the remaining
US$300.00 and P4,660.00 and turned it over to them. 19 aScITE
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court:

In its January 23, 2013 Judgment, the RTC found all three accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft. The evidence
submitted by the prosecution proved that Word lost his money and that
the accused-minor was the finder thereof, and who shared the cash he
found with his co-accused cousin and Pante, the latter both knowing where
the money came from. While the trial Court was convinced that Word lost
dollar bills in the amount of US$4,450, the prosecution failed to prove that
he also lost money in Philippine currency. It found that Pante got
US$1,700.00, while the two accused-minor netted US$500.00 and
US$2,350.00 each.
The trial court noted that Pante even instructed the two minors not
to return the money. Instead of encouraging them to return the cash, Pante
got a portion for himself and headed home. Thus, the trial court did not
give credence to Pante's position that he did not have any interest in
keeping the money. Neither can his act of returning the money be
considered voluntary since he already knew that Word was looking for his
lost money and he only returned it upon the arrival of police authorities in
his house.
The dispositive portion of the RTC's Judgment 20 insofar as petitioner
Pante is concerned, reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing judgment, judgment
is hereby rendered as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
3. Finding the accused FERNANDO PANTE, "GUILTY" beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of theft under Article 308, par. 1 of
the Revised Penal Code and imposing the penalty of imprisonment
ranging from 2 years 4 months and 1 day of prision correccional as
minimum to 9 years and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum.He is
ordered to pay the private complainant Dawson Word the sum of
P59,120.00 as actual damages.
SO ORDERED. 21 (Emphasis in the original)
Aggrieved, Pante appealed 22 the judgment of conviction before the
CA, arguing that the prosecution did not prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. First, the prosecution did not present any proof of ownership over
the money that Word had allegedly lost. 23 Moreover, he argued that
Word's knowledge of Pante's participation in the crime was based solely on
his co-accused's averments 24 which are only circumstantial evidence that
cannot warrant his conviction. Lastly, Pante posited that there was no
unlawful taking of the money on his part because the finder of the lost
money was his co-accused and not himself. Not knowing where it came
from, he averred that he did not have any intent to take money belonging
to another. 25
On the other hand, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG),maintained that Pante's guilt was clearly established beyond
reasonable doubt. No less than the petitioner himself admitted in open
court that he knowingly received US$1,000.00 from the lost money. 26 His
co-accused also testified that Pante actually took US$1,700.00 and insisted
they keep the money to themselves. 27
In fact, Pante's act of returning the items purchased using Word's
money, and the remaining cash amounting to US$300.00 and P4,660.00,
support such allegations. The OSG further contended that Pante is
considered a "finder in law" and guilty of Theft even if the original finder of
the money was his co-accused because he failed to return the same despite
knowledge that it was lost property. 28
Ruling of the Court of Appeals:
The CA, in its assailed February 6, 2015 Decision, 29 affirmed the RTC's
ruling. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE,premises considered, the instant appeal is
hereby DENIED.The Judgment dated January 23, 2013 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Pili, Camarines Sur finding accused-
appellant Fernando Pante y Rangasa guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Theft defined and penalized under Article 308,
par. 2, subpar. (1) of theRevised Penal Code and to pay private
complainant Dawson Word the sum of P59,120.00 as actual
damages is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION in that appellant is
ordered to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 2 years 4 months
and 1 day of prision correccional,as minimum to 13 years of reclusion
temporal,as maximum.
SO ORDERED.30 (Emphasis in the original)
Undeterred, Pante filed the instant the Petition for Review
on Certiorari 31 raising the following —
Issues:
(A) WHETHER THE [CA] ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF
THE PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE
PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
(B) WHETHER THE [CA] ERRED IN CONVICTING THE PETITIONER FOR
THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO
ESTABLISH THAT HE CONSPIRED WITH [HIS CO-ACCUSED] IN THE
COMISSION OF THE CRIME OF THEFT. 32
Our Ruling
The Petition is unmeritorious.
The CA correctly found that the prosecution sufficiently established
Pante's guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft. Under Article
308, par. 2 (1) of the RPC, Theft is also committed by one's failure to deliver
lost property to its owner or local authorities. 33 In this kind of Theft, it is
essential to prove: 1) the finding of lost property; 2) the failure of the finder
to deliver the same to the local authorities or its owner. 34 HEITAD
In the case at bar, both the trial court and the appellate court found
that the prosecution witnesses were able to prove that Word lost his
bundled money after alighting from his car in front of his residence and
forgetting that he had placed them in between his legs. Such fact was
corroborated by the prosecution witness who testified that he positively
saw the accused-minor pick up the bundle of money under Word's car.
In the same vein, all three accused admitted that it was the accused-
minor who found the bundle of money in front of the bakery, which they
later divided among themselves in the following manner: US$1,700.00 for
Pante; and US$500.00 and US$2,350.00 for each of the two accused-minor.
Despite knowing that the money did not rightfully belong to them, Pante
encouraged the two minor accused to keep the money for themselves. He
also appropriated the money for himself by buying various items such as a
JVC component, gas tank, and construction materials. He only returned the
remainder of the money to Word when police authorities showed up in his
house. 35
Time and again, this Court has held that greater weight is given to the
positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witness than the
accused's denial and explanation concerning the commission of the
crime. 36 Mere denials are only self-serving evidence whose evidentiary
weight cannot outweigh the declaration of credible witnesses who testified
on affirmative matters. 37
In relation thereto, findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of
the testimonial evidence of the parties as well as its conclusion on its
findings, are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect. 38 This is
because of the unique advantage of the trial court to observe, at close
range, the conduct, demeanor and deportment of the witness as they
testify. 39 This rule applies even more when such findings are affirmed by
the appellate court. When the trial court's findings have been affirmed by
the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court. 40
Anent Pante's argument that he cannot be convicted for Theft
because he is not the finder of the lost property, we are not persuaded. The
question of whether criminal appropriation of found property can be
committed by a person other than the one by whom the property is first
found has been lengthily discussed and answered in the affirmative
in People v. Avila,41 viz.:
From a comparison of the definitions given above it is obvious
that the most fundamental notion in the crime of theft is taking of
the thing to be appropriated into the physical power of the thief,
which idea is qualified by other conditions, such as that taking must
be effected animo lucrandi and without the consent of the owner;
and it will be here noted that the definition does not require that the
taking should be effected against the will of the owner but merely
that it should be without consent, — a distinction of no slight no sight
importance.
Upon these considerations it is evident that the taking and
appropriation of a thing by one who finds it, knowing the same to
have been misplaced or lost by the true owner, and with
acknowledge of his identify, is legitimately within to the second
subsection article 517 of the Penal Code the authors of the code
have merely extended the general definition to a special case about
which otherwise some doubt might have existed; and we cannot
impute to them the clumsy mistake of having imported into the law
of theft a form of offense foreign to that conception and which
should properly have been incorporated in the chapter dealing
with estafa.
What has been said is of the greatest practical importance in
dealing the problem now in hand, for it determines the proper point
of view for the correct interpretation of the provision relating to the
theft of found property; namely, the provision should be interpreted
according to its true spirit and conformably with the doctrines that
inform it. If we had discovered that this form of theft is really a
species of estafa wrenched from its proper associations and
artificially placed under a heading where it does not belong, much
could be said in favor of a strict and literal interpretation; but when
it is made to appear that the criminal misappropriation of found
property is theft upon general principles of jurisprudence and not
some other crime, it becomes obvious that the provision in question
should be applied in accordance with its true spirit.
What then is the meaning of the second subsection of article
517, in so far as it affects the case before us? The words used in the
law are literally these: "Those are guilty of theft: ...2. Who, finding a
lost thing, and knowing who the owner is, appropriate it with intent
to gain." The gist of this offense is the furtive taking and
misappropriation of the property found, with knowledge of its
true ownership; and the word "finding" (in
Spanish, encontrandose) must not be treated as a cabalistic or
sacramental first finder. The furtive appropriation of the found
property, under the conditions stated, is the principal thing. In
the case before us, the accused if not the actual finder, occupied
towards the purse, from the time he took it into his hands,
precisely the same relation as if he had picked it up himself. The
purpose of the law is to protect the owner of the lost thing from
appropriation by the person into whose hands it may come,
with knowledge of its ownership. The accused was a finder in
law, if not in fact; and his act in appropriating the property was
of precisely the same character as if it had been originally found
by him.42 ATICcS
xxx xxx xxx

The same writer then passes on to a proposition more directly
connected with the case now before us, since it relates to the act of
misappropriation by one who receives the property by voluntary
substitution from the actual finder. Upon this the rule there
formulated is this: "One who receives property from the finder
thereof assumes, in legal contemplation, by voluntary
substitution, as to the property and the owner, the relation
occupied by the finder, placing himself in the finder's stead.In
such a case, whether the person taking the property is guilty must
be determined on the same principles that govern in the case of the
actual finder." (17 R. C. L.,36.)
In Allen vs. State (91 Ala.,19) some children found a pocketbook
containing money and certain papers sufficient to identify the owner.
Upon arriving home, the children delivered the purse to their father, who
converted it of his own use. It was held that the accused was properly
convicted and that his guilt was to be determined by the same principles
that would have government if he had been the actual finder. In the
course of the opinion the following language was used:
"...Finding it, and its delivery to the defendant by
the finder, did not deprive the money, as to the owner
of the character status of lost property; the ownership
remained in him, drawing to it, constructively, the right
of possession. When defendant took the money
from his children, he knew it had been lost, and
took it as such. It is manifest the children had no
felonious intent, and properly delivered the money
to their father for his disposition. By receiving it
from his children, knowing it was lost, defendant
assumed, in legal contemplation, by voluntary
substitution, as to the money and the owner, the
relation occupied by the finders, placing himself in
their stead.Otherwise a person knowingly receiving
lost property from the finder, who had no intent to
steal, with the felonious intent to appropriate it to his
own use, escapes punishment. In such case, whether or
not the person taking the money principles which
govern in the case of the actual finder." 43 (Emphasis
supplied)
In fine, a "finder" under Article 308, par. 2 (1) of the RPC is not only
limited to the actual finder of the lost property 44since the gist of the offense
is the furtive taking and misappropriation of the property found. 45 Though
not the actual finder, there is no dispute that Pante knew for a fact that his
two co-accused minor did not own the subject money. He knew for a fact
that his co-accused minor merely found the money along the road while
the latter was delivering bread. 46 Instead of returning the money, Pante
convinced his co-accused minors not to return the money and to divide it
among themselves. At that moment, Pante placed himself precisely in the
situation as if he was the actual finder. Otherwise stated, petitioner was a
"finder in law," if not in fact; and his act in appropriating the money was of
precisely of the same character as if it had been originally found by
him. 47 His criminal intent to commandeer the money found was altogether
clear at that point.
The rationale for the "finder in law" concept is not difficult to fathom.
It is precisely to protect the owner of the lost property in the event the lost
property is transferred from one individual to another and to prevent the
"finder in law" from escaping liability by claiming that he was not the actual
finder thereof but was merely entrusted custody thereof by someone who
had no intention to appropriate the same. "Otherwise a person knowingly
receiving lost property from the finder, who had no intent to steal, with the
felonious intent to appropriate it to his [or her] own use, escapes
punishment. In such case, whether or not the person taking the money is
guilty of [theft] must be determined on the same principles which govern
in the case of the actual finder." 48
Having obtained possession of Word's lost money, Pante had the
opportunity and the obligation to return the lost property to its rightful
owner or to the local authorities, but he unjustifiably refrained from doing
so. Assuming for the sake of argument that he did not know that the money
belonged to Word, Pante would still be held liable for Theft for failing to
return the amount. This is because the RPC does not require that the thief
must know the owner of the lost property. 49 This is precisely why the
subject penal provision gave the finder the option to return the lost
property not only to the owner thereof but also to the local authorities. 50
As to the second issue, this Court notes that petitioner raised the
issue on conspiracy for the first time on appeal. On this point, we
heed Rebadulla v. Republic,51 where it was pronounced that:
It is well-settled that no question will be entertained on appeal
unless it has been raised in the proceedings below. Points of law,
theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the
lower court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial body, need not
be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the
first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of fairness and due
process impel this rule. Any issue raised for the first time on appeal
is barred by estoppel. 52
Clearly, issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be
entertained because to do so would be contrary to the principles of fairness
and due process. 53 As such, we agree with the findings of the RTC and the
CA in finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Theft.
However, this Court finds it necessary to modify the penalty to be
imposed upon petitioner pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 10951, 54 which
became effective during the pendency of the case. 55 The Act provides that
its retroactivity shall be given effect insofar as it is favorable to the accused
or person serving sentence by final judgment. 56 Hence, it is applicable to
petitioner's case.
Given that the value involved in this case is P59,120.00, the penalty
under Article 309 of the RPC, as amended by Section 81 of RA No. 10951,
is prisión correccional in its minimum and medium periods 57 which ranges
from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2)
months. 58 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term
of the penalty shall be taken from the penalty next lower in
degree i.e.,arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, 59 or
anywhere from two months and one day to six (6) months. Hence,
petitioner must suffer a minimum indeterminate penalty of four months
and 20 days of arresto mayor,as minimum to two (2) years, eleven (11)
months, and ten (10) days of prisioncorreccional,as maximum. TIADCc
Moreover, in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, the amount
of P59,120.00 shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%)
per annum from finality of this Decision until fully paid.
WHEREFORE,the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED for lack
of reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals. The February 6, 2015
Decision and June 9, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 36219 are hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION in that petitioner
Fernando Pante y Rangasa is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of four (4) months and twenty (20) days of arresto mayor,as
minimum, to two (2) years, eleven (11) months, and ten (10) days
of prision correccional,as maximum. He is also ordered to pay private
complainant the amount of P59,120.00 as actual damages, with interest at
the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of this Decision
until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Leonen, C.J. and Inting, J.,concur.
Delos Santos, J.,please see separate concurring opinion.
Rosario, * J.,is on official leave.
Separate Opinions
DELOS SANTOS,J.,concurring:
I concur with the ponencia ably-written by my esteemed colleague,
Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando, and submit this Opinion to
express my thoughts and stress on some particular points.
Petitioner Fernando Pante y Rangasa (Pante) was charged with theft
under Article 308, paragraph 2 (1), of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), which
provides:
Article 308. Who are liable for theft. x x x
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to
deliver the same to the local authorities or to its owner;
xxx xxx xxx
Reading the above provision, it is noteworthy that it does not matter
if the finder knows the true owner of the lost property for him to be
convicted of the crime of theft for failure to return the same. As pointed out
in the ponencia, the RPCdoes not require that the thief must know the
owner of the lost property; the subject penal provision gives the finder the
option to return the lost property not only to the owner thereof but also to
the local authorities. This is an apparent change from the second
subsection of Article 517 of the 1870 Codigo Penal, enforced in the
Philippines prior to the effectivity of theRevised Penal Code in 1932, which
requires that the finder must have knowledge of the identity of the true
owner of the misplaced or lost thing, 1 to wit: "Son reos de hurto: ...(2) Los
que encontrándose una cosa perdida y sabiendo quién es su dueño se la
apropriaren co intención de lucro" 2 or, if translated, says, "Those are guilty of
theft: ... 2. Who, finding a lost thing, and knowing who the owner is,appropriate
it with intent to gain." 3
Relevant to the above discussion is the provision under Article 719 of
the New Civil Code of the Philippines which sheds light on a situation where
the finder of a lost property does not know the owner of the thing found. It
provides:
Article 719. Whoever finds a movable, which is not treasure, must
return it to its previous possessor. If the latter is unknown, the finder
shall immediately deposit it with the mayor of the city or municipality
where the finding has taken place.
The finding shall be publicly announced by the mayor for two
consecutive weeks in the way he deems best.
If the movable cannot be kept without deterioration, or without
expenses which considerably diminish its value, it shall be sold at
public auction eight days after the publication.
Six months from the publication having elapsed without the owner
having appeared, the thing found, or its value, shall be awarded to
the finder. The finder and the owner shall be obliged, as the case
may be, to reimburse the expenses.
As it stands now, the proper thing for a finder of a lost property of
unknown owner, except hidden treasure, to do is to return or turn it over
to the proper authority, who is the mayor of the city or municipality where
the finding has taken place. Thereafter, the provision in Article 719 shall
apply. Nevertheless, the failure, per se,to turn it over to the mayor does not
constitute the crime of theft. People v. Rodrigo 4 instructs that there must be
a deliberate failure on the part of the finder to return the lost thing. Thus:
[U]nder paragraph 2, subparagraph (1),the elements are (1) the
finding of lost property; and (2) the failure of the finder to deliver the
same to the local authorities or to its owner. In this kind of theft
intent of gain is inferred from the deliberate failure to deliver the lost
property to the proper person,the finder knowing that the property
does not belong to him.
As such, if a finder of lost thing of unknown owner turns it over to
other local authorities or to any individual with the instruction or intention
of returning it to the owner or to the proper authority, he could not be held
guilty of the crime of theft. Such action negates the intent not to return the
thing to the proper persons, much less an intent to gain or to appropriate
the lost property. On the other hand, if the finder uses or appropriates the
thing found or keeps the same for an unreasonable period of time, he is
certainly guilty of theft. Such action constitutes a deliberate failure to
deliver the lost property to the proper persons which is punished under
Article 308 paragraph 2 (1). acEHCD
In this case, the actions of Pante clearly establish that there was a
deliberate intention on his part not to return or turn over the lost dollar
bills he received from his minor co-accused to the owner or to the proper
authority. First, he knew that the dollar bills were not owned but were just
found by his minor co-accused. 5 Second, he took a portion of the lost dollar
bills, kept the same for a few days, and exchanged them to Philippine
Currency. 6 Third, he instructed his minor co-accused not to return the
money. Fourth, he used the money to buy JVC component, a gas stove with
a tank, a CD cassette, and construction materials. 7 Concomitantly, not only
that Pante did not have the intention to return the lost property to the
owner or to proper authorities, he likewise appropriated the same for his
own gain and benefit. Thus, he is guilty of the crime of theft.
Furthermore, I agree with the ponencia in rejecting Pante's argument
that he cannot be convicted of theft because he is not a finder of the lost
property. The ponente has appropriately cited the case of People v. Avila 8 to
elucidate that the finder under Article 308, par. 2 (1) is not limited to the
actual finder or "finder in fact" of the lost property but also extends to the
"finder in law" or one who receives the lost property from the actual finder
and then appropriates the same or deliberately fails to return it to the
owner or to proper authorities.
I must stress, though, that for one to be considered a "finder in law"
and be held guilty for the crime of theft, he must have received the lost
property from the actual finder who has no intention to appropriate the
said property. This is the scenario under which the ruling in People v.
Avila (Avila) was arrived at by the Court. In that case, it was the driver of
the carretela which actually found the purse containing money, gold coins,
and jewels, left by his passenger inside the aforesaid carriage. He, however,
handed the purse to the accused therein, who happened to be police
officer, and asked him to deliver it to the owner. The accused therein,
instead of returning it, appropriated the purse with all its contents.
Accordingly, the Court pointed out the principal question in the said case to
wit:
The principal question presented for consideration is one of
law x x x. In other words, is this form of theft limited to the actual
finder, using the word in its literal and most limited sense, or does it
include misappropriation by any one into whose hands the property
may be placed by the actual finder for delivery to the true and known
owner? x x x
In ruling that the accused is guilty of theft, the Court in Avila held that
"the accused occupied towards the purse, from the time he took it into his
hands, precisely the same relation as if he had picked it up himself." 9 It
underscored that "the accused was a finder in law, if not in fact; and his act
in appropriating the property was of precisely the same character as if it
had been originally found by him." 10 Citing English and American
jurisprudence, the Court further ruled that "one who receives property
from the finder thereof assumes, in legal contemplation, by voluntary
substitution, as to the property and the owner, the relation occupied by the
finder, placing himself in the finder's stead. In such a case, whether the
person taking the property in guilty must be determined on the same
principles that govern in the case of the actual finder." 11 To further support
its stand, the Court cited the American case of Allen v. State (Allen) 12 and
held:
In [Allen],some children found a pocketbook containing money and
certain papers sufficient to identify the owner. Upon arriving home,
the children delivered the purse to their father, who converted it to
his own use. It was held that the accused was properly convicted and
that his guilt was to be determined by the same principles that would
have governed if he had been the actual finder. In the course of the
opinion the following language was used:
* * * Finding it, and its delivery to the defendant by the
finder, did not deprive the money, as to the owner, of
the character or status of lost property; the ownership
remained in him, drawing to it, constructively, the right
of possession. When defendant took the money from
his children, he knew it had been lost, and took it as
such. It is manifest the children had no felonious
intent,and properly delivered the money to their father
for his disposition. By receiving it from his children,
knowing it was lost, defendant assumed, in legal
contemplation, by voluntary substitution, as to the
money and the owner, the relation occupied by the
finders, placing himself in their stead. Otherwise a
person knowingly receiving lost property from the
finder, who had no intent to steal,with the felonious
intent to appropriate it to his own use, escapes
punishment. In such case, whether or not the person
taking the money is guilty of larceny must be
determined on the same principles which govern in the
case of the actual finder.
Based on the foregoing pronouncements and under the
circumstances in which Avila was decided by the Court, and at the expense
of being repetitive, I am of the opinion that for one to be considered a
"finder in law" and be held guilty for the crime of theft, he must have
received the lost property from the actual finder who has no intention to
appropriate the same. I find this compelling to point out due to my humble
opinion that if the actual finder already has the deliberate intention not to
return the lost property, then he is the one who should be held liable as a
principal in the crime for theft and that the persons who receive or profit
from the stolen property should only be considered as a fence, which under
our present laws may be punished as an accessory under paragraph 3 of
Article 19 of the RPC 13 to the crime of theft, or as a principal in the crime of
fencing under Presidential Decree No. 1612, 14 otherwise known as the
"Anti-Fencing Law of 1979." 15 Having said that, let me explain why Pante is
properly convicted as a principal in the crime of theft and not merely
considered as a fence. SDHTEC
It may be recalled that when Pante's minor co-accused found the lost
bundle of dollar bills, he went to his cousin, the other minor co-accused,
and Pante. 16 At this point in time, there was no deliberate intent yet on the
part of said minor co-accused not to return the lost property to its owner
or to the proper authorities as the said minor actual finder did not know
yet what to do with the money. 17 Then came Pante, who, being the only
adult among the accused, got hold of the lost money, took 17 pieces of
US$100.00 dollar bills for himself and instructed the two minor co-accused
not to return the money. 18 At that moment, by taking a portion of the lost
money, Pante became a "finder in law" with respect to the amount he took
from the actual finder-minor accused. He assumed, in legal contemplation,
the relation occupied by the actual finder with respect to the property and
the owner. This obliged him to return the lost and found property to the
owner or to the proper authorities. Instead, Pante appropriated the
aforesaid amount for himself which makes him liable as principal in the
crime of theft. It may not be amiss to point out that it was only after Pante
took possession of a portion of the lost property and only after giving
instruction to the two minor co-accused to keep the money for themselves
that the actual finder-minor accused's intention not to return the money
became manifest and deliberate when he acceded to Pante's instruction
and began appropriating the money he found.
Based on the foregoing disquisitions, I vote to DENY the petition
and AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals with MODIFICATION as
to the penalty imposed against petitioner Fernando Pante y Rangasa, as
discussed in the ponencia.
Footnotes
* On official leave.
1. Rollo,pp. 10-27.
2. CA rollo,pp. 67-83; penned by Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia and concurred

in by Associate Justices Leoncia R. Dimagiba and Maria Elisa Sempio Diy.
3. Id. at 105-106.
4. Records, pp. 327-338; penned by Presiding Judge Marvel C. Clavecilla.

5. Id. at 1-2.
6. Id. at 1.
7. TSN, July 18, 2008, pp. 5-6.
8. TSN, March 13, 2008, p. 26.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 27.
11. TSN, July 18, 2008, pp. 5-6.
12. Records, p. 11. See Joint Affidavit of SPO3 Jovito B. De Castro, SPO3 Pedro D.
Corporal, and PO2 Herenerio Z. Burgos.
13. Id. at 189.

14. TSN, October 3, 2008, pp. 4-6.
15. Records, pp. 190-191.
16. TSN, May 19, 2010, pp. 9-10.

17. TSN, July 1, 2010, pp. 3-12.
18. TSN, August 10, 2011, pp. 5-8.
19. Id. at 9-11.

20. Records, pp. 327-338; see also rollo,pp. 65-76.
21. Id. at 338.
22. CA rollo,pp. 18-32.

23. Id. at 31.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. TSN, August 10, 2011, pp. 6-8.
27. TSN, July 1, 2010, pp. 3-12.
28. CA rollo,p. 58.

29. Id. at 67-83.
30. Id. at 82-83.
31. Rollo,pp. 10-27.

32. Id. at 17-18.
33. REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 308, par. 2 (1).

34. People v. Rodrigo,123 Phil. 310, 313 (1966).
35. TSN, August 10, 2011, p. 10.
36. Fantastico v. Malisce, Sr.,750 Phil. 120, 133-134 (2015),citing People v.

Alvarado,341 Phil. 725, 734 (1997).
37. Id. at 134.
38. Id. at 135.

39. Id.,citing People v. Dumadag,667 Phil. 664, 673 (2011).
40. People v. Mores,712 Phil. 480, 494 (2013).

41. 44 Phil. 720, 723 (1923).
42. Id. at 726-727.
43. Id. at 730-731.

44. Reyes, L.,2012. The Revised Penal Code Book II. 18th ed. p. 747.
45. Id. citing People v. Avila, supra note 41.
46. TSN, October 5, 2011, p. 10.

47. People v. Avila, supra note 41 at 726-727.
48. Id. at 730-731.
49. Campanilla M.,2018. Criminal Law Reviewer II.p. 332 citing People v. Panotes, et
al.,C.A.,36 O.G. 1008).
50. Id.
51. 824 Phil. 982 (2018).
52. Id. at 994, citing S.C. Megaworld Construction and Development Corporation v.
Engr. Parada,717 Phil. 752, 760 (2013).
53. Punongbayan-Visitacion v. People of the Philippines,823 Phil. 212, 222-223 (2018).

54. Republic Act No. 10951, entitled "An Act Adjusting the Amount or the Value of
Property and Damage on Which a Penalty is Based, and the Fines Imposed
under the Revised Penal Code, Amending for the Purpose Act No. 3815,
Otherwise Known as "The Revised Penal Code," as Amended. Approved:
August 27, 2019.
55. Republic Act No. 10951, Sec. 102 provides:
Section 102. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect within fifteen (15) days
after its publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
56. Republic Act No. 10951, Section 100.
57. Republic Act No. 10951, Section 81 provides:
Section 81. The penalty of prisión correccional in its minimum and medium
periods, if the value of the property stolen is more than Twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000) but does not exceed Six hundred thousand pesos
(P600,000).
58. The range of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods is as
follows:
Minimum: Six months and one day to one year, eight months and 20 days.
Medium: One year, eight months and 21 days to two years, 11 months and
10 days.
Maximum: Two years, 11 months and 11 days to four years and two
months.
59. The range of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods is as follows:
Minimum: Two (2) months and one (1) day to three (3) months and ten (10)
days.
Medium: Three (3) months and eleven (11) days to four (4) months and
twenty (20) days.
Maximum: Four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days to six (6) months.
DELOS SANTOS, J.,concurring:
1. See People v. Avila,44 Phil. 720 (1923).
2. See Valenzuela v. People,G.R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007.
3. People v. Avila,supra note 1.

4. 123 Phil. 310 (1983).
5. Ponencia,p. 3.
6. Id. at 4, 6-7.
7. Id. at 7.
8. Supra note 1.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. 91 Ala.,19.
13. Article 19. Accessories.— Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the
commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as
principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of
the following manners:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects
of the crime.
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or

instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery.
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of
the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or
whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or
an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be
habitually guilty of some other crime.
14. Section 2 of PD 1612 defines Fencing as "the act of any person who, with
intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep,
acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other
manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he
knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft." The same Section also states
that a Fence "includes any person, firm, association, corporation or
partnership or other organization who/which commits the act of fencing."
(Cahulogan v. People,G.R. No. 225695, March 21, 2018)
15. In Dizon-Pamintuan v. People (G.R. No. 111426, July 11, 1994, 234 SCRA 63),the
Court held that while a Fence may be prosecuted either as an accessory of
Robbery/Theft or a principal for Fencing, there is a preference for the
prosecution of the latter as it provides for harsher penalties.
16. Ponencia,pp. 3-4.
17. Id. at 6-7.

18. Id. at 3-4, 6-7, 9.
||| (Pante y Rangasa v. People, G.R. No. 218969, [January 18, 2021])
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 212191. September 5, 2018.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RICHARD

DILLATAN, SR. y PAT and DONATO GARCIA y DUAZO, accused-
appellants.
DECISION
PERALTA, J :
p
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal filed by herein accused-

appellants Richard Dillatan, Sr. y Pat (Dillatan) and Donato Garcia y
Duazo (Garcia) seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA), dated August 30, 2013, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
05294, which denied their appeal and affirmed, with modification, the
October 24, 2011 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas,
Isabela, Branch 23, finding herein accused-appellants guilty of the crime of
robbery with homicide, imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordering them to pay civil indemnity as well as moral and
actual damages.
The facts, as established by the prosecution, are as follows:
Herein private complainants, the spouses Henry and Violeta
Acob (Spouses Acob), were owners of a market stall at the public market of
Sta. Rosa Aurora, Isabela. Around 6 o'clock in the evening of February 7,
2010, the Spouses Acob, together with their son, Homer, closed their stall
and proceeded home by riding together on their motorcycle. Homer was
the driver, Violeta sat at the middle, while Henry sat behind her. They were
approaching the entrance to their barangayaround 6:30 p.m. when they
noticed two persons, whom they later identified as herein accused-
appellants, near a motorcycle. When they passed, accused-appellants rode
the motorcycle and tailed them. Accused-appellants eventually caught up
with them, whereupon, accused Dillatan forced them to stop and
immediately declared a holdup. Violeta embraced Homer, while Dillatan
grabbed her belt bag which contained P70,000.00 cash. Thereafter, Dillatan
uttered, "barilin mo na." Garcia then fired at the victims hitting, first, the left
hand of Violeta. The bullet went through the left hand of Violeta and pierced
Homer's chest causing the latter to fall down together with the motorcycle.
Henry, on the other hand, was able to get off the motorcycle and tried to
escape but Garcia also fired at him thereby hitting his right knee. Accused-
appellants, thereafter, fled through their motorcycle. Several people then
came to the aid of the private complainants and brought them to the
hospital where Homer later expired by reason of his gunshot wound.
Violeta and Henry were treated for their wounds. Accused-appellants were
apprehended by police authorities later at night where they were
subsequently identified by Violeta at the police station as the ones who
grabbed her belt bag and shot them. A criminal complaint was
subsequently filed against accused-appellants.
On February 8, 2010, an Information was filed against herein
accused-appellants, the accusatory portion of which reads, thus:
That on or about the 7th day of February, 2010 in the
Municipality of Aurora, Province of Isabela, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused RICHARD
DILLATAN, SR. y PAT and DONATO GARCIA y DUAZO, conspiring,
confederating together, and helping one another, with intent to gain
and by means of force, violence and intimidation against persons,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take, steal
and carry away a belt bag containing cash money in the amount of
SEVENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P70,000.00) and belonging to
[complainants] against their will and consent to the damage and
prejudice of the said owners, in the aforesaid amount of SEVENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P70,000.00).
That during the occasion and by reason of the said robbery,
the said accused in pursuance of their conspiracy, and to enable
them to take, [steal] and bring away the said amount of SEVENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P70,000.00), with intent to kill and without any
just motive, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault, attack and shoot the [person] of Homer Acob on his chest
which directly caused his death and the bullet penetrating Homer
Acob's body and hitting Violeta Acob inflicting gunshot wound on
[her] left hand and Henry Acob hitting him on his right knee, which
injuries would ordinarily cause the death of said Violeta Acob and
Henry Acob, thus, performing all the acts of execution which should
have produced the crime of homicide, as a consequence, but
nevertheless, did not produce it, by reason of causes independent of
their will, that is by the timely and able medical assistance rendered
to the said Violeta Acob and Henry Acob, which prevented their
death.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
Accused-appellants were arraigned on September 29, 2010 where
both pleaded not guilty. 4
In their defense, accused-appellants denied the allegations of the
prosecution and also raised the defense of alibi. For his part, Garcia claimed
that on February 7, 2010, he was at a tricycle terminal in Aurora, Isabela
where he worked as a dispatcher until 7 o'clock in the evening. His
allegation was corroborated by the testimony of another tricycle driver who
claimed to have seen him during the night in question. On the part of
Dillatan, he testified that he was in his bakery in Quezon, Isabela until 7
o'clock in the evening of February 7, 2010. His testimony was corroborated
by his own witness.
Pre-trial was conducted on October 20, 2010. 5 Thereafter, trial
ensued.
On October 24, 2011, the RTC rendered its Decision finding accused-
appellants guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt, a
JUDGMENT is hereby rendered convicting accused RICHARD
DILLATAN y PAT and DONATO GARCIA y DUAZO of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 294,
par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, thus, imposing upon them the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The Accused are also ordered to jointly and severally pay the
following:
a. The amount of Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) as civil
indemnity, and another Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000)
as moral damages to the Heirs of Homer Acob;
b. The amount of seventy thousand pesos (P70,000) as actual
damages to spouses Henry and Violeta Acob;
c. The amount of Forty-eight thousand six hundred seventy-
[t]hree and 75/[1]00 pesos (P48,673.75) to Henry Acob as
reimbursement of his medical expenses;
d. The amount of Five thousand five hundred seventy-one
pesos (P5,571) to Violeta Acob as reimbursement of her
medical expenses.
SO ORDERED. 6
The RTC held that: all the elements of the crime of robbery are
present in the instant case; robbery was the main purpose of accused-
appellants; the killing of Homer and the infliction of injuries upon Violeta
and Henry are only committed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery;
hence, these crimes are merged into a special complex crime of robbery
with homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC). The RTC further held that the prosecution was able to
sufficiently establish that the accused-appellants are the perpetrators of
the crime when they were positively identified by Violeta.
Accused-appellants appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.
On August 30, 2013, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision
affirming the Decision of the RTC with modification by ordering accused-
appellants to further pay temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00.
The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC that the prosecution was able
to establish the presence of all the elements of robbery with homicide by
proving that Dillatan declared a holdup and grabbed Violeta's belt bag,
while Garcia fired at the private complainants in order to facilitate the
taking of the bag and their escape from the crime scene. The CA sustained
the RTC in giving credence to the testimony of Violeta who positively
identified the accused-appellants in court, as well as in the police station,
on the same night that the crime took place. The CA also gave credence to
Henry's testimony identifying accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the
crime. The CA held that accused-appellants' defenses of denial and alibi
could not prevail over the positive testimony of Violeta and Henry who
pointed to them as the ones who robbed and fired at them.
On September 11, 2013, accused-appellants, through counsel, filed a
Notice of Appeal 7 manifesting their intention to appeal the CA Decision to
this Court.
In its Resolution 8 dated October 29, 2013, the CA gave due course to
accused-appellants Notice of Appeal and ordered the elevation of the
records of the case to this Court.
Hence, this appeal was instituted.
In a Resolution 9 dated July 7, 2014, this Court, among others, notified
the parties that they may file their respective Supplemental Briefs, if they
so desire.
In its Manifestation and Motion 10 dated August 27, 2014, the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) manifested that it will not be filing a
Supplemental Brief because it had already adequately addressed in its Brief
filed before the CA all the issues and arguments raised by accused-
appellants in their Brief.
In the same manner, accused-appellants filed a Manifestation in Lieu
of Supplemental Brief 11 dated September 2, 2014, indicating that they no
longer intend to file a Supplemental Brief on the ground that the issues
have been thoroughly discussed and applicable defenses and arguments
were already raised in their Brief which was filed with the CA.
In their Brief, accused-appellants mainly contend that the RTC erred
in convicting them of the crime charged, and the CA, in affirming their
conviction, despite the incredibility of the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, and the failure of the prosecution to establish the identity of the
assailants.
The appeal lacks merit. The Court finds no cogent reason to reverse
accused-appellants' conviction.
Essentially, accused-appellants question the credibility of the
prosecution's key witnesses, Henry and Violeta Acob, who identified them
as the malefactors.
First, accused-appellants argue that, since the alleged crime
happened so fast and in a very short period of approximately two minutes,
Violeta and Henry could not have clearly seen and remembered the faces
of the perpetrators. Second, accused-appellants attempt to cast doubt on
their identification by claiming that there was inadequate lighting at
the locus criminis. They contend that the poor illumination at the crime
scene made positive identification impossible; thus, the trial court should
not have accepted the identification of accused-appellants as the
malefactors.
The Court is not persuaded.
The basic issues raised by accused-appellants are mainly factual and
it is a well settled rule that in criminal cases, factual findings of the trial court
are generally accorded great weight and respect on appeal, especially when
such findings are supported by substantial evidence on record. 12 It is only
in exceptional circumstances, such as when the trial court overlooked
material and relevant matters, that the Court will evaluate the factual
findings of the court below. 13 More importantly, it is an established
principle in appellate review that the trial court's assessment of the
credibility of the witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies
are accorded great respect and even conclusive effect and that these
findings and conclusions assume greater weight if they are affirmed by the
CA. 14 Guided by the foregoing principle, the Court finds no cogent reason
to disturb the RTC's factual findings, as affirmed by the CA.
Robbery with homicide exists when a homicide is committed either
by reason, or on occasion, of the robbery. 15 To sustain a conviction for
robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the following elements:
(1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or
intimidation against persons; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the
taking is animo lucrandi or with intent to gain; and (4) on the occasion or by
reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in the generic sense,
was committed. 16 A conviction needs certainty that the robbery is the
central purpose and objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely
incidental to the robbery. 17 The intent to rob must precede the taking of
human life, but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery. 18
Under the given facts, the Court finds no error in the findings of both
the RTC and the CA that the prosecution was able to clearly establish that:
(1) accused-appellants forced Homer, Henry and Violeta to stop their
motorcycle; (2) Dillatan declared the holdup and grabbed the belt bag in
Violeta's possession; and (3) thereafter, Garcia fired at the victims in order
to preserve their possession of the stolen item and to facilitate their escape.
The Court, likewise, finds no cogent reason to disturb the rulings of
both the RTC and the CA in giving credence to the testimonies of Henry and
Violeta, especially, their positive and categorical identification of accused-
appellants as the perpetrators of the crime.
Thus, pertinent portions of Violeta's testimony in open court are as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Q. In going home coming from your store, Madam Witness, can you
recall what time did you leave the Public Market of Aurora,
Isabela?
A. 6:00 o'clock in the evening, sir.
Q. Were you able to reach your home at Barangay Diamantina,
Aurora, Isabela, Madam Witness?
A. No, sir.
Q. Can you please tell us why you were not able to reach your home
at Barangay Diamantina, Aurora, Isabela, Madam Witness?
A. When we were about to enter our barangay a motorcycle came near
us, sir.
Q. Do you know who are these persons riding on a motorcycle,
Madam Witness?
A. No, sir.
Q. When these two (2) persons riding on a motorcycle went near you,
what happened then, Madam Witness, if there was any?
A. When the motorcycle came near us I heard the words stop this is a
hold-up, give your bag to us, sir.
Q. Did you know who was this person declaring hold-up, Madam
Witness?
A. That man, sir. (The witness pointed to a man sitting on the first
bench of the Court and who when asked his name gave his
name as Richard Dillatan, Sr.)
Q. When accused Richard Dillatan, Sr. declared hold-up, what did you
do, Madam Witness, if there was any?
A. When I was about to give my bag he said again "shoot them," sir.
Q. To whom did you give your bag, Madam Witness?
A. It was grabbed from me by that person I previously identified a
while ago as Richard Dillatan, Sr., sir.
Q. Was he able to get your bag, Madam Witness?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You also mentioned a while ago that somebody uttered, "sige
barilin mo na sila," do you know who was that person who
uttered that (sic) words?
A. The same person who took my bag, sir.
Q. What happened, Madam Witness, when accused Richard Dillatan,
Sr. instructed his co-accused to shoot you?
A. I was hit on my left hand and the bullet which penetrated my hand
hit my son on his chest, sir.
Q. By the way, Madam Witness, do you know this person who shot
you?
A. I know him, sir.
Q. Can you please tell us his name, Madam Witness, if you know?
A. That man, sir (The witness pointed to a man sitting on the first
bench of the Court and who when asked his name answered
Donato Garcia)
xxx xxx xxx
Q. You mentioned a while ago that a motorcycle went near you,
Madam Witness, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How far were these two (2) persons from you when they went near
you, Madam Witness?
A. Like this, sir. (The witness demonstrated the distance and when
measured it is 25 centimeters away).
Q. When these two (2) male persons you identified as Donato Garcia
and Richard Dillatan, Sr. went near you, were you able to
recognize their [faces], Madam Witness?
A. I recognized them because we were near with (sic) them, sir.
Q. You mentioned a while ago that the incident transpired at around
6:30 o'clock in the evening, how come that you were able to
identify the faces of the two accused, Madam Witness?
A. Because it was still bright that time, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Madam Witness, when you were shot upon by accused Donato
Garcia, what happened next?
A. They shot also my husband and he was hit on his knee, sir.
Q. Who shot your husband, Madam Witness?
A. Donato Garcia, sir.
Q. How many times did he shoot your husband, Madam Witness?
A. Only once, sir.
Q. By the way, where was your husband when accused Donato Garcia
shot him, Madam Witness?
A. He was running when he was shot, sir.
Q. And Donato Garcia was using the same firearm then, Madam
Witness?
A. Yes, sir. 19
Henry also testified, during cross-examination, as follows:
Q. Mr. Witness, you said in your direct-testimony that on your way
home from the Aurora Public Market on February 7, 2010, you
were held up by two (2) men, is this correct?
THE WITNESS:
A. Yes, ma'am
Q. And that the incident happened at the Barangay Road of Barangay
Diamantina, Aurora, Isabela, is that correct?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. And that the incident happened at around 6:30 in the evening, is
this correct?
A. Yes, Ma'am.
Q. And that you were on board a motorcycle, together with your wife
and son, when the incident happened?
A. Yes, Ma'am.
Q. The men who held you up were also on board a motorcycle, is this
correct?
A. Yes, Ma'am.
Q. And that the motorcycle was one (1) meter away from the
motorcycle you were riding at when they declared a hold up, is
this correct?
A. Yes, Ma' am.
Q. And that the man driving the other motorcycle immediately shot
your son, which caused the motorcycle that you were riding at
to fall down, is this correct?
A. Yes, Ma'am.
Q. And that the man who held you up also shot you once, which hit
you on your knee, is this correct, Mr. Witness?
A. Yes, Ma'am.
Q. And that the companion of the man, who shot you, immediately
grabbed the belt bag from your wife, is this correct?
A. Yes, Ma'am, after we were shot.
Q. Mr. Witness, how long did it take for the men who held you up to
declare hold up to time they grabbed the belt bag and sped
away?
A. I cannot recall, Ma'am.
Q. Could it be one (1) minute, Mr. Witness?
A. Maybe two (2) minutes, Ma'am.
Q. So, Mr. Witness, you are saying that the incident happened in more
or less two (2) minutes?
A. Yes, Ma'am.
Q. And that the assailants were one (1) meter away from you when it
happened?
A. Yes, Ma'am.
Q. So, Mr. Witness, can you tell us how were the assailants identified?
A. They were near from (sic) us when they shot us, Ma'am.
Q. You were able to clearly see their faces despite the fact that the
incident happened at 6:30 in the evening?
A. Yes, Ma'am.
Q. Mr. Witness, did you personally identify the accused?
A. I recognized their faces, Ma'am. 20
In this case, both the trial and appellate courts found Violeta's and
Henry's separate testimonies as credible. It is doctrinal that findings of trial
courts on the credibility of witnesses deserve a high degree of respect and
will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing that the trial court
had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances
of weight and substance which could reverse a judgment of conviction. 21 In
fact, in many instances, such findings are even accorded finality. 22 This is
so because the assignment of value to a witness' testimony is essentially
the domain of the trial court, not to mention that it is the trial judge who
has the direct opportunity to observe the demeanor of a witness on the
stand, which opportunity provides him the unique facility in determining
whether or not to accord credence to the testimony or whether the witness
is telling the truth or not. 23 The foregoing doctrine finds application in the
instant case.
Even after carefully going through the records of the case, the Court
still finds no sufficient ground to disturb the findings of both the RTC and
the CA.
The records show that Henry and Violeta positively, categorically and
unhesitatingly identified Dillatan as the one who declared the holdup and
successfully grabbed Violeta's belt bag, while Garcia was the one who fired
at the victims, thereby killing Homer and wounding Henry and Violeta.
The Court is not persuaded by accused-appellants' insistence on their
argument that given the circumstances surrounding the commission of the
crime, the prosecution failed to establish their identity as the malefactors.
First, this Court has ruled that common human experience tells us
that when extraordinary circumstances take place, it is natural for persons
to remember many of the important details. 24 This Court has held that the
most natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the
features and faces of their assailants and observe the manner in which the
crime is committed. 25 Most often the face of the assailant and body
movements thereof, create a lasting impression which cannot be easily
erased from a witness' memory. 26 Experience dictates that precisely
because of the unusual acts of violence committed right before their eyes,
eyewitnesses can remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of
criminals at any given time. 27
Thus, if family members who have witnessed the killing of a loved one
usually strive to remember the faces of the assailants, this Court sees no
reason how both parents, who witnessed the violence inflicted, not only
upon themselves, but especially upon their son, who eventually died by
reason thereof, could have done any less. It must be stressed that Henry
and Violeta were seated together atop their motorcycle when Dillatan
grabbed her bag and Garcia fired at them. In fact, Violeta was embracing
her son, Homer, when a single bullet struck them. Both accused-appellants,
at that time, were both less than a meter away from the victims. Hence,
despite the swiftness of the assault upon them, Henry and Violeta could not
have mistaken the identity of accused-appellants as the persons
responsible for the attack.
Moreover, Violeta's testimony disproves the poor illumination claim
of accused-appellants when she testified that "it was still bright" at the time
of the commission of the crime. 28 It is settled that when the conditions of
visibility are favorable, as in this case, the eyewitness identification of
accused-appellants as the malefactors and the specific acts constituting the
crime should be accepted. 29 Add the fact that Violeta and Henry had an
unhindered view of the faces of accused-appellants during the whole time
that the crime was being committed. Thus, accused-appellants' attack on
the positive identification by Violeta and Henry must, therefore, fail.
The lower courts, also, correctly ruled that accused-appellants acted
in conspiracy with one another. Conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it. 30Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the
accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime which
indubitably point to, and are indicative of, a joint purpose, concert of action
and community of interest. 31 For conspiracy to exist, it is not required that
there be an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence;
it is sufficient that at the time of the commission of the offense, the
malefactors had the same purpose and were united in its execution. 32 In
the present case, the coordinated acts and movements of accused-
appellants before, during and after the commission of the crime point to
no other conclusion than that they have acted in conspiracy with each
other. Moreover, it is settled that when homicide is committed by reason
or on the occasion of robbery, all those who took part as principals in the
robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single and indivisible
felony of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in
the killing, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the
same. 33
Lastly, accused-appellants' lackluster defenses of denial and alibi fail
to cast doubt on the positive identification made by Henry and Violeta and
the continuous chain of circumstances established by the prosecution. This
Court has consistently held that alibi and denial being inherently weak
cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused as the
perpetrator of the crime. 34 They are facile to fabricate and difficult to
disprove, and are thus generally rejected. 35 Besides, for the defense of alibi
to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other
place at the time of the commission of the crime but also that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its
immediate vicinity. 36 The excuse must be so airtight that it would admit of
no exception. 37 Where there is the least possibility of accused-appellants'
presence at the crime scene, as in this case, the alibi will not hold
water. 38 The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the ruling of the
lower courts that apart from their self-serving testimony that they were
someplace else at the time of the commission of the crime, accused-
appellants were unable to sufficiently show that it was physically impossible
for them to be at the scene of the crime when it was committed.
As to the penalty, the special complex crime of robbery with homicide
is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under Article 294 (1) of the RPC,
as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. Article 63 of the same Code, as
amended, states that when the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two
(2) indivisible penalties, and the crime is neither attended by mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances, the lesser penalty shall be imposed.
Considering that there was no modifying circumstance which attended the
commission of the crime, the RTC and the CA correctly imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
At this stage, the Court notes that, on the occasion of the robbery,
aside from Homer being killed, the Spouses Acob also sustained injuries by
reason of the gunshots fired by Garcia. It bears to reiterate at this point that
the component crimes in a special complex crime have no attempted or
frustrated stages because the intention of the offender/s is to commit the
principal crime which is to rob but in the process of committing the said
crime, another crime is committed. 39"Homicide," in the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide, is understood in its generic sense and
forms part of the essential element of robbery, which is the use of violence
or the use of force upon anything. 40 Stated differently, all the felonies
committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated
into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. 41 Thus, as in the
present case where, aside from the killing of Homer, the Spouses Acob, on
the occasion of the same robbery, also sustained injuries, regardless of the
severity, the crime committed is still robbery with homicide as the injuries
sustained by the Spouses Acob are subsumed under the generic term
"homicide" and, thus, become part and parcel of the special complex crime
of robbery with homicide.
Nonetheless, it is also settled that in robbery with homicide, the
victims who sustained injuries, but were not killed, shall also be
indemnified. 42 Hence, the nature and severity of the injuries sustained by
these victims must still be determined for the purpose of awarding civil
indemnity and damages. 43
It is settled that if a victim suffered mortal wounds and could have
died if not for a timely medical intervention, the victim should be awarded
civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages equivalent to the
damages awarded in a frustrated stage, and if a victim suffered injuries that
are not fatal, an award of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary
damages should likewise be awarded equivalent to the damages awarded
in an attempted stage. 44
In the instant case, while it was alleged in the Information that Henry,
who was shot on his right knee, and Violeta, whose n left hand was hit by
the same bullet that killed Homer, could have died from their injuries were
it not for the timely and able medical assistance rendered to them, the
prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to prove such allegation.
Thus, their injuries are not considered fatal and, as such, the Spouses Acob
are each entitled only to be indemnified amounts which are equivalent to
those awarded in an attempted stage.
Also, this Court has held in the controlling case of People v.
Jugueta 45 that in special complex crimes like robbery with homicide where
the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, the awards for civil indemnity,
moral damages, and exemplary damages are now uniformly pegged at
P75,000.00. The award of temperate damages is also increased to
P50,000.00.
Thus, with respect to accused-appellants' civil liabilities, this Court
deems it proper to modify the monetary awards granted by the lower
courts in conformity with prevailing jurisprudence.
Hence, for the death of Homer, his heirs are entitled to the awards of
P75,000 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00
as exemplary damages. The award of temperate damages to the heirs of
Homer, for burial expenses, shall be increased from P25,000.00 to
P50,000.00. With respect to the Spouses Acob, in addition to the awards of
actual damages to them for their hospitalization expenses and the return
of the P70,00.00 n cash taken from them, each of them are entitled to the
awards of P25,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,000.00 as moral damages, and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. 46
The Court also imposes interest, at the legal rate of six percent
(6%) per annum, on all the monetary awards from the date of finality of this
Decision until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the Decision,
dated August 30, 2013, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
05294, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accordingly, accused-
appellants, RICHARD DILLATAN, SR. Y PAT AND DONATO GARCIA Y
DUAZO, are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the special
complex crime of Robbery with Homicide, defined and penalized under
Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and are sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
In addition, to the monetary awards granted by the lower courts,
accused-appellants are further ORDERED to PAY the Heirs of Homer the
following:
(1) civil indemnity and moral damages in the increased
amounts of P75,000.00, each;
(2) exemplary damages in the amount of P75,000.00;
(3) temperate damages in the increased amount of
P50,000.00.
Accused-appellants are, likewise, ORDERED to PAY each of the
victims, Henry and Violeta Acob, the following:
(1) civil indemnity in the amount of P25,000.00;
(2) moral damages in the amount of P25,000.00; and
(3) exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00.
Accused-appellants shall pay interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum on all the monetary awards, from the date of finality of this
Decision until fully paid.
All other awards are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bersamin, * Leonen, Gesmundo and A.B. Reyes, Jr., ** JJ., concur.
Footnotes
* Designated additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr., per
Raffle dated September 3, 2018.
** Designated additional member per Special Order No. 2588 dated August 28,
2018.
1. Penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr., (now a member of this Court),
with Associate Justices Mario V. Lopez and Socorro B. Inting concurring;
CA rollo, pp. 100-111.
2. Penned by Judge Bernabe B. Mendoza; records, pp. 126-141.

3. Records, p. 1.
4. See RTC Order and Certificate of Arraignment, id. at 34 and 35, respectively.
5. See Pre-Trial Order, id. at 54-55.

6. CA rollo, pp. 56-57.
7. Id. at 116-118.
8. Id. at 120.
9. Rollo, p. 19.
10. Id. at 20-22.

11. Id. at 23-26.
12. People v. Palma, et al., 754 Phil. 371, 377 (2015).
13. Id.
14. People v. Diu, et al., 708 Phil. 218, 232 (2013).
15. People v. Uy, et al., 664 Phil. 483, 498 (2011).
16. Id.
17.Id.
18.Id.
19.TSN, October 29, 2010, pp. 9-22.

20.TSN, November 18, 2010, pp. 3-6.
21.People v. Mokammad, et al., 613 Phil. 116, 126 (2009).
22.Id.
23.Id.
24.People v. Lugnasin, et al., 781 Phil. 701, 714 (2016), citing People v. Martinez, 469
Phil. 509, 524-525 (2002).
25.Id.
26.People v. Pepino, et al., 777 Phil. 29, 55 (2016), citing People v. Esoy, et al., 631
Phil. 547, 556 (2010).
27.Id.
28.See TSN, October 29, 2010.
29.People v. Manchu, et al., 593 Phil. 398, 409 (2008).

30.People v. Buyagan, 681 Phil. 569, 574 (2012).
31.Id.
32.Id.
33.People v. Diu, et al., 708 Phil. 218, 237 (2013), citing People v. De Jesus, 473 Phil.
405, 426-428 (2004).
34.People v. Manchu, supra note 29, at 410.
35.Id.
36.People v. Ambatang, G.R. No. 205855, March 29, 2017.

37.Id.
38.Id.
39.People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806, 845 (2016).

40.Id. at 846.
41.People v. Diu, supra note 33.
42.People v. Jugueta, supra note 39.

43.Id. at 846.
44.Id.
45.Supra note 39.
46.Id. at 851.
n Note from the Publisher: Copied verbatim from the official document.
n Note from the Publisher: Written as "who's" in the official document.
||| (People v. Dillatan, Sr. y Pat, G.R. No. 212191, [September 5, 2018])
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 199208. July 30, 2014.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,vs.TRINIDAD A.

CAHILIG, appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO, J :
p
The Case
Before the Court is an appeal by Trinidad A. Cahilig (Cahilig) from the
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01381 affirming
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),Branch 137, Makati City in
Criminal Case Nos. 03-2178 to 2207 finding her guilty of thirty (30) counts
of Qualified Theft.
The Facts
Cahilig worked as cashier at Wyeth Philippines Employees Savings
and Loan Association, Inc. (WPESLAI) from December 1992 until 7
November 2001. She was tasked with handling, managing, receiving, and
disbursing the funds of the WPESLAI. 1
It was discovered that from 31 May 2000 to 31 July 2001, Cahilig made
withdrawals from the funds of WPESLAI and appropriated the same for her
personal benefit. 2 Cahilig would prepare disbursement vouchers, to be
approved by the WPESLAI president and Board of Directors, in order to
withdraw funds from one of WPESLAI's bank accounts then transfer these
funds to its other bank account. The withdrawal was done by means of a
check payable to Cahilig, in her capacity as WPESLAI cashier. This procedure
for transferring funds from one bank account to another was said to be
standard practice at WPESLAI. However, Cahilig did not actually transfer the
funds. Instead, she made it appear in her personal WPESLAI ledger that a
deposit was made into her account and then she would fill out a withdrawal
slip to simulate a withdrawal of said amount from her capital contribution. 3
The trial court found that Cahilig employed the same scheme in each
of the 30 cases of qualified theft filed against her, allowing her to pilfer from
WPESLAI'S funds a total of P6,268,300.00, broken down into the following
amounts:
Criminal Case No. 03-2178 P200,000.00
All 30 cases were consolidated and jointly heard. Upon agreement of

the parties, only three of the 30 cases went thru trial. The remaining 27
cases were the subject of a written stipulation of facts, on the basis of which
these were submitted for resolution. The stipulation stated, among others:
That for purposes of efficient and speedy administration of these
cases, the parties herein agreed, during the pre-trial conference and
approved by the Honorable Court, that the actual trial and
presentation of evidence will be done only on the first three (3)
counts of the cases, i.e.,on Cases Numbers 03-2178 to 03-2180, with
the understanding and agreement that after the termination of the
hearing on said three (3) cases, the parties shall adopt the results
thereof in the remaining twenty-seven (27) counts, considering that
all the cases arose from similar transactions with the same methods
or modus operandi used in committing the crime charged, and
involving the same accused and the same offended party[.] 4
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC found Cahilig guilty of the crimes charged, in a Decision
dated 16 June 2005, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court hereby finds
Trinidad Cahilig guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
qualified theft in each of the informations, and sentences her to suffer
the penalty of:
1. In Criminal Case No. 03-2178, reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the private complainant in the amount of P200,000.00;
9. In Criminal Case No. 03-2186, ten (10) years and one (1)
days (sic) as minimum to twenty (20) years as maximum and to
indemnify the private complainant in the amount of P60,000.00; ETIDaH

14. In Criminal Case No. 03-2191, ten (10) years and one (1) day
as minimum to twenty (20) years as maximum and to indemnify the
private complainant in the amount of P4[6],300.00;
private complainant in the amount of P25,000.00; ECaTDc

private complainant in the amount of P30,000.00;
indemnify the private complainant in the amount of P500,000.00; cEaDTA

indemnify the private complainant in the amount of P500,000.00.
Costs against accused in each of the above numbered cases.
SO ORDERED. 5
The RTC held that Cahilig, as cashier of WPESLAI, was granted trust
and confidence by the key officers of the association. The RTC noted that
Cahilig "enjoyed access to the funds and financial records of the
association, a circumstance that understandably facilitated her easy
withdrawal of funds which she converted to her personal use in the manner
heretofore described. Undoubtedly, she betrayed the trust and confidence
reposed upon her by her employer." 6
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Cahilig appealed her conviction to the CA. In a Decision dated 18
February 2011, the CA denied her appeal and affirmed the RTC's Decision.
The CA held that all the elements of Qualified Theft were present in every
charge:
...First, there was taking of personal property, when accused-
appellant took the proceeds of the WPESLAI checks issued in her name
as cashier of the association which are supposed to be redeposited to
another account of WPESLAI. Second, the property belongs to
another, since the funds undisputably belong to WPESLAI. Third, the
taking was done without the consent of the owner, which is obvious
because accused-appellant created a ruse showing that the funds
were credited to another account but were actually withdrawn from
her own personal account. Fourth, the taking was done with intent to
gain, as accused-appellant, for her personal benefit, took the funds by
means of a modus operandi that made it appear through the entries
in the ledgers that all withdrawals and deposits were made in the
normal course of business and with the approval of WPESLAI. Fifth,
the taking was accomplished without violence or intimidation against
the person [or] force upon things. And finally, the acts were committed
with grave abuse of confidence considering that her position as
cashier permeates trust and confidence. 7 acCDSH
The Court's Ruling

The Court denies the petition. However, the penalties imposed by the
trial court in six of the 30 cases are incorrect and, therefore, must be
modified.
Qualified Theft
Article 310, in relation to Article 308, of the Revised Penal
Code defines the crime of Qualified Theft:
Art. 310. Qualified theft.— The crime of theft shall be punished by the
penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively
specified in the next preceding articles, if committed by a domestic
servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen
is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts
taken from the premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond
or fishery, or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake,
typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident
or civil disturbance.
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft.— Theft is committed by any person
who, with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation
of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of
another without the latter's consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver
the same to the local authorities or to its owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property
of another, shall remove or make use of the fruits or objects of the
damage caused by him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where
trespass is forbidden or which belongs to another and without the
consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather
fruits, cereals, or other forest or farm products.cSIADH
Thus, the elements of Qualified Theft, committed with grave abuse of

confidence, are as follows:
1. Taking of personal property;
2. That the said property belongs to another;
3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That it be done without the owner's consent;

5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation
against persons, nor of force upon things;
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence. 8
It is clear that all the elements of Qualified Theft are present in these
cases.
Cahilig took money from WPESLAI and its depositors by taking
advantage of her position. Her intent to gain is clear in the use of a carefully
planned and deliberately executed scheme to commit the theft.
Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of Qualified Theft, "must
be the result of the relation by reason of dependence, guardianship, or
vigilance, between the appellant and the offended party that might create
a high degree of confidence between them which the appellant abused." 9
Cahilig's position was one reposed with trust and confidence,
considering that it involves "handling, managing, receiving, and disbursing"
money from WPESLAI's depositors and other funds of the association.
Cahilig's responsibilities as WPESLAI cashier required prudence and
vigilance over the money entrusted into her care. cHaADC
However, instead of executing her duties, she deliberately misled the

board of directors into authorizing disbursements for money that
eventually ended up in her personal account, a fact that Cahilig did not
deny.
Proper Penalty
The trial court, however, erred in the penalty imposed in Criminal
Case Nos. 03-2186, 03-2191, 03-2194, 03-2197, 03-2204, and 03-2206.
To recall, the amounts involved in the aforesaid cases are P20,000.00,
P46,300.00, P25,000.00, P30,000.00, P40,000.00, and P35,000.00,
respectively.
Article 310 provides that Qualified Theft "shall be punished by the
penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in
the next preceding article." Article 309, in turn, states:
Art. 309. Penalties.— Any person guilty of theft shall be punished
by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but
does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen
exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period
of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each
additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may
be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and
for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall
be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal,as the case may be. ScTIAH
xxx xxx xxx

In the aforementioned six cases, none of the amounts are below
P12,000.00. Hence, if the crime charged had been simple theft, the penalty
in any of these six cases would have been, at least, prision mayor in its
minimum and medium periods. Since it was established that the crime was
qualified by grave abuse of confidence, Article 310 provides that the penalty
to be imposed shall be the one "next higher by two degrees," which in this
case is reclusion perpetua.Accordingly, the penalty in these six cases should
be reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE,the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 01381 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.In lieu of the penalties meted
out by the trial court in Criminal Case Nos. 03-2186, 03-2191, 03-2194, 03-
2197, 03-2204, and 03-2206, appellant Trinidad A. Cahilig is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of
qualified theft in the aforesaid cases. The judgment to indemnify the
amounts in each of the corresponding charges stands.
SO ORDERED.
Brion, Bersamin, *Perez and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
*Designated additional member per Raffle dated 17 October 2012.

1.CA rollo,p. 125.
2.Id.
3.Id. at 126.
4.Id. at 54.
5.Id. at 138-141.
6.Id. at 136.
7.Rollo,p. 12.
8.People v. Mirto,G.R. No. 193479, 19 October 2011, 659 SCRA 796, 807,
citing People v. Puig,585 Phil. 555, 561-562 (2008);Roque v. People,486 Phil.
288, 311 (2004).See also Miranda v. People,G.R. No. 176298, 25 January
2012, 664 SCRA 124, 130-131.
9.Ringor v. People,G.R. No. 198904, 11 December 2013. Citations omitted.
||| (People v. Cahilig, G.R. No. 199208, [July 30, 2014], 740 PHIL 200-211)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 230669. June 16, 2021.]
REX SORONGON, 1 petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J :p
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 2 (Petition)

under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks the reversal of the
Decision 3 dated October 25, 2016 and Resolution 4 dated February 21,
2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 01887. 5 The CA
affirmed the Decision 6 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 65, San
Miguel, Jordan, Guimaras in Criminal Case No. 06-0949 finding petitioner
Rex Sorongon (petitioner) guilty of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1
(b) 7 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Facts
Petitioner was charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b)
of the RPC in an Information that reads:
"That on or about July 2004, in the Municipality of
B[ue]navista, Province of Guimaras, Philippines, the said accused
having received from Nelly Van der Bom 8 a mixer valued at Twenty
Five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos under express obligation of
turning over said mixer upon demand and once in possession of said
mixer, far from complying with his obligation with intent to gain and
to defraud, the said accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, misappropriate, misapply and convert the said
mixer to his own personal use and benefit to the damage and
prejudice of Nelly Van der Bom, the sum of Twenty Five Thousand
(P25,000.00) Pesos Phil. Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW." 9
When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. 10 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
Evidence of the Prosecution
During trial, the prosecution presented the testimony of private
complainant, Nelly Van der Bom 11 (Nelly), and those of Francisco
Igpuara 12 (Francisco), Arnaldo Marcasote (Arnaldo), Daren Almarquez
(Daren), and Bernaros Andreos Gregorios Keultjes 13 (Bernaros). AIDSTE
Nelly testified that she and her husband, Hans Peter Van der
Bom 14 (Hans), hired petitioner, a civil engineer, to put up a water system
for their water refilling business. Sometime in July 2004, after the project
was completed, petitioner asked to borrow the subject cement mixer for
his project in Iloilo City. Nelly agreed to lend the cement mixer on the
condition that petitioner would return it as soon as his project is
completed. 15 Nelly claimed that petitioner, however, failed to return her
cement mixer when she demanded for it after several months had passed.
She thereafter asked her lawyer to write a formal demand letter to
petitioner, but the same also went unheeded. 16
The prosecution also presented the testimony of Francisco, a
mechanic who did maintenance work for the equipment owned by Nelly
and her husband. Francisco testified that he was familiar with the subject
cement mixer and that only he and petitioner can borrow it from the Van
der Boms. He claimed that Nelly's husband, Hans, told him that petitioner
borrowed the cement mixer and brought it to Iloilo. Francisco admitted to
not knowing whether petitioner returned it. 17
Arnaldo, an employee of the Van der Boms, also testified about
knowing that petitioner borrowed the cement mixer from the couple.
Petitioner allegedly told him that he would bring it to Iloilo and even asked
Arnaldo to teach him and his employees how to operate the equipment. 18
Another employee of Nelly and her husband, Daren, testified that she
personally knew petitioner and saw him in July 2004 when he borrowed the
cement mixer from the couple. She allegedly saw that the cement mixer
was attached to an owner-type jeepney, to be carted to petitioner's house
in Sto. Rosario. Daren also testified that the Van der Boms purchased the
cement mixer from their friend, Bernaros. She also claimed petitioner did
not return it to the couple. 19
Finally, the prosecution presented Bernaros, the friend of Nelly and
her husband from whom they purchased the cement mixer. Bernaros
testified that the cement mixer was a heavy-duty equipment made in
Germany and had a wider mouth compared to an ordinary mixer. He
further testified that he sold it to the Van der Boms in 2000 for
P50,000.00. 20
Evidence of the Defense
The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of
petitioner and Rudy de la Torre 21 (Rudy), a Barangay Kagawad of Barangay
Sto. Rosario, Buenavista, Guimaras.
Rudy testified that Nelly and her husband filed a complaint in the
barangay against petitioner about unpaid accounts, which included a
cement mixer valued at P40,000.00. Considering that Nelly failed to present
any receipts for her claims, Rudy purportedly advised her to just settle the
case amicably. Nelly eventually agreed and the parties signed an amicable
settlement in March 2005. 22
Petitioner testified that he was employed by the Van der Boms from
December 22, 2000 to March 2004 as the liaison officer of their water
refilling business. He denied borrowing the cement mixer and was
surprised when summoned to the barangay. Petitioner corroborated the
testimony of Rudy that he (petitioner) and Nelly reached an amicable
settlement before the barangay. Thereafter, however, he received the
complaint in the instant case. 23
The amicable settlement provided that the parties agreed that
thereafter, there will be no countercharges "related to this case" to be filed
"in the future." 24 The minutes of the barangay proceedings also provided,
in part:
1. Complainant alleged that the respondent
barrowed (sic) from her various equipments (sic) such as cement
mixer, accessories of a computer and (sic) when she demanded for
the return of the same, respondent failed to do so. She also charged
that certain amount in form of cash advances was not paid by the
respondent.
xxx xxx xxx
4. Complainant agreed to waive her ownership of properties
in question in favor of the respondent provided (sic) no further case
or counter charge (sic) will be filed by the respondent. 25
Petitioner also testified that in January 2005, he filed a labor case
against the Van der Boms where he submitted the amicable settlement he
and Nelly agreed to before the barangay. The National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) allegedly took note of petitioner's indebtedness
contained in the settlement agreement and deducted the same from the
award it granted in his favor. 26
Ruling of the RTC
After trial on the merits, the RTC convicted petitioner of the crime
charged in its Decision 27 dated July 25, 2011, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Estafa, defined and penalized under Article 315,
paragraph 1 (B).
There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances and
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused is hereby
sentence[d] to suffer a penalty of imprisonment of Three (3) years
of prision correccional to Seven (7) years of prision mayor and to pay
the costs.
The bailbond posted by the accused is ordered cancelled and
the accused is ordered ARRESTED.
SO ORDERED. 28
In finding petitioner guilty, the RTC found that the prosecution was
able to establish that the subject cement mixer was owned by Nelly and her
husband and that petitioner borrowed the same. The trial court did not give
weight to the bare denial of petitioner, noting that the testimony of Nelly
was fully corroborated by witnesses. As such, borrowing a thing
necessitates an express and implied intention to return it and demand by
the owner is not required under the law. The failure to account for the thing
borrowed upon demand raises the presumption that the borrower has
misappropriated it. 29
In this regard, the RTC also noted the admissions made by petitioner.
The first was with respect to having received Nelly's letter demanding the
return of the equipment. The second was that the cement mixer was part
of his and Nelly's amicable settlement before the barangay. Hence, the trial
court observed: if indeed petitioner did not borrow the cement mixer, he
should have objected to its inclusion in the agreement. As testified to by
Rudy, this agreement was never repudiated. Petitioner, in fact, even
submitted the agreement before the NLRC in relation to his labor case
against the Van der Boms and allowed that its value be deducted from the
award granted to him by the Commission. 30
The RTC, however, held that petitioner is no longer civilly liable in light
of the deduction of the value of the cement mixer in the award made by
the NLRC in favor of petitioner in his labor case against the Van der Boms. 31
Ruling of the CA
In the assailed Decision 32 dated October 25, 2016, the CA sustained
petitioner's conviction and held that the prosecution has established his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Estafa. AaCTcI
The CA held it beyond dispute that petitioner borrowed and received

the subject cement mixer from Nelly. The CA further held that Nelly's act of
lending the equipment gave rise to a contract of commodatum between her
and petitioner; in which case, petitioner, as the borrower, did not acquire
ownership over the thing borrowed and had the duty to return the same
thing to the lender, Nelly. Corollary, the phrase "or any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same" under Article
315 of the RPC applies in this case as it may refer to a contract
of commodatum. 33
Moreover, the CA held that following case law, failure to account
upon demand for funds or properties held in trust, is circumstantial
evidence of misappropriation. The Court found that Nelly duly demanded
for the return of the cement mixer to her, but petitioner ignored these
demands. Consequently, the failure of petitioner in the case at bar to
account for the cement mixer upon Nelly's demand constituted
circumstantial evidence that he had misappropriated or converted the
thing for his personal use. Petitioner's failure to return the cement mixer
indubitably deprived Nelly the right to use the property, to her prejudice
and detriment. 34
The CA likewise affirmed the trial court's finding that the inclusion of
the value of the cement mixer in the computation of the labor arbiter of the
award given in petitioner's favor bolstered the claim of the prosecution that
he borrowed and received the cement mixer and appropriated it for his
personal use. 35
In the same manner, the CA held that the amicable settlement
between petitioner and Nelly did not exonerate him from criminal liability,
as nowhere in the said settlement did Nelly relinquish her rights or interests
over her claims. At any rate, the CA noted, compromise or amicable
settlement entered into after the commission of a crime does not
extinguish an accused's criminal liability since the offense is against the
State. 36
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the CA Decision, but the
same was denied in the assailed Resolution 37 dated February 21, 2017.
Hence, the instant Petition.
Issue
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether the lower courts
erred in convicting petitioner of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of
the RPC.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Preliminarily, determination of guilt is fundamentally a factual issue
which the Court generally does not entertain in a Rule 45 petition. Settled
is the rule that factual findings of the trial court are accorded great weight
and respect on appeal, especially when such findings are supported by
substantial evidence on record. There are recognized exceptions to this
rule, however, and one of which is where there has been a
misapprehension of facts by the lower courts. 38 This exception applies in
this case.
The trial court and the CA failed to appreciate the fact that the parties
had entered into an amicable settlement prior to the filing of the
Information against petitioner. Following jurisprudence on the effect of
novation and compromise in Estafa cases under Article 315, paragraph 1
(b), the amicable settlement between the parties in this case had effectively
prevented the incipient criminal liability of petitioner. Petitioner may have
not assigned this as an error in his petition before the Court, but this is of
no moment. The well-settled rule is that an appeal in a criminal case throws
the whole case wide open for review and that it becomes the duty of the
Court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed
from, whether they are assigned as errors or not. 39
Indeed, the long-standing general rule is that criminal liability for
Estafa is not affected by payment, indemnification, reimbursement of or
compromise as to the amounts misappropriated, or by the novation of the
contract. This is because Estafa is a public offense which must be
prosecuted and punished by the State on its own motion even though
complete reparation should have been made of the damage suffered by
the offended party. 40 Since it is committed against the State, the private
offended party may not waive or extinguish the criminal liability that the
law imposes for the commission of the crime. 41
Nevertheless, in cases involving the type of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1 (b), where there is an underlying contractual relationship or
bilateral agreement between the parties which they can modify or
alter, 42 the Court has consistently acknowledged at the same time the
possible effects of novation. The Court held that in these cases, novation
may serve to either prevent the rise of criminal liability, or to cast doubt on
the true nature of the original basic transaction, whether or not it was such
that the breach of the obligation would not give rise to penal responsibility,
as when money loaned is made to appear as a deposit, or other similar
disguise is resorted to. 43 The prevention of the rise of criminal liability
happens when there is novation before an Information is filed in court. As
the Court first held in People v. Nery 44(Nery):
The novation theory may perhaps apply prior to the filing of
the criminal information in court by the state prosecutors because
up to that time the original trust relation may be converted by the
parties into an ordinary creditor-debtor situation, thereby placing
the complainant in estoppel to insist on the original trust. But after
the justice authorities have taken cognizance of the crime and
instituted action in court, the offended party may no longer divest
the prosecution of its power to exact the criminal liability, as
distinguished from the civil. The crime being an offense against the
state, only the latter can renounce it (People vs. Gervacio, 54 Off. Gaz.
2898; People vs. Velasco, 42 Phil. 76; U.S. vs. Montañes, 8 Phil. 620). 45
In Nery, the complainant entrusted diamond rings to the accused to
be sold by her on commission. The accused, however, neither turned over
any proceeds of the sale of the items nor returned them. During the
pendency of the case before the trial court, the accused executed a deed in
favor of the complainant. The deed contained the promise of accused to
pay her debt and committing that in the event that she failed to comply
with the said compromise, the case filed against her by the private
complainant would push through. When the accused later raised the
defense of novation, therefore, the Court rejected the same on the ground
that the purported novation occurred after the criminal case had already
been instituted and while it was already pending trial. EcTCAD
The Court further emphasized in Nery that in order for novation to

effectively prevent the incipience of criminal liability, its concept under
the Civil Code has to be followed as well. Thus:
Even in Civil Law the acceptance of partial payments, without
further change in the original relation between the complainant and
the accused, can not produce novation. For the latter to exist, there
must be proof of intent to extinguish the original relationship, and
such intent can not be inferred from the mere acceptance of
payments on account of what is totally due. Much less can it be said
that the acceptance of partial satisfaction can effect the nullification
of a criminal liability that is fully matured, and already in the process
of enforcement. Thus, this Court has ruled that the offended party's
acceptance of a promissory note for x x x all or part of the amount
misapplied does not obliterate the criminal offense (Camus vs. Court
of Appeals, 48 Off. Gaz. 3898). 46
Novation in the Civil Code is found in Article 1291, which provides
that novation arises when there is a substitution of an obligation by a
subsequent one that extinguishes the first, either by changing the object or
the principal conditions, or by substituting the person of the debtor, or by
subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor. 47 For a valid
novation to take place, there must therefore be: (a) a previous valid
obligation; (b) an agreement of the parties to make a new contract; (c) an
extinguishment of the old contract; and (d) a valid new contract. 48
Novation, likewise, is never presumed. For it to be effective, it is
imperative that the extinguishment be so declared in unequivocal terms, or
that the old and the new obligations be on every point incompatible with
each other. In case of only slight modifications, the old obligation would still
prevail. 49 The Court, in Quinto v. People 50 (Quinto), has so elaborated:
There are two ways which could indicate, in fine, the presence
of novation and thereby produce the effect of extinguishing an
obligation by another which substitutes the same. The first is when
novation has been explicitly stated and declared in unequivocal
terms. The second is when the old and the new obligations are
incompatible on every point. The test of incompatibility is whether
or not the two obligations can stand together, each one having its
independent existence. If they cannot, they are incompatible and the
latter obligation novates the first. Corollarily, changes that breed
incompatibility must be essential in nature and not merely
accidental. The incompatibility must take place in any of the essential
elements of the obligation, such as its object, cause or principal
conditions thereof; otherwise, the change would be merely
modificatory in nature and insufficient to extinguish the original
obligation. 51(Italics in the original)
Quinto also involved the receipt of jewelry by the accused from the
complainant for the purpose of selling the same on commission basis and
with the express obligation on the part of the accused to turn over the
proceeds of the sale thereof, or to return the said jewelry, if not sold. The
accused interposed the defense that the agreement between her and the
complainant was effectively novated when the latter consented to receive
payment on installments directly from the buyers of the jewelry. The Court
disagreed, concluding that there has never been any animus
novandi between or among the parties. It explained that the changes
alluded to by the accused consisted only in the manner of payment. There
was really no substitution of debtors since the complainant merely
acquiesced to the payment but did not give her consent to enter into a new
contract.
Also, in Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Reynado, 52 the
respondents were charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b)
for conniving with the bank's client, Universal Converter Philippines, Inc.
(Universal), to make huge withdrawals against uncleared regional check
deposits and without prior approval of the bank's head office. Before the
Information was filed in court, however, the bank and Universal entered
into a Debt Settlement Agreement. Thus, the issue that confronted the
Court was whether the execution of the Debt Settlement Agreement
precluded the bank from holding respondents liable to stand trial for Estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b). In ruling in the negative, the Court held
that the execution of the Debt Settlement Agreement did not prevent the
incipience of the criminal liability of respondents. 53 It explained: HSAcaE
Even if the instant case is viewed from the standpoint of the

law on contracts, the disposition absolving the respondents from
criminal liability because of novation is still erroneous.
Under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, "contracts take effect only
between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where
the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not
transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of
law." The civil law principle of relativity of contracts provides that
"contracts can only bind the parties who entered into it, and it cannot
favor or prejudice a third person, even if he is aware of such contract
and has acted with knowledge thereof."
In the case at bar, it is beyond cavil that respondents are
not parties to the agreement. The intention of the parties
thereto not to include them is evident either in the onerous or
in the beneficent provisions of said agreement. They are not
assigns or heirs of either of the parties. Not being parties to the
agreement, respondents cannot take refuge therefrom to bar
their anticipated trial for the crime they committed. It may do
well for respondents to remember that the criminal action
commenced by petitioner had its genesis from the alleged fraud,
unfaithfulness, and abuse of confidence perpetrated by them in
relation to their positions as responsible bank officers. It did not
arise from a contractual dispute or matters strictly between
petitioner and Universal. This being so, respondents cannot rely
on subject settlement agreement to preclude prosecution of
the offense already committed to the end of extinguishing their
criminal liability or prevent the incipience of any liability that
may arise from the criminal offense. This only demonstrates that
the execution of the agreement between petitioner and Universal
has no bearing on the innocence or guilt of the
respondents. 54 (Emphasis supplied)
Simply put, there was no attempt to compromise, settle, or novate
the criminal liability of the respondents in the above case at any point in
time. The Debt Settlement Agreement, while executed before the
Information against respondents was filed in court, did not include them as
parties. Consequently, respondents cannot benefit therefrom and the
original trust relations between them and the bank remained unchanged.
In yet another case involving a violation lender Article 315, paragraph
1 (b), Degaños v. People, 55 the accused was charged with Estafa for
misappropriating the pieces of jewelries entrusted to her by the
complainants to be sold on commission. The accused argued that his
partial payments to the complainants novated his contract with them from
agency to loan, thereby converting his liability from criminal to civil. He
insisted that his failure to complete his payments prior to the filing of the
complaint-affidavit by the complainants notwithstanding the fact that the
complainants later required him to make a formal proposal before the
barangay authorities on the payment of the balance of his outstanding
obligations confirmed that novation had occurred. The Court disagreed
with the argument of the accused, expounding once again on the nature
and role of novation in a criminal prosecution. It so held that although the
novation of a contract of agency to make it one of sale may relieve an
offender from an incipient criminal liability, that did not happen in the said
case, for the partial payments and the proposal to pay the balance the
accused made during the barangay proceedings were not at all
incompatible with his liability under the agency that had already attached.
Rather than converting the agency to sale, therefore, he even thereby
confirmed his liability as the sales agent of the complainants.
Applying the foregoing discussion to the case at bar, the Court finds
that the original contract of commodatumbetween the herein parties was
effectively novated when they entered into an amicable settlement before
the barangay in March 2005, which amicable settlement came about before
the Information for Estafa against petitioner was filed in January 2006. 56 To
reiterate, the subject of the amicable settlement were the unpaid accounts
which petitioner supposedly owed Nelly and her husband. The purpose of
the proceedings, in other words, was to settle these monetary or civil
liabilities of petitioner to the spouses Van der Bom. These unpaid accounts
included the value of the cement mixer and some other personal
properties, as well as alleged loans and cash advances which petitioner and
his wife had borrowed from the couple. 57
Correlatively, in January 2005 or prior to the barangay proceedings in
March 2005, the lawyer of the Van der Boms wrote a demand letter to
petitioner about the supposed monetary liabilities which he incurred from
the couple. The amount of 125,000.00 representing the amount of the
cement mixer which petitioner obtained from the couple in 2004 was
among those listed, along with other sums which were all included in the
unpaid accounts made subject of the barangay proceedings. 58 Also, in his
testimony before the trial court, the Pangkat Chairman, Rudy de la Torre,
affirmed that the cement mixer was included as a subject matter before the
barangay proceedings. 59
The amicable settlement stipulated, in no uncertain terms, that the
parties agreed that they would desist from filing countercharges in the
future. 60 Contrary to the findings of the CA, as well, the minutes of the
proceedings further revealed that Nelly agreed to waive her ownership of
the properties subject of their dispute in favor of petitioner. Unmistakably,
one of these properties was the cement mixer. Again, the pertinent
portions of the minutes of the barangay proceedings provide:
1. Complainant alleged that the respondent
barrowed (sic) from her various equipments (sic) such as cement
mixer, accessories of a computer and (sic) when she demanded for
the return of the same, respondent failed to do so. She also charged
that certain amount in form of cash advances was not paid by the
respondent.
xxx xxx xxx
4. Complainant agreed to waive her ownership of
properties in question in favor of the
respondentprovided (sic) no further case or counter charge (sic) will
be filed by the respondent. 61 (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, the waiver made by Nelly was on the condition that
petitioner would not file any case or countercharge against Nelly in the
future. 62 Petitioner kept to his end of this bargain. The labor case which he
filed against the couple was not a violation of the agreement since it was
filed in January 2005, or prior to the barangay proceedings in March
2005. HESIcT
With Nelly waiving her ownership over the cement mixer in favor of
petitioner in exchange for the concession that he would refrain from filing
any case against her in the future, there was clearly an implied novation of
the original contract of commodatum between her and petitioner. 63 The
waiver effectively extinguished the original contract of petitioner and Nelly
and, in its stead, a new contract in the form of the amicable settlement they
executed before the barangay, emerged. The intention to extinguish the
old obligation might not have been done expressly, but considering that the
new contract of the parties was, by all accounts, incompatible with their
original contract of commodatum, novation had effectively occurred. The
incompatibility was far from being merely incidental or modificatory as the
original bailor-bailee relationship between the parties was altogether
severed. While ownership by the bailor over the thing loaned is not an
indispensable requirement in commodatum as Article 1938 of the Civil
Code very well provides that the bailor in commodatum need not be the
owner of the thing loaned, it is important to note in this case, however, that
the waiver over the ownership of the property, which was the very object
of the original contract of the parties, was made in favor of petitioner. This
went against a well-established concept in commodatum that ownership of
the thing loaned does not pass to the borrower. 64
In plain terms, prior to the filing of the Information in court, Nelly had
already renounced or relinquished her ownership over the property
subject of the criminal case in favor of petitioner. Consequently, therefore,
the elements of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of
the RPC became nonexistent. These elements are:
(1) the offender receives the money, goods or other personal
property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to
return, the same;
(2) the offender misappropriates or converts such money or property
or denies receiving such money or property;
(3) the misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and
(4) the offended party demands that the offender return the money
or property.
In particular, there is no longer any duty or obligation on the part of
petitioner to deliver or return the cement mixer to Nelly or to any other
person for that matter because the ownership thereof had already been
transferred to petitioner by Nelly's waiver and renunciation in his favor. It
follows, too, that there is no longer any prejudice caused to another.
Perforce, with the new obligation under the amicable settlement
between Nelly and petitioner having the effect of novating their old
obligation, Nelly is now estopped from insisting on the latter. Accordingly,
any incipient criminal liability of petitioner involving his failure to return the
cement mixer was effectively averted.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The
assailed October 25, 2016 Decision and February 21, 2017 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 01887, which affirmed the July 25, 2011
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, San Miguel, Jordan,
Guimaras in Criminal Case No. 06-0949 finding petitioner Rex Sorongon
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Rex Sorongon is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged
against him. Let an entry of judgment be issued immediately.
SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C.J., Carandang, Zalameda and Gaerlan, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rex Soroñgon in some parts of the rollo.

2. Rollo, pp. 9-24.
3. Id. at 27-43. Penned by Associate Justice Pablito A. Perez, with Associate Justices
Pamela Ann Abella Maxino and Gabriel T. Robeniol concurring.
4. Id. at 45-46.
5. Also CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 01887 in some parts of the rollo.

6. Id. at 47-66. Dated July 25, 2011, promulgated on February 17, 2012 and penned
by Judge Merlin D. Deloria.
7. Also Article 315, sub-paragraph 1 (b), Article 315, Sub-Section 1 (B), and Art. 315,
Sec. 1 (b) in some parts of the rollo.
8. Nelly Mijares Van Der Bom in some parts of the rollo.

9. Rollo, p. 28.
10. Id.
11. Van Der Bom in some parts of the rollo.

12. Francisco Ygpuara in some parts of the rollo.
13. Ben in some parts of the rollo.

14. Hans Van der Bom in some parts of the rollo.
15. Rollo, pp. 29, 52-53.
16. Id. at 29, 48.

17. Id. at 48.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 49.

20. Id.
21. Id. at 50.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 51.
24. Records, p. 308.
25. Id. at 310.
26. Rollo, pp. 16, 51.

27. Supra note 6.
28. Id. at 66.
29. Id. at 55-56.

30.Id. at 56-65.
31. Id. at 66.

32. Supra note 3.
33. Id. at 33.
34. Id. at 34.

35. Id. at 36.
36. Id. at 37.
37. Supra note 4.

38. See Macayan, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 175842, March 18, 2015, 753 SCRA 445,
458-459.
39. Lapi v. People, G.R. No. 210731, February 13, 2019, 892 SCRA 680, 688,
citing Ferrer v. People, 518 Phil. 196, 220 (2006).
40. See Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Reynado, G.R. No. 164538, August
9, 2010, 627 SCRA 88, 98-99, citing Firaza v. People, G.R. No. 154721, March
22, 2007, 518 SCRA 681, 694; Recuerdo v. People, G.R. No. 168217, June 27,
2006, 493 SCRA 517, 536; People v. Moreno, 373 Phil. 336, 349 (1999);
and People v. Ladera, 398 Phil. 588, 602 (2000).
41. Tamayo v. People, G.R. No. 174698, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 312, 324.
42. See People v. Tanjutco, No. L-23924, April 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 361, 373.
43. Degaños v. People, G.R. No. 162826, October 14, 2013, 707 SCRA 438, 451-452,
citing People v. Nery, No. L-19567, February 5, 1964, 10 SCRA 244, 247.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 247.
46. Id. at 247-248.
47. Heirs of Servando Franco v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 159709, June 27, 2012, 675 SCRA
96, 106-107.
48. Id. at 107.
49. See Degaños v. People, supra note 43, at 449-450.
50. G.R. No. 126712, April 14, 1999, 305 SCRA 708.
51. Id. at 715-716.
52. Supra note 40.

53. The Court in this case upheld the general rule that a compromise or
settlement entered into after the commission of the crime does not
extinguish accused's liability for Estafa. The Court cited several cases to
support its holding, to wit:
x x x In Firaza v. People and Recuerdo v. People, this Court ruled that in a
crime of Estafa, reimbursement or belated payment to the offended party
of the money swindled by the accused does not extinguish the criminal
liability of the latter. We also held in People v. Moreno and in People v.
Ladera that "criminal liability for estafa is not affected by compromise or
novation of contract, for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted
and punished by the Government on its own motion even though complete
reparation should have been made of the damage suffered by the offended
party." Similarly in the case of Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v.
Tonda cited by petitioner, we held that in a crime of estafa, reimbursement
of or compromise as to the amount misappropriated, after the commission
of the crime, affects only the civil liability of the offender, and not his
criminal liability. (Id. at 98-99.)
Notably, however, the above-cited cases, save for Tonda, did not involve the
kind of Estafa in Article 315 paragraph 1 (b), where there is an underlying
original obligation which can be novated. Firaza and Recuerdo involved
violations under Article 315 paragraph 2 (d), particularly on issuing checks
despite full knowledge that they were worthless. In the same vein, Moreno,
and Ladera both involved violations under Article 315 paragraph 2 (a) for
employing false pretenses in undertaking recruitment of others for
employment abroad.
Tonda, on the other hand, did involve a violation under Article 315
paragraph 1 (b) in relation to the Trust Receipts Law. The parties attempted
to enter into a loan restructuring agreement which entailed the
respondents opening a savings account and depositing checks therein to
pay the entire principal obligation of the outstanding trust receipts account.
The Court found that the parties failed to reach a settlement because they
failed to agree on the terms of the loan restructuring agreement. The
bank's purported acknowledgment of its receipt of the checks made no
reference to the trust receipt obligations of the parties, and the Court said
that it cannot be presumed to be anything more than an ordinary bank
deposit. Clearly, in this case, the underlying original contractual obligation
of the parties was not effectively modified so as to extinguish any incipient
criminal culpability arising therefrom.
54. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Reynado, supra note 40, at 100-101.
55. Supra note 43.
56. Rollo, p. 11.

57. TSN, August 18, 2009, p. 6.
58. Records, p. 16; Annex A of Demand Letter; Exhibit B; Exhibit 7.

59. TSN, August 18, 2009, p. 24.
60. Supra note 24.
61. Supra note 25.

62. Id.
63. Art. 1933 of the Civil Code provides that in commodatum, the bailor retains the
ownership of the thing loaned. One cannot lend a thing he does not own.
64. See CIVIL CODE, Art. 1933 which provides:
ART. 1933. By the contract of loan, one of the parties delivers to another,
either something not consumable so that the latter may use the same for a
certain time and return it, in which case the contract is called
a commodatum; or money or other consumable thing, upon the condition
that the same amount of the same kind and quality shall be paid, in which
case the contract is simply called a loan or mutuum.
Commodatum is essentially, gratuitous.

Simple loan may be gratuitous or with a stipulation to pay interest.
In commodatum the bailor retains the ownership of the thing loaned, while
in simple loan, ownership passes to the borrower.
||| (Sorongon v. People, G.R. No. 230669, [June 16, 2021])

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 234818. November 5, 2018.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FELIX

AQUINO, accused-appellant,
IRIS AQUINO (deceased), ELEANOR MACABBALUG (at-large),

GENALYN NASOL (at-large), ARTURO DELGADO, JR. (at-large),
PEARL MILITAR (at-large) and CATHERINE ANNA DELA CRUZ
(at-large), accused.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J : p
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal 1 filed by accused-appellant

Felix Aquino (Felix) assailing the Decision 2 dated July 28, 2017 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 07078, which affirmed the Joint
Decision 3 dated July 22, 2014, as partly revised by the Order 4 dated August
8, 2014, of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 146 (RTC) in Crim.
Case Nos. 04-1270, 04-1271, 04-1273, 04-1274, 04-1275, 04-1276, 04-1277,
04-1278, 04-1279, 04-1280, 04-1281, 04-1284, 04-1285, 04-1287, 04-1288,
04-1290, 04-1291, 04-1296, 04-1298, 04-1300, and 04-1301, convicting him
of twenty-one (21) counts of Syndicated Estafa defined and penalized under
Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in relation to Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 1689. 5
The Facts
The instant case stemmed from thirty-three (33) separate

Informations 6 filed before the RTC each charging Felix and his co-accused,
namely, Iris Z. Aquino (Iris), Eleanor Macabbalug, Genalyn Nasol, Arturo
Delgado, Jr., Pearl Militar, and Catherine Anna Dela Cruz of the aforesaid
crime. The accusatory portions of the said Informations, save for the case
number, private complainants, dates, and respective amounts, are similarly
worded as follows:
That within the month of ________ in the City of Makati,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above named accused, conspiring, confederating together and
mutually helping one another as a syndicate, did then and there, as
Officers/Directors of Everflow Group of Companies which operated
on funds solicited from the public, willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously induced _____ to give and/or deliver to said accused the
amount of _____ as investment in Everflow Group of Companies
upon false pretenses and fraudulent acts executed by the accused
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud that said
amount will earn 5% interest per month, purposely for the accused
to convert, misapply and misappropriate, as they did convert
misapply and misappropriate to their personal gain or benefit the
amount received as investment, to the damage and prejudice of
_____ in the aforesaid amount of ______, which accused failed and
refused to return, as they continue to fail and refuse to return said
amount despite demands for them to do so.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 7
The prosecution alleged that spouses Felix and Iris are the owners of
Everflow Group of Companies, Inc. (Everflow), with the latter being its
chairperson. Private complainants alleged that on various dates between
2000 and 2002, they were convinced by Iris and Felix to invest their money
in Everflow, claiming that the money to be invested will earn seventy
percent (70%) interest; that the same will be doubled in more than a year;
that the investment was in safe hands; and that it would earn five percent
(5%) interest per month. Convinced with the reassurances by Iris and Felix,
they invested a total of P5,161,211.28 and US$90,981.00. When
complainants went back to Everflow to get their investments, Felix
promised the return of their money. After the closure of Everflow because
of the Cease and Desist Order issued by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, they demanded the return of their money, but to no avail.
Thus, they were compelled to file multiple charges of
Syndicated Estafa against Felix, Iris, and their co-accused who are allegedly
members of the board of directors of it Everflow. 8 CAIHTE
Of the seven (7) accused, only Felix and Iris were arrested and
arraigned, while the others remained at-large to this day. 9 Further, on April
15, 2008, the RTC provisionally dismissed eleven (11) 10 of the thirty-three
(33) counts of Syndicated Estafa with their consent, due to the failure to
appear by the respective private complainants before the court despite due
notice. 11
In their defense, Felix and Iris denied the accusations against them,
claiming that they were mere victims of a certain Rosario Baladjay who
recommended that they put up Everflow as a conduit of Multinational
Telecom Investors Corporation (Multitel), which was controlled by a certain
Rosario Baladjay. They also alleged that the money invested in Everflow was
also invested in Multitel. 12 Notably, the cases against Iris were dismissed
due to her supervening death. 13
The RTC Ruling
In a Joint Decision 14 dated July 22, 2014, the RTC found Felix guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of sixteen (16) counts 15of the crime charged, and
accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment for
each count. 16 It further ordered him to pay the total amount of
P2,323,504.00 and US$4,983.00, 17 with legal interest from the filing of the
Informations until fully paid. 18
The RTC found that Felix and his co-accused, who were in control of
the operations of Everflow and through their counselors, fraudulently
induced private complainants to invest their money to Everflow, despite
knowing that they are prohibited from soliciting and accepting investments
from the general public. To even bolster their scheme, they even issued
checks representing the investment of private complainants plus interest,
only for such checks to be dishonored upon presentment for being drawn
against closed accounts. 19
However, in an Order 20 dated August 8, 2014, the RTC modified the
dispositive portion of its earlier Joint Decision, convicting Felix of twenty-
one (21) counts 21 instead of sixteen (16) counts of Syndicated Estafa, as
indicated in the body of the said Joint Decision. Nonetheless, the RTC
clarified that while Felix was found criminally liable for twenty-one (21)
counts of Syndicated Estafa, he can only be held civilly liable to sixteen (16)
private complainants in their respective cases, considering: (a) that the
witnesses who testified in the other five (5) counts were not necessarily the
private complainants therein who had personal knowledge of the
commission of the offense; and (b) the absence of private complainants in
said five (5) counts and the absence of an authorization that they are indeed
claiming the civil aspect of their respective cases. 22
Aggrieved, Felix appealed to the CA. 23
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 24 dated July 28, 2017, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling in
toto. 25 It held that Felix and his co-accused defrauded private complainants
substantial amounts of money by misrepresenting and falsely pretending
to the latter that they will invest the money in legitimate businesses which
will earn them huge percentage of returns. However, such returns
remained unrealized when the checks purportedly representing the same
were dishonored for being drawn against a closed account. According to
the CA, Felix and his co-accused's fraudulent intent was made even more
apparent by the fact that they solicited investments from the general public
despite Everflow not being authorized to do so. 26 DETACa
Hence, this appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Felix is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Syndicated Estafa.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is without merit.

Article 315 (2) (a) of the RPC reads:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud
another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be
punished by:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or
fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud:
(a) By using a fictitious name, or falsely
pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.
xxx xxx xxx
The elements of Estafa as contemplated in this provision are the
following: (a) that there must be a false pretense or fraudulent
representation as to his power, influence, qualifications, property, credit,
agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense or
fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended
party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and
was induced to part with his money or property; and (d) that, as a result
thereof, the offended party suffered damage. 27
In relation thereto, Section 1 of PD 1689 states that
Syndicated Estafa is committed as follows:
Section 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or
other forms of swindling as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be punished by life
imprisonment to death if the swindling (estafa) is committed by a
syndicate consisting of five or more persons formed with the
intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction,
enterprise or scheme, and the defraudation results in the
misappropriation of money contributed by stockholders, or
members of rural banks, cooperative, "samahang nayon(s)," or
farmers' association, or funds solicited by corporations/associations
from the general public.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, the elements of Syndicated Estafa are: (a) Estafa or Other Forms
of Swindling, as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC, is
committed; (b) the Estafa or Swindling is committed by a syndicate of five
(5) or more persons; and (c)defraudation results in the misappropriation of
moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks,
cooperative, "samahang nayon(s)," or farmers' association, or of funds
solicited by corporations/associations from the general public. 28
In this case, a judicious review of the records reveals that Felix and
his co-accused repeatedly induced the public to invest in Everflow on the
undertaking that their investment would yield a huge percentage of
returns. Under such lucrative promise, the public — as represented by
private complainants — were enticed to invest their hard-earned money
into Everflow. Initially, Everflow would deliver on their promise, thus
"hooking" the unwary investors into infusing more funds into it. However,
as the Everflow officers/directors, i.e., Felix and his co-accused, knew from
the start that Everflow had no clear trade by which it can pay the assured
profits to its investors, they could no longer comply with their guarantee
and had to simply abscond with their investors' funds. It is settled that
"where one states that the future profits or income of an enterprise shall
be a certain sum, but he actually knows that there will be none, or that they
will be substantially less than he represents, the statements constitute an
actionable fraud where the hearer believes him and relies on the statement
to his injury," 29 as in this case.
aDSIHc
Lest it be misunderstood, not all proposals to invest in certain

business ventures are tainted with fraud. To be sure, an actionable fraud
arises when the accused has knowledge that the venture proposed would
not reasonably yield the promised results, and yet, despite such knowledge,
deliberately continues with the misrepresentation. Business investments
ordinarily carry risks; but for as long as the incipient representations
related thereto are legitimate and made in good faith, the fact that the
business eventually fails to succeed or skews from its intended targets does
not mean that there is fraud. As case law instructs, "the gravamen of the
[crime of Estafa] is the employment of fraud or deceit to the damage or
prejudice of another. 30 When fraud pertains to the means of committing a
crime or the classes of crimes under Chapter Three, Title Four, Book Two
and Chapter Three, Title Seven, Book Two of the RPC, criminal liability may
arise; otherwise, if fraud merely causes loss or injury to another, without
being an element of a crime, then it may only be classified as civil fraud
from which an action for damages may arise. 31
Far from being a legitimate business venture, the Court herein
observes that Felix and his co-accused's modus operandi is constitutive of
criminal fraud as they used the same to commit a crime. In fact, their modus
operandi may be characterized as a kind of Ponzi scheme, which schemes
have gained notoriety in modern times. As generally defined, a Ponzi
scheme is "a type of investment fraud that involves the payment of
purported returns to existing investors from funds contributed by new
investors. Its organizers often solicit new investors by promising to invest
funds in opportunities claimed to generate high returns with little or no risk.
In many Ponzi schemes, the perpetrators focus on attracting new money to
make promised payments to earlier-stage investors to create the false
appearance that investors are profiting from a legitimate business. It is not
an investment strategy but a gullibility scheme, which works only as long as
there is an ever increasing number of new investors joining the scheme. It
is difficult to sustain the scheme over a long period of time because the
operator needs an ever larger pool of later investors to continue paying the
promised profits to early investors. The idea behind this type of swindle is
that the 'con-man' collects his money from his second or third round of
investors and then absconds before anyone else shows up to collect.
Necessarily, Ponzi schemes only last weeks, or months at the most." 32
In this light, the courts a quo correctly found that all the elements of
Syndicated Estafa are present in the instant case, as shown in the following
circumstances: (a) the officers/directors of Everflow, comprising of Felix
and his co-accused who are more than five (5) people, made false pretenses
and representations to the investing public, i.e., private complainants,
regarding a lucrative investment opportunity with Everflow in order to
solicit money from them; (b) the said false pretenses and representations
were made prior to and simultaneous with the commission of fraud, which
is made more apparent by the fact that Everflow was not authorized by the
Securities and Exchange Commission to solicit investments from the public
in the first place; (c) relying on the same, private complainants invested
various amounts of money into Everflow; and (d)Felix and his co-accused
failed to deliver their promised returns and ended up running away with
private complainants' investments, obviously to the latter's prejudice.
Thus, the Court finds no reason to deviate from the factual findings
of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, as there is no indication that it
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding facts and
circumstances of the case. In fact, the trial court was in the best position to
assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses presented by both
parties, and hence, due deference should be accorded to the same. 33 As
such, Felix's conviction for twenty-one (21) counts of
Syndicated Estafa must be upheld. Accordingly, he should suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment for each count of the aforesaid crime.
Finally, the Court deems it proper to adjust the actual damages
awarded to private complainants in order to reflect the amount defrauded
from them, as indicated in the respective Informations. These amounts
shall earn legal interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from
the filing of the Informations until June 30, 2013, and six percent (6%) per
annum from July 1, 2013 until full payment. 34
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated July 28, 2017
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 07078 finding accused-
appellant Felix Aquino GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of twenty-one
(21) counts of Syndicated Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315 (2)
(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Presidential Decree No. 1689is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment for each count. He is further ordered to pay
actual damages to the following private complainants in the following
amounts: (a) P150,000.00 to Elna E. Hidalgo; (b) P50,000.00 to Rosabella
Espanol; (c) US$562.00 to Reynold C. Español; (d) P15,000.00 to Virginia D.
Casero; (e) P15,435.00 to Imelda Dela Cruz; (f) P50,000.00 to Vennus C.
Español; (g) P102,819.00 to Merlina C. Español; (h)US$4,421.00 to Luz B.
Unay; (i) P480,000.00 to Victor Flores; (j) P400,000.00 to Felix So
Manota; (k) P125,250.00 to Restituto C. Novero; (l) P320,000.00 to Melanie
C. Navata; (m) P315,000.00 to Michelle C. Navata; (n) P50,000.00 to Gil
Nicanor; (o)P210,000.00 to Zosimo Malagday; and (p) P40,000.00 to Elpidio
Navata. All sums due shall each earn legal interest at the rate of twelve
percent (12%) per annum from the filing of the Informations until June 30,
2013, and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until full
payment. ETHIDa
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Caguioa and A.B. Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
J.C. Reyes, Jr., * J., is on official leave.
Footnotes
*Designated Additional Member per Special Order No. 2587 dated August 28,
2018; on official leave.
1.See Notice of Appeal dated August 14, 2017; rollo, pp. 36-37.
2.Id. at 2-35. Penned by Associate Justice Marie Christine Azcarraga-Jacob with

Associate Justices Normandie B. Pizarro and Danton Q. Bueser concurring.
3.CA rollo at 113-134. Penned by Judge Encarnacion Jaja G. Moya.

4.Id. at 135.
5.Entitled "INCREASING THE PENALTY FOR CERTAIN FORMS OF SWINDLING OR
ESTAFA" (April 6, 1980).
6.Not attached to the rollo.
7.See rollo, pp. 3-6. See also CA rollo, pp. 113-114. Private complainants and the
respective amounts allegedly taken from them are as follows:
Criminal Complainant Amount Criminal Complainant Amount

Case No. Case No.
04-1270 Elna E. P150,000.00 04-1287 Restituto C. P125,250.00
Hidalgo Novero
04-1271 Rosabella P50,000.00 04-1288 Karen N. US$50,000.00
Espanol Novero
04-1272 Dionisio P200,000.00 04-1289 Letecia P30,000.00
Miguel Barnizo
04-1273 Reynold C. US$562.00 04-1290 Melanie C. P320,000.00
Español Navata
04-1274 Virginia D. P15,000.00 04-1291 Michelle C. P315,000.00
Casero Navata
04-1275 Imelda Dela P15,435.00 04-1292 Fermin P. P200,000.00
Cruz Vivas
04-1276 Vennus C. P50,000.00 04-1293 Victoria F. P25,306.38
Español Sto. Tomas
04-1277 Merlina C. P102,819.00 04-1294 Lorna V. US$5,000.00
Español Aclan
04-1278 Luz B. Unay US$4,421.00 04-1295 Rochelle P. P350,000.00
Alinabon
04-1279 Rogelio C. P200,000.00 04-1296 Judith P334,000.00
Unay Novero
04-1280 Marilyn Ruth P13,400.90 04-1297 Ma. Cecilia P300,000.00
C. Flores Reyes
Patton
04-1281 Victor Flores P480,000.00 04-1298 Gil Nicanor P50,000.00
04-1282 Eddie P. P50,000.00 04-1299 Asteria De P100,000.00
Agorilla and Guzman
US$1,000.00
04-1283 Charisma N. US$10,000.00 04-1300 Zosimo P210,000.00
De Guzman Malagday
04-1284 Chona N. P200,000.00 04-1301 Elpidio P40,000.00
Novero and Navata
US$14,500.00
04-1285 Felix So P400,000.00 04-1302 Nilda Primo P100,000.00
Manota and
US$2,600.00
04-1286 Esperanza P735,000.00
Longino and
US$2,898.00
(Cases are erroneously numbered in the CA Decision.)
8.See rollo, pp. 6-20.
9.See id. at 6.
10.Criminal Case Nos. 04-1272, 04-1282, 04-1283, 04-1286, 04-1289, 04-1292, 04-
1293, 04-1294, 04-1295, 04-1299, and 04-1302.
11.Rollo, p. 20.
12.See id. at 20-22.

13.Id. at 32.
14.CA rollo, pp. 113-134.
15.Criminal Case Nos. 04-1270, 04-1271, 04-1273, 04-1274, 04-1275, 04-1276, 04-
1277, 04-1278, 04-1281, 04-1285, 04-1287, 04-1290, 04-1291, 04-1298, 04-
1300, and 04-1301 (erroneously numbered as 04-1302).
16.See CA rollo, pp. 132-133.
17.Felix is held liable to pay: (a) in Crim. Case No. 04-1270, P150,000.00 to Elna E.
Hidalgo; (b) in Crim. Case No. 04-1271, P50,000.00 to Rosabella C.
Español; (c) in Crim. Case No. 04-1273, US$562.00 to Reynold C.
Español; (d) in Crim. Case No. 04-1274, P15,000.00 to Virginia D.
Casero; (e) in Crim. Case No. 04-1275, P15,435.00 to Imelda Dela Cruz; (f) in
Crim. Case No. 04-1276, P50,000.00 to Vennus C. Español; (g) in Crim. Case
No. 04-1277, P102,819.00 to Merlina C. Español; (h) in Crim. Case No. 04-
1278, US$4,421.00 to Luz B. Unay; (i) in Crim. Case No. 04-1281,
P480,000.00 to Victor Flores; (j) in Crim. Case No. 04-1285, P400,000.00 to
Feliz So Manota; (k) in Crim. Case No. 04-1287, P125,250.00 to Restituto C.
Novero; (l) in Crim. Case No. 04-1290, P320,000.00 to Melanie C.
Navata; (m) in Crim. Case No. 04-1291, P315,000.00 to Michelle C.
Navata; (n) in Crim. Case No. 04-1298, P50,000.00 to Gil Nicanor; (o) in Crim.
Case No. 04-1300, P210,000.00 to Zosimo Malagday; and (p) in Crim. Case
No. 04-1301 (erroneously numbered as 04-1302), P40,000.00. (Id.)
18.Id.
19.See id. at 128-131.

20.Id. at 135.
21.Criminal Case Nos. 04-1279, 04-1280, 04-1284, 04-1288, and 04-1296 were
added to the initial list of cases where Felix was convicted.
22.See id. at 132 and 135.
23.See Notice of Appeal dated July 23, 2014; id. at 64.

24.Rollo, pp. 2-35.
25.Id. at 34.
26.See id. at 25-34.

27.People v. Tibayan, 750 Phil. 910, 919 (2015), citing People v. Chua, 695 Phil. 16, 32
(2012).
28.Id. at 920, citing Galvez v. CA, 704 Phil. 463, 472 (2013).
29.People v. Menil, Jr., 394 Phil. 433, 453 (2000), citing People v. Balasa, 356 Phil.
362, 387 (1998).
30.See People v. Baladjay, G.R. No. 220458, July 26, 2017.

31.See Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. Nos. 159139 and 174777, June 6, 2017; citations omitted.
32.People v. Tibayan, supra note 27, at 921; citations omitted.

33.See Peralta v. People, G.R. No. 221991, August 30, 2017, citing People v. Matibag,
757 Phil. 286, 293 (2015).
34.See Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267, 281-283 (2013), applying Resolution
No. 796 of the Bangko Sentral ng PilipinasMonetary Board.
||| (People v. Aquino, G.R. No. 234818, [November 5, 2018])

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 225753. October 15, 2018.]
JOSE PAULO LEGASPI y NAVERA,petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF THE

[G.R. No. 225799. October 15, 2018.]
VICTOR DAGANAS y JANDOC,petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF THE

DECISION
TIJAM, J :
p
Petitioners Jose Paulo Legaspi y Navera (Legaspi) and Victor

Daganas y Jandoc (Daganas) (collectively, the petitioners) assail through
these consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court the Decision 2dated January 21, 2016 and the
subsequent Resolution 3 dated July 13, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 36404. Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG),filed its Comment 4 on the consolidated petitions, to which Legaspi
interposed a Reply. 5
On September 6, 2017, the Court denied the consolidated petitions
for failure to show reversible error on the part of the CA as to warrant the
exercise of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction. 6 Legaspi and Daganas
timely moved for reconsideration 7 and urged a review of the denial of their
petitions essentially on the ground that the Information under which they
were charged was fatally defective and negates the crime charged
therein. 8 The OSG sought the denial of petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
To lend proper context and appropriate review of the instant case, a
statement of the facts and the arguments raised by the parties is
imperative.
The Facts
Legaspi and Daganas were charged with the crime of estafa

committed under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of theRevised Penal Code
(RPC) in an Information 9 which reads: CAIHTE
The undersigned State Prosecutor II of the Department of

Justice, in his capacity as the Acting City Prosecutor of Pasig City,
hereby accuses [Legaspi] and [Daganas] of the crime of estafa under
Article 315, par. 1(b) of the [RPC], committed as follows:
That on or about November 15, 2005, in Pasig City and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
[petitioners],conspiring and confederating together and helping one
another, did then and there willfuly, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud Fung Hing Kit in the following manner, to wit: the said
[petitioners],with abuse of confidence, induced Fung Hing Kit to
invest at iGen-Portal, and the latter invested and in fact deposited
the amount of 9.5 Million Pesos into the account of iGen-Portal, once
in possession of said amount, the said [petitioners],with abuse of
confidence, misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said
amount to their own and personal use and benefit, to the damage
and prejudice of said Fung Hing Kit in the aforesaid amount of 9.5
Million Pesos.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 10
When arraigned, petitioners pleaded not guilty. At the pre-trial
conference, the parties stipulated that Fung Hing Kit (private complainant)
remitted, through Express Padala in Hongkong, the amount of
P9,500,000.00 to iGen-Portal International Corporation (iGen-Portal).11
The prosecution presented private complainant and one Marcelina
Balisi (Balisi),private complainant's domestic helper in Hongkong. 12 The
prosecution's evidence tends to establish the following facts:
Private complainant is a businessman in Hongkong. In May 2005, he
met Daganas in Hongkong who then proposed a "joint venture" by buying
10% share of iGen-Portal. Private complainant went to the Philippines in
November 2005 where he was presented with iGen-Portal's income
analysis, articles of incorporation and projected income analysis. Private
complainant agreed to invest in iGen-Portal upon his return to
Hongkong. 13
Thus, in November 15, 2005, private complainant remitted the
amount of P9,500,000.00 as payment for the 10% shares of iGen-Portal.
Private complainant requested for the issuance of a stock certificate in his
name but none was allegedly given. 14
In January 2006, private complainant met with petitioners in
Hongkong. Instead of issuing his stock certificate, petitioners allegedly
made new proposals which private complainant turned down. 15 DETACa
For their part, petitioners alleged that private complainant wanted to

purchase shares of iGen-Portal. However, because there were no more
shares available and because private complainant is a foreigner prohibited
to engage in retail trade business, petitioners refused. Then, petitioners
received a call from Balisi who wanted to buy 2,000 shares of stock of iGen-
Portal for P9,500,000.00 and that private complainant, on behalf of Balisi,
will remit the said amount to iGen-Portal. After some time, private
complainant demanded that the shares in the name of Balisi be transferred
to his name, explaining that it was he who actually paid for the shares of
stock. When the shares could not be transferred to him, private
complainant demanded for the return of the P9,500,000.00. Eventually,
iGen-Portal suffered loss of sales which led to its closure. 16
On November 14, 2013, the RTC rendered Judgment 17 finding
petitioners guilty of the crime of estafa and disposed as follows:
rendered finding the accused, [LEGASPI] AND [DAGANAS],guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa penalized under
Article 315, par. 1(b) of the [RPC], without any aggravating or
mitigating circumstance, and are accordingly sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from 4 years and 2
months of prision correccional as minimum to 20 years of reclusion
temporal as maximum and to indemnify private complainant, Fung
Hing Kit, in the amount of Php9,500,000.00 as well as to pay the costs
of suit.
SO ORDERED. 18
This prompted petitioners to appeal 19 to the CA, essentially arguing
that the instant case involves the purchase and sale of shares of stock and
as such, there can be no estafa in the absence of a fiduciary relationship
between petitioners and private complainant.
The CA, however, affirmed petitioners' conviction in a Decision dated
January 21, 2016, as follows:
WHEREFORE,the instant appeal is DENIED.The Decision dated
14 November 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
166, in Criminal Case No. 136334 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.20
According to the CA, all elements of estafa through conversion or
misappropriation are present: (1) money in the amount of P9,500,000.00
was received by Legaspi as evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt issued
by the latter; 21 (2) there is a legal presumption of conversion or
misappropriation when petitioners failed to issue to private complainant
the stock certificate evidencing the 2,000 shares which he purchased and
when petitioners failed to return the amount of P9,500,000.00; 22 (3) private
complainant was prejudiced by petitioners' misappropriation; 23 and (4)
there was demand for the return of private complainant's investment. 24 aDSIHc
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration met similar denial from the

CA Resolution 25 dated July 13, 2016. Thus, resort to the present appeal.
The Issue
The core issue to be resolved is whether or not the CA correctly

affirmed petitioners' conviction for estafa defined and penalized under
Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC.
Ruling of the Court

We find merit in the motions for reconsideration and
accordingly, the Court reconsiders its Resolution dated September 6,
2017.
Criminal fraud resulting to damage capable of pecuniary estimation
is punished under Article 315 of the RPC. In general, the elements
of estafa are: (1) that the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of
confidence, or (b) by means of deceit; and (2) that damage or prejudice
capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third
person. Invariably, unlawful abuse of confidence or deceit is the essence
of estafa.
In particular, estafa through misappropriation is defined and
penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, as amended
by Republic Act No. 10951, 26 which provides:
Section 85. Article 315 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act
No. 4885, Presidential Decree No. 1689, and Presidential Decree No.
818, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another
by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prisión correccional in its maximum period
to prisión mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is
over Two million four hundred thousand pesos (P2,400,000) but
does not exceed Four million four hundred thousand pesos
(P4,400,000), and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty
provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period,
adding one year for each additional Two million pesos (P2,000,000);
but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties
which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions
of thisCode, the penalty shall be termed prisión mayor or reclusion
temporal,as the case may be. ETHIDa
xxx xxx xxx

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice
of another, money, goods or any other personal
property received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to
return the same, even though such obligation be totally
or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having
received such money, goods, or other property[.]
The elements of estafa through misappropriation under Article 315,
paragraph 1 (b) are: (a) the offender's receipt of money, goods, or other
personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the
same; (b) misappropriation or conversion by the offender of the money or
property received, or denial of receipt of the money or property; (c) the
misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
(d) demand by the offended party that the offender return the money or
property received. 27
To secure conviction, it behooves upon the State to prove the
existence of all the essential elements of the offense charged beyond
reasonable doubt. Anything less than all the elements of the offense
charged negates a finding of guilt.
To establish the first element of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1
(b),the CA focused on an acknowledgment receipt executed by Legaspi to
show that the latter indeed received the amount of P9,500,000.00 from
private complainant. This observation is, however, inaccurate.
For one, Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) requires proof of receipt by the
offender of the money, goods, or other personal property in trust or on
commission,or for administration,or under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of or to return the same. In other words, mere receipt
of the money, goods, or personal property does not satisfy the first
element, it must be demonstrated that the character of such receipt must
either be in trust, on commission or for administration or that the accused
has the obligation to deliver or return the same money, goods or personal
property received. 28 It is therefore essential to prove that the accused
acquired both material or physical possession and juridical possession of
the thing received. 29cSEDTC
The Information itself is bereft of any indication that petitioners
received private complainant's money in such manner as to create a
fiduciary relationship between them. On the contrary, the Information
reads that private complainant "invested" his money with iGen-Portal. It is
undisputed that at the time material to the instant case, iGen-Portal was a
duly-registered corporation engaged in wholesale and retail
business, 30 the existence of which was never denied by private
complainant as he himself admitted having scrutinized iGen-Portal's
Articles of Incorporation, income analysis and projected income
analysis. 31 Clearly, by the transfer of stocks in exchange for the amount of
P9,500,000.00, no fiduciary relationship was created between petitioners
and private complainant.
However, as the undisputed facts reveal, the shares of stock of
Legaspi were transferred to Balisi, a Filipino, instead of to private
complainant. This transaction was duly evidenced by a Deed of Sale of
Shares of Stock between Legaspi and Balisi. Accordingly, a stock certificate
was issued for the 2,000 shares in the name of Balisi which was recorded
in the stock and transfer book of iGen-Portal. 32 To be sure, the issue of it
whether such arrangement was contrary to foreign ownership restrictions
or was used to circumvent Commonwealth Act No. 108 or the "Anti-Dummy
Law" is not the pressing concern in this estafa case. If at all, what this
circumstance reveals is that there was no abuse of confidence committed
by petitioners nor suffered by private complainant; rather, private
complainant voluntarily parted with his money after he was made fully
aware of foreign ownership restrictions and then, even acquiesced to
having Balisi, private complainant's domestic helper, purchase the stocks
albeit the funds therefor would come from him.
It is also revealing that private complainant first demanded for the
issuance or transfer of the stock certificate in his name and when said
demand was not forthcoming, he demanded for the return of his
investment and when that remained unsatisfied, only then did he file the
complaint a quo for estafa.Private complainant's demand for the issuance
of a stock certificate in his name in return for his investment negates the
claim that petitioners received the money with the obligation to return the
same.
For another, the acknowledgment receipt relied upon by the CA
unequivocally states that the amount of P9,500,000.00 was "for the
payment for 2,000 shares of stocks of [i-Gen] Portal." This is consistent with
private complainant's allegation in his complaint that he remitted the
amount of P9,500,000.00 as "payment for the 10% shares of [i-Gen] Portal."
At the pre-trial, the prosecution also stipulated that said amount was
"received by i-Gen Portal in its account." 33 The Information also charges
that private complainant deposited the amount of P9,500,000.00 "into the
account of [i-Gen] Portal." Such partake of judicial admissions which require
no further proof. Thus, the inevitable conclusion is that the sum of
P9,500,000.00 was not received by petitioners, either materially or
juridically, but by iGen-Portal — an entity separate and distinct from
individual petitioners which veil of corporate fiction was not pierced. SDAaTC
Anent the second element, the CA relied on a legal presumption of

conversion or misappropriation only because petitioners failed to issue to
private complainant the stock certificates for the 2,000 shares of stocks
purchased. This reasoning is utterly misplaced.
In Tria v. People,34 We defined the second element of conversion or
misappropriation as follows:
The words "convert" and "misappropriate" connote the act of
using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own, or
of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon.
To misappropriate for one's own use includes not only conversion to
one's personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the
property of another without right. In proving the element of
conversion or misappropriation, a legal presumption of
misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver the
proceeds of the sale or to return the items to be sold and fails to give
an account of their whereabouts. 35 (Citation omitted)
Thus, to convert or to misappropriate invariably require that the
accused used or disposed the property as if it were his own or devoted the
same to an entirely different purpose than that agreed upon. Here, there
was not the slightest demonstration that petitioners used the amount of
P9,500,000.00 at any time after private complainant deposited said money
to iGen-Portal. In fact, the CA had to rely on a mere presumption that
petitioners converted or misappropriated said money anchored upon the
latter's failure to issue the stock certificate in private complainant's name.
We find that the application of said legal presumption is utterly
misplaced. Under the Corporation Code, 36 shares of stock are personal
property and thus may be transferred by delivery of the certificate. For a
corporation to be bound, such transfer must be recorded in the stock and
transfer book, where the names of the parties to the transaction, the date
of the transfer, the number of the certificate or certificates and the number
of shares transferred are indicated. It is only from this time that the
obligation on the part of the corporation to recognize the rights of a
transferee as a stockholder arises. 37Consequently, "without such
recording, the transferee may not be regarded by the corporation as one
among its stockholders and the corporation may legally refuse the issuance
of stock certificates." 38 Thus, private complainant could not have
demanded for the issuance of a stock certificate in his name when he
acquiesced to having Balisi stand-in for him. As far as i-Gen Portal was
concerned, the purchase was made by Balisi and hence, if at all, the transfer
ought to be made in her name. acEHCD
In the absence of the first and second elements, there can be no

crime of estafa;petitioners' acquittal should follow as a matter of course.
It is apparent that private complainant departed with a considerable
amount of money for purposes of investing in iGen-Portal. It is an
unfortunate occurrence that after his investment, iGen-Portal suffered
successive breakaways of its distributors. 39 But the Court cannot hold
petitioners liable, much less criminally, only because of private
complainant's unfruitful investment. As succinctly held in Spouses Pascual v.
Ramos:40
All men are presumed to be sane and normal and subject to
be moved by substantially the same motives. When of age and sane,
they must take care of themselves. In their relations with others in
the business of life, wits, sense, intelligence, training, ability and
judgment meet and clash and contest, sometimes with gain and
advantage to all, sometimes to a few only, with loss and injury to
others. In these contests men must depend upon themselves —
upon their own abilities, talents, training, sense, acumen, judgment.
The fact that one may be worsted by another, of itself, furnishes no
cause of complaint. One man cannot complain because another is
more able, or better trained, or has better sense or judgment than
he has; and when the two meet on a fair field the inferior cannot
murmur if the battle goes against him. The law furnishes no
protection to the inferior simply because he is inferior, any more
than it protects the strong because he is strong. The law furnishes
protection to both alike — to one no more or less than to the other.
It makes no distinction between the wise and the foolish, the great
and the small, the strong and the weak. The foolish may lose all they
have to the wise; but that does not mean that the law will give it back
to them again. Courts cannot follow one every step of his life and
extricate him from bad bargains, protect him from unwise
investments, relieve him from one-sided contracts, or annul the
effects of foolish acts. Courts cannot constitute themselves
guardians of persons who are not legally incompetent. Courts
operate not because one person has been defeated or overcome by
another, but because he has been defeated or
overcome illegally.Men may do foolish things, make ridiculous
contracts, use miserable judgment, and lose money by then —
indeed, all they have in the world; but not for that alone can the law
intervene and restore. There must be, in addition, a violation of law,
the commission of what the law knows as an actionable wrong,before
the courts are authorized to lay hold of the situation and remedy
it. 41 (Citation omitted and italics in the original)
WHEREFORE,the motions for reconsideration are GRANTED.The
Resolution dated September 6, 2017 is SET ASIDE.Instead, a new judgment
is rendered GRANTING the consolidated petitions. Accordingly, the
Decision dated January 21, 2016 and Resolution dated July 13, 2016 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 36404 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.The criminal charges against petitioners Jose Paulo Legaspi y Navera
and Victor Daganas y Jandoc, in Criminal Case No. 136334,
are DISMISSED. SDHTEC
SO ORDERED.
Bersamin * and Del Castillo, JJ.,concur.
Jardeleza, J.,is on official business.
Gesmundo, ** J.,is on leave.
Footnotes
*Designated Acting Chairperson per Special Order No. 2606 dated October 10,
2018.
**Designated Additional Member per Special Order No. 2607 dated October 10,
2018; on leave.
1.Rollo (G.R. No. 225753),pp. 30-62; rollo (G.R. No. 225799),pp. 12-38.
2.Rollo (G.R. No. 225753),pp. 64-73.

3.Id. at 75-76.
4.Id. at pp. 287-289.
5.Rollo (G.R. No. 225799),pp. 97-103.

6.Rollo (G.R. No. 225753),p. 302.
7.Id. at 304-336 and 339-361.
8.Id. at 311.
9.Id. at 77.
10.Id.
11.Id. at 79.
12.Id. at 80.
13.Id. at 66.
14.Id. at 66-67.
15.Id. at 67.
16.Id. at 67-68.
17.Id. at 131-148.
18.Id. at 148.
19.Id. at 153-203.
20.Id. at 72.
21.Id. at 70-71.
22.Id. at 71.
23.Id. at 72.
24.Id.
25.Id. at 75-76.
26.AN ACT ADJUSTING THE AMOUNT OR THE VALUE OF PROPERTY AND DAMAGE
ON WHICH A PENALTY IS BASED AND THE FINES IMPOSED UNDER THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ACT NO. 3815,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "REVISED PENAL CODE," AS AMENDED.
Approved August 29, 2017.
27.Serona v. Court of Appeals,440 Phil. 508, 517 (2002).
28.Tanzo v. Hon. Drilon,385 Phil. 790, 800 (2000).

29.See Santos v. People,260 Phil. 519, 526 (1990).
30.Rollo (G.R. No. 225753),p. 137.
31Id. at 133.
32.Id. at 139.
33.Id. at 44.
34.743 Phil. 441 (2014).
35.Id. at 452.
36.Sec. 63. Certificate of stock and transfer of shares. — The capital stock of stock
corporations shall be divided into shares for which certificates signed by
the president or vice president, countersigned by the secretary or assistant
secretary, and sealed with the seal of the corporation shall be issued in
accordance with the by-laws. Shares of stock so issued are personal
property and may be transferred by delivery of the certificate or certificates
endorsed by the owner or his attorney-in-fact or other person legally
authorized to make the transfer. No transfer, however, shall be valid,
except as between the parties, until the transfer is recorded in the books of
the corporation showing the names of the parties to the transaction, the
date of the transfer, the number of the certificate or certificates and the
number of shares transferred.
No shares of stock against which the corporation holds any unpaid claim shall
be transferable in the books of the corporation.
37. Ponce v. Alsons Cement Corp.,442 Phil. 98, 110 (2002).
38. Id.
39. Rollo (G.R. No. 225753),p. 49.

40. 433 Phil. 449 (2002).
41. Id. at 460-461, citing Vales v. Villa,35 Phil. 769, 787-788 (1916).
||| (Legaspi y Navera v. People, G.R. Nos. 225753 & 225799 , [October 15, 2018])
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 221836. August 14, 2019.]
ESTHER ABALOS y PUROC,petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

DECISION
J.C. REYES, JR., J :

p
The Case
Petitioner Esther P. Abalos (petitioner) comes to this Court
appealing 1 her conviction for the crime of Estafa rendered by the Court of
Appeals (CA) in its Decision dated May 20, 2015, 2 in CA-G.R. CR No. 35633,
which affirmed the indeterminate penalty of four years and two months
of prision correccional as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as
maximum and actual damages of P232,500.00 imposed by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC),but modified the legal interest at 6% per annum from
finality of the decision until fully paid.
The Version of the Prosecution
In April 2011, petitioner, who introduced herself as "Vicenta Abalos,"
accompanied by Christine Molina (Molina),went to the office of private
complainant Elaine D. Sembrano (Sembrano) at Manulife, Baguio City and
offered to her two EastWest Bank checks for rediscounting. 3 The checks
were signed by petitioner in Sembrano's office, as follows:
Check No. Dated Amount
0370031 May 31, 2011 P17,500.00
0370032 June 1, 2011 250,000.00
––––––––––––
P267,500.00 4
Sembrano agreed to rediscount the checks upon assurance of

petitioner and her companion, Molina, that they were good
checks. 5 Sembrano gave the amount of P250,000.00 less 7% as interest.
Sometime later, she learned from friends that petitioner's name was Esther
and not "Vicenta." 6 When Sembrano presented the checks for payment on
due dates, the checks were dishonored. 7 Sembrano then engaged the
services of Benguet Credit Collectors to collect from petitioner. Petitioner
failed to make good the checks such that a demand letter was sent to
petitioner which she received on October 23, 2011. 8 Despite the said
demand, petitioner made a promise to pay, but up to this date, nothing was
received by Sembrano. 9 For failure to pay her loans, a complaint for estafa
under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) was filed against
petitioner.
The Version of the Defense
Petitioner denied the accusations. She claimed that the checks were
issued only as a collateral for a loan together with the title to a property in
the name of "Vicenta Abalos." 10 She stated that she did not personally
transact with Sembrano 11 and that it was Molina who transacted with her
and she merely accompanied Molina to Sembrano's office in April
2011. 12 As a requirement for the release of the loan, petitioner was asked
to present as collateral an original certificate of title and a check, which she
agreed. 13 When she was informed that the loan was ready, she together
with Molina proceeded to the office of Sembrano purposely to receive the
money. 14 Before taking the money from Sembrano, petitioner was asked
to sign a real estate mortgage offering the title as a collateral to the
loan. 15 After she and Molina received the money from Sembrano, they
went to a convenience store where Molina gave petitioner P100,000.00 and
petitioner handed back to Molina P20,000.00 as commission. 16 Petitioner
insists that the checks she issued were merely to serve as collateral for the
loan and not for the purpose of rediscounting the same. 17
The Ruling of the RTC
On November 29, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision 18 finding
petitioner guilty, viz.:
WHEREFORE, all premises duly considered, the [c]ourt finds
the accused, GUILTY as charged. Applying the provisions of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being no aggravating and
mitigating circumstance, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum.
The accused is likewise found to be civilly liable to pay the
private complainant the amount of Php232,500.00 as and by way of
actual damages, with legal interest thereon to be computed from the
date of the filing of this case, until the same is fully paid.
SO ORDERED. 19
The Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction, but fixed the rate of
interest at 6% per annum, thus:
WHEREFORE,premises considered, the appeal
is DISMISSED.The Decision dated November 29, 2012 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Baguio City, in Criminal Case No.
32571-R, finding [appellant] guilty of [Estafa] is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that appellant is directed to pay private
complainant the amount of P232,500.00 as and by way of actual
damages, with legal interest at six percent (6%) per annum from
finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED. 20
The CA is convinced that the false pretense of petitioner is apparent
when she, together with her companion knowingly and intelligently
misrepresented herself as "Vicenta Abalos" by showing to Sembrano a
Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of Vicenta Abalos, a BIR ID Card, a
Community Tax Certificate all bearing the name of Vicenta Abalos, and by
signing the subject checks as "Vicenta Abalos." These pieces of evidence
assured Sembrano that petitioner can make good the checks she issued as
she has the means to do so prompting her to part with her money. The CA
likewise ruled that mere issuance of a check and its subsequent non-
payment is a prima facie evidence of deceit.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant appeal.
The Issue
Petitioner submits for the Court's consideration the lone issue that —
THE [CA] ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER IS GUILTY
OF ESTAFA CONSIDERING THAT THE REAL TRANSACTION
BETWEEN THE PARTIES, AS DEFINED BY LAW, IS NOT CRIMINAL
IN NATURE, BUT CIVIL ONLY. 21
Petitioner insists that not all elements of estafa were established. The
element of deceit and/or false pretenses are lacking because the issuance
of the checks was not the factor that induced private complainant to grant
the loan, but the intercession made by Molina and the interest to be earned
on the money lent. 22 It was Molina who maneuvered the transaction with
private complainant by assuring the latter that petitioner will pay the
loan. 23
Petitioner also zeroed-in on the irreconcilable conflict between
Sembrano's affidavit and her testimony in open court. In her affidavit,
Sembrano stated that the checks were offered to her for rediscounting,
while her testimony in open court, she admitted that the checks were used
for collaterals. 24 This inconsistency put doubt on the testimony of
Sembrano, but strengthened petitioner's claim that the checks were meant
to be collaterals of the loan which are supposed to be encashed only upon
non-payment. 25
The Ruling of the Court
As can be inferred from the records, petitioner was convicted of
estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the RPC, 26which provides:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa).— Any person who shall defraud
punished by:
xxx xxx xxx
fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) By [postdating] a check, or issuing a check in payment of an
obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank,
or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to
cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer
of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover
his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from
the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has
been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall
be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false
pretense or fraudulent act. (As amended by R.A. [No.]
4885, approved June 17, 1967.)
This kind of estafa is committed by any person who shall defraud
another by false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. The elements are: (1)
postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the
time the check was issued; (2) lack of sufficient funds to cover the check; (3)
knowledge on the part of the offender of such circumstances; and (4)
damage to the complainant. 27
The prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt all
the aforesaid elements of estafa.
There is no question that petitioner issued two checks in the total
amount of P267,500.00 in payment for an obligation. The issued checks
have insufficient funds as proven by the fact that they were dishonored for
the reason "account closed." Because petitioner knew too well that she was
not the owner of the check, petitioner had no knowledge whether the
checks were sufficiently funded to cover the amount drawn against the
checks. Petitioner did not inform Sembrano about the insufficiency/lack of
funds of the checks. Thus, upon presentment for payment, the checks were
eventually dishonored causing damages to Sembrano in the total amount
of P267,500.00, 28 as what was reflected in the issued checks.
What sets apart the crime of estafa from the other offense of this
nature (i.e., Batas Pambansa Bilang 22) is the element of deceit. Deceit has
been defined as "the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by
words or conduct by false or misleading allegations or by concealment of
that which should have been disclosed which deceives or is intended to
deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury." 29
In Juaquico v. People,30 the Court reiterated that in the crime of estafa
by postdating or issuing a bad check, deceit and damage are essential
elements of the offense and have to be established with satisfactory proof
to warrant conviction. To constitute estafa, deceit must be the efficient
cause of the defraudation, such that the issuance of the check should be
the means to obtain money or property from the payer 31 resulting to the
latter's damage. In other words, the issuance of the check must have been
the inducement for the surrender by the party deceived of his money or
property. 32
The element of deceit was established from the very beginning when
petitioner misrepresented herself as Vicenta Abalos, the owner of the
check. To fortify the misrepresentation, petitioner issued and signed the
checks in front of Sembrano 33 presumably to show good faith on her part.
Petitioner also showed Sembrano documents such as an Identification
Card and Community Tax Certificate to prove that she is Vicenta Abalos.
And lastly, she showed a transfer certificate of title of a land registered
under the name of "Vicenta Abalos" presumably guaranteeing her
capability to pay. As observed by the RTC, at the outset, petitioner's
fraudulent scheme was already evident.
The misrepresentation of petitioner assured Sembrano that she is
indeed dealing with Vicenta Abalos who has sufficient means and property,
and the capacity to make good the issued checks. It is safe to say that
Sembrano was induced to release the money to petitioner relying on the
latter's false pretense and fraudulent act. Evidently, petitioner's act of
issuing a worthless check belonging to another who appears to have
sufficient means is the efficient cause of the deceit and defraudation. Were
it not for the said circumstance, Sembrano would not have parted with her
money. At any rate a prima facie presumption of deceit arises when the
drawer of the dishonored check is unable to pay the amount of the check
within three days from receipt of the notice of dishonor. 34
In its last ditch effort to enfeeble the case against her, petitioner
pointed out the inconsistency in the evidence of the prosecution specifically
with the testimonies of Sembrano herself. In her affidavit, Sembrano stated
that the checks were offered to her for rediscounting, while her testimony
in open court, she admitted that the checks were used for collaterals. 35 For
a discrepancy to serve as basis for acquittal, it must refer to significant facts
vital to the guilt or innocence of the accused. An inconsistency, which has
nothing to do with the elements of the crime, cannot be a ground to reverse
a conviction. 36 The inconsistency referred to in this case does not attach
upon the very element of the crime of estafa.
While it was indeed admitted by Sembrano that the checks were
collaterals, this only lends credence to the fact that the said checks were
the reason why Sembrano parted with her money. Sembrano was assured
that the loan contracted was secured by the checks issued.
Notwithstanding that the said checks were merely used to guarantee a
loan, the fact remains that petitioner committed deceit when she failed to
make known to Sembrano that the checks she issued were not hers and
they were not sufficiently funded. Sembrano will not accede to an
arrangement of issuing unfunded checks to secure the loan. It is against
ordinary human behavior and experience for a person to accept a check,
even as a mere guaranty for a supposed loan or obligation, if one knew
beforehand that the account against which the check was drawn was
already closed. 37 The check would not even serve its purpose of guaranty
because it can no longer be encashed. 38
While it is true that no criminal liability under the RPC arises from the
mere issuance of postdated checks as a guarantee of repayment, 39 this is
not true in the instant case where the element of deceit is attendant in the
issuance of the said checks. The liability therefore is not merely civil, but
criminal.
As to the penalty imposed, we take into consideration the
amendment embodied in R.A. No. 10951 40 which modifies the penalty in
swindling and estafa cases. Section 100 of the said law, however, provides
that it shall have retroactive effect only insofar as it is favorable to the
accused. This necessitates a comparison of the corresponding penalties
imposable under the RPC and R.A. No. 10951.
The penalty imposed by the RPC in estafa committed under Section
315, paragraph 2(d) are as follows:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa).— Any person who shall defraud
another by any of the means mentioned herein below shall be
punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but
does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount
exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period,
adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but
the total penalty which may be imposed shall not
exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection
with the accessory penalties which may be imposed
and for the purpose of the other provisions of
this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision
mayor or reclusion temporal,as the case may be.
Considering that the penalty prescribed by law is composed only of
two periods, pursuant to Article 65 of the RPC, the same must be divided
into three equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed,
forming one period for each of the three portions, 41 to wit:
Maximum — 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years;
Medium — 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20
days; and
Minimum — 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10
days. 42
Since the amount involved in this case is P232,500.00 43 which is
beyond the P22,000.00 ceiling set by law, the penalty to be imposed upon
the petitioner should be taken within the maximum period of the penalty
prescribed which is eight years; and from there should be added the
incremental penalty of 21 years (P232,500.00 less P22,000.00 divided by
10).However, the law only provides the highest allowable duration which is
20 years. Therefore, the maximum period of indeterminate penalty is 20
years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term should
be within the penalty next lower in degree of the penalty prescribed, which
is, prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or anywhere
from six months and one day to four years and two months. If only to be
beneficial to the accused, the lowest term possible that can be imposed is
six months and one day.
Hence, under the RPC, the penalty of estafa (of the amount of
P232,500.00) ranged from six months and one day as minimum to 20 years
as maximum.
On the other hand, R.A. No. 10951 provides:
SEC. 85. Article 315 of the same Act, as amended by Republic
Act No. 4885, Presidential Decree No. 1689, and Presidential Decree
No. 818, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa).— x x x
xxx xxx xxx
Any person who shall defraud another by means
of false pretenses or fraudulent acts as defined in
paragraph 2(d) hereof shall be punished by:
4th. The penalty of prision mayor in its
medium period, if such amount is over Forty
thousand pesos (P40,000) but does not exceed One
million two hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000).
Considering that the actual amount involved in this case is
P232,500.00, the proper imposable penalty is prision mayor in its medium
period. Since the penalty prescribed by law is a penalty composed of only
one period, Article 65 of theRPC requires the division of the time included
in the penalty into three portions, thus:
Maximum: 9 years, 4 months and 1 day to 10 years
Medium: 8 years, 8 months and 1 day to 9 years and 4 months
Minimum: 8 years and 1 day to 8 years and 8 months 44
Under Article 64 of the RPC, the penalty prescribed shall be imposed
in its medium period when there are neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances. Considering the absence of any modifying circumstance in
this case, the maximum penalty should be anywhere within the medium
period of eight years, eight months and one day to nine years and four
months.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL),the minimum term,
which is left to the sound discretion of the court, should be within the range
of the penalty next lower than the aforementioned penalty, which is left to
the sound discretion of the court. 45 Thus, the minimum penalty should be
one degree lower from the prescribed penalty of prision mayor in its
medium period, or prision mayor in its minimum period. 46 The minimum
term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from six years and
one day to 10 years.
Under R.A. No. 10951, therefore, the petitioner is liable to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from six years and one day
of prision mayor,as minimum, to eight years, eight months and one day
of prision mayor,as maximum. 47
It appears, however, that the imposable penalty under the RPC, which
is six months and one day to 20 years, presents a lower minimum period,
but a higher maximum period of imprisonment compared to that
imposable under R.A. No. 10951, which is six years and one day to eight
years, eight months and one day. In the case of Hisoler v. People,48 the Court
has ruled that since the penalty under the RPC is more beneficial to the
accused, thus, it is the proper penalty to be imposed. It ratiocinated as
follows:
At any rate, even if the maximum period imposable upon the
petitioner under the RPC in this case is higher than that under R.A.
No. 10951, the Court finds that the benefits that would accrue to the
petitioner with the imposition of a lower minimum sentence
outweighs the longer prison sentence and is more in keeping with
the spirit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
In fixing the indeterminate penalty imposable upon the
accused, the Court should be mindful that the basic purpose of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is to "uplift and redeem valuable
human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive
deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness." Simply, an
indeterminate sentence is imposed to give the accused the
opportunity to shorten the term of imprisonment depending upon
his or her demeanor, and physical, mental, and moral record as a
prison. The goal of the law is to encourage reformation and good
behavior, and reduce the incidence of recidivism. While the grant of
parole after service of the minimum sentence is still conditional, the
flexibility granted upon the petitioner to immediately avail of the
benefits of parole considering the much shorter minimum sentence
under the RPC should inspire the petitioner into achieving the
underlying purpose behind the Indeterminate Sentence Law. 49
It is clear, therefore, that if R.A. No. 10951 would be given retroactive
effect, the same will prejudice petitioner. The penalty under the RPC,
insofar as it benefits the petitioner must prevail. Hence, the penalty
imposed by the RTC and the CA, which is four years and two months
of prision correccional as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as
maximum, is correct as it is within the proper penalty imposed by law.
The legal rate of interest of 6% per annum on the monetary award of
P232,500.00 (the actual damage sustained by Sembrano),from the date of
finality of this Decision until fully paid, as imposed by the CA, is modified as
follows: the monetary award shall earn interest at the rate of 12% per
annum from the filing of the Information until June 30, 2013 and 6% per
annum from July 1, 2013 until the finality of the decision. The total amount
of the foregoing shall, in turn, earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum
from the finality of the decision until full payment of the same. 50
WHEREFORE,the Decision dated May 20, 2015 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 35633 sentencing petitioner to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the
monetary award of P232,500.00 shall be subject to interest rate of 12% per
annum from the filing of the Information until June 30, 2013 and 6% per
annum from July 1, 2013 until the finality of the decision, and the total
amount of the foregoing shall, in turn, earn interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from the finality of the decision until full payment thereof.
SO ORDERED.
Caguioa, Lazaro-Javier and Zalameda, JJ.,concur.
Carpio, * J.,is on official leave.
Footnotes
* On official leave.
1. By way of Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, rollo,pp. 7-25.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Victoria Isabel A. Paredes, with Associate Justices

Isaias P. Dicdican and Elihu A. Ybañez, concurring; id. at 55-69.
3. Id. at 58.
4. Id. at 56.
5. Id. at 27.
6. Id. at 58.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 59.
9. Supra note 5.
10. Supra note 8.

11. Supra note 5.
12. Supra note 8.

13. Supra note 5.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Penned by Judge Edilberto T. Claravall; id. at 26-30.

19. Id. at 29-30.
20. Id. at 68.

21. Id. at 15.
22. Id. at 18.
23. Id. at 19.
24. Id. at 20-21.
25. Id. at 17 & 22.

26. Id. at 56-57; Information dated December 6, 2011, reads:
That sometime in the month of April 2011, prior and/or subsequent thereto, in
the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the abovenamed accused, by means of deceit, committed prior to or
simultaneous with the commission of fraud, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud ELAINE D. SEMBRANO, in the following
manner, to wit: the said accused induced the complainant to have the
following EastWest Bank Baguio Branch
Check No. Dated (sic) Amount
0370031 May 31, 2011 P17,500.00
0370032 June 1, 2011 250,000.00
–––––––––––
P267,500.00
be rediscounted although knowing fully well that said checks are not good or
backed up with sufficient funds and the offended party believing and
relying on the false pretenses and misrepresentation of the accused,
delivered the total amount of P267,500.00 to the accused, but when the
checks were presented for payment with the drawee bank on the due dates
or soon thereafter, the same were dishonored for having been drawn
against "Account Closed" and despite demands for her to pay the value of
the aforesaid checks, the accused failed or refused to do so. Thereby
misapplying, misappropriating and converting to her own personal use and
benefit the amount of Php267,500.00, to the damage and prejudice of the
offended party in the aforementioned amount of TWO HUNDRED SIXTY
SEVEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P267,500.00) PESOS, Philippine
Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
27. People v. Dimalanta,483 Phil. 56, 64 (2004).
28. TSN, July 10, 2012, p. 6.
29. Batac v. People,G.R. No. 191622, June 6, 2018.

30. G.R. No. 223998, March 5, 2018.
31. Ilagan v. People,550 Phil. 791, 801 (2007).
32. People v. Cuyugan,440 Phil. 637, 647 (2002).

33. Rollo,p. 122.
34. Hisoler v. People,G.R. No. 237337, June 6, 2018 (Unsigned Resolution).

35. Rollo,pp. 20-21.
36. People v. Almazan,417 Phil. 697, 705 (2001).
37. Hisoler v. People,supra note 34.

38. Id.
39. See People v. Cuyugan,supra note 31, at 648.
40. Republic Act No. 10951, An Act Adjusting the Amount or the Value of Property
and Damage on Which a Penalty is Based, and the Fines Imposed under the
Revised Penal Code, approved on August 29, 2017.
42. Id.
43. Actual amount handed to petitioner.

45. Batac v. People,supra note 29.
46. Hisoler v. People,supra.

47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See Resolution dated October 3, 2018 of the Second Division.
||| (Abalos y Puroc v. People, G.R. No. 221836, [August 14, 2019])
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 207711. July 2, 2018.]
MARIA C. OSORIO,petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF THE

DECISION
LEONEN, J :p
Persons who receive money for investment in a particular company

but divert the same to another without the investor's consent may be held
criminally liable for other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal
Code. Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code is broad in scope intended to
cover all other kinds of deceit not falling under Articles 315, 316, and 317 of
the Revised Penal Code.
For resolution is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 challenging the
January 30, 2013 Decision 2 and June 14, 2013 Resolution 3 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 34274. The assailed judgments affirmed Maria C.
Osorio's (Osorio) conviction for the crime of estafa.
In an Information, Osorio was charged with estafa, punished under
Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as
follows:
That in or about and sometime during the period comprised
from November 19, 2001 to January 11, 2002, in the City of Manila[,]
Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously defraud JOSEFINA O. GABRIEL, in the following
manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations
and fraudulent representations which she made to said JOSEFINA O.
GABRIEL, prior to and even simultaneous with the commission of the
fraud, to the effect that her money, if invested with Philamlife Fund
Management will earn 20% interest per annum, and by means of
other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing the said
JOSEFINA O. GABRIEL to give and deliver, as in fact, she gave and
delivered to the said accused the total amount of Php200,000.00, on
the strength of the manifestations and representations of said
accused well knowing that the said manifestation and
representation were false and fraudulent and were made solely for
the purpose of obtaining, as in fact she did obtain the total amount
of Php200,000.00, which amount once in her possession, with intent
to defraud, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated,
misapplied and converted the same to her own personal use and
benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said JOSEFINA O. GABRIEL in
the aforesaid amount Php200,000.00, Philippine Currency.
Contrary to law. 4
Osorio pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. After pre-trial, trial on
the merits ensued. 5
The prosecution presented as witnesses private complainant,
Josefina O. Gabriel (Gabriel),and Alberto G. Fernandez (Fernandez),head of
Philam Life's Business Values and Compliance Department. Their collective
testimonies produced the prosecution's version of the incident. 6
Gabriel was a proprietor of a stall in Paco Market, Manila. Sometime
in December 2000, Osorio visited Gabriel's store and introduced herself as
an agent of the Philippine American Life and General Insurance Company
(Philam Life).As proof, Osorio presented her company ID and calling card.
During their meeting, Osorio offered insurance coverage to Gabriel. Gabriel
told Osorio to come back at a later date as she needed more time to think
about the offer. 7
When Osorio returned, Gabriel availed Philam Life's Tri-Life Plan and
Excelife Gold Package. 8 Gabriel consistently paid the quarterly premiums
from February 2001 to November 2001. 9
On November 19, 2001, Osorio offered Gabriel an investment
opportunity with Philam Life Fund Management. 10 The proposed
investment would be placed under a time deposit scheme 11 and would
earn 20% annually. Osorio informed Gabriel that the proceeds of her
investment may be channeled to pay for her insurance premiums. Enticed
by the offer, Gabriel tendered P200,000.00 to Osorio, who in turn issued
Philam Life receipts. 12
A few months later, Gabriel discovered that her insurance policies
had lapsed due to non-payment of premiums. When Gabriel confronted
Osorio about the matter, Osorio assured Gabriel that she would take
responsibility. 13
Meanwhile, in May 2002, Gabriel received a letter from Philippine
Money Investment Asset Management (PMIAM),thanking her for investing
in the company. In the same letter, PMIAM informed Gabriel that her
investment would earn interest on a semi-annual basis starting June 20,
2002. 14 Gabriel confronted Osorio on why her investment was diverted to
PMIAM. Osorio explained that PMIAM investments would yield a higher rate
of return. Displeased with what had happened, Gabriel asked for a refund
of her initial investment. 15
On August 2, 2002, Gabriel received P13,000.00 from PMIAM as
evidenced by PMIAM Voucher No. 001854. 16 In spite of this, Gabriel
insisted on the refund. 17
Later, PMIAM informed Gabriel that her initial investment and unpaid
interest income would be released to her on May 14, 2004. Unfortunately,
she was unable to recover it. She then visited the Philam Life office to see
Osorio but she was nowhere to be found. Philam Life referred Gabriel to a
certain Atty. Cabugoy 18 who sent a demand letter to Osorio. 19
Fernandez testified that Osorio was a Philam Life agent and that she
was allowed to engage in other lines of work. He stated that Osorio should
not have issued Philam Life receipts for Gabriel's P200,000.00
investment. 20 Although the receipts were genuine, Fernandez claimed that
they should only be issued for insurance premium payments. 21
The defense presented Osorio as its sole witness. Osorio admitted
that aside from being a Philam Life agent, she was also a referral agent of
PMIAM. She received P4,000.00 from the company as commission for
Gabriel's investment. 22 She asserted that she initially planned to place
Gabriel's investment in Philam Life but decided later on to divert it to
PMIAM since the latter offered a higher rate of return. 23 When Osorio
informed Gabriel of her decision, Gabriel allegedly gave her
consent. 24 Osorio claimed that her husband also failed to recover his
P300,000.00 investment in PMIAM 25 due to internal problems with its
mother company in the United States. 26
On April 19, 2011, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment finding
Osorio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of estafa. 27 It ruled that Gabriel was
induced to part with her money through Osorio's misrepresentation that it
would be invested in Philam Life, a company with an established
reputation. It rejected Osorio's defense that Gabriel later on consented to
the placement. When she was informed of the placement with PMIAM,
Gabriel had no other choice but to agree. 28
The dispositive portion of the Regional Trial Court April 19, 2011
Decision stated:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused MARIA C. OSORIO
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa punishable under Article
315 par. 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences her
to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Accused MARIA C. OSORIO is also directed to reimburse the
private complainant, Josefina Gabriel the sum of Php200,000.00,
with legal rate of interest fixed at 6% per annum from the date of
filing of the complaint until the same is fully settled, which the
accused received from the offended party.
With costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED. 29
Osorio was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión correccional as
minimum to 20 years of reclusión temporal as maximum. She was also
directed to pay P200,000.00 plus six percent (6%) legal interest per annum
from the date of the filing of the complaint until satisfaction. 30
Osorio appealed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, arguing that
her act of investing Gabriel's money with PMIAM was done in good faith. 31
On January 30, 2013, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment
affirming Osorio's conviction. 32 Osorio moved for reconsideration but her
motion was denied. 33
On August 8, 2013, Osorio filed a Petition for Review before this
Court 34 to which the People of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, filed a Comment. 35
In its February 10, 2014 Resolution, this Court required petitioner to
file a reply to the comment on the petition. 36 On April 24, 2014, petitioner
manifested that she would no longer file a reply. 37
On June 18, 2014, this Court gave due course to the petition and
required both parties to submit their respective memoranda. 38 However,
both parties manifested that they would no longer file their memoranda. 39
In praying for her acquittal, 40 petitioner asserts that not all the
elements of estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) of theRevised Penal Code were
established by the prosecution. Only damage on the part of the private
complainant was proven. Petitioner argues that she did not employ any
deceit in soliciting private complainant's investment as nothing in the
records shows that she used a fictitious name or that she pretended to
possess power, agency, or certain qualifications. Fernandez, one of the
prosecution's witnesses, even admitted that she was a Philam Life agent. 41
Furthermore, petitioner claims that she acted in good faith when she
decided to place private complainant's investment in PMIAM. She adds that
she did not conceal this from private complainant, who later on agreed to
the placement. 42
In its Comment, 43 respondent claims that the main issue raised by
petitioner is factual in nature. Thus, it is beyond the scope of review in
a Rule 45 petition. Respondent argues that even if this Court undertakes a
factual review in this case, the lower courts did not err in convicting
petitioner of estafa. 44 Petitioner misrepresented to private complainant
that the latter's investment would be placed in Philam Life and that its
proceeds would be channeled to pay for her insurance premiums. This
misrepresentation caused private complainant to part with her money. 45
The principal issue presented by this case is whether or not
petitioner's acts constitute estafa as defined and punished under Article
315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code.
The rule with respect to petitions for review brought under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court is that only questions of law may be raised. 46 The factual
findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding
on this Court and will not be disturbed on appeal. 47
There is a question of law when "doubt or difference arises as to what
the law is on a certain set of facts or circumstances." 48 On the other hand,
there is a question of fact when "the issue raised on appeal pertains to the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts." 49 This includes an assessment of the
probative value of evidence presented during trial. 50 If the principal issue
may be resolved without reviewing the evidence, then the question before
the appellate court is one of law.
Petitioner claims that the prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt on the ground that she did not employ deceit in soliciting
private complainant's funds. The determination of whether the element of
deceit or fraud is present in a charge for estafa is a question of fact as it
involves a review of the lower court's appreciation of the evidence. 51
Petitioner concedes that the case involves mixed questions of fact
and law. However, she claims that this Court is authorized to undertake a
factual review if the findings of the lower courts do not conform to the
evidence on record. 52 Her contention is well-taken.
Petitioner was charged with estafa by means of deceit under Article
315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code:
Article 315. Swindling (Estafa).— Any person who shall defraud
punished by:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to
possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or
by means of other similar deceits.
In sustaining a conviction under this provision, the following
elements must concur:
(a) [T]hat there must be a false pretense or fraudulent
representation as to his power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such false
pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed prior
to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the
offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or
fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money or
property; and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party
suffered damage. 53
There are different modalities of committing the crime of estafa
under Article 315 (2) (a).The false pretense or fraudulent representation
referred to under the first element exists when the accused uses a fictitious
name, pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business, or imaginary transactions, or when the accused
commits other similar deceits.
There is no evidence to prove that petitioner committed any of these
acts when she obtained private complainant's money.
Petitioner neither used a fictitious name nor misrepresented herself
as an agent of Philam Life. During her first meeting with private
complainant, petitioner presented her company ID and calling card as
proof of her identity and employment. 54 Fernandez, head of Philam Life's
Business Values and Compliance Department, even admitted during trial
that petitioner had been a Philam Life agent as of December 2000. 55
There is also no proof that petitioner pretended to possess the
authority to solicit investments for Philam Life Fund Management. All that
Fernandez stated was that the issuance of Philam Life receipts to private
complainant was improper because the receipts only cover insurance
premium payments. 56 Thus, in the absence of contrary evidence, it is
presumed that petitioner was authorized to solicit money for investment
purposes.
In estafa by means of deceit under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised
Penal Code, the element of deceit consisting of the false pretense or
representation must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Otherwise,
criminal liability will not attach. In Aricheta v. People,57 the accused was
charged of estafa for selling property that she had previously sold to a third
party. She allegedly misrepresented to the buyer that she was still the
owner at the time of the sale. 58 In acquitting the accused, this Court found
that the prosecution failed to prove the alleged false representation she
made:
As can be gleaned from the allegations in the information,
petitioner was charged with Estafa for allegedly selling to private
complainant the subject property knowing fully well that she had
already sold the same to a third party. From this, it is therefore clear
that the supposed false representation or false pretense made by
petitioner to private complainant was that she was still the owner of
the property when she sold it to private complainant.
xxx xxx xxx
The question to be resolved is whether the prosecution was
able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the alleged false
representation or false pretense contained in the information.
As above explained, the alleged false representation or false
pretense made by petitioner to private complainant was that she
was still the owner of the property when she sold it to private
complainant. To prove such allegation, the prosecution should first
establish that the property was previously sold to a third party
before it was sold to private complainant. The prosecution utterly
failed to do this. The fundamental rule is that upon him who alleges
rests the burden of proof. It made this allegation but it failed to
support it with competent evidence. Except for private
complainant's bare allegation that petitioner told her that she
(petitioner) sold the property to another person, the records are
bereft of evidence showing that the property was indeed previously
sold to a third person before it was sold again to private
complainant. What was shown by the prosecution and admitted by
the defense is the fact that the property is being currently occupied
by a person other than private complainant. This fact does not prove
that the property was previously sold to another person before
being sold again to private complainant. 59 (Citation omitted)
In this case, although there is no proof that petitioner used a fictitious
name or pretended to possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, or business in soliciting private complainant's money,
petitioner should nevertheless be held criminally liable for misrepresenting
to private complainant that the latter's money would be invested in Philam
Life Fund Management and that its proceeds may be utilized to pay for
private complainant's insurance premiums.
Private complainant accepted the investment opportunity offered by
petitioner due to the promise that her money would be invested in Philam
Life, a company with which she had existing insurance policies. She parted
with her funds because of the representation that her investment's
earnings would be conveniently channeled to the payment of her insurance
premiums. As a result of petitioner's representations, private complainant
no longer saw the need to pay for the succeeding insurance premiums as
they fell due. 60 Moreover, petitioner's issuance of Philam Life
receipts 61 led private complainant to believe that her money was already
as good as invested in the company.
The false representations committed by petitioner in this case fall
beyond the scope of "other similar deceits" under Article 315 (2) (a) of
the Revised Penal Code. The phrase "other similar deceits" in Article 315 (2)
(a) of the Revised Penal Code has been interpreted in Guinhawa v.
People 62 as limited to acts of the same nature as those specifically
enumerated. Under the principle of ejusdem generis,"other similar deceits"
cannot be construed in the broadest sense to include all kinds of deceit:
[T]he petitioner's reliance on paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code is misplaced. The said provision reads:
fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess
power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other
similar deceits.
The fraudulent representation of the seller, in this case, that
the van to be sold is brand new, is not the deceit contemplated in
the law. Under the principle of ejusdem generis,where a statement
ascribes things of a particular class or kind accompanied by words
of a generic character, the generic words will usually be limited to
things of a similar nature with those particularly enumerated unless
there be something in the context to the contrary. 63 (Citation
omitted)
Nevertheless, petitioner may be held criminally liable for other
deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code.
Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code is broad in application. It is
intended as a catch-all provision to cover all other kinds of deceit not falling
under Articles 315, 316, and 317 of the Revised Penal Code. 64
For an accused to be held criminally liable under Article 318 of
the Revised Penal Code, the following elements must exist:
(a) [The accused makes a] false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense
other than those in [Articles 315, 316, and 317];(b) such false
pretense, fraudulent act or pretense must be made or executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; and (c)
as a result, the offended party suffered damage or
prejudice. 65 (Citation omitted)
All the elements of Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code are present
in this case.
Petitioner, in soliciting private complainant's money, falsely
represented that it would be invested in Philam Life and that its proceeds
would be used to pay for private complainant's insurance premiums. This
false representation is what induced private complainant to part with her
funds and disregard the payment of her insurance premiums. Since
petitioner deviated from what was originally agreed upon by placing the
investment in another company, private complainant's insurance policies
lapsed.
The present case is different from money market transactions where
dealers are usually given full discretion on where to place their client's
investments. In MERALCO v. Atilano,66 this Court explained the nature of
money market transactions and the corresponding liabilities that dealers
may face when dealing with their clients' investments:
[I]n money market transactions, the dealer is given discretion on where
investments are to be placed,absent any agreement with or
instruction from the investor to place the investments in specific
securities.
Money market transactions may be conducted in various
ways. One instance is when an investor enters into an investment
contract with a dealer under terms that oblige the dealer to place
investments only in designated securities. Another is when there is
no stipulation for placement on designated securities; thus, the
dealer is given discretion to choose the placement of the investment
made. Under the first situation, a dealer who deviates from the
specified instruction may be exposed to civil and criminal
prosecution; in contrast, the second situation may only give rise to a
civil action for recovery of the amount invested. 67 (Emphasis in the
original)
Although petitioner was charged of estafa by means of deceit under
Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code, she may be convicted of other
deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code.
As a rule, an accused can only be convicted of the crime with which
he or she is charged. This rule proceeds from the Constitutional guarantee
that an accused shall always be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him or her. 68 An exception to this is the rule on variance
under Rule 120, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
states:
RULE 120
Judgment
Section 4. Judgment in Case of Variance between Allegation and Proof.—
When there is variance between the offense charged in the
complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as
charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the
accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included
in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included
in the offense proved.
Rule 120, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure simply
means that if there is a variance between the offense charged and the
offense proved, an accused may be convicted of the offense proved if it is
included in the offense charged. An accused may also be convicted of the
offense charged if it is necessarily included in the offense proved.
In Sales v. Court of Appeals,69 the accused was charged with estafa by
means of deceit under Article 315 (2) (d) of theRevised Penal Code. She was
convicted of other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code. In
holding that there was no violation of the accused's constitutional right to
be informed of the accusation against her, this Court held that the elements
of the crime of other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal
Code also constitute one (1) of the elements of estafa by means of deceit
under Article 315 (2) (d) of the Revised Penal Code:
In the information filed against her, the petitioner with the
crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised
Penal Code which reads:
xxx xxx xxx
"(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in
payment of an obligation when the offender had no
funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were
not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The
failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount
necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from
receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or
holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or
insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of
deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act. (As
amended by Rep. Act No. 4885, approved June 17,
1967.)"
Under the aforequoted provision, the elements of estafa as
defined therein are as follows: (1) postdating or issuance of a check
in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was
issued; (2) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3)
damage to the payee thereof ...Basically, the two essential requisites
of fraud or deceit and damage or injury must be established by
sufficient and competent evidence in order that the crime of estafa
may be established.
On the other hand, Article 318 of the same Code partly
provides that:
"Other deceits.— The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine
of not less than the amount of the damage caused and
not more than twice such amount shall be imposed
upon any person who shall defraud or damage another
by any other deceit not mentioned in the preceding
articles of this chapter."
xxx xxx xxx
Clearly, the principal elements of deceit and damage are
likewise present in the preceding article cited. The petitioner's
conviction under the latter provision instead of that with which she
was charged was merely an application of the rule on variance
between allegation and proof defined under Rule 120, Section 4 of
the Revised Rules of Court which states that:
"Judgment in case of variance between allegation and
proof.— When there is variance between the offense
charged in the complaint or information, and that
proved or established by the evidence, and the offense
as charged is included in or necessarily includes the
offense proved, the defendant shall be convicted of the
offense proved included in that which is charged, or of
the offense charged included in that which is proved."
Simply put, an accused may be convicted of an offense proved
provided it is included in the charge or of an offense charged which
is included in that which is proved. In the case at bar, the petitioner
was convicted of the crime falling under "Other deceits" which is
necessarily included in the crime of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(d) considering that the elements of deceit and damage
also constitute the former. Hence, the petitioner's right to be
properly informed of the accusation against her was never
violated. 70 (Citation omitted)
In the present case, the crime of other deceits under Article 318 of
the Revised Penal Code is necessarily included in the crime of estafa by
means of deceit under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code.
Therefore, petitioner may be convicted of other deceits under Article 318
of the Revised Penal Code.
The imposable penalty for other deceits under paragraph 1 of Article
318 of the Revised Penal Code 71 has been retained by Republic Act No.
10951. 72 Accordingly, petitioner should suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor and pay a fine, which should neither be less than nor more than
twice the amount of the damage caused. The amount of damage caused
against private complainant in this case is P200,000.00.
As a final note, the defense that private complainant eventually
consented to the investment in PMIAM deserves scant consideration.
Records show that private complainant asked petitioner for a refund of her
initial investment when she discovered that her investment was placed in
PMIAM. 73 The ratification allegedly given by private complainant hardly
qualifies as genuine consent. When private complainant discovered the
transaction, her insurance policies had already lapsed. She was trapped in
a difficult situation where she could potentially lose another investment.
Thus, she had no other choice but to agree to the placement. The lack of
genuine consent is further evidenced by private complainant's repeated
requests for a refund of her initial investment even after she received the
first tranche of interest income. 74
WHEREFORE,the Court of Appeals January 30, 2013 Decision and the
June 14, 2013 Resolution in CA-G.R. CR No. 34274
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.Petitioner Maria C. Osorio is GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of other deceits under Article 318 of
the Revised Penal Code. There being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, petitioner is sentenced to suffer the penalty of two (2)
months and (1) day to four (4) months of arresto mayor in its medium
period, 75and to pay a fine of P200,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr.,Bersamin, Martires and Gesmundo, JJ.,concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo,pp. 10-24.
2. Id.at 26-39. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro
and concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and
Manuel M. Barrios of the Second Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
3. Id.at 41-42. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Normandie B.

Pizarro and concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-
Fernando and Manuel M. Barrios of the Second Division, Court of Appeals,
Manila.
4. Id.at 11-12.
5. Id.at 12.
6. Id.at 28.
7. Id.at 12 and 28.

8. Id.at 12.
9. Id.at 62.
10. Id.at 64.
11. Id.at 29.
12. Id.at 12 and 29.

13. Id.at 12.
14. Id.at 95.
15. Id.at 30.

16. Id.
17. Id.at 64.

18. Id.at 63.
19. Id.at 30-31.
20. Id.at 64.

21. Id.at 31.
22. Id.at 32.
23. Id.at 31.

24. Id.
25. Id.at 32.
26. Id.at 13.

27. Id.at 60-69. The Decision, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-246346, was
penned by Judge Antonio M. Rosales of Branch 52, Regional Trial Court,
Manila.
28. Id.at 66-68.
29. Id.at 68-69.
30. Id.
31. Id.at 57.
32. Id.at 36-39.
33. Id.at 41-42.

34. Id.at 10.
35. Id.at 93-106.

36. Id.at 107.
37. Id.at 108-112.
38. Id.at 114-114-A.

39. Id.at 115-118, Office of the Solicitor General's Manifestation, and rollo,pp. 120-
124, Osorio's Manifestation.
40. Id.at 18.

41. Id.at 17.
42. Id.at 17-18.

43. Id.at 93-106.
44. Id.at 97-98.
45. Id.at 101-102.

46. RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, sec. 1.
47. Pascual v. Burgos,776 Phil. 169, 182 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
48.Spouses Miano v. Manila Electric Company,G.R. No. 205035, November 16,

2016 4 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division] citing Bases Conversion Development
Authority v. Reyes,711 Phil. 631 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second
Division].
49.Id.
50.Pascual v. Burgos,776 Phil. 169, 183 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
51.See Quesada v. Department of Justice,532 Phil. 159, 166 (2006) [Per J. Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Second Division].
52.Rollo,p. 15.
53.Sy v. People,632 Phil. 276, 284 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
54.Rollo,p. 28.
55.Id.at 64.
56.Id.at 31.
57.560 Phil. 170 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].

58.Id.at 175.
59.Id.at 182-183.
60.Rollo,p. 67.
61.Id.at 29.
62.505 Phil. 383 (2005) [Per J. Callejo, Sr.,Second Division].

63.Id.at 401.
64.Id.
65.Id.at 400.
66.689 Phil. 394 (2012) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
67.Id.at 409.
68.Navarrete v. People,542 Phil. 496, 504 (2007) [Per J. Corona, First Division].
69.247-A Phil. 38 (1988) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr.,Third Division].
70.Id.at 42-43.
71.REV. PEN. CODE, Art. 318 provides:
Article 318. Other Deceits. — The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of not less
than the amount of the damage caused and not more than twice such
amount shall be imposed upon any person who shall defraud or damage
another by any other deceit not mentioned in the preceding articles of this
chapter.
Any person who, for profit or gain, shall interpret dreams, make forecasts, tell
fortunes, or take advantage of the credulity of the public in any other
similar manner, shall suffer the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not
exceeding 200 pesos.
72.Rep. Act No. 10951, sec. 86 provides:
Section 86. Article 318 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:
Article 318. Other deceits. — The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of not less
than the amount of the damage caused and not more than twice such
amount shall be imposed upon any person who shall defraud or damage
another by any other deceit not mentioned in the preceding articles of this
Chapter.
Any person who, for profit or gain, shall interpret dreams, make forecasts, tell
fortunes, or take advantage of the credulity of the public in any other
similar manner, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine not
exceeding Forty thousand pesos (P40,000).
73.Rollo,pp. 29-30.
74.Id.
75.The Indeterminate Sentence Law is inapplicable because the maximum term of
imprisonment does not exceed one year.
||| (Osorio v. People, G.R. No. 207711, [July 2, 2018])

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 162822. August 25, 2005.]
JAIME GUINHAWA, petitioner,vs.PEOPLE OF THE

Benjamin E. Bulalacao for petitioner.

Luis M. Contreras, Jr. for Bolante Imperial & Associates.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; INFORMATION; MUST
ALLEGE CLEARLY AND ACCURATELY THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
— Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the
Information must allege the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense: SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint or
information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation
of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate
date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed. When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of
them shall be included in the complaint or information. The real nature of the
offense charged is to be ascertained by the facts alleged in the body of the
Information and the punishment provided by law, not by the designation or
title or caption given by the Prosecutor in the Information. The Information
must allege clearly and accurately the elements of the crime charged.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; OTHER DECEITS; ELEMENTS. — For one to be liable for
"other deceits" under the law, it is required that the prosecution must prove
the following essential elements: (a) false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense
other than those in the preceding articles; (b) such false pretense, fraudulent
act or pretense must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud; and (c) as a result, the offended party suffered
damage or prejudice. It is essential that such false statement or fraudulent
representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive for the private
complainant to part with her property. The provision includes any kind of
conceivable deceit other than those enumerated in Articles 315 to 317 of
the Revised Penal Code. It is intended as the catchall provision for that
purpose with its broad scope and intendment.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONCEALMENT; WHEN SUPPRESSION OF MATERIAL FACT
WHICH A PARTY IS BOUND IN GOOD FAITH TO DISCLOSE IS EQUIVALENT TO
FALSE REPRESENTATION; RATIONALE. — It is true that mere silence is not in
itself concealment. Concealment which the law denounces as fraudulent
implies a purpose or design to hide facts which the other party sought to know.
Failure to reveal a fact which the seller is, in good faith, bound to disclose may
generally be classified as a deceptive act due to its inherent capacity to
deceive. Suppression of a material fact which a party is bound in good faith to
disclose is equivalent to a false representation. Moreover, a representation is
not confined to words or positive assertions; it may consist as well of deeds,
acts or artifacts of a nature calculated to mislead another and thus allow the
fraud-feasor to obtain an undue advantage. Fraudulent nondisclosure and
fraudulent concealment are of the same genre. Fraudulent concealment
presupposes a duty to disclose the truth and that disclosure was not made
when opportunity to speak and inform was presented, and that the party to
whom the duty of disclosure, as to a material fact was due, was induced
thereby to act to his injury. Article 1389 of the New Civil Code provides that
failure to disclose facts when there is a duty to reveal them constitutes fraud.
In a contract of sale, a buyer and seller do not deal from equal bargaining
positions when the latter has knowledge, a material fact which, if
communicated to the buyer, would render the grounds unacceptable or, at
least, substantially less desirable. If, in a contract of sale, the vendor knowingly
allowed the vendee to be deceived as to the thing sold in a material matter by
failing to disclose an intrinsic circumstance that is vital to the contract, knowing
that the vendee is acting upon the presumption that no such fact exists, deceit
is accomplished by the suppression of the truth.
4. ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.;VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE THING SOLD WILL NOT
RELIEVE THE SELLER OF HIS CRIMINAL LIABILITY; APPLICATION IN CASE AT
BAR. — The petitioner is not relieved of his criminal liability for deceitful
concealment of material facts, even if the private complainant made a visual
inspection of the van's interior and exterior before she agreed to buy it and
failed to inspect its under chassis. Case law has it that where the vendee made
only a partial investigation and relies, in part, upon the representation of the
vendee, and is deceived by such representation to his injury, he may maintain
an action for such deceit. The seller cannot be heard to say that the vendee
should not have relied upon the fraudulent concealment; that negligence, on
the part of the vendee, should not be a defense in order to prevent the vendor
from unjustifiably escaping with the fruits of the fraud. In one case, the
defendant who repainted an automobile, worked it over to resemble a new
one and delivered it to the plaintiff was found to have warranted and
represented that the automobile being sold was new. This was found to be "a
false representation of an existing fact; and, if it was material and induced the
plaintiff to accept something entirely different from that which he had
contracted for, it clearly was a fraud which, upon its discovery and a tender of
the property back to the seller, [it] entitled the plaintiff to rescind the trade
and recover the purchase money."
5. ID.;ID.;CAVEAT EMPTOR IS NOT A DEFENSE. — On the petitioner's
insistence that the private complainant was proscribed from charging him with
estafa based on the principle of caveat emptor, case law has it that this rule
only requires the purchaser to exercise such care and attention as is usually
exercised by ordinarily prudent men in like business affairs, and only applies
to defects which are open and patent to the service of one exercising such
care. In an avuncular case, it was held that: ...The rule of caveat emptor, like
the rule of sweet charity, has often been invoked to cover a multitude of sins;
but we think its protecting mantle has never been stretched to this extent. It
can only be applied where it is shown or conceded that the parties to the
contract stand on equal footing and have equal knowledge or equal means of
knowledge and there is no relation of trust or confidence between them. But,
where one party undertakes to sell to another property situated at a distance
and of which he has or claims to have personal knowledge and of which the
buyer knows nothing except as he is informed by the seller, the buyer may
rightfully rely on the truth of the seller's representations as to its kind, quality,
and value made in the course of negotiation for the purpose of inducing the
purchase. If, in such case, the representations prove to be false, neither law
nor equity will permit the seller to escape responsibility by the plea that the
buyer ought not to have believed him or ought to have applied to other
sources to ascertain the facts. ...It bears stressing that Azotea and the
petitioner had every opportunity to reveal to the private complainant that the
van was defective. They resolved to maintain their silence, to the prejudice of
the private complainant, who was a garment merchant and who had no special
knowledge of parts of motor vehicles. Based on the surrounding
circumstances, she relied on her belief that the van was brand new. In fine,
she was the innocent victim of the petitioner's fraudulent nondisclosure or
concealment. The petitioner cannot pin criminal liability for his fraudulent
omission on his general manager, Azotea. The two are equally liable for their
collective fraudulent silence. Case law has it that wherever the doing of a
certain act or the transaction of a given affair, or the performance of certain
business is confided to an agent, the authority to so act will, in accordance with
a general rule often referred to, carry with it by implication the authority to do
all of the collateral acts which are the natural and ordinary incidents of the
main act or business authorized.
6. ID.; ID.; IMPOSABLE PENALTY. — An indeterminate penalty may be
imposed if the minimum of the penalty is one year or less, and the maximum
exceeds one year. For example, the trial court may impose an indeterminate
penalty of six months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four
months of prision correccional, as maximum, since the maximum term of
imprisonment it imposed exceeds one year. If the trial court opts to impose a
penalty of imprisonment of one year or less, it should not impose an
indeterminate penalty, but a straight penalty of one year or less instead. Thus,
the petitioner may be sentenced to a straight penalty of one year, or a straight
penalty of less than one year, i.e., ten months or eleven months. We believe
that considering the attendant circumstances, a straight penalty of
imprisonment of six months is reasonable. Conformably with Article 39 in
relation to paragraph 3, Article 38 of the Revised Penal Code, the petitioner
shall suffer subsidiary imprisonment if he has no property with which to pay
the penalty of fine.
7. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; EJUSDEM GENERIS; DEFINED. — Under
the principle of ejusdem generis, where a statement ascribes things of a
particular class or kind accompanied by words of a generic character, the
generic words will usually be limited to things of a similar nature with those
particularly enumerated unless there be something in the context to the
contrary.
8. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; JURISDICTION; CANNOT BE
CONFERRED BY THE WILL OF THE PARTIES NOR DIMINISHED NOR WAIVED BY
THEM. — Jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution or by law. It cannot be
conferred by the will of the parties, nor diminished or waived by them. The
jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the complaint or
Information, in relation to the law prevailing at the time of the filing of the
criminal complaint or Information, and the penalty provided by law for the
crime charged at the time of its commission.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J :
p
Jaime Guinhawa was engaged in the business of selling brand new

motor vehicles, including Mitsubishi vans, under the business name of Guinrox
Motor Sales. His office and display room for cars were located along
Panganiban Avenue, Naga City. He employed Gil Azotea as his sales manager.
On March 17, 1995, Guinhawa purchased a brand new Mitsubishi L-300
Versa Van with Motor No. 4D56A-C8929 and Serial No. L069WQZJL-07970 from
the Union Motors Corporation (UMC) in Paco, Manila. The van bore Plate No.
DLK 406. Guinhawa's driver, Leopoldo Olayan, drove the van from Manila to
Naga City. However, while the van was traveling along the highway in Labo,
Daet, Camarines Norte, Olayan suffered a heart attack. The van went out of
control, traversed the highway onto the opposite lane, and was ditched into
the canal parallel to the highway. 1 The van was damaged, and the left front
tire had to be replaced.
The incident was reported to the local police authorities and was
recorded in the police blotter. 2 The van was repaired and later offered for sale
in Guinhawa's showroom. 3
Sometime in October 1995, the spouses Ralph and Josephine Silo
wanted to buy a new van for their garment business; they purchased items in
Manila and sold them in Naga City. 4 They went to Guinhawa's office, and were
shown the L-300 Versa Van which was on display. The couple inspected its
interior portion and found it beautiful. They no longer inspected the under
chassis since they presumed that the vehicle was brand new. 5 Unaware that
the van had been damaged and repaired on account of the accident in Daet,
the couple decided to purchase the van for P591,000.00. Azotea suggested
that the couple make a downpayment of P118,200.00, and pay the balance of
the purchase price by installments via a loan from the United Coconut Planters
Bank (UCPB),Naga Branch, with the L-300 Versa Van as collateral. Azotea
offered to make the necessary arrangements with the UCPB for the
consummation of the loan transaction. The couple agreed. On November 10,
1995, the spouses executed a Promissory Note 6 for the amount of
P692,676.00 as payment of the balance on the purchase price, and as evidence
of the chattel mortgage over the van in favor of UCPB.
On October 11, 1995, the couple arrived in Guinhawa's office to take
delivery of the van. Guinhawa executed the deed of sale, and the couple paid
the P161,470.00 downpayment, for which they were issued Receipt No.
0309. 7 They were furnished a Service Manual 8 which contained the warranty
terms and conditions. Azotea instructed the couple on how to start the van
and to operate its radio. Ralph Silo no longer conducted a test drive; he and
his wife assumed that there were no defects in the van as it was brand new. 9
On October 12, 1995, Josephine Silo, accompanied by Glenda Pingol,
went to Manila on board the L-300 Versa Van, with Glenda's husband, Bayani
Pingol III, as the driver. Their trip to Manila was uneventful. However, on the
return trip to Naga from Manila on October 15 or 16, 1995, Bayani Pingol heard
a squeaking sound which seemed to be coming from underneath the van.
They were in Calauag, Quezon, where there were no humps along the
road. 10 Pingol stopped the van in Daet, Camarines Norte, and examined the
van underneath, but found no abnormalities or defects. 11 But as he drove the
van to Naga City, the squeaking sound persisted. Believing that the van merely
needed grease, Pingol stopped at a Shell gasoline station where it was
examined. The mechanic discovered that some parts underneath the van had
been welded. When Pingol complained to Guinhawa, the latter told him that
the defects were mere factory defects. As the defects persisted, the spouses
Silo requested that Guinhawa change the van with two Charade-Daihatsu
vehicles within a week or two, with the additional costs to be taken from their
downpayment. Meanwhile, the couple stopped paying the monthly
amortization on their loan, pending the replacement of the van. Guinhawa
initially agreed to the couple's proposal, but later changed his mind and told
them that he had to sell the van first. The spouses then brought the vehicle to
the Rx Auto Clinic in Naga City for examination. Jesus Rex Raquitico, Jr.,the
mechanic, examined the van and discovered that it was the left front stabilizer
that was producing the annoying sound, and that it had been
repaired. 12 Raquitico prepared a Job Order containing the following notations
and recommendations:
1. CHECK UP SUSPENSION (FRONT)
2. REPLACE THE ROD END
3. REPLACE BUSHING
NOTE: FRONT STEP BOARD HAS BEEN ALREADY DAMAGED AND

REPAIRED.
NOTE: FRONT LEFT SUSPENSION MOUNTING IS NOT ON SPECIFIED

ALIGNMENT/MEASUREMENT 13
Josephine Silo filed a complaint for the rescission of the sale and the
refund of their money before the Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI).During the confrontation between her and Guinhawa, Josephine learned
that Guinhawa had bought the van from UMC before it was sold to them, and
after it was damaged in Daet. Subsequently, the spouses Silo withdrew their
complaint from the DTI.
On February 14, 1996, Josephine Silo filed a criminal complaint for
violation of paragraph 1, Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code against
Guinhawa in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Naga City. After the requisite
investigation, an Information was filed against Guinhawa in the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Naga City. The inculpatory portion reads:
The undersigned Assistant Prosecutor of Naga City accuses
Jaime Guinhawa of the crime of OTHER DECEITS defined and penalized
under Art. 318, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
"That on or about October 11, 1995, in the City of
Naga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, being a motor vehicle
dealer using the trade name of Guinhawa Motor Sales at
Panganiban Avenue, Naga City, and a dealer of brand
new cars, by means of false pretenses and fraudulent
acts, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud private complainant, JOSEPHINE P.
SILO, as follows: said accused by means of false
manifestations and fraudulent representations, sold to
said private complainant, as brand new, an automobile
with trade name L-300 Versa Van colored beige and the
latter paid for the same in the amount of P591,000.00,
when, in truth and in fact, the same was not brand new
because it was discovered less than a month after it was
sold to said Josephine P. Silo that said L-300 Versa Van
had defects in the underchassis and stepboard and
repairs had already been done thereat even before said
sale, as was found upon check-up by an auto mechanic;
that private complainant returned said L-300 Versa Van
to the accused and demanded its replacement with a
new one or the return of its purchase price from said
accused but despite follow-up demands no replacement
was made nor was the purchase price returned to private
complainant up to the present to her damage and
prejudice in the amount of P591,000.00, Philippine
Currency, plus other damages that may be proven in
court." 14
Guinhawa testified that he was a dealer of brand new Toyota, Mazda,

Honda and Mitsubishi cars, under the business name Guinrox Motor Sales. He
purchased Toyota cars from Toyota Philippines, and Mitsubishi cars from UMC
in Paco, Manila. 15 He bought the van from the UMC in March 1995, but did not
use it; he merely had it displayed in his showroom in Naga City. 16 He insisted
that the van was a brand new unit when he sold it to the couple. 17 The spouses
Silo bought the van and took delivery only after inspecting and taking it for a
road tests. 18 His sales manager, Azotea, informed him sometime in November
1995 that the spouses Silo had complained about the defects under the left
front portion of the van. By then, the van had a kilometer reading of 4,000
kilometers. 19 He insisted that he did not make any false statement or
fraudulent misrepresentation to the couple about the van, either before or
simultaneous with its purchase. He posited that the defects noticed by the
couple were not major ones, and could be repaired. However, the couple
refused to have the van repaired and insisted on a refund of their payment for
the van which he could not allow. He then had the defects repaired by the
UMC. 20 He claimed that the van was never involved in any accident, and
denied that his driver, Olayan, met an accident and sustained physical injuries
when he drove the van from Manila to Naga City. 21 He even denied meeting
Bayani Pingol.
The accused claimed that the couple filed a Complaint 22 against him
with the DTI on January 25, 1996, only to withdraw it later. 23 The couple then
failed to pay the amortizations for the van, which caused the UCPB to file a
petition for the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage and the sale of the van at
public auction. 24
Azotea testified that he had been a car salesman for 16 years and that
he sold brand new vans. 25 Before the couple took delivery of the vehicle,
Pingol inspected its exterior, interior, and underside, and even drove it for the
couple. 26 He was present when the van was brought to the Rx Auto Clinic,
where he noticed the dent on its front side. 27 He claimed that the van never
figured in any vehicular accident in Labo, Daet, Camarines Norte on March 17,
1995. 28 In fact, he declared, he found no police record of a vehicular accident
involving the van on the said date. 29 He admitted that Olayan was their driver,
and was in charge of taking delivery of cars purchased from the manufacturer
in Manila. 30
On November 6, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment convicting
Guinhawa. The fallo of the decision reads:

rendered declaring the accused, JAIME GUINHAWA, guilty of the crime
of Other Deceits defined and penalized under Art. 318(1) of
the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt and hereby imposes upon him the
penalty of imprisonment from 2 months and 1 day to 4 months
of Arresto Mayor and a fine of One Hundred Eighty Thousand Seven
Hundred and Eleven Pesos (P180,711.00) the total amount of the
actual damages caused to private complainant.
As to the civil aspect of this case which have been deemed
instituted with this criminal case, Articles 2201 and 2202 of the Civil
Code provides:
"Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the
damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith
is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable
consequences of the breach of the obligation, and
which the parties have foreseen or could have
reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was
constituted.
"In case of fraud, malice or wanton attitude, the

obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may
be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the
obligation."
"Art. 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the
defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the
natural and probable consequences of the act or
omission complained of. It is not necessary that such
damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably
been foreseen by the defendant."
Thus, accused is condemned to pay actual damages in the
amount of One Hundred Eighty Thousand Seven Hundred and Eleven
Pesos (Php180,711.00),which represents the 20% downpayment and
other miscellaneous expenses paid by the complainant plus the
amount of Nineteen Thousand Two Hundred Forty-One
(Php19,241.00) Pesos, representing the 1st installment payment made
by the private complainant to the bank. Accused is, likewise, ordered
to pay moral damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (Php100,000.00) in view of the moral pain suffered by the
complainant; for exemplary damages in the amount of Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (Php200,000.00) to serve as deterrent for those
businessmen similarly inclined to take undue advantage over the
public's innocence. As for attorney's fees, the reasonable amount of
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php100,000.00) is hereby awarded.
SO ORDERED. 31
The trial court declared that the accused made false pretenses or
misrepresentations that the van was a brand new one when, in fact, it had
figured in an accident in Labo, Daet, Camarines Norte, and sustained serious
damages before it was sold to the private complainant.
Guinhawa appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Naga City, Branch 19, in which he alleged that:
1. The lower court erred in its finding that the repair works on
the left front portion and underchassis of the van was the result of the
accident in Labo, Camarines Norte, where its driver suffered an attack
of hypertension.
2. The lower court erred in its four (4) findings of fact that
accused-appellant made misrepresentation or false pretenses "that
the van was a brand new car," which constituted deceit as defined in
Article 318, paragraph 1 of theRevised Penal Code.
3. The lower court erred in finding accused-appellant civilly

liable to complainant Josephine Silo. But, even if there be such liability,
the action therefor has already prescribed and the amount awarded
was exorbitant, excessive and unconscionable. 32
Guinhawa insisted that he never talked to the couple about the sale of
the van; hence, could not have made any false pretense or misrepresentation.
On August 1, 2002, the RTC affirmed the appealed judgment. 33
Guinhawa filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals

(CA),where he averred that:
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING PETITIONER OF THE
CRIME OF OTHER DECEITS AND SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER
IMPRISONMENT OF TWO MONTHS AND ONE DAY TO FOUR MONTHS
OF ARRESTO MAYOR AND TO PAY FINE IN THE AMOUNT OF
P180,711.00.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ORDERING PETITIONER TO PAY
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT P180,711.00 AS DOWNPAYMENT, P19,241.00
AS FIRST INSTALLMENT WITH UCPB NAGA, P100,000.00 AS MORAL
DAMAGES, P200,000.00 AS EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND P100,000.00
AS ATTORNEY'S FEES. 34
On January 5, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming with

modification the decision of the RTC. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE,premises considered, the instant petition is
hereby partially granted insofar as the following are concerned: a) the
award of moral damages is hereby REDUCED to P10,000.00 and b) the
award of attorney's fees and exemplary damages are
hereby DELETED for lack of factual basis. In all other respects, We
affirm the decision under review. IDAEHT
Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED. 35
The CA ruled that the private complainant had the right to assume that
the van was brand new because Guinhawa held himself out as a dealer of
brand new vans. According to the appellate court, the act of displaying the van
in the showroom without notice to any would-be buyer that it was not a brand
new unit was tantamount to deceit. Thus, in concealing the van's true
condition from the buyer, Guinhawa committed deceit.
The appellate court denied Guinhawa's motion for reconsideration,
prompting him to file the present petition for review on certiorari,where he
contends:
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
INFORMATION CHARGED AGAINST PETITIONER DID NOT INFORM HIM
OF A CHARGE OF OTHER DECEITS.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER
EMPLOYED FRAUD OR DECEIT AS DEFINED UNDER ARTICLE
318, REVISED PENAL CODE.
III
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE
CIRCUMSTANCES POINTING TO THE INNOCENCE OF THE
PETITIONER. 36
The issues for resolution are (1) whether, under the Information, the
petitioner was charged of other deceits under paragraph 1, Article 318 of
the Revised Penal Code; and (2) whether the respondent adduced proof
beyond reasonable doubt of the petitioner's guilt for the crime charged.
The petitioner asserts that based on the allegations in the Information,
he was charged with estafa through false pretenses under paragraph 2, Article
315 of the Revised Penal Code. Considering the allegation that the private
complainant was defrauded of P591,000.00, it is the RTC, not the MTC, which
has exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The petitioner maintains that he is not
estopped from assailing this matter because the trial court's lack of jurisdiction
can be assailed at any time, even on appeal, which defect cannot even be
cured by the evidence adduced during the trial. The petitioner further avers
that he was convicted of other deceits under paragraph 1, Article 318 of
the Revised Penal Code, a crime for which he was not charged; hence, he was
deprived of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the charge
against him. And in any case, even if he had been charged of other deceits
under paragraph 1 of Article 318, the CA erred in finding him guilty. He insists
that the private complainant merely assumed that the van was brand new, and
that he did not make any misrepresentation to that effect. He avers that deceit
cannot be committed by concealment, the absence of any notice to the public
that the van was not brand new does not amount to deceit. He posits that
based on the principle of caveat emptor,if the private complainant purchased
the van without first inspecting it, she must suffer the consequences.
Moreover, he did not attend to the private complainant when they examined
the van; thus, he could not have deceived them.
The petitioner maintains that, absent evidence of conspiracy, he is not
criminally liable for any representation Azotea may have made to the private
complainant, that the van was brand new. He insists that the respondent was
estopped from adducing evidence that the vehicle was involved in an accident
in Daet, Camarines Norte on March 17, 1995, because such fact was not
alleged in the Information. STcEIC
In its comment on the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General avers
that, as gleaned from the material averments of the Information, the
petitioner was charged with other deceits under paragraph 1, Article 318 of
the Revised Penal Code, a felony within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC.
The petitioner was correctly charged and convicted, since he falsely claimed
that the vehicle was brand new when he sold the same to the private
complainant. The petitioner's concealment of the fact that the van sustained
serious damages as an aftermath of the accident in Daet, Camarines Norte
constituted deceit within the meaning of paragraph 1 of Article 318.
The Information filed against the petitioner reads:
That on or about October 11, 1995, in the City of Naga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, being a motor vehicle dealer using the trade name of
Guinhawa Motor Sales at Panganiban Avenue, Naga City, and dealer
of brand new cars, by means of false pretenses and fraudulent acts,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud private
complainant, JOSEPHINE P. SILO, as follows: said accused by means of
false manifestations and fraudulent representations, sold to said
private complainant, as brand new, an automobile with trade name L-
300 Versa Van colored beige and the latter paid for the same in the
amount of P591,000.00, when, in truth and in fact, the same was not
brand new because it was discovered less than a month after it was
sold to said Josephine P. Silo that said L-300 Versa Van had defects in
the underchassis and stepboard and repairs have already been done
thereat even before said sale, as was found upon check-up by an auto
mechanic; that private complainant returned said L-300 Versa Van to
the accused and demanded its replacement with a new one or the
return of its purchase price from said accused but despite follow-up
demands no replacement was made nor was the purchase price
returned to private complainant up to the present to her damage and
prejudice in the amount of P591,000.00, Philippine Currency, plus
other damages that may be proven in court.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 37
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the
Information must allege the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense:
SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.— A complaint or
information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the
place where the offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of
them shall be included in the complaint or information.
The real nature of the offense charged is to be ascertained by the facts

alleged in the body of the Information and the punishment provided by law,
not by the designation or title or caption given by the Prosecutor in the
Information. 38 The Information must allege clearly and accurately the
elements of the crime charged. 39
As can be gleaned from its averments, the Information alleged the
essential elements of the crime under paragraph 1, Article 318 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The false or fraudulent representation by a seller that what he offers for
sale is brand new (when, in fact, it is not) is one of those deceitful acts
envisaged in paragraph 1, Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code. The provision
reads:
Art. 318. Other deceits.— The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine
of not less than the amount of the damage caused and not more than
twice such amount shall be imposed upon any person who shall
defraud or damage another by any other deceit not mentioned in the
preceding articles of this chapter.
This provision was taken from Article 554 of the Spanish Penal
Code which provides:
El que defraudare o perjudicare a otro, usando de cualquier
engaño que no se halle expresado en los artículos anteriores de esta
sección, será castigado con una multa del tanto al duplo del perjuicio que
irrogare; y en caso de reincidencia, con la del duplo y arresto mayor en su
grado medio al máximo.
For one to be liable for "other deceits" under the law, it is required that
the prosecution must prove the following essential elements: (a) false
pretense, fraudulent act or pretense other than those in the preceding articles;
(b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense must be made or executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; and (c) as a result,
the offended party suffered damage or prejudice. 40 It is essential that such
false statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause or the
only motive for the private complainant to part with her property.
The provision includes any kind of conceivable deceit other than those
enumerated in Articles 315 to 317 of the Revised Penal Code. 41 It is intended
as the catchall provision for that purpose with its broad scope and
intendment. 42
Thus, the petitioner's reliance on paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code is misplaced. The said provision reads:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of
the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess
power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions; or by means of
other similar deceits.
The fraudulent representation of the seller, in this case, that the van to
be sold is brand new, is not the deceit contemplated in the law. Under the
principle of ejusdem generis,where a statement ascribes things of a particular
class or kind accompanied by words of a generic character, the generic words
will usually be limited to things of a similar nature with those particularly
enumerated unless there be something in the context to the contrary. 43
Jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution or by law. It cannot be
conferred by the will of the parties, nor diminished or waived by them. The
jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the complaint or
Information, in relation to the law prevailing at the time of the filing of the
criminal complaint or Information, and the penalty provided by law for the
crime charged at the time of its commission.
Section 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No.
7691, provides that the MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six years, irrespective of the
amount of the fine:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases.— Except in
cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial
Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations
of city or municipal ordinances committed within their
respective territorial jurisdiction; and
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless
of other imposable accessory or other penalties,
including the civil liability arising from such offenses or
predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value
or amount thereof: Provided, however,That in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal
negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
thereof.
Since the felony of other deceits is punishable by arresto mayor,the MTC

had exclusive jurisdiction over the offense lodged against the petitioner.
On the merits of the petition, the Court agrees with the petitioner's
contention that there is no evidence on record that he made direct and
positive representations or assertions to the private complainant that the van
was brand new. The record shows that the private complainant and her
husband Ralph Silo were, in fact, attended to by Azotea. However, it bears
stressing that the representation may be in the form of words, or conduct
resorted to by an individual to serve as an advantage over another. Indeed, as
declared by the CA based on the evidence on record:
Petitioner cannot barefacedly claim that he made no personal
representation that the herein subject van was brand new for the
simple reason that nowhere in the records did he ever refute the
allegation in the complaint, which held him out as a dealer of brand
new cars. It has thus become admitted that the petitioner was dealing
with brand new vehicles — a fact which, up to now, petitioner has not
categorically denied. Therefore, when private complainant went to
petitioner's showroom, the former had every right to assume that she
was being sold brand new vehicles there being nothing to indicate
otherwise. But as it turned out, not only did private complainant get a
defective and used van, the vehicle had also earlier figured in a road
accident when driven by no less than petitioner's own driver. 44
Indeed, the petitioner and Azotea obdurately insisted in the trial court
that the van was brand new, and that it had never figured in vehicular accident.
This representation was accentuated by the fact that the petitioner gave the
Service Manual to the private complainant, which manual contained the
warranty terms and conditions, signifying that the van was "brand new."
Believing this good faith, the private complainant decided to purchase the van
for her buy-and-sell and garment business, and even made a downpayment
of the purchase price.
As supported by the evidence on record, the van was defective when the
petitioner sold it to the private complainant. It had ditched onto the shoulder
of the highway in Daet, Camarines Norte on its way from Manila to Naga City.
The van was damaged and had to be repaired; the rod end and bushing had
to be replaced, while the left front stabilizer which gave out a persistent
annoying sound was repaired. Some parts underneath the van were even
welded together. Azotea and the petitioner deliberately concealed these facts
from the private complainant when she bought the van, obviously so as not to
derail the sale and the profit from the transaction.
The CA is correct in ruling that fraud or deceit may be committed by
omission. As the Court held in People v. Balasa: 45
Fraud, in its general sense, is deemed to comprise anything
calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions, and concealment
involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly
reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue and
unconscientious advantage is taken of another. It is a generic term
embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity can device,
and which are resorted to by one individual to secure an advantage
over another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth and
includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any unfair way by
which another is cheated. On the other hand, deceit is the false
representation of a matter of fact whether by words or conduct, by false
or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have
been disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he
shall act upon it to his legal injury. 46
It is true that mere silence is not in itself concealment. Concealment

which the law denounces as fraudulent implies a purpose or design to hide
facts which the other party sought to know. 47 Failure to reveal a fact which the
seller is, in good faith, bound to disclose may generally be classified as a
deceptive act due to its inherent capacity to deceive. 48 Suppression of a
material fact which a party is bound in good faith to disclose is equivalent to a
false representation. 49 Moreover, a representation is not confined to words
or positive assertions; it may consist as well of deeds, acts or artifacts of a
nature calculated to mislead another and thus allow the fraud-feasor to obtain
an undue advantage. 50
Fraudulent nondisclosure and fraudulent concealment are of the same

genre. Fraudulent concealment presupposes a duty to disclose the truth and
that disclosure was not made when opportunity to speak and inform was
presented, and that the party to whom the duty of disclosure, as to a material
fact was due, was induced thereby to act to his injury. 51
Article 1389 of the New Civil Code provides that failure to disclose facts
when there is a duty to reveal them constitutes fraud. In a contract of sale, a
buyer and seller do not deal from equal bargaining positions when the latter
has knowledge, a material fact which, if communicated to the buyer, would
render the grounds unacceptable or, at least, substantially less desirable. 52 If,
in a contract of sale, the vendor knowingly allowed the vendee to be deceived
as to the thing sold in a material matter by failing to disclose an intrinsic
circumstance that is vital to the contract, knowing that the vendee is acting
upon the presumption that no such fact exists, deceit is accomplished by the
suppression of the truth. 53
In the present case, the petitioner and Azotea knew that the van had
figured in an accident, was damaged and had to be repaired. Nevertheless, the
van was placed in the showroom, thus making it appear to the public that it
was a brand new unit. The petitioner was mandated to reveal the foregoing
facts to the private complainant. But the petitioner and Azotea even
obdurately declared when they testified in the court a quo that the vehicle did
not figure in an accident, nor had it been repaired; they maintained that the
van was brand new, knowing that the private complainant was going to use it
for her garment business. Thus, the private complainant bought the van,
believing it was brand new.
Significantly, even when the petitioner was apprised that the private
complainant had discovered the van's defects, the petitioner agreed to replace
the van, but changed his mind and insisted that it must be first sold. ACTISE
The petitioner is not relieved of his criminal liability for deceitful

concealment of material facts, even if the private complainant made a visual
inspection of the van's interior and exterior before she agreed to buy it and
failed to inspect its under chassis. Case law has it that where the vendee made
only a partial investigation and relies, in part, upon the representation of the
vendee, and is deceived by such representation to his injury, he may maintain
an action for such deceit. 54 The seller cannot be heard to say that the vendee
should not have relied upon the fraudulent concealment; that negligence, on
the part of the vendee, should not be a defense in order to prevent the vendor
from unjustifiably escaping with the fruits of the fraud.
In one case, 55 the defendant who repainted an automobile, worked it
over to resemble a new one and delivered it to the plaintiff was found to have
warranted and represented that the automobile being sold was new. This was
found to be "a false representation of an existing fact; and, if it was material
and induced the plaintiff to accept something entirely different from that
which he had contracted for, it clearly was a fraud which, upon its discovery
and a tender of the property back to the seller, [it] entitled the plaintiff to
rescind the trade and recover the purchase money." 56
On the petitioner's insistence that the private complainant was
proscribed from charging him with estafa based on the principle of caveat
emptor,case law has it that this rule only requires the purchaser to exercise
such care and attention as is usually exercised by ordinarily prudent men in
like business affairs, and only applies to defects which are open and patent to
the service of one exercising such care. 57 In an avuncular case, it was held that:
...The rule of caveat emptor,like the rule of sweet charity, has
often been invoked to cover a multitude of sins; but we think its
protecting mantle has never been stretched to this extent. It can only
be applied where it is shown or conceded that the parties to the
contract stand on equal footing and have equal knowledge or equal
means of knowledge and there is no relation of trust or confidence
between them. But, where one party undertakes to sell to another
property situated at a distance and of which he has or claims to have
personal knowledge and of which the buyer knows nothing except as
he is informed by the seller, the buyer may rightfully rely on the truth
of the seller's representations as to its kind, quality, and value made
in the course of negotiation for the purpose of inducing the purchase.
If, in such case, the representations prove to be false, neither law nor
equity will permit the seller to escape responsibility by the plea that
the buyer ought not to have believed him or ought to have applied to
other sources to ascertain the facts. ... 58
It bears stressing that Azotea and the petitioner had every opportunity
to reveal to the private complainant that the van was defective. They resolved
to maintain their silence, to the prejudice of the private complainant, who was
a garment merchant and who had no special knowledge of parts of motor
vehicles. Based on the surrounding circumstances, she relied on her belief that
the van was brand new. In fine, she was the innocent victim of the petitioner's
fraudulent nondisclosure or concealment.
The petitioner cannot pin criminal liability for his fraudulent omission on
his general manager, Azotea. The two are equally liable for their collective
fraudulent silence. Case law has it that wherever the doing of a certain act or
the transaction of a given affair, or the performance of certain business is
confided to an agent, the authority to so act will, in accordance with a general
rule often referred to, carry with it by implication the authority to do all of the
collateral acts which are the natural and ordinary incidents of the main act or
business authorized. 59
The MTC sentenced the petitioner to suffer imprisonment of from two
months and one day, as minimum, to four months of arresto mayor,as
maximum. The CA affirmed the penalty imposed by the trial court. This is
erroneous. Section 2 of Act 4103, as amended, otherwise known as
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, provides that the law will not apply if the
maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year:
SEC. 2. This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses
punished with death penalty or life-imprisonment; to those convicted
of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason; to those
convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage; to
those convicted of piracy; to those who are habitual delinquents; to
those who shall have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence;
to those who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief
Executive shall have violated the terms thereof; to those whose
maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year, not to
those already sentenced by final judgment at the time of approval of
this Act, except as provided in Section 5 hereof. (As amended by Act
No. 4225.)
In this case, the maximum term of imprisonment imposed on the

petitioner was four months and one day of arresto mayor.Hence, the MTC was
proscribed from imposing an indeterminate penalty on the petitioner. An
indeterminate penalty may be imposed if the minimum of the penalty is one
year or less, and the maximum exceeds one year. For example, the trial court
may impose an indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor,as
minimum, to two years and four months ofprision correccional,as maximum,
since the maximum term of imprisonment it imposed exceeds one year. If the
trial court opts to impose a penalty of imprisonment of one year or less, it
should not impose an indeterminate penalty, but a straight penalty of one year
or less instead. Thus, the petitioner may be sentenced to a straight penalty of
one year, or a straight penalty of less than one year, i.e.,ten months or eleven
months. We believe that considering the attendant circumstances, a straight
penalty of imprisonment of six months is reasonable.
Conformably with Article 39 in relation to paragraph 3, Article 38 of
the Revised Penal Code, the petitioner shall suffer subsidiary imprisonment if
he has no property with which to pay the penalty of fine.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed
Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Considering the
surrounding circumstances of the case, the petitioner is hereby sentenced to
suffer a straight penalty of six (6) months imprisonment. The petitioner shall
suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Tinga and Chico-Nazario, JJ.,concur.
Footnotes
1.Exhibit "B."
2.Exhibit "D."
3.TSN, 1 June 2000, pp. 16-17.

4.TSN, 3 August 2000, p. 5.
5.TSN, 6 October 1999, p. 18.
6.Exhibit "DD-1."
7.Exhibit "FF."
8.Exhibit "J."
9.TSN, 6 October 1999, p. 18.

10.TSN, 29 January 1998, pp. 5-7.
11.Exhibit "F."
12.Exhibits "K" to "K-1."

13.Exhibit "AA."
14.Records, p. 1.
15.TSN, 1 June 2000, p. 6.
16.Exhibit "4-A."
17.TSN, 1 June 2000, p. 19.
18.Id.at 7.
19.Exhibit "4-A."
20.TSN, 1 June 2000, p. 19; Exhibits "4" to "4-C."

21.Exhibit "4."
22.Exhibit "8."
23.Exhibit "11."
24.Exhibits "DD" and "EE."
25.TSN, 23 November 2000, p. 11.
26.TSN, 3 August 2000, pp. 6-7.
27.Id.at 10.
28.Id.at 14.
29.Id.at 13.
30.Id.at 13-14.
31.Records, pp. 641-642.
32.Records, p. 575.
33.Id.at 588-592.
34.Id.at 606.
35.Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr.,with Associate Justices

Buenaventura J. Guerrero and Regalado E. Maambong, concurring;
CA Rollo,p. 100.
36.Rollo,p. 9.
37.Records, p. 1.
38.Buhat v. Court of Appeals,G.R. No. 119601, 17 December 1996, 265 SCRA

701; People v. Escosio,G.R. No. 101742, 25 March 1993, 220 SCRA 475; Buaya
v. Polo,G.R. No. 75079, 26 January 1989, 169 SCRA 471.
39.Serapio v. Sandiganbayan,G.R. No. 148769, 28 January 2003, 396 SCRA 443.

40....1. que exista realmente una defraudacion, un perjuicio ejectivo; (2) que este se
haya causado mediante engaño, esto es, con el empleo de medios fraudulentos
puestos en juego por el estafador para conseguir su mal proposito.(Viada,
CODIGO PENAL, 6th ed.,Vol. 6, p. 570)
41.Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, 2001 ed., Vol. II, p. 815.
42.Regalado, CRIMINAL LAW CONSPECTUS, 1st ed.,p. 592.
43.Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of Appeals,G.R. No. 118552, 5

February 1996, 253 SCRA 241.
44.Rollo,p. 34.
45.G.R. No. 106357, 3 September 1998, 295 SCRA 49. (Emphasis supplied)
46.Id.at 71-72.
47.Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Daniel Motors Co.,149 S.W.2d 979 (1941).
48.Testo v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 83 A.L.R.,3rd ed.,p. 680 (1976);554 P.2d
349.
49.Tyler v. Savage,143 U.S. 79, 12 S.Ct. 340, 36 L.Ed. 82.
50.Lindberg Cadillac Company v. Leonard Aron,371 S.W.2d 651 (1963).

51.Lovell v. Smith,169 So. 280 (1936).
52.Supra,at note 47.

53.Lindbergh Cadillac Company v. Aron,371 S.W.2d 651 (1963).
54.Burnett v. Boyer,285 S.W. 670; Madton v. Norton,238 N.W. 686.
55.Kraus v. National Bank of Commerce of Mankato,167 N.W. 353.

56.Snellgrove v. Dingelhoef, 103 S.E. 418 (1920).
57.Judd v. Walker,89 S.W. 558.
58.Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, et al.,173 N.W. 255 (1919).

59.Park v. Moorman Manufacturing Company,40 A.L.R. 2d 273 (1952).
||| (Guinhawa v. People, G.R. No. 162822, [August 25, 2005], 505 PHIL 383-409)
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 190834. November 26, 2014.]
ARIEL T. LIM, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

DECISION
PERALTA, J :p
This is to resolve the petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal
of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)promulgated on June 30, 2009,
and its Resolution 2 dated January 4, 2010. The CA affirmed the judgment of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC), convicting petitioner of one (1) count
of violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Bilang 22 in Criminal Case No. 07-
249932.
Records reveal that petitioner issued Bank of Commerce Check Nos.
0013813 and 0013814, dated June 30, 1998 and July 15, 1998, respectively,
payable to CASH, in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) for each check. He gave the checks to Mr. Willie
Castor (Castor) as his campaign donation to the latter's candidacy in the
elections of 1998. It was Castor who ordered the delivery of printing materials
and used petitioner's checks to pay for the same. Claiming that the printing
materials were delivered too late, Castor instructed petitioner to issue a "Stop
Payment" order for the two checks. Thus, the checks were dishonored by the
bank because of said order and during trial, when the bank officer was
presented on the witness stand, he admitted that said checks were drawn
against insufficient funds (DAIF). Private complainant Magna B. Badiee sent
two demand letters to petitioner, dated July 20, 1998 and July 23, 1998 and,
subsequently, private complainant filed a complaint against petitioner before
the Office of the Prosecutor. After the lapse of more than one month from
receipt of the demand letters, and after receiving the subpoena from the Office
of the Prosecutor, petitioner issued a replacement check dated September 8,
1998 in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00). Private
complainant Magna B. Badiee was able to encash said replacement check.
Nevertheless, on March 19, 1999, or six (6) months after petitioner had
paid the amount of the bounced checks, two Informations were filed against
him before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC), to wit:
CRIMINAL CASE No. 327138-CR
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses ARIEL LIM of violation of B.P. Blg. 22

committed as follows:
That sometime in the month of April, 1998 in the City of Manila,

Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously make or draw and issue to MAGNA B. BADIEE to apply
on account or for value BANK OF COMMERCE CHECK No. 0013814
dated July 15, 1998, payable to Cash in the amount of P100,000.00 said
accused knowing fully well that at the time of issue he did not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such
check in full upon its presentment, which check when presented for
payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason
"PAYMENT STOPPED," but the same would have been dishonored for
insufficient funds had not the accused, without any valid reason,
ordered the bank to stop payment, the said accused, despite receipt
of notice of such dishonor failed to pay said Magna B. Badiee the
amount of the said check or to make arrangement for payment in full
of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
CRIMINAL CASE No. 327139-CR

INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses ARIEL LIM of violation of B.P. Blg. 22

committed as follows: HIETAc
That sometime in the month of April, 1998 in the City of Manila,

Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously make or draw and issue to MAGNA B. BADIEE to apply
on account or for value BANK OF COMMERCE CHECK No. 0013813
dated June 30, 1998 payable to Cash in the amount of P100,000.00
said accused knowing fully well that at the time of issue he did not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of
such check in full upon its presentment, which check when presented
for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason
"PAYMENT STOPPED," but the same would have been dishonored for
insufficient funds had not the accused, without any valid reason,
ordered the bank to stop payment, the said accused, despite receipt
of notice of such dishonor failed to pay said Magna B. Badiee the
amount of the said check or to make arrangement for payment in full
of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
On September 12, 2006, the MeTC promulgated its Decision finding

petitioner guilty of two (2) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Petitioner
appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC), and on July 20, 2007, the
RTC issued a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, this court therefore modifies the lower court
decision with respect to criminal case no. 327138 (07-249931),
because the lower court of Manila has no jurisdiction to try and decide
cases where the essential ingredients of the crime charged happened
in Quezon City. The decision of the lower court with respect to criminal
case no. 327138 (07-249931) is ordered vacated and set aside for lack
of jurisdiction.
The lower court findings that accused is found guilty beyond

reasonable doubt for Violation of BP 22 with respect to criminal case
no. 07-24992 is affirmed and is ordered to pay a fine of P100,000.00
plus costs. No findings as to civil liability because the court agrees with
the lower court that the check was paid, is affirmed and there is no
cogent reason to disturb the same. In case of failure to pay fine, the
accused shall undergo subsidiary imprisonment of not more than six
(6) months.
SO ORDERED. 5
A petition for review was then filed with the Court of Appeals, and on
June 30, 2009, the CA promulgated its Decision affirming in toto the RTC
judgment. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof was
denied per Resolution dated January 4, 2010.
Thus, the present petition wherein petitioner posits that jurisprudence
dictates the dismissal of the criminal case against him on the ground that he
has fully paid the amount of the dishonored checks even before the
Informations against him were filed in court. Petitioner mainly relies on Griffith
v. Court of Appeals. 6 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) likewise
recommends the acquittal of petitioner, opining that Griffith 7 is applicable to
the present case.
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
In Griffith, the Court acquitted the accused therein due to the fact that
two years before the filing of the Information for violation of B.P. No. 22, the
accused had, in effect, paid the complainant an amount greater than the value
of the bounced checks. The CA held that the factual circumstances
in Griffith are dissimilar from those in the present case. The Court disagrees
with such conclusion.
The CA found Griffith inapplicable to the present case, because the
checks subject of this case are personal checks, while the check involved
in Griffith was a corporate check and, hence, some confusion or
miscommunication could easily occur between the signatories of the check
and the corporate treasurer. Although the factual circumstances in the
present case are not exactly the same as those in Griffith, it should be noted
that the same kind of confusion giving rise to petitioner's mistake very well
existed in the present case. Here, the check was issued by petitioner merely
as a campaign contribution to Castor's candidacy. As found by the trial court,
it was Castor who instructed petitioner to issue a "Stop Payment" order for the
two checks because the campaign materials, for which the checks were used
as payment, were not delivered on time. Petitioner relied on Castor's word and
complied with his instructions, as it was Castor who was supposed to take
delivery of said materials. Verily, it is easy to see how petitioner made the
mistake of readily complying with the instruction to stop payment since he
believed Castor's word that there is no longer any valid reason to pay
complainant as delivery was not made as agreed upon. Nevertheless, two
months after receiving the demand letter from private complainant and just
several days after receiving the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor,
accused issued a replacement check which was successfully encashed by
private complainant.
The CA also took it against petitioner that he paid the amount of the
checks only after receiving the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor,
which supposedly shows that petitioner was motivated to pay not because he
wanted to settle his obligation but because he wanted to avoid prosecution.
This reasoning is tenuous, because in Griffith, the accused therein did not even
voluntarily pay the value of the dishonored checks; rather, the complainant
was paid from the proceeds of the invalid foreclosure of the accused's
property. In said case, the Court did not differentiate as to whether payment
was made before or after the complaint had been filed with the Office of the
Prosecutor. It only mattered that the amount stated in the dishonored check
had actually been paid before the Information against the accused was filed in
court. In this case, petitioner even voluntarily paid value of the bounced
checks. The Court, therefore, sees no justification for differentiating this case
from that of Griffith. Records show that both in Griffith and in this case,
petitioner had paid the amount of the dishonored checks before the filing of
the Informations in court. Verily, there is no reason why the same liberality
granted to the accused in Griffithshould not likewise be extended to herein
petitioner. The precept enunciated in Griffith is herein reiterated, to wit: ECTIHa
While we agree with the private respondent that the gravamen

of violation of B.P. 22 is the issuance of worthless checks that are
dishonored upon their presentment for payment, we should not
apply penal laws mechanically. We must find if the application of
the law is consistent with the purpose of and reason for the
law. Ratione cessat lex, et cessat lex. (When the reason for the law
ceases, the law ceases.) It is not the letter alone but the spirit of
the law also that gives it life. This is especially so in this case
where a debtor's criminalization would not serve the ends of
justice but in fact subvert it. The creditor having collected already
more than a sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks for
payment of rentals, via auction sale, we find that holding the debtor's
president to answer for a criminal offense under B.P. 22 two years
after said collection is no longer tenable nor justified by law or
equitable considerations.
In sum, considering that the money value of the two checks
issued by petitioner has already been effectively paid two years
before the informations against him were filed, we find merit in
this petition. We hold that petitioner herein could not be validly
and justly convicted or sentenced for violation of B.P. 22. . .
. 8(Emphasis supplied)
In the more recent case of Tan v. Philippine Commercial International

Bank, 9 the foregoing principle articulated in Griffith was the precedent cited to
justify the acquittal of the accused in said case. Therein, the Court enumerated
the elements for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 being "(1) The accused makes, draws
or issues a check to apply to account or for value; (2) The accused knows at the
time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with
the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3)
The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit, or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not
the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment." 10 To
facilitate proving the second element, the law created a prima
faciepresumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit, which is
established when it is shown that the drawer of the check was notified of its
dishonor and, within five banking days thereafter, failed to fully pay the
amount of the check or make arrangements for its full payment. If the check,
however, is made good or the drawer pays the value of the check within the
five-day period, then the presumption is rebutted. Evidently, one of the
essential elements of the violation is no longer present and the drawer may
no longer be indicted for B.P. Blg. 22. Said payment within the period
prescribed by the law is a complete defense.
Generally, only the full payment of the value of the dishonored check
during the five-day grace period would exculpate the accused from criminal
liability under B.P. Blg. 22 but, as the Court further elaborated in Tan:
In Griffith v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that were the
creditor had collected more than a sufficient amount to cover the
value of the checks representing rental arrearages, holding the
debtor's president to answer for a criminal offense under B.P. Blg. 22
two years after the said collection is no longer tenable nor justified
by law or equitable considerations. In that case, the Court ruled that
albeit made beyond the grace period but two years prior to the institution
of the criminal case, the payment collected from the proceeds of the
foreclosure and auction sale of the petitioner's impounded properties,
with more than a million pesos to spare, justified the acquittal of the
petitioner.
xxx xxx xxx
In the present case, PCIB already extracted its proverbial pound

of flesh by receiving and keeping in possession the four buses — trust
properties surrendered by petitioner in about mid 1991 and March
1992 pursuant to Section 7 of the Trust Receipts Law, the estimated
value of which was "about P6.6 million." It thus appears that the total
amount of the dishonored checks — P1,785,855.75 —, . . . was more
than fully satisfied prior to the transmittal and receipt of the July
9, 1992 letter of demand. In keeping with jurisprudence, the Court
then considers such payment of the dishonored checks to have
obliterated the criminal liability of petitioner.
It is consistent rule that penal statutes are construed strictly

against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. And since penal
laws should not be applied mechanically, the Court must determine
whether the application of the penal law is consistent with the
purpose and reason of the law. . . . 11 (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, although payment of the value of the bounced check, if made

beyond the 5-day period provided for in B.P. Blg. 22, would normally not
extinguish criminal liability, the aforementioned cases show that the Court
acknowledges the existence of extraordinary cases where, even if all the
elements of the crime or offense are present, the conviction of the accused
would prove to be abhorrent to society's sense of justice. Just like
in Griffith and in Tan, 12 petitioner should not be penalized although all the
elements of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are proven to be present. The fact that the
issuer of the check had already paid the value of the dishonored check after
having received the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor should have
forestalled the filing of the Information in court. The spirit of the law which,
for B.P. Blg. 22, is the protection of the credibility and stability of the banking
system, would not be served by penalizing people who have evidently made
amends for their mistakes and made restitution for damages even before
charges have been filed against them. In effect, the payment of the checks
before the filing of the informations has already attained the purpose of the
law.
It should be emphasized as well that payment of the value of the
bounced check after the information has been filed in court would no
longer have the effect of exonerating the accused from possible conviction for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Since from the commencement of the criminal
proceedings in court, there is no circumstance whatsoever to show that the
accused had every intention to mitigate or totally alleviate the ill effects of his
issuance of the unfunded check, then there is no equitable and compelling
reason to preclude his prosecution. In such a case, the letter of the law should
be applied to its full extent. EcAISC
Furthermore, to avoid any confusion, the Court's ruling in this case

should be well differentiated from cases where the accused is charged with
estafa under Article 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, where the fraud
is perpetuated by postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an
obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited
therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. In said case of
estafa, damage and deceit are the essential elements of the offense, and the
check is merely the accused's tool in committing fraud. In such a case, paying
the value of the dishonored check will not free the accused from criminal
liability. It will merely satisfy the civil liability of the crime but not the criminal
liability.
In fine, the Court holds that herein petitioner must be exonerated from
the imposition of penalties for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 as he had already paid
the amount of the dishonored checks six (6) months before the filing of
Informations with the court. Such a course of action is more in keeping with
justice and equity.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated June 30, 2009,
in CA-G.R. CR No. 31725, is hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. Petitioner Ariel
T. Lim is ACQUITTED in Criminal Case No. 07-249932.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Villarama, Jr., Reyes and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Penned by Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos, with Associate Justices Amelita

G. Tolentino and Sixto C. Marella, Jr., concurring.
2.Id.
3.CA rollo, p. 40.
4.Id. at 39.
5.Rollo, pp. 40-41.
6.428 Phil. 878 (2002).
7.Supra.
8.Griffith v. Court of Appeals, supra note 6, at 892.
9.575 Phil. 485 (2008).

10.Id. at 494.
11.Id. at 496-497. (Underscoring ours)
12.Supra.
||| (Lim v. People, G.R. No. 190834, [November 26, 2014], 748 PHIL 649-660)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 191404. July 5, 2010.]
EUMELIA R. MITRA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

and FELICISIMO S. TARCELO, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J : p
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court assailing the July 31, 2009 Decision 1 and the February 11, 2010
Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31740. The subject
decision and resolution affirmed the August 22, 2007 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Batangas City (RTC) which, in turn, affirmed
the May 21, 2007 Decision of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2,
Batangas City (MTCC).
THE FACTS:
Petitioner Eumelia R. Mitra (Mitra) was the Treasurer, and Florencio L.
Cabrera, Jr. (now deceased) was the President, of Lucky Nine Credit
Corporation (LNCC), a corporation engaged in money lending activities.
Between 1996 and 1999, private respondent Felicisimo S.
Tarcelo (Tarcelo) invested money in LNCC. As the usual practice in money
placement transactions, Tarcelo was issued checks equivalent to the
amounts he invested plus the interest on his investments. The following
checks, signed by Mitra and Cabrera, were issued by LNCC to Tarcelo. 2
Bank Date Issued Date of Check Amount Check No.
Security Bank September 15, 1998 January 15, 1999 P3,125.00 0000045804
-do- September 15, 1998 January 15, 1999 125,000.00 0000045805
-do- October 3, 1998 February 3, 1999 2,500.00 0000045875
-do- October 3, 1998 February 3, 1999 100,000.00 0000045876
-do- November 17, 1998 February17, 1999 5,000.00 0000046061
-do- November 17, 1998 March 17, 1999 5,000.00 0000046062
-do- November 19, 1998 January 19, 1999 2,500.00 0000046065
-do- November 19, 1998 February19, 1999 2,500.00 0000046066
-do- November 20, 1998 February 20, 1999 10,000.00 0000046071
-do- November 30, 1998 February 28, 1999 2,500.00 0000046076
When Tarcelo presented these checks for payment, they were

dishonored for the reason "account closed." Tarcelo made several oral
demands on LNCC for the payment of these checks but he was frustrated.
Constrained, in 2002, he caused the filing of seven informations for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22) in the total amount of
P925,000.00 with the MTCC in Batangas City. 3 TCHEDA
After trial on the merits, the MTCC found Mitra and Cabrera guilty of
the charges. The fallo of the May 21, 2007 MTCC Decision 4 reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the
accused FLORENCIO I. CABRERA, JR., and EUMELIA R. MITRA are
hereby found guilty of the offense of violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 and are hereby ORDERED to respectively pay the following
fines for each violation and with subsidiary imprisonment in all cases, in
case of insolvency:
1. Criminal Case No. 43637 — P200,000.00

Said accused, nevertheless, are adjudged civilly liable and are

ordered to pay, in solidum, private complainant Felicisimo S. Tarcelo
the amount of NINE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P925,000.000).
SO ORDERED.
Mitra and Cabrera appealed to the Batangas RTC contending that:

they signed the seven checks in blank with no name of the payee, no
amount stated and no date of maturity; they did not know when and to
whom those checks would be issued; the seven checks were only among
those in one or two booklets of checks they were made to sign at that time;
and that they signed the checks so as not to delay the transactions of LNCC
because they did not regularly hold office there. 5
The RTC affirmed the MTCC decision and later denied their motion
for reconsideration. Meanwhile, Cabrera died. Mitra alone filed this petition
for review 6 claiming, among others, that there was no proper service of the
notice of dishonor on her. The Court of Appeals dismissed her petition for
lack of merit.
Mitra is now before this Court on a petition for review and submits
these issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE ELEMENTS OF VIOLATION
OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 MUST BE PROVED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT AS AGAINST THE CORPORATION WHO OWNS
THE CURRENT ACCOUNT WHERE THE SUBJECT CHECKS WERE
DRAWN BEFORE LIABILITY ATTACHES TO THE SIGNATORIES. AcaEDC
2. WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS PROPER SERVICE OF NOTICE
OF DISHONOR AND DEMAND TO PAY TO THE PETITIONER AND THE
LATE FLORENCIO CABRERA, JR.
The Court denies the petition.

A check is a negotiable instrument that serves as a substitute for
money and as a convenient form of payment in financial transactions and
obligations. The use of checks as payment allows commercial and banking
transactions to proceed without the actual handling of money, thus, doing
away with the need to physically count bills and coins whenever payment
is made. It permits commercial and banking transactions to be carried out
quickly and efficiently. But the convenience afforded by checks is damaged
by unfunded checks that adversely affect confidence in our commercial and
banking activities, and ultimately injure public interest.
BP 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law was enacted for the specific
purpose of addressing the problem of the continued issuance and
circulation of unfunded checks by irresponsible persons. To stem the harm
caused by these bouncing checks to the community, BP 22 considers the
mere act of issuing an unfunded check as an offense not only against
property but also against public order. 7 The purpose of BP 22 in declaring
the mere issuance of a bouncing check as malum prohibitum is to punish
the offender in order to deter him and others from committing the offense,
to isolate him from society, to reform and rehabilitate him, and to maintain
social order. 8 The penalty is stiff. BP 22 imposes the penalty of
imprisonment for at least 30 days or a fine of up to double the amount of
the check or both imprisonment and fine.
Specifically, BP 22 provides:
SECTION 1. Checks Without Sufficient Funds. — Any person who
makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value,
knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full
upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by
imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1)
year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount
of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion
of the court.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who,
having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he
makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds
or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if
presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing
thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity,

the person or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such
drawer shall be liable under this Act.
IaAScD
SECTION 2. Evidence of Knowledge of Insufficient Funds. — The

making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused
by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such
bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the
check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency
of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder
thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for
payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking
days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the
drawee.
Mitra posits in this petition that before the signatory to a bouncing

corporate check can be held liable, all the elements of the crime of violation
of BP 22 must first be proven against the corporation. The corporation
must first be declared to have committed the violation before the liability
attaches to the signatories of the checks. 9
The Court finds Itself unable to agree with Mitra's posture. The third
paragraph of Section 1 of BP 22 reads: "Where the check is drawn by a
corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually signed
the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act." This
provision recognizes the reality that a corporation can only act through its
officers. Hence, its wording is unequivocal and mandatory — that
the person who actually signed the corporate check shall be held liable for a
violation of BP 22. This provision does not contain any condition,
qualification or limitation.
In the case of Llamado v. Court of Appeals, 10 the Court ruled that the
accused was liable on the unfunded corporate check which he signed as
treasurer of the corporation. He could not invoke his lack of involvement in
the negotiation for the transaction as a defense because BP 22 punishes
the mere issuance of a bouncing check, not the purpose for which the check
was issued or in consideration of the terms and conditions relating to its
issuance. In this case, Mitra signed the LNCC checks as treasurer.
Following Llamado, she must then be held liable for violating BP 22.
Another essential element of a violation of BP 22 is the drawer's
knowledge that he has insufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank to
cover his check. Because this involves a state of mind that is difficult to
establish, BP 22 creates theprima facie presumption that once the check is
dishonored, the drawer of the check gains knowledge of the insufficiency,
unless within five banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the
drawer pays the holder of the check or makes arrangements with the
drawee bank for the payment of the check. The service of the notice of
dishonor gives the drawer the opportunity to make good the check within
those five days to avert his prosecution for violating BP 22.
Mitra alleges that there was no proper service on her of the notice of
dishonor and, so, an essential element of the offense is missing. This
contention raises a factual issue that is not proper for review. It is not the
function of the Court to re-examine the finding of facts of the Court of
Appeals. Our review is limited to errors of law and cannot touch errors of
facts unless the petitioner shows that the trial court overlooked facts or
circumstances that warrant a different disposition of the case 11 or that the
findings of fact have no basis on record. Hence, with respect to the issue of
the propriety of service on Mitra of the notice of dishonor, the Court gives
full faith and credit to the consistent findings of the MTCC, the RTC and the
CA. CEHcSI
The defense postulated that there was no demand served upon

the accused, said denial deserves scant consideration. Positive
allegation of the prosecution that a demand letter was served upon
the accused prevails over the denial made by the accused. Though,
having denied that there was no demand letter served on April 10,
2000, however, the prosecution positively alleged and proved that
the questioned demand letter was served upon the accused on April
10, 2000, that was at the time they were attending Court hearing
before Branch I of this Court. In fact, the prosecution had submitted
a Certification issued by the other Branch of this Court certifying the
fact that the accused were present during the April 10, 2010 hearing.
With such straightforward and categorical testimony of the witness,
the Court believes that the prosecution has achieved what was
dismally lacking in the three (3) cases of Betty King, Victor Ting and
Caras — evidence of the receipt by the accused of the demand letter
sent to her. The Court accepts the prosecution's narrative that the
accused refused to sign the same to evidence their receipt thereof. To
require the prosecution to produce the signature of the accused on
said demand letter would be imposing an undue hardship on it. As
well, actual receipt acknowledgment is not and has never been
required of the prosecution either by law or
jurisprudence. 12 [emphasis supplied]
With the notice of dishonor duly served and disregarded, there arose
the presumption that Mitra and Cabrera knew that there were insufficient
funds to cover the checks upon their presentment for payment. In fact, the
account was already closed.
To reiterate the elements of a violation of BP 22 as contained in the
above-quoted provision, a violation exists where:
1. a person makes or draws and issues a check to apply on
account or for value;
2. the person who makes or draws and issues the check knows
at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank for the full payment of
the check upon its presentment; and
3. the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit, or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment. 13
There is no dispute that Mitra signed the checks and that the bank
dishonored the checks because the account had been closed. Notice of
dishonor was properly given, but Mitra failed to pay the checks or make
arrangements for their payment within five days from notice. With all the
above elements duly proven, Mitra cannot escape the civil and criminal
liabilities that BP 22 imposes for its breach. 14
WHEREFORE, the July 31, 2009 Decision and the February 11, 2010
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31740 are
hereby AFFIRMED. aESIDH
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Nachura, Peralta and Abad, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes with Associate Justice Isaias P.

Dicdican and Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison concurring.
2.Complaint-Affidavits, Rollo, pp. 109-115.

3.Id. at 116-129.
4.Id. at 130-134.
5.Id. at 143.
6.Id. at 75-105.
7.Lozano v. Martinez, 230 Phil. 406, 428 (1986).

8.Rosario v. Co, G.R. No. 133608, August 26, 2008, 563 SCRA 239, 253.
9.Rollo, p. 47.
10.337 Phil. 153, 160 (1997).

11.American Home Assurance Company v. Chua, 368 Phil. 555, 569 (1999).
12.Rollo, p. 133.
13.Rigor v. People, 485 Phil. 125, 139 (2004).

14.In Gosiaco v. Ching, G.R. No. 173807, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 471, 483, we held
an accused corporate officer free from civil liability for the corporate debt
after the lower court acquitted the accused of criminal liability under BP 22.
Note that this is a totally different case from the present case as the issue
here is both criminal and civil liability.
||| (Mitra v. People, G.R. No. 191404, [July 5, 2010], 637 PHIL 645-655)
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 140665. November 13, 2000.]
VICTOR TING "SENG DEE" and EMILY CHAN-

AZAJAR, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Ocampo & Ocampo for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioners were found guilty of seven counts of violation of BP Blg. 22.

Hence, this appeal.
For liability to attach under the Bouncing Checks Law, the prosecution
must establish that a check was issued and subsequently dishonored. Further,
the issuer must, at the time of the check's issuance, have knowledge that he
did not have enough funds or credit in the bank for payment thereof upon its
presentment. Nonetheless, to avert criminal prosecution, the issuer is still
given the chance to settle his obligation on the check within 5 banking days
after receiving notice of dishonor. Hence, procedural due process requires
that the issuer be actually served a notice of dishonor. The prosecution failed
to prove this. The copy of the demand letter allegedly sent to petitioners
through registered mail and its corresponding registry receipt were
insufficient evidence that petitioner indeed received a notice of dishonor.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; BP BLG. 22 (BOUNCING CHECKS LAW); ELEMENTS. —

Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks
Law, provides [for criminal liability for issuing checks without sufficient funds.].
. . For a violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to be committed, the following
elements must be present: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check
to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or
issuer that at the time of issue there are no sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment;
and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment (Sycip, Jr.
vs. CA, G.R. No. 125059, March 17, 2000).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; THAT CHECKS WERE DISHONORED; PRESENT. — [S]ection
3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 provides that "the introduction in evidence of any
unpaid and dishonored check, having the drawee's refusal to pay stamped or
written thereof, or attached thereto, with the reason therefor as aforesaid,
shall be prima facie evidence of the making or issuance of said check, and the
due presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof, and
that the same was properly dishonored for the reason written, stamped, or
attached by the drawee on such dishonored check." In the instant case, the
fact of the checks' dishonor is sufficiently shown by the return slips issued by
MetroBank, the depository bank, stating that the checks had been returned
for the reason "DAIF — Drawn Against Insufficient Funds."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; THAT ISSUER HAD KNOWLEDGE HE DID NOT HAVE
ENOUGH FUNDS IN BANK FOR PAYMENT; ELUCIDATED. — [F]or liability to
attach under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. . . [t]he prosecution must also prove. . .
that the issuer, at the time of the check's issuance, had knowledge that he did
not have enough funds or credit in the bank for payment thereof upon its
presentment. Since the second element involves a state of mind which is
difficult to verify, Section 2 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 creates a
presumption juris tantum that the second element prima facie exists when the
first and third elements of the offense are present (Magno v. People, 210 SCRA
471 [1992]). . . In truth, this Court declared in King v. People(G.R. No. 131540,
December 2, 1999) that "the prima facie presumption arises when the check is
issued. But the law also provides that the presumption does not arise when
the issuer pays the amount of the check or makes arrangement for its
payment 'within five banking days after receiving notice that such check has
not been paid by the drawee.' Verily, BP 22 gives the accused an opportunity
to satisfy the amount indicated in the check and thus avert prosecution. . . This
opportunity, however, can be used only upon receipt by the accused of a
notice of dishonor." Thus, the presumption that the issuer had knowledge of
the insufficiency of funds is brought into existence only after it is proved that
the issuer had received a notice of dishonor and that, within five days from
receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make
arrangement for its payment. Moreover, in Lina Lim Lao v. CA (274 SCRA 572
[1997]) [the Court] emphasized that "the full payment of the amount
appearing in the check within five banking days from notice of dishonor is a
'complete defense.' The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives
an accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly,
procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually
served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand — and the basic
postulate of fairness require — that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to
and received by her to afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution
under BP 22."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIRED NOTICE OF DISHONOR TO ISSUER; NOT
SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED. — To prove that petitioners received a notice of
dishonor, the prosecution presented a copy of the demand letter allegedly
sent to petitioners through registered mail and its corresponding registry
receipt. . . However, no attempt was made to show that the demand letter was
indeed sent through registered mail nor was the signature on the registry
return receipt authenticated or identified. It cannot even be gleaned from the
testimony of private complainant as to who sent the demand letter and when
the same was sent. In fact, the prosecution seems to have presumed that the
registry return receipt was proof enough that the demand letter was sent
through registered mail and that the same was actually received by petitioners
or their agents. . . It is a general rule that when service of notice is an issue, the
person alleging that the notice was served must prove the fact of service (58
Am Jur 2d, Notice, § 45). The burden of proving notice rests upon the party
asserting its existence. Now, ordinarily, preponderance of evidence is
sufficient to prove notice. In criminal cases, however, the quantum of proof
required is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, for Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 cases, there should be clear proof of notice. Moreover, it is a general rule
that, when service of a notice is sought to be made by mail, it should appear
that the conditions on which the validity of such service depends had
existence, otherwise the evidence is insufficient to establish the fact of service
(C.J.S., Notice, § 18). . . In civil cases, service made through registered mail is
proved by the registry receipt issued by the mailing office and an affidavit of
the person mailing of facts showing compliance with Section 7 of Rule 13 (See
Section 13, Rule 13, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). If, in addition to the registry
receipt, it is required in civil cases that an affidavit of mailing as proof of service
be presented, then with more reason should we hold in criminal cases that a
registry receipt alone is insufficient as proof of mailing. In the instant case, the
prosecution failed to present the testimony, or at least the affidavit, of the
person mailing that, indeed, the demand letter was sent. . . [Further,] receipts
for registered letters and return receipts do not prove themselves; they must
be properly authenticated in order to serve as proof of receipt of the letters
(Central Trust Co. v. City of Des Moines, 218 NW 580). Likewise, for notice by mail,
it must appear that the same was served on the addressee or a duly
authorized agent of the addressee. In fact, the registry return receipt itself
provides that "[a] registered article must not be delivered to anyone but the
addressee, or upon the addressee's written order, in which case the
authorized agent must write the addressee's name on the proper space and
then affix legibly his own signature below it." In the case at bar, no effort was
made to show that the demand letter was received by petitioners or their
agent. All that we have on record is an illegible signature on the registry receipt
as evidence that someone received the letter. As to whether this signature is
that of one of the petitioners or of their authorized agent remains a mystery.
From the registry receipt alone, it is possible that petitioners or their
authorized agent did receive the demand letter. Possibilities, however, cannot
replace proof beyond reasonable doubt. There being insufficient proof that
petitioners received notice that their checks had been dishonored, the
presumption that they knew of the insufficiency of the funds therefor cannot
arise.CDAHaE
5. ID.; ID.; VIOLATION THEREOF NEGATED BY FAILURE TO PROVE ALL

ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE. — As stated in Savage v. Taypin (G.R. No. 134217,
May 11, 2000), "penal statutes must be strictly construed against the State and
liberally in favor of the accused." Likewise, the prosecution may not rely on the
weakness of the evidence for the defense to make up for its own blunders in
prosecuting an offense. Having failed to prove all the elements of the offense,
petitioners may not thus be convicted for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
DECISION
MELO, J :
p
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 seeking the reversal of

the February 12, 1999 decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed that of
the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region (Manila, Branch
45) finding petitioners guilty of seven (7) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22.
Petitioners' version of the background events is as follows:
From 1991 to 1992, Juliet Ting "Chan Sioc Hiu" obtained loans, in the
aggregate amount of P2,750,000.00 private complainant Josefina K. Tagle for
use in Juliet's furniture business. As payment thereof, Juliet issued eleven (11)
post-dated checks which, upon maturity, were dishonored for reasons of
"Closed Account" or "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds." Juliet was
subsequently prosecuted for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
Due to her financial difficulties, Juliet requested her husband Victor Ting
"Seng Dee" and her sister Emily Chan-Azajar (petitioners herein) to take over
her furniture business, including the obligations appurtenant thereto.
Agreeing to Juliet's request, petitioners issued nineteen (19) checks in
replacement of the eleven (11) checks earlier issued by Juliet. The planned
take-over, however, never materialized since the Naga Hope Christian School,
petitioner Emily Chan-Azajar's employer in Naga, refused to let her resign to
attend to her sister's business. Since the planned take-over did not take place,
petitioners requested Juliet to reassume her obligation to private complainant
Tagle by replacing the checks they had previously issued to the latter. Thus,
Juliet replaced the nineteen (19) checks issued by petitioners with twenty-three
(23) Far East Bank checks in favor of Tagle. Petitioners then requested private
complainant Tagle to return the nineteen (19) checks they had issued to her.
Instead of returning the checks, Tagle deposited seven of the checks with
MetroBank where they were dishonored for being "Drawn Against Insufficient
Funds."
On the other hand, private complainant Tagle alleged that sometime in
April 1993, petitioners obtained a loan of P950,000.00 from her, issuing several
post-dated checks in payment thereof. When the checks were deposited by
Tagle with MetroBank, they were dishonored for having been drawn against
insufficient funds. Tagle alleged that despite verbal and written demands,
petitioners failed to pay her the value of the dishonored checks.
Consequently, seven informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 were filed against petitioners. Said informations are similarly worded
except with respect to the check number, the amount involved, and the date
the check was issued. The information in Criminal Case No. 94-131945 (the
other cases are Criminal Case No. 94-131946, Criminal Case No. 94-131947,
Criminal Case No. 94-131948, Criminal Case No. 94-131949; Criminal Case No.
94-131950, and Criminal Case No. 94-131951) charged: SAHIaD
That sometime prior to May 27, 1993, in the City of Manila,

Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together
and mutually helping each other, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to JOSEPHINE K.
TAGLE, to apply on account or for value Producers Bank of the
Philippines, Check No. 946072 dated May 27, 1993 payable to CASH in
the amount of P250,000.00 said accused well knowing that at the time
of issue they did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which
check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the
date thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
Drawn Against Insufficient Funds and despite receipt of notice of such
dishonor, said accused failed to pay said JOSEFINA K. TAGLE the
amount of the check or to make arrangements for full payment of the
same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
(p. 2, Original Records.)
Criminal Cases No. 94-131945 to 94-131951 were consolidated and

jointly tried. When arraigned, petitioners, assisted by counsel, pleaded not
guilty. During trial, the prosecution presented only one witness, the private
complainant, the testimony of Producer's Bank representative Ferdinand Lazo
being dispensed with after counsel for petitioners admitted the dishonor of
the checks subject matter of the action.
On March 16, 1995, the trial court found petitioners guilty of
violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in each of the seven cases, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accused VICTOR TING
and EMILY CHAN AZAJAR are hereby found "GUILTY" beyond
reasonable doubt of all the charges contained in Criminal Case Nos.
94-131945; 94-131946; 94-131947; 94-131948; 94-131949; 94-131950
and 94-131951 and for each count, they are hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of one (1) year imprisonment; to pay Josefina K.
Tagle the total amount of P950,000.00; and to pay the cost.
(p. 294, Rollo.)
Aggrieved, petitioners filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals which

was docketed therein as C.A.-G.R. No. 18054. However, the appellate court, on
February 12, 1999, affirmed. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was,
likewise, denied for lack of merit. Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
decision of the trial court, given the absence of proof beyond reasonable
doubt or in the presence of facts creating reasonable doubt.
The petition has merit.
Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing
Checks Law, provides:
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. — Any person who
year or by a fine of not less than but not more double the amount of
the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two hundred thousand
pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the
court.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who
For a violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to be committed, the following

elements must be present:
(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for
account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of
issue there are no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason
had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank
to stop payment (Sycip, Jr. vs. CA, G.R. No. 125059, March 17,
2000).IEDHAT
An analysis of the evidence presented, however, shows that not all the
aforementioned elements have been established by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt.
That the seven checks in question were issued by petitioners is beyond
dispute. Not only were the dishonored checks presented in court, but
petitioners even admitted signing the checks and issuing them to private
complainant. From the evidence on record, it is clear that petitioners signed
and issued the seven checks in question.
That the checks were dishonored is also clearly established. Section 3
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 provided that "the introduction in evidence of any
unpaid and dishonored check, having the drawees refusal to pay stamped or
written thereon, or attached thereto, with the reason therefor as aforesaid,
shall be prima facie evidence of the making or issuance of said check, and the
due presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof, and
that the same was properly dishonored for the reason written, stamped, or
attached by the drawee on such dishonored check." In the instant case, the
fact of the checks' dishonor is sufficiently shown by the return slips issued by
MetroBank, the depository bank, stating that the checks had been returned
for the reason "DAIF — Drawn Against Insufficient Funds." Not only are these
check return slips prima facie evidence that the drawee bank dishonored the
checks, but the defense did not present any evidence to rebut these
documents. In fact, counsel for petitioners even admitted the fact of the
checks' dishonor, agreeing to dispense with the presentation of the bank
representative who was supposed to prove the fact of dishonor of said checks
(p. 162, Rollo.).
However, for liability to attach under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, it is not
enough that the prosecution establishes that a check was issued and that the
same was subsequently dishonored. The prosecution must also prove the
second element, that is, it must further show that the issuer, at the time of the
check's issuance, had knowledge that he did not have enough funds or credit
in the bank for payment thereof upon its presentment. Since the second
element involves a state of mind which is difficult to verify, Section 2 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 creates a presumption juris tantum that the second
element prima facieexists when the first and third elements of the offense are
present (Magno v. People, 210 SCRA 471 [1992]). Section 2 provides:
Section 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. — The
making, drawing, and issuance of a check payment of which is refused
by the drawee because of insufficient funds or credit with such bank,
when presented within ninety days from the date of the check, shall
be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or
credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the
amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by
the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving
notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee."
In truth, this Court declared in King v. People (G.R. No. 131540, December
2, 1999) that "the prima facie presumption arises when the check is issued. But
the law also provides that the presumption does not arise when the issuer
pays the amount of the check or makes arrangement for its payment 'within
five banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by
the drawee.' Verily, BP 22 gives the accused an opportunity to satisfy the
amount indicated in the check and thus avert prosecution . . . This opportunity,
however, can be used only upon receipt by the accused of a notice of
dishonor." Thus, the presumption that the issuer had knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds is brought into existence only after it is proved that the
issuer had received a notice of dishonor and that, within five days from receipt
thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangement for
its payment.
King v. People, decided by this Division, involves a set of facts similar to
the case at bar. In said case, the accused therein was proven to have issued
eleven checks, all of which were duly filled up and signed by her. It was also
clearly established that these eleven checks were dishonored, as shown by the
checks themselves which were stamped "ACCOUNT CLOSED" and further
supported by the return tickets issued by PCI Bank stating that the checks had
been dishonored. Yet, even if the prosecution had already established the
issuance of the checks and their subsequent dishonor, this Court still required
the prosecution to show that the issuer knew of the insufficiency of funds by
proving that he or she received a notice of dishonor and, within five banking
days thereafter, failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement
for its payment.
Moreover, in Lina Lim Lao v. CA (274 SCRA 572 [1997]), we emphasized
that "the full payment of the amount appearing in the check within five
banking days from notice of dishonor is a 'complete defense.' The absence of
a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to
preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly
enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner. Petitioner
has a right to demand — and the basic postulate of fairness require — that
the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to afford her the
opportunity to avert prosecution under BP 22." DACcIH
To prove that petitioners received a notice of dishonor, the prosecution

presented a copy of the demand letter allegedly sent to petitioners through
registered mail and its corresponding registry receipt. Private complainant
Josefina Tagle, the sole witness for the prosecution, testified thus:
Q: Now, when these seven (7) checks bounced for insufficiency of
funds, what step did you take?
A: I demanded the return of my money from them.

Q: Now, what was the reply of the two accused?
A: They kept on promising that they will pay but up to now they have
not paid any single centavo.
Q: What other step did you take?
A. I requested my lawyer to write a demand letter.

Q. And that demand letter was sent to the accused?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. In what manner?
A. By registered mail.
Q. Now, was that demand letter received by the two accused?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. What is your evidence?
A. The return card.

Q. If you are shown anew the copy of the demand letter which is
already marked as Exhibit B, would you be able to recognize the
same?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Is that the one that you are referring to?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. How about the return card, is that correct?
A. Yes, Sir, this is the one.
Q. Now, upon receipt of this letter by the two accused, did the two
accused pay the amount of the said check?
A: No, Sir.
Q: So what did you do next?
A: I told my lawyer to file charges against them.
Q: You mean the present charge?
A: Yes, Sir.
Atty. Acuesta:
That is all, Your Honor.
(TSN, Aug. 24, 1994, pp. 8-9.)
Aside from the above testimony, no other reference was made to the
demand letter by the prosecution. As can be noticed from the above exchange,
the prosecution alleged that the demand letter had been sent by mail. To
prove mailing, it presented a copy of the demand letter as well as the registry
return receipt. However, no attempt was made to show that the demand letter
was indeed sent through registered mail nor was the signature on the registry
return receipt authenticated or identified. It cannot even be gleaned from the
testimony of private complainant as to who sent the demand letter and when
the same was sent. In fact, the prosecution seems to have presumed that the
registry return receipt was proof enough that the demand letter was sent
through registered mail and that the same was actually received by petitioners
or their agents. aCSDIc
As adverted to earlier, it is necessary in cases for violation of Batas

Pambansa Blg. 22, that the prosecution prove that the issuer had received a
notice of dishonor. It is a general rule that when service of notice is an issue,
the person alleging that the notice was served must prove the fact of service
(58 Am Jur 2d, Notice, §45). The burden of proving notice rests upon the party
asserting its existence. Now, ordinarily, preponderance of evidence is
sufficient to prove notice. In criminal cases, however, the quantum of proof
required is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, for Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 cases, there should be clear proof of notice. Moreover, it is a general rule
that, when service of a notice is sought to be made by mail, it should appear
that the conditions on which the validity of such service depends had
existence, otherwise the evidence is insufficient to establish the fact of service
(C.J.S., Notice, §18). In the instant case, the prosecution did not present proof
that the demand letter was sent through registered mail, relying as it did only
on the registry return receipt. In civil cases, service made through registered
mail is proved by the registry receipt issued by the mailing office and an
affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with Section 7 of
Rule 13 (See Section 13, Rule 13, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). If, in addition
to the registry receipt, it is required in civil cases that an affidavit of mailing as
proof of service be presented, then with more reason should we hold in
criminal cases that a registry receipt alone is insufficient as proof of mailing.
In the instant case, the prosecution failed to present the testimony, or at least
the affidavit, of the person mailing that, indeed, the demand letter was sent.
Moreover, petitioners, during the pre-trial, denied having received the
demand letter (p. 135, Rollo.). Given petitioners' denial of receipt of the
demand letter, it behooved the prosecution to present proof that the demand
letter was indeed sent through registered mail and that the same was received
by petitioners. This, the prosecution miserably failed to do. Instead, it merely
presented the demand letter and registry return receipt as if mere
presentation of the same was equivalent to proof that some sort of mail
matter was received by petitioners. Receipts for registered letters and return
receipts do not prove themselves; they must be properly authenticated in
order to serve as proof of receipt of the letters (Central Trust Co. v. City of Des
Moines, 218 NW 580).
Likewise, for notice by mail, it must appear that the same was served on
the addressee or a duly authorized agent of the addressee. In fact, the registry
return receipt itself provides that "[a] registered article must not be delivered
to anyone but the addressee, or upon the addressee's written order, in which
case the authorized agent must write the addressee's name on the proper
space and then affix legibly his own signature below it." In the case at bar, no
effort was made to show that the demand letter was received by petitioners
or their agent. All that we have on record is an illegible signature on the registry
receipt as evidence that someone received the letter. As to whether this
signature is that of one of the petitioners or of their authorized agent remains
a mystery. From the registry receipt alone, it is possible that petitioners or their
authorized agent did receive the demand letter. Possibilities, however, cannot
replace proof beyond reasonable doubt. There being insufficient proof that
petitioners received notice that their checks had been dishonored, the
presumption that they knew of the insufficiency of the funds therefor cannot
arise.
As we stated in Savage v. Taypin (G.R. No. 134217, May 11, 2000), "penal
statutes must be strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of
the accused." Likewise, the prosecution may not rely on the weakness of the
evidence for the defense to make up for its own blunders in prosecuting an
offense. Having failed to prove all the elements of the offense, petitioners may
not thus be convicted for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
That petitioners are civilly liable to private complainant is also doubtful.
Private complainant claims that petitioners borrowed Nine Hundred Fifty
Thousand (P950,000.00) Pesos from her on or about the end of April 1993, in
payment of which petitioners issued several post-dated checks in her favor.
The seven checks issued by petitioners as payment for the amount borrowed
add up to P950,000.00. If private complainant is the businesswoman that she
claims to be, she should be collecting interest on the loan she granted to
petitioners. In other words, the amount to be repaid by petitioners should be
more than P950,000.00, to account for interest on the loan. The checks issued
by petitioners, however, do not provide for interest. It is thus more credible
that the seven checks involved in this case form part of nineteen checks issued
to replace the checks issued by Juliet Ting to private complainant. This
conclusion is bolstered by private complainant's admission in her reply-
affidavit that more than seven checks were issued by petitioners (p.
11, Original Records). In said reply-affidavit, private complainant states that
"respondents issued and delivered to me in Manila several checks, which
partially include their seven (7) bouncing checks herein. I say 'partially' because
I will have to file additional bouncing check cases against them, as these other
checks likewise bounced." Furthermore, in the same reply-affidavit, private
complainant claims that the checks in question were not replaced, allegedly
because the replacement checks must first be cleared, which did not happen
in this case. By implication, had the 23 Far East Bank checks issued by Juliet
Ting to replace the nineteen checks issued by petitioners been cleared, then
private complainant would have considered the checks in question as having
been replaced. This only supports our conclusion that it was Juliet Ting who
owed money to private complainant, not petitioners.
Moreover, the original debtor Juliet Ting was convicted by the Regional
Trial Court of Manila in Criminal Cases 93-126581-91 for eleven counts of
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. These eleven bouncing check cases
involved the same obligation being sued upon by private complainant Tagle
herein. The trial court expressly acknowledged in said cases that nineteen (19)
checks were issued by petitioners as payment for Juliet Ting's obligation. In its
August 7, 1997 decision convicting Juliet Ting for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22, the trial court declared that "to cover the additional loans, accused
(Juliet Ting) delivered 19 post-dated checks issued by Victor Ting and Emily
Azajar (p. 55, Rollo.)." The trial court's decision further provides:
Since she could not fund the other checks (Exhs. B to K), she
replaced the same with 19 post-dated checks of her husband Victor-
Ting and her sister Emily Azajar totaling P2,450,000.00. They issued
the checks as they would take over her furniture business. The
intended partnership of Victor and Emily was aborted as the latter was
not allowed to resign from her teaching post in Naga City. She then
replaced the checks issued by Victor and Emily with her own checks —
23 FEB post-dated checks per list (Exh. 9) prepared by Suzanne Azajar.
Despite receipt of the replacement checks, complainant
refused to return the checks of Victor and Emily and even filed cases
against them.
(p. 56, Rollo.)
Not having borrowed the amount of Nine Hundred Fifty Thousand

(P950,000.00) from private complainant, petitioners may not thus be held
liable therefor.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED and
the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 12, 1999
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners Victor Ting "Seng Dee" and Emily Chan-
Azajar are hereby ACQUITTED of the charges against them for violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, for lack of sufficient evidence to prove the offenses
charged beyond reasonable doubt. No special pronouncement is made as to
costs.SIHCDA
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Panganiban and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
(Ting v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140665, [November 13, 2000], 398 PHIL 481-
|||
496)
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 142762. March 4, 2005.]
LILANY YULO y BILLONES, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J : p
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997

Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to reverse the Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals dated January 31, 1997 in CA-G.R. CR No. 17513 and its
Resolution 2 dated March 16, 2000.
The facts, as culled from the findings of the trial court and affirmed by
the Court of Appeals are:
Sometime in August 1992, Lilany B. Yulo, petitioner, and Josefina
Dimalanta went to the house of Myrna Roque, private complainant, in
Caloocan City. Josefina, introduced to Myrna petitioner Yulo as her best friend
and a good payer. Josefina told Myrna that petitioner wanted her checks
encashed. In view of Josefina's assurance that petitioner is trustworthy, Myrna
agreed to encash the checks. Petitioner then issued to Myrna three checks: (a)
Equitable Bank (EB) Check No. 237936 in the amount of P40,000.00, postdated
September 30, 1992; (b) EB Check No. 237941 in the amount of P16,200.00;
and (c) Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) Check No. 656602 in the amount of
P40,000.00, postdated November 18, 1992. IEAacS
When Myrna presented the checks for payment to the drawee banks,
they were dishonored. The EB checks were "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds,"
while the BPI check was stamped "Account Closed."
As Myrna did not know petitioner's address, she immediately informed
Josefina about the dishonored checks. The latter told Myrna not to worry and
repeated her assurance that petitioner is her best friend and a good payer.
Myrna tried to get petitioner's address from Josefina, but the latter refused
and instead made the assurance that she will inform petitioner that the checks
were dishonored. iatdcjur
When no payment was forthcoming, Myrna lodged a complaint against

petitioner with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City.
On August 23, 1993, three (3) Informations were filed by the Caloocan
City Prosecutor with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 130, same city, for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. C-44774,
44775, and 44776.
When arraigned with the assistance of counsel de parte, petitioner
pleaded not guilty to the charges. The cases were then consolidated and jointly
heard.
Petitioner admitted having issued the checks in question but claimed
that she merely lent them to Josefina. In turn, Josefina delivered the checks to
her friend who showed them to a jeweler as "show money." It was understood
that the checks were not to be deposited. Petitioner vehemently denied having
any transaction with Myrna.
Petitioner also claimed that when she issued the checks, she knew she
had no funds in the banks; and that she was aware that the checks would be
dishonored if presented for payment.
After hearing, the trial court rendered its Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused LILANY YULO y
BILLONES, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, and is hereby sentenced as follows:
(1) In Criminal Case No. C-44774, to an imprisonment of ONE (1) YEAR,
and to indemnify the offended party Myrna Roque in the
amount of P16,200.00, representing the face value of Equitable
Bank Check No. 227941, and to pay the costs;
(2) In Criminal Case No. C-44775, to an to an imprisonment of ONE (1)
YEAR, and to indemnify the offended party Myrna Roque in the
amount of P40,000.00, representing the face value of Bank of
the Philippine Islands Check No. 656602, and to pay the costs;
(3) In Criminal Case No. C-44776, to an imprisonment of ONE (1) YEAR,
and to indemnify the offended party Myrna Roque in the
amount of P40,000.00, representing the face value of Equitable
Bank Check No. 237936, and to pay the costs.ASaTHc
Pursuant to Rule 114, Section 2(a) of the Rules of Court, as

amended, the bail bond of the accused is cancelled and the accused
is hereby committed to the City Jail.
SO ORDERED. 3
Upon appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 17513, the Court of Appeals

affirmed in toto the Decision of the trial court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Hence, the instant petition raising the following assignments of error:
"I. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF HER RIGHT
TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES;
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THE CONVICTION FOR VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG.
22. EVEN IF THE REQUISITES THEREFORE ARE NOT COMPLETE;
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ALTHOUGH THE LATTER'S
DECISION WAS BASED ON THE UNCORROBORATED,
INCREDIBLE, AND UNNATURAL STATEMENTS OF THE
COMPLAINANT AND ALTHOUGH THE TESTIMONY OF THE
ACCUSED WAS SUPPORTED BY CORROBORATING EVIDENCE. 4
The issues for our resolution are: (1) whether the Court of Appeals
violated petitioner's right to a speedy trial; and (2) whether the same court
erred in holding that the prosecution has proved petitioner's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
On the first issue, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals resolved
her motion for reconsideration only after three (3) years from its filing. Such
inaction violates her right to a speedy disposition of her case.
In his comment, the Solicitor General counters that the Appellate Court
has explained satisfactorily why petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
not resolved immediately.
Article III, Section 16 of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition
of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative
bodies.
Under the foregoing provision, any party to a case has the right to
demand on all officials tasked with the administration of justice to expedite its
disposition. However, the concept of speedy disposition is a relative term and
must necessarily be a flexible concept. 5 A mere mathematical reckoning of the
time involved is not sufficient. 6 In applying the Constitutional guarantee,
particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances of each case.
The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy
trial, 7 is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause
or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party
having his case tried. 8 To determine whether the right has been violated, the
following factors may be considered: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons
for such delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused;
and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay. 9
In the instant case, we agree with the Solicitor General that the delay
was sufficiently explained by the Court of Appeals. The ponente of the decision
in CA-G.R. CR No. 17513, Associate Justice Jainal D. Rasul, retired during the
pendency of petitioner's motion for reconsideration filed on March 4, 1997.
However, the case was assigned to Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole
only on February 28, 2000 and brought to her attention on March 2, 2000. We
note that it took Justice Gozo-Dadole only two (2) weeks from notice to resolve
the motion. Clearly, she did not incur any delay. We, therefore, rule that there
has been no violation of the petitioner's right to a speedy trial.
On the second issue, petitioner submits that the prosecution failed to
prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Not all the elements of the offense
of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 were adequately established. For one,
Myrna Roque, private complainant, did not send her any notice of dishonor. It
was Josefina whom Myrna contacted, not her. For another, petitioner merely
lent the checks to Josefina to be shown by her friend to a jeweler.
Petitioner's arguments are simply untenable.
The elements of the offense penalized by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 are:
(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for
value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of
issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent
dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficient funds or credit or
dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause,
ordered the bank to stop payment. 10
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the prosecution has proved all
the elements of the offense. IDATCE
Petitioner admitted having issued the three dishonored checks for

value. Her purpose was to encash them. She also admitted that at the time
she issued the checks, she was aware that she had only P1,000.00 in her
account with the Equitable Bank and that her BPI account was already closed.
Significantly, what Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 penalizes is the issuance of a
bouncing check. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law
punishes, but the act of making and issuing a check that is dishonored upon
presentment for payment. 11 The purpose for which the check was issued and
the terms and conditions relating to its issuance are immaterial. What is
primordial is that the issued checks were worthless and the fact of
worthlessness was known to the petitioner at the time of their issuance, as in
this case. This is because under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the mere act of
issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum. 12
We likewise find no reason to sustain petitioner's contention that she
was not given any notice of dishonor. Myrna had no reason to be suspicious
of petitioner. It will be recalled that Josefina Dimalanta assured Myrna that
petitioner is her "best friend" and "a good payer." Consequently, when the
checks bounced, Myrna would naturally turn to Josefina for help. We note that
Josefina refused to give Myrna petitioner's address but promised to inform
petitioner about the dishonored checks.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court. Settled is
the rule that factual findings of the trial court which have been affirmed in
toto by the Court of Appeals are entitled to great weight and respect by this
Court and will not be disturbed absent any showing that the trial court
overlooked certain facts and circumstances which could substantially affect
the outcome of the case. 13 This exception is not present here. That Myrna was
the sole witness for the prosecution is of no moment. There is no law requiring
that the testimony of a single witness must be corroborated. The rule in this
jurisdiction is that the testimony of witnesses is weighed, not numbered, and
the testimony of a single witness, if found trustworthy and credible, as in this
case, is sufficient to sustain a conviction. 14
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated January 31, 1997 and its Resolution dated March 16, 2000, in
CA-G.R. CR No. 17513, sustaining the Joint Decision of the trial court in Criminal
Cases Nos. C-44774, C-44775, and C-44776 are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Corona, Carpio Morales and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Rollo at 37-44. Penned by Associate Justice Jainal D. Rasul (deceased) and

concurred in by Associate Justices Hector L. Hofileña and Artemio G. Toquero
(both retired).
2.Id. at 46-47. Per Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole with Associate Justices
Buenaventura J. Guerrero and Hilarion L. Aquino (both retired), concurring.
3.Id. at 57-58.
4.Id. at 37.
5.Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 101689, March 17, 1993, 220 SCRA 55,
63; Caballero v. Alfonso, Jr., G.R. No. 45647, August 21, 1987, 153 SCRA 153,
163.
6.Binay v. Sandiganbayan, 374 Phil. 413, 447 (1999), citing Socrates v. Sandiganbayan,
253 SCRA 773 (1996).
7.CONST. ART. III, Sec. 14(2).
8.Ty-Dazo v. Sandiganbayan, 424 Phil. 945, 950-951 (2002),
citing Binay v. Sandiganbayan, supra; Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan, 199 SCRA
298 (1991).
9.Blanco v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 136757-58, November 27, 2000, 346 SCRA 108,
114 citing Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan, supra.
10.Tan v. Mendez, Jr., 432 Phil. 760, 769 (2002) citing Lim v. People, 420 Phil. 506
(2001).
11.Ibasco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117488, September 5, 1996, 261 SCRA 449,
463, citing Caram v. Contreras, 237 SCRA 724 (1994).
12.Llamado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 99032, March 26, 1997, 270 SCRA 423, 431
citing People v. Nitafan, 215 SCRA 79 (1992).
13.Lim v. People, 420 Phil. 506, 512 (2001), citing American Home Assurance
Co. v. Chua, 309 SCRA 250 (1999).
14.People v. Pirame, 384 Phil. 286, 297 (2000).
||| (Yulo v. People, G.R. No. 142762, [March 4, 2005], 493 PHIL 54-62)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 145498. January 17, 2005.]
BENJAMIN LEE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J : p
Petitioner is now before us on a petition for review under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals dated July 30, 1999, which affirmed the judgment of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 79, Quezon City (RTC) convicting him of violating Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 in Criminal Case No. Q-93-50094; and the
Resolution 2dated October 11, 2000, denying his motion for
reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
On October 4, 1993, an Information was filed against petitioner Dr.
Benjamin F. Lee and a certain Cesar Al. Bautista, for violation of B.P. Blg. 22,
which reads:
That on or about the 24th day of July 1993, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring together, confederating
with, and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Rogelio G.
Bergado to apply on account or for value United Coconut Planters
Bank Check No. 168341 dated July 24, 1993 payable to the order of
Rogelio G. Bergado in the amount of P980,000.00, Philippine
Currency, said accused well knowing that at the time of issue they
did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check
when presented for payment was subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for Account Closed and despite receipt of notice of
such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Rogelio G. Bergado
the amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment
of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said
notice.
EHSAaD
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
Petitioner pleaded not guilty in his arraignment on February 1,
1995. 4 Presiding Judge Godofredo L. Legaspi noted in the assailed
judgment that trial proceeded insofar only as petitioner is concerned,
"since accused Cesar Bautista is presently detained at Municipal Jail at
Calapan, Mindoro where he has a pending case before the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MTC), Calapan, Mindoro and despite several notices to the jail
warden of Calapan, Mindoro, the latter failed to bring the person of said
accused to this Court for arraignment." 5
For the prosecution, private complainant Rogelio Bergado testified
that: on July 19, 1992, he loaned Unlad Commercial Enterprises (Unlad for
brevity), through its agent Norma Ilagan, the amount of P500,000.00 with
an interest of 4% a month; on September 10, 1992, he loaned another
P400,000.00 through Ilagan for the same interest rate; in exchange, he
received a total of twenty-six checks, four of which were dishonored for the
reason "drawn against insufficient funds"; he went to Calapan, Mindoro and
talked to Bautista and the latter replaced the dishonored checks with
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. ARA 168341, signed by
Bautista and herein petitioner dated July 24, 1993, in the amount of
P980,000.00 representing the total amount loaned plus interests; when
Bergado deposited the check at UCPB, the same was dishonored due to
"account closed"; through his lawyer, he sent demand letters to Bautista
and petitioner, who, despite having received the same still failed and
refused to make any payment. Upon cross-examination, Bergado admitted
that he did not see or meet petitioner prior to July 24, 1993 nor did he go
to Calapan, Mindoro to check the existence of Unlad prior to lending it the
amount of P900,000.00. 6
The prosecution also presented Zenaida 7 Katigbak, Branch
Operations Officer of UCPB Araneta Avenue, Quezon City, who testified that
Bautista and petitioner are the authorized signatories of Current Account
No. 130-000406-2, against which the check subject of the present criminal
case was issued; and that the account was opened on August 22, 1988 and
closed on January 31, 1992 due to mishandling of the account, i.e., a check
was previously issued against it without sufficient funds. 8
The prosecution presented UCPB Check No. ARA 168341, 9 UCPB
Check Return Slip dated August 5, 1993 stating that Check No. ARA 168341
was returned unpaid due to "account closed"; 10 a demand letter addressed
to petitioner dated August 9, 1993; 11 registry return slip; 12 a copy of the
complaint affidavit of private complainant; 13 signature card of the current
account of petitioner and Bautista at UCPB; 14 and the bank statement of
the current account of petitioner and Bautista dated January 31, 1992
reflecting that said account has been closed on said date. 15
For the defense, petitioner testified that: it is Bautista who is the sole
owner of Unlad; he knew Bautista and became his "compadre" because of
Bautista's wife who was his employee; he does not know anything about
the check issued by Bautista in favor of Bergado nor did he receive any
amount from Bergado or any other person; he agreed to open an account
with Bautista in 1988 because Bautista promised to give him 5% interest
from the proceeds of loans that will be made in favor of other people from
said account; before July of 1989, Bautista also asked him to sign several
checks in exchange for 2.5% interest a month from the proceeds of loan to
be made in favor of other people; after July 1989, he terminated his
accommodation arrangement with Bautista after learning that Bautista was
also giving 5% interest to other investors without any accommodation
agreement; he asked for the checks he previously signed but Bautista
refused to return them saying that he did not have them anymore; and
inspite of these, he continued investing in Bautista's business in the amount
of more than P500,000.00. 16
On cross-examination, petitioner admitted that he signed several
checks in blank on different occasions; that he was the one who asked and
insisted that Bautista execute Exhs. "1" and "2", affidavits of Bautista stating
that Unlad shall be Bautista's sole responsibility; and that despite having
severed his relationship with Bautista in July of 1989, he did not inform
UCPB Araneta, Quezon City branch of such fact and he continued investing
in Unlad, from July 1989 to April 1994. 17
To bolster his claim, petitioner presented: an affidavit executed by
Bautista dated May 31, 1993 stating that Bautista is the sole proprietor of
Unlad and that any business transaction entered into by Unlad shall be
Bautista's personal responsibility; 18 an affidavit executed by Bautista on
June 4, 1990, stating that petitioner is no longer connected with Unlad and
that petitioner should not be held liable regarding any transaction entered
into by Unlad after July 1989 since petitioner is no longer a signatory; 19 a
business permit issued by the Municipality of Calapan certifying that
Bautista has been granted a permit to operate a "general
merchandise"; 20 a certification from the Department of Trade and
Industry, Oriental Mindoro Provincial Office stating that Unlad is registered
in the name of Cesar Bautista and/or Placer Bautista; 21 orders of
attachment issued by the Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro on the
properties of Bautista and petitioner; 22 and checks issued by Bautista in
favor of petitioner and his wife Amelia Lee. 23
On July 22, 1997, the RTC promulgated its decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in this case finding
accused Benjamin Lee guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and accordingly sentences him to suffer
an imprisonment of one (1) year of prision correccional, and to pay
the offended party P980,000.00 and to pay a fine of P200,000.00 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and non-payment of
the fine by the accused.
SO ORDERED. 24
Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals which modified the trial
court's judgment, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Decision is hereby MODIFIED by imposing a
penalty of one (1) year and for the accused to pay the private party
the sum of Nine Hundred Eighty Thousand Pesos (P980,000.00) as
civil indemnity.
With cost against the accused.
SO ORDERED. 25
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on October 11,
2000. DAEcIS
Hence, the present petition with the following assignment of errors:

1. THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR OF
LAW IN DISREGARDING PETITIONER'S DEFENSE THAT HE HAD
ALREADY SEVERED, SINCE JULY 1989, HIS ACCOMMODATION
ARRANGEMENT WITH HIS CO-ACCUSED BAUTISTA WHO WAS
SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL THE TRANSACTIONS ENTERED INTO
BY UNLAD COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES AND THEREFORE
PETITIONER HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUFFICIENCY OR
INSUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS OF UNLAD'S BANK ACCOUNT.
2. THE COURT A QUO HAS DECIDED IN (A) WAY NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW IN FAILING TO RULE THAT THE SUBJECT CHECK,
UCPB CHECK NO. ARA 168341, WAS NOT ISSUED BY PETITIONER TO
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT ON ACCOUNT OR FOR VALUE.
3. THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW WHEN
IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT AT THE TIME THE SUBJECT CHECK WAS
ISSUED BY BAUTISTA IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT, THE
LATTER WAS ALREADY AWARE THAT THE RESPECTIVE ESTATES OF
THE ACCUSED WERE ALREADY ATTACHED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF CALAPAN, ORIENTAL MINDORO.
4. THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR OF
FACT AND LAW IN NOT ACQUITTING PETITIONER ON GROUND OF
REASONABLE DOUBT.
5. THE COURT A QUO AND THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN THEY FAILED TO DISMISS THE
INFORMATION FOR VIOLATION OF B.P. 22 AGAINST THE ACCUSED
FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION. 26
In support of his first assigned error, petitioner claims that: he had
no actual knowledge of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the funds handled
by his co-accused Bautista; while it is true that he opened a joint account
with Bautista at UCPB Araneta Avenue, Quezon City and that he signed
several UCPB checks in blank to accommodate Bautista, he already severed
his accommodation arrangement with Bautista as early as July of 1989; this
is evidenced by the affidavits executed by Bautista dated June 4, 1990 and
May 31, 1993 which the court a quo ignored; the Court of Appeals
erroneously held that the affidavits of Bautista are "self-serving" since there
was no showing that Bautista was lying when he made the statements
therein; also, the declarant in this case is Bautista and not petitioner, thus
the principle of self-serving statements cannot apply; the affidavits of
Bautista are declarations against the interest of the person making it, which
are admissible notwithstanding their hearsay character, since such
declarations are relevant to the case and the declarant is not available as a
witness despite efforts of petitioner to present Bautista in court; the true
test of the reliability of the declaration is not whether it was made ante litem
motam as in this case but whether the declaration was uttered under
circumstances justifying the conclusion that there was no probable motive
to falsify; also, the affidavits of Bautista, having been acknowledged before
a notary public, should be given evidentiary weight. 27
Petitioner also points out that in Lao vs. Court of Appeals 28 the Court
held that if knowledge of the insufficiency of funds is proven to be actually
absent or non-existent, the accused should not be held liable for the
offense defined under Sec. 1 of B.P. Blg. 22; in said case, petitioner was
acquitted, even though she was still connected with the corporation at the
time of the issuance of the check, since she was not expected or obliged to
possess under the organizational structure of the corporation, knowledge
of the insufficiency of funds; and that in the case at bar, the court a
quo affirmed the conviction of petitioner even though it was established
that he had ceased to be connected with co-accused Bautista's business for
more than three years prior to the issuance of the subject check and even
though it was clear from the testimony of private complainant himself that
he had dealt with Bautista and Ilagan only. 29
Anent the second and third assigned errors, petitioner argues that: in
the case at bar, there was neither a pre-existing obligation nor an obligation
incurred on the part of petitioner when the subject check was given by
Bautista to private complainant on July 24, 1993 since petitioner was no
longer connected with Unlad or Bautista starting July of 1989; when
Bautista issued the subject check to Bergado on July 24, 1993, Bautista had
no more authority to use petitioner's pre-signed checks thus there was no
consideration to speak of; petitioner was deceived by Bautista into
believing that all the pre-signed checks were already used or issued as of
1989; the court a quo should not have presumed that when petitioner
signed the checks and handed the same to Bautista, petitioner had
knowledge that their account had no funds; in all criminal cases, suspicion,
no matter how strong cannot sway judgment; even assuming that
petitioner had issued the subject check when he signed the same sometime
before July 1989 and that he had an undertaking to whoever would be the
payee, still petitioner should be exempted from criminal liability since
petitioner could not comply with the said undertaking due to an
insuperable cause, i.e., as early as June 18, 1993, all the properties of
petitioner had already been attached/garnished by the Regional Trial Court
of Oriental Mindoro. 30
Petitioner further argues that: private complainant is not a holder in
due course because he knew that the account of Bautista and petitioner
with UCPB Araneta branch had been closed at the time that he deposited
UCPB Check No. ARA 168341 on August 5, 1993; Check No. ARA 374058 in
the amount of P500,000.00, which bounced earlier, was drawn from the
same UCPB account of Bautista and petitioner which had already been
closed by the UCPB on January 31, 1992; 31private complainant also had
knowledge that the respective estates of both accused were already
attached by the RTC at the time the subject check was given to him by
Bautista since the first order of attachment was issued on June 18, 1993
and was recorded with the Registry of Deeds of Oriental Mindoro on the
same date; applying the principle that registration of instrument is notice
to the world, Bergado is presumed to know the various orders of
attachment/garnishment issued by the court. 32
As to his fourth assigned error, petitioner argues that: the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; the
prosecution failed to rebut the allegation of petitioner that he was not
anymore connected with the business of Bautista and therefore he had no
knowledge of the insufficiency of the funds handled by Bautista; and the
prosecution and the trial court relied solely on the authenticity of
petitioner's signature on the subject check which fact is not enough to
convict petitioner of the offense charged. 33
Finally, anent his fifth assigned error, petitioner claims that the
Regional Trial Court which tried and convicted petitioner had no jurisdiction
over violations of B.P. Blg. 22 considering that the penalty therefor is
imprisonment of thirty days to one year and/or a fine not less than, and not
more than double, the amount, but not to exceed P200,000.00; and that at
the time the Information was filed on October 4, 1993, violations of B.P. Blg.
22 fell under the jurisdiction of the MTC in view of Sec. 32 (2) of B.P. Blg.
129 which provides that the MTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over all
offenses punishable with imprisonment of not more than four years and
two months or a fine of not more than P4,000.00 or both such fine and
imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties
including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kin, nature, value or amount thereof. 34
In his Comment, the Solicitor General contends that: the mere fact
that petitioner was a signatory to the check makes him solidarily liable with
his co-signatory; if it is true that petitioner severed his accommodation
arrangement with Bautista as early as July of 1989, he should have
informed the UCPB Araneta Avenue, Quezon City branch that any check
that would be issued bearing his signature and that of Bautista and drawn
against their joint account after July of 1989 should no longer be honored;
the affidavit of Bautista to the effect that petitioner should not be held
answerable for any liability of Unlad after July 1989 is not admissible as
Bautista was not presented in court nor the prosecution afforded any
opportunity to test the veracity of his allegations; having failed to
convincingly establish that petitioner has severed his accommodation
arrangement with his co-accused Bautista, the presumption stands that he
was aware that they no longer had sufficient funds at the time the check
was issued; the presumption also stands that the check was issued on
account or for value; petitioner also cannot claim that private complainant
was aware that petitioner and Bautista's joint account was already closed
at the time the subject check was issued and delivered to complainant since
there is nothing on record to show that the reason for the non-payment of
the checks earlier issued to complainant was due to "account closed";
Bergado claims that the earlier checks were dishonored due to lack of
sufficient funds; there is also no merit to the argument of petitioner that
private complainant was already aware that petitioner together with
Bautista could no longer make good the subject check in view of the various
writs of attachment issued by the court against their properties, which writs
of attachment were duly recorded with the Register of Deeds; the
registration of the various writs of attachment affected only the real
properties of petitioner and such registration served as warning to those
who may have or intend to have dealings affecting such lands covered by
the attachments; with regard to the attachment of their bank accounts,
there was no showing that private complainant was aware of the same;
there is also no merit to the claim of petitioner that his guilt was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt; the prosecution was able to establish that
petitioner, together with Bautista, issued the subject check to the
complainant in payment of the money loaned by the latter to Unlad; the
check bounced for the reason "account closed" and despite demand to
make good the check, petitioner and his co-accused failed and refused to
pay the complainant; and there is no merit to the claim of petitioner that
the RTC had no jurisdiction over the present case following Sec. 32 (2) of B.P.
Blg. 129 where it is provided that in order that the offense under the
jurisdiction of Municipal Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, the imposable penalty must not exceed four
years and two months or a fine of not more than P4,000.00 or both such
fine and imprisonment; in the case at bar, the imposable fine is way beyond
the limit of P4,000.00 as the amount of the check is P980,000.00 thus the
RTC had jurisdiction over the case. 35
Simply stated, the issues that need to be resolved are as follows: (1)
whether the RTC, which tried and convicted petitioner, has jurisdiction over
the case; (2) whether petitioner had actual knowledge of the sufficiency or
insufficiency of funds handled by his co-accused; (3) whether the check was
issued on account or for value; (4) whether the private complainant, at the
time of issuance, had knowledge that the check had no sufficient funds; and
(5) whether the guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable
doubt. ICAcTa
First issue. Whether the RTC, which tried and convicted petitioner, had
jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner claims that the RTC which tried and convicted him had no
jurisdiction over violations of B.P. Blg. 22 since such jurisdiction is vested on
the MTC in view of Sec. 32 (2) of B.P. Blg. 129.
We do not agree.
As clearly provided by Sec. 32 (2) of B.P. Blg. 129, to wit:
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. — Except in
Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable
with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a
fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or
predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount
thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed
twenty thousand pesos. (Emphasis supplied)
the MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, OR, a fine of
not more than four thousand pesos or both such fine and imprisonment.
The Information in this case was filed on October 4, 1993.
On March 25, 1994, Republic Act No. 7691 took effect and amended
Sec. 32 (2) of B.P. Blg. 129 to read as follows:
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. — Except in
Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable
with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount
of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or
predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount
thereof: Provided, however, that in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction thereof. (Emphasis supplied) cTACIa
Since the Information in the present case was filed prior to the
amendment of R.A. No. 7691, the old rule governs and therefore,
considering that the imposable penalty for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 per
Section 1, thereof is imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more
than one year OR by a fine of not less than but not more than double the
amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed P200,000.00, or both
fine and imprisonment; and inasmuch as the fine imposable in the present
case is more than P4,000.00 as the subject amount of the check is
P980,000.00, it is the Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction over the
present case. As we held in People vs. Velasco: 36
. . . as a general rule . . . the jurisdiction of a court to try a
criminal action is to be determined by the law in force at the time of
the institution of the action. Where a court has already obtained and
is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to
proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by
new legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another
tribunal. The exception to the rule is where the statute expressly
provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate
as to actions pending before its enactment. Where a statute
changing the jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive effect, it
cannot be applied to a case that was pending prior to the enactment
of a statute.
A perusal of R.A. No. 7691 will show that its retroactive
provisions apply only to civil cases that have not yet reached the pre-
trial stage. Neither from an express proviso nor by implication can it
be understood as having retroactive application to criminal cases
pending or decided by the Regional Trial Courts prior to its effectivity
. . . At the time the case against the appellant was commenced by the
filing of the information on July 3, 1991, the Regional Trial Court had
jurisdiction over the offense charged.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . In fine, the jurisdiction of the trial court (RTC) over the case
of the appellant was conferred by the aforecited law then in force
(R.A. No. 6425 before amendment) when the information was filed.
Jurisdiction attached upon the commencement of the action and
could not be ousted by the passage of R.A. No. 7691 reapportioning
the jurisdiction of inferior courts, the application of which to criminal
cases is, to stress, prospective in nature. 37
Second issue. Whether petitioner had actual knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds. HEcSDa
We have held that knowledge involves a state of mind difficult to

establish, thus the statute itself creates a prima faciepresumption that the
drawer had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the
bank at the time of the issuance and on the check's presentment for
payment if he fails to pay the amount of the check within five banking days
from notice of dishonor. 38
Sec. 2 of B.P. Blg. 22, provides:
Section 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. — The
making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is
refused by the drawee bank because of insufficient funds in or credit
with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the
date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such
insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the
holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for
payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking
days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the
drawee.
As a rule, the prosecution has a duty to prove all the elements of the
crime, including the acts that give rise to theprima facie presumption.
Petitioner, on the other hand, has a right to rebut such presumption. Thus,
if such knowledge of insufficiency of funds is proven to be actually absent
or inexistent, the accused should not be held liable for the offense defined
under the first paragraph of Sec. 1 of B.P. Blg. 22, 39 thus:
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. — Any person who
makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for
value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit
or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment,
shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but
not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more
than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case
exceed Two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court. 2005cdjur

or to maintain a credit or to cover the full amount of the check if
presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date
appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee
bank.
xxx xxx xxx
In the present case, the prosecution has established the prima
facie presumption of knowledge of petitioner of insufficient funds through
the demand letter sent to petitioner, Exhibit "C" 40 which was duly received
by petitioner as shown by the registry return receipt, Exhibit "D". 41
Petitioner tried to rebut the prima facie presumption by insisting that
he is not an owner of Unlad and he has already severed his accommodation
arrangement with Bautista as early as 1989. He argues that the affidavits of
Bautista exonerating him from any responsibility as well as the private
complainant's own testimony that he never dealt with petitioner, should be
given weight.
We are not persuaded.
It is a hornbook doctrine that unless the affiant himself takes the
witness stand to affirm the averments in his affidavits, the affidavits must
be excluded from the judicial proceeding, being inadmissible
hearsay. 42 The trial court and the Court of Appeals were correct in
considering the same as hearsay evidence and in not giving probative
weight to such affidavits.
Moreover, petitioner had admitted that he continued investing in
Unlad until April 1994. Hence, he now cannot claim that he has completely
severed his ties with Bautista as of 1989. With nothing but his bare
assertions, which are ambiguous at best, petitioner has failed to rebut
the prima facie presumption laid down by the statute and established by
the prosecution.
Petitioner's insistence that since he is not an owner of Unlad, he could
not have had any knowledge as to the insufficiency of funds is devoid of
merit. As clarified in Lao vs. Court of Appeals, 43 the very case petitioner is
invoking, the doctrine that a mere employee tasked to sign checks in blanks
may not be deemed to have knowledge of the insufficiency of funds applies
only to corporate checks and not to personal checks. 44 In this case, what is
involved is a personal and not a corporate check. HIACac
Worth mentioning also is the fact that in the Lao case, the notice of
dishonor was never personally received by petitioner, thus the prima
facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds never arose. Here,
as correctly found by the RTC, petitioner was duly notified of the dishonor
of the subject check as shown by Exh. "C," 45 a letter, specifically mentioning
that the subject check was dishonored for reason "Account Closed," with
the corresponding registry return receipt showing that petitioner received
the notice on August 16, 1993 which petitioner did not impugn. 46
Third issue. Whether or not the check was issued on account or for
value.
Petitioner's claim is not feasible. We have held that upon issuance of
a check, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the
same was issued for valuable consideration. 47 Valuable consideration, in
turn, may consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to
the party who makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or
some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or
undertaken by the other side. It is an obligation to do, or not to do in favor
of the party who makes the contract, such as the maker or indorser. 48
In this case, petitioner himself testified that he signed several checks
in blank, the subject check included, in exchange for 2.5% interest from the
proceeds of loans that will be made from said account. This is a valuable
consideration for which the check was issued. That there was neither a pre-
existing obligation nor an obligation incurred on the part of petitioner when
the subject check was given by Bautista to private complainant on July 24,
1993 because petitioner was no longer connected with Unlad or Bautista
starting July 1989, cannot be given merit since, as earlier discussed,
petitioner failed to adequately prove that he has severed his relationship
with Bautista or Unlad.
At any rate, we have held that what the law punishes is the mere act
of issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor
the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. This is because the thrust
of the law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them
into circulation. 49
Fourth issue. Whether the private complainant, at the time of
issuance, had knowledge that the checks had no sufficient funds.
We have held that knowledge of the payee that the drawer did not
have sufficient funds with the drawee bank at the time the check was issued
is immaterial as deceit is not an essential element of the offense under B.P.
Blg. 22. 50 This is because the gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a
bad check, hence, malice and intent in the issuance thereof are
inconsequential. 51
In Yu Oh vs. Court of Appeals 52 the Court held that there is no violation
of B.P. Blg. 22, if complainant was actually told by the drawer that he has no
sufficient funds in the bank. 53 In the present case, since there is no
evidence that a categorical statement was given to private complainant
when the subject check was issued to him, the above ruling cannot apply. SITCEA
Fifth issue. Whether the guilt of the accused was proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
Petitioner maintains that the prosecution has failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt since the prosecution failed to rebut his
allegation that he was not anymore connected with the business of Bautista
and the trial court relied solely on the authenticity of petitioner's signature
on the subject check to convict him of the offense charged. We are not
convinced.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean absolute certainty.
Suffice it to say the law requires only moral certainty or that degree of proof
which produces conviction in a prejudiced mind. 54
After reviewing the entire records of this case, we find that there is
no reason to depart from the trial court's judgment of conviction. The
weight and quantum of evidence needed to prove the guilt of petitioner
beyond reasonable doubt were met and established by the prosecution
and correctly affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
However, in view of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-
2000, as clarified by Administrative Circular No. 13-2001, establishing a rule
of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg.
22; and the recommendation of the Solicitor General in its Comment that
the policy laid down in Vaca vs. Court of Appeals, 55 and Lim vs. People, 56 of
redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary
deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness, be considered in
favor of petitioner who is not shown to be a habitual delinquent or a
recidivist, 57 we find that the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals
should be modified by deleting the penalty of imprisonment and imposing
only a fine of P200,000.00.
An appeal in a criminal case throws the entire case for review and it
becomes our duty to correct any error, as may be found in the appealed
judgment, whether assigned as an error or not. 58 Considering that the civil
aspect of the case is deemed instituted with the criminal case and
considering that the trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to award, in
their respective judgments, the interest on the amount due to private
complainant, it is incumbent upon us to correct the patent error of the
lower courts. Private complainant is entitled to a 12% legal interest per
annum from the date of finality of judgment. 59
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
the following MODIFICATIONS: The sentence of imprisonment is deleted.
Instead, petitioner is ordered to pay a fine of P200,000.00, subject to
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency pursuant to Article 39 of
the Revised Penal Code; and petitioner is ordered to pay the private
complainant the amount of P980,000.00 with 12% legal interest per annum
from the date of finality of herein judgment. CcTIDH
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Callejo, Sr., Tinga and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Penned by Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr., and concurred in by Justices Jainal D. Rasul
and Ruben T. Reyes; Rollo, pp. 49-57.
2.Penned by Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr. and concurred in by Justices Ruben T. Reyes
and Mariano M. Umali (now retired).
3.Records, p. 1.
4.Id., p. 45.
5.Rollo, p. 63.
6.TSN, May 17, 1995, pp. 4-12.

7.Spelled as "Zayda" in the TSN, May 24, 1995, but "Zenaida" in the RTC
decision, Rollo, p. 63.
8.TSN, May 24, 1995, pp. 4-6 and 9.

9.Exh. "A", Records, p. 76.
10.Exh. "B", Records, p. 76.
11.Exh. "C", Records, p. 77.

12.Exh. "D", Records, p. 78.
13.Exh. "E", Records, pp. 79-81.

14.Exh. "F", Records, p. 82.
15.Exh. "G", Records p. 83.
16.TSN, August 13, 1996, pp. 7-8, 13-18.
17.TSN, August 20, 1996, pp. 12-17.
18.Exh. "1", Records, p. 189.
19.Exh. "2", Records, p. 190.

20.Exh. "3", Records, p. 191.
21.Exh. "4", Records, p. 192.
22.Exhs. "5", "6", "7", "8", "9", "10", "11", "12", "13" and "14"; Records, pp. 193-206.
23.Exhs. "15", "16", "17", "18", "19", "20", "21", "22", "23"; Records, pp. 207-209.
24.Rollo, p. 68.
25.Id., p. 57.
26.Rollo, p. 19.
27.Rollo, pp. 20-25.
28.G.R. No. 119178, June 20, 1997, 274 SCRA 572.
29.Rollo, pp. 28-29 and 31.

30.Id., pp. 31-34.
31.Id., pp. 35-36.

32.Id., p. 37.
33.Id., p. 41.
34.Id., pp. 41-42.

35.Rollo, pp. 154-159.
36.G.R. No. 110592, January 23, 1996, 252 SCRA 135, 147.
37.Id., pp. 147-148.

38.Llamado vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 99032, March 26, 1997, 270 SCRA 423,
429-430.
39.Lao vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119178, June 20, 1997, 274 SCRA 572, 585-586.
40.RTC Records, p. 77.
41.Id., p. 78.
42.People vs. Quidato, G.R. No. 117401, October 1, 1998, 297 SCRA 1, 8; People vs.
Rendoque, January 20, 2000, 322 SCRA 622, 635.
43.Supra, note 28.

44.Id., pp. 591-592.
45.RTC Records, p. 77.
46.Id., p. 78.
47.Ty vs. People, G.R. No. 149275, September 27, 2004.
48.Ibid.
49.Ibid.
50.Ty vs. People, supra; Rigor vs. People, G.R. No. 144887, November 17, 2004.
51.Rigor vs. People, supra.
52.G.R. No. 125297, June 6, 2003, 403 SCRA 300.

53.Id., p. 316, citing Eastern Assurance and Surety Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, January
18, 2000, 322 SCRA 73, 79.
54.People vs. Esquila, G.R. No. 116727, February 27, 1996, 254 SCRA 140, 147.
55.November 16, 1998, 298 SCRA 656.
56.G.R. No. 130038, September 18, 2000, 340 SCRA 497.

57.Rollo, p. 159.
58.People vs. Laguerta, October 30, 2000, 344 SCRA 453, 458; People vs. Balacano,
July 31, 2000, 336 SCRA 615, 629-630.
59.Eastern Assurance and Surety Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, January 18, 2000,
322 SCRA 73, 79.
||| (Lee v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 145498, [January 17, 2005], 489 PHIL 420-444)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 154947. August 11, 2004.]
LEODEGARIO BAYANI, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J :
p
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22861 affirming on appeal the Decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch 59, in Criminal Case No. 93-135
convicting the accused therein, now the petitioner, for violation of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22.
On February 9, 1993, Leodegario Bayani was charged with violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 in an Information which reads:
That on or about the 20th day of August 1992, in the
Municipality of Candelaria, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously issue and make out
Check No. 054936 dated August 29, 1992, in the amount of FIFTY-FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P55,000.00) Philippine Currency, drawn against
the PSBank, Candelaria Branch, Candelaria, Quezon, payable to "Cash"
and give the said check to one Dolores Evangelista in exchange for
cash although the said accused knew fully well at the time of issuance
of said check that he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for payment of said check in full upon presentment; that
upon presentation of said check to the bank for payment, the same
was dishonored and refused payment for the reason that the drawer
thereof, the herein accused, had no sufficient fund therein, and that
despite due notice, said accused failed to deposit the necessary
amount to cover said check or to pay in full the amount of said check,
to the damage and prejudice of said Dolores Evangelista in the
aforesaid amount.
Contrary to law. 3
The Case for the Prosecution

At about noon on August 20, 1992, Alicia Rubia arrived at the grocery
store of Dolores Evangelista in Candelaria, Quezon, and asked the latter to
rediscount Philippine Savings Bank (PSBank) Check No. 054936 in the amount
of P55,000.00. The check was drawn by Leodegario Bayani against his account
with the PSBank and postdated August 29, 1992. 4 Rubia told Evangelista that
Bayani asked her to rediscount the check for him because he needed the
money. 5 Considering that Rubia and Bayani were long-time customers at the
store and she knew Bayani to be a good man, Evangelista agreed to rediscount
the check. 6After Rubia endorsed the check, Evangelista gave her the amount
of P55,000.00. 7 However, when Evangelista deposited the check in her
account with the Far East Bank & Trust Company on September 11, 1992, it
was dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason that on September 1, 1992,
Bayani closed his account with the PSBank. 8 The reason for the dishonor of
the check was stamped at its dorsal portion. As of August 27, 1992, the balance
of Bayani's account with the bank was P2,414.96. 9Evangelista then informed
Rubia of the dishonor of the check and demanded the return of her
P55,000.00. Rubia replied that she was only requested by Bayani to have the
check rediscounted and advised Evangelista to see him. When Evangelista
talked to Bayani, she was told that Rubia borrowed the check from him. 10
Thereafter, Evangelista, Rubia, Bayani and his wife, Aniceta, had a
conference in the office of Atty. Emmanuel Velasco, Evangelista's lawyer. Later,
in the Office of the Barangay Captain Nestor Baera, Evangelista showed Bayani
a photocopy of the dishonored check and demanded payment thereof. Bayani
and Aniceta, on one hand, and Rubia, on the other, pointed to each other and
denied liability thereon. Aniceta told Rubia that she should be the one to pay
since the P55,000.00 was with her, but the latter insisted that the said amount
was in payment of the pieces of jewelry Aniceta purchased from her. 11 Upon
Atty. Velasco's prodding, Evangelista suggested Bayani and Rubio to pay
P25,000.00 each. Still, Bayani and Rubio pointed to the other as the one solely
liable for the amount of the check. 12 Rubia reminded Aniceta that she was
given the check as payment of the pieces of jewelry Aniceta bought from
her.cIaCTS
The Case for the Petitioner

Bayani testified that he was the proprietor of a funeral parlor in
Candelaria, Quezon. He maintained an account with the PSBank in Candelaria,
Quezon, and was issued a checkbook which was kept by his wife, Aniceta
Bayani. Sometime in 1992, he changed his residence. In the process, his wife
lost four (4) blank checks, one of which was Check No. 054936 13 which formed
part of the checks in the checkbook issued to him by the PSBank. 14 He did not
report the loss to the police authorities. He reported such loss to the bank
after Evangelista demanded the refund of the P55,000.00 from his wife. 15 He
then closed his account with the bank on September 11, 1992, but was
informed that he had closed his account much earlier. He denied ever
receiving the amount of P55,000.00 from Rubia. 16
Bayani further testified that his wife discovered the loss of the checks
when he brought his wife to the office of Atty. Emmanuel Velasco. 17 He did
not see Evangelista in the office of the lawyer, and was only later informed by
his wife that she had a conference with Evangelista. His wife narrated that
according to Evangelista, Rubia had rediscounted a check he issued, which
turned out to be the check she (Aniceta) had lost. He was also told that
Evangelista had demanded the refund of the amount of the check. 18 He later
tried to contact Rubia but failed. He finally testified that he could not recall
having affixed his signature on the check. 19
Aniceta Bayani corroborated the testimony of her husband. She testified
that she was invited to go to the office of Atty. Velasco where she, Rubia and
Evangelista had a conference. It was only then that she met Evangelista. Rubia
admitted that she rediscounted the complainant's check with Evangelista.
When Evangelista asked her to pay the amount of the check, she asked that
the check be shown to her, but Evangelista refused to do so. She further
testified that her husband was not with her and was in their office at the time.
At the conclusion of the trial, the court rendered judgment finding
Bayani guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22.
The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused
Leodegario Bayani guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 1, Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and hereby sentences him to
suffer an imprisonment of ONE (1) YEAR, or to pay a fine of ONE
HUNDRED TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P110,000.00), to pay to
complaining witness Dolores Evangelista the sum of FIFTY-FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P55,000.00), the value of the check and to pay the
costs.
SO ORDERED. 20
On appeal, the petitioner averred that the prosecution failed to adduce

evidence that he affixed his signature on the check, or received from Rubia the
amount of P55,000.00, thus negating his guilt of the crime charged.
The petitioner asserts that even Teresita Macabulag, the bank manager
of PSB who authenticated his specimen signatures on the signature card he
submitted upon opening his account with the bank, failed to testify that the
signature on the check was his genuine signature.
On January 30, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered
judgment 21 affirming the decision of the RTC with modification as to the
penalty imposed on the petitioner.
The petitioner asserts in the petition at bar that —
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING
WITH MODIFICATION THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER BY THE TRIAL
COURT FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG.
22 NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE PROSECUTION MISERABLY FAILED
TO PROVE THAT THE CHECK WAS ISSUED FOR A VALUABLE
CONSIDERATION. 22
The petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to prove all the
essential elements of the crime of violation of Section 1, B.P. Blg. 22. He asserts
that the prosecution failed to prove that he issued the check. He avers that
even assuming that he issued the check, the prosecution failed to prove that
it was issued for valuable consideration, and that he received the amount of
P55,000.00 from Rubia. Hence, in light of the ruling of this Court in Magno vs.
Court of Appeals, 23 he is entitled to an acquittal on such grounds.
The petitioner further contends that Evangelista's testimony, that Rubia
told her that it was the petitioner who asked her to have the check
rediscounted, is hearsay and, as such, even if he did not object thereto is
inadmissible in evidence against him. He avers that the prosecution failed to
present Rubia as a witness, depriving him of his right to cross-examine her. He
contends that any declaration made by Rubia to Evangelista is inadmissible in
evidence against him.
The petition is denied.
We agree with the submission of the petitioner that Evangelista's
testimony, that Rubia told her that the petitioner requested that the subject
check be rediscounted, is hearsay. Evangelista had no personal knowledge of
such request of the petitioner to Rubia. Neither is the information relayed by
Rubia to Evangelista as to the petitioner's request admissible in evidence
against the latter, because the prosecution failed to present Rubia as a
witness, thus, depriving the petitioner of his right of cross-examination. cHaCAS
However, the evidence belies the petitioner's assertion that the

prosecution failed to adduce evidence that he issued the subject check.
Evangelista testified that when she talked to the petitioner upon Rubia's
suggestion, the petitioner admitted that he gave the check to Rubia, but
claimed that the latter "borrowed" the check from him.
Q. When this check in question was returned to you because of the
closed account, what did you do, if you did anything?
A. I talked to Alicia Rubia, Sir.

Q. And what did Alicia Rubia tell you in connection with the check in
question?
A. Alicia Rubia told me that she was just requested by Leodegario
Bayani, Sir.
Q. And what else did she tell you?
A. She advised me to go to Leodegario Bayani, Sir.

Q. Did you go to Leodegario Bayani as per instruction of Alicia Rubia?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. And what did Leodegario Bayani tell you in connection with this
check?
A. He told me that Alicia Rubia borrowed the check from him, Sir. 24
Evangelista testified that she showed to the petitioner and his wife,
Aniceta, a photocopy of the subject check in the office of Atty. Velasco, where
they admitted to her that they owned the check:
ATTY. ALZAGA (TO WITNESS)
Q. When you shown (sic) the check to Leodegario Bayani and his wife
in the law office of Atty. Velasco, what did they tell you?
ATTY. VELASCO:
Misleading. The question is misleading because according to the
question, Your Honor, he had shown the check but that was not
the testimony. The testimony was the xerox copy of the check
was the one shown.
ATTY. ALZAGA
"The xerox copy of the check."

COURT
As modified, answer the question.

WITNESS
A They told me they owned the check but they were pointing to each
other as to who will pay the amount, Sir. 25
The petitioner cannot escape criminal liability by denying that he

received the amount of P55,000.00 from Rubia after he issued the check to
her. As we ruled in Lozano vs. Martinez: 26
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of
making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored
upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an
obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed
to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit,
under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and
putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the
public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes
the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against
public order. 27
The evidence on record shows that Evangelista rediscounted the check

and gave P55,000.00 to Rubia after the latter endorsed the same. As such,
Evangelista is a holder of the check in due course. 28 Under Section 28 of
the Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL), absence or failure of consideration is a
matter of defense only as against any person not a holder in due course, thus:
SECTION 28. Effect of want of consideration. — Absence or failure
of consideration is a matter of defense as against any person not a
holder in due course; and partial failure of consideration is a
defense pro tanto, whether the failure is an ascertained and liquidated
amount or otherwise.
Moreover, Section 24 of the NIL provides the presumption of

consideration, viz:
SECTION 24. Presumption of consideration. — Every negotiable
instrument is deemed prima facie to have been issued for a valuable
consideration; and every person whose signature appears thereon to
have become a party thereto for value.
Such presumption cannot be overcome by the petitioner's bare denial

of receipt of the amount of P55,000.00 from Rubia.
The petitioner cannot, likewise, seek refuge in the ruling of this Court
in Magno vs. Court of Appeals 29 because the facts and issues raised therein are
substantially different from those extant in this case. Indeed, the Court ruled
in the said case that:
It is intriguing to realize that Mrs. Teng did not want the
petitioner to know that it was she who "accommodated" petitioner's
request for Joey Gomez, to source out the needed funds for the
"warranty deposit." Thus, it unfolds the kind of transaction that is
shrouded with mystery, gimmickry and doubtful legality. It is in simple
language, a scheme whereby Mrs. Teng as the supplier of the
equipment in the name of her corporation, Mancor, would be able to
"sell or lease" its goods as in this case, and at the same time, privately
financing those who desperately need petty accommodations as this
one. This modus operandi has in so many instances victimized
unsuspecting businessmen, who likewise need protection from the
law, by availing of the deceptively called "warranty deposit" not
realizing that they also fall prey to leasing equipment under the guise
of lease-purchase agreement when it is a scheme designed to skim off
business clients. 30
Equally futile is the petitioner's contention that the prosecution failed to

prove the crime charged. For the accused to be guilty of violation of Section 1
of B.P. Blg. 22, the prosecution is mandated to prove the essential elements
thereof, to wit:
1. That a person makes or draws and issues any check.
2. That the check is made or drawn and issued to apply on
account or for value.
3. That the person who makes or draws and issues the

check knows at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in
full upon its presentment.
4. That the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or would have been
reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. 31
In this case, the prosecution adduced documentary evidence that when

the petitioner issued the subject check on or about August 20, 1992, the
balance of his account with the drawee bank was only P2,414.96. During the
conference in the office of Atty. Emmanuel Velasco, Evangelista showed to the
petitioner and his wife a photocopy of the subject check, with the notation at
its dorsal portion that it was dishonored for the reason "account closed."
Despite Evangelista's demands, the petitioner refused to pay the amount of
the check and, with his wife, pointed to Rubia as the one liable for the amount.
The collective evidence of the prosecution points to the fact that at the time
the petitioner drew and issued the check, he knew that the residue of the
funds in his account with the drawee bank was insufficient to pay the amount
of the check.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Tinga and Chico-Nazario, JJ ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz, with Associate Justices Hilarion L.

Aquino and Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring.
2.Penned by Judge Virgilio C. Alpajora.
3.Records, pp. 2-3.

4.Exhibit "A," Id. at 98.
5.TSN, 2 September 1993, p. 10.
6.Id. at 11; TSN, 8 June, 1995, p. 20.

7.TSN, 2 September, 1993, p. 13.
8.Exhibit "B-2" and "C;" Records, pp. 101-102.

9.Exhibit "B-4;" Id. at 100.
10.TSN, 2 September, 1993, p. 21.
11.TSN, 8 June 1995, p. 45.

12.TSN, 2 September 1993, pp. 23-24.
13.Exhibit "A," Records, p. 98.
14.TSN, 4 November, 1994, pp. 36, 45.

15.Id. at 46-47.
16.Id. at 17.
17.Id. at 19.
18.Id. at 24.
19.Id. at 16.
20.Records, p. 193.
21.Rollo, p. 18.
22.Id. at 10.
23.210 SCRA 471 (1992).
24.TSN, 2 September 1995, pp. 20-21.
25.TSN, 8 June 1995, pp. 14-15.

26.146 SCRA 323 (1986).
27.Id. at 338.
28.SECTION 52. What constitutes a holder in due course. — A holder in due course is
a holder who has taken the instrument under the following conditions:
(a) That it is complete and regular upon its face;

(b) That he became the holder of it before it was overdue, and without notice, that
it had been previously dishonored, if such was the fact;
(c) That he took it in good faith and for value;

(d) That at the time it was negotiated to him, he had no notice of any infirmity in
the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating it.
29.Supra.
30.Id. at 477-478.
31.Lao vs. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 572 (1997).
||| (Bayani v. People, G.R. No. 154947, [August 11, 2004], 479 PHIL 755-767)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137191. November 18, 2002.]
BEN B. RICO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

Manalo Puno Jocson and Palacio Law Offices for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner Ben B. Rico was convicted of five (5) counts of violation

of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 by the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City. Aggrieved,
petitioner filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial
court's decision. The Court of Appeals found petitioner's defense of payment
untenable and not proven by clear and convincing evidence. It further stated
that even if there was payment, petitioner failed to prove that it was made
within five days from receipt of the notice of dishonor. Hence, the present
petition.HDAaIS
The Supreme Court found the petition partly meritorious and acquitted
petitioner. According to the Court, the element of knowledge of insufficiency
of funds or credit in the drawee bank for the payment of a check upon its
presentment was not sufficiently established in case at bar. The Court stressed
that a notice of dishonor personally sent to and received by the accused is
necessary before one can be held liable under B.P. 22. If such notice of non-
payment by the drawee bank is not sent to the maker or drawer of the bum
check, or if there is no proof as to when such notice was received by the
drawer, then the presumption of knowledge as provided in Section 2 of B.P.
22 cannot arise, since there would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial
five-day period. The failure of the prosecution to prove the existence and
receipt by petitioner of the requisite written notice of dishonor and that he
was given at least five banking days within which to settle his account
constitutes sufficient ground for his acquittal. The prosecution may have failed
in sufficiently establishing a case to warrant conviction, but clearly proved
petitioner's failure to pay a just debt owing to the private complainant. The
established fact that the subject checks remained in the possession of private
complainant contradicted petitioner's allegation of payment. Petitioner was
ordered by the Court to pay the face value of the check with 12 percent legal
interest per annum, reckoned from the filing of the information until the
finality of the decision.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22; ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME.

— The law enumerates the elements of violation of B.P. 22, namely (1) the
making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent
dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit
or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause,
ordered the bank to stop payment.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ELEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE OF INSUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS;
A NOTICE OF DISHONOR PERSONALLY SENT TO AND RECEIVED BY THE
ACCUSED IS NECESSARY BEFORE ONE CAN BE HELD LIABLE UNDER B.P. 22. —
We have ruled that to hold a person liable under B.P. 22, it is not enough to
establish that a check was dishonored upon presentment. It must be shown
further that the person who issued the check knew at the time of issue that he
payment of such check in full upon its presentment. Because this element
involves a state of mind which is difficult to establish, Section 2 of the law
creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge. Thus, the presumption
that the issuer had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds is brought into
existence only after it is proved that the issuer had received a notice of
dishonor and that, within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the
amount of the check or to make arrangement for its payment. Here, both the
Court of Appeals and the trial court relied solely on the testimony of
prosecution witness Danilo Cac to the effect that private complainant
immediately demanded payment of the value of the checks after they were
dishonored. Aside from this self-serving testimony, no other evidence was
presented to prove the giving and receiving of such notice. The nature and
content of said demands were not clarified. Even the date when and the
manner by which these alleged demands were made upon and received by
petitioner were not specified. Worse, the records do not show that formal and
written demand letters or notices of dishonor were ever sent to petitioner.
Where the presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds does not arise
due to the absence of notice of dishonor of the check, the accused should not
be held liable for the offense defined under the first paragraph of Section 1
of B.P. 22. As held in the case of Lao vs. Court of Appeals a notice of dishonor
personally sent to and received by the accused is necessary before one can be
held liable under B.P. 22. In other words, if such notice of non-payment by the
drawee bank is not sent to the maker or drawer of the bum check, or if there
is no proof as to when such notice was received by the drawer, then the
presumption of knowledge as provided in Section 2 of B.P. 22 cannot arise,
since there would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial five-day period.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE
EXISTENCE AND RECEIPT BY PETITIONER OF THE REQUISITE WRITTEN NOTICE
OF DISHONOR AND THAT HE WAS GIVEN AT LEAST FIVE BANKING DAYS
WITHIN WHICH TO SETTLE HIS ACCOUNT CONSTITUTES SUFFICIENT GROUND
FOR HIS ACQUITTAL. — The prosecution not only failed to prove the receipt by
petitioner of any notice of dishonor, the records are also bereft of any
indication that written formal demand letters or notice of dishonor were
actually sent to petitioner. In recent cases, we had the occasion to emphasize
that not only must there be a written notice of dishonor or demand letters
actually received by the drawer of a dishonored check, but there must also
be proof of receipt thereof that is properly authenticated, and not mere
registered receipt and/or return receipt. Thus, as held in Domagsang vs. Court
of Appeals, while Section 2 of B.P. 22 indeed does not state that the notice of
dishonor be in writing, this must be taken in conjunction with Section 3 of the
law, i.e., "that where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with such drawee
bank, such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or
refusal." A mere oral notice or demand to pay would appear to be insufficient
for conviction under the law. In our view, both the spirit and the letter of
theBouncing Checks Law require for the act to be punished thereunder not
only that the accused issued a check that is dishonored, but also that the
accused has actually been notified in writing of the fact of dishonor. The
consistent rule is that penal statutes must be construed strictly against the
State and liberally in favor of the accused. In Victor Ting vs. Court of Appeals, we
stated that when service of a notice is sought to be made by mail, it should
appear that conditions exist on which the validity of such service depends.
Otherwise, the evidence is insufficient to establish the fact of service. Receipts
for registered letters and return receipts do not by themselves prove receipt;
they must be properly authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of the letters.
In fine, the failure of the prosecution to prove the existence and receipt by
petitioner of the requisite written notice of dishonor and that he was given at
least five banking days within which to settle his account constitutes sufficient
ground for his acquittal.
4. ID.; CIVIL LIABILITY; AN ACQUITTAL BASED ON REASONABLE DOUBT
DOES NOT PRECLUDE AWARD OF CIVIL DAMAGES. — While petitioner is
acquitted for violation of B.P. 22, he should be ordered to pay the face value
of the five dishonored checks plus legal interest in accordance with our ruling
in Domagsang vs. Court of Appeals. There, the prosecution failed to sufficiently
establish a case to warrant conviction, but clearly proved petitioner's failure to
pay a just debt owing to the private complainant. Thus, petitioner was ordered
to pay the face value of the check with 12 percent legal interest per annum,
reckoned from the filing of the information until the finality of the decision. It
is well settled that an acquittal based on reasonable doubt does not preclude
the award of civil damages. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability
of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts
from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is
not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on lack of proof
beyond reasonable doubt, since only preponderance of evidence is required
in civil cases. There appears to be no sound reason to require that a separate
civil action be still filed considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case
have already been established in the criminal proceedings where the accused
was acquitted. To require a separate civil action would mean needless clogging
of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant
loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned. SCDaHc
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J : p
For review on certiorari is the decision 1 dated June 15, 1998 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19764, affirming the judgment 2 of the Regional
Trial Court of Laoag City which found the petitioner guilty of five counts of
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law), and the
resolution 3 dated January 7, 1999 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner Ben Rico was a "pakyaw" contractor who used to purchase
construction materials on credit from private complainant Ever Lucky
Commercial (ELC), represented by Victor Chan, Manager. Petitioner made
payments either in cash or by postdated checks. On several occasions, he
issued checks to ELC, which were dishonored by the bank upon presentment
for payment for "insufficiency of funds" or "closed account," as follows:
CHECK NO. DATE DATE OF REASON FOR AMOUNT
DISHONOR DISHONOR
04142 Nov. 5, 1990 Nov. 13, 1990 Insufficient P81,800.00

funds
1759806 Apr. 19, 1990 Apr. 20, 1990 Insufficient 25,000.00
funds
1759808 Apr. 20, 1990 Apr. 23, 1990 Account Closed 4,834.00
funds
funds
1759811 May 2, 1990 May 3, 1990 Account Closed 12,550.00
——————
TOTAL P178,434.00
===========
Consequently, petitioner was charged under several informations
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 5796, 5797, 5798, 5799 and 5800 for violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. The information in Criminal Case No. 5796 reads:
That on or about the 27th day of October, 1990, in the City of
Laoag, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously draw and issue Check No. 04142 in the amount of Eighty
One Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos (P81,800.00), dated November 5,
1990, drawn against the Philippine Commercial and International
Bank, Laoag City Branch, in favor of the Ever Lucky Commercial, as
payee, in payment of construction materials which he purchased on
credit from the said Ever Lucky Commercial, located at Brgy. No. 12,
Gen. Segundo Ave., Laoag City, of which Mr. Victor Chan is the Gen.
Manager, knowing fully well that he had no sufficient funds deposited
with the drawee bank to cover the payment thereof, as in fact it was
dishonored when presented for payment to the drawee bank on
November 13, 1990, on the ground that it was drawn against
insufficient funds, and the accused, despite due notice to him of the
dishonor of said check had not paid the amount thereof nor had he
made arrangements for its payment in full by the drawee bank within
five (5) banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, to the
damage and prejudice of the Ever Lucky Commercial in the amount of
P81,800.00, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
The other informations are similarly worded, except for the check
number and their amounts and the dates of issue which are hereunder
itemized as follows:
CRIMINAL CASE CHECK NO. DATE AMOUNT
NO.
5797 1759806 Apr. 19, 1990 P25,000.00

5798 1759808 Apr. 20, 1990 P4,834.00
5799 1759810 Apr. 11, 1990 P39,000.00
1759812 Apr. 11, 1990 P15,250.00
5800 1759811 May 2, 1990 P12,550.00
The five informations were consolidated by the lower court. Upon
arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to all the charges, and trial on the
merits ensued.
The prosecution established that petitioner, who used to purchase
construction materials on credit from ELC, issued the above-cited checks as
payment for the materials and that they were dishonored upon presentment
for payment to the bank either for "insufficient funds" or "account closed."
After the checks were dishonored, ELC demanded payments from petitioner,
who failed to make good his undertaking to replace the checks. No formal
written demand letter or notice of dishonor, however, was sent to the
petitioner. It was also established by the prosecution that ELC, through its
manager, issued several receipts covering several payments in various
amounts made by petitioner as replacement of some dishonored but returned
checks as well as for payment of materials purchased. No official receipts
covering the materials purchased, however, were presented in court as
evidence. 5
In his defense, petitioner did not deny that he issued the subject checks
and that they were dishonored upon presentment for payment with the
drawee bank. He claimed, however, that he already paid the amounts covered
by the checks, totalling P284,340.50, including interest. In support thereof, he
submitted as evidence the following official receipts issued by ELC. 6
OFFICIAL RECEIPT NO. DATE AMOUNT
3290 Apr. 24, 1990 P65,000.00

3298 Apr. 27, 1990 90,733.50
3411 May 3, 1990 10,000.00
3683 Sept. 4, 1990 68,607.00
3866 Jan. 5, 1991 50,000.00
——————
TOTAL P284,340.50
===========
According to petitioner, the difference between the total amount as
reflected in the receipts and the total amount covered by the subject checks
represented interest. 7 He also admitted that he did not retrieve the
dishonored checks as they were not yet fully paid. 8
On March 13, 1996, the trial court rendered its judgment as follows:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 5796, the accused is hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of BP Bilang 22. He is
sentenced to suffer the straight penalty of ONE (1) YEAR imprisonment
and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P81,800.00;
sentenced to suffer the straight penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS
imprisonment and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of
P25,000.00;
sentenced to suffer the straight penalty of THREE (3) MONTHS
P4,834.00;
sentenced to suffer the straight penalty of ONE (1) YEAR Imprisonment
and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P54,250.00; and
sentenced to suffer the straight penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS
P12,550.00.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED. 9
In convicting petitioner, the trial court noted that petitioner had

admitted the issuance and dishonor of the subject checks, and he could not
escape criminal liability as it found his defense of payment off-tangent. 10 It
ruled that the alleged payments do not apply to the subject checks but for the
other materials purchased, and granting they were applicable, they could only
affect his civil liability. 11 Further, the trial court concluded that a mathematical
computation of the payments made by the petitioner vis-a-vis the subject
checks did not give credence to the stance of petitioner. The trial court found
it illogical for petitioner to have paid more than the amounts covered by the
subject checks without a single alleged payment matching any of the amounts
written in the subject checks, and with petitioner paying more than his
outstanding liabilities at some point. 12
Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the trial court's decision. The Court of Appeals found petitioner's
defense of payment untenable and not proven by clear and convincing
evidence. It further stated that even if there were payment, petitioner failed to
prove that it was made within five days from receipt of notice of dishonor. 13 In
relation thereto, it ruled that the testimonial evidence of private complainant
declaring that immediate demands to pay were made on petitioner is in
themselves notices of dishonor. 14 Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
denied in a resolution dated January 7, 1999. ADaECI
Hence, this petition raising issues based on the alleged errors of the
appellate court.
MAIN ISSUE:
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A GRAVE MISTAKE IN AFFIRMING
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER IN THE FIVE (5)
CRIMINAL CASES IS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
VIOLATION OF BP BILANG 22 AND SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER THE
PENALTY IMPOSED THEREIN.
SUB-ISSUES
I
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN SHIFTING UNTO THE PETITIONER

THE BURDEN OF PROVING HIS OWN INNOCENCE INSTEAD OF LAYING
THE BURDEN UPON THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE GUILT OF
PETITIONER BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT DEFENSE OF
PAYMENT BY PETITIONER DID NOT OVERTHROW THE PRIMA FACIE
EVIDENCE OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE INSUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS AT THE
TIME OF ISSUANCE OF THE CHECKS AND THAT THE DEMANDS FOR
PAYMENT MADE TO PETITIONER ARE IN THEMSELVES NOTICES OF
DISHONOR.
III
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S
FINDING THAT THE PAYMENTS MADE BY THE PETITIONER TO THE
EVER LUCKY COMMERCIAL (ELC) AS EVIDENCED BY OFFICIAL RECEIPT
ISSUED BY ELC REFER TO OTHER TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN THE
PETITIONER AND ELC AND NOT TO THE DISHONORED CHECKS.
IV
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S
ANALYSIS DEBUNKING PETITIONER'S DEFENSE OF PAYMENTS. 15
In our view, the principal issue for our resolution is whether or not
petitioner's guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt.
Petitioner contends that he should be acquitted of all charges because
he already paid his obligations to Ever Lucky Commercial. He likewise avers
that the prosecution failed to establish all the elements of the crime,
particularly that he had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds in the bank
at the time he issued the checks. This failure, according to petitioner, can be
traced to the prosecution's inability to prove that notices of dishonor were
sent to him.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for appellee, argues that the
payments made by petitioner refer to different transactions and not to those
covered by the checks subject matter of this case. The OSG also avers that the
verbal demands made by private complainant are more than enough to prove
that petitioner had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds in the bank at
the time he issued the checks.
At the outset, we must stress that as a general rule, the factual findings
of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are accorded respect
and finality, unless tainted with arbitrariness or palpable error, 16 or when the
trial court failed to appreciate certain facts and circumstances which, if taken
into account, would materially affect the result of the case. 17 We find that the
exceptions rather than the general rule apply in this case. We also find the
petition meritorious.
The law enumerates the elements of violation of B.P. 22, namely (1) the
making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he
payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent
dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit
or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause,
ordered the bank to stop payment. 18
The first and third elements of the offense are present and proved in
these consolidated cases. But we find that the second element was not
sufficiently established.
Knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit in the drawee bank for the
payment of a check upon its presentment is an essential element of the
offense. 19 In several cases, 20 we have ruled that to hold a person liable
under B.P. 22, it is not enough to establish that a check was dishonored upon
presentment. It must be shown further that the person who issued the check
knew at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment. Because this element involves a state of mind which is difficult
to establish, Section 2 of the law creates a prima facie presumption of such
knowledge.
SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. — The making,
drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the
drawee because of insufficient funds or credit with such bank, when
presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall
credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount
due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of
such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such
check has not been paid by the drawee." (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
In King vs. People, 21 we held:

. . . The prima facie presumption arises when a check is issued.
But the law also provides that the presumption does not arise when
the issuer pays the amount of the check or makes arrangement for its
payment within five banking days after receiving notice that such
check has not been paid by the drawee.
Thus, the presumption that the issuer had knowledge of the

insufficiency of funds is brought into existence only after it is proved that the
issuer had received a notice of dishonor and that, within five days from receipt
thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangement for
its payment. 22
Here, both the Court of Appeals and the trial court relied solely on the
testimony of prosecution witness Danilo Cac to the effect that private
complainant immediately demanded payment of the value of the checks after
they were dishonored. Aside from this self-serving testimony, no other
evidence was presented to prove the giving and receiving of such notice. The
nature and content of said demands were not clarified. Even the date when
and the manner by which these alleged demands were made upon and
received by petitioner were not specified. Worse, the records do not show that
formal and written demand letters or notices of dishonor were ever sent to
petitioner.
Where the presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds does not
arise due to the absence of notice of dishonor of the check, the accused should
not be held liable for the offense defined under the first paragraph of Section
1 of B.P. 22. 23
As held in the case of Lao vs. Court of Appeals 24 a notice of dishonor
personally sent to and received by the accused is necessary before one can be
held liable under B.P. 22. In that case, we stated thus:
Because no notice of dishonor was actually sent to and received
by the petitioner, the prima facie presumption that she knew about
the insufficiency of funds cannot apply. Section 2 of BP Blg. 22 clearly
provides that this presumption arises not from the mere fact of
drawing, making, and issuing a bum check; there must also be a
showing that, within five banking days from receipt of the notice of
dishonor, such maker or drawer failed to pay the holder of the check
the amount due thereon or to make arrangement for its payment in
full by the drawee of such check.
It has been observed that the State, under this statute, actually
offers the violator "a compromise by allowing him to perform some
act which operates to preempt the criminal action, and if he opts to
perform it the action is abated." . . . The absence of a notice of dishonor
necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a
notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right
to demand — and the basic postulates of fairness require — that the
notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to afford her
the opportunity to avert prosecution under BP Blg. 22. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In other words, if such notice of non-payment by the drawee bank is not

sent to the maker or drawer of the bum check, or if there is no proof as to
when such notice was received by the drawer, then the presumption of
knowledge as provided in Section 2 of B.P. 22 cannot arise, since there would
simply be no way of reckoning the crucial five-day period. 25
As stated earlier, the prosecution not only failed to prove the receipt by
petitioner of any notice of dishonor, the records are also bereft of any
indication that written formal demand letters or notice of dishonor were
actually sent to petitioner. In recent cases, we had the occasion to emphasize
that not only must there be a written notice of dishonor or demand letters
actually received by the drawer of a dishonored check, but there must also
be proof of receipt thereof that is properly authenticated, and not mere
registered receipt and/or return receipt.
Thus, as held in Domagsang vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while Section 2 of B.P.
22 indeed does not state that the notice of dishonor be in writing, this must
be taken in conjunction with Section 3 of the law, i.e., "that where there are no
sufficient funds in or credit with such drawee bank, such fact shall always be
explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal." A mere oral notice or
demand to pay would appear to be insufficient for conviction under the law.
In our view, both the spirit and the letter of the Bouncing Checks Law require
for the act to be punished thereunder not only that the accused issued a check
that is dishonored, but also that the accused has actually been notified in
writing of the fact of dishonor. The consistent rule is that penal statutes must
be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.
In Victor Ting vs. Court of Appeals, 27 we stated that when service of a notice is
sought to be made by mail, it should appear that conditions exist on which the
validity of such service depends. Otherwise, the evidence is insufficient to
establish the fact of service. Receipts for registered letters and return receipts
do not by themselves prove receipt; they must be properly authenticated to
serve as proof of receipt of the letters.
In fine, the failure of the prosecution to prove the existence and receipt
by petitioner of the requisite written notice of dishonor and that he was given
at least five banking days within which to settle his account constitutes
sufficient ground for his acquittal.
However, while petitioner is acquitted for violation of B.P. 22, he should
be ordered to pay the face value of the five dishonored checks plus legal
interest in accordance with our ruling in Domagsang vs. Court of
Appeals. 28 There, the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish a case to
warrant conviction, but clearly proved petitioner's failure to pay a just debt
owing to the private complainant. Thus, petitioner was ordered to pay the face
value of the check with 12 percent legal interest per annum, reckoned from the
filing of the information until the finality of the decision. It is well settled that
an acquittal based on reasonable doubt does not preclude the award of civil
damages. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused
for damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the
civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished
by acquittal where the acquittal is based on lack of proof beyond reasonable
doubt, since only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases. There
appears to be no sound reason to require that a separate civil action be still
filed considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been
established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted. To
require a separate civil action would mean needless clogging of court dockets
and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of time,
effort, and money on the part of all concerned. 29
Finally, we agree that petitioner's alleged prior payment is untenable. As
found by the trial court and by the Court of Appeals, it is unnatural and illogical
for petitioner to have paid more than his outstanding obligations. It is also
unlikely that he would pay substantial amounts of interest when nothing had
been agreed upon on this matter. It is quite striking how he could have
generously paid more than what was due from him when he could hardly pay
private complainant in cash, and had to issue post-dated checks. Moreover, he
could have asked for the return of the checks as a matter of sound business
practice and procedure if indeed he already paid all the dishonored checks.
The fact that these checks remained in the possession of private complainant
contradicts petitioner's allegation of payment. 30
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
19764 is MODIFIED. Petitioner BEN RICO is ACQUITTED of the charge for
violation of B.P. 22 on the ground of reasonable doubt. However, he is ordered
to pay private complainant the face value of the checks in the total amount of
P178,434.00, with 12 percent interest per annum, from the filing of the
informations until the amount due is fully paid. IcTEAD
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., on leave.
Footnotes
1.CA Rollo, pp. 89-97.
2.Records, pp. 209-221.

3.Supra note 1 at 123.
4.Records, p. 1.
5.TSN, April 22, 1994, July 18, 1994 and August 22, 1994, pp. 2-50.
6.Records, pp. 190-191.
7.TSN, August 22, 1994, pp. 59-60.
8.Id. at 61.
9.Records, p. 221.
10.Id. at 217.
11.Id. at 217-218.
12.Id. at 218-220.
13.CA Rollo, p. 94.

14.Ibid.
15.Rollo, pp. 32-33.
16.David vs. Manila Bulletin Publishing Company, Inc., 347 SCRA 68, 69 (2000).
17.Danao vs. Court of Appeals, 358 SCRA 450, 456 (2001).
18.Lim vs. People, G.R. No. 143231, October 26, 2001, p. 4; Wong vs. Court of
Appeals, 351 SCRA 100, 108-109 (2001); Domagsang vs. Court of Appeals, 347
SCRA 75, 80-81 (2000).
19.Lao vs. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 572, 585 (1997).
20.Danao vs. Court of Appeals, 358 SCRA 450, 458 (2001); Ting vs. Court of Appeals,
344 SCRA 551, 557-558 (2000); King vs. People, 319 SCRA 654, 667-668
(1999).
21.Supra note 20 at 668.
22.Ting vs. Court of Appeals, supra note 20 at 558.
23.Supra note 19 at 585-586.

24.Id. at 593-594.
25.Danao vs. Court of Appeals, supra note 20 at 458-459.
26.Supra note 18 at 83-84.

27.Supra note 20 at 561-562.
28.Supra note 18 at 84-85.

29.Padilla, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558, 565-567 (1984).
30.See Alberto Lim vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 143231, October 26, 2001,
pp. 6-7.
||| (Rico v. People, G.R. No. 137191, [November 18, 2002], 440 PHIL 540-556)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 160893. November 18, 2005.]
SONIA P. RUIZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

Brazil Law and Notarial Office for petitioner.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; APPEAL;

REQUIREMENTS. — The Court agrees with the OSG's contention that, under Section
3, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the proper remedy of the
petitioner from the decision of the RTC on appeal from an MTC decision was to file a
petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, in which the petitioner may
raise errors of facts or law, or both, committed by the RTC. If the aggrieved party fails
to file such petition within the period therefor, the RTC decision becomes final and
executory, beyond the jurisdiction of the CA or even by this Court to reverse or modify.
2. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; APPEAL; QUESTION OF FACT
DISTINGUISHED FROM QUESTION OF LAW. — Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court provides that only questions of law may be raised in this Court on a petition
for review. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, this Court distinguished a question of fact
from a question of law: . . . A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy
concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when
the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when
the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query
invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the
witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as
their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.
3. CRIMINAL LAW; VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG.
22 (BOUNCING CHECKS LAW); ELEMENTS. — To be liable for violation of B.P.
22, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt the following
elements: 1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for
value; 2. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have
sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full
upon its presentment; and 3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank
for insufficiency of funds or credit or it would have been dishonored for the same reason
had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.
4. ID.; ID.; THE GRAVAMEN OF THE OFFENSE IS THE ACT OF MAKING
AND ISSUING WORTHLESS CHECK OR ANY CHECK THAT IS DISHONORED
UPON ITS PRESENTMENT FOR PAYMENT AND PUTTING THEM IN
CIRCULATION; EFFECT; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. — In Lozano v.
Martinez, this Court ruled that the gravamen of the offense is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check or any check that is dishonored upon its presentment for
payment and putting them in circulation. The law includes all checks drawn against
banks. The law was designed to prohibit and altogether eliminate the deleterious and
pernicious practice of issuing checks with insufficient or no credit or funds therefor.
Such practice is deemed a public nuisance, a crime against public order to be abated.
The mere act of issuing a worthless check, either as a deposit, as a guarantee, or even
as an evidence of a pre-existing debt or as a mode of payment is covered by B.P. 22. It
is a crime classified as malum prohibitum. The law is broad enough to include, within
its coverage, the making and issuing of a check by one who has no account with a bank,
or where such account was already closed when the check was presented for payment.
As the Court in Lozano explained: The effects of the issuance of a worthless check
transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and
touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a
wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of
putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very
well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. As aptly stated — The
"check flasher" does a great deal more than contract a debt; he shakes the pillars of
business; and to my mind, it is a mistaken charity of judgment to place him in the same
category with the honest man who is unable to pay his debts, and for whom the
constitutional inhibition against "imprisonment for debt, except in cases of fraud" was
intended as a shield and not a sword. Considering that the law imposes a penal sanction
on one who draws and issues a worthless check against insufficient funds or a closed
account in the drawee bank, there is, likewise, every reason to penalize a person who
indulges in the making and issuing of a check on an account belonging to another with
the latter's consent, which account has been closed or has no funds or credit with the
drawee bank.
5. ID.; ID.; DRAWING OF CHECK AS ACCOMMODATION PARTY IS
NOT A DEFENSE; RATIONALE. — Equally barren of factual and legal basis is the
petitioner's defense that she issued the said check merely to accommodate the private
complainant, the latter knew that it was Gina Parro who owned the check, and such
check was drawn against a closed account. Aside from her uncorroborated testimony,
the petitioner failed to adduce any evidence to prove such claim. Neither is there any
indication on the face of the check that the petitioner drew the check merely as an
accommodation party. What the records show is that the petitioner drew and delivered
the check in payment of a loan in favor of the private complainant. It bears stressing
that, whether a person is an accommodation party is a question of intent. When the
intent of the parties does not appear on the face of the check, it must be ascertained in
the light of the surrounding facts and circumstances. Invariably, the tests applied are
the purpose test and the proceeds test. Under both tests, the petitioner is not an
accommodation party. And even assuming she was such party, this circumstance is not
a defense to a charge for violation of B.P. 22. What the law punishes is the issuance
itself of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued or of the terms
and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check,
whether merely as an accommodation, is covered by B.P. 22. Hence, the agreement
surrounding the issuance of a check is irrelevant to the prosecution and conviction of
the petitioner.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J : p
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of
the Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Camarines Sur, which
affirmed the Decision 2 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Goa, Camarines Sur,
convicting petitioner Sonia P. Ruiz of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P.
22), otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.
Sonia Ruiz contracted several loans from Norberta Mendoza amounting to
P184,000.00, broken down as follows: P70,000.00 on December 10, 1996; P50,000.00
in February 1997; and P64,000.00 in June 1997. 3
On July 4, 1997, Ruiz issued United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No.
151061 4 dated June 30, 1997; the check for P184,000.00 was drawn against Account
No. 320-000534-5. Mendoza deposited the check in her account with the Philippine
National Bank (PNB) in Goa, Camarines Sur. However, the drawee bank dishonored
the check, as the account against which it was drawn was already closed. 5 PNB notified
Mendoza of the dishonor of the check. 6
In a Letter 7 dated September 22, 1997, Mendoza, through counsel, informed
Ruiz that the check had been dishonored "for the reason that her account with the
drawee bank was already closed." Mendoza also demanded the payment of the amount
of the check plus interest thereon. Ruiz received the letter on September 24, 1997 8 and
promised Mendoza that she would pay the amount of the check. However, Ruiz reneged
and failed to pay. 9
Mendoza then filed a complaint against Ruiz in the Office of
the Barangay Chairman. Despite due notice, Ruiz failed to appear during the scheduled
hearings. Consequently, the Office of the Barangay Chairman issued a Certificate to
File Action. 10
Ruiz was charged with violation of B.P. 22 in the MTC of Goa, Camarines Sur.
The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about June 30, 1997, in the Municipality of Goa, Camarines
Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make,
draw out and issue to herein complainant, a UCPB Savings Bank, Goa Branch,
Goa, Camarines Sur Check No. 151061 in the amount of P184,000.00 dated June
30, 1997, as payment to herein complainant for accused's outstanding obligation,
accused knowing that at the time she issued said Check she did not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such Check in full
upon its presentment, or that said accused failed to keep sufficient funds to
maintain a credit for encashment or payment, and which Check when actually
presented for payment with the drawee bank on its due date was dishonored for
the reason of "account closed," and despite notice of dishonor and demand for
payment upon said accused to make good said Check, she has, up to the present,
failed to pay the amount due thereon or make arrangement for the payment in full
by the drawee (sic) of said Check within five (5) banking days after receiving
notice that said Check has not been paid by the drawee bank, thus to the damage
and prejudice of the herein complainant in the aforesaid amount of P184,000.00,
Philippine Currency.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW. 11
Ruiz admitted that she drew the check and delivered the same to Mendoza.
However, she declared that she did so with the conformity of her sister, Gina Parro,
who was the owner of UCPB Account No. 320-000534-5, and that this was done in the
presence of Mendoza. 12 Ruiz further declared that Mendoza had asked her to draw and
issue the check for the purpose of showing the same to an insurance agent with whom
she (Mendoza) had applied for a P1,000,000.00 life insurance. Ruiz further testified
that she agreed to draw and issue the check to Mendoza merely for accommodation
purposes. She claimed that she informed Mendoza that the check was not funded, and
the latter assured her that the check would not be encashed nor deposited. 13 She was
surprised when Mendoza deposited the check in her account with the PNB.
After due trial, the MTC rendered judgment convicting Ruiz of violation of B.P.
22. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proved the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, Sonia Ruiz is hereby ORDERED to pay a FINE of
P200,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and as civil
indemnity, she is also ordered to pay to Norberta Mendoza the face value of
UCPB Check No. 151061 of P184,000.00 with legal interest thereon from
September 24, 1997, as well as to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 14
On appeal to the RTC, Ruiz contended that B.P. 22 does not apply to a situation
where the drawer of a putative check is not the owner of the account against whom the
check was drawn, or someone who had no account or credit with the drawee bank.
However, the RTC rendered judgment affirming the decision of the MTC:
Sonia Ruiz, now the petitioner, filed the instant a petition, alleging that:
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL OF
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT (HEREIN PETITIONER) WHEN IT APPLIED
SECTION 4 OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22 (B.P. 22) IN ADDRESSING
AND PASSING UPON THE VERY LEGAL ISSUE ON WHETHER OR NOT
ACCUSED-APPELLANT (HEREIN PETITIONER) CAN BE CONVICTED
FOR VIOLATING B.P. 22 BY AFFIXING HER SIGNATURE AS "DRAWER"
OF A CHECK WHICH BELONGS TO ANOTHER PERSON AND WAS
SUBSEQUENTLY DISHONORED FOR THE REASON OF "ACCOUNT
CLOSED"; and
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING HEREIN
PETITIONER'S APPEAL WHEN IT DECIDED THAT "KNOWLEDGE BY
THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT OF THE FACT THAT THE ACCOUNT
AGAINST WHICH THE SUBJECT CHECK WAS DRAWN DOES NOT
BELONG TO HEREIN PETITIONER AND OF THE FACT THAT SAID
ACCOUNT AGAINST WHICH SAID CHECK WAS DRAWN WAS
ALREADY CLOSED" IS NOT A VALID DEFENSE FOR VIOLATION
OF B.P. 22. 15
The petitioner asserts that she filed the petition with this Court since the issue
involved is one of law and not of facts. She avers that criminal liability for violation
of B.P. 22 only arises if the maker of the check is a depositor of the drawee bank or has
a checking account therein. She posits that one who issues a check against a checking
account owned by somebody else cannot order the drawee bank to pay the amount of
the check to the payee. Citing the ruling of this Court in Firestone Tire and Rubber Co.
of the Philippines v. Ines Chaves & Co. Ltd., 16 the petitioner avers that while the maker,
in issuing a check, represents that there are funds in the bank for its payment, one who
draws a check against an account which he or she does not own cannot possibly
represent that he or she has an existing account with the drawee bank. Besides, the
petitioner asserts, she merely accommodated Mendoza, who needed the check as proof
to the insurance agent that she had money with which to pay life insurance
premiums. EaDATc
The petitioner reiterates her arguments in the RTC and maintains that she could
not be convicted of violation of B.P. 22 considering that when the check was drawn,
Mendoza already knew that Gina Parro, the petitioner's sister, did not have sufficient
funds with the drawee bank.
In its comment on the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) avers
that the proper remedy of the petitioner was not to file a petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, but a petition for review in the Court of Appeals (CA) under
Rule 42 on questions of fact and law. It posits that the decisions of the MTC and the
RTC are in accord with the evidence and the law. 17
The threshold issues for resolution are the following: (a) whether the proper
remedy of the petitioner from the decision of the RTC was via a petition for review in
the CA under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court; and (b) whether the RTC erred in affirming
the decision of the MTC convicting the petitioner of violation of B.P. 22.
On the first issue, the Court agrees with the OSG's contention that, under Section
3, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the proper remedy of the
petitioner from the decision of the RTC on appeal from an MTC decision was to file a
petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, in which the petitioner may
raise errors of facts or law, or both, committed by the RTC. 18 If the aggrieved party
fails to file such petition within the period therefor, the RTC decision becomes final
and executory, beyond the jurisdiction of the CA or even by this Court to reverse or
modify.
The instant petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is improper for
another reason — the petitioner also raised factual issues. Section 1 of Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court provides that only questions of law may be raised in this Court on a
petition for review. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 19 this Court distinguished a
question of fact from a question of law:
. . . A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the
correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the
issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists
when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when
the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the
credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding
circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the
probability of the situation.
As gleaned from the following allegations in her petition in this Court, the
petitioner raised questions of facts, viz.:
It is noteworthy in the case at bench that petitioner "issued" said check
believing that she was not violating the provisions of B.P. 22 considering that the
account against which said check was drawn and issued is/was not hers. Be it
noted that the purpose on which said check was "issued" and "drawn" by
petitioner was to accommodate or help private complainant about her problem on
insurance. It was private complainant who was the author of all these
circumstances and the one who was so insistent for the petitioner to sign on the
said check as "drawer" to avoid whatever trouble such as being criminally
prosecuted under B.P. 22 that might hound petitioner's sister since the latter is the
true and real owner of the check in question considering that the check was only
given by the petitioner's sister just to accommodate private complainant's plea to
borrow a check as a proof for her to show that come a certain date she has
money. 20
xxx xxx xxx

Undeniably, petitioner "issued" the check in question upon the prodding
of the private complainant because at that time private complainant was in dire
need of a check in order to show it to the insurance agent whom private
complainant secured an insurance policy in the amount of ONE MILLION
(P1,000,000.00) PESOS that come a certain date private complainant has already
an amount for the payment of her insurance.
Admittedly, private complainant promised the petitioner and her
(petitioner's) sister that said check would not be presented for payment or deposit
with the drawee bank (UCPB) since the purpose of which said check was signed
by the petitioner as "drawer" was to help private complainant of her problem
about her insurance. CITcSH
It is very suspicious and highly intriguing why private complainant

presented the subject check for payment with the drawee bank (UCPB) even if
she knew very well that the one who "issued" said check was a complete stranger
to the check in question. 21
In contrast to the petitioner's claim, the private complainant averred that the
check was made and delivered in payment of the petitioner's P184,000.00 loan, and that
she (private complainant) was unaware that it was drawn and issued by the petitioner
against an account belonging to her sister, Gina Parro. The private complainant averred
she had not known that the petitioner had no account with UCPB, and that the latter
failed to make arrangements with the said bank to pay the amount of the check upon its
presentment. Thus, the petition tasks this Court to calibrate the conflicting testimonies
of the petitioner and the private complainant, determine the probative weight thereof,
and resolve whether the petitioner's defense deserves merit or not. As such, this petition
should be dismissed for being the improper remedy.
Even assuming gratia argumenti that the only issues raised in this case are of
law, a careful study of the case shows that, in any event, the petition is destined to fail.
The petitioner posits that she is not criminally liable for violation of B.P.
22 because she merely accommodated the private complainant and was not the owner
of UCPB Account No. 320-000534-5 against which the subject check was drawn. She
insists that the law applies only to a maker of the dishonored check who has an account
with the drawee bank. The RTC, however, rejected this defense. The OSG, for its part,
asserts that the ruling of the RTC is correct, thus:
To give merit to petitioner's argument would be to defeat the primary
purpose of B.P. 22. For, B.P. 22 was enacted to discourage the issuance of
bouncing checks, to prevent checks from becoming "useless scraps of paper," and
to restore respectability to checks, all without distinction as to the purpose of the
issuance of the checks (Roberto Cruz versus Court of Appeals, et al., 233 SCRA
301 [1994]. Accordingly, the ownership of the check should not be material in
the determination of liability for Violation of B.P. 22. Otherwise, unscrupulous
people may just start drawing or issuing checks of other people with insufficient
or no funds at all knowing that they will incur no criminal liability by employing
such a scheme.
When petitioner issued the subject check to complainant, she did so in the
capacity of a drawer and upon her representation that she will make good said
check. On this point, the Regional Trial Court aptly held:
In the light of the evidence adduced on record, it is beyond an iota
of doubt that the accused-appellant did not have credit or understanding
or arrangement with UCPB Savings Bank, Goa Branch for the payment
of the check which she borrowed from her sister Gina Parro. The latter is
the one who had the "credit" as the word is defined by Section 4, B.P.
22 with the bank. But the latter did not sign the check. It was signed by
the accused-appellant who was a complete stranger to the bank. Obviously
at the time that the accused-appellant issued the particular check no.
151061 in favor of the private offended party, she had full knowledge that
she does not only have sufficient funds thereat but that she is entirely
bereft of any account or credit or arrangement/understanding with the
UCPB, Goa Branch for the full payment of the check upon its
presentment. It was likewise obvious from the very start that if the said
check were presented for payment it would be dishonored by the UCPB
Goa Branch as the accused did not have any "credit" with said bank as the
word "credit" is defined by Section 4 of BP 22. In common parlance the
accused did not have a current account with said bank. That she
nonetheless, issued Check No. 151061 under such circumstance is a
violation of BP 22. (p. 6, RTC Decision)
B.P. 22 covers any check which bounces. It does not matter then that the
subject check belongs to the accused or another person. Therefore, petitioner's
deliberate act of drawing a worthless check is the very act which B.P.
22punishes. aTCAcI
The importance of arresting the proliferation of worthless checks need not

be underscored. The mischief created by unfunded checks in circulation is
injurious not only to the payee or holder, but to the public as well. This harmful
practice "can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the
banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest"
(Roberto Cruz versus Court of Appeals, et al., supra). The gravamen of the
offense punished by B.P. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check
or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-
payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or
designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit,
under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them
in circulation (Remigio S. Ong versus People of the Philippines, et al., 346 SCRA
117 (2000). 22
The Court holds that the ruling of the RTC is in accord with the law and the
evidence on record.
Section 1 of B.P. 22 provides:
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. — Any person who makes
or draws and issued any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the
time that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit
or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by
imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a
fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine
shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and
issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover
the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from
the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
Where the check is drawn by the corporation, company or entity, the person or
persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable
under this Act.
To be liable for violation of B.P. 22, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the following elements:
1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or
for value;
2. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not
have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the
check in full upon its presentment; and
3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or it would have been dishonored for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment. 23
In Lozano v. Martinez, 24 this Court ruled that the gravamen of the offense is the
act of making and issuing a worthless check or any check that is dishonored upon its
presentment for payment and putting them in circulation. The law includes all checks
drawn against banks. 25 The law was designed to prohibit and altogether eliminate the
deleterious and pernicious practice of issuing checks with insufficient or no credit or
funds therefor. Such practice is deemed a public nuisance, a crime against public order
to be abated. The mere act of issuing a worthless check, either as a deposit, as a
guarantee, or even as an evidence of a pre-existing debt or as a mode of payment is
covered by B.P. 22. It is a crime classified as malum prohibitum. 26 The law is broad
enough to include, within its coverage, the making and issuing of a check by one who
has no account with a bank, or where such account was already closed when the check
was presented for payment. As the Court in Lozano explained:
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private
interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the
interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to
the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of
putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can
very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system
and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. As aptly stated
—
The "check flasher" does a great deal more than contract a debt; he shakes
the pillars of business; and to my mind, it is a mistaken charity of judgment to
place him in the same category with the honest man who is unable to pay his
debts, and for whom the constitutional inhibition against "imprisonment for debt,
except in cases of fraud" was intended as a shield and not a sword. 27
Considering that the law imposes a penal sanction on one who draws and issues
a worthless check against insufficient funds or a closed account in the drawee
bank, there is, likewise, every reason to penalize a person who indulges in the making
and issuing of a check on an account belonging to another with the latter's consent,
which account has been closed or has no funds or credit with the drawee bank.
The evidence on record shows that the petitioner drew and signed the subject
check with the knowledge and consent of her sister, Gina Parro, the owner of the check
and UCPB Account No. 320-000534-5. Parro knew that the check was to be delivered
by the petitioner to the private complainant in payment of her P184,000.00 loan. Verily,
Parro had full knowledge of the petitioner's acts, thus approved and sanctioned them;
as such, the check must be given legal effect. 28 The records show that the private
complainant was completely impervious of the fact that another person owned the
account against which the petitioner drew the check, and that such account had already
been closed when the check was delivered to her. The private complainant believed all
along that the check was drawn against the petitioner's account with the UCPB. It was
only when the petitioner testified in the trial court that the private complainant became
aware that such checking account belonged to the petitioner's sister.
Equally barren of factual and legal basis is the petitioner's defense that she issued
the said check merely to accommodate the private complainant, the latter knew that it
was Gina Parro who owned the check, and such check was drawn against a closed
account. Aside from her uncorroborated testimony, the petitioner failed to adduce any
evidence to prove such claim. Neither is there any indication on the face of the check
that the petitioner drew the check merely as an accommodation party. What the records
show is that the petitioner drew and delivered the check in payment of a loan in favor
of the private complainant. TcADCI
It bears stressing that, whether a person is an accommodation party is a question

of intent. When the intent of the parties does not appear on the face of the check, it must
be ascertained in the light of the surrounding facts and circumstances. Invariably, the
tests applied are the purpose test and the proceeds test. 29 Under both tests, the
petitioner is not an accommodation party. And even assuming she was such party, this
circumstance is not a defense to a charge for violation of B.P. 22. What the law punishes
is the issuance itself of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued
or of the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a
worthless check, whether merely as an accommodation, is covered by B.P. 22. Hence,
the agreement surrounding the issuance of a check is irrelevant to the prosecution and
conviction of the petitioner. 30 Moreover, as aptly elucidated by the OSG —
. . . Petitioner's claim that it was issued to accommodate private
complainant's request to use it as "show money" to a third person, and that private
complainant agreed not to deposit it, was emphatically denied by the latter, thus:
Atty. Delena:
Madam Witness, at the hearing of this case on June 8, 2000 where the accused
testified in her defense, she claimed that sometime in November 1996
you requested her to issue a check to show to an insurance agent that
you have a check on a certain date, what can you say to that?
Answer:
No, I did not request her to issue a check to show to an insurance agent.
xxx xxx xxx
Question:
Now, according to her, you insisted to issue you (sic) a check for more than
three (3) times and/or that she lend you a check because of her account
to you, what can you say to that?
Answer:
I did not insist her (sic) to issue me a check, she issued me a check because of
her loan to me.
xxx xxx xxx
Court:
Will you read the question?
Stenographer:
Can you recall the amount of loan from you?
Answer:
P184,000.00.
(TSN, p. 4, April 29, 2002-Labrador)
xxx xxx xxx
Question:
And that she issued the check and affixed her signature on the check on your
assurance that the check will not be encashed or deposited with the bank,
what can you say to that also?
Answer:
We have not agreed on that, Sir.
(TSN, p. 5, April 29, 2002-Labrador)
It is settled that the evaluation of testimonies of the witnesses by the trial
court is binding upon the appellate court in the absence of a clear showing that it
was reached arbitrarily or that the trial court plainly overlooked certain facts of
substance or value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. For
indeed, the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a
matter best undertaken by the trial court, considering its opportunity to observe
the witnesses and their demeanor, conduct and attitude, especially under cross-
examination (People versus Panique, 316 SCRA 757 [1999]; People versus
Napiot, 311 SCRA 772 [1999]. 31
The Court is convinced that the defense interposed by the petitioner was merely
an afterthought. The evidence on record shows that when she was notified by the private
complainant that the check was dishonored for having been drawn against a closed
account, the petitioner promised to pay the check after the release of a loan she and her
husband were applying for:
QUESTION:
When you were informed by the PNB Bank, Goa Branch, Camarines Sur that
this check, Exhibit "A" has no more fund because the account of the
drawer was already closed, what did you do?
ANSWER:
I went to her store and I informed her that the check was already closed
account.
QUESTION:
What did she tell you, if any?
ANSWER:
She promised me that she will pay because they applied [a] loan in AFPSLAI
Manila with her husband.
QUESTION:
Now, did she tell you that she will be making good for a certain specific time?
ANSWER:
Yes, Sir.
QUESTION:
When did she promised to pay?
ANSWER:
Her husband promised that he [would] personally go to Manila so that the
processing of the loan will be expedited and when he comes back to
Goa, he will pay me the amount.
QUESTION:
When was that if you can still remember when he promised to pay?
ANSWER:
After the account was discovered closed.
QUESTION:
Did her husband, Mrs. Witness, make good his promise to pay you when he
came back from Manila?
ANSWER:
No, Sir.
QUESTION:
Up to the present?
ANSWER:
No, Sir. 32
Contrary to the petitioner's claim, she never informed the private complainant
that her sister was the owner of the account on which the check was drawn. It was only
when she testified in her defense that the petitioner claimed, for the first time, that she
made and issued her sister's check against the latter's closed account with the UCPB
merely to accommodate the private complainant, who she also claimed was aware of
such fact.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The decision
of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Chico-Nazario, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1.Criminal Case No. T-2484, Penned by Judge Eufronio K. Maristela; Rollo, pp. 20-26.
2.Penned by Judge Ramon V. Efondo; Records, pp. 473-477.
3.TSN, 29 September 1998, pp. 5-9; Records, pp. 65-69.
4.Exhibit "A;" Id. at 209.
5.Ibid.
6.Exhibit "B," Id. at 210.
7.Exhibit "C," Id. at 211.
8.Exhibit "C-2."
9.TSN, 29 September 1998, p. 11; Records, p. 71.
10.Exhibit "F," Records, p. 214.
11.Records, p. 1.
12.TSN, 8 June 2000, pp. 6-10.
13.Ibid.
14Records, p. 477.
15.Rollo, p. 7.
16.G.R. No. L-17106, 19 October 1966, 18 SCRA 356.
17.Rollo, pp. 66-73.
18.Section 2, Rule 42, Rules of Court.
19.G.R. No. 102508, 30 January 2002, 375 SCRA 145.
20.Rollo, p. 12.
21.Rollo, p. 14.
22.Rollo, pp. 66-69.
23.Yu Oh v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125297, 6 June 2002, 403 SCRA 300.
24.G.R. No. L-63419, 18 December 1986, 146 SCRA 323.
25.People v. Nitafan, G.R. No. 75954, 22 October 1992, 215 SCRA 79.
26.Ibid.
27.Lozano v. Martinez, supra.
28.Strader v. Haley, 12 N.W. 2d 608 (1944); Farmer's Co-op. Exchange Co. of Good Thunder
v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 182 N.W. 1008 (1921).
29.Branch Banking and Trust Co. v. Thompson, 418 S.E. 2d 694 (1992).
30.People v. Nitafan, supra.
31.Rollo, pp. 71-73.
32.TSN, 29 September 1998, pp. 10-11; Records, pp. 70-71.
||| (Ruiz v. People, G.R. No. 160893, [November 18, 2005], 512 PHIL 127-144)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 187174. August 28, 2013.]
FELY Y. YALONG, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

and LUCILA C. YLAGAN, respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J : p
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the Resolutions

dated August 1, 2008 2 and March 10, 2009 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 104075 which dismissed petitioner Fely Y. Yalong's (Yalong)
Petition for Review 4 dated June 26, 2008 (subject petition for review), finding
the same to be the improper mode of appeal.
The Facts
Stemming from a complaint filed by respondent Lucila C. Ylagan
(Ylagan), an Information was filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of
Batangas City, Branch 1 (MTCC), docketed as Criminal Case No. 45414,
charging Yalong for the crime of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 5 (BP
22) as follows:
That on or about April 2, 2002 at Batangas City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, well-knowing that she does not have funds in or credit with
the Export and Industry Bank, Juan Luna Branch, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously draw, make and issue to Major
Lucila Ylagan, Export and Industry Bank Check No. 0002578833 dated
May 3, 2002 in the amount of FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P450,000.00), Philippine Currency, to apply on account or for
value, but when said check was presented for full payment with the
drawee bank, the same was dishonored by the drawee bank on the
ground of "Account Closed," which in effect is even more than a
dishonor for insufficiency of funds, despite notice of dishonor and
demands made upon her to make good her check by making proper
arrangement with the drawee bank or pay her obligation in full directly
to Major Lucila Ylagan, accused failed and refused to do so, which acts
constitute a clear violation of the aforecited law, to the damage and
prejudice of transaction in commercial documents in general and of
Major Lucila Ylagan in particular in the aforementioned amount. LLpr
CONTRARY TO LAW. 6
Upon arraignment, Yalong pleaded not guilty to the aforesaid charge.

Hence, the case was set for pre-trial and thereafter, trial ensued. 7
During trial, Ylagan testified that sometime on April 2, 2002, Yalong
borrowed from her the amount of P450,000.00 with a verbal agreement that
the same would be paid back to her in cash and, as payment thereof, issued
to her, inter alia, a postdated check dated May 3, 2002 in the similar amount
of P450,000.00 (subject check). However, when Ylagan presented the subject
check for payment on August 27, 2002, it was dishonored and returned to her
for the reason "Account Closed." As verbal and written demands made on
Yalong to pay her loan proved futile, Ylagan was constrained to file the instant
criminal case. 8
In her defense, Yalong averred that she already paid her loan but did not
require Ylagan to issue a receipt or acknowledge the same. Likewise, she
claimed that the subject check belonged to her husband and that while she
knew that the said check was not covered by sufficient funds, it was already
signed by her husband when she handed it to Ylagan. 9
The MTCC Ruling and Subsequent Proceedings
On August 24, 2006, the MTCC rendered its Judgment 10 (MTCC
Decision), finding Yalong guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
violation of BP 22 and accordingly sentenced her to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for a term of one year and ordered her to pay Ylagan the
amount of P450,000.00, with legal interest of 12% per annum from October
10, 2002, including P25,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs of suit. 11
The MTCC found all the elements of the crime charged to have been duly
established. It did not give credence to Yalong's defense that she did not own
the checking account and that she was not the one who issued the subject
check. On this score, it cited the case of Ruiz v. People 12 wherein it was held
that "[BP 22] is broad enough to include, within its coverage, the making and
issuing of a check by one who has no account with a bank, or where such
account was already closed when the check was presented for
payment." 13 Further, it observed that Yalong failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that she has completely paid the loan and thus, such
defense must likewise fail. 14IaEHSD
Yalong filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and Recall the

Warrant of Arrest 15 dated October 15, 2006 which the MTCC treated as an
original motion for reconsideration. The said motion was, however, denied in
an Order 16 dated December 5, 2006.
Consequently, Yalong filed a Notice of Appeal 17 dated January 2, 2007
which was denied due course in an Order 18 dated January 19, 2007,
considering that the judgment against her was promulgated in absentia on
account of her unjustified absence.
Dissatisfied, Yalong filed a Petition for Relief from Order and Denial of
Appeal 19 which was dismissed in an Order 20dated July 25, 2007 on the ground
that Yalong had lost the remedies available to her under the law when
she: (a) failed to appear without justifiable reason at the scheduled
promulgation of the MTCC Decision; (b) did not surrender within 15 days from
the date of such promulgation; (c) did not file a motion for leave of court to
avail of the remedies under the law; and (d)remained at large. Yalong moved
for reconsideration 21 which was, however, denied in an Order 22 dated
October 25, 2007. Aggrieved, Yalong filed a Petition for Certiorari with Petition
for Bail (certiorari petition), docketed as Civil Case No. 8278, before the
Regional Trial Court of Batangas City, Branch 7 (RTC). 23
The RTC Ruling
In a Resolution 24 dated April 2, 2008 (RTC Resolution), the RTC denied
Yalong's certiorari petition, finding the promulgation of the MTCC Decision in
absentia to be valid as Yalong was duly notified of the scheduled date of
promulgation on October 6, 2006 and yet failed to appear
thereat. 25 Furthermore, the RTC observed that Yalong did not make any effort
to surrender within the time allowed by the rules and thus, lost the remedies
available to her under the law. 26
Yalong filed a motion for reconsideration on April 30, 2008 27 which was
eventually denied in an Order 28 dated May 27, 2008. As such, on June 26, 2008,
she filed the subject petition for review before the CA. 29 SaTAED
The CA Ruling
In a Resolution 30 dated August 1, 2008, the CA dismissed the subject
petition for review on the ground that the "Order of the [RTC] was issued in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction — where appeal [by filing a notice of
appeal with the RTC] — and not a petition for review is the proper remedy."
Yalong filed a motion for reconsideration dated November 20,
2008 31 which was, however, denied in a Resolution 32dated March 10, 2009.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not the CA properly
dismissed the subject petition for review on the ground of improper appeal.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
While the Rules of Court (Rules) do not specifically state that the
inappropriate filing of a petition for review instead of a required notice of
appeal is dismissible (unlike its converse, i.e., the filing of a notice of appeal
when what is required is the filing of a petition for review), 33 Section 2 (a), Rule
41 of the Rules nonetheless provides that appeals to the CA in cases decided
by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a
notice of appeal with the latter court. The said provision reads:
SEC. 2. Modes of appeal. —
(a) Ordinary appeal. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in
cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with
the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed
from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record
on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other
cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so
require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served
in like manner. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) ICAcaH
In the case at bar, records reveal that Yalong filed a petition
for certiorari with the RTC and that the latter court rendered a Resolution
dated April 2, 2008 dismissing the same. It is fundamental that a petition
for certiorari is an original action 34 and, as such, it cannot be gainsaid that the
RTC took cognizance of and resolved the aforesaid petition in the exercise of
its original jurisdiction. Hence, based on the above-cited rule, Yalong should
have filed a notice of appeal with the RTC instead of a petition for review with
the CA. As a consequence of Yalong's failure to file a notice of appeal with the
RTC within the proper reglementary period, the RTC Decision had attained
finality which thereby bars Yalong from further contesting the same.
In this relation, it must be pointed out that Yalong's contention that a
petition for review may be treated as a notice of appeal since the contents of
the former already include the required contents of the latter cannot be given
credence since these modes of appeal clearly remain distinct procedures
which cannot, absent any compelling reason therefor, be loosely interchanged
with one another. For one, a notice of appeal is filed with the regional trial
court that rendered the assailed decision, judgment or final order, while a
petition for review is filed with the CA. Also, a notice of appeal is required when
the RTC issues a decision, judgment or final order in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, while a petition for review is required when such issuance was in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Thus, owing to these differences,
Yalong's filing of the subject petition for review cannot be simply accorded the
same effect as the filing of a notice of appeal.
Verily, jurisprudence dictates that the perfection of an appeal within the
period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-
compliance with such requirements is considered fatal and has the effect of
rendering the judgment final and executory. To be sure, the rules on appeal
must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable to forestall or
avoid unreasonable delays in the administration of justice, to ensure an
orderly discharge of judicial business, and to put an end to controversies.
Though as a general rule, rules of procedures are liberally construed, the
provisions with respect to the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting
appeals are strictly applied and are only relaxed in very exceptional
circumstances on equitable considerations, which are not present in the
instant case. 35 As it stands, the subject petition for review was the wrong
remedy and perforce was properly dismissed by the CA.
Besides, even discounting the above-discussed considerations, Yalong's
appeal still remains dismissible on the ground that, inter alia, the MTCC had
properly acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 45414. It is well-settled
that violation of BP 22 cases is categorized as transitory or continuing crimes,
which means that the acts material and essential thereto occur in one
municipality or territory, while some occur in another. Accordingly, the court
wherein any of the crime's essential and material acts have been committed
maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court
taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Stated differently, a person
charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any
municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed. 36 Applying
these principles, a criminal case for violation of BP 22 may be filed in any of
the places where any of its elements occurred — in particular, the place where
the check is drawn, issued, delivered, or dishonored. 37 EaHDcS
In this case, while it is undisputed that the subject check was drawn,
issued, and delivered in Manila, records reveal that Ylagan presented the same
for deposit and encashment at the LBC Bank in Batangas City where she
learned of its dishonor. 38As such, the MTCC correctly took cognizance of
Criminal Case No. 45414 as it had the territorial jurisdiction to try and resolve
the same. In this light, the denial of the present petition remains warranted.
As the Court finds the above-stated reasons already sufficient to deny
the present petition, it is unnecessary to delve on the other ancillary issues in
this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Resolutions dated
August 1, 2008 and March 10, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No.
104075 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Peralta, * Del Castillo and Perez, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
*Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1525 dated August 22, 2013.
1.Rollo, pp. 14-45.
2.Id. at 48. Penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas, with Associate Justices
Bienvenido L. Reyes (now Supreme Court Justice) and Apolinario D. Bruselas,
Jr., concurring.
3.Id. at 17-50. Penned by Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., with Associate
Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes (now Supreme Court Justice) and Sixto C.
Marella, Jr., concurring.
4.Id. at 110-150.
5."AN ACT PENALIZING THE MAKING OR DRAWING AND ISSUANCE OF A CHECK
WITHOUT SUFFICIENT FUNDS OR CREDIT AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES."
6.Rollo, p. 69.
7.Id. at 70.
8.Id. at 70-71.
9.Id. at 71-72.
10.Id. at 69-76. Penned by Acting Judge Alberico B. Umali.

11.Id. at 75.
12.G.R. No. 160893, November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 476.
13.Id. at 489.
14.Rollo, pp. 74-75.
15.Id. at 77-87.
16.Id. at 88-90. Penned by Presiding Judge Dorcas P. Ferriols-Perez.
17.Id. at 91-92.
18.Id. at 93.
19.Id. at 21.
20.Id. at 99-100.
21.Id. at 21.
22.Id. at 101-103.
23.Id. at 21.
24.Id. at 104-107. Penned by Pairing Judge Ernesto L. Marajas.
25.Id. at 105.
26.Id. at 107.
27.Id. at 22.
28.Id. at 108-109.
29.Id. at 22.
30.Id. at 48.
31.Id. at. 51-68.

32.Id. at 49-50.
33.Under Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules, the filing of a notice of appeal instead of
a required petition for review is considered an erroneous appeal and is
dismissible outright, viz.:
SEC. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals. — An appeal under Rule
41 taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals raising only
questions of law shall be dismissed, issues purely of law not being reviewable
by said court. Similarly, an appeal by notice of appeal instead of by
petition for review from the appellate judgment of a Regional Trial
Court shall be dismissed. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
34.". . . [A] petition for certiorari is an original and independent action that was not
part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order
complained of. . . . ." (China Banking Corporation v. Cebu Printing and Packaging
Corporation, G.R. No. 172880, August 11, 2010, 628 SCRA 154, 167, citing Tagle
v. Equitable PCI Bank, G.R. No. 172299, April 22, 2008, 552 SCRA 424, 441.)
35.See Heirs of Gaudiano v. Benemerito, G.R. No. 174247, February 21, 2007, 516
SCRA 416, 421-422.
36.See Rigor v. People, G.R. No. 144887, November 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 450, 463-464.
37.Id. at 464.
38.Rollo, p. 89.
||| (Yalong v. People, G.R. No. 187174, [August 28, 2013], 716 PHIL 657-667)
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 198270. December 9, 2015.]
ARMILYN MORILLO,petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

and RICHARD NATIVIDAD,respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J : p
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 dated
January 18, 2011 and Resolution 2 dated August 9, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 32723 which reversed and set aside the
Decision 3 dated February 23, 2009 and Order 4 dated July 13, 2009, of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. 08-1876-77, which, in turn
affirmed the Joint Decision 5 dated September 3, 2008 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) in Criminal Case Nos. 337902-03.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Sometime in July 2003, respondent Richard Natividad, Milo Malong
and Bing Nanquil, introducing themselves as contractors doing business in
Pampanga City under the name and style of RB Custodio Construction,
purchased construction materials for their project inside the Subic Freeport
Zone from petitioner Armilyn Morillo, owner of Amasea General
Merchandize and Construction Supplies. The parties agreed that twenty
percent (20%) of the purchases shall be paid within seven (7) days after the
first delivery and the remaining eighty percent (80%) to be paid within
thirty-five (35) days after the last delivery, all of which shall be via post-dated
checks. 6
Pursuant to the agreement, petitioner delivered construction
materials amounting to a total of P500,054.00 at the construction site
where respondent and his partners were undertaking their project. After
the last delivery, respondent paid P20,000.00 in cash and issued two (2)
post-dated checks, drawn from Metrobank, Pampanga branch, in the
amounts of P393,000.00 and P87,054.00. Upon maturity, petitioner
attempted to deposit the checks in her savings account at Equitable
PCIBank, San Lorenzo, Makati City. They were, however, dishonored by the
drawee bank. Immediately thereafter, petitioner communicated the
dishonor to respondent and his partners and demanded for payment.
Again, respondent issued two (2) post-dated Metrobank checks and
assured petitioner that they will be honored upon maturity. Upon deposit
in her savings account at Equitable PCIBank, Makati Branch, the checks
were once again dishonored for the reason that the account from which
they were drawn was already a closed account. Consequently, petitioner
made several demands from respondent and his partners, but to no avail,
prompting her to file a complaint with the City Prosecution Office, Makati
City. 7 Thus, on August 12, 2004, two (2) Informations were filed against
respondent and Milo Malong, the accusatory portions of which read:
Criminal Case No. 337902
That on or about the 20th day of October 2003, or prior
thereto, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place
accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make
out, draw and issue to AMASEA GENERAL MERCHANDIZE AND
CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES herein represented by ARMILYN
MORILLO to apply on account or for value the check described
below:
Check No. : 2960203217

Drawn Against : Metrobank
In the amount : Php434,430.00
Postdated/Dated : October 20, 2003
Payable to : AMASEA GENERAL MERCHANDIZE AND
CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES
said accused well knowing that at the time of issue thereof, said
accused did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such check upon
its presentment which check when presented for payment within
ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "Account Closed" and
despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, the said accused failed to
pay said payee the face amount of said check or to make
arrangement for full payment thereof within five (5) banking days
after receiving notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 337903
That on or about the 20th day of October 2003, or prior
thereto, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place
accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make
out, draw and issue to AMASEA GENERAL MERCHANDIZE AND
CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES herein represented by ARMILYN
MORILLO to apply on account or for value the check described
below:
Check No. : 2960203218

Drawn Against : Metrobank
In the amount : Php13,032.00
Postdated/Dated : October 20, 2003
Payable to : AMASEA GENERAL MERCHANDIZE
AND CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES
said accused well knowing that at the time of issue thereof, said
accused did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such check upon
its presentment which check when presented for payment within
ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "Account Closed" and
despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, the said accused failed to
pay said payee the face amount of said check or to make
arrangement for full payment thereof within five (5) banking days
after receiving notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 8
On September 15, 2004, the Assistant City Prosecutor issued a
Resolution recommending that respondent and his partners be charged in
court with the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (d) of
the Revised Penal Code as well as for Violation of Batas Pambansa No.
22 (BP 22),which was later docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 337902-03.
On September 3, 2008, the MeTC rendered its Joint Decision, finding
that the prosecution had proven all the elements of violation of BP 22 as
against respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in Criminal Cases Nos.
337902-03 finding the accused, RICHARD NATIVIDAD, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 and is sentenced to pay a fine equivalent to Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php200,000.00), for Check No.
2960203217 and Thirteen Thousand Thirty-Two Pesos for Check No.
2960203218 or a total penalty of Two Hundred Thirteen Thousand
Thirty Two Pesos (Php213,032.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency. However, accused MILO MALONG, is ACQUITTED
on the ground of reasonable doubt. Both accused Malong and
Natividad are ordered to jointly pay the private complainant the total
sum of Four Hundred Forty-Seven Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-
Two Pesos (Php447,462.00) which are the face value of the two (2)
checks issued, subject of these cases, with interest at twelve percent
(12%) per annum and three percent (3%) penalty per month as
stipulated in the invoices, reckoned from the date of receipt of the
demand on February 28, 2004, until the amount is fully paid, plus the
costs of suit.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of evidence.
SO ORDERED. 9
Respondent appealed the decision of the MeTC to the RTC arguing
that the MeTC of Makati City had no jurisdiction over the case. He asserted
that since the subject checks were issued, drawn, and delivered to
petitioner in Subic, the venue of the action was improperly laid for none of
the elements of the offense actually transpired in Makati City. Respondent
also pointed out that during the retaking of petitioner's testimony on March
14, 2008, the records of the case did not show that the public prosecutor
manifested his presence in court and that he delegated the prosecution of
the case to the private prosecutor. Thus, since there was no appearance for
the public prosecutor, nor was there a proper delegation of authority, the
proceedings should be declared null and void. 10
On February 23, 2009, the RTC affirmed the MeTC ruling in the
following wise:
Since accused Natividad failed to raise before the court [a quo]
the issue of authority of the private prosecutor to present witness
Morillo in the absence of the public prosecutor during the March 14,
2008 proceeding, and only did so after obtaining an adverse
judgment, it would be an injustice if all the proceedings had in the
case would be set aside.
The second issue raised on appeal also holds no ground. A
violation of BP 22 is a continuing or transitory offense, which is oft-
repeated in our jurisprudence. Under this doctrine, jurisdiction may
be had in several places where one of the acts material to the crime
occurred.
Accused Natividad postulates that since the checks were
presented and dishonored in Makati City, which is not the place
where it was issued and delivered, the court [a quo] lacks
jurisdiction. This argument is, at best, specious. The fact
remains that the bank where it was presented for payment is in
Makati City. These checks passed through this bank for
clearance, confirmation, and or validation processes. Moreover,
the eventual dishonor indeed took place or was completed at
the end of the collecting bank in Makati City, where the private
complainant maintains her account over which the court [a quo]
has jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, finding no merit on accused-appellant
Natividad's appeal, the same is hereby dismissed. Accordingly, the
appealed decision of the court [a quo] is hereby AFFIRMED in full.
SO ORDERED. 11
On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals, in its January 18, 2011
Decision, reversed the lower courts' rulings and dismissed the case without
prejudice to its refiling in the proper venue, the pertinent portions of said
Decision state:
In this case, records will reveal that the first element of the
offense happened in Pampanga. It was indisputably established that
the subject checks were issued to private complainant at petitioner's
office in Pampanga. Said checks were drawn from petitioner's
account in Metrobank, Pampanga branch.
The second element of the offense or the knowledge of
dishonor of the checks by the maker also transpired in Pampanga.
After private complainant was informed of the dishonor of the
checks, she immediately proceeded to petitioner's office in
Pampanga, personally informed him and his companions of the
dishonor of the checks and tendered a demand letter for the
payment of the construction materials.
Finally, the third element or dishonor of the checks by the
drawee bank also happened in Pampanga. Upon maturity of the
subject checks, private complainant deposited the same in her
savings account at Equitable PCIBank, Makati Branch.
Subsequently, she was informed by the latter bank that the
subject checks were dishonored by the drawee bank,
Metrobank, Pampanga branch.
Clearly, all the essential elements of the offense
happened in Pampanga. Consequently, the case can only be
filed in said place. Unfortunately, private complainant filed the
case in Makati City, under the erroneous assumption that since
she deposited the subject checks in Equitable PCIBank, Makati
City, and was informed of the dishonor of the checks by the
same bank, the case may be filed in Makati City. However, as
correctly argued by the OSG, the act of depositing the check is
not an essential element of BP 22. Likewise, the fact that private
complainant was informed of the dishonor of the checks at her
bank in Makati City did not vest the MeTC, Makati City with
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. To reiterate, a
transitory crime can only be filed in any of the places where its
constitutive elements actually transpired. And, knowledge of
the payee of the dishonor of the checks is not an element of BP
22. The law speaks only of the subsequent dishonor of the
checks by the drawee bank and the knowledge of the fact of
dishonor by the maker. Consequently, none of the elements of
the offense can be considered to have transpired in Makati City.
Thus, the venue of the instant case was improperly laid.12
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant action invoking the following
argument:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI CITY DID NOT HAVE
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE DESPITE A CLEAR SHOWING THAT THE
OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF SAID
COURT. 13
Petitioner maintains that the MeTC of Makati City, the place where
the dishonored checks were deposited, had jurisdiction over the instant
case. In support of her contention, petitioner cites the ruling in Nieva, Jr. v.
Court of Appeals,14wherein it was held that since the check drawn in
violation of BP 22 was deposited and presented for encashment with the
Angeles City Branch of the Bank of the Philippine Islands, the RTC of
Pampanga clearly had jurisdiction over the crime of which accused therein
was charged. 15 Thus, petitioner asserts that the appellate court erred in
ruling that the Makati MeTC did not have jurisdiction to try the instant case.
That none of the essential elements of the crime of violation of BP
22occurred in the City of Makati is belied by the Nieva doctrine recognizing
the jurisdiction of the court of the place where the check was deposited
and/or presented for encashment.
Petitioner went on to state that all the elements of violation of BP
22 were duly proven beyond reasonable doubt. First the prosecution
sufficiently established that the respondent issued the subject checks as
shown by the documentary evidence submitted. They were issued for
value, as payment for the construction supplies and materials which
petitioner delivered to the accused.
As to the second and third elements, petitioner posits that it was
clearly shown that respondent had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds
in or credit with the drawee bank, which subsequently dishonored the
subject checks. Section 2 of BP 22 provides that "the dishonor of a check
when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check shall
be prima facie evidence of knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit
unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due
thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such
check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has
not been paid by the drawee." In this case, petitioner states that the
prosecution was able to sufficiently show that the subject checks were
presented within the time period required by law. In fact, written demand
relaying the fact that the drawee bank dishonored the subject checks was
even personally delivered by petitioner to respondent as evidenced by the
demand letter signed by respondent. Thus, respondent cannot deny that
he had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds in his account with the
drawee bank and that the subject checks were subsequently dishonored
for the reason that the account from which they were drawn was already a
closed account.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the
State, is in line with the appellate court's and respondent's stance that the
MeTC had no jurisdiction over the instant case. According to the OSG, the
act of depositing the check is not an essential element of the offense under
the Bouncing Checks Law. Citing the ruling in Rigor v. People,16 the OSG
posited that the place of deposit and the place of dishonor are distinct from
each other and that the place where the check was issued, delivered, and
dishonored is the proper venue, not the place where the check was
deposited, viz.:
The evidence clearly shows that the undated check was issued
and delivered at the Rural Bank of San Juan, Metro Manila. ...The
check was deposited with PS Bank, San Juan Branch, Metro Manila.
...The information at bar effectively charges San Juan as the place of
drawing and issuing. The jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is
determined by the allegations of the complaint or information.
Although the check was dishonored by the drawee, Associated Bank,
in its Tarlac Branch, appellant has drawn, issued and delivered it at
RBSJ, San Juan. The place of issue and delivery was San Juan and
knowledge, as an essential part of the offense, was also overtly
manifested in San Juan. There is no question that crimes committed
in San Juan are triable by the RTC stationed in Pasig. 17
On the basis of the pronouncement in Rigor, the OSG thus claimed
that the MeTC of Makati City did not have jurisdiction over the instant case
for none of the essential elements of violation of BP 22 occurred therein.
The contention is untenable.
It is well settled that violations of BP 22 cases are categorized as
transitory or continuing crimes, meaning that some acts material and
essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one
municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In such cases, the
court wherein any of the crime's essential and material acts have been
committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that
the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Thus, a
person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in
any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed. 18
The OSG, relying on our ruling in Rigor v. People,concluded that "the
Supreme Court regarded the place of deposit and the place of dishonor as
distinct from one another and considered the place where the check was
issued, delivered and dishonored, and not where the check was deposited,
as the proper venue for the filing of a B.P. Blg. 22 case." The Court, however,
cannot sustain such conclusion.
In said case, the accused therein obtained a loan from the Rural Bank
of San Juan, Metro Manila, and in payment thereof, he issued a check drawn
against Associated Bank of Tarlac. Thereafter, Rural Bank deposited the
check at PS Bank, San Juan, but the same was returned for the reason that
it had been dishonored by Associated Bank of Tarlac. When all other efforts
to demand the repayment of the loan proved futile, Rural Bank filed an
action against the accused for violation of BP 22 at the RTC of Pasig City,
wherein crimes committed in San Juan are triable. The accused, however,
contends that the RTC of Pasig had no jurisdiction thereon since no proof
had been offered to show that his check was issued, delivered, dishonored
or that knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in the Municipality of
San Juan. The Court, however, disagreed and held that while the check was
dishonored by the drawee, Associated Bank, in its Tarlac Branch, evidence
clearly showed that the accused had drawn, issued and delivered it at Rural
Bank, San Juan, viz.:
Lastly, petitioner contends that the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig had no jurisdiction over this case since no proof has been
offered that his check was issued, delivered, dishonored or that
knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in the Municipality of
San Juan, Metro Manila.
The contention is untenable.
xxx xxx xxx.
The evidence clearly shows that the undated check was issued
and delivered at the Rural Bank of San Juan, Metro Manila on
November 16, 1989, and subsequently the check was dated
February 16, 1990 thereat. On May 25, 1990, the check was
deposited with PS Bank, San Juan Branch, Metro Manila. Thus, the
Court of Appeals correctly ruled:
Violations of B.P. 22 are categorized as transitory
or continuing crimes. A suit on the check can be filed in
any of the places where any of the elements of the
offense occurred, that is, where the check is drawn,
issued, delivered or dishonored. ...
The information at bar effectively charges
San Juan as the place of drawing and issuing. The
jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is
determined by the allegations of the complaint or
information. Although, the check was dishonored
by the drawee, Associated Bank, in its Tarlac
Branch, appellant has drawn, issued and delivered
it at RBSJ, San Juan. The place of issue and delivery
was San Juan and knowledge, as an essential part of
the offense, was also overtly manifested in San
Juan. There is no question that crimes committed in
November, 1989 in San Juan are triable by the RTC
stationed in Pasig. In short both allegation and
proof in this case sufficiently vest jurisdiction upon
the RTC in Pasig City.19
The bone of contention in Rigor, therefore, was whether the
prosecution had offered sufficient proof that the check drawn in violation
of BP 22 was issued, delivered, dishonored or that knowledge of
insufficiency of funds occurred in the Municipality of San Juan, thereby
vesting jurisdiction upon the RTC of Pasig City. Nowhere in the cited case,
however, was it held, either expressly or impliedly, that the place where the
check was deposited is not the proper venue for actions involving violations
of BP 22. It is true that the Court, in Rigor, acknowledged the fact that the
check was issued and delivered at the Rural Bank of San Juan while the
same was deposited with the PS Bank of San Juan. But such differentiation
cannot be taken as basis sufficient enough to conclude that the court of the
place of deposit cannot exercise jurisdiction over violations of BP 22. In the
absence, therefore, of any ground, jurisprudential or otherwise, to sustain
the OSG's arguments, the Court cannot take cognizance of a doctrine that
is simply inapplicable to the issue at hand.
In contrast, the ruling in Nieva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals 20 cited by
petitioner is more squarely on point with the instant case. In Nieva, the
accused delivered to Ramon Joven a post-dated check drawn against the
Commercial Bank of Manila as payment for Joven's dump truck. Said check
was deposited in the Angeles City Branch of the Bank of Philippine Islands.
Joven was advised, however, that the Commercial Bank of Manila returned
the check for the reason that the account against which the check was
drawn is a "closed account." Consequently, the accused was charged with
violation of BP 22 before the RTC of Pampanga. On the contention of the
accused that said court had no jurisdiction to try the case, the Court
categorically ruled:
As to petitioner's contention that the Regional Trial Court
of Pampanga has no jurisdiction to try the cases charged herein
as none of the essential elements thereof took place in
Pampanga, suffice it to say that such contention has no basis.
The evidence discloses that the check was deposited and/or
presented for encashment with the Angeles City Branch of the
Bank of the Philippine Islands. This fact clearly confers
jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga over the
crimes of which petitioner is charged. It must be noted that
violations of B.P. Blg. 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing
crimes and so is the crime of estafa. The rule is that a person
charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried in any
municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed. 21
In fact, in the more recent Yalong v. People,22 wherein the modes of
appeal and rules of procedure were the issues at hand, the Court similarly
inferred:
Besides, even discounting the above-discussed
considerations, Yalong's appeal still remains dismissible on the
ground that, inter alia, the MTCC had properly acquired jurisdiction
over Criminal Case No. 45414. It is well-settled that violation of BP
22 cases is categorized as transitory or continuing crimes, which
means that the acts material and essential thereto occur in one
municipality or territory, while some occur in another. Accordingly,
the court wherein any of the crime's essential and material acts have
been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being
understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same
excludes the other. Stated differently, a person charged with a
continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any
municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.
Applying these principles, a criminal case for violation of BP 22 may
be filed in any of the places where any of its elements occurred — in
particular, the place where the check is drawn, issued, delivered, or
dishonored.
In this case, while it is undisputed that the subject check
was drawn, issued, and delivered in Manila, records reveal that
Ylagan presented the same for deposit and encashment at the
LBC Bank in Batangas City where she learned of its dishonor. As
such, the MTCC [of Batangas City] correctly took cognizance of
Criminal Case No. 45414 as it had the territorial jurisdiction to
try and resolve the same. In this light, the denial of the present
petition remains warranted.23
Guided by the foregoing pronouncements, there is no denying,
therefore, that the court of the place where the check was deposited or
presented for encashment can be vested with jurisdiction to try cases
involving violations of BP 22. Thus, the fact that the check subject of the
instant case was drawn, issued, and delivered in Pampanga does not strip
off the Makati MeTC of its jurisdiction over the instant case for it is
undisputed that the subject check was deposited and presented for
encashment at the Makati Branch of Equitable PCIBank. The MeTC of
Makati, therefore, correctly took cognizance of the instant case and
rendered its decision in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction.
It may be argued, however, that the instant petition ought to be
dismissed outright due to certain procedural infirmities. Section 35 (1),
Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code provides that
the OSG shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. Specifically, it shall
represent the Government in all criminal proceedings before the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals. 24 Thus, as a general rule, if a criminal case
is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, the appeal on the
criminal aspect of the case must be instituted by the Solicitor General on
behalf of the State. 25
There have been instances, however, where the Court permitted an
offended party to file an appeal without the intervention of the OSG, such
as when the offended party questions the civil aspect of a decision of a
lower court, 26 when there is denial of due process of law to the prosecution
and the State or its agents refuse to act on the case to the prejudice of the
State and the private offended party, 27 when there is grave error
committed by the judge, or when the interest of substantial justice so
requires. 28
Corollary, a judgment of acquittal may be assailed through a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Courtshowing that the lower
court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of
judgment, but also exercised grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thereby rendering the
assailed judgment null and void. If there is grave abuse of discretion,
granting the aggrieved party's prayer is not tantamount to putting the
accused in double jeopardy, 29 in violation of the general rule that the
prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment
rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal case. This is because a
judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory, and the
prosecution is barred from appealing lest the constitutional prohibition
against double jeopardy be violated. 30
Thus, it may be argued that since the instant petition is one for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, not under Rule 65, and
was not filed by the OSG representing the interest of the Republic, the same
should be summarily dismissed. The unique and special circumstances
attendant in the instant petition, however, justify an adjudication by the
Court on the merits and not solely on technical grounds.
First of all, the Court stresses that the appellate court's dismissal of
the case is not an acquittal of respondent. Basic is the rule that a dismissal
of a case is different from an acquittal of the accused therein. Except in a
dismissal based on a Demurrer to Evidence filed by the accused, or for
violation of the right of the accused to a speedy trial, the dismissal of a
criminal case against the accused will not result in his acquittal. 31 In the oft-
cited People v. Salico,32 the Court explained:
This argument or reasoning is predicated on a confusion of
the legal concepts of dismissal and acquittal. Acquittal is always
based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because
the evidence does not show that defendant's guilt is beyond a
reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not decide the case on the
merits or that the defendant is not guilty. Dismissal terminates
the proceeding, either because the court is not a court of
competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the
offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court, or the complaint or information is not valid or sufficient
in form and substance, etc. The only case in which the word
dismissal is commonly but not correctly used, instead of the proper
term acquittal, is when, after the prosecution has presented all its
evidence, the defendant moves for the dismissal and the court
dismisses the case on the ground that the evidence fails to show
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty; for in such
case the dismissal is in reality an acquittal because the case is
decided on the merits. If the prosecution fails to prove that the
offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court and the case is dismissed, the dismissal is not an acquittal,
inasmuch as if it were so the defendant could not be again
prosecuted before the court of competent jurisdiction; and it is
elemental that in such case, the defendant may again be
prosecuted for the same offense before a court of competent
jurisdiction.33
Thus, when the appellate court herein dismissed the instant case on
the ground that the MeTC lacked jurisdiction over the offense charged, it
did not decide the same on the merits, let alone resolve the issue of
respondent's guilt or innocence based on the evidence proffered by the
prosecution. 34 The appellate court merely dismissed the case on the
erroneous reasoning that none of the elements of BP 22 was committed
within the lower court's jurisdiction, and not because of any finding that the
evidence failed to show respondent's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Clearly, therefore, such dismissal did not operate as an acquittal, which, as
previously discussed, may be repudiated only by a petition
for certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing a grave abuse or
discretion.
Thus, petitioner's resort to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court cannot be
struck down as improper. In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45, the parties raise only questions of law because the Court, in its exercise
of its power of review, is not a trier of facts. There is a question of law when
the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts
and which does not call for an existence of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the parties-litigants. 35 In De Vera v. Spouses
Santiago,36 the Court categorically ruled that the issue of whether the
appellate court erred in annuling the RTC Decision for lack of jurisdiction is
a question of law, to wit:
Undeniably, the issue whether the CA erred in annulling
the RTC Decision for lack of jurisdiction is a question of law. The
resolution of such issue rests solely on what the law [B.P. Blg.
129, as amended] provides on the given set of circumstances as
alleged in petitioners' complaint for reconveyance of ownership
and possession with damages.37
In the instant case, the lone issue invoked by petitioner is precisely
"whether the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Makati City did not have jurisdiction over the case despite
clear showing that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of said
court." Evidently, therefore, the instant petition was filed within the bounds
of our procedural rules for the issue herein rests solely on what the law
provides on the given set of circumstances insofar as the commission of
the crime of BP 22 is concerned. In criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the
court is determined by the averments of the complaint or Information, in
relation to the law prevailing at the time of the filing of the complaint or
Information, and the penalty provided by law for the crime charged at the
time of its commission. 38 Thus, when a case involves a proper
interpretation of the rules and jurisprudence with respect to the
jurisdiction of courts to entertain complaints filed therewith, it deals with a
question of law that can be properly brought to this Court under Rule 45. 39
More importantly, moreover, since the dismissal of the instant case
cannot be considered as an acquittal of respondent herein, he cannot
likewise claim that his constitutional right to protection against double
jeopardy will be violated. In Paulin v. Hon. Gimenez,40 the Court held:
Jurisprudence on double jeopardy as well as the exceptions
thereto which finds application to the case at bar has been laid down
by this Court as follows:
...However, an appeal by the prosecution
from the order of dismissal (of the criminal case) by
the trial court shall not constitute double jeopardy
if (1) the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the
express consent of the defendant; (2) the dismissal
is not an acquittal or based upon consideration of
the evidence or of the merits of the case; and (3) the
question to be passed upon by the appellate court
is purely legal so that should the dismissal be found
incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to
the court of origin for further proceedings, to
determine the guilt or innocence of the
defendant.41
A cursory review of the records would readily reveal the presence of
the foregoing requisites. First,as early as the stage of respondent's appeal
of the MeTC's decision to the RTC, respondent had already been moving for
the dismissal of the case alleging the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the CA's dismissal on said ground can rightly be considered to
have been with respondent's express consent. Second,as earlier
mentioned, the dismissal herein is not an acquittal or based upon a
consideration of the merits. Third,the question raised in this case is based
purely on a question of law. In view therefore of the presence of all three
requisites, the Court finds that petitioner's appeal of the appellate court's
dismissal cannot be barred by double jeopardy.
As to the issue of petitioner's legal standing to file the instant petition
in the absence of the OSG's participation, the circumstances herein warrant
the Court's consideration. In Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz,42 the Court gave
due regard to the ends of substantial justice by giving due course to a
petition filed before it by the private offended party, viz.:
Citing the "ends of substantial justice," People v. Calo,however,
provided an exception to the above doctrines in this manner:
While the rule is, as held by the Court of Appeals,
only the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions
on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or
represent the People or the State in criminal
proceedings pending in this Court and the Court of
Appeals (Republic vs. Partisala,118 SCRA 320 [1982]),the
ends of substantial justice would be better served,
and the issues in this action could be determined in
a more just, speedy and inexpensive manner, by
entertaining the petition at bar. As an offended
party in a criminal case, private petitioner has
sufficient personality and a valid grievance against
Judge Adao's order granting bail to the alleged
murderers of his (private petitioner's) father.
xxx xxx xxx
The ends of substantial justice indeed require the
affirmation of the appellate court's ruling on this point. Clearly,
the assailed Order of Judge Santiago was issued in grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.A void order is no
order at all. It cannot confer any right or be the source of any relief.
This Court is not merely a court of law; it is likewise a court of justice.
To rule otherwise would leave the private respondent
without any recourse to rectify the public injustice brought
about by the trial court's Order, leaving her with only the
standing to file administrative charges for ignorance of the law
against the judge and the prosecutor. A party cannot be left
without recourse to address a substantive issue in law.43
In a similar manner, the Court finds that in the interest of substantial
justice, it must give due course to the instant petition and
consequently rule on the merits of the same. The circumstances
surrounding this case left petitioner with no other suitable recourse but to
appeal the case herself. Not only was there an absence of support from the
OSG, said government office also took a position in contrast to the rights
and interests of petitioner. Moreover, as discussed above, the arguments
which ran counter to petitioner's interest as well as the grounds used to
support them were simply inapplicable to the issue at hand. In fact, these
erroneous contentions were adopted by the appellate court in their
entirety, dismissing the instant case in a manner not in accord with law and
applicable jurisprudence. For the Court, now, to apply procedural rules in
their strict and literal sense by similarly dismissing, as the CA had,
petitioner's action poses serious consequences tantamount to a
miscarriage of justice. To rule that the accused can postpone criminal
prosecution and delay the administration of justice at petitioner's expense
on the erroneous ground of lack of jurisdiction would create a hazardous
precedent and open loopholes in our criminal justice system. 44
Indeed, the unique and exceptional circumstances in the instant case
demand that the Court forego a rigid application of the technicalities under
the law so as to prevent petitioner from suffering a grave injustice. As
disclosed by the records, petitioner had already fulfilled her end of the
agreement in giving respondent, as early as in the year 2003, construction
materials amounting to half a million pesos and yet up until now, she has
not been paid therefor. In fact, after having sufficiently proven to the
satisfaction of both the MeTC and the RTC her right allegedly violated by
respondent, the CA simply dismissed, albeit without prejudice to the re-
filing of the case with the appropriate court, her action for the incorrect
ground of wrong venue. On the mistaken reasoning that the MeTC of
Makati City did not have jurisdiction over the instant case, the CA, without
providing any legal or jurisprudential basis, would have petitioner start
from the very beginning and re-file her complaint before the same court
which already had jurisdiction in the first place.
Thus, when there exists meritorious grounds to overlook strict
procedural matters, the Court cannot turn a blind eye thereto lest the
administration of justice be derailed by an overly stringent application of
the rules. 45 Rules of procedure are meant to be tools to facilitate a fair and
orderly conduct of proceedings. Strict adherence thereto must not get in
the way of achieving substantial justice. As long as their purpose is
sufficiently met and no violation of due process and fair play takes place,
the rules should be liberally construed. 46 Dismissal of appeals purely on
technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the court is to
encourage hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of
procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of
procedure are used only to help secure, not override substantial justice. It
is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a
technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to
attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and
cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy
disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage
of justice. 47
WHEREFORE,premises considered, the instant petition
is GRANTED.The Decision dated January 18, 2011 and Resolution dated
August 9, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32723
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.The Decision dated February 23, 2009 and
Order dated July 13, 2009, of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case Nos.
08-1876-77, which affirmed the Joint Decision dated September 3, 2008 of
the Metropolitan Trial Court in Criminal Case Nos. 337902-03 are
hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr.,Del Castillo, * Villarama, Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
*Designated Additional Member in lieu of Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza,

per Raffle dated September 10, 2014.
1.Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid, with Associate Justices
Ricardo R. Rosario and Samuel H. Gaerlan concurring; rollo, pp. 31-43.
2.Id. at 45-46.
3.Penned by Judge Maryann C. Corpus-Mañalac; id. at 76-81.

4.Id. at 93.
5.Penned by Judge Carlito B. Calpatura; id. at 68-74.
6.Id. at 34.
7.Id.
8.Id. at 32-33.
9.Id. at 73-74.
10.Id. at 36.
11.Id. at 80-81. (Emphasis ours)

12.Id. at 40-41.
13.Id. at 18.
14.338 Phil. 529 (1997).

15.Nieva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, supra,at 541.
16.485 Phil. 125 (2004).

17.Rollo,pp. 204-205. (Emphasis omitted)
18.Yalong v. People, G.R. No. 187174, August 28, 2013, 704 SCRA 195, 205;
citing Rigor v. People, supra note 16, at 138.
19.Rigor v. People, supra note 16.
20.Supra note 14.
21.Nieva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 14, at 13-14. (Emphasis ours)
22.Supra note 18.
23.Yalong v. People, supra note 18, at 205. (Emphasis ours)

24.Section 35 (1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative
Code provides:
Section 35. Powers and Functions. — The Office of the Solicitor General
shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. When authorized
by the President or head of the office concerned, it shall also represent
government owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor
General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such,
shall discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers. It shall have the
following specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its
officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or
tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the
Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.
25.Villareal v. Aliga,G.R. No. 166995, January 13, 2014, 713 SCRA 52, 64.
26.Heirs of Delgado, et al. v. Gonzalez,612 Phil. 817, 844 (2009),citing People v. Judge
Santiago,255 Phil. 851 (1989).
27.Id.
28.Anlud Metal Recycling Corporation, etc. v. Joaquin Ang,G.R. No. 182157, August 17,
2015, citing Cariño v. De Castro,576 Phil. 634 (2008).
29.People of the Philippines and AAA v. Court of Appeals, 21st Division, Mindanao
Station, et al.,G.R. No. 183652, February 25, 2015.
30.Id.
31.People v. Sandiganbayan,482 Phil. 613, 632 (2004).
32.84 Phil. 722 (1949).
33.People v. Salico, supra,at 732-733. (Emphasis ours)

34.Consino v. People of the Philippines,G.R. No. 200465, April 20, 2015.
35.De Vera, et al. v. Spouses Santiago, et al.,G.R. No. 179457, June 22, 2015,
citing Samson v. Spouses Gabor, et al.,G.R. No. 182970, July 23, 2014, 730
SCRA 490, 497.
36.Supra.
37.De Vera v. Spouses Santiago, supra note 35. (Emphasis ours)
38.Consino v. People, supra note 34, citing Guinhawa v. People,505 Phil. 383, 401-
402 (2005).
39.Padilla v. Globe Asiatique Realty Holdings Corporation, G.R. No. 207376, August 6,
2014, 732 SCRA 416, 431.
40.G.R. No. 103323, January 21, 1993, 217 SCRA 386.

41.Paulin v. Hon. Gimenez, supra,at 390, citing People v. Hon. Villalon,270 Phil. 637,
645 (1990).(Emphasis ours)
42.385 Phil. 208 (2000).
43.Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz, supra,at 222-223, citing People v. Calo, Jr.,264 Phil.
1007, 1012-1013 (1990).
44.See Separate Concurring Opinion, Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion in De la
Cuesta v. Sandiganbayan, First Division,G.R. Nos. 164068-69, November 19,
2013, 709 SCRA 631, 673.
45.Civil Service Commission v. Almojuela,G.R. No. 194368, April 2, 2013, 694 SCRA
441, 463.
46.Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, et al. v. CA, et al.,632 Phil. 191, 197
(2010).
47.Peñoso v. Dona,549 Phil. 39, 46 (2007),citing Aguam v. Court of Appeals,388 Phil.

587, 594 (2000).
||| (Morillo v. People , G.R. No. 198270, [December 9, 2015])

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136462. September 19, 2002.]
PABLO N. QUIÑON, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.

SYNOPSIS
For failure to return the two super caliber .38 pistol and their magazines
and one 12-gauge shotgun that were issued to him during his incumbency and
by reason of his function as Station Commander of Calinog, Iloilo PC/INP, Pablo
N. Quiñon was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of the crime of Malversation
of Public Property. Thus, he interposed this petition for review claiming that
the Sandiganbayan erred in holding that he is an accountable public officer.
The Court ruled that Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code is designed
to protect the government and to penalize erring public officials and
conspiring private individuals responsible for the loss of public funds and
property by reason of corrupt motives or neglect or disregard of duty. Its all
encompassing provision cannot be limited by petitioner's absurd
interpretation of the provisions of the Administrative Code restricting the
application thereof only to government funds and to bonded public officials.
Accordingly, the decision of the Sandiganbayan was affirmed.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS OR PROPERTY;

ELEMENTS. — The elements of malversation, essential for the conviction of an
accused under the above penal provision are: 1. That the offender is a public
officer; 2. That he has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of
the duties of his office; 3. That the funds or property are public funds or
property for which he is accountable; and 4. That he appropriated, took,
misappropriated or consented or through abandonment or negligence,
permitted another person to take them. AaECSH
2. ID.; ID.; ACCOUNTABLE OFFICER NEED NOT BE A BONDED OFFICIAL.

— An accountable public officer, within the purview of Article 217 of
the Revised Penal Code, is one who has custody or control of public funds or
property by reason of the duties of his office. To be liable for malversation, an
accountable officer need not be a bonded official. The name or relative
importance of the office or employment is not the controlling factor. What is
decisive is the nature of the duties that he performs and that as part of, and
by reason of said duties, he receives public money or property which he is
bound to account.
3. ID.; ID.; POLICE OFFICER IS ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE FIREARMS ISSUED
TO HIM WHEN HE FAILED TO PRODUCE IT UPON DEMAND BY THE PROPER
AUTHORITY. — In the case at bar, the delivery to petitioner of the firearms
belonging to the Government, by reason of his office as Station Commander
of Calinog, Iloilo, PC-INP, necessarily entailed the obligation on his part to
safely keep the firearms, use them for the purposes for which they were
entrusted to him, and to return them to the proper authority at the
termination of his tenure as commander, or on demand by the owner, the
duty to account for said firearms. Thus, in Felicilda v. Grospe, the Court held a
police officer accountable for the firearms issued to him and consequently
convicted him for malversation of public property when he failed to produce
said firearms upon demand by the proper authority.
4. ID.; ID.; PURPOSE. — Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code is designed
to protect the government and to penalize erring public officials and
conspiring private individuals responsible for the loss of public funds and
property by reason of corrupt motives or neglect or disregard of duty. Its all
encompassing provision cannot be limited by petitioner's absurd
interpretation of the provisions of the Administrative Code restricting the
application thereof only to government funds and to bonded public officials.
5. ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO RETURN PUBLIC FUNDS OR PROPERTY UPON
DEMAND SHALL BE PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE THAT HE HAS PUT SUCH MISSING
FUNDS OR PROPERTY TO PERSONAL USE. — Under Article 217 of the Code, the
failure of the public officer to have duly forthcoming such public funds or
property, upon demand by a duly authorized officer, shall beprima
facieevidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use.
Considering that petitioner failed to adduce evidence on why he failed to
produce, after the expiration of his term and despite lawful demand, the two
.38 caliber pistols with Serial Nos. 310136 and 310150 issued to him by reason
of his duties as Station Commander of the Calinog, Iloilo, PC-INP, the
Sandiganbayan correctly convicted him of malversation of public property. ADHCSE
6. ID.; ID.; IMPOSABLE PENALTY. — Regarding the imposable penalty; the

Sandiganbayan correctly amended the maximum period of petitioner's
indeterminate penalty from ten (10) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal. Under
paragraph (3) of Article 217, the penalty for malversation where the amount
involved is more than P6,000.00 but less than P12,000.00, is prision mayor in
its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period. Since there
are no modifying circumstances, penalty shall be imposed in its medium
period, i.e., within the range of eleven (11) years, six (6) months and twenty-
one (21) days to thirteen (13) years, one (1) month and ten (10) days. The
minimum period of the indeterminate penalty shall be within the range of six
(6) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years of prision mayor, the penalty next
lower in degree to the prescribed penalty.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J : p
This petition for review seeks to set aside the September 21, 1998
decision and the December 4, 1998 resolution of the Sandiganbayan 1 in
Criminal Case No. 16279, convicting petitioner Pablo N. Quiñon of the crime of
malversation of public property as defined and penalized under Article 217 of
the Revised Penal Code.
The Information filed against accused-appellant reads:
That on or about March 14, 1988 or subsequent thereto, in
Calinog, Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then the
Station Commander of the Calinog, Iloilo PC/INP, and who by reason
of the duties of his office is accountable for public properties that
come to his possession and control, received in his official capacity the
following firearms: two (2) super caliber .38 pistol and their magazines,
with Serial Nos. 310136 and 310150, valued at P5,500.00 per pistol,
with total value of P11,000.00; and one (1) 12 gauge shotgun, with
Serial No. 242446 valued at P4,000.00, and with grave abuse of
confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
apply and convert to his personal use and benefit said firearms to the
damage and prejudice of the government in the total amount of
Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00), Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2
On May 13, 1991, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Petitioner, however,

failed to appear when the case was set for pre-trial and trial from July 18, 1991
to February 23, 1993, allegedly due to hypertension. 3
The facts as established by the prosecution: Petitioner Police Sergeant
Pablo N. Quiñon was the Station Commander of Calinog, Iloilo, Philippine
Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP), now Philippine National
Police (PNP), from February 5, 1987 to March 14, 1988. During his incumbency
and by reason of his functions as Station Commander, he was issued the
following firearms and ammunitions under Memorandum Receipts duly
signed by him, to wit:
Memorandum Receipt dated February 20, 1987:
1 each Pistol Star Cal. 38

Sn 310150
1 each Mag
Sn 310151
6 Rounds Ammos Cal 38 w/ mag
[Sn] 310136
6 Rounds Ammos Cal. 38 w/ mag
1 each Rifle M16 armalite Cal. 5.45
Sn 157840
40 Rounds Ammos Cal. 5.56 4
Memorandum Receipt dated April 24, 1987:
1 each Shotgun Squire Bingham 12 gauge

Sn 242446 5
On March 15, 1988, Police Sergeant Emilio Aviador assumed office as
Station Commander of the Calinog, Iloilo, PC-INP, vice petitioner who was
transferred to the 322nd Philippine Constabulary Co., at Camp Tirador, Iloilo.
After an inventory of the firearms of the Calinog, Iloilo Police Station, it was
discovered that petitioner did not turn over the firearms issued to him. Thus,
Police Sergeant Aviador sent a radio message to petitioner demanding the
return of the unaccounted firearms. Police Sergeant Aviador likewise sought
the help of the Provincial Commander/Police Superintendent of the Iloilo PC-
INP for the return of said firearms and ammunitions. 6
Subsequently, petitioner surrendered one (1) unit M16 armalite rifle
with Serial No. 157840 and one (1) pistol cal. 38 with Serial No. 310151 to the
322nd PC Co., at Camp Tirador, Iloilo, which in turn delivered said firearms to
the Calinog, Iloilo Police Station. On March 17, 1989, Police Sergeant Aviador
recovered the shotgun with Serial No. 242446 from a certain Rudy Penuela, an
alleged asset or informer of petitioner when he was still the Station
Commander of Calinog. 7
Petitioner failed to return the two remaining .38 caliber pistols with
Serial Nos. 310136 and 310150 despite demands of the Calinog Police Station.
The value of the unaccounted firearms per the updated cost valuation dated
July 30, 1984 of the Ministry of National Defense, amounted to P5,500.00 each,
or a total of P11,000.00. 8
After the prosecution rested its case, the Sandiganbayan issued an order
directing petitioner to present evidence on July 22 and 23, 1983. Petitioner
again failed to appear on the scheduled dates despite notice. Hence, the
Sandiganbayan considered his absence a waiver of his right to present
evidence. Upon motion of the prosecution, the case was submitted for
decision. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that he was
denied due process, however, the same was denied by the Sandiganbayan. 9
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as
G.R. No. 113908. Petitioner contended, inter alia, that he was denied due
process of law and that the information filed against him does not charge an
offense. The petition was denied for lack of merit. 10
On August 7, 1998, the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment in Criminal
Case No. 16279, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of malversation of public
properties, more particularly of two .38 Cal. Pistols, with a total value
of P11,000.00; and the Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer
an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of six (6) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, to pay a fine of P11,000.00 and
also to suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification; and to
pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 11
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied and the decretal

portion of the August 7, 1998 decision was amended with respect to the
penalty, thus —
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the accused
guilty, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of malversation of
public properties, more particularly of two .38 Cal. pistols, with a total
value of P11,000.00; and the Court hereby sentences the accused to
suffer an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, to pay a fine of P11,000.00,
and also to suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and
to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 12
Hence, the instant petition on the following grounds:

I
THE SANDIGANBAYAN PATENTLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER IS AN ACCOUNTABLE PUBLIC OFFICER.
II
THE SANDIGANBAYAN PATENTLY ERRED IN FINDING PETITIONER
GUILTY OF MALVERSATION UNDER ARTICLE 217 OF THEREVISED
PENAL CODE. 13
The crime of malversation of public funds or property is defined as

follows:
ART. 217. Malversation of public funds or property.
— Presumption of malversation. — Any public officer who, by reason of
the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property,
shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall
consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any
other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially,
or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of
such funds or property, . . . .
xxx xxx xxx

The failure of the public officer to have duly forthcoming such
public funds or property, upon demand by a duly authorized officer,
shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or
property to personal use.
The elements of malversation, essential for the conviction of an accused

under the above penal provision are:
1. That the offender is a public officer;
2. That he has the custody or control of funds or property by reason
of the duties of his office;
3. That the funds or property are public funds or property for which
he is accountable; and
4. That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or
through abandonment or negligence, permitted another
person to take them. 14
Petitioner does not deny that he received the firearms in question by

reason of his office as Station Commander of the Calinog, Iloilo PC-INP, and he
failed to return them upon the expiration of his term and despite demand of
the new Station Commander. He, however, argues that he cannot be convicted
of malversation of public property because he is not an "accountable officer"
within the contemplation of Article 217. Citing the Administrative Code of
1987, 15 petitioner alleges that "only public officers whose duties require
possession or custody of government public funds and are bonded, are
considered public accountable officers." 16
The contentions lack merit.
An accountable public officer, within the purview of Article 217 of
the Revised Penal Code, is one who has custody or control of public funds or
property by reason of the duties of his office. To be liable for malversation, an
accountable officer need not be a bonded official. The name or relative
importance of the office or employment is not the controlling factor. What is
decisive is the nature of the duties that he performs and that as part of, and
by reason of said duties, he receives public money or property which he is
bound to account. 17
In the case at bar, the delivery to petitioner of the firearms belonging to
the Government, by reason of his office as Station Commander of Calinog,
Iloilo, PC-INP, necessarily entailed the obligation on his part to safely keep the
firearms, use them for the purposes for which they were entrusted to him, and
to return them to the proper authority at the termination of his tenure as
commander, or on demand by the owner, the duty to account for said
firearms. 18 Thus, in Felicilda v. Grospe, 19the Court held a police officer
accountable for the firearms issued to him and consequently convicted him
for malversation of public property when he failed to produce said firearms
upon demand by the proper authority.
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code is designed to protect the
government and to penalize erring public officials and conspiring private
individuals responsible for the loss of public funds and property by reason of
corrupt motives or neglect or disregard of duty. Its all encompassing provision
cannot be limited by petitioner's absurd interpretation of the provisions of
theAdministrative Code restricting the application thereof only to government
funds and to bonded public officials.
Under Article 217 of the Code, the failure of the public officer to have
duly forthcoming such public funds or property, upon demand by a duly
authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing
funds or property to personal use. Considering that petitioner failed to adduce
evidence on why he failed to produce, after the expiration of his term and
despite lawful demand, the two .38 caliber pistols with Serial Nos. 310136 and
310150 issued to him by reason of his duties as Station Commander of the
Calinog, Iloilo, PC-INP, the Sandiganbayan correctly convicted him of
malversation of public property.
Regarding the imposable penalty, the Sandiganbayan correctly
amended the maximum period of petitioner's indeterminate penalty from ten
(10) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal to twelve (12) years and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal. Under paragraph (3) of Article 217, the penalty for
malversation where the amount involved is more than P6,000.00 but less than
P12,000.00, is prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its
minimum period. Since there are no modifying circumstances, penalty shall be
imposed in its medium period, i.e., within the range of eleven (11) years, six (6)
months and twenty-one (21) days to thirteen (13) years, one (1) month and ten
(10) days. The minimum period of the indeterminate penalty shall be within
the range of six (6) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years of prision mayor, the
penalty next lower in degree to the prescribed penalty.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the resolution of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 16279, convicting petitioner Pablo N.
Quiñon of the crime of malversation of public property and sentencing him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, as well as the penalty of perpetual
special disqualification; and ordering him to pay a fine of P11,000.00, is
AFFIRMED. CTcSIA
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Fourth Division, composed of Associate Justices: Sabino R. De Leon, Jr. (Chairman
and ponente); Narciso S. Nario (member); and Teresita Leonardo-De Castro
(member).
2.Records, p. 1.
3.Records, pp. 257-261.
4.Exhibit "A".
5.Exhibit "B".
6.Exhibit "C".
7.TSN, February 24, 1993, pp. 6-7; Records, pp. 4-5.
8.Exhibits "D" and "D-1".
9.Records, p. 255.
10.Quiñon v. Sandiganbayan, 271 SCRA 575 [1997].
11.Rollo, p. 33.
12.Rollo, pp. 41-42.

13.Rollo, p. 11.
14.Diego v. Sandiganbayan, 339 SCRA 592, 603 [2000], citing Salamera v.

Sandiganbayan, 217 SCRA 303 [1999].
15.Sec. 50. Accountable Officers; Board Requirements. — (1) Every officer of any
government agency whose duties permit or require the possession or
custody of government funds shall be accountable therefore and for
safekeeping thereof in conformity with law; and (2) Every accountable officer
shall be properly bonded in accordance with law. (Chapter 9, Book V)
16.Rollo, p. 19.
17.Aquino, Revised Penal Code, Vol. II, [1997], p. 484.
18.Quiñon v. Sandiganbayan, supra.

19.211 SCRA 285 [1992].
||| (Quiñon v. People, G.R. No. 136462, [September 19, 2002], 438 PHIL 146-156)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132926. July 20, 2001.]
ELVIRA AGULLO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Herein petitioner Elvira Agullo used to be the Disbursing Officer of the

then Ministry of Public Works and Highways (MPWH) in the Regional Office in
Palo, Leyte. She was charged with the crime of malversation of public funds on
30 September 1988. During her arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to
the charge. The charge against her germinated from an audit conducted,
which resulted in discovering a P26,404.26 cash shortage on petitioner's
accountability. She was immediately informed of the said cash shortage and
was required to produce immediately the missing funds. Further she was
required to submit a written explanation of the cash shortage. Petitioner
complied with the directive by explaining that the cash shortage was, in effect,
due to a "fortuitous event" where the amount could have been stolen/taken
by somebody on the day she suffered a stroke on 22 October 1985. Striking
down the defense as incredible and without basis, the Sandiganbayan
rendered the assailed decision. In convicting the petitioner, the
Sandiganbayan ratiocinated principally that no evidence was presented linking
the loss of the government funds with the alleged sudden heart attack of the
accused. Hence, this petition.
The Supreme Court held that petitioner Agullo had satisfactorily
overcome and rebutted by competent proof, the prima facie evidence of
conversion so as to exonerate her from the charge of malversation. Petitioner
presented evidence that sufficiently proved that not a single centavo of the
missing funds was used for her own personal benefit or gain. The evidence
adduced by the defense revealed sufficient circumstances to establish the
strongest degree of probability that the public funds subject of the case were
lost during that fateful day when the petitioner suffered a stroke on the streets
of Tacloban City as she was then on her way to the MPWH Regional Office.
Hence, in light of the satisfactory explanation proffered by the defense and in
view of the impotency of the prosecution's evidence, petitioner's
constitutional right to be presumed innocent necessarily thrives. The decision
of respondent Sandiganbayan was reversed and set aside. Petitioner Elvira
Agullo was acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt. EHTCAa
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS; PRESUMPTION

OF CONVERSION; REBUTTABLE BY NATURE; COMPLETELY DESTROYED WHEN
THE ABSENCE OF FUNDS IS NOT DUE TO THE PERSONAL USE THEREOF BY THE
ACCUSED; CASE AT BAR. — The evidence for the prosecution, upon which the
Sandiganbayan riveted its judgment of conviction, was limited to documents
to wit, the report of Cash Examination and Letter of Demand. As could be
readily gleaned from the assailed decision, the verdict adjudging herein
petitioner guilty of the crime of malversation was anchored solely on the
presumption provided under Article 217, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal
Code, which prima facie evidence, in turn, was rooted loosely on the
documentary evidence presented by the prosecution, to wit: the Report of
Cash Examination and Letter of Demand — pieces of evidence which the
defense concededly admitted, but which, to our mind, do not suffice to convict
the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Thus, in a string
of categorical pronouncements, this Court has consistently and emphatically
ruled that the presumption of conversion incarnated in Article 217, paragraph
(4) of the Revised Penal Code is — by its very nature — rebuttable. To put it
differently, the presumption under the law is not conclusive but disputable by
satisfactory evidence to the effect that the accused did not utilize the public
funds or property for his personal use, gain or benefit. Accordingly, if the
accused is able to present adequate evidence that can nullify any likelihood that
he had put the funds or property to personal use, then that presumption would
be at an end and the prima facie case is effectively negated. This Court has
repeatedly said that when the absence of funds is not due to the personal use
thereof by the accused, the presumption is completely destroyed; in fact, the
presumption is never deemed to have existed at all.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; MUST BE AFFIRMATIVELY PROVED BY DIRECT EVIDENCE
OR BY PRODUCTION OF FACTS FROM WHICH CONVERSION NECESSARILY
FOLLOWS; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — Mere absence of funds is not
sufficient proof of conversion. Neither is the mere failure of the accused to
turn over the funds at any given time sufficient to make even aprima facie case.
Conversion must be affirmative proved, either by direct evidence or by the
production of facts from which conversion necessarily follows. Truly, these
serve as strong considerations that seriously impair the basis upon which is
founded the legal presumption of personal misappropriation of money or
property of accountable officers who fail to have forthcoming, such money or
property when so demanded by a duly authorized official. Verily, a finding
of prima facie evidence of accountability does not shatter the presumption of
innocence the accused enjoys because, before prima facie evidence arises,
"certain facts [have still to be] proved"; the trial court cannot depend alone on
such an evidence, because precisely, it is merely prima facie. It must still satisfy
that the accused is guilty — beyond reasonable doubt — of the offense
charged. Neither can it rely on the weak defense the latter may adduce.
Notably, the Sandiganbayan, in convicting petitioner, obviously relied more on
the flaws and deficiencies in the evidence presented by the defense, not on
the strength and merit of the prosecution's evidence. This course of action is
impermissible for the evidence of the prosecution clearly cannot sustain a
conviction "in an unprejudiced mind."
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN;
CONCLUSIVE UPON THE COURT; EXCEPTIONS. — The rule of general
application is that the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive on
this court. However, such rule admits of settled exceptions, among others: (1)
the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and
conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave
abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts;
and (5) the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are premised on a want of
evidence and are contradicted by evidence on record.
DECISION
BUENA, J :
p
Charged with, tried and convicted in Criminal Case No. 13579 for
malversation of public funds, herein petitioner Elvira Agullo, erstwhile
Disbursing Officer of the then Ministry of Public Works and Highways (MPWH),
Regional Office No. VIII, Candahug, Palo, Leyte, now comes before the High
Court to assail the Decision 1 of the Sandiganbayan promulgated on 16 March
1992, and its Resolution dated 11 March 1998, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration 2 but reducing the penalty imposed on petitioner as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Elvira S. Agullo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Malversation of Public
Funds, defined and penalized under Article 217, paragraph 4 of
the Revised Penal Code. [There being neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances, no evidence having been adduced
respecting partial or full restitution of the amount
malversed,] Considering the absence of any aggravating circumstances
and her full restitution by salary deduction, the accused Elvira S. Agullo
should be, as she is, hereby sentenced to the indeterminate penalty
of, from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION MAYOR, as
MINIMUM; to [EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND ONE (1)
DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL] SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS
and ONE (1) DAY of RECLUSION TEMPORAL, AS MAXIMUM, with the
accessory penalties of the law; to pay a fine in the sum of P26,404.26
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; to suffer the
penalty of Perpetual Special Disqualification and to pay the costs."
(Italics ours)
In an information 3 dated 30 September 1988, herein petitioner was

charged with the crime of malversation of public funds, committed as follows:
"That on or about the period October 22, 1985 to July 14, 1986,
inclusive or within said dates in the Municipality of Palo, Province of
Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, being then the disbursing officer of then
Ministry of Public Works and Highways, Regional Office No. VIII,
Candahug, Palo, Leyte, charged with the official custody of public
funds thus paid, collected and received by her in her official capacity,
and by reason of which duties she is accountable thereof, taking
advantage of her official position, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, convert and misappropriate for her
own personal use and benefit the public funds she had in her
possession in the amount of Twenty Six Thousand Four Hundred Four
Pesos and 26/100 (P26,404.26), belonging to the government of the
Republic of the Philippines, to the damage and prejudice of the latter
in the aforestated amount. ECcDAH
"Contrary to law."
Upon arraignment, herein petitioner Agullo, assisted by counsel de

officio Antonio Manzano, pleaded not guilty 4 to the charge, after which the
Sandiganbayan conducted a pre-trial on 11 February 1990 and issued the
following Pre-Trial Order: 5
"When this case was called for pre-trial, the accused personally
and through her counsel Atty. Antonio Manzano of the CLAO readily
entered into stipulations insofar as her official position in government as
well as the fact of audit of her accounts are concerned, including
therewith the admission that, in all respects the Cash Production
Notice and the Examination of her Cash and Accounts which the
government marked as Exhibit 'A' was faithful reproduction of the
original, and insofar as the contents thereof are concerned, are
correct. The accused likewise admitted that she had received a letter
of demand, said letter dated July 14, 1986 marked as exhibit 'B'. With
this the accused stated that her defense was premised on her having
suffered a stroke on October 22, 1985 as a result of which the amount
subject of the shortage found in her audit had been lost.
"The accused also indicated that not only had she immediately
replied to the letter by various communications by her or in her behalf
protesting the withholding of various amounts due her by way of
salaries on the premise that the loss of the amount subject matter of
the Information was not chargeable to her as a personal liability. The
accused has likewise informed the Court that prior to the incident on
October 22, 1985, she had been audited on May 27, 1985 and, after the
incident, on December 23, 1985 although she concedes she was also
audited on July 14, 1986.
"Considering that all the documents necessary for the defense
of the accused are still to be organized, Atty. Manzano is given ten (10)
days from today within which to prepare a proposal for stipulations of
facts and, if that is not possible, at least a complete outline of his case
together with the marking of the documents he wishes to present
which the prosecution might not admit as to the substance thereof
though the genuineness of the documents presented might be
conceded.
"With the above, the prosecution may now rest its case and the
presentation of the evidence for the defense may take place on April
5 and 6, and May 17 and 18, 1990, at 8:00 o' clock in the morning and
2:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
"The setting for tomorrow is cancelled.
"SO ORDERED." (Italics ours)
As borne by the records, the charge of malversation against petitioner

germinated from an audit conducted on 14 July 1986 by Ignacio Gerez,
Auditing Examiner III, as a result of which a P26,404.26 each shortage was
discovered on petitioner's accountability. On the same date, Gerez informed
petitioner of said finding of cash shortage and required the latter, through a
letter of demand, 6 to "produce immediately the missing funds." Further,
petitioner was required to submit within 72 hours from receipt a written
explanation of the cash shortage.
In a letter 7 dated 25 August 1986, addressed to the Resident Auditor of
the MPWH, petitioner complied with the directive by explaining that the cash
shortage was, in effect, due to a "fortuitous event" where the amount could
have been stolen/taken by somebody on the day she suffered a stroke on 22
October 1985, near the corner of Juan Luna Street and Imelda Avenue,
Tacloban City.
In the course of the pre-trial, petitioner Agullo conceded the fact of audit
and admitted 8 the findings in the Report of Cash Examination and the facts
set forth in the Letter of Demand. In effect, she admitted the fact of shortage
in the amount stated in the Information. Notwithstanding, petitioner Agullo, at
all stages of the criminal indictment, persistently professed her innocence of
the charge and categorically denied having malversed or converted the public
funds in question for her own personal use or benefit. 9
With petitioner's admission of the fact of cash shortage, the prosecution
then rested its case. 10 For its part, the defense, in its bid to overturn the
presumption of malversation and shatter the prima facie evidence of
conversion, offered the testimony of the following witnesses: petitioner Elvira
Agullo; Rene Briones Austero, Cashier III of the Department of Public Works
and Highways (DPWH), Region VIII; and Engracia Camposano-Camaoy,
Barangay Captain of Hinabuyan, Dagame, Leyte.
During trial, the defense offered to present the testimony of witness
Austero for the purpose of proving that an amount equal to P26,722.05 11 was
withheld from the salary and other compensation of petitioner Agullo. Further,
the defense offered the testimony of witness Barangay Captain Camaoy for
the purpose of establishing that "the accused suffered a heart attack (stroke)
on October 22, 1985; that on June 30, 1986, the accused informed her that the
accused lost the money for which she (was being) subjected to criminal
prosecution . . .; and that between October 22, 1985 and June 30, 1986, there
had been no demand upon the accused to produce the money for which she
was declared short." 12
Additionally, the defense presented the following documentary
evidence, 13 all of which were admitted by the Sandiganbayan:
"Exhibit '1' — Letter dated 25 August 1986 by accused to the
Resident Auditor MPWH, Regional Office No. 8, Candahug, Palo, Leyte;
"Exhibit '2' — Letter dated 22 August 1987 by accused to Engr.
Alfredo P. Torres, Regional Director;
"Exhibit '3' — Medical Certificate dated 05 August 1986, issued
by Dr. Juan T. Abando, M.D., St. Paul's Hospital, Tacloban City;
"Exhibit '3-A' — Verified Medical Certificate dated 19 January

1986, issued by Dr. Juan Abando, notarized on page 02;
"Exhibit '4' — Letter dated 26 December 1986 by accused to the
Regional Director;
"Exhibit '5' — Letter dated 19 February 1987 to the Regional
Director by Atty. Eric T. De Veyra;
"Exhibit '6' — Letter dated 15 April 1987 by accused to the
Regional Director;
"Exhibit '7' — Letter dated 01 September 1987 of Director
Alfredo Torres of DPWH to the Regional Director COA;
"Exhibit '8' — Letter of Accused dated 26 November 1987;

"Exhibit '9' — Affidavit of accused Elvira Agullo;
"Exhibit '10' — Affidavit of witness Engracia Camaoy;
"Exhibit '11' — Letter-Request dated 04 May 1988 of accused to

the Regional Director;
"Exhibit '12' — Certification by Mauricio Pacatang;

"Exhibit '13' — Protest of accused against the appointment of
Sylvia de la Rosa;
"Exhibit '14' — Letter dated 25 February 1987 to the Manager,
Employees Compensation Department, GSIS, Metro Manila;
"Exhibit '15' — Initial Approval of the Employees Compensation
Department, GSIS;
"Exhibit '16' — Hospitalization Claim for payment of accused;
"Exhibit '17' — Report of Injury signed and approved by Pablo P.

Burgos, Regional Engineering Coordinator and Head of Office;
"Exhibit '18' — Certification issued by PNB Tacloban, thru its
Asst. Manager B.L. Telmo;
"Exhibit '19' — Memorandum to accused dated 02 April 1984;
"Exhibit '20' — Memorandum dated 05 May 1990."
At the witness stand, petitioner Agullo unrelentingly maintained her

innocence and vehemently denied the accusation against her. Thus, according
to petitioner, in the morning of 21 October 1985, she reported for work and
prepared an inventory of her cash accountability 14 as Disbursing Officer 15 of
the MPWH Regional Office, Candahug, Palo, Leyte. On the same day, petitioner
received around thirteen (13) checks in the form of cash advances in her name
totaling P26,076.87, 16which amount represented salaries of MPWH officials
and employees.
Around 1:30 PM, petitioner, together with Benjamin Veridiano, driver of
MPWH Finance and Management Division, proceeded to the Philippine
National Bank (PNB) Tacloban City Branch, on board the MPWH official vehicle,
to encash the aforesaid checks. Upon encashment of the checks, petitioner
then put the money inside a PNB envelope which she further placed in her
bag. From the PNB, petitioner — who boarded the official vehicle driven by
Veridiano for the purpose of proceeding further to the MPWH Regional Office
— felt dizziness, chest pain and nausea. As a result of her condition, petitioner
Agullo requested driver Veridiano to drop her off at petitioner's residence
located at 109 Juan Luna Street — about half a kilometer away from the PNB. 17
In the morning of the following day, 22 October 1985, petitioner — upon
realizing that it was then the third-week payday of the month, and burdened
with the thought that she failed to give the salary of the permanent employees
— strove to report for work despite her weak physical condition. Petitioner
Agullo testified that she left her residence alone and brought with her the bag
containing the money which she encashed the previous day from the PNB. 18
Upon leaving the house with the money inside her bag, she walked the
stretch of Juan Luna Street and was able to reach almost the corner of Juan
Luna and Imelda Avenue 19 a distance of around 50 meters away from her
residence 20 when she was stricken with deep chest pain 21 and experienced
dizziness; her vision blurred and "the right part of (her) body (became) heavy"
to the point that she "could not move anymore." At this point, she collapsed
and lost consciousness. 22
In the afternoon of the same day, she found herself in a hospital bed of
St. Paul's Hospital located about a block away from petitioner's residence.
Upon inquiry, she was informed that a certain Metro Tacloban Aide by the
name of Teresa Lorenzo came to her rescue when she fainted, assisted in
rushing her to the hospital, and informed her family about Agullo's dire
condition and the unfortunate event that befell her. 23 Petitioner was confined
in St. Paul's Hospital for over a week — from 22 October 1985 to 01 November
1985 24 — under the care of her attending physician, Dr. Juan Abando, who
issued the corresponding Medical Certificate pregnant with the following
findings:
". . . Hypertension complicated with Cerebro Vascular Accident
(CVA), Rt. Hemiparesis and Urinary Infection.
"Condition started apparently 20 hrs. before admission as
moderate headache and dizziness, associated with blurring of vision
and nausea. Fifteen hrs. prior to admission, she felt weakness of her
right half of her body and slurring of speech. Had history of high blood
pressure taken last April 1985. B/P = 190/120. On admission B/P = was
230/120; PR = 83/min.; RR = 20/min.
"Pertinent findings: conscious, coherent, slurred speech, rt.
Hemiplegia.
"Diagnosis: = Malignant hypertension.
= CVA with Right Hemiplegia.
= Urinary Tract Infection."
As to petitioner's medical history and physical condition after her stroke,

the Sandiganbayan, in its decision, observed from the records:
". . . In the past, the accused had likewise suffered a stroke and
had undergone medical treatment. A medical certificate, marked as
Exhibits "3" and "3-A", attest(s) to the fact that she had a history of high
blood pressure and had been undergoing treatment for the said
malady. Since her sudden breakdown on October 22, 1985, the right
part of her body became paralyzed and her speech has been
impaired. She was advised by her doctor to undergo physical therapy
and to take medicine regularly. She was advised not to report for work
during such time that she was under recuperation. Only on February
2, 1986 did she start to report for work, although at irregular intervals,
until the date of the audit, July 14, 1986."
Striking down the defense as "incredible and without basis," the

Sandiganbayan rendered its assailed decision, convicting petitioner Agullo of
the crime of malversation of public funds, ratiocinating principally that "no
evidence has been presented linking the loss of the government funds with the
alleged sudden heart attack of the accused (herein petitioner)."
We do not agree.
By and large, the pieces of evidence presented against petitioner in this
case do not fulfill the test of moral certainty and may not be deemed sufficient
to support a conviction. 25 Records reveal that evidence for the prosecution
consisted solely of the Report of Cash Examination, 26 dated 14 July 1986, which
was presented by the prosecution to prove the cash shortage in the amount
of P26,404.26, on petitioner Agullo's accountability as Disbursing Officer of the
then MPWH. Likewise, the prosecution presented the Letter of
Demand 27 dated 14 July 1986 signed by Auditing Examiner III Ignacio Gerez.
Aside from the aforementioned documents, the prosecution opted not to
present a single witness to buttress its bid for conviction and relied merely on
the prima facie evidence of conversion or presumption of
malversation under Article 217, paragraph (4) of the Revised Penal Code, to
wit:AHEDaI
"ARTICLE 217. Malversation of public funds or property.

— Presumption of malversation —
. . . "The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any
public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand
by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has
put such missing funds or property to personal uses."
Stated otherwise, the evidence for the prosecution, upon which the
Sandiganbayan riveted its judgment of conviction, was limited to documents
to wit, the Report of Cash Examination and Letter of Demand. As could be
readily gleaned from the assailed decision, the verdict adjudging herein
petitioner guilty of the crime of malversation was anchored solely on the
presumption provided under Article 217, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal
Code, which prima facie evidence, in turn, was rooted loosely on the
documentary evidence presented by the prosecution, to wit; the Report of
Cash Examination and Letter of Demand — pieces of evidence which the
defense concededly admitted, but which, to our mind, do not suffice to convict
the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
Thus, in a string of categorical pronouncements, this Court has
consistently and emphatically ruled that the presumption of
conversion incarnated in Article 217, paragraph (4) of the Revised Penal Code is
— by its very nature — rebuttable. To put it differently, the presumption under
the law is not conclusive but disputable by satisfactory evidence to the effect
that the accused did not utilize the public funds or property for his personal
use, gain or benefit.
Accordingly, if the accused is able to present adequate evidence that can
nullify any likelihood that he had put the funds or property to personal use, then
that presumption would be at an end and the prima facie case is effectively
negated. This Court has repeatedly said that when the absence of funds is not
due to the personal use thereof by the accused, the presumption is completely
destroyed; in fact, the presumption is never deemed to have existed at all. 28
Applying the foregoing principle, the prosecution in the instant case
upon whose burden, as in Diaz vs. Sandiganbayan, 29was laden the task of
establishing by proof beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner had committed
the offense charged, mainly relied on the statutory presumption aforesaid
and failed to present any substantial piece of evidence to indicate that petitioner
had used the funds for personal gain.
Worth noting is that the Sandiganbayan, in its impugned decision,
admitted that "conversion or the placing of malversed government funds to
personal uses has, indeed, not been proven in the case at bar. 30 " Perhaps
realizing such gaping hole, the Sandiganbayan nonetheless leaped into the
conclusion, albeit erroneous, that herein petitioner was just the same guilty of
malversation invoking the prima facie evidence stated in Article 217,
paragraph (4) of the Revised Penal Code.
On this score, the rule of general application is that the factual findings
of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive on this court. However, such rule admits
of settled exceptions, among others: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the inference made is
manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is
based on misapprehension of facts; and (5) the findings of fact of the
Sandiganbayan are premised on a want of evidence and are contradicted by
evidence on record. 31
On this matter, the Sandiganbayan's conclusion that "there is no
evidence to show that the accused was then carrying the sum of P26,404.26 in
her person when she allegedly collapsed at Juan Luna Street, Tacloban City," is
to say the least, without factual basis and not duly supported by evidence. On
the stark contrary, the records are extant, as petitioner Agullo, in fact, testified
on the witness stand that she had the money with her when she suffered a
stroke and collapsed on the streets of Tacloban City on 22 October 1985.
Records likewise reveal that the amount of P327.39, which is the difference
between P26,404.26 32 and P26,076.87, 33 represents the salary of Mr. Alcober,
Jr., Administrative Officer of the DPWH in Candahug, who made a telephone
call to petitioner for the latter to bring the sum of P327.39, together with the
payroll.
In the case before us, the Sandiganbayan undoubtedly disregarded or
overlooked certain evidence of substance which, to a large extent, bear
considerable weight in the adjudication of petitioner's guilt or the affirmation
of her constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise.
Upon thorough scrutiny of the evidence adduced by both prosecution
and defense, we hold that petitioner Agullo has satisfactorily overcome and
rebutted by competent proof, the prima facie evidence of conversion so as to
exonerate her from the charge of malversation. To this end, petitioner
presented evidence that satisfactorily prove that not a single centavo of the
missing funds was used for her own personal benefit or gain.
True enough, the evidence adduced by the defense reveals sufficient
circumstances to establish the strongest degree of probability that the public
funds subject of the criminal indictment for malversation was lost during that
fateful day of 22 October 1985, where petitioner Agullo suffered a stroke on
the streets of Tacloban City as she was then on her way to the MPWH Regional
Office.
In fact, the records though insensate, clearly reveal that the prosecution
admitted that petitioner suffered a stroke on the streets of Tacloban on 22
October 1985. As to the prosecution's allegation that no evidence exists
regarding loss of the public funds, this postulation is belied by the records as
petitioner herself testified on the stand that she had the money subject of
inquiry when she collapsed and lost consciousness as a result of the stroke.
To us, this circumstance — coupled with the other peculiarities
attendant in the instant case and further considering the palpable failure of
the prosecution to adduce other evidence to clearly establish conversion —
"suffice to make the mind uneasy as to Agullo's guilt, notwithstanding the prima
facie evidence established by law against herein petitioner, which by no means
dispenses with the need of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt." 34 After all,
mere absence of funds is not sufficient proof of conversion. Neither is the
mere failure of the accused to turn over the funds at any given time sufficient
to make even a prima facie case. Conversion must be affirmatively proved,
either by direct evidence or by the production of facts from which conversion
necessarily follows. 35
Truly, these serve as strong considerations that seriously impair the
basis upon which is founded the legal presumption of personal
misappropriation of money or property of accountable officers who fail to
have forthcoming, such money or property when so demanded by a duly
authorized official. 36 Verily, a finding of prima facie evidence of accountability
does not shatter the presumptive innocence the accused enjoys because,
before prima facie evidence arises, "certain facts [have still to be] proved"; the
trial court cannot depend alone on such an evidence, because precisely, it is
merely prima facie. It must still satisfy that the accused is guilty — beyond
reasonable doubt — of the offense charged. Neither can it rely on the weak
defense the latter may adduce. 37
Notably, the Sandiganbayan, in convicting petitioner, obviously relied
more on the flaws and deficiencies in the evidence presented by the defense,
not on the strength and merit of the prosecution's evidence. 38 This course of
action is impermissible for the evidence of the prosecution clearly cannot
sustain a conviction "in an unprejudiced mind." 39
All told, this Court, through the scholarly ponencia of Mr. Justice Isagani
Cruz in People vs. De Guzman, 40 inked in vivid prose the premium accorded to
the right of an accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved,
to wit:
"The constitutional presumption of innocence is not an empty
platitude meant only to embellish the Bill of Rights. Its purpose is to
balance the scales in what would otherwise be an uneven contest
between the lone individual pitted against the People of the
Philippines and all the resources at their command. Its inexorable
mandate is that, for all the authority and influence of the prosecution,
the accused must be acquitted and set free if his guilt cannot be
proved beyond the whisper of doubt."
Hence, in light of the satisfactory explanation proffered by the defense

and in view of the impotency of the prosecution's evidence, petitioner's
constitutional right to be presumed innocent necessarily thrives. Corollarily,
the prima facie evidence of conversion in the instant case, withers, so to speak,
like a petrified twig wilted in the scorching heat of the noonday sun.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is granted.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of respondent Sandiganbayan dated 16 March
1992 and its Resolution dated 18 March 1998, are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner Elvira Agullo is hereby ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable
doubt.
MOREOVER, the DPWH is hereby directed to refund petitioner the sum
of Three Hundred Seventeen Pesos and Seventy Nine Centavos (P317.79)
representing the amount overdeducted from petitioner's salary, cost of living
allowance and other emoluments.
SO ORDERED. ScAaHE
Bellosillo, Mendoza and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Quisumbing, J., is on official business.
Footnotes
1.Decision of Sandiganbayan, 1st Division, promulgated on 16 March 1992; Rollo,

pp. 39-56.
2.Motion for Reconsideration dated 27 March 1992; Rollo, pp. 57-63.

3.Records, pp. 1-2.
4.Certificate of Arraignment dated 03 August 1989; Records p. 19.
5.Records, pp. 36-37.

6.Exhibit "B".
7.Exhibit "1".
8.Rollo, p. 73; Rollo, p. 75.

9.Ibid, p. 76.
10.Ibid., p. 85.
11.Ibid, p. 93; Exhibit "12", Certification dated 09 May 1988 issued by Mauricio
Pacatang.
12.Decision, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 43-44.

13Rollo, pp. 41-43.
14.Rollo, p. 109.
15.At the time of trial, petitioner Agullo was employed as Clerk III at the
Department of Public Works and Highways; TSN, 06 April 1990, p. 5; Rollo, p.
107.
16.Exhibit 18, Certification dated 18 August 1986 signed by Philippine National
Bank Tacloban City Branch Assistant Manager B.L. Telmo.
17.Rollo, p. 113.
18.TSN, 06 April 1990, p. 11; Rollo, p. 114.

19.Around six (6) meters from the corner of Juan Luna Street and Imelda Avenue;
TSN, 06 April 1990, p. 11; Rollo, p. 114.
20.Ibid.
21.A: ". . . Masakit na masakit", the chest pain, very "mabigat dito" (witness
pointing to her chest) . . .'; TSN 06 April 1990, p. 10; Rollo, p. 113.
22.Rollo, p. 114.
23.TSN, 06 April 1990, p. 12; Rollo, p. 115.
24.Exhibit '3'.
25.Alvarez vs. Sandiganbayan, 201 SCRA 557 [1991].
26.Exhibit "A."
27.Exhibit "B."
28.Diaz vs. Sandiganbayan, 302 SCRA 118 [1999] citing U.S. vs. Catolico, 18 Phil.
504, U.S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil 230, Quizo vs. Sandiganbayan, 149 SCRA 108
[1987], Mahinay vs. Sandiganbayan, 173 SCRA 237 [1989].
29.302 SCRA 118 [1999].
30.Rollo, p. 54.
31.Diaz vs. Sandiganbayan, 302 SCRA 118 [1999]; Bugayong vs. People, 202 SCRA
762 [1991] citing Cesar vs. Sandiganbayan, 134 SCRA 105 [1985].
32.The amount of cash shortage alleged in the Information.

33.Amount encashed at the Philippine National Bank.
34.Gali vs. Court of Appeals, 98 SCRA 268 [1980].
35.U.S. vs. Catolico, 18 Phil. 504 [1911] cited in Bugayong vs. People, 202 SCRA 762
[1991].
36.Gali vs. Court of Appeals, 98 SCRA 268 [1980].

37.Babida vs. People, 178 SCRA 204 [1989] citing People vs. Mingoa, 92 Phil. 856
[1953].
38.Bugayong vs. People, 202 SCRA 762 [1991].

39.Section 2, Rule 133, Rules of Court provides, "Proof beyond reasonable doubt. —
In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is
shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not
mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces
absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof
which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind."
40.194 SCRA 601, 606 [1991].
||| (Agullo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 132926, [July 20, 2001], 414 PHIL 86-102)
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 116754. March 17, 2000.]
MORONG WATER DISTRICT, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE

DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN, WILFRED L. PASCASIO, RAUL R.
ARNAU, ABELARDO L. APORTADERA, JR., FRANCISCO VILLA,
EDGARD STA. MARIA and EMMA CENSON, respondents.
Aladdin F. Trinidad for petitioner.

Jose Concepcion Javier for private respondent.
SYNOPSIS
In September 1993, petitioner filed a complaint before the Office of the

Ombudsman-Luzon against Edgar Sta. Maria, former manager of Morong
Water District and Emma Censon, Adviser of the Local Water Utilities
Administration for alleged violations of R.A. 3019 and Article 217 of
the Revised Penal Code on malversation of public funds. The complaint stated
that private respondents confederated with one another and took advantage
of their positions as officers of Morong Water District in taking from the funds
of the said office the amount of P33,190.73 for the purpose of paying for the
design of the Wawa, San Juan Morong Project; that no design was ever made,
and that respondent made it appear that the amount of P15,000.00 was given
to a certain Engineer Reyes, when in fact, they personally pocketed the said
amount and the rest was spent in installing the water connections of a new
market site of Morong, Rizal. Respondents denied the charges in their
respective counter-affidavits. On March 28, 1994, public respondent, through
Graft Investigation Officer Amante issued the questioned resolution
dismissing the complaint for lack of sufficient evidence. Petitioner filed motion
for reconsideration but the same was dismissed. Aggrieved by the decision,
petitioner filed the instant petition.
The Supreme Court found the petition devoid of merit. The Court ruled
that the questioned resolution clearly showed that the findings of the Office
of the Ombudsman regarding the liability of the private respondents are
supported by substantial evidence. The conclusion that the amounts allegedly
malversed by private respondents were actually liquidated by them found
support not only in the evidence of private respondents but even in the
evidence submitted by petitioner. Such factual findings of the Office of the
Ombudsman deserve respect from the Supreme Court and should not be
disturbed on appeal. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed and the
resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman were affirmed.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN; ANY APPEAL

OR APPLICATION FOR REMEDY MAY ONLY BE ENTERTAINED BY THE SUPREME
COURT ON PURE QUESTION OF LAW. — A reading of the petition shows that
the issues raised refer primarily to the findings of fact made by the respondent
public officials. On this point, it must be stressed that any appeal or application
for remedy against a decision or finding of the Office of the Ombudsman may
only be entertained by the Supreme Court, on pure question of law. Section
14 of Republic Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides that "(n)o
court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or
findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court on pure question of
law." Moreover, Section 27 of the said Act provides further that "(f)indings of
fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence
are conclusive."
2. ID.; ID.; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
DESERVE DUE RESPECT FROM THE COURT AND SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED
ON APPEAL. — Petitioner's main contention in its complaint before the Office
of the Ombudsman is that private respondents conspired with each other in
withdrawing the amount of P33,190.75 from the coffers of petitioner and then
pocket P15,000.00 for their own personal use. On this point, we note with
approval the following pronouncement of the Office of the Ombudsman:
"After a meticulous examination of the records of the case, the undersigned
finds that there is no sufficient evidence to establish a probable cause for
malversation or violation of R.A. 3019 for that matter, and that respondents
are probably guilty thereof. There is no question that respondent Edgard Sta.
Maria is the payee of Cash Voucher No. 3150 dated August 3, 1992. On the
face of the said cash voucher, it is disclosed that it was prepared by the
Bookkeeper, certified as to the availability of funds by the Finance Officer and
the check prepared by the Cashier. It is also disclosed by the same document
that the cash advance was to be used for the design and execution of Project
Wawa Pipeline Extension. As regards, therefore, to the participation of
respondent Emma Censon it is very clear that she has nothing to do with the
cash advance of P33,190.73. With respect to respondent Edgard Sta. Maria,
obviously he has the duty to liquidate the said cash advance. However,
complainant's Annex "B" which is a general ledger of account, disclose that the
amount of P16,790.40 was diverted to Paglabas Pipeline Extension, but which
diversion was authorized by the Board of Directors as per Board Meeting of
October 9, 1992. It is worthy to note that this general ledger was signed by
complainant's witnesses, the Bookkeeper and the Finance Manager, in the
same manner that they affixed signatures on the cash voucher, together with
the cashier. Going back to respondent Sta. Maria's duty to liquidate or account
for the said cash advance, the evidence of complainant also shows that the
P16,790.40 was duly receipted by the Filacon Enterprises for the amount of 4
rolls of P.S. Tubing (32 pieces) 1 x 100 cm. It cannot be said therefore, that the
amount of P16,790.00 was misappropriated by respondent Sta. Maria for his
personal benefit. As to the remaining balance of P15,000.00 which allegedly
was pocketed by respondent instead of using the same in payment of the
design for the Wawa project, there also appears a reimbursement expense
receipt which is attached by the complainant as its Annex "D". The same was
signed by a certain civil engineer Ricardo Reyes. The latter attested that he
received the amount as partial payment for the design. Complainant's claim
that Ricardo Reyes is a fictitious person is based on the certification from the
Local Water Utilities Administration that he is not an employee therein. The
reimbursement expense did not however state that Engineer Ricardo Reyes is
an employee of LWUA. Hence, the certification of said agency will not be
conclusive evidence of Ricardo Reyes being a fictitious person, as there was no
representation of said fact in the reimbursement receipt." The above-quoted
portion of the questioned resolution clearly shows that the findings of the
Office of the Ombudsman regarding the liability of private respondents are
supported by substantial evidence. The conclusion that the amounts allegedly
malversed by private respondents were actually liquidated by them finds
support not only in the evidence of private respondents but even in the
evidence submitted by petitioner in its complaint. Such factual findings of the
Office of the Ombudsman deserve due respect from the Supreme Court and
should not be disturbed on appeal.
3. CRIMINAL LAW; MALVERSATION; PREVIOUS DEMAND IS NOT
NECESSARY FOR VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 217 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE. —
Petitioner likewise contends that the Office of the Ombudsman erred in stating
that demand from the Commission on Audit to settle or liquidate the amount
is needed before a case for malversation can mature. Citing the case of U.S. vs.
Saberon, the petitioner argues that demand need not be made by the
Commission on Audit as it is sufficient that there is a law or regulation
requiring the public officer to render an accounting. There is merit in
petitioner's contention although his reliance on the cited case is misplaced.
The Saberon case is not applicable as it deals with a violation of Article 218 of
the Revised Penal Code for failure of accountable officers to render accounts.
On the other hand, the instant case involves a violation of Article 217 of
the Revised Penal Code for malversation of public funds and property which
is entirely separate and distinct from Article 218. Petitioner should have cited
the case of People vs. Tolentino which held that previous demand is not
necessary for violation of Article 217 in spite of the last paragraph of the said
provision. The last paragraph of Article 217 provides only for a rule of
procedural law. More recently, in the case of Nizurtado vs. Sandiganbayan, the
Court stated in this regard that "(d)emand merely raises a prima
facie presumption that missing funds have been put to personal use. The
demand itself, however, is not an element of, and not indispensable to
constitute, malversation." HECTaA
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J : p
Assailed in this petition for certiorari is the Resolution 1 dated 28 March

1994 of the Office of the Ombudsman which dismissed the case for violation
of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and Article 217 of
the Revised Penal Code filed against private respondents Edgard Sta. Maria
and Emma Censon by herein petitioner Morong Water District. Likewise
assailed is the Order 2 dated 27 May 1994 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. LLpr
The facts of the case are as follows:

Private respondent Edgard Sta. Maria, was the former General Manager
of petitioner Morong Water District in San Pedro, Morong, Rizal. Private
respondent Emma Censon was the Advisor of the Local Water Utilities
Administration assigned to petitioner Morong Water District. Respondents
Wilfred L. Pascasio, Raul R. Arnau, Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr. and Francisco
Villa are officials of the Office of the Ombudsman who are included as
respondents in their official capacities as the public officers who promulgated
the questioned resolution and order.
On 3 August 1993, Edgard Sta. Maria, while still the General Manager of
MOWAD, received from petitioner a cash advance of
P33,190.73 3 representing an initial release of funds for the design and
execution of the Wawa pipeline extension project in Morong, Rizal.
On 5 August 1992, as shown by a journal voucher 4 issued by petitioner,
Sta. Maria submitted a partial liquidation of expenses amounting to
P15,000.00 against the cash advance of P33,190.73. Respondent Sta. Maria
allegedly used the money as payment for the design, including the pipelaying
scheme, service connection detail, and interconnection detail, of the Sitio
Wawa Pipeline Extension. The liquidation report was supported by a
Reimbursement Expense Receipt 5 indicating that the P15,000.00 was paid to
and received by a certain Engineer Ricardo Reyes.
On 10 November 1992, Sta. Maria made a final liquidation of expenses
amounting to P16,790.40. The amount was used for the Paglabas Pipeline
Extension in compliance with the request of the Municipal Mayor. As indicated
in the journal voucher 6 supporting the transaction, the diversion of funds was
authorized by the Board of Directors in a Board Meeting held on 9 October
1992.
On 14 December 1992, Sta. Maria was ousted as General Manager of
petitioner Morong Water District.
On 24 September 1993, Maximo San Diego, petitioner's officer-in-
charge, filed a complaint 7 before the Office of the Ombudsman-Luzon against
private respondents Sta. Maria and Censon for alleged violations of R.A. 3019,
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code on malversation of public funds.
The complaint stated that respondents Sta. Maria and Censon
confederated with one another and took advantage of their official positions
as General Manager and Advisor, respectively, of the Morong Water District in
taking from the funds of the said office the amount of P33,190.75 for the
purpose of paying for the design of MOWAD Wawa, San Juan, Morong Project.
The complaint alleged that no such design was made, and that respondents
made it appear that the amount of P15,000.00 was given to a certain Engineer
Ricardo Reyes when in fact, they personally pocketed the aforesaid amount
and the rest was spent in installing the water connections of the new market
site of Morong, Rizal. As proof, petitioner attached the joint affidavit 8 of its
Bookkeeper, Cashier and Finance Manager and a certification 9 from the Local
Water Utilities Administration that no person by the name of Engineer Ricardo
Reyes has ever been employed by their agency.
Respondents denied the charges in their respective counter-affidavits.
In her counter-affidavit, respondent Emma Censon denied receiving the
amount of P15,000.00 as charged. She claimed that she was not the custodian
of petitioner's funds and that she did not have any participation in the
preparation and execution of disbursement vouchers covering the release of
funds. 10
For his part, respondent Edgard Sta. Maria stated in his counter-affidavit
that he was forcibly ousted as petitioner's General Manager on 14 December
1992 due to the criminal and administrative complaints he lodged against
some members of petitioner's Board of Directors. In view of their subsequent
indictment, the said officials vowed to get even with him by filing various
complaints against him. With respect to the design for the Wawa Project, he
claimed that he sent a letter dated March 29, 1993 to the Chairman of the
Board, Mr. Aniceto Mateo, informing him that the original detailed design
plans and drawings of the project were left at petitioner's office. He likewise
averred that the present complaint is closely interrelated with another case,
docketed as Civil Case No. 492-M, pending with the Regional Trial Court of
Morong, Rizal. 11
On March 28, 1994, public respondent, through Graft Investigation
Officer Aleu A. Amante, issued the questioned Resolution dismissing the
complaint. The resolution stated that "(a)fter a meticulous examination of the
records of the case, there is no sufficient evidence to establish a probable
cause for malversation or violation of RA 3019." 12
On 6 May 1994, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 13 of the
above Resolution.
On May 27, 1994, public respondent, through Graft Investigation Officer
Wilfredo L. Pacasio, issued the questioned Order dismissing the Motion for
Reconsideration. The Order first noted that the motion for reconsideration did
not raise any new issues and did not adduce any newly discovered evidence.
Instead of dismissing the motion outright on this ground, the Office of the
Ombudsman made an extended discussion of the issues raised by petitioner.
It was emphasized that the evidence on record, particularly the "journal
voucher" and "reimbursement expense receipt," indubitably disclosed that the
sum allegedly misappropriated had, in fact, been duly liquidated by the
respondents. Moreover, the Ombudsman stated that the version of the
respondents was more logical, natural and believable. Finally, public
respondent states that the allegation of conspiracy had not been fully
substantiated and thus, the inclusion and joinder of respondent Emma
Censon had no legal justification. Public respondent thus dismissed the
motion for reconsideration and affirmed its Resolution dated 28 March 1994.
Petitioner now comes to us by way of the instant Petition for Certiorari.
Petitioner grounds the instant petition on the following allegation: cdasia
"(The) Hon. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman acted arbitrarily,

whimsically and with grave abused (sic) of discretion and authority
dismissed OMB Case No. 0-93-2579 when in the conduct of the
preliminary investigation Respondents biasely (sic) disregarded the
evidence in the record which clearly established a prima facie case of
malversation as supported by the facts, the law and existing
jurisprudence." 14
There is no merit in the petition.

At the outset, a reading of the petition shows that the issues raised refer
primarily to the findings of fact made by the respondent public officials. On
this point, it must be stressed that any appeal or application for remedy
against a decision or finding of the Office of the Ombudsman may only be
entertained by the Supreme Court, on pure question of law. 15 Section 14
of Republic Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides that "(n)o
court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or
findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court on pure question of
law." Moreover, Section 27 of the said Act provides further that "(f)indings of
fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence
are conclusive."
A thorough examination of the questioned Order and Resolution of the
Office of the Ombudsman and the records of the case reveal that the findings
of fact made by the Ombudsman are supported by substantial evidence on
record.
Petitioner's main contention in its complaint before the Office of the
Ombudsman is that private respondents conspired with each other in
withdrawing the amount of P33,190.75 from the coffers of petitioner and then
pocket P15,000.00 for their own personal use. 16 On this point, we note with
approval the following pronouncement of the Office of the Ombudsman:
"After a meticulous examination of the records of the case, the
undersigned finds that there is no sufficient evidence to establish a
probable cause for malversation or violation of R.A. 3019 for that
matter, and that respondents are probably guilty thereof. There is no
question that respondent Edgard Sta. Maria is the payee of Cash
Voucher No. 3150 dated August 3, 1992. On the face of the said cash
voucher, it is disclosed that it was prepared by the Bookkeeper,
certified as to the availability of funds by the Finance Officer and the
check prepared by the Cashier. It is also disclosed by the same
document that the cash advance was to be used for the design and
execution of Project Wawa Pipeline Extension. As regards, therefore,
to the participation of respondent Emma Censon it is very clear that
she has nothing to do with the cash advance of P33,190.73. With
respect to respondent Edgard Sta. Maria, obviously he has the duty to
liquidate the said cash advance. However, complainant's Annex "B"
which is a general ledger of account, disclose that the amount of
P16,790.40 was diverted to Paglabas Pipeline Extension, but which
diversion was authorized by the Board of Directors as per Board
Meeting of October 9, 1992. It is worthy to note that this general ledger
was signed by complainant's witnesses, the Bookkeeper and the
Finance Manager, in the same manner that they affixed signatures on
the cash voucher, together with the cashier.
Going back to respondent Sta. Maria's duty to liquidate or
account for the said cash advance, the evidence of complainant also
shows that the P16,790.40 was duly receipted by the Filacon
Enterprises for the amount of 4 rolls of P.S. Tubing (32 pieces) 1 x 100
cm. It cannot be said therefore, that the amount of P16,790.40 was
misappropriated by respondent Sta. Maria for his personal benefit. As
to the remaining balance of P15,000.00 which allegedly was pocketed
by respondent instead of using the same in payment in payment of
the design for the Wawa project, there also appears a reimbursement
expense receipt which is attached by the complainant as its Annex "D".
The same was signed by a certain civil engineer Ricardo Reyes. The
latter attested that he received the amount as partial payment for the
design. Complainant's claim that Ricardo Reyes is a fictitious person is
based on the certification from the Local Water Utilities Administration
that he is not an employee therein. The reimbursement expense
receipt did not however state that Engineer Ricardo Reyes is an
employee of LWUA. Hence, the certification of said agency will not be
conclusive evidence of Ricardo Reyes being a fictitious person, as
there was no representation of said fact in the reimbursement
receipt." 17
The above-quoted portion of the questioned resolution clearly shows

that the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman regarding the liability of
private respondents are supported by substantial evidence. The conclusion
that the amounts allegedly malversed by private respondents were actually
liquidated by them finds support not only in the evidence of private
respondents but even in the evidence submitted by petitioner in its complaint.
Such factual findings of the Office of the Ombudsman deserve due respect
from the Supreme Court and should not be disturbed on appeal. 18
Despite a clear showing that the issues involved in the instant petition
are factual, petitioner, nonetheless, invokes the power of the court to reverse
the decision of the Ombudsman by alleging that the Office of the Ombudsman
acted with grave abuse of discretion and authority. Petitioner claims that the
public respondents acted arbitrarily and whimsically in disregarding the
evidence on record which allegedly clearly show a prima facie case for
malversation.
We have closely examined the issues raised in the present petition, the
arguments in support thereof, as well as the comments of the respondents
thereon and the reply thereto and we find that the petition fails to show a
grave abuse of discretion or any act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the
part of private respondents. The public respondent's act of dismissing the
complaint against herein private respondents is neither whimsical or
capricious. In fact, the complaint of petitioner was taken up by the Office of
the Ombudsman in two extended discussions. Such fact virtually dispels any
allegation that arbitrariness or abuse of discretion attended the resolution of
petitioner's complaint. prcd
The act of the Ombudsman is dismissing the complaint is an exercise of

the Ombudsman's powers based upon constitutional mandate and the courts
should not interfere with such exercise. 19 The rule is based not only upon
respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the
Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well.
Otherwise, the functions of the Court will be grievously hampered by
innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed
before it.
One final point. Petitioner likewise contends that the Office of the
Ombudsman erred in stating that demand from the Commission on Audit to
settle or liquidate the amount is needed before a case for malversation can
mature. Citing the case of U.S. vs. Saberon, 20 the petitioner argues that
demand need not be made by the Commission on Audit as it is sufficient that
there is a law or regulation requiring the public officer to render an accounting.
There is merit in petitioner's contention although his reliance on the
cited case is misplaced. The Saberon case is not applicable as it deals with a
violation of Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code for failure of accountable
officers to render accounts. On the other hand, the instant case involves a
violation of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code for malversation of public
funds and property which is entirely separate and distinct from Article 218.
Petitioner should have cited the case of People vs. Tolentino 21 which held that
previous demand is not necessary for violation of Article 217 in spite of the last
paragraph of the said provision. The last paragraph of Article 217 provides
only for a rule of procedural law. More recently, in the case of Nizurtado vs.
Sandiganbayan, 22 the Court stated in this regard that "(d)emand merely raises
a prima faciepresumption that missing funds have been put to personal use.
The demand itself, however, is not an element of, and not indispensable to
constitute, malversation."
Be that as it may, this is still no reason to overturn the assailed Order
and Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman. The holding of the Office of
the Ombudsman that no demand was made by the Commission on Audit is
not the main reason why petitioner's complaint was dismissed. As stated
previously, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint as it found
that there was no sufficient evidence to establish probable cause against
private respondents for malversation or violation of R.A. 3019.
In sum, the Order and the Resolution of the Ombudsman are based on
substantial evidence. In dismissing the complaint of petitioner, we cannot say
that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion so as to call for the
exercise of our supervisory powers over him. This court is not a trier of facts.
As long as there is substantial evidence in support of the Ombudsman's
decision, that the decision will not be overturned. 23
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
The Resolution dated March 28, 1994 and the Order dated May 27, 1994 of the
Office of the Ombudsman are hereby AFFIRMED. cdasia
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Vitug, Panganiban and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 35-39.

2.Rollo, pp. 45-51.
3.Rollo, pp. 21-22.

4.Rollo, p. 32.
5.Rollo, p. 33.
6Rollo, p. 23.
7.Docketed as OMB Case No. 0-93-2579.
8.Rollo, pp. 19-20.
9.Rollo, p. 34.
10.Rollo, p. 36.
11.Rollo, pp. 36-37.

12.Rollo, p. 37.
13.Rollo, pp. 40-44.
14.Rollo, p. 7.
15.Hagad vs. Gozo-Dadole, 228 SCRA 718.
16.Rollo, p. 17.
17.Resolution dated March 28, 1994, pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 37-38.
18.Young vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 225 SCRA 718.
19.Ocampo, IV vs. Ombudsman, 225 SCRA 725.

20.19 Phil. 391.
21.69 Phil. 715.
22.239 SCRA 33.

23.Tan vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 295 SCRA 315.
(Morong Water District v. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, G.R. No. 116754,
|||
[March 17, 2000], 385 PHIL 45-58)

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 156169. August 12, 2005.]
VICTOR ONGSON, petitioner,vs.PEOPLE OF THE

Llosa Bongaciso Ruperto Abiera Zerna Law Offices for petitioner.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENTS; SHOULD STATE
CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH IT IS BASED;
RATIONALE; CASE AT BAR. — Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, as well
as Section 1 of Rule 36 and Section 1, Rule 120 of the Rules on Civil Procedure,
similarly state that a decision, judgment or final order determining the merits
of the case shall state, clearly and distinctly, the facts and the law on which it
is based. Pertinently, the Court issued on January 28, 1988 Administrative
Circular No. 1, which requires judges to make complete findings of facts in
their decision, and scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in the light of
the evidence presented, and avoid the tendency to generalize and to form
conclusion without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are
deduced. We emphasized in Velarde v. Social Justice Society, citing Yao v.
Court of Appeals, that: "Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14,
Article VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due
process and fair play. It is likewise demanded by the due process clause of
the Constitution. The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was
decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the
conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is
rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any
justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why
he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe
that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and
distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in
the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing
party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by
a higher tribunal. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the
parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of
legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge,
preventing him from deciding ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the
purse by the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign
prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of his
fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend on the power of reason for
sustained public confidence in the justness of his decision.". . . . Based on the
foregoing considerations, we find that the trial court's decision in the case at
bar did not state the material facts, i.e., the transaction that led to the issuance
of the checks, their respective amounts, the date and reason for dishonor. The
decision likewise failed to discuss the elements of B.P. 22 and other pertinent
facts. Clearly, the absence of relevant antecedents as well as the lack of
evaluation of the evidence adduced by the parties and justification for its
conclusion render the instant decision void.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; BATAS PAMBANSA 22; ELEMENTS. — The elements of
violation of B.P. 22 are: (1) making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply
on account or for value; (2) knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at
the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3)
subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit, or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
3. ID.;ID.;ID.;THE DISHONORED CHECK MUST BE SUFFICIENTLY
IDENTIFIED IN THE INFORMATION. — The first element, i.e.,making, drawing,
and issuance of any check, requires that the check be properly described in
the Information to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. Without a sufficient identification of the dishonored
check in the Information, the conviction of the accused should be set aside for
being violative of the constitutional requirement of due process. In the instant
case, petitioner should be acquitted in Criminal Case Nos. Q-93-43437 and Q-
93-43442, because the date of the check and the amount thereof as stated in
the Informations vary with the exhibits submitted by the prosecution, which
inconsistencies violate petitioner's constitutional right to be informed of the
nature of the offense charged.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INCONSISTENCIES IN THE IDENTITY OF THE
DISHONORED CHECKS JUSTIFY THE ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED. — The
Information in Criminal Case No. Q-93-43437, described Check No. 492615 as
dated October 15, 1992, for P3,117.00. The records, however, show that said
check differ from Exhibit "I", because the date and amount stated therein are
October 17, 1992 and 3,117.50, respectively. Likewise in Criminal Case No. Q-
93-43442, the date of Check No. 492580 as reflected in the Information is
September 28, 1992, while Exhibit "D" shows October 2, 1992. As held
in Dico v. Court of Appeals, citing Alonto v. People, these inconsistencies
justify the acquittal of the accused. . . .
5. ID.;ID.;ID.;ABSENT EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY, CHECKS ARE
PRESUMED TO HAVE BEEN ISSUED FOR VALUABLE CONSIDERATION; CASE AT
BAR. — There is no merit in petitioner's contention that the checks were issued
without valuable consideration. We have held that upon issuance of a check,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the same was
issued for valuable consideration, which may consist either in some right,
interest, profit or benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract, or
some forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or
service given, suffered or undertaken by the other side. It is an obligation to
do, or not to do in favor of the party who makes the contract, such as the
maker or endorser. In the case at bar, the prosecution established beyond
reasonable doubt that petitioner received money in various amounts from
private complainant. Whether the amounts were loans or investment in the
business of petitioner, the checks were issued for valuable consideration.
Either way, petitioner is under obligation to pay private complainant. Likewise,
the prosecution proved that some of the checks were payment for private
complainant's commission from selling the products of petitioner. Hence, the
latter cannot successfully claim that the issuance of the checks were not for a
valuable consideration.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; GRAVAMEN OF THE OFFENSE; MERE ISSUANCE OF A BUM
CHECK IS PUNISHABLE AND NOT THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH THE CHECK WAS
ISSUED NOR THE TERMS OR CONDITIONS RELATING TO ITS ISSUANCE. — Then
too, the gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. 22 is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check, that is, a check that is dishonored upon its
presentation for payment. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum
prohibition. So also, it is not the nonpayment of the obligation that is being
punished, but the making of worthless checks. What the law punishes is such
issuance of a bum check and not the purpose for which the check was issued
nor the terms or conditions relating to its issuance. Thus, even if there had
been payment through compensation or some other means, there could still
be prosecution for violation of B.P. 22.
7. ID.;ID.;ID.;PRIMA FACIE PRESUMPTION THAT THE DRAWER HAD
KNOWLEDGE OF THE INSUFFICIENCY OF HIS FUNDS OR CREDIT WITH THE
BANK, WHEN MAY ARISE. — As to the second element, we have held that
knowledge involves a state of mind which is difficult to establish, thus the
statute itself creates a prima facie presumption that the drawer had
knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank at the
time of the issuance and on the check's presentment for payment if he fails to
pay the amount of the check within five (5) banking days from notice of
dishonor. For this presumption to arise, the prosecution must prove the
following: (a) the check is presented within ninety (90) days from the date of
the check; (b) the drawer or maker of the check receives notice that such check
has not been paid by the drawee; and (c) the drawer or maker of the check
fails to pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon, or make
arrangements for payment in full within five (5) banking days after receiving
notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee. In other words, the
presumption is brought into existence only after it is proved that the issuer
had received a notice of dishonor and that within five days from receipt
thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangements for
its payment. The presumption or prima facie evidence as provided in this
section cannot arise, if such notice of nonpayment by the drawee bank is not
sent to the maker or drawer, or if there is no proof as to when such notice was
received by the drawer, since there would simply be no way of reckoning the
crucial 5-day period. Furthermore, the notice of dishonor must be in writing; a
verbal notice is not enough.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACCUSED'S RECEIPT OF THE NOTICE OF DISHONOR
WITHOUT PAYING THE VALUE OF THE CHECKS OR MAKING ARRANGEMENTS
FOR ITS PAYMENT WITHIN FIVE DAYS FROM RECEIPT THEREOF ESTABLISHED
THE PRIMA FACIE PRESUMPTION THAT HE HAD KNOWLEDGE OF THE
INSUFFICIENCY OF HIS FUNDS IN OR CREDIT WITH THE BANK AT THE TIME OF
THE ISSUANCE OF THE CHECKS. — In the instant case, petitioner through
counsel, admitted receipt of private complainant's demand letters sent via
registered mail, informing him of the dishonor of the checks and the reason
therefor; and demanding that the value of the check be paid in cash.
In King v. People, it was held that the accused's admission through counsel,
made during the trial, binds the client. Similarly, in Rigor v. People, the Court
ruled that the accused cannot pretend that he did not receive the notice of
dishonor of the check because the transcript of records shows that the
accused admitted knowledge of the dishonor of his check through a demand
letter received by him. That only a representative of petitioner signed the
registry return receipt in the case at bar is of no consequence because of the
unqualified admission by the latter that he received private complainant's
demand letter with notice of dishonor. Said admission binds him considering
that he never denied receipt of the notice of dishonor. Neither did he
contradict said judicial admission of receipt of the notice nor alleged a
palpable mistake in making the same. Thus, petitioner's receipt of the notice
of dishonor without paying the value of the checks or making arrangements
for its payment within five (5) days from receipt of said notice, established the
prima facie presumption that he had knowledge of the insufficiency of his
funds in or credit with the bank at the time of the issuance of the checks.
Failing to overcome this legal presumption, the findings of the courts below
must be sustained.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISHONOR OF THE CHECK BY THE DRAWEE BANK IS PRIMA
FACIE PRESUMED WHERE REASON FOR THE DISHONOR IS STAMPED IN THE
DORSAL PORTION OF THE CHECK. — The third element of violation of B.P. 22,
i.e., the dishonor of the check by the drawee bank, is also attendant in the
present case as shown by the reason for the dishonor as stamped in the dorsal
portion of the checks which are also prima facie presumptions of such
dishonor and the reasons therefor. In Garcia v. Court of Appeals, it was held
that while it is true that the presumption is merely prima facie, the accused
must, nonetheless, present proof to the contrary to overcome this
presumption. Here, other than the bare allegations of petitioner, he presented
no well-grounded defense to prove that the subject checks were not
dishonored by the drawee banks.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESENTATION OF THE DRAWEE BANK'S
REPRESENTATIVE AS A WITNESS TO TESTIFY ON THE DISHONOR OF THE
CHECKS, NOT INDISPENSABLE. — Likewise, in Recuerdo v. People, the court
emphasized that it is not required much less indispensable, for the
prosecution to present the drawee bank's representative as a witness to testify
on the dishonor of the checks. The prosecution may present, as it did in this
case, only private complainant as a witness to prove all the elements of the
offense charged. Said witness is competent and qualified to testify that upon
presentment for payment, the subject checks were dishonored by the drawee
bank.
11. ID.; ID.; IMPOSABLE PENALTY FOR VIOLATION THEREOF. —
Under Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, imprisonment need not be
imposed on those found guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22. Administrative Circular
No. 13-2001, issued on February 14, 2001, vests in the courts the discretion to
determine, taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case,
whether the imposition of fine (of not less than but not more than double the
amount of the check, but in no case exceeding P200,000.00), would best serve
the interest of justice, or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would
depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order,
or otherwise contrary to the imperatives of justice. In Recuerdo v. People,
and Young v. Court of Appeals, it was held that where there is neither proof
nor allegation that the accused is not a first time offender, imposition of the
penalty of fine instead of imprisonment is proper. Likewise, in Lee v. Court of
Appeals, we ruled that the policy laid down in Vaca v. Court of Appeals,
and Lim v. People, of redeeming valuable human material and preventing
unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness, should
be considered in favor of the accused who is not shown to be a habitual
delinquent or a recidivist. Said doctrines squarely apply in the instant case
there being no proof or allegation that petitioner is not a first time offender.
12. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; INTEREST; PAYMENT OF 12% INTEREST PER
ANNUM, WHEN PROPER; CASE AT BAR. — Finally, petitioner should be ordered
to pay interest of 12% per annum pursuant to Cabrera v. People, that when an
obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, the
interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. In the
absence of such stipulation, the rate shall be 12% per annum computed from
judicial or extrajudicial demand. In this case, there was no stipulated interest
on petitioner's obligation to pay the value of the dishonored checks. Demand
for payment was made extrajudicially as evidenced by petitioner's receipt of
private complainant's demand letter with notice of dishonor. The applicable
interest rate is therefore 12% per annum from the date of receipt of the
demand letter on December 7, 1992 for Check Nos. 492666, 492482, 492581
and 492319; December 10, 1992 for Check No. 119789; and December 18,
1992 for Check No. 492837 until finality of this decision. From the finality of
this decision, the total amount of the dishonored checks inclusive of interest
shall further earn 12% interest per annum until fully paid.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J : p
The instant petition for review seeks to annul and set aside the June 27,
2002 decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 18662 which affirmed
with modification the March 8, 1995 decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 97, in Criminal Case Nos. Q-93-43435 to Q-43442, finding
petitioner Victor Ongson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of eight (8) counts of
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22).
The evidence for the prosecution shows that on separate occasions,
private complainant Samson Uy extended loans to petitioner and as payment
therefor, he issued to Uy eight (8) post dated checks. Upon presentment, the
checks were dishonored and despite demands, petitioner failed to make good
the bounced checks. On April 15, 1993, eight (8) separate Informations were
filed against petitioner and docketed as follows:
Criminal Check Date Amount Drawee Reason for the
Case
No. No. Bank dishonor
Payment
Stopped/Drawn
Q-93- 119789 4 Nov. 23, 1992 P200,000.00 PSB Against Insufficient
43435 3
Funds (DAIF)
Q-93- 492837 6 Nov. 4, 1992 24,000.00 FBTC Account Closed

43436 5
Q-93- 492615 8 Oct. 15, 1992 3,117.00 FBTC DAIF
43437 7
Q-93- 492319 10 Oct. 15, 1992 11,887.10 FBTC DAIF
43438 9
Q-93- 492482 12 Oct. 15, 1992 50,000.00 FBTC DAIF
43439 11
Q-93- 492581 14 Oct. 4, 1992 25,500.00 FBTC DAIF
43440 13
Q-93- 492666 16 Oct. 2, 1992 200,000.00 FBTC DAIF
43441 15
Q-93- 492580 18 Sept. 28, 68,145.62 FBTC DAIF
43442 17 1992
Except as to the check's drawee bank, number, amount and date of
issue, the Informations were similarly worded in this wise:
That on or about the 23rd day of November, 1992, in Quezon
City, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to SAMSON UY to
apply on account or for value Philippine Savings Bank Check No.
119789 dated November 23, 1992 payable to Cash in the amount of
P200,000.00, Philippine Currency, said accused well knowing that at
the time of issue she/he/they did not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its
presentment, which check when presented for payment was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds/Account Closed and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor,
said accused failed to pay said Samson Uy the amount of said check
or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5)
banking days after receiving said notice. ETDAaC
CONTRARY TO LAW. 19
Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty.

At the pre-trial, petitioner admitted the authenticity of his signatures on
the checks, the stamps of dishonored deposit, the dates thereof and reasons
for dishonor. 20
After the prosecution rested its case, the defense presented Rowena
Carbon but since she failed to appear for continuation of the cross-
examination, 21 the trial court ordered her testimony stricken off the
record. 22 The defense also presented Evelyn Villareal who testified that Liana's
Supermarket, where Uy was sole distributor of petitioner's beverage products,
issued check vouchers to Uy. 23
On March 8, 1995, the trial court rendered a one-page decision finding
petitioner guilty as charged, the full text of which reads:
The consolidated Informations, above-numbered, for violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, for eight (8) counts are on record.
Upon arraignment accused pleaded Not Guilty and at the pre-

trial, he agreed to and signed the Pre-trial order on Page 108, dated
July 14th, 1993, wherein accused admitted the authenticity of the
signatures on the checks in question, Exh "B",Exh
"C","D","E","F","G","H","I" and submarkings thereon, showing the fact
of dishonor, the reason therefor and the dates thereof, reserving only
for trial on the merits the issue of the correctness of the amounts and
the consideration.
The private complainant testified as to the consideration, which

is also presumed under the law, unless rebutted by accused, which he
failed to do, convincing the court beyond reasonable doubt of his guilt
as charged herein.
WHEREFORE, accused Victor Ongson is hereby declared GUILTY
of Violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 on eight (8) counts and
sentenced to serve 6 months imprisonment for each of the eight (8)
counts and to pay a fine equivalent to the amount of the said checks
mentioned in the above-numbered informations or a total of
P582,149.72, and to indemnify, as actual and compensatory damages,
the private complainant Samson Uy in the same amount of the said
checks, or P582,149.72 plus interest at 12% from the date of this
decision.
SO ORDERED. 24
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals contending he was denied
due process and that the trial court's decision violated the Constitution and
the Rules of Court. In the assailed decision of June 27, 2002, the Court of
Appeals found no infirmity in the trial court's decision and affirmed the
conviction of petitioner, but modified the penalty as follows:
WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATIONS that the penalty of fine
is hereby DELETED and appellant sentenced to a prison term of thirty
(30) days in each of the eight (8) counts whereof he was found guilty
by the lower court, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED
and this appeal DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 25
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, the
instant petition. The issues for resolution are:
1) Was the decision of the trial court violative of the
requirements of the Constitution and the Rules of Court?
2) Was the conviction of petitioner proper?
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, as well as Section 1 of Rule 36

and Section 1, Rule 120 of the Rules on Civil Procedure, similarly state that a
decision, judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall state,
clearly and distinctly, the facts and the law on which it is based. Pertinently,
the Court issued on January 28, 1988 Administrative Circular No. 1, which
requires judges to make complete findings of facts in their decision, and
scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in the light of the evidence
presented, and avoid the tendency to generalize and to form conclusion
without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are deduced.
We emphasized in Velarde v. Social Justice Society, 26 citing Yao v. Court of
Appeals, 27 that:
"Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14,
Article VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a paramount
component of due process and fair play. It is likewise
demanded by the due process clause of theConstitution. The
parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided,
with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to
the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that
judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave
it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The
losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal
to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the
decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly
and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based
leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is
precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to
pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher
tribunal. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the
parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the
processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the
impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding ipse
dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by
the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign
prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property
of his fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend on the
power of reason for sustained public confidence in the justness
of his decision."
xxx xxx xxx
In the present case, it is starkly obvious that the assailed

Decision contains no statement of facts — much less an assessment
or analysis thereof — or of the court's findings as to the probable facts.
The assailed Decision begins with a statement of the nature of the
action and the question or issue presented. Then follows a brief
explanation of the constitutional provisions involved, and what the
Petition sought to achieve. Thereafter, the ensuing procedural
incidents before the trial court are tracked. The Decision proceeds to
a full-length opinion on the nature and the extent of the separation of
church and state. Without expressly stating the final conclusion she
has reached or specifying the relief granted or denied, the trial judge
ends her "Decision" with the clause "SO ORDERED."
What were the antecedents that necessitated the filing of the
Petition? What exactly were the distinct facts that gave rise to the
question sought to be resolved by SJS? More important, what were the
factual findings and analysis on which the trial court based its legal
findings and conclusions? None were stated or implied. Indeed, the
RTC's Decision cannot be upheld for its failure to express clearly and
distinctly the facts on which it was based. Thus, the trial court clearly
transgressed the constitutional directive.
The significance of factual findings lies in the value of the
decision as a precedent. How can it be so if one cannot apply the ruling
to similar circumstances, simply because such circumstances are
unknown? Otherwise stated, how will the ruling be applied in the
future, if there is no point of factual comparison?
Based on the foregoing considerations, we find that the trial court's

decision in the case at bar did not state the material facts, i.e., the transaction
that led to the issuance of the checks, their respective amounts, the date and
reason for dishonor. The decision likewise failed to discuss the elements
of B.P. 22 and other pertinent facts. Clearly, the absence of relevant
antecedents as well as the lack of evaluation of the evidence adduced by the
parties and justification for its conclusion render the instant decision void.
The Court would ordinarily remand this case to the court a quo for
compliance with the constitutional requirements. However, we deem it proper
to resolve the case on the merits to avoid further delay. 28
Section 1 of B.P. 22, states:
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds.— Any person who
year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount
of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two hundred thousand
pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the
court.
The elements of violation of B.P. 22 are: (1) making, drawing, and

issuance of any check to apply on account or for value; (2) knowledge of the
maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full
upon its presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment. 29
The first element, i.e.,making, drawing, and issuance of any check,
requires that the check be properly described in the Information to inform the
accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Without a
sufficient identification of the dishonored check in the Information, the
conviction of the accused should be set aside for being violative of the
constitutional requirement of due process. 30
In the instant case, petitioner should be acquitted in Criminal Case Nos.
Q-93-43437 and Q-93-43442, because the date of the check and the amount
thereof as stated in the Informations vary with the exhibits submitted by the
prosecution, which inconsistencies violate petitioner's constitutional right to
be informed of the nature of the offense charged.
The Information 31 in Criminal Case No. Q-93-43437, described Check
No. 492615 as dated October 15,1992, for P3,117.00.The records, however,
show that said check differ from Exhibit "I," because the date and amount
stated therein are October 17,1992 and 3,117.50,respectively. Likewise in
Criminal Case No. Q-93-43442, the date of Check No. 492580 as reflected in
the Information 32 is September 28, 1992,while Exhibit "D" shows October 2,
1992.
As held in Dico v. Court of Appeals, 33 citing Alonto v. People, 34 these
inconsistencies justify the acquittal of the accused. Thus —
In the information filed by Felipe C. Belciña, Prosecutor II, the
check involved is described as Far East Bank and Trust Company
(FEBTC) Check No. 364903 dated 12 May 1993 in the amount of
P100,000 payable to Equitable Banking Corporation. However, after
going over the records of the case, the parties, including the courts,
overlooked the fact that the check being identified in court was
different from that described in the information. The prosecution
marked as its Exhibit "B" FEBTC Check No. 369403 dated 12 May 1993
in the amount of P100,000 payable to Equitable Banking Corporation.
The issue as to the identity of the check, though not raised as an error,
should be considered in favor of the petitioner.
The variance in the identity of the check nullifies petitioner's

conviction. The identity of the check enters into the first element of
the offense under Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 — that a person draws or
issues a check on account or for value. There being a discrepancy in
the identity of the checks described in the information and that
presented in court, petitioner's constitutional right to be informed of
the nature of the offense charged will be violated if his conviction is
upheld.
In the case of Alonto v. People,this Court had this to say when there
was a variance involving the date as regards the check described in the
information and that adduced in evidence:
This Court notes, however, that under the third count,

the information alleged that petitioner issued a check dated 14
May 1992 whereas the documentary evidence presented and
duly marked as Exhibit "I" was BPI Check No. 831258 in the
amount of P25,000 dated 05 April 1992. Prosecution witness
Fernando Sardes confirmed petitioner's issuance of the three
BPI checks (Exhibits G, H, and I),but categorically stated that the
third check (BPI Check No. 831258) was dated 14 May 1992,
which was contrary to that testified to by private complainant
Violeta Tizon, i.e.,BPI check No. 831258 dated 05 April 1992. In
view of this variance, the conviction of petitioner on the third
count (Criminal Case No. Q-93-41751) cannot be sustained. It is
on this ground that petitioner's fourth assignment of error is
tenable, in that the prosecution's exhibit, i.e., Exhibit "I" (BPI
Check No. 831258 dated 05 April 1992 in the amount of
P25,000) is excluded by the law and the rules on evidence. Since
the identity of the check enters into the first essential element
of the offense under Section 1 of B.P. 22, that is, that a
person makes, draws or issues a check on account or for value,
and the date thereof involves its second element, namely,
that at the time of issue the maker, drawer or issuer knew that
he or she did not have sufficient funds to cover the same, there
is a violation of petitioner's constitutional right to be informed
of the nature of the offense charged in view of the aforesaid
variance, thereby rendering the conviction for the third count
fatally defective.
With respect to Criminal Case Nos. Q-93-43435, Q-93-43436, Q-93-

43438, Q-93-43439, Q-93-43440 and Q-93-43441, the judgment of conviction
should be affirmed.
There is no merit in petitioner's contention that the checks were issued
without valuable consideration. We have held that upon issuance of a check,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the same was
issued for valuable consideration, which may consist either in some right,
interest, profit or benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract, or
some forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or
service given, suffered or undertaken by the other side. It is an obligation to
do, or not to do in favor of the party who makes the contract, such as the
maker or endorser. 35
In the case at bar, the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt
that petitioner received money in various amounts from private complainant.
Whether the amounts were loans or investment in the business of petitioner,
the checks were issued for valuable consideration. Either way, petitioner is
under obligation to pay private complainant. Likewise, the prosecution proved
that some of the checks were payment for private complainant's commission
from selling the products of petitioner. Hence, the latter cannot successfully
claim that the issuance of the checks were not for a valuable consideration.
Interestingly, while petitioner denied existence of consideration, he at
the same time admitted that his obligation was P358,872.72 and not
P582,149.72. 36 It appears from Rowena Carbon's testimony that, as sole
distributor of petitioner's product to Liana's Supermarket, private complainant
received from the latter 3 checks in the amounts of P41,748.00, P78,840.00
and P105,209.00, but were not remitted to petitioner. 37 Hence, Carbon
claimed that the total unremitted amount of the checks should be deducted
from the indebtedness of the latter. AHaETS
These declarations of Carbon, however, will not warrant the acquittal of

petitioner because Carbon's testimony was stricken off the record by the trial
court. Even if Carbon's testimony was retained, the alleged receipt by private
complainant of the P41,748.00 and P78,840.00 checks will not warrant the
acquittal of petitioner because the same were without documentary
basis; 38 and while the amount of P105,209.00 was supported with a voucher
dated July 29, 1992, 39 petitioner failed to positively show that private
complainant did not remit said amount. Likewise, Carbon did not specify
whether the check was drawn to cash or to the order of Beverly Food Ventures
Corporation. If it was drawn to cash, then it is petitioner's burden to prove that
the payment was intended for Beverly Food Ventures Corporation and not for
private complainant. If it was paid to the order of the corporation, then the
latter must at least establish that private complainant was able to encash and
profit from said check. Moreover, Evelyn Villareal never validated the alleged
receipt by private complainant of the P41,748.00, P78,840.00 and P105,209.00
checks. While she declared that Liana's Supermarket issued checks to
petitioner, the subject 3 checks were not specified in her testimony.
Then too, the gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. 22 is the act of
making and issuing a worthless check, that is, a check that is dishonored upon
its presentation for payment. The mere act of issuing a worthless check
is malum prohibitum.So also, it is not the nonpayment of the obligation that is
being punished, but the making of worthless checks. 40 What the law punishes
is such issuance of a bum check and not the purpose for which the check was
issued nor the terms or conditions relating to its issuance. 41 Thus, even if
there had been payment through compensation or some other means, there
could still be prosecution for violation of B.P. 22. 42
As to the second element, we have held that knowledge involves a state
of mind which is difficult to establish, thus the statute itself creates a prima
facie presumption that the drawer had knowledge of the insufficiency of his
funds in or credit with the bank at the time of the issuance and on the check's
presentment for payment if he fails to pay the amount of the check within five
(5) banking days from notice of dishonor. 43
Sec. 2 of B.P. 22, provides:
SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds.— The making,
drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the
drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when
presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall
credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the
amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by
the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving
notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
For this presumption to arise, the prosecution must prove the following:
(a) the check is presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check;
(b) the drawer or maker of the check receives notice that such check has not
been paid by the drawee; and (c) the drawer or maker of the check fails to pay
the holder of the check the amount due thereon, or make arrangements for
payment in full within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such
check has not been paid by the drawee. In other words, the presumption is
brought into existence only after it is proved that the issuer had received a
notice of dishonor and that within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to
pay the amount of the check or to make arrangements for its payment. The
presumption or prima facie evidence as provided in this section cannot arise,
if such notice of nonpayment by the drawee bank is not sent to the maker or
drawer, or if there is no proof as to when such notice was received by the
drawer, since there would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial 5-day
period. 44 Furthermore, the notice of dishonor must be in writing; a verbal
notice is not enough. 45
In the instant case, petitioner through counsel, admitted receipt of
private complainant's demand letters sent viaregistered mail, informing him
of the dishonor of the checks and the reason therefor; and demanding that
the value of the check be paid in cash. Pertinent portion of the transcript of
stenographic notes, reads:
ATTY. YABUT [private respondent's counsel]:
...Exh. "J" is the demand letter dated November 27, 1992 and the
signature of the counsel therein marked as Exh. "J-1" to prove
that a demand letter was sent to the accused and to his wife,
Mrs. Grace Tiu Ongson, demanding therein that the said
dishonored check be encashed or be replaced and the Registry
Receipt which is Exh. "J-2" and Registry Return Receipt which
is Exh. "J-3" is being offered to prove that the said demand
letter was sent by registered mail and the same was sent
as per Exh. "J-2" and received [on December 7, 1992] by the
accused thru his representative which is Exh. "J-3"; and Exh.
"K" is the same demand letter dated November 27, 1992 and
signed by the counsel which is marked as Exh. "K-1" addressed
to the accused and/or his wife, Mrs. Grace Tiu Ongson and
demanding therein that the said check which is stated in the
said demand letter which bounced be replaced with cash; Exh.
"K-2" which is the Registry Receipt; and Exh. "K-3" which is the
Registry Return Receipt is being offered to prove that the
demand letter was sent to the accused by registered mail
and that the same was received [on December 7, 1992 by
his authorized representative;Exh. "L" is the demand letter
dated December 3, 1992 addressed to the accused demanding
therein that the said check contained in the demand letter be
replaced with cash or be made good and the signature therein
of the lawyer which is Exh. "L-1" is being offered to prove that
the demand letter was sent by the lawyer and that the registry
receipt marked as Exh. "L-2" and the Registry Return
Receipt, Exh. "L-3" is being offered to prove that it was sent
by registered mail and that the same was received by the
accused [on December 7, 1992];Exh. "M" which is a demand
letter dated December 15, 1992 sent to the accused demanding
therein that the check bounced and that the same should be
replaced with cash or be made good accordingly, and the
signature of the lawyer which is Exh. "M-l" to prove that the said
lawyer sent a demand letter to the accused; and the Registry
Receipt marked as Exh. "M-2" and the Registry Return Receipt
Exh. "M-3" to prove that the demand letter was sent to the
accused and received by his representative [on December
18, 1992];we are therefore offering for the admission of this
Honorable Court the exhibits from Exh. "A" to Exh. "M"
accordingly and the testimony of the private complainant to this
Honorable Court.
COURT:
Any comments?
ATTY. GIRONELLA [petitioner's counsel]:
With the kind permission of the Honorable Court.
COURT:
Proceed.
ATTY. GIRONELLA:
With respect to the various demand letters marked as Exhs.

"H","J","K","L" and "M",we admit them insofar as we intend
to prove that there was such a demand letter and demand
these letters were received by the accused (sic); 46
In King v. People, 47 it was held that the accused's admission through

counsel, made during the trial, binds the client. Similarly,
in Rigor v. People, 48 the Court ruled that the accused cannot pretend that he
did not receive the notice of dishonor of the check because the transcript of
records shows that the accused admitted knowledge of the dishonor of his
check through a demand letter received by him.
Section 4 of Rule 129, states:
SEC. 4. Judicial admissions.— An admission, verbal or written,
made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case,
does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made.
That only a representative of petitioner signed the registry return receipt

in the case at bar is of no consequence because of the unqualified admission
by the latter that he received private complainant's demand letter with notice
of dishonor. Said admission binds him considering that he never denied
receipt of the notice of dishonor. Neither did he contradict said judicial
admission of receipt of the notice nor alleged a palpable mistake in making
the same. Thus, petitioner's receipt of the notice of dishonor without paying
the value of the checks or making arrangements for its payment within five (5)
days from receipt of said notice, established the prima facie presumption that
he had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank at
the time of the issuance of the checks. Failing to overcome this legal
presumption, the findings of the courts below must be sustained.
The third element of violation of B.P. 22, i.e.,the dishonor of the check by
the drawee bank, is also attendant in the present case as shown by the reason
for the dishonor as stamped in the dorsal portion of the checks which are
also prima facie presumptions of such dishonor and the reasons
therefor. 49 In Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 50 it was held that while it is true that
the presumption is merely prima facie,the accused must, nonetheless, present
proof to the contrary to overcome this presumption. Here, other than the bare
allegations of petitioner, he presented no well-grounded defense to prove that
the subject checks were not dishonored by the drawee banks.
Likewise, in Recuerdo v. People, 51 the court emphasized that it is not
required much less indispensable, for the prosecution to present the drawee
bank's representative as a witness to testify on the dishonor of the checks. The
prosecution may present, as it did in this case, only private complainant as a
witness to prove all the elements of the offense charged. Said witness is
competent and qualified to testify that upon presentment for payment, the
subject checks were dishonored by the drawee bank.
Furthermore, the dishonor was bolstered by the pre-trial order duly
signed by petitioner where he admitted dishonor of the subjects
checks. 52 Incidentally, there is no merit in petitioner's contention that the pre-
trial was irregular because it was held in his absence and before arraignment.
Records show that the May 17, 1993 pre-trial held in the absence of petitioner
was annulled by the trial court. 53 Pre-trial was re-set and conducted on July
14, 1993, after arraignment in the presence of petitioner, 54 who affixed his
signature in the pre-trial order with the assistance of counsel. cITCAa
All told, the Courts finds that all the elements of violation of B.P. 22 had
been established beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. Nevertheless,
the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals should be modified.
Under Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, imprisonment need not be
imposed on those found guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22. Administrative Circular
No. 13-2001, issued on February 14, 2001, vests in the courts the discretion to
determine, taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case,
whether the imposition of fine (of not less than but not more than double the
amount of the check, but in no case exceeding P200,000.00), would best serve
the interest of justice, or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would
depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order,
or otherwise contrary to the imperatives of justice. 55
In Recuerdo v. People,and Young v. Court of Appeals, 56 it was held that

where there is neither proof nor allegation that the accused is not a first time
offender, imposition of the penalty of fine instead of imprisonment is proper.
Likewise, in Lee v. Court of Appeals, 57 we ruled that the policy laid down
in Vaca v. Court of Appeals, 58 and Lim v. People, 59 of redeeming valuable
human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty
and economic usefulness, should be considered in favor of the accused who
is not shown to be a habitual delinquent or a recidivist. Said doctrines squarely
apply in the instant case there being no proof or allegation that petitioner is
not a first time offender.
Finally, petitioner should be ordered to pay interest of 12% per annum
pursuant to Cabrera v. People, 60 that when an obligation is breached, and it
consists in the payment of a sum of money, the interest due should be that which
may have been stipulated in writing. In the absence of such stipulation, the rate
shall be 12% per annum computed from judicial or extrajudicial demand. In this
case, there was no stipulated interest on petitioner's obligation to pay the value of
the dishonored checks. Demand for payment was made extrajudicially as
evidenced by petitioner's receipt of private complainant's demand letter with notice
of dishonor. The applicable interest rate is therefore 12% per annum from the
date of receipt of the demand letter on December 7, 1992 for Check Nos.
492666, 492482, 492581 and 492319; December 10, 1992 for Check No.
119789; and December 18, 1992 for Check No. 492837 until finality of this
decision. From the finality of this decision, the total amount of the dishonored
checks inclusive of interest shall further earn 12% interest per annum until
fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The June 27, 2002
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 18662 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS.
In Criminal Case Nos. Q-93-43437 and Q-93-43442, petitioner
Victor Ongson is ACQUITTED of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 on the ground that his
guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
In Criminal Case Nos. Q-93-43435, Q-93-43436, Q-93-43438, Q-93-43439,
Q-93-43440 and Q-93-43441 petitioner is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and is sentenced as follows:
(1) In Criminal Case No. Q-93-43435, petitioner is sentenced to
pay a fine of P200,000.00 and to indemnify private complainant
Samson Uy in the amount of P200,000.00 with 12% interest per
annum from the date of receipt of the demand letter on December 10,
1992, until the finality of this Decision;
pay a fine of P48,000.00 and to indemnify private complainant Samson
Uy in the amount of P24,000.00 with 12% interest per annum from the
date of receipt of the demand letter on December 18, 1992, until the
finality of this Decision;
finality of this Decision;
Samson Uy in the amount of P50,000.00 with 12% interest per annum
from the date of receipt of the demand letter on December 7, 1992,
until the finality of this Decision;
finality of this Decision; and

Samson Uy in the amount of P200,000.00 with 12% interest per
annum from the date of receipt of the demand letter on December 7,
1992, until the finality of this Decision.
The total amount of the dishonored checks inclusive of interest shall

further earn 12% interest per annum from the finality of the decision until fully
paid.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr.,C. J.,Quisumbing, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Penned by now Supreme Court Associate Justice Cancio C. Garcia and concurred
in by Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Eliezer R. De Los Santos
(Rollo,pp. 25-37).
2.Penned by Judge Oscar L. Leviste, Rollo,p. 114.

3.Records, pp. 2-3.
4.Exhibit "B",Folder of Exhibits, p. 1.
5.Records, pp. 4-5.

6.Exhibit "C",Folder of Exhibits, p. 1.
7.Records, pp. 6-7.

8.Exhibit "I",Folder of Exhibits, p. 2.
9.Records, pp. 8-9.
10.Exhibit "H",Folder of Exhibits, p. 2.

12.Exhibit "G",Folder of Exhibits, p. 2.

14.Exhibit "F",Folder of Exhibits, p. 2.
16.Exhibit "E",Folder of Exhibits, p. 1.

18.Exhibit "D",Folder of Exhibits, p. 1.

19.Records, p. 2.
20.Rollo,p. 49.
21.Records, p. 194.
22.Id.at 201.
23.TSN, 29 November 1993, pp. 9-11.
24.Rollo,p. 114.
25.Id.at 37.
26.G.R. No. 159357, 28 April 2004, 428 SCRA 283, 306-308.

27.G.R. No. 132428, 24 October 2000, 344 SCRA 202.
28.People v. Lizada,444 Phil. 67, 80 (2003).See also People v. Bugarin,339 Phil. 570,
580 (1997).
29.Dico v. Court of Appeals,G.R. No. 141669, 28 February 2005.
30Id.
31.Records, p. 6.
32.Id.at 16.
33.Supra.
34.G.R. No. 140078, 9 December 2004, 445 SCRA 624.

35.Lee v. Court of Appeals,G.R. No. 145498, 17 January 2005.
36.TSN, 6 October 1993, p. 30.
37.Id.at 14-16.
38.Id.at 16-17.
39.Id.at 19-22.
40.Ngo v. People,G.R. No. 155815, 14 July 2004, 434 SCRA 522, 530-531.
41.Sia v. People,G.R. No. 149695, 28 April 2004, 428 SCRA 206, 221.
42.Tan v. Mendez, Jr.,432 Phil. 760, 769-770 (2002).

43.Lee v. Court of Appeals, supra.
44.Dico v. Court of Appeals, supra.

45.Marigomen v. People,G.R. No. 153451, 26 May 2005.
46.TSN, 13 September 1993, pp. 56-57 (emphasis supplied).
47.377 Phil. 692, 705 (1999).

48.G.R. No. 144887, 17 November 2004, 442 SCRA 450, 462-463.
49.King v. People, supra at 708.
50.G.R. No. 138197, 27 November 2002, 393 SCRA 79, 86.

51.443 Phil. 770, 780 (2003).
52.Records, p. 108.
53.Id.at 90-91.
54.Id.at 106.
55.Recuerdo v. People, supra at 781.

56.G.R. No. 140425, 10 March 2005.
57.G.R. No. 145498, 17 January 2005.
58.359 Phil. 187 (1998).

59.394 Phil. 844 (2000).
60.G.R. No. 150618, 24 July 2003, 407 SCRA 247.
||| (Ongson v. People, G.R. No. 156169, [August 12, 2005], 504 PHIL 214-238)
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 192330. November 14, 2012.]
ARNOLD JAMES M. YSIDORO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

DECISION
ABAD, J :
p
This case is about a municipal mayor charged with illegal diversion of

food intended for those suffering from malnutrition to the beneficiaries of
reconstruction projects affecting the homes of victims of calamities.
The Facts and the Case
The Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas accused Arnold James M.
Ysidoro before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 28228 of violation of illegal
use of public property (technical malversation) under Article 220 of
the Revised Penal Code. 1
The facts show that the Municipal Social Welfare and Development
Office (MSWDO) of Leyte, Leyte, operated a Core Shelter Assistance Program
(CSAP) that provided construction materials to indigent calamity victims with
which to rebuild their homes. The beneficiaries provided the labor needed for
construction.
On June 15, 2001 when construction for calamity victims in Sitio Luy-
a, Barangay Tinugtogan, was 70% done, the beneficiaries stopped reporting
for work for the reason that they had to find food for their families. This
worried Lolita Garcia (Garcia), the CSAP Officer-in-Charge, for such
construction stoppage could result in the loss of construction materials
particularly the cement. Thus, she sought the help of Cristina Polinio (Polinio),
an officer of the MSWDO in charge of the municipality's Supplemental Feeding
Program (SFP) that rationed food to malnourished children. Polinio told Garcia
that the SFP still had sacks of rice and boxes of sardines in its storeroom. And
since she had already distributed food to the mother volunteers, what
remained could be given to the CSAP beneficiaries.
Garcia and Polinio went to petitioner Arnold James M. Ysidoro, the Leyte
Municipal Mayor, to seek his approval. After explaining the situation to him,
Ysidoro approved the release and signed the withdrawal slip for four sacks of
rice and two boxes of sardines worth P3,396.00 to CSAP. 2 Mayor Ysidoro
instructed Garcia and Polinio, however, to consult the accounting department
regarding the matter. On being consulted, Eldelissa Elises, the supervising
clerk of the Municipal Accountant's Office, signed the withdrawal slip based on
her view that it was an emergency situation justifying the release of the goods.
Subsequently, CSAP delivered those goods to its beneficiaries. Afterwards,
Garcia reported the matter to the MSWDO and to the municipal auditor as per
auditing rules.CaAcSE
On August 27, 2001 Alfredo Doller, former member of the Sangguniang

Bayan of Leyte, filed the present complaint against Ysidoro. Nierna Doller,
Alfredo's wife and former MSWDO head, testified that the subject SFP goods
were intended for its target beneficiaries, Leyte's malnourished children. She
also pointed out that the Supplemental Feeding Implementation Guidelines
for Local Government Units governed the distribution of SFP goods. 3 Thus,
Ysidoro committed technical malversation when he approved the distribution
of SFP goods to the CSAP beneficiaries.
In his defense, Ysidoro claims that the diversion of the subject goods to
a project also meant for the poor of the municipality was valid since they came
from the savings of the SFP and the Calamity Fund. Ysidoro also claims good
faith, believing that the municipality's poor CSAP beneficiaries were also in
urgent need of food. Furthermore, Ysidoro pointed out that the COA Municipal
Auditor conducted a comprehensive audit of their municipality in 2001 and
found nothing irregular in its transactions.
On February 8, 2010 the Sandiganbayan found Ysidoro guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of technical malversation. But, since his action caused no
damage or embarrassment to public service, it only fined him P1,698.00 or
50% of the sum misapplied. The Sandiganbayan held that Ysidoro applied
public property to a pubic purpose other than that for which it has been
appropriated by law or ordinance. On May 12, 2010 the Sandiganbayan denied
Ysidoro's motion for reconsideration. On June 8, 2010 Ysidoro appealed the
Sandiganbayan Decision to this Court.
The Questions Presented
In essence, Ysidoro questions the Sandiganbayan's finding that he
committed technical malversation. He particularly raises the following
questions:
1. Whether or not he approved the diversion of the subject goods to a
public purpose different from their originally intended purpose; CAIHTE
2. Whether or not the goods he approved for diversion were in the

nature of savings that could be used to augment the other authorized
expenditures of the municipality;
3. Whether or not his failure to present the municipal auditor can be
taken against him; and
4. Whether or not good faith is a valid defense for technical
malversation.
The Court's Rulings
One. The crime of technical malversation as penalized under Article 220
of the Revised Penal Code 4 has three elements: a) that the offender is an
accountable public officer; b) that he applies public funds or property under
his administration to some public use; and c) that the public use for which such
funds or property were applied is different from the purpose for which they
were originally appropriated by law or ordinance. 5 Ysidoro claims that he
could not be held liable for the offense under its third element because the
four sacks of rice and two boxes of sardines he gave the CSAP beneficiaries
were not appropriated by law or ordinance for a specific purpose.
But the evidence shows that on November 8, 2000 the Sangguniang
Bayan of Leyte enacted Resolution 00-133 appropriating the annual general
fund for 2001. 6 This appropriation was based on the executive budget 7 which
allocated P100,000.00 for the SFP and P113,957.64 for the Comprehensive and
Integrated Delivery of Social Services 8 which covers the CSAP housing
projects. 9 The creation of the two items shows the Sanggunian's intention to
appropriate separate funds for SFP and the CSAP in the annual budget.
Since the municipality bought the subject goods using SFP funds, then
those goods should be used for SFP's needs, observing the rules prescribed
for identifying the qualified beneficiaries of its feeding programs. The target
clientele of the SFP according to its manual 10 are: 1) the moderately and
severely underweight pre-school children aged 36 months to 72 months; and
2) the families of six members whose total monthly income is P3,675.00 and
below. 11 This rule provides assurance that the SFP would cater only to the
malnourished among its people who are in urgent need of the government's
limited resources. AaITCS
Ysidoro disregarded the guidelines when he approved the distribution

of the goods to those providing free labor for the rebuilding of their own
homes. This is technical malversation. If Ysidoro could not legally distribute
the construction materials appropriated for the CSAP housing beneficiaries to
the SFP malnourished clients neither could he distribute the food intended for
the latter to CSAP beneficiaries.
Two. Ysidoro claims that the subject goods already constituted savings
of the SFP and that, therefore, the same could already be diverted to the CSAP
beneficiaries. He relies on Abdulla v. People 12 which states that funds classified
as savings are not considered appropriated by law or ordinance and can be
used for other public purposes. The Court cannot accept Ysidoro's argument.
The subject goods could not be regarded as savings. The SFP is a
continuing program that ran throughout the year. Consequently, no one could
say in mid-June 2001 that SFP had already finished its project, leaving funds or
goods that it no longer needed. The fact that Polinio had already distributed
the food items needed by the SFP beneficiaries for the second quarter of 2001
does not mean that the remaining food items in its storeroom constituted
unneeded savings. Since the requirements of hungry mouths are hard to
predict to the last sack of rice or can of sardines, the view that the subject
goods were no longer needed for the remainder of the year was quite
premature.
In any case, the Local Government Code provides that an ordinance has
to be enacted to validly apply funds, already appropriated for a determined
public purpose, to some other purpose. Thus:
SEC. 336. Use of Appropriated Funds and Savings. — Funds shall
be available exclusively for the specific purpose for which they have
been appropriated. No ordinance shall be passed authorizing any
transfer of appropriations from one item to another. However, the
local chief executive or the presiding officer of the sanggunian
concerned may, by ordinance, be authorized to augment any item in
the approved annual budget for their respective offices from savings
in other items within the same expense class of their respective
appropriations.
The power of the purse is vested in the local legislative body. By

requiring an ordinance, the law gives the Sanggunian the power to determine
whether savings have accrued and to authorize the augmentation of other
items on the budget with those savings. HTCaAD
Three. Ysidoro claims that, since the municipal auditor found nothing
irregular in the diversion of the subject goods, such finding should be
respected. The SB ruled, however, that since Ysidoro failed to present the
municipal auditor at the trial, the presumption is that his testimony would
have been adverse if produced. Ysidoro argues that this goes against the rule
on the presumption of innocence and the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions.
Ysidoro may be right in that there is no basis for assuming that had the
municipal auditor testified, his testimony would have been adverse to the
mayor. The municipal auditor's view regarding the transaction is not
conclusive to the case and will not necessarily negate the mayor's liability if it
happened to be favorable to him. The Court will not, therefore, be drawn into
speculations regarding what the municipal auditor would have said had he
appeared and testified.
Four. Ysidoro insists that he acted in good faith since, first, the idea of
using the SFP goods for the CSAP beneficiaries came, not from him, but from
Garcia and Polinio; and, second, he consulted the accounting department if
the goods could be distributed to those beneficiaries. Having no criminal
intent, he argues that he cannot be convicted of the crime.
But criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law
punishes the act of diverting public property earmarked by law or ordinance
for a particular public purpose to another public purpose. The offense is mala
prohibita, meaning that the prohibited act is not inherently immoral but
becomes a criminal offense because positive law forbids its commission based
on considerations of public policy, order, and convenience. 13 It is the
commission of an act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect
thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated.
Hence, malice or criminal intent is completely irrelevant. 14
Dura lex sed lex. Ysidoro's act, no matter how noble or miniscule the
amount diverted, constitutes the crime of technical malversation. The law and
this Court, however, recognize that his offense is not grave, warranting a mere
fine.
WHEREFORE, this Court AFFIRMS in its entirety the assailed Decision of
the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 28228 dated February 8, 2010. IcESaA
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Perez * and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
*Designated Acting Member, per Special Order 1299 dated August 28, 2012.
1.Records, p. 1.
2.Id. at 250.
3.Id. at 260-329.
4.Art. 220. Illegal use of public funds or property. — Any public officer who shall
apply any public fund or property under his administration to any public
use other than for which such fund or property were appropriated by law
or ordinance shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum
period or a fine ranging from one-half to the total of the sum misapplied, if
by reason of such misapplication, any damages or embarrassment shall
have resulted to the public service. In either case, the offender shall also
suffer the penalty of temporary special disqualification.
If no damage or embarrassment to the public service has resulted, the

penalty shall be a fine from 5 to 50 per cent of the sum misapplied.
5.Parungao v. Sandiganbayan, 274 Phil. 451, 460 (1991).
6.Records, pp. 258-259.
7.SEC. 318. Preparation of the Budget by the Local Chief Executive. — Upon receipt of
the statements of income and expenditures from the treasurer, the budget
proposals of the heads of departments and offices, and the estimates of
income and budgetary ceilings from the local finance committee, the local
chief executive shall prepare the executive budget for the ensuing
fiscal year in accordance with the provisions of this Title. The local
chief executive shall submit the said executive budget to the
sanggunian concerned not later than the sixteenth (16th) of October of
the current fiscal year. Failure to submit such budget on the date
prescribed herein shall subject the local chief executive to such criminal
and administrative penalties as provided for under this Code and other
applicable laws. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 319. Legislative Authorization of the Budget. — On or before the end of

the current fiscal year, the sanggunian concerned shall enact, through an
ordinance, the annual budget of the local government unit for the ensuing
fiscal year on the basis of the estimates of income and expenditures
submitted by the local chief executive.
8.Records, p. 254.
9.TSN, May 23, 2006, p. 15 (rollo, pp. 127-128) and TSN, August 2, 2007, pp. 15-16
(rollo, p. 130).
10.Guidelines on the Management of CRS Supported Supplemental Feeding

Program Implemented by the Local Government Units;
Sandiganbayan rollo, Vol. I, pp. 260-329.
11.Id. at 263.
12.495 Phil. 70 (2005).
13.FLORENZ REGALADO, CRIMINAL LAW CONSPECTUS (2003 rev. ed), citing People
v. Pavlic, 227 Mich., 563, N.W. 371, 35 ALR.
14.Luciano v. Estrella, 145 Phil. 454, 464-465 (1970).
||| (Ysidoro v. People, G.R. No. 192330, [November 14, 2012], 698 PHIL 813-821)
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 150129. April 6, 2005.]
NORMA A. ABDULLA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

DECISION
GARCIA, J :
p
Convicted by the Sandiganbayan 1 in its Crim. Case No. 23261 of the

crime of illegal use of public funds defined and penalized under Article 220 of
the Revised Penal Code, or more commonly known as technical malversation,
appellant Norma A. Abdulla is now before this Court on petition for review
under Rule 45.
Along with Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, appellant was charged
under an Information which pertinently reads:
That on or about November, 1989 or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Jolo, Sulu, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused:
NORMA A. ABDULLA and NENITA P. AGUIL, both public officers, being
then the President and cashier, respectively, of the Sulu State College,
and as such by reason of their positions and duties are accountable
for public funds under their administration, while in the performance
of their functions, conspiring and confederating with MAHMUD I.
DARKIS, also a public officer, being then the Administrative Officer V
of the said school, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, without lawful authority, apply for the payment of wages
of casuals, the amount of FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00),
Philippine Currency, which amount was appropriated for the payment
of the salary differentials of secondary school teachers of the said
school, to the damage and prejudice of public service.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Appellant's co-accused, Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, were both
acquitted. Only appellant was found guilty and sentenced by the
Sandiganbayan in its decision 2 dated August 25, 2000 (promulgated on
September 27, 2000), as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Mahmud Darkis
and Nenita P. Aguil are hereby acquitted of the crime charged. The
cash bond posted by each of the said accused for their provisional
liberty are hereby ordered returned to each of them subject to the
usual auditing and accounting procedures. SACEca
Accused Norma Abdulla is hereby convicted of the crime

charged and is hereby meted a fine of three thousand pesos, pursuant
to the second paragraph of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. She
is further imposed the penalty of temporary special disqualification
for a period of six (6) years. She shall also pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.
Upon motion for reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan amended

appellant's sentence by deleting the temporary special disqualification
imposed upon her, thus:
Premises considered, the decision of this Court dated August
25, 2000, is hereby amended to the effect that the penalty of
temporary special disqualification for six (6) years is hereby cancelled
and set aside. Hence, the last paragraph of said decision shall read as
follows:
Accused Abdulla is hereby convicted of the crime

charged and is hereby meted a fine of three thousand pesos,
pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 220 of the Revised
Penal Code. She shall also pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED. 3
Still dissatisfied, appellant, now before this Court, persistently pleas

innocence of the crime charged.
The record shows that the prosecution dispensed with the presentation
of testimonial evidence and instead opted to mark in evidence the following
exhibits:
EXHIBITS DESCRIPTION
"A" Audit Report which is denominated as Memorandum of

Commission on Audit, Region IX, Zamboanga City, from
the Office of the Special Audit Team, COA, dated May 8,
1992, consisting of nine (9) pages;
"B" Certified Xerox copy of a letter from the Department of

Budget and Management through Secretary Guillermo N.
Carague to the President of the Sulu State College dated
October 30, 1989;
"C" Certified copy of the DBM Advice of Allotment for the

Year 1989;
"C-1" The entry appearing in Exhibit "C" which reads: "Purpose

— release partial funding for the conversion of 34
Secondary School Teacher positions to Instructor I items;
Fund Source — lump-sum appropriation authorized on
page 370 of RA 6688 and the current savings under
personal services;"
"D" Manifestation filed by accused Norma Abdulla herself

dated November 24, 1997 consisting of two (2) pages
appearing on pages 225 to 226 of the record;
"E" Motion filed by the accused through Atty. Sandra Gopez

dated February 9, 1998 found on pages 382-a and 382-b
of the records of this case; and
"F" Prosecution's Opposition to the motion marked as Exhibit

"E" dated February 11, 1998, consisting of three (3)
pages, appearing in pages 383 to 385 of the record. 4
Thereafter, the prosecution immediately made its Formal Offer of

Evidence, and, with the admission thereof by the court, rested its case. TAaIDH
The defense proceeded to adduce its evidence by presenting four (4)

witnesses, namely, accused Mahmud Darkis, who was the Administrative
Officer of Sulu State College, Jolo, Sulu; accused Nenita Aguil, the Cashier of
the same College; appellant Norma Abdulla herself, who was the College
President; and Gerardo Concepcion, Jr., Director IV and Head of the
Department of Budget and Management, Regional Office No. 9, Zamboanga
City.
The undisputed facts, as found by the Sandiganbayan itself:
The evidence on record . . . show that the request for the
conversion of thirty-four (34) secondary school teachers to Instructor
I items of the Sulu State College, through its former president, accused
Abdulla, was approved by the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM); that consequent to the approval of the said
request, was the allotment by the DBM of the partial funding for the
purpose of paying the salary differentials of the said thirty-four (34)
secondary school teachers in the amount of forty thousand pesos
(P40,000.00) sourced from the "lump sum appropriation authorized
on page 370 of R.A. 6688 [should be page 396 of RA 6688 (General
Appropriations Act January 1 — December 31, 1989)] and the current
savings under personal services of said school (Exhibits 'B,' 'C' and 'C-
1;' Exhibit '18,' pp. 32-35; tsn, hearing of September 22, 1998, pp. 6 to
25 and 26); that out of the thirty-four (34) secondary school teachers,
only the six (6) teachers were entitled and paid salary differentials
amounting to P8,370.00, as the twenty-eight (28) teachers, who were
occupying Teacher III positions, were no longer entitled to salary
differentials as they were already receiving the same salary rate as
Instructor I (Exhibit 'A,' p. 4, par. 1; Exhibits '1' to '6,' inclusive; Exhibit
'14-A;' tsn, hearing of September 22, 1998, pp. 6 to 8; tsn, hearing of
September 23, 1998, pp. 10-11); and that the amount of P31,516.16,
taken from the remaining balance of the P40,000.00 allotment, was
used to pay the terminal leave benefits of the six (6) casuals (Exhibits
'D' and 'E;' Exhibits '7' to '12,' inclusive; tsn, hearing of September 22,
1998, pp. 13 and 34; tsn, hearing of September 23, 1998, p. 13).
Accused Abdulla was able to sufficiently justify the payment of the salary
differentials of only six (6), out of the thirty-four (34) teachers, when she
testified that out of the thirty-four (34) teachers, twenty-eight (28) were already
holding the position of Secondary School Teacher III receiving the salary of
Instructor I; and that the remaining six (6) were still holding Secondary Teacher
II positions and therefore receiving a salary lower than that of Instructor I so
they were paid salary differentials (tsn, hearing of September 23, 1998, pp. 8,
10 and 11). In fact, the notarized audit investigation report (Exhibit 'A,' p. 4, 1st
par.) and the Joint Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao
(Exhibit '14-a'), also point that said act of the accused is justified.
In this recourse, appellant questions the judgment of conviction
rendered against her, claiming that the Sandiganbayan erred:
"I
. . . ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN INVOKING THE PRESUMPTION OF
UNLAWFUL INTENT DESPITE EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY.
II
. . . ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT THE PROSECUTION
WAS ABLE TO PROVE THAT PETITIONER COMMITTED TECHNICAL
MALVERSATION UNDER ARTICLE 220 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE".
The Court grants the appeal.

So precious to her is the constitutional right of presumption of
innocence unless proven otherwise that appellant came all the way to this
Court despite the fact that the sentence imposed upon her by the
Sandiganbayan was merely a fine of three thousand pesos, with no
imprisonment at all. And recognizing the primacy of the right, this Court,
where doubt exists, has invariably resolved it in favor of an accused. CAIaDT
In a judgment of acquittal in favor of two (2) accused charged of murder

in People vs. Abujan, 5 the Court wrote:
We are enraged by the shocking death suffered by the victim
and we commiserate with her family. But with seeds of doubt planted
in our minds by unexplained circumstances in this case, we are unable
to accept the lower court's conclusion to convict appellants. We
cannot in conscience accept the prosecution's evidence here as
sufficient proof required to convict appellants of murder. Hence, here
we must reckon with a dictum of the law, in dubilis reus est absolvendus.
All doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused. Nowhere is this
rule more compelling than in a case involving the death penalty for a
truly humanitarian Court would rather set ten guilty men free than
send one innocent man to the death row. Perforce, we must declare
both appellants not guilty and set them free.
Similarly, the Court had to acquit an accused charged of rape in People

vs. De Jesus 6 on ground of reasonable doubt, to wit:
With seeds of doubt planted in our minds by the conduct of
proceedings on record, we are unable to accept the lower court's
conclusion to convict appellant. His conviction is founded on the sole
testimony of Agnes, but though a credible witness despite her mental
retardation, she showed unnecessary dependence on her mother
when identifying the father of her child. Maternal coaching taints her
testimony. That her mother had to be ordered by the judge to go
outside the courtroom impresses us as significant. We are unable to
accept as sufficient the quantum of proof required to convict
appellant of rape based on the alleged victim's sole testimony. Hence,
here we must fall back on a truism of the law, in dubilis reus est
absolvendus. All doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated May 26, 2000, of the

Regional Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac, Branch 68, is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Appellant RUBEN LUMIBAO is ACQUITTED of the charge of
rape on reasonable doubt.
The Court's faithful adherence to the constitutional directive imposes

upon it the imperative of closely scrutinizing the prosecution's evidence to
assure itself that no innocent person is condemned and that conviction flows
only from a moral certainty that guilt has been established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. In the words of People vs. Pascua 7 :
Our findings in the case at bar should not create the mistaken
impression that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses should
always be looked at with askance. What we are driving at is that every
accused is presumed innocent at the onset of an indictment. But, it
has often happened that at the commencement of a trial, people's
minds, sometimes judges too, would have already passed sentence
against the accused. An allegation, or even any testimony, that an act
was done should never be hastily accepted as proof that it was really
done. Proof must be closely examined under the lens of a judicial
microscope and only proof beyond reasonable doubt must be allowed
to convict. Here, that quantum of proof has not been satisfied.
We shall now assay appellant's guilt or innocence in the light of the

foregoing crucibles.
In her first assigned error, appellant contends that the prosecution failed
to adduce evidence to prove criminal intent on her part. When she raised this
issue in her Motion for Reconsideration before the Sandiganbayan, that court,
invoking Section 5 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, ruled in a
Resolution 8 promulgated on September 17, 2001, as follows:
Anent the allegation of the movant/accused that good faith is a
valid defense in a prosecution for malversation as it would negate
criminal intent on the part of the accused which the prosecution failed
to prove, attention is invited to pertinent law and rulings of the
Supreme Court on the matter. EAaHTI
Sec. 5(b) of the Rule 131, Rules of Court,provides, 'That an

unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent.' Hence, dolo may be
inferred from the unlawful act. In several cases (Tria, 17 Phil. 303;
Ballesteros, 25 Phil. 634; Sia Tioan, 54 Phil. 52; Cueto, 38 Phil. 935;
Cubelo, 106 Phil. 496), the Supreme Court ruled that 'When it has been
proven that the appellants committed the unlawful acts alleged, it is
properly presumed that they were committed with full knowledge and
with criminal intent, 'and it is incumbent upon them to rebut such
presumption.' Further, the same court also ruled that when the law
plainly forbids an act to be done, and it is done by a person, the law
implies the guilty intent, although the offender was honestly mistaken
as to the meaning of the law which he had violated (State vs. McBrayer,
98 NIC 619; Sing Cong Bieng and Co Kong, 30 Phil. 577, 580;
Hermenigildo Bautista, CA 40 O.G. 5th Supp. 139). If the act is criminal,
then criminal intent is presumed (Francisco y Martin, CA 53 O.G. 1450).
In the case at bar, inasmuch as the prosecution had proved that
a criminal act was committed by the accused under Article 220 of
the Revised Penal Code, criminal intent was presumed. The accused
did not present any evidence to prove that no such criminal intent was
present when she committed the unlawful act of technical
malversation. Hence, the presumption that the unlawful act of the
accused was done with criminal intent had been satisfactorily proven
by the prosecution (Sec. 5[b], Rule 131).
The Court must have to part ways with the Sandiganbayan in its reliance
on Section 5 (b) of Rule 131 as basis for its imputation of criminal intent upon
appellant.
For sure, the procedural rule relied upon does not apply at all to this
case. Indeed, clear it is from its very language that the disputable presumption
of the existence of unlawful or criminal intent presupposes the commission of
an unlawful act. Thus, intent to kill is presumed when the victim dies because
the act of killing clearly constitutes an unlawful act. In People vs. Gemoya, 9 the
Court held:
The intent to kill is likewise presumed from the fact of death,
unless the accused proves by convincing evidence that any of the
justifying circumstances in Article 11 or any of the exempting
circumstances in Article 12, both of theRevised Penal Code, is present.
In fact, in a Resolution penned by Justice Romeo Callejo, Sr. in People vs.

Delim, 10 the Court en banc categorically stated:
If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactor,
intent to kill is conclusively presumed. (Emphasis supplied).
Similarly, intent to gain or animus lucrandi is presumed when one is

found in possession of stolen goods precisely because the taking of another's
property is an unlawful act. So it is that in People vs. Reyes, 11 the Court held:
Accused-appellant's contention that the animus lucrandi was
not sufficiently established by the prosecution is devoid of
merit. Animus lucrandi or intent to gain is an internal act which can be
established through the overt acts of the offender. Although proof of
motive for the crime is essential when the evidence of the robbery is
circumstantial, intent to gain or animus lucrandi may be presumed
from the furtive taking of useful property pertaining to another, unless
special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the
perpetrator. The intent to gain may be presumed from the proven
unlawful taking. In the case at bar, the act of taking the victim's
wristwatch by one of the accused Cergontes while accused-appellant
Reyes poked a knife behind him sufficiently gave rise to the
presumption.
The presumption of criminal intent will not, however, automatically

apply to all charges of technical malversation because disbursement of public
funds for public use is per se not an unlawful act. Here, appellant cannot be said
to have committed an unlawful act when she paid the obligation of the Sulu
State College to its employees in the form of terminal leave benefits such
employees were entitled to under existing civil service laws. Thus, in a similar
case, 12 the Court reversed a conviction for technical malversation of one who
paid out the wages of laborers:
There is no dispute that the money was spent for a public
purpose — payment of the wages of laborers working on various
projects in the municipality. It is pertinent to note the high priority
which laborers' wages enjoy as claims against the employers' funds
and resources. DTSIEc
In the absence of any presumption of unlawful intent, the burden of

proving by competent evidence that appellant's act of paying the terminal
leave benefits of employees of the Sulu State College was done with criminal
intent rests upon the prosecution.
The Court notes the odd procedure which the prosecution took in
discharging its undertaking to prove the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable
doubt. As it is, the prosecution did not present any single witness at all, not
even for the purpose of identifying and proving the authenticity of the
documentary evidence on which it rested its case. The prosecution definitely
failed to prove unlawful intent on the part of appellant.
Settled is the rule that conviction should rest on the strength of
evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense.
The weakness of the defense does not relieve it of this responsibility.
And when the prosecution fails to discharge its burden of establishing
the guilt of an accused, an accused need not even offer evidence in his
behalf. A judgment of conviction must rest on nothing less than moral
certainty. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his
innocence must be duly taken into account. The proof against him
must survive the test of reason and the strongest suspicion must not
be permitted to sway judgment. There must be moral certainty in an
unprejudiced mind that it was accused-appellant who committed the
crime. Absent this required quantum of evidence would mean
exoneration for accused-appellant. 13
The Sandiganbayan's improper reliance on Sec. 5(b) of Rule 131 does not
save the day for the prosecution's deficiency in proving the existence of
criminal intent nor could it ever tilt the scale from the constitutional
presumption of innocence to that of guilt. In the absence of criminal intent,
this Court has no basis to affirm appellant's conviction.
. . .. This calls to mind the oft-repeated maxim 'Actus non facit
reum, nisi mens sit rea,' which expounds a basic principle in criminal
law that a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing
the act complained of be innocent. Thus, to constitute a crime, the act
must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be accompanied
by a criminal intent. It is true that a presumption of criminal intent may
arise from proof of the commission of a criminal act; and the general
rule is that if it is proved that the accused committed the criminal act
charged, it will be presumed that the act was done with criminal
intention and that it is for the accused to rebut this presumption. But
it must be borne in mind that the act from which such presumption
springs must be a criminal act In the case at bar, the act is not criminal.
Neither can it be categorized as malum prohibitum, the mere
commission of which makes the doer criminally liable even if he acted
without evil intent. 14
The second assigned error refers to the failure of the prosecution to

prove the existence of all the essential elements of the crime of technical
malversation defined in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, which are:
"1. That the offender is a public officer;
"2. That there is public fund or property under his administration;

"3. That such public fund or property has been appropriated by law
or ordinance;
"4. That he applies the same to a public use other than that for which
such fund or property has been appropriated by law or
ordinance." 15
Appellant contends that the prosecution was unable to prove the second
and third elements of the crime charged. 16 She argued that the public funds
in question, having been established to form part of savings, had therefore
ceased to be appropriated by law or ordinance for any specific purpose.
The Court finds merit in appellant's submission.
As found by the Sandiganbayan no less, the amount of forty thousand
pesos (P40,000.00) originally intended to cover the salary differentials of thirty
four (34) secondary school teachers whose employment status were
converted to Instructor I, were sourced from the "lump sum appropriation"
authorized on page 370 (should be page 396) of R.A. 6688 and the current
savings under personal services of said school. 17
The pertinent portions of RA 6688 are reproduced hereunder:
"K.2 Sulu State College
For general administration, administration of personnel
benefits, salary standardization, higher education and secondary
education services, including locally-funded project as indicated
hereunder. — P17,994,000
New Appropriations, by Function/Project

Current
Operating
Expenditures
Maintenance
and Other
Personal Operating
Services Expenses Capital Outlays Total
Functions
1. General Administration
and Support Services P 1,605,000 P 1,196,000 P P 2,801
2. Administration of
Personnel Benefits 608,000 608
3. Salary Standardization 57,000 57
4. Higher Education Services 1,967,000 577,000 2,544
5. Secondary Education
Services 2,636,000 736,000 3,372
Total, Functions 6,873,000 2,509,000 9,382
Locally-Funded Project
1. Acquisition and
Improvements of Lands,
Construction,
Rehabilitation or
Renovation of Buildings
and Structures, and
Acquisition of Equipment 8,612,000 8,612
----------- ----------- ----------- -----
Total New Appropriations,
Sulu State College P6,873,000 P2,509,000 P8,612,000 P17,994
========= ========= ========= =======
xxx xxx xxx
New Appropriations, by Object of Expenditures
(In Thousand Pesos)
A. Functions/Locally-Funded Project
Current Operating Expenditures
Personal Services
Total Salaries of Permanent Personnel 4,148
Total Salaries and Wages of Contractual and Emergency Personnel 146
———
Total Salaries and Wages 4,294
Other Compensation
Honoraria and Commutable Allowances 185

Cost of Living Allowances 1,292
Employees Compensation Insurance Premiums 44
Pag-I.B.I.G. Contributions 35
Medicare Premiums 18
Merit Increases 20
Salary Standardization 37
Bonuses and Incentives 511
Others 437
Total Other Compensation 2,579
O1 Total Personal Services 6,873

The Court notes that there is no particular appropriation for salary
differentials of secondary school teachers of the Sulu State College in RA 6688.
The third element of the crime of technical malversation which requires that
the public fund used should have been appropriated by law, is therefore
absent. The authorization given by the Department of Budget and
Management for the use of the forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) allotment
for payment of salary differentials of 34 secondary school teachers is not an
ordinance or law contemplated in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. ETCcSa
The Court has unequivocably ruled in Parungao vs. Sandiganbayan 18 that

in the absence of a law or ordinance appropriating the public fund allegedly
technically malversed (in that case, the absence of any law or ordinance
appropriating the CRBI fund for the concreting of Barangay Jalung Road), the
use thereof for another public purpose (there, for the payment of wages of
laborers working on projects other than the Barangay Jalung Road) will not
make the accused guilty of violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant herein, who used the remainder of the forty thousand pesos
(P40,000.00) released by the DBM for salary differentials, for the payment of
the terminal leave benefits of other school teachers of the Sulu State College,
cannot be held guilty of technical malversation in the absence, as here, of any
provision in RA 6688 specifically appropriating said amount for payment of
salary differentials only. In fine, the third and fourth elements of the crime
defined in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code are lacking in this case.
Acquittal is thus in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the appealed
decision and resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 23261 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and appellant ACQUITTED of the crime charged
against her. The cash bond posted by appellant for her provisional liberty, if
any, is ordered returned to her subject to the usual auditing and accounting
procedures.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Carpio Morales, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Fifth Division, Ma. Cristina Cortez-Estrada (ponente), Minita V. Chico-Nazario

(now a member of this Court), and Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr., JJ.
2.Rollo, pp. 24-42
3.Resolution, p. 5, Rollo, p. 48.
4.Decision, pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 26-27.
5.G.R. No. 140870, February 11, 2004.

6.G.R. No. 144080-81, January 26, 2004
7.G.R. No. 82303, December 21, 1989.
8.Rollo, pp. 44-48

9.G.R. No. 132633, October 4, 2000.
10.G.R. No. 142773, January 28, 2003

11.G.R. No. 135682, March 26, 2003
12.Parungao vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 96025, May 15,1991.
13.People vs. Ortillas, G.R. No. 137666, May 20, 2004.

14.Manzanaris vs. People, G.R. No. L-64750, January 30, 1984.
15.L.B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book II, 12th ed.
16.See Petition, p. 12. This should have been third and fourth instead of second
and third.
17.See Decision, p. 14, Rollo, p. 37.

18.See note 12, Supra.
||| (Abdulla v. People, G.R. No. 150129, [April 6, 2005], 495 PHIL 70-86)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 200021-22. August 28, 2019.]
JASON ALVARES PARAN, * petitioner, vs. ERLINDA MANGUIAT

and THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, respondents.
DECISION
J.C. REYES, JR., J :

p
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court which seeks to reverse and set aside the Office of the Ombudsman's
Decision 1 dated March 16, 2011, and Order 2 dated October 4, 2011 in
OMB-L-A-08-0432-G, an administrative case for Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, Oppression, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service, as well as the Resolution 3 dated March 16, 2011, and the
Order 4 dated October 4, 2011 in OMB-L-C-08-0520-G, which found
probable cause to indict herein petitioner SPO1 Jayson Alvares Paran (SPO1
Paran) for the crime of Perjury.
The Facts
On March 22, 2008, between 10:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m., a Barangay
(Brgy.) Tanod from Brgy. Solis, Municipality of Balete, Province of Batangas,
visited the Balete Police Station and reported that a dead person was found
lying on the street of Brgy. Solis. SPO2 Melencio Landicho (SPO2 Landicho),
SPO1 Paran, and three more policemen stationed at the Balete Police
Station, proceeded to the alleged crime scene to verify the report. In Brgy.
Solis, the policemen found the lifeless body of Damiano M. Manguiat
(Damiano) sprawled on the roadside near the store of Brgy. Captain Vicente
Bathan (Brgy. Captain Bathan), the Brgy. Captain of Brgy. Solis. Later, the
policemen found the cadaver of Damiano's older brother, Victorio M.
Manguiat (Victorio), in the forest.
On April 4, 2008, Erlinda B. Manguiat (Erlinda), the widow of Damiano,
filed an Amended Complaint-Affidavit 5 wherein she accused Brgy. Captain
Bathan and six other persons for the killing of Damiano and Victorio. In her
complaint, Erlinda alleged that on the night of March 22, 2008, she asked
his sons, Lary Manguiat (Lary) and Dennis Manguiat (Dennis) to fetch their
father and uncle at the house of a certain "Lando." However, when his sons
returned, they told her that they saw Brgy. Capt. Bathan, together with
several barangay tanods and private persons, mauling and shooting
Damiano and Victorio. For fear that they would suffer the same fate, Lary
and Dennis bitterly decided to leave their loved ones and fled. Attached to
Erlinda's complaint-affidavit are the respective affidavits of Lary 6 and
Dennis. 7
On May 30, 2008, SPO1 Paran executed an affidavit 8 wherein he
declared that at dawn of March 23, 2008, after their investigation at the
crime scene, he and SPO2 Landicho went to Lary's house to inform the
latter of his father's death. He stated that he personally informed Lary that
his father was killed; and that Lary replied by saying "siningil agad si
itay?" The said affidavit was sworn and submitted to the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Tanauan City, Batangas.
On June 11, 2008, Erlinda 9 and Lary 10 filed their respective affidavits
to belie the statements made by SPO1 Paran in his affidavit. Lary, in
particular, claimed that he does not know and that never talked to SPO1
Paran. He stated that SPO2 Landicho was the only one who went to, and
talked to him in his house on March 23, 2008, at around 2:00 a.m. He
claimed, however, that he told SPO2 Landicho that he already knew what
happened to his father.
On July 9, 2008, Erlinda filed before the Ombudsman an
administrative complaint for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and Oppression, and a
criminal complaint for Perjury against SPO1 Paran. 11
Ruling of the Ombudsman
In OMB-L-A-08-0432-G, the Ombudsman, in its Decision dated March

16, 2011, found SPO1 Paran guilty of Simple Dishonesty. He was suspended
from office for a period of one month and one day, without pay. SPO1 Paran
moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the Ombudsman
in its October 4, 2011 Resolution.
In OMB-L-C-08-0520-G, the Ombudsman, in its Resolution dated
March 16, 2011, ruled that there is probable cause to believe that SPO1
Paran committed the crime of Perjury. Thus, it recommended the filing of
an Information for the crime of Perjury against SPO1 Paran with the
appropriate court. The Ombudsman noted that the subject affidavit was
sworn before, and submitted to the Office of the City Prosecutor. It also
observed that the essence of SPO1 Paran's affidavit is to suggest that Lary's
demeanor and/or actuation at the time he was allegedly informed of his
father's and uncle's deaths were contrary to the behavior of a person who
had just witnessed his family's killings. Consequently, SPO1 Paran's
statement was executed upon a material matter as it legitimately affects
Lary's credibility. It further opined that there was willfull and deliberate
assertion of falsehood by SPO1 Paran. It found that Lary's statement that
he never talked to SPO1 Paran was buttressed by SPO2 Landicho who, in
his affidavit 12 dated August 13, 2008, declared that he was the only one
who talked to Lary. Thus, there is cause to believe that all of the elements
of Perjury were present.
SPO1 Paran moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by
the Ombudsman in its Order dated October 4, 2011.
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
I
WHETHER THE OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT FOUND SPO1 PARAN GUILTY OF DISHONESTY AND
ORDERED HIS SUSPENSION FOR 1 MONTH AND 1 DAY WITHOUT
PAY.
II
WHETHER THE OMBUDSMAN SERIOUSLY ERRED AND GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE IS
PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT SPO1 PARAN COMMITTED
THE CRIME OF PERJURY.
SPO1 Paran insists that the statements he made in the subject
affidavit are true claiming that SPO2 Landicho's affidavit effectively
corroborated his statements. He points out that even if it was SPO2
Landicho who informed Lary of his father's death, it would be immaterial
to the issue of whether Lary indeed witnessed the killing of his father and
uncle.
In its Comment, 13 the Office of the Solicitor General avers that the
instant petition must be denied for the following reasons: first, the
decisions and resolutions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases may
be appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court, and may not be directly elevated to this Court; and second, the
Ombudsman did not err when it found probable cause against SPO1 Paran
for the crime of Perjury as the evidence sufficiently shows that more likely
than not the crime of Perjury has been committed and there is enough
reason to believe it was committed by SPO1 Paran.
The Court's Ruling
At the onset, the Court notes that SPO1 Paran indeed availed of the
wrong remedy which necessitates the denial of this petition.
It must be stressed that a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 is limited only to questions of law. Factual questions are not the proper
subject of an appeal by certiorari. 14 "A question of law arises when there is
doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a
question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts." 15 A question of fact requires the court to review the
truthfulness or falsity of the allegations of the parties. 16
In this case, SPO1 Paran's main argument that he did not lie in his
affidavit is obviously a question of fact. Indeed, an examination of the said
allegation would be necessary to determine whether it is true or not.
Clearly, this question is not proper in a petition for review on certiorari.
Further, it is settled that appeals from the decisions of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be elevated to the
CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. 17 It is clear that OMB-L-A-08-0432-
G involves an administrative disciplinary case. As such, the decision and
order therein should have been taken to the CA under Rule 43 and not
directly to this Court. For failure to comply with this elementary procedural
rule, the present petition, or at least the portion which seeks redress to the
administrative case, must be denied.
Likewise, it is also settled that the proper remedy in cases in which it
is alleged that the Ombudsman has acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in its adjudication of criminal
cases is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed before this Court. 18 In
this case, SPO1 Paran alleges that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse
of discretion when it found probable cause to indict him with the crime of
Perjury. Very clearly, SPO1 Paran availed of the wrong remedy when he filed
the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. And even if the
present petition could be considered as one filed under Rule 65, the Court
would still have to dismiss the same.
Jurisprudence has defined the term "grave abuse of discretion" in the
following manner:
x x x the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. 19
In a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the petitioner has the duty
to establish that the respondent court or tribunal is guilty of grave abuse of
discretion by showing that it acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or
despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction. 20
The Court opines that SPO1 Paran failed to show that the
Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion.
The Ombudsman's powers to investigate and prosecute crimes
allegedly committed by public officers or employees are plenary and
unqualified. 21 Simply stated, the Ombudsman is empowered to determine
whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter,
to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts. 22 The
Ombudsman's finding of probable cause is entitled to great respect absent
a showing of grave abuse of discretion. For this reason, the Court would not
normally interfere in the Ombudsman's exercise of discretion in
determining probable cause. 23
The term probable cause had been understood to mean a reasonable
ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is
guilty of the offense with which he is charged. 24 To determine if there exists
a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the
suspect is probably guilty thereof, the elements of the crime charged
should, in all reasonable likelihood, be present. 25
In this regard, the following are the elements of the crime of Perjury,
to wit: (1) that the accused made a statement under oath or executed an
affidavit upon a material matter; (2) that the statement or affidavit was
made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer
oath; (3) that in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and
deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and (4) that the sworn statement or
affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal
purpose. 26
In finding for probable cause, the Ombudsman in effect ruled that
these elements of Perjury are likely present in this case. There is no
compelling reason for the Court to interfere with these findings.
First, it is not disputed that SPO1 Paran executed an affidavit wherein
he declared that he personally informed Lary that his father was killed. It is
also not disputed that SPO1 Paran executed the said affidavit after he
learned that Lary executed an affidavit claiming that he witnessed how his
father and uncle were killed. As observed by the Ombudsman, SPO1
Paran's affidavit in effect refuted the statements made by Lary by
suggesting that the latter did not actually witness the incident and that in
fact he was in shock at that time. The purpose of SPO1 Paran's affidavit,
therefore, is to attack the credibility of Lary, who claims to be an eyewitness.
Thus, there is reason to believe that SPO1 Paran's affidavit was executed
upon a material matter.
Second, it is clear from SPO1 Paran's affidavit that the same was
sworn before the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of the Province of
Batangas, a person authorized to receive an oath. Further, it is also clear
that it was filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Batangas
in Tanauan City, Batangas.
Third, there is reason to believe that SPO1 Paran made a willful and
deliberate assertion of a falsehood in his affidavit. As pointed out by the
Ombudsman, Lary's statement that he only talked with SPO2 Landicho, and
no one else, was corroborated by SPO2 Landicho himself in his own
affidavit. Further, contrary to SPO1 Paran's allegations, Lary's admission
that SPO2 Landicho indeed went to his house on March 23, 2008 at around
2:00 a.m. did not automatically confirm his own insinuation that Lary's
actuation at that time was of a person who was shocked to learn of his
father's death rather than a person who had witnessed the incident.
In his affidavit, SPO2 Landicho stated that Lary did not immediately
say anything after he told him of his father's demise. Instead, Lary only
replied later that he will just go after them to Brgy. Solis. While it is true that
Lary's reaction may be interpreted as shock, the same reaction may also be
viewed in other ways, such as fear. Lary's reaction may even be interpreted
as a realization, after confirmation by the police officers, that what he had
witnessed was indeed the brutal killing of his father. What is clear is that
Lary's response to SPO2 Landicho, as well as his initial non-response, are
insufficient to conclude that Lary only learned of the incident from SPO2
Landicho. Consequently, the likelihood that SPO1 Paran deliberately lied in
his affidavit to discredit the statements made by Lary still subsists.
This likelihood is sufficient for purposes of filing of the Information as
probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence or
proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is enough that the pieces of evidence
engenders a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that
the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. 27
Lastly, it is clear that SPO1 Paran's affidavit was made for a legal
purpose. After all, he would not have filed the subject affidavit before the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Batangas if this was not the case.
In fine, the Court opines that there is sufficient basis for the
Ombudsman's finding of probable cause for Perjury against SPO1 Paran.
Further, SPO1 Paran failed to show that the assailed Ombudsman
resolution and order were tainted by grave abuse of discretion. Instead, the
instant petition is bereft of any statement or sufficient allegation
purportedly showing that the Ombudsman exercised its power in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.
Consequently, the instant petition must be denied.
WHEREFORE, the present petition for review
on certiorari is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Caguioa, Lazaro-Javier and Zalameda, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
* Also referred to as SPO1 Jayson Alvarez Paran in some portions of the rollo.
1. Penned by Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer I Eleanor Saguil Payao,
recommended for approval by Acting Director Joaquin Payao,
recommended and approved by Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Mark E.
Jalandoni.
2. Id. at 241-246.
3. Id. 217-229.
4. Id. at 247-252.
5. Id. at 42-47.
6. Id. at 60-61.
7. Id. at 62-63.
8. Id. at 30-31.
9. Id. at 112-114.
10. Id. at 115-116.
11. Id. at 34-40.
12. Id. at 32-33.
13. Id. at 273-297.

14. Miro v. Vda. De Erederos, 721 Phil. 772, 785 (2013).
15. Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. v. People, 721 Phil. 760, 767 (2013).
16. Pascual v. Burgos, 776 Phil. 167, 183 (2016).
17. Macalalag v. Ombudsman, 468 Phil. 918, 922 (2004).
18. Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), 430 Phil. 101, 112 (2002).
19. Congressman Garcia v. The Executive Secretary, 602 Phil. 64, 78 (2009).
20. Malayang Manggagawa ng Stayfast Philippines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 716 Phil. 500, 515 (2013).
21. Office of the Ombudsman v. Atty. Valera, 508 Phil. 672, 697 (2005); Galario v.
Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao), 554 Phil. 86, 110 (2007).
22. Judge Angeles v. Ombudsman Gutierrez, 85 Phil. 183, 194 (2012).

23. Cam v. Casimiro, 762 Phil. 72, 88 (2015).
24. Martinez v. People, 703 Phil. 609, 617-618 (2013).
25. Aguilar v. Department of Justice, 717 Phil. 789, 800 (2013).

26. Ilusorio v. Bildner, 595 Phil. 869, 880 (2008).
27. AAA v. Judge Carbonell, 551 Phil. 936, 950 (2007).
||| (Paran v. Manguiat, G.R. Nos. 200021-22, [August 28, 2019])

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 205260. July 29, 2019.]
C/INSP. RUBEN LIWANAG, SR. y

SALVADOR, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
DECISION
LAZARO-JAVIER, J : p
The Case
This Petition for Review assails the dispositions of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 25943 entitled "People of the Philippines v. C/Insp.
Ruben Liwanag, Sr. y Salvador":
1) Decision 1 dated June 27, 2011, affirming petitioner C/Insp. Ruben
Liwanag's conviction for falsification of public document; and
2) Resolution 2 dated October 21, 2011, denying petitioner's motion
for reconsideration.
The Proceedings Before the Trial Court
The Charge
By Information 3 dated November 15, 1996, petitioner C/Insp. Ruben

Liwanag, a police officer of the Western Police District Command, was
indicted for falsification of public document, as defined and penalized by
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), viz.:
That on or about June 10, 1994, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused being then a police officer of the
Western Police District Command, this City, and therefore, a public
officer, with intent to cause damage, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of falsification of a public
document, in the following manner, to wit: the said accused having
somehow obtained possession of a Temporary Operator's Permit
(TOP) No. 02774452-A of the Land Transportation Office
(LTO),Quezon City, an instrumentality of the Republic of the
Philippines and, therefore, a public document which was originally
issued to C/Insp[.] Antonio D. Salas of the said Western Police District
Comman(d),this City, prepared, forged and falsified the said
Temporary Operator's Permit (TOP) No. 02774452-A, by then and
there filling up or caused to be filled up the blank spaces thereon,
among others, by writing the date, "10 June 94";the name of the
accused's son "RUBEN RUBIO LIWANAG, JR.";the entry pertaining to
the badge no. of the accused which was misdeclared from 04580 to
50480 and leaving the space blank intended for the
permit/registration number which should reflect to the driver's
license of said RUBEN RUBIO LIWANAG, [JR.] thereby making it
appear, as it did appear, that said TOP No. 02774452-A dated June
19, 1994 was issued to the latter, when it (sic) truth and in fact as the
said accused fully well knew that the said Temporary Operator's
Permit (TOP) is spurious as the same was not duly authorized to
issue the said TOP to RUBEN RUBIO LIWANAG, JR. neither did the
said LTO nor Chief Inspector Antonio D. Salas to whom the said TOP
booklet containing the said serial number was issued, participate or
intervene in the preparation and execution of the said document,
thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts which
the said accused has the legal obligation to disclose the truth; that
once the said document has been forged and falsified in the manner
above setforth (sic),the son of the accused, said RUBEN RUBIO
LIWANAG[,] JR. while driving a car, Kia Pride with Plate No. PSX 844
was involved in a vehicular accident with Nelia E. Enoc and Noel
Agcopra, introduced and presented the said TOP No. 02774452-A to
the PNCC guards, knowing the same to be spurious, to the damage
and prejudice of the said Nelia E. Enoc and Noel Agcopra and/or
public interest.AaCTcI
Contrary to law.
The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Manila. On
arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. 4
Prosecution's Version
On July 3, 1994, a vehicular accident occurred in Biñan, Laguna.

Petitioner's son, Ruben Liwanag, Jr. drove a Kia Pride car which collided with
a military jeep driven by Noel Agcopra. Ruben Liwanag, Jr. was not able to
present a valid driver's license but showed Temporary Operator's Permit
(TOP) No. 02774452-A instead to the investigating officer, Conrado Tamayo
of the Philippine National Construction Company (PNCC).The TOP showed
that it was issued on June 10, 1994 to "Ruben Rubio Liwanag" who was
purportedly born on June 27, 1974. It also appeared that petitioner issued
the TOP to his own son. 5
During the investigation, it was discovered that per certification by
the Land Transportation Office (LTO),Ruben Liwanag, Jr. indeed did not
have a driver's license. At the time of the accident, Ruben Liwanag, Jr.,who
was born on June 27, 1977 according to his birth certificate, was still a minor
and was not eligible to hold a driver's license. His birth date on the TOP,
however, was "June 27, 1974." 6
In view of the dubious entries on the TOP, Nelia Enoc and Noel
Agcopra, owners of the military jeep, filed an affidavit-complaint for
falsification of public document against petitioner, which led to his
indictment therefor in court. 7
C/Insp. Antonio Salas, who was also a police officer at the Western
Police District Command, testified that when a driver commits a traffic
violation and his driver's license is confiscated by the apprehending officer,
a TOP is issued. TOP permits the violator to drive for the period that his
actual license is not in his possession. The TOP is valid for fifteen days. 8
C/Insp. Salas further stated that TOP No. 02774452-A was part of the
booklet issued to him by the LTO. He denied ever issuing the TOP in
question and he only came to know of its issuance when the same was
traced to have come from him. In truth, the TOP in question was among the
other TOPs which were detached from the LTO booklet issued to him. He
also confirmed that petitioner was a fellow officer at the Western Police
District Traffic Command. He and petitioner used to share a room together
at their headquarters and he sometimes forgot to secure his locker where
he kept his TOP booklet. 9
The prosecution submitted the following documentary evidence: a)
LTO Certification dated November 4, 1994, certifying that petitioner was not
a deputized agent; b) LTO Certification dated August 4, 1994, certifying that
TOP No. 02774452-A was issued to C/Insp. Salas; c) LTO Certification dated
August 16, 1994, certifying that Ruben Liwanag, Jr. who was born on June
29, 1974, was not a licensed driver; and d) Ruben Rubio Liwanag, Jr.'s
certificate of live birth. 10
The Defense's Version
Petitioner admitted that he filled out the TOP but denied issuing it to
his son. He only used the TOP as part of his instructional materials when he
lectured on the duties and functions of traffic aides. He was deputized to
issue TOPs, including the one subject of the case. His son had his own
driver's license and the TOP was only recovered from his son's car during
the accident. 11EcTCAD
The Trial Court's Ruling
By Decision dated August 24, 2001, the trial court found petitioner
guilty as charged. It took into account petitioner's admission that it was his
handwriting and signature which appeared on the TOP. Also, per LTO
certification, petitioner was not authorized to issue TOPs. The TOP in
question formed part of the LTO booklet issued to C/Insp. Salas. Further,
petitioner's son was issued a driver's license only on June 13, 1994, three
(3) days after the accident. PNCC investigator Conrado Tamayo categorically
testified that petitioner's son himself showed what he claimed was his TOP
in lieu of his supposed driver's license. 12 The trial court decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused
C/INSP. RUBEN LIWANAG, SR. Y SALVADOR GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC
DOCUMENT and hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate
sentence of FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY TO
SIX (6) YEARS.
SO ORDERED. 13
The Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

On appeal, petitioner faulted the trial court for rendering the verdict
of conviction despite the alleged failure of the prosecution to formally offer
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. There was no evidence that
he illegally obtained and issued the TOP to his son. The certifications
presented by the prosecution were not identified by the persons who
issued them. 14
In refutation, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),countered that
petitioner failed to object, hence, was deemed to have waived any objection
to the presentation of Nelia Enoc, Antonio Salas, Noel Agcopra, and
Conrado Tamayo as prosecution witnesses. Besides, through its Order
dated May 5, 1999, the trial court had admitted the prosecution's
documentary exhibits and testimonial evidence. 15
The Court of Appeals' Ruling
By its assailed Decision dated June 27, 2011, the Court of Appeals
affirmed. It noted that although the transcript of stenographic notes reveal
that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were not formally
offered, the defense did not object to their presentation. In fact, the
defense counsel even cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. 16
Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals
denied through its assailed Resolution dated October 21, 2011.
The Present Petition
Petitioner now implores the court to exercise its discretionary

appellate jurisdiction to review and reverse the assailed dispositions of the
Court of Appeals. He asserts that he never had any malicious or wrongful
intent to injure a third person, which is an essential element of the offense.
His son Ruben Rubio Liwanag, Jr. never used the TOP which was merely
recovered from his car. He merely filled out the TOP on June 10, 1994 only
as a visual aid or educational tool when he gives lectures to traffic
enforcers. 17HSAcaE
On the other hand, the OSG submits that the petition raises a factual,
not a legal issue. In any event, the trial court's factual findings, especially
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court. 18
Issue
Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the verdict of conviction for
falsification of public document against petitioner?
Ruling
The petition lacks merit.

Falsification of a public document is defined and penalized under
Article 171 19 of the Revised Penal Code. It requires the following elements:
1) the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public; 2) he takes
advantage of his official position; and 3) he falsifies a document by
committing any of the aforementioned acts. 20
In falsification of public or official documents, the presence of intent
to gain or intent to injure a third person is not necessary. For what is
punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth
as therein solemnly proclaimed. 21
Here, petitioner was indicted for and convicted of falsification of
public document under Article 171 (par. 4) of theRevised Penal
Code because when he issued TOP No. 02774452-A he made untruthful
statements in a narration of facts, i.e.,a) he entered his son's name "Ruben
Rubio Liwanag, Jr." on the TOP; b) he made a false entry pertaining to his
son's birthdate i.e.,June 27, 1974 instead of June 27, 1977 (his son's true
birthdate);and c) he altered his badge number from "04580" to "50480,"
thus, making it appear that he had authority to issue the subject TOP. 22
To be convicted under Article 171 (par. 4) of the Revised Penal Code,
the following elements must concur: 1) the offender makes in a public
document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; 2) he has a legal
obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and 3) the facts
narrated by him are absolutely false. 23
Petitioner does not deny the presence of these elements here. He,
nonetheless, insists on his plea that he had no malicious or wrongful intent
to injure a third person.
On this score, suffice it to state that intent to gain or intent to injure
is not an element of the crime of falsification of public document. Nor is it
a valid defense. Typoco, Jr. v. People 24 is apropos:
In addition, petitioners argue that damage to the government
should have been proven considering that this was alleged in the
Information. We do not agree. In falsification of public or official
documents, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain
or the intent to injure a third person because in the falsification of a
public document, what is punished is the violation of the public faith
and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. HESIcT
The law is clear that wrongful intent on the part of the accused
to injure a third person is not an essential element of the crime of
falsification of public document. It is jurisprudentially settled that in
the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public
officers or private persons, it is not necessary that there be present
the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person for the reason
that, in contradistinction to private documents, the principal thing
punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of
truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. In falsification of public
documents, therefore, the controlling consideration is the public
character of a document; and the existence of any prejudice caused
to third persons or, at least, the intent to cause such damage
becomes immaterial.
So must it be.
Indeed, absent any showing of any glaring errors, gross
misapprehension of facts or unsupported conclusions, the trial court's
findings are accorded the highest respect and conclusiveness especially if
affirmed in full by the Court of Appeals, 25 as in this case.
Lastly, we modify the penalty imposed on petitioner. The trial court
imposed the penalty of "FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY
TO SIX (6) YEARS." This is not correct. Goma v. Court of Appeals 26 dictates
what the imposable indeterminate penalty is for the crime of falsification
of public document under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code if there are
no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, thus:
Finally, the penalty imposed by the RTC, as affirmed by the CA,
is proper. Art. 171 of the RPC provides for a single divisible penalty
of prision mayor to public officers or employees who, taking
advantage of their official positions, shall cause it to appear that
persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did
not in fact participate. And where neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance attended the execution of the offense, as here, the
imposable penalty is, according to Art. 64 of the RPC, that of the
medium period provided. The medium period for prision mayoris
from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty
imposable would be that of a degree lower than the medium period
of prision mayor as minimum, and the maximum is any period
included in the medium period of prision mayor.The degree lower
than the medium period of prision mayor is the medium period
of prision correccional which ranges from two (2) years, four (4)
months, and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.
Applying Goma,we sentence petitioner to two (2) years, four (4)
months, and one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day, as
maximum.
ACCORDINGLY,the petition is DENIED.The assailed Decision dated
June 27, 2011 and Resolution dated October 21, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 25943
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION,sentencing petitioner C/Insp. Ruben
Liwanag, Sr. to two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day, as minimum,
to eight (8) years and one (1) day, as maximum.
SO ORDERED. caITAC
Carpio, Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa and J.C. Reyes, Jr.,JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Penned by Associate Justice Danton Q. Bueser with the concurrence of Associate

Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Ricardo R. Rosario, rollo,pp. 40-55.
2.Rollo,pp. 37-38.
3.Id. at 41-42.
4.Id. at 42.
5.Id. at 42-43.
6.Id. at 43.
7.Id. at 41-42.
8.Id. at 43.
9.Id. at 43-44.
10.Id. at 44.
11.Id. at 45.
12.Id. at 45-46.
13.Id. at 40-41.
14.Id. at 48-49.
15.Id. at 49.
16.Id. at 51.
17.Id. at 14-17.
18.Id. at 75-91.
19.Article 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic
minister. — The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000
pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who,
taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by
committing any of the following acts:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding
when they did not in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding
statements other than those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes
its meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an

original document when no such original exists, or including in such a copy
a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a

protocol, registry, or official book.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any ecclesiastical minister who shall
commit any of the offenses enumerated in the preceding paragraphs of
this article, with respect to any record or document of such character that
its falsification may affect the civil status of persons.
20.Regidor, Jr. v. People,598 Phil. 714, 732 (2009).
21.Id.
22.Rollo,pp. 46-47.
23.Galeos v. People,657 Phil. 500, 520 (2011).
24.G.R. No. 221857, August 16, 2017, 837 SCRA 306, 328-329.
25.See Espino v. Amora,571 Phil. 210, 214 (2008).
26.596 Phil. 1, 13-14 (2009).
||| (Liwanag, Sr. y Salvador v. People, G.R. No. 205260, [July 29, 2019])
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 168437. January 8, 2009.]
LAURINIO GOMA and NATALIO UMALE, petitioners, vs. THE

COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and
SANGGUNIAN MEMBER MANUEL G. TORRALBA, respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J :
p
The Case
Appealed, via this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, is
the Decision 1 dated June 6, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 27963, affirming the July 28, 2003 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 26 in Santa Cruz, Laguna in Criminal Case No. SC-6712. The
RTC convicted petitioners of the crime of falsification of public document
under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). HESIcT
The Facts
On the basis of the affidavit-complaint of Manuel Torralba and two
other members of the Sangguniang Barangay of Brgy. Cabanbanan,
Pagsanjan, Laguna, the Office of the Ombudsman for Luzon filed with the
RTC in Sta. Cruz, Laguna an Information for falsification of public document
under Art. 171 (2) of the RPC against petitioners Laurinio Goma and Natalio
Umale. 3 Specifically, the complaint alleged that Laurinio and Natalio,
as barangay chairperson and secretary, respectively, falsified
a barangay resolution dated September 24, 1995, allocating the amount of
PhP18,000 as disbursement for a seminar for the two officials. The indicting
information, docketed as Crim. Case No. SC-6712 and raffled to Branch 26
of the Sta. Cruz RTC, alleged as follows:
That on or about September 24, 1995 in Barangay
Cabanban [sic], Pagsanjan, Laguna, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
LAURINIO GOMA and NATALIO A. UMALI, both public officials, being
the Barangay Chairman and Barangay Secretary, respectively, taking
advantage of their official positions and committing the offense in
relation to their office, in connivance and conspiracy with each other,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a
Resolution dated September 24, 1995, an official document, by
indicating therein that aforesaid Resolution was passed on motion of
Kagawad Renato Dizon, seconded by Kagawad Recaredo C. Dela Cruz
and unanimously approved by those present in the meeting held on
September 24, 1995 at 2:00 P.M., when in truth and in fact no meeting
was held as no quorum was mustered, to the damage and prejudice
of public interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
When arraigned, both Laurinio and Natalio, assisted by counsel,

pleaded not guilty to the above charge. Pre-trial and trial then ensued.
The prosecution presented the three complaining witnesses, 5 who
testified that, for lack of quorum, no actual session of the sanggunian of
Brgy. Cabanbanan took place on September 24, 1995, the day the disputed
resolution was allegedly passed. On that day, according to the three, they
went to the barangay health center to attend a pre-scheduled session
which, however, did not push through as, apart from them, only one other
member, i.e., Laurinio, came. But they later got wind of the existence of
subject Resolution No. T-95 (Res. T-95) dated September 24, 1995, in which
it was made to appear that all the sanggunian members attended the
session of September 24, 1995 and unanimously approved, upon motion
of kagawad Renato Dizon, duly seconded by kagawad Ricaredo dela Cruz,
the allocation of PhP18,000 to defray the expenses of two officials who
would attend a seminar in Zamboanga. On the face of the resolution
appears the signature of Natalio and Laurinio, in their respective capacities
as barangay secretary and chairperson. It also bore the official seal of
the barangay.
On October 15, 1995, the sanggunian held a special session during
which it passed a resolution therein stating that no session was held on
September 24, 1995. 6
In their defense, Natalio and Laurinio, while admitting having affixed
their signatures on the adverted falsified resolution, alleged that said
resolution was nothing more than a mere proposal or a draft which Natalio,
as was the practice, prepared and signed a week before the scheduled
September 24, 1995. They also alleged that the same resolution was not
the enabling instrument for the release of the seminar funds.
The Ruling of the RTC
After trial, the RTC rendered on July 28, 2003 judgment, finding both
Laurinio and Natalio guilty as charged and, accordingly, sentenced them,
thus:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds both accused Laurinio Goma and
Natalio A. Umali guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals in the
felony of falsification of public document punishable under
Section [sic] 171 of the Revised Penal Code and there being neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, hereby imposes upon each
of said accused the penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years, and two (2)
months of prision mayor, as maximum.
Costs against both accused.
SO ORDERED. 7
The RTC found Res. T-95 to have all the appearance of a complete and
"true and genuine document", sealed and signed by
the Sanggunian secretary. 8 And for reasons set out in its decision, the trial
court dismissed, as incredulous, the defense's theory, and the arguments
propping it, about the subject resolution being just a mere proposal.
The Ruling of the CA
From the RTC decision, Laurinio and Natalio appealed to the CA, their
recourse docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 27963, raising three issues, to wit: (a)
whether Res. T-95 is a public document; (b) whether they violated Art. 171
(2) of the RPC; and (c) whether the penalty imposed is proper. Answering all
three issues in the affirmative, the CA, by its Decision dated June 6, 2005,
affirmed that of the trial court, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the 28 July 2003 Decision of Branch 26, Regional
Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna finding accused-appellants Laurinio
Goma and Natalio A. Umali guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of falsification of public document under Article 171(2) of
the Revised Penal Code and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correctional [sic], as
minimum, to eight (8) years, and two (2) months of prision mayor, as
maximum, is AFFIRMED. Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED. 9
Petitioners are now before this Court raising the very same issues
they earlier invoked before the CA, the first two of which may be reduced
into the following proposition: Whether Res. T-95 may be characterized as
a public document to bring the case, and render petitioners liable on the
basis of the evidence adduced, under Art. 171 (2) of the RPC.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
As a preliminary consideration, petitioners, in this recourse, merely
highlight and discuss their defense that the subject resolution is a mere
draft or proposed resolution not acted upon by the sanggunian for lack of
quorum on September 24, 1995, and that they never had any criminal
intent when they signed such proposed resolution. They deny having
affixed the barangay official seal on the subject resolution.
Subject Resolution a Public Document
Under Sec. 19 (a) of Rule 132, Revised Rules on Evidence, public
documents include "[t]he written official acts, or records of the official acts
of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers,
whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country." Verily, resolutions and
ordinances of sanggunians, be they of the sanggunian
panlalawigan, panlungsod, bayan, or barangay, come within the pale of the
above provision, such issuances being their written official acts in the
exercise of their legislative authority. As a matter of common practice, an
action appropriating money for some public purpose or creating liability
takes the form of an ordinance or resolution.
Black defines a public document as "a document of public interest
issued or published by a political body or otherwise connected with public
business." 10 The term is also described as a document in the execution of
which a person in authority or notary public takes part. 11 There can be no
denying that the public money-disbursing and seemingly genuine Res. T-
95, in the preparation of which petitioners, in their official capacity, had a
hand, is, in context, a public document in a criminal prosecution for
falsification of public document. And it bears to stress that in falsification
under Art. 171 (2) of the RPC, it is not necessary that there be a genuine
document; it is enough that the document fabricated or simulated has the
appearance of a true and genuine document or of apparent legal
efficacy. 12
Petitioners Guilty of Falsification
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the Court usually defers to
factual findings of the trial court, more so when such findings receive a
confirmatory nod from the appellate court. We explained in one case:
The rule is that the findings of fact of the trial court, its
calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of
the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on
said findings, are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect. This is
more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court. When
the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the appellate court,
said findings are generally binding upon this Court. 13
And this factual determination, as a matter of long and sound

appellate practice, deserves great weight and shall not be disturbed on
appeal, except only for the most convincing reasons, 14 such as when that
determination is clearly without evidentiary support on record 15 or when
the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts or overlooked certain
relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion. 16 This is as it should be since it is not the function of the Court
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to evaluate and weigh all over again the
evidence presented or the premises supportive of the factual holdings of
lower courts. 17 IHTaCE
The case disposition of the CA and the factual and logical premises
holding it together commend themselves for concurrence. Its inculpatory
findings on the guilt of petitioners for falsification under Art. 171 (2) of
the RPC, confirmatory of those of the trial court, are amply supported by
the evidence on record, consisting mainly of the testimony of the
complaining witnesses and a copy of the subject resolution.
Art. 171 (2) of the RPC provides as follows:
ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee; or notary or
ecclesiastical minister. — The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to
exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer,
employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position,
shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any

act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate.
The elements of the crime of falsification of public documents, as

above defined and penalized, are:
1. That the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary
public.
2. That he takes advantage of his official position.
3. That he falsifies a document by causing it to appear that
persons have participated in any act or proceeding.
4. That such person or persons did not in fact so participate in
the proceeding. 18
The first two elements clearly obtain, petitioners, during the period
material, being local government elected officials who, by reason of their
position, certified, as Natalio did, as to the holding of a barangay session
and falsely attested, as Laurinio did, as to the veracity of a resolution
supposedly taken up therein. The other two elements are likewise present.
As correctly observed by the CA:
. . . [Petitioners] made it appear in the Barangay resolution
dated 24 September 1995 that all members of the Sangguniang
Barangay deliberated upon and unanimously approved the
questioned resolution, when in fact no such deliberation and approval
occurred. The non-participation of the members of the Sangguniang
Barangay in the passage of the resolution was established by the 15
October 1995 resolution issued by 7 of the 8 members of the
Sangguniang Barangay denying that the challenged resolution was
passed upon and approved by the council. 19 ICHAaT
Petitioners' bid to pass off the resolution in question as a mere

proposal or a draft cannot be accorded merit in the light of the manner they
worded and made it appear. Consider the following apt observations of the
trial court:
Barangay Resolution No. T-95 does not appear to be a proposed
resolution in all aspects . . .
xxx xxx xxx
b) the opening paragraph unequivocally states that the

contents thereof were copied from the minutes of the ordinary
session of Sanggunian held on September 24, 1995 meeting, at 2:00
o'clock pm;
c) it announces all the names of the members of the
Sanggunian who attended the session during which said resolution
[was] passed;
d) it bears the resolution number, not the proposed resolution
number;
e) the title clearly states that the Sanggunian had already

approved the allocation of P18,000.00 for two (2) barangay officials . .
.;
f) it made mention that Kagawad Renato M. Dizon made the
motion, duly seconded by Kagawad [Ricaredo] C. de la Cruz, for the
passing of said resolution; and
g) accused Natalio A. Umali, in his official capacity as Barangay
Kalihim, certified said resolution as true and correct, and accused
Laurinio A. Goma, Punong Barangay, attested to the truthfulness of
said resolution. 20
Indeed, the contents and appearance of Res. T-95 argue against the
very idea of its being merely a proposal or a draft barangay enactment. Res
ipsa loquitur. A draft resolution would not be numbered or be carrying
certificatory and attestative signatures, let alone impressed with the dry
seal of the barangay. It would not also include such particulars as the
attendance of all members of the sanggunian and the identity of the moving
and seconding kagawads relative to the passage of the resolution, for such
details are not certain; unless they have been rehearsed or planned
beforehand. But the notion that a plan had been arranged by
the sanggunian as a body would be negated by subsequent development
which saw the approval of a resolution dated October 15, 1995 duly signed
by seven kagawads virtually trashing Res. T-95 as a falsity. The sequence of
events would readily show that petitioners falsified the subject resolution,
but only to be exposed by private complainants. ECcDAH
Petitioners' allegation that kagawad Torralba was the one who affixed
the seal or that he harbored ill-feelings towards them strikes this Court as
a mere afterthought, absent convincing evidence to support the
imputation.
Finally, petitioners urge their acquittal on the theory that they did not
benefit from, or that the public was not prejudiced by, the resolution in
question, it not having been used to obtain the PhP18,000 seminar funds.
The argument holds no water. Falsification of a public document is
consummated upon the execution of the false document. And criminal
intent is presumed upon the execution of the criminal act. Erring public
officers' failure to attain their objectives, if that really be the case, is not
determinative of their guilt or innocence. The simulation of a public
document, done in a manner so as to give it the appearance of a true and
genuine instrument, thus, leading others to errors as to its authenticity,
constitutes the crime of falsification. 21
In fine, the element of gain or benefit on the part of the offender or
prejudice to a third party as a result of the falsification, or tarnishing of a
document's integrity, is not essential to maintain a charge for falsification
of public documents. 22 What is punished in falsification of public document
is principally the undermining of the public faith and the destruction of
truth as solemnly proclaimed therein. In this particular crime, therefore, the
controlling consideration lies in the public character of a document; and the
existence of any prejudice caused to third persons or, at least, the intent to
cause such damage becomes immaterial. 23
Third Issue: Imposed Penalty Proper
Finally, the penalty imposed by the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, is
proper. Art. 171 of the RPC provides for a single divisible penalty of prision
mayor to public officers or employees who, taking advantage of their official
positions, shall cause it to appear that persons have participated in any act
or proceeding when they did not in fact participate. And where neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstance attended the execution of the
offense, as here, the imposable penalty is, according to Art. 64 of the RPC,
that of the medium period provided. The medium period for prision
mayor is from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposable
would be that of a degree lower than the medium period of prision
mayor as minimum, and the maximum is any period included in the
medium period of prision mayor. The degree lower than the medium period
of prision mayor is the medium period of prision correccional which ranges
from two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day to four (4) years and
two (2) months. SIDTCa
The penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and two (2) months of prision
mayor, as maximum, thus imposed on petitioners is well within the
authorized imposable range, and is, therefore, proper.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the appealed CA Decision dated June 6, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR No.
27963 is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Carpio-Morales, Tinga and Brion, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 27-40. Penned by Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona and concurred
in by Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Jose C. Reyes, Jr.
2.Id. at 41-51. Penned by Judge Pablo B. Francisco.
3.His surname is spelled "Umali" in both the RTC and CA decisions.
4.Rollo, p. 41.
5.Barangay Kagawads Manuel G. Torralba, Armando F. Cabantog, and Ricaredo
dela Cruz of Barangay Cabanbanan, Pagsanjan, Laguna. The defense
presented Laurinio, Natalio, and Asst. Municipal Treasurer Elizalde G.
Cabaleño.
6.Rollo, p. 44.
7.Id. at 51.
8.Id. at 45. cESDCa
9.Id. at 39-40.
10.BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 520 (8th ed.).
11.Bermejo v. Barrios, Nos. L-23614-15, February 27, 1970, 31 SCRA 764; Cacnio v.
Baens, 5 Phil. 742 (1906); cited in 6 Herrera, REMEDIAL LAW 256 (1999).
12.2 L.B. Reyes, THE REVISED PENAL CODE 213 (1981); citing MILLER ON CRIMINAL
LAW.
13.Fullero v. People, G.R. No. 170583, September 12, 2007, 533 SCRA 97, 117;
citations omitted.
14.Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116372, January 18, 2001, 349 SCRA 451,
460.
15.Alba Vda. de Raz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120066, September 9, 1999, 314
SCRA 36, 52.
16.Sampayan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156360, January 14, 2005, 448 SCRA 220,
229.
17.Culaba v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125862, 15 April 2004, 427 SCRA 721, 729.
18.2 L.B. Reyes, THE REVISED PENAL CODE (15th ed., 2001).
19.Rollo, p. 36.
20.Id. at 49-50.
21.Re: Fake Decision Allegedly in G.R. No. 75242, A.M. No. 02-8-23-0, February 16,
2005, 451 SCRA 357, 386. cTECIA
22.Bustillo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 146217, April 7, 2006, 486 SCRA 545, 551.
23.Lastrilla v. Granda, G.R. No. 160257, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 324, 345;
citing Lumancas v. Intas, G.R. No. 133472, December 5, 2000, 347 SCRA 22,
33-34; and Luague v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 55683, February 22, 1982,
112 SCRA 97, 101.
||| (Goma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 168437, [January 8, 2009], 596 PHIL 1-14)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 133472. December 5, 2000.]
CONSOLACION A. LUMANCAS and YOLANDO O.

URIARTE, petitioners, vs. VIRGINIA B. INTAS, respondent.
Atty. Noe Q. Laguindam for petitioners.

Atty. Elpidio I. Digaum for respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioners Consolacion A. Lumancas and Yolando O. Uriarte are regular

employees of the Philippines Postal Corporation in Tandag, Surigao del Sur.
They were charged by their co-employee respondent Virginia B. Intas for
making false entries in their respective Personal Data Sheets (PDS, [CSC Form
212]) regarding their educational attainment, resulting in their promotion to
higher positions to the prejudice of other postal employees who have been in
the service for a longer period. Petitioners stated in their PDS that they are
college graduates when in truth and in fact they are not. After evaluating the
evidence, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding Lumancas
and Uriarte guilty as charged and dismissed them from the service without
prejudice to their right to appeal as provided under Sec. 27, RA 6770.
Lumancas and Uriarte filed their respective motions for reconsideration
insisting on a formal hearing, which the Office of the Ombudsman finally
granted. Thereafter, hearings were held after which the Office of the
Ombudsman conclusively held that despite the burning of the records of the
DECS Regional Office XI in 1991, other records at the DECS-CHED did not show
that Lumancas and Uriarte had been enrolled at the International Harvardian
University during the years they allegedly took their respective courses as
stated in their respective PDS. Lumancas' and Uriarte's Motions for
Reconsideration were denied by the Office of the Ombudsman; hence, the
present petition for review.
The Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the Office of the
Ombudsman. According to the Court, the use of false documents by
petitioners attesting that they are college graduates when in truth and in fact
they are not, makes them administratively liable for dishonesty through the
use of falsified documents. The Court also stressed that as responsible public
servants who are due for promotion, petitioners are expected to be noble
exemplars and should be models of good morals. Their repeated acts of
dishonesty are repugnant to the established code of conduct and ethical
standards required of public officials and employees.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PUBLIC OFFICERS; GROUNDS

FOR DISMISSAL; FALSIFICATION AND DISHONESTY; PETITIONERS' USE OF
FALSIFIED DOCUMENTS ATTESTING THAT THEY ARE COLLEGE GRADUATES
WHEN IN TRUTH AND IN FACT THEY ARE NOT, MAKES THEM
ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR DISHONESTY THROUGH THE USE OF
FALSIFIED DOCUMENTS. — The use of false documents by Lumancas and
Uriarte attesting that they are college graduates when in truth and in fact they
are not, makes them administratively liable for dishonesty through the use of
falsified documents. The elements of "use of falsified documents," which is a
crime under Art. 172 of the Revised Penal Code, are: (a) That the offender knew
that a document was falsified by another person; (b) That the false document
is embraced in Art. 171 or in any of subdivisions 1 or 2 of Art. 172; (c) That he
used such document (not in judicial proceedings); and, (d) That the use of the
false document caused damage to another or at least it was used with intent
to cause such damage. The fact that they used the false certifications in
support of this promotion resulted in prejudice to other applicants genuinely
qualified for the position.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FALSIFICATION AND DISHONESTY ARE GROUNDS
FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION. — Petitioners' act of falsifying their Personal Data
Sheets (PDS) to reflect that they are graduates of BSC, Major in Management,
from the IHU when in truth and in fact they are not, is a ground for disciplinary
action. Lumancas made different and inconsistent entries in her 1989, 1991
and 1993 PDS. Likewise, Uriarte made conflicting entries in his PDS of February
1987 and March 1990. As responsible public servants who are due for
promotion, petitioners are expected to be noble exemplars and should be
models of good morals. Their repeated acts of dishonesty are repugnant to
the established code of conduct and ethical standards required of public
officials and employees. As regular members of the career service, they are
bound by the Civil Service Law and Rules. Chapter 7, Sec. 46, Book V, of EO
292 provides ". . . b) The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action: (1)
Dishonesty . . . (2) Misconduct . . . (13) Falsification of official document . . . " It
should be emphasized that this is an administrative case, not a criminal case;
thus, petitioners' argument that they were not charged with the proper
offense under the Revised Penal Code is unimportant. Any of the above charges
may be cited as grounds to subject them to disciplinary action. CAacTH
3. CRIMINAL LAW; USE OF FALSIFIED DOCUMENTS; ELEMENTS;

PERSONAL DATA SHEETS ARE OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS REQUIRED IN
CONNECTION WITH PROMOTION TO HIGHER POSITION AND CONTENDERS
FOR PROMOTION HAVE LEGAL OBLIGATION TO DISCLOSE THE TRUTH. — All
the elements of falsification through the making of untruthful statements in a
narration of facts are present: (a) That the offender makes in a document
statements in a narration of facts; (b) That he has a legal obligation to disclose
the truth of the facts narrated by him; (c) That the facts narrated by the
offender are absolutely false; and, (d) That the perversion of truth in the
narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person.
In People v. Po Giok To the Court held that "in the falsification of public or official
documents, whether by public officials or by private persons, it is unnecessary
that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person, for
the reason that, in contradistinction to private documents, the principal thing
punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as
therein solemnly proclaimed." Hence, the last requisite need not be present.
Also, petitioners themselves have affirmed in their petition that their Personal
Data Sheets were not sworn to before any administering officer thereby taking
their case away from the confines of perjury. Nonetheless, they argue that
they have no legal obligation to disclose the truth in their PDS since these are
not official documents. We disagree. In Inting v. Tanodbayan the Court held
that "the accomplishment of the Personal Data Sheet being a requirement
under the Civil Service Rules and Regulations in connection with employment
in the government, the making of an untruthful statement therein was,
therefore, intimately connected with such employment . . . " The filing of a
Personal Data Sheet is required in connection with the promotion to a higher
position and contenders for promotion have the legal obligation to disclose
the truth. Otherwise, enhancing their qualifications by means of false
statements will prejudice other qualified aspirants to the same position.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J :p
CONSOLACION A. LUMANCAS and YOLANDO O. URIARTE seek in this

petition for review the reversal of the Amended Resolution of the Office of the
Ombudsman dated 16 August 1996 finding them administratively liable for
falsification, dishonesty and grave misconduct, and consequently ordering
their dismissal from the service, as well as its Order dated 12 February 1998
denying their Motions for Reconsideration. TCIEcH
Petitioners were regular employees of the Philippine Postal Corporation

in Tandag, Surigao del Sur. They were charged by their co-employee Virginia
B. Intas, respondent herein, for making false entries in their respective
Personal Data Sheets (PDS, [CSC Form 212]) regarding their educational
attainment, resulting in their promotion to higher positions to the prejudice of
other postal employees who had been in the service for a longer period.
As found by the Office of the Ombudsman, 1 Consolacion A. Lumancas'
original appointment as mail sorter with the Bureau of Posts showed that her
highest educational attainment was Fourth Year Pharmacy. 2 Her official
Transcript of Records from the International Harvardian University (IHU),
Davao City, showed that she took up Bachelor of Science in Commerce (BSC),
Major in Management, from 1974 to 1978 when she graduated and was issued
Special Order No. 5-276 dated 6 November 1978. Lumancas' answers however
in her three (3) PDS accomplished in 1989, 1991 and 1993 were inconsistent.
In her PDS accomplished in 1989 3 Lumancas stated that she finished Bachelor
of Science in Pharmacy 4 from 1970 to 1975 at the Centro Escolar University.
In her PDS accomplished in 1991 5 she stated that she obtained her BS
Pharmacy at the Centro Escolar University in 1974 and had her post graduate
studies at the IHU in 1978. 6 In her PDS accomplished in 1993 7 Lumancas
stated that she graduated with the degree of Bachelor of Science in
Commerce, Major in Management, at the IHU from 1970-1974 inclusive. 8 In
filling up her PDS for 1989 however she stated that she studied at the Centro
Escolar University from 1970 to 1975. When requested to submit the academic
records of herein petitioner Consolacion A. Lumancas, the IHU submitted
several records but the original of her Special Order was not among them.
According to Severina O. Villarin, Chief, Higher Education Division, Region XI,
Lumancas' name could not be found in the IHU enrollment list filed with her
office (Higher Education Division), Region XI, from school years 1974-75 to
1978-79, meaning, that she had not enrolled with the school during those
terms.
When directed to answer, Lumancas denied the allegations. She averred
that while it was true that in her 3 February 1989 appointment she indicated
that her highest educational attainment was Fourth Year Pharmacy, despite
her allegedly having finished Bachelor of Science in Commerce in 1978 at the
IHU, this was because at that time she had not yet received her Transcript of
Records and Special Order from the IHU, so that she was not sure whether she
had passed all her subjects. Since her position did not require her to be a
graduate of Bachelor of Science in Commerce, she did not bother to check
whether she graduated from the course. TacESD
Lumancas also claimed that her Special Order was authentic considering
that even the copy attached to the complaint 9was supposedly checked and
verified against the original and was in fact certified by Severina O. Villarin,
Chief, Higher Education Division, Region XI, Commission on Higher Education
(CHED). Lumancas admitted that there were mistakes in the entries made in
her 1989 and 1993 PDS but denied making any mistake in 1991. She averred
that there was no malice nor intent on her part to falsify the entries in her PDS
and that she was just in a hurry to fill these up. 10
As regards petitioner Yolando O. Uriarte, the Office of the Ombudsman
found that he and a certain Mario L. Julve 11 also acquired falsified Transcripts
of Records and Special Orders from the IHU as the Bureau of Higher Education
of DECS in Manila through Director III Diosdada C. Boiser denied that her Office
issued Special Orders to them. 12 Petitioners Lumancas and Uriarte, together
with Mario L. Julve, had since been promoted one (1) rank higher on the bases
of the questioned documents presented as part of their credentials. 13
On her part, Yolando O. Uriarte asserted that he finished his Bachelor of
Science in Commerce, Major in Management, at the IHU in 1968 14 and that his
Transcript of Records and Special Order were issued on the basis of his
completion of the academic requirements for the course. He also claimed that
his Transcript of Records and Special Order No. (B) 5-0035 were authentic as
these were checked and verified by the same Severina O. Villarin of CHED. He
also insisted that his promotion was based on his qualifications considering
that he was with the postal service since 1975 without any derogatory record
and was even cited several times for his outstanding performance. 15
On 31 July 1995, in reply to a query from the Office of the Ombudsman
dated 11 July 1995, Severina O. Villarin informed the Office 16 that she had
conducted an investigation and discovered that the clerk who prepared
Uriarte's certifications relied only on photocopies of the Special Orders
purportedly issued to the IHU by the Bureau of Higher Education, Manila, in
favor of Uriarte. However, the Bureau denied having issued the Special Orders,
thus she herself had ordered the cancellation of the certifications for being
spurious. 17
As regards the case of Lumancas, the IHU was requested to submit her
academic records; consequently, several records were submitted but the
original of the Special Order was not among them. Villarin further declared
that Lumancas' name could not be found in the IHU enrollment list filed with
their office from school years 1974-75 to 1978-79, meaning, that she had not
enrolled during those terms. 18
Petitioners Lumancas and Uriarte moved for a formal hearing but the
Office of the Ombudsman denied their motion on the ground that it was
apparently intended merely to delay the proceedings. 19 It noted that the
motion praying for a formal hearing was filed only on 3 July 1996, or more than
nine (9) months after the parties failed to appear for the preliminary
conference on 18 September 1995, 20 and after they failed to submit their
memorandum despite an order 21 dated 6 October 1995 from the Office of the
Ombudsman granting their motion for extension of time to submit their
memorandum. 22
After evaluating the evidence, the Office of the Ombudsman issued the
Amended Resolution of 16 August 1996, 23released 17 January 1997, finding
Lumancas and Uriarte guilty as charged and dismissed them from the service
without prejudice to their right to appeal as provided under Sec. 27, RA
6770. 24
On 6 February 1997 and 7 February 1997 respondents Lumancas and
Uriarte, now herein petitioners, filed their respective motions for
reconsideration insisting on a formal hearing, which the Office of the
Ombudsman finally granted. Thereafter, hearings were held on 14-17 April
1997 25 after which the Office of the Ombudsman conclusively held that
despite the burning of the records of the DECS Regional Office XI in 1991, other
records at the DECS-CHED did not show that Lumancas and Uriarte had been
enrolled at the IHU during the years they allegedly took their respective
courses as stated in their respective PDS. 26
On 12 February 1998 Lumancas' and Uriarte's Motions for
Reconsideration were denied by the Office of the Ombudsman; hence, this
petition for review.aHATDI
Section 27 of RA 6770 27 provides in part that "(f)indings of fact by the

Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are
conclusive." According to the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, the
evidence sustains the conclusion that Lumancas and Uriarte are not college
graduates, and that their contention that the Special Orders issued in their
favor are authentic, banking on the certification issued by Severina O. Villarin,
Chief, BHE, Regional Office XI, is without merit. In fact, upon verification by the
same office from the Bureau of Higher Education, Manila, the same BHE
Regional Office XI, through Villarin herself, cancelled the certification it
previously issued and notified this Office that the Special Orders issued in
favor of Uriarte and Julve were spurious. 28
An examination of the records of the DECS, as verified by CHED officers
during the hearings, particularly Form 19, 29failed to disclose that petitioners'
names were among the list of students enrolled in the IHU during their alleged
period of study. In the case of Uriarte, although his Transcript of Records
reflects that he was enrolled in the second semester of 1964-65 and the
summer thereafter, and received grades for subjects taken during those
terms, his name was not included in the list of students submitted by the IHU
to DECS. The same is true with Lumancas, whose name could not be found
among the DECS records for the first and second semesters of schoolyears
1976-78 although her Transcript of Records shows that she was enrolled for
that period and in fact received grades for subjects taken during those
semesters.
Laura Geronilla, Assistant Registrar of the IHU, claimed that the
omissions were unavoidable in the preparation of Form 19 by hand. But this
testimony alone cannot overturn the fact that there exists no records at the
DECS of Lumancas' or Uriarte's enrollment at the IHU. Strangely, the omission
did not happen just once, but repeated many times over involving several
semesters and to students enrolled in different school years. Hence, there can
only be one conclusion — that petitioners were never reported to DECS as
students of the IHU because indeed they were never enrolled thereat.
In her certification dated 14 September 1994 30 Laura Geronilla stated
that according to available academic records, Yolando O. Uriarte was indeed a
graduate of the IHU the school year 1967-68 with the degree of Bachelor of
Science in Commerce (BSC), Major in Management, and that his Form 19 "had
already been resubmitted to DECSRO XI for the issuance of a corrective Special
Order due to the accidental omission/exclusion of his name in the DECS
microfilm files despite its vivid inclusion in the original paper copy submitted."
Petitioners however failed to submit a copy of such original paper or the DECS
microfilm wherein Uriarte's name was allegedly missing, nor presented
evidence that such request had been favorably acted upon by the DECS.
It may also be noted that on 20 November 1981 31 Geronilla issued
another certification in favor of Uriarte certifying that he had "completed all
the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Science in Commerce (BSC),
Major in Management, as of March 1979. This is to certify further that his
application for graduation has been forwarded to the DECS Regional Office for
the issuance of his Special Order." 32 However, Uriarte's Special Order which
was allegedly issued by the DECS is dated 8 January 1969. If Uriarte had
actually graduated in 1968, what was the purpose of this 1981 certification?
On the other hand, if Uriarte actually completed all the requirements for
graduation only in March 1979, then why was he issued a Special Order which
antedated the day when he became qualified to be a graduate of the
school? HcTEaA
Quite obviously, neither Lumancas nor Uriarte is a graduate of a four (4)-
year course and thus is not qualified to be promoted to a higher position. The
use of false documents attesting that they are college graduates when in truth
and in fact they are not, makes them administratively liable for dishonesty
through the use of falsified documents.
The elements of "use of falsified documents," which is a crime under Art.
172 of the Revised Penal Code, are: (a) That the offender knew that a document
was falsified by another person; (b) That the false document is embraced in
Art. 171 or in any of subdivisions 1 or 2 of Art. 172; (c) That he used such
document (not in judicial proceedings); and, (d) That the use of the false
document caused damage to another or at least it was used with intent to
cause such damage. The fact that they used the false certifications in support
of this promotion resulted in prejudice to other applicants genuinely qualified
for the position. In this connection, we refer to the Court's observation in Diaz
v. People 33 —
As correctly observed by the trial court, 'It is also quite
significant to note in this score that the accused in his defense failed
to present any corroborating piece of evidence which will show that
he was indeed enrolled in the Philippine Harvardian Colleges. . . . If he
had enrolled as a student during this period of time and he was
positive that the transcript of records issued to him and in his
possession is genuine and valid, it could have been easy for him to
introduce corroborating evidence, i.e., the testimony of any of his
classmates or teachers in the different subjects that he took to
support his claim that he studied and passed these collegiate courses
at the said school. But this he failed to do despite all the opportunities
open to him and in the face of damning evidence all showing that he
had not really enrolled in this school . . . 34
Finally, petitioners' act of falsifying their Personal Data Sheets (PDS) to

reflect that they are graduates of BSC, Major in Management, from the IHU
when in truth and in fact they are not, is a ground for disciplinary action.
Lumancas made different and inconsistent entries in her 1989, 1991 and 1993
PDS. Likewise, Uriarte made conflicting entries in his PDS of February
1987 35 and March 1990. 36 As responsible public servants who are due for
promotion, petitioners are expected to be noble exemplars and should be
models of good morals. Their repeated acts of dishonesty are repugnant to
the established code of conduct and ethical standards required of public
officials and employees. 37
As regular members of the career service, they are bound by the Civil
Service Law and Rules. Chapter 7, Sec. 46, Book V, of EO 292 38 provides ". . . b)
The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action: (1) Dishonesty . . . (2)
Misconduct . . . (3) Falsification of official document . . ." It should be
emphasized that this is an administrative case, not a criminal case; thus,
petitioners' argument that they were not charged with the proper offense
under the Revised Penal Code is unimportant. Any of the above charges may be
cited as grounds to subject them to disciplinary action.
All the elements of falsification through the making of untruthful
statements in a narration of facts are present: (a) That the offender makes in
a document statements in a narration of facts; (b) That he has a legal obligation
to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; (c) That the facts narrated by
the offender are absolutely false; and, (d) That the perversion of truth in the
narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person.
In People v. Po Giok To 39 the Court held that "in the falsification of public or
official documents, whether by public officials or by private persons, it is
unnecessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a
third person, for the reason that, in contradistinction to private documents,
the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the
destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed." Hence, the last
requisite need not be present. Also, petitioners themselves have affirmed in
their petition that their Personal Data Sheets were not sworn to before any
administering officer 40 thereby taking their case away from the confines of
perjury. Nonetheless, they argue that they have no legal obligation to disclose
the truth in their PDS since these are not official documents. We disagree.
In Inting v. Tanodbayan, 41 the Court held that "the accomplishment of the
Personal Data Sheet being a requirement under the Civil Service Rules and
Regulations in connection with employment in the government, the making of
an untruthful statement therein was, therefore, intimately connected with
such employment . . . ." 42 The filing of a Personal Data Sheet is required in
connection with the promotion to a higher position and contenders for
promotion have the legal obligation to disclose the truth. Otherwise,
enhancing their qualifications by means of false statements will prejudice
other qualified aspirants to the same position.
The Court notes that it is not uncommon for employees to do everything
in their power to better their lot in order to survive the nation's worsening
economic crisis. However, let this case serve as a stern warning to all who may
be tempted to do the same that dishonesty and disrespect for the law,
however motivated, will never be countenanced by this Court. THaDAE
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit and the Amended
Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman dated 16 August 1996 dismissing
petitioners Consolacion A. Lumancas and Yolando O. Uriarte from the service,
as well as its Order dated 12 February 1998 denying reconsideration, is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 37-39.
2.Record, p. 5.
3.Id., p. 13.
4.In the 1989 Form, the entry appears as follows for the College Level: Name of
School/College/University: Centro Escolar University; Degree/Units Earned:
BS Pharm IV; Inclusive Date of Attendance: 1970-1975; thereby indicating
that she finished only her fourth year of BS Pharmacy. No entry for the Post
Graduate Level.
5.Record, p. 14.
School/College/University: Centro Escolar University; Degree/Units Earned:
BS Pharm IV; Inclusive Date of Attendance: 1974; which is inconsistent with
the 1989 form. Again, for the Post Graduate Level, the entry appears as
follows: Name of School/College/University: International Harvardian
University; Degree/Units Earned: BSC IV; Inclusive Date of Attendance:
1978; thereby indicating that in 1978 she finished only her fourth year of BS
Commerce; which is inconsistent with the 1993 Form.
7.Record, p. 15.
School/College/University: International Harvardian University;
Degree/Units Earned: BSC Mgnt. grad.; Inclusive Date of Attendance: 1970-
1974; which is inconsistent with the 1989 and 1991 Forms.
9.Record, p. 10.
10.Id., pp. 69-70.
11.At the time of this appeal by certiorari, Mariano Julve, one of the original
respondents, had already been found guilty by the Civil Service Commission
in its Resolution No. 95-3793, dated 23 June 1995, on the same charges of
dishonesty, falsification and grave misconduct and had been dismissed
from service, hence making the Ombudsman resolution moot and
academic insofar as Julve is concerned.
12.Record, pp. 56-58.

13.Id., p. 17. Boiser's letter addressed to the Postmaster II dated 9 August 1994
states as follows:
Sir:
With reference to your request of July 14, 1994, please be informed
that the name of MARIO L. JULVE is not included in Special Order (B) No.
5-0299, s. 1978, for the BSC course issued to INTERNATIONAL
HARVARDIAN UNIVERSITY, Davao City; neither does the name of
YOLANDO A. URIARTE in Special Order (B) No. 5-0035, S. 1969.
Special Order (B) No. 5-276, s. 1978, supposedly issued in favor of
CONSOLACION H. ALAAN, same course and school, was not issued by this
Office . . . .
(sgd) DIOSDADA C. BOISER
Director III
14.Id., p. 69.
15.Rollo, pp. 9-11.
16.Record, p. 214.
17.Id., pp. 218-19.
18.Id., p. 39.
19.Record, p. 321.
20.Id., p. 263. In a telegram received by the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao
on 6 September 1995, complainant Intas stated that she found the
evidences submitted to be sufficient and waived her right to appear in the
preliminary conference.
21.Id., p. 266.
22.Id., p. 264.
23.Rollo, p. 41. Prior to its amendment, the Resolution included Julve among the
respondents found to be guilty of the charges and dismissed from service.
The amendment dismissing the instant case against Julve was a necessary
consequence of CSC Resolution No. 95-3793 dated 23 June 1995.
24.The case was decided by the Office of the Ombudsman on 16 August 1996 and
the amended resolution approved by the Ombudsman on 17 January 1997,
before the portion of Sec. 27 of RA 6770, providing for "appeals of all
administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman to be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a
petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice
of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for
reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court," was
declared unconstitutional in the case of Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742,
16 September 1998, 295 SCRA 470. The present appeal by certiorari was
filed with the Supreme Court on 7 May 1998 before the promulgation
of A.M. No. 99-2-02-SC on 9 February 1999 holding that "any appeal by way
of petition for review from a decision or final resolution or order of the
Ombudsman in administrative cases, or special civil action relative to such
decision, resolution or order filed with the Court after 15 March 1999 shall
no longer be referred to the Court of Appeals, but must be forthwith
DENIED or DISMISSED, respectively."
25.Rollo, p. 103.
26.Id., p. 70.
27.The Ombudsman Act of 1989.

28.Record, pp. 214-215.
29.The Form 19 contains the names of the students, the subjects taken up and
their grades in those subjects submitted by schools to the DECS every
semester. It is the basis of the Special Order issued by DECS to show that
the student has completed a four (4)-year course.
30.Annex "R"; Rollo, p. 112.
31.Record, p. 34.
32.Ibid.
33.Diaz v. People, G.R. No. 65006, 31 October 1990, 191 SCRA 86.
34.Id., pp. 91-92.
35.Record, p. 40.
36.Id., p. 42.
37.Rollo, pp. 40-41.
38.Administrative Code of 1987.
39.People v. Po Giok To, 96 Phil. 913, 918 (1955).

40.Rollo, p. 26.
41.Inting v. Tanodbayan, G.R. No. 52446-48, 15 May 1980, 97 SCRA 494.

42.Id., p. 499.
||| (Lumancas v. Intas, G.R. No. 133472, [December 5, 2000], 400 PHIL 785-799)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 141931. December 4, 2000.]
ANICETO RECEBIDO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

Atty. Rofebar F. Gerona for petitioner.

SYNOPSIS
Sometime in 1983, private complainant Caridad Dorol mortgaged an

agricultural land to her cousin, herein petitioner. Petitioner and private
complainant did not execute a document on the mortgage but the latter,
instead gave petitioner a copy of the Deed of Sale dated June 16, 1973
executed in her favor by her father, Juan Dorol. On September 9, 1990 private
complainant went to petitioner to redeem her property. However, petitioner
refused to surrender the property claiming that private complainant sold it to
him in 1979. Upon verification, private respondent found that a Deed of Sale
dated August 13, 1979 which she allegedly executed in favor of petitioner, was
filed in the Office of the Assessor and that the property was registered in the
latter's name. After comparison of the specimen signatures of Caridad Dorol
in other documents, with that appearing on the questioned Deed of Sale, the
National Bureau of Investigation found that the latter signature was falsified.
Petitioner was charged, tried and convicted by the Regional Trial Court
of Falsification of Public Document and was sentenced accordingly. Accused
was ordered to pay damages and to vacate the land in question. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, with modification
deleting the award of damages. Hence, this petition.
The Supreme Court denied the petition. The Court of Appeals did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed petitioner's conviction
by the trial court. The petitioner admitted that the Deed of Sale that was in his
possession is a forged document as found by the appellate court. Petitioner,
nonetheless, argued that notwithstanding this admission, the fact remained
that there was no proof that the petitioner authored such falsification or that
the forgery was done under his direction. This argument is without merit.
Under the circumstances, there was no need of any direct proof that the
petitioner was the author of the forgery. The petitioner was in possession of
the forged deed of sale, which purports to sell the subject land from the
private complainant to him. Given this factual backdrop, the petitioner is
presumed to be the author of the forged deed of sale, despite the absence of
any direct evidence of his authorship of the forgery. Since the petitioner is the
only person who stood to benefit by the falsification of the document found in
his possession, it is presumed that he is the material author of the falsification.
The trial court did not commit any error in ordering petitioner to vacate
the subject property. Petitioner cannot profit from the effects of his crime.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; MOTION TO QUASH; PRESCRIPTION; ALTHOUGH

NOT INVOKED IN THE TRIAL MAY BE INVOKED ON APPEAL. — Under the Rules
of Court, the failure of the accused to assert the ground of extinction of the
offense, inter alia,in a motion to quash shall not be deemed a waiver of such
ground. The reason is that by prescription, the State or the People loses the
right to prosecute the crime or to demand the service of the penalty imposed.
Accordingly, prescription, although not invoked in the trial, may, as in this case,
be invoked on appeal. Hence, the failure to raise this defense in the motion to
quash the information does not give rise to the waiver of the petitioner-
accused to raise the same anytime thereafter including during appeal. DETcAH
2. CRIMINAL LAW; PRESCRIPTION OF CRIMES; DEPENDS ON PENALTY

IMPOSABLE; FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT; PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD;
RECKONING POINT. — The petitioner is correct in stating that whether or not
the offense charged has already prescribed when the information was filed
would depend on the penalty imposable therefor, which in this case is "prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than
5,000.00 pesos." Under theRevised Penal Code, said penalty is a correctional
penalty in the same way that the fine imposed is categorized as correctional.
Both the penalty and fine being correctional, the offense shall prescribe in ten
years. The issue that the petitioner has missed, however, is the reckoning point
of the prescriptive period. The petitioner is of the impression that the ten-year
prescriptive period necessarily started at the time the crime was committed.
This is inaccurate. Under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, the period of
prescription shall "commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, . . . ."
In People v. Reyes, this Court has declared that registration in public registry is
a notice to the whole world. The record is constructive notice of its contents
as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. All persons are
charged with knowledge of what it contains.
3. ID.; FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT; POSSESSOR OF FALSIFIED
DOCUMENT IS PRESUMED TO BE THE MATERIAL AUTHOR OF THE
FALSIFICATION IF HE IS THE ONLY PERSON WHO STOOD TO BE BENEFITED BY
THE FALSIFICATION; CASE AT BAR. — The petitioner admits that the deed of
sale that was in his possession is a forged document as found by the trial and
appellate court. Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that notwithstanding this
admission, the fact remains that there is no proof that the petitioner authored
such falsification or that the forgery was done under his direction. This
argument is without merit. Under the circumstance, there was no need of any
direct proof that the petitioner was the author of the forgery. As keenly
observed by the Solicitor General, "the questioned document was submitted
by petitioner himself when the same was requested by the NBI for
examination. Clearly in possession of the falsified deed of sale was petitioner
and not Caridad Dorol who merely verified the questioned sale with the
Provincial Assessor's Office of Sorsogon." In other words, the petitioner was in
possession of the forged deed of sale which purports to sell the subject land
from the private complainant to him. Given this factual backdrop, the
petitioner is presumed to be the author of the forged deed of sale, despite the
absence of any direct evidence of his authorship of the forgery. Since the
petitioner is the only person who stood to benefit by the falsification of the
document found in his possession, it is presumed that he is the material
author of the falsification. As it stands, therefore, we are unable to discern any
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals.
4. CIVIL LAW; SALES; A FORGED DEED OF SALE CANNOT BE A VALID BASIS
OF POSSESSION; A PERSON CANNOT PROFIT FROM EFFECTS OF HIS CRIME. —
The petitioner based his claim of possession alternatively by virtue of two
alternative titles: one, based on the forged deed of sale and, two, as mortgagee
of the land. As already discussed, the deed of sale was forged and, hence,
could not be a valid basis of possession. Neither could his status as mortgagee
be the basis of possession since it is the mortgagor in a contract of mortgage
who is entitled to the possession of the property. We have taken note of the
practice in the provinces that in giving a realty for a collateral, possession
usually goes with it. Besides, even assuming that petitioner had a right to
possess the subject land, his possession became unlawful when the private
complainant offered to redeem the property and petitioner unjustly refused.
Petitioner cannot profit from the effects of his crime. The trial court, therefore,
did not commit any error in ordering petitioner to vacate the subject
property. IcSEAH
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J : p
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision of the

Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. No. 21347 entitled "People of the Philippines versus
Aniceto Recebido," dated September 9, 1999 which found petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of Public Document; and its
Resolution dated February 15, 2000 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are the following, to wit:
On September 9, 1990, private complainant Caridad Dorol went to the
house of her cousin, petitioner Aniceto Recebido, at San Isidro, Bacon,
Sorsogon to redeem her property, an agricultural land with an area of 3,520
square meters located at San Isidro, Bacon, Sorsogon, which Caridad Dorol
mortgaged to petitioner sometime in April of 1985. Petitioner and Caridad
Dorol did not execute a document on the mortgage but Caridad Dorol instead
gave petitioner a copy of the Deed of Sale dated June 16, 1973 (Exhibit "A")
executed in her favor by her father, Juan Dorol.
In said confrontation, petitioner refused to allow Caridad Dorol to
redeem her property on his claim that she had sold her property to him in
1979. Caridad Dorol maintained and insisted that the transaction between
them involving her property was a mortgage.
Caridad Dorol verified from the Office of the Assessor in Sorsogon that
there exists on its file a Deed of Sale dated August 13, 1979 (Exhibit "J"),
allegedly executed by Caridad Dorol in favor of petitioner and that the
property was registered in the latter's name. After comparison of the
specimen signatures of Caridad Dorol in other documents (Exhibits "K" to "K-
10") with that of the signature of Caridad Dorol on the questioned Deed of
Sale, NBI Document Examiner Antonio Magbojas, found that the latter
signature was falsified (Exhibits "L-1" to "L-2").
Thereafter, Caridad Dorol filed her complaint against petitioner Aniceto
Recebido with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Legaspi City and its
Questioned Documents Division conducted an examination in the original
copy of the Deed of Sale in question allegedly signed by Caridad, particularly
her signature affixed thereon.
Mr. Magboja's report was approved by the Chief of the Questioned
Documents Division, Arcadio Ramos, and the Deputy Director of Technical
Services, Manuel Roura, both of the NBI. 1
Thus, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Sorsogon filed the
information indicting petitioner for Falsification of Public Document with the
Regional Trial Court, 5th Judicial Region, Branch 51, Sorsogon, Sorsogon,
reading as follows:AcICHD
"That on or about the 13th day of August, 1979, in the

Municipality of Sorsogon, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and
accused, being a private individual, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to defraud, falsify and/or
imitate the signature of one Caridad Dorol and/or cause it to appear
that said Caridad Dorol has signed her name on a Deed of Absolute
Sale of Real Property in favor of the herein accused and Notarized as
Doc. No. 680; page No. 54; Boon No. XIV and Series of 1979 of the
Registry of Notary Public Dominador S. Reyes, when in truth and in
fact accused well knew, that Caridad Dorol did not execute said
document, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
Contrary to law." 2
Upon arraignment petitioner pleaded "not guilty."

As narrated by the Court of Appeals, the petitioner contends that the
land in question was mortgaged to him by Juan Dorol, the father of Caridad,
on February 25, 1977 and was subsequently sold to him on August 13, 1983
although it was made to appear that the deed of sale was executed on August
13, 1979. It was also on the said date that Recebido gave Caridad the amount
of P1,000.00 in addition to the P2,600.00 mortgage price given to Juan Dorol
which culminated into the execution of the Deed of Sale signed by Caridad. 3
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered the decision on
December 2, 1996, convicting petitioner of the crime charged and sentencing
him as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, accused ANECITO RECEBIDO is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of one (1) year to three (3) years and six (6)
months of prision correccional as maximum and to pay a fine of Three
Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment.
Accused is ordered to pay P5,000.00 damages and to vacate the

land in question owned by the offended party.
SO ORDERED. 4
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision

of the trial court, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, with the modification that the award for damages
is DELETED, is assailed judgment is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED. 5
The petitioner raises his case before this Court seeking the reversal of
the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. Based on his
petition, the following issues are before this Court:TCacIA
1. Whether or not the crime charged had already prescribed at

the time the information was filed?
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed gave abuse of
discretion in sustaining the conviction of the petitioner?
3. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grievous error
in affirming the decision of the trial court for the petitioner
to vacate the land in question owned by the offended
party?
We rule in the negative on the three issues.
On the first issue: While the defense of prescription of the crime was
raised only during the motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court
of Appeals, there was no waiver of the defense. Under the Rules of Court, the
failure of the accused to assert the ground of extinction of the offense, inter
alia, in a motion to quash shall not be deemed a waiver of such ground. 6 The
reason is that by prescription, the State or the People loses the right to
prosecute the crime or to demand the service of the penalty
imposed. 7 Accordingly, prescription, although not invoked in the trial, may, as
in this case, be invoked on appeal. 8 Hence, the failure to raise this defense in
the motion to quash the information does not give rise to the waiver of the
petitioner-accused to raise the same anytime thereafter including during
appeal.
Nonetheless, we hold that the crime charged has not prescribed. The
petitioner is correct in stating that whether or not the offense charged has
already prescribed when the information was filed would depend on the
penalty imposable therefor, which in this case is "prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000.00
pesos." 9Under the Revised Penal Code, 10 said penalty is a correctional
penalty in the same way that the fine imposed is categorized as
correctional. Both the penalty and fine being correctional, the offense shall
prescribe in ten years. 11 The issue that the petitioner has missed, however, is
the reckoning point of the prescriptive period. The petitioner is of the
impression that the ten-year prescriptive period necessarily started at the time
the crime was committed. This is inaccurate. Under Article 91 of theRevised
Penal Code, the period of prescription shall "commence to run from the day
on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or
their agents, . . . ." In People v. Reyes, 12 this Court has declared that registration
in public registry is a notice to the whole world. The record is constructive
notice of its contents as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included
therein. All persons are charged with knowledge of what it contains. IcHTCS
The prosecution has established that private complainant Dorol did not
sell the subject land to the petitioner-accused at anytime and that sometime
in 1983 the private complainant mortgaged the agricultural land to petitioner
Recebido. It was only on September 9, 1990, when she went to petitioner to
redeem the land that she came to know of the falsification committed by the
petitioner. On the other hand, petitioner contends that the land in question
was mortgaged to him by Juan Dorol, the father of private complainant, and
was subsequently sold to him on August 13, 1983. This Court notes that the
private offended party had no actual knowledge of the falsification prior to
September 9, 1990. Meanwhile, assuming arguendo that the version of the
petitioner is believable, the alleged sale could not have been registered before
1983, the year the alleged deed of sale was executed by the private
complainant. Considering the foregoing, it is logical and in consonance with
human experience to infer that the crime committed was not discovered, nor
could have been discovered, by the offended party before 1983. Neither could
constructive notice by registration of the forged deed of sale, which is
favorable to the petitioner since the running of the prescriptive period of the
crime shall have to be reckoned earlier, have been done before 1983 as it is
impossible for the petitioner to have registered the deed of sale prior thereto.
Even granting arguendo that the deed of sale was executed by the private
complainant, delivered to the petitioner-accused in August 13, 1983 and
registered on the same day, the ten-year prescriptive period of the crime had
not yet elapsed at the time the information was filed in 1991. The inevitable
conclusion, therefore, is that the crime had not prescribed at the time of the
filing of the information.
On the second issue: We hold that the Court of Appeals did not commit
any grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed petitioner's conviction by the
trial court. The petitioner admits that the deed of sale that was in his
possession is a forged document as found by the trial and appellate
court. 13 Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that notwithstanding this admission,
the fact remains that there is no proof that the petitioner authored such
falsification or that the forgery was done under his direction. This argument is
without merit. Under the circumstance, there was no need of any direct proof
that the petitioner was the author of the forgery. As keenly observed by the
Solicitor General, "the questioned document was submitted by petitioner
himself when the same was requested by the NBI for examination. Clearly in
possession of the falsified deed of sale was petitioner and not Caridad Dorol
who merely verified the questioned sale with the Provincial Assessor's Office
of Sorsogon." 14 In other words, the petitioner was in possession of the forged
deed of sale which purports to sell the subject land from the private
complainant to him. Given this factual backdrop, the petitioner is presumed to
be the author of the forged deed of sale, despite the absence of any direct
evidence of his authorship of the forgery. Since the petitioner is the only
person who stood to benefit by the falsification of the document found in his
possession, it is presumed that he is the material author of the
falsification. 15 As it stands, therefore, we are unable to discern any grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals.
On the third issue: Petitioner submits that the trial court is without
jurisdiction to order petitioner to vacate the land in question considering that
the crime for which he is charged is falsification. 16 The petitioner insists that
the civil aspect involved in the criminal case at bar refer to the civil damages
recoverable ex delicto or arising from the causative act or omission. 17 In
addition, petitioner argues that he is entitled to possession as mortgagee since
the private complainant has not properly redeemed the property in question.
These are specious arguments. The petitioner based his claim of
possession alternatively by virtue of two alternative titles: one, based on the
forged deed of sale and, two, as mortgagee of the land. As already discussed,
the deed of sale was forged and, hence, could not be a valid basis of
possession. Neither could his status as mortgagee be the basis of possession
since it is the mortgagor in a contract of mortgage who is entitled to the
possession of the property. We have taken note of the practice in the
provinces that in giving a realty for a collateral, possession usually goes with
it. 18 Besides, even assuming that petitioner had a right to possess the subject
land, his possession became unlawful when the private complainant offered
to redeem the property and petitioner unjustly refused. Petitioner cannot
profit from the effects of his crime. The trial court, therefore, did not commit
any error in ordering petitioner to vacate the subject property. TcEDHa
In view of the foregoing, this Court finds that the Court of Appeals did
not commit any reversible error in its Decision dated September 9, 1999 and
its Resolution dated February 15, 2000.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Comment, Office of the Solicitor General pp. 1-2; Rollo, pp. 42-43.
2.RTC Decision, p. 1.
3.Decision, Court of Appeals, p. 1; Rollo, p. 13.

4.Decision, RTC, p. 1; Id., at 24.
5.Rollo, p. 13.
6.RULES OF COURT, Rule 117, Sec. 8, Rule 117 provides, to wit:

SEC. 8. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. — The failure of
the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to
the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to
quash or failed to allege the same in said motion shall be deemed a waiver
of the grounds of a motion to quash, except the grounds of no offense
charged, lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, extinction of the offense
or penalty and jeopardy, as provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (f) and (h) of
Section 3 of this Rule. (Italics supplied)
7.Santos v. Superintendent, 55 Phil. 345, 348-349 (1930).
8.See People v. Balagtas, 105 Phil. 1362-1363 [Unrep.].
9.Petition, p. 4; Rollo, p. 6.
10.REVISED PENAL CODE, Arts. 25 and 26.
11.REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 90.

12.175 SCRA 597, 604 (1989). Citations omitted.
13.Petitioner's Reply, p. 2; Rollo, p. 56.
14.Comment of the Solicitor General, p. 6; Rollo, p. 47.
15.Sarep v. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 440, 449 (1989).
16.Petition, p. 6; Rollo, p. 8.
17.Reply, p. 3; Id., at 57.
18.Heirs of George Bofill v. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 451, 459 (1994).
||| (Recebido v. People, G.R. No. 141931, [December 4, 2000], 400 PHIL 752-762)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 192565. February 28, 2012.]
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and DESI

TOMAS, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
DECISION
BRION, J :
p
We review in this Rule 45 petition, the decision 1 of the Regional Trial

Court, Branch 65, Makati City (RTC-Makati City) in Civil Case No. 09-1038. The
petition seeks to reverse and set aside the RTC-Makati City decision dismissing
the petition for certiorari of petitioners Union Bank of the Philippines (Union
Bank) and Desi Tomas (collectively, the petitioners). The RTC found that the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 63, Makati City (MeTC-Makati City) did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash the
information for perjury filed by Tomas.
The Antecedents
Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) for making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum
Shopping. The Information against her reads:
That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of
Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make untruthful statements under
oath upon a material matter before a competent person authorized
to administer oath which the law requires to wit: said accused stated
in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a complaint for
sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin docketed as [Civil]
Case No. 342-00 of the Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay City, that the
Union Bank of the Philippines has not commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency,
accused knowing well that said material statement was false thereby
making a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood. 2
The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Bank's two (2)

complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the
spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. The first complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0717, was filed before the RTC, Branch 109,
Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The second complaint, docketed as Civil Case
No. 342-000, was filed on March 15, 2000 and raffled to the MeTC, Branch 47,
Pasay City. Both complaints showed that Tomas executed and signed the
Certification against Forum Shopping. Accordingly, she was charged of
deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC by falsely declaring under oath in
the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did
not commence any other action or proceeding involving the same issue in
another tribunal or agency. DTIaHE
Tomas filed a Motion to Quash, 3 citing two grounds. First, she argued
that the venue was improperly laid since it is the Pasay City court (where the
Certificate against Forum Shopping was submitted and used) and not the
MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was
subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury case. Second, she argued that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense because: (a) the third element
of perjury — the willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood — was not
alleged with particularity without specifying what the other action or
proceeding commenced involving the same issues in another tribunal or
agency; (b) there was no other action or proceeding pending in another court
when the second complaint was filed; and (c) she was charged with perjury by
giving false testimony while the allegations in the Information make out
perjury by making a false affidavit.
The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has
jurisdiction over the case since the Certificate against Forum Shopping was
notarized in Makati City. 4 The MeTC-Makati City also ruled that the allegations
in the Information sufficiently charged Tomas with perjury. 5 The MeTC-Makati
City subsequently denied Tomas' motion for reconsideration. 6
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-Makati City
to annul and set aside the MeTC-Makati City orders on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion. The petitioners anchored their petition on the rulings
in United States v. Cañet 7 and Ilusorio v. Bildner 8 which ruled that venue and
jurisdiction should be in the place where the false document was presented.
The Assailed RTC Decision
In dismissing the petition for certiorari, the RTC-Makati City held:
[I]nsofar as the petitioner's stance is concerned[,] the more
recent case of [Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy] (G.R. Nos. 174168 & 179438, March
30, 2009) however, reaffirms what has been the long standing view on
the venue with respect to perjury cases. In this particular case[,] the
high court reiterated the rule that the criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where
the offense was committed, or where any of its essential ingredients
occurred. It went on to declare that since the subject document[,] the
execution of which was the subject of the charge[,] was subscribed
and sworn to in Manila[,] then the court of the said territorial
jurisdiction was the proper venue of the criminal action[.]
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Given the present state of jurisprudence on the matter, it is
not amiss to state that the city court of Makati City has jurisdiction to
try and decide the case for perjury inasmuch as the gist of the
complaint itself which constitute[s] the charge against the petitioner
dwells solely on the act of subscribing to a false certification. On the
other hand, the charge against the accused in the case of Ilusorio v.
Bildner, et al., based on the complaint-affidavits therein[,] was not
simply the execution of the questioned documents but rather the
introduction of the false evidence through the subject documents
before the court of Makati City. 9 (emphasis ours)
The RTC-Makati City ruled that the MeTC-Makati City did not commit
grave abuse of discretion since the order denying the Motion to Quash was
based on jurisprudence later than Ilusorio. The RTC-Makati City also observed
that the facts inIlusorio are different from the facts of the present case. Lastly,
the RTC-Makati City ruled that the Rule 65 petition was improper since the
petitioners can later appeal the decision in the principal case. The RTC-Makati
City subsequently denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 10
The Petition
The petitioners pray that we reverse the RTC-Makati City decision and
quash the Information for perjury against Tomas. The petitioners contend that
the Ilusorio ruling is more applicable to the present facts than our ruling in Sy
Tiong Shiou v. Sy Chim. 11 They argued that the facts in Ilusorio showed that the
filing of the petitions in court containing the false statements was the essential
ingredient that consummated the perjury. In Sy Tiong, the perjurious
statements were made in a General Information Sheet (GIS) that was
submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Interestingly, Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz shared the
petitioners' view. In his Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment (which we
hereby treat as the Comment to the petition), the Solicitor General also relied
on Ilusorio and opined that the lis mota in the crime of perjury is the deliberate
or intentional giving of false evidence in the court where the evidence is
material. The Solicitor General observed that the criminal intent to assert a
falsehood under oath only became manifest before the MeTC-Pasay City. SDHCac
The Issue
The case presents to us the issue of what the proper venue of perjury
under Article 183 of the RPC should be — Makati City, where the Certificate
against Forum Shopping was notarized, or Pasay City, where the Certification
was presented to the trial court.
The Court's Ruling
We deny the petition and hold that the MeTC-Makati City is the
proper venue and the proper court to take cognizance of the perjury case
against the petitioners.
Venue of Action and Criminal Jurisdiction
Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It
determines not only the place where the criminal action is to be instituted, but
also the court that has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case. The reason for
this rule is two-fold. First,the jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-
defined territories such that a trial court can only hear and try cases involving
crimes committed within its territorial jurisdiction. 12 Second, laying the venue
in the locus criminisis grounded on the necessity and justice of having an
accused on trial in the municipality of province where witnesses and other
facilities for his defense are available. 13
cECaHA
Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases
carries jurisdictional consequences. In determining the venue where the
criminal action is to be instituted and the court which has jurisdiction over it,
Section 15 (a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:
(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and
tried in the court or municipality or territory where the offense
was committed or where any of its essential ingredients
occurred. [emphasis ours]
The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedurewhich states:
Place of commission of the offense. — The complaint or
information is sufficient if it can be understood from its allegations
that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients
occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the
particular place where it was committed constitutes an essential
element of the offense charged or is necessary for its identification.
Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over

criminal cases not only in the court where the offense was committed, but also
where any of its essential ingredients took place. In other words, the venue of
action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the
Information states that the offense was committed or some of its essential
ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Information Charging Perjury
Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
contains the requirement for a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The
Certificate against Forum Shopping can be made either by a statement under
oath in the complaint or initiatory pleading asserting a claim or relief; it may
also be in a sworn certification annexed to the complaint or initiatory pleading.
In both instances, the affiant is required to execute a statement under oath
before a duly commissioned notary public or any competent person
authorized to administer oath that: (a) he or she has not theretofore
commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any
court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his or her knowledge,
no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other
pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof;
and (c) if he or she should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or
claim has been filed or is pending, he or she shall report that fact within five
days therefrom to the court wherein his or her aforesaid complaint or
initiatory pleading has been filed. In relation to the crime of perjury, the
material matter in a Certificate against Forum Shopping is the truth of the
required declarations which is designed to guard against litigants pursuing
simultaneous remedies in different fora. 14
In this case, Tomas is charged with the crime of perjury under Article 183
of the RPC for making a false Certificate against Forum Shopping. The
elements of perjury under Article 183 are:
(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an
affidavit upon a material matter.
(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent
officer, authorized to receive and administer oath. aCSDIc
(c) That in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful

and deliberate assertion of a falsehood.
(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity
is required by law or made for a legal purpose. 15 (emphasis
ours)
Where the jurisdiction of the court is being assailed in a criminal case on
the ground of improper venue, the allegations in the complaint and
information must be examined together with Section 15 (a), Rule 110 of
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On this basis, we find that the
allegations in the Information sufficiently support a finding that the crime of
perjury was committed by Tomas within the territorial jurisdiction of the
MeTC-Makati City.
The first element of the crime of perjury, the execution of the subject
Certificate against Forum Shopping was alleged in the Information to have
been committed in Makati City. Likewise, the second and fourth elements,
requiring the Certificate against Forum Shopping to be under oath before a
notary public, were also sufficiently alleged in the Information to have been
made in Makati City:
That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of
Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make untruthful statements under
oath upon a material matter before a competent person authorized
to administer oath which the law requires to wit: said accused stated
in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit . . . . 16
We also find that the third element of willful and deliberate falsehood
was also sufficiently alleged to have been committed in Makati City, not Pasay
City, as indicated in the last portion of the Information:
[S]aid accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit
of merit of a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of
replevin docketed as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the Metropolitan Trial
Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union Bank of the Philippines has not
commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues
in another tribunal or agency, accused knowing well that said material
statement was false thereby making a willful and deliberate assertion
of falsehood. 17 (underscoring ours)
Tomas' deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly

shown when she made the false declarations in the Certificate against Forum
Shopping before a notary public in Makati City, despite her knowledge that the
material statements she subscribed and swore to were not true. Thus, Makati
City is the proper venue and MeTC-Makati City is the proper court to try the
perjury case against Tomas, pursuant to Section 15 (a), Rule 110 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as all the essential elements constituting
the crime of perjury were committed within the territorial jurisdiction of
Makati City, not Pasay City. AHTICD
Referral to the En Banc

The present case was referred to the En Banc primarily to address the
seeming conflict between the division rulings of the Court in the Ilusorio case
that is cited as basis of this petition, and the Sy Tiong case that was the basis
of the assailed RTC-Makati City ruling.
The Cited Ilusorio and Sy Tiong Cases
The subject matter of the perjury charge in Ilusorio involved false
statements contained in verified petitions filed with the court for the
issuance of a new owner's duplicate copies of certificates of title. The verified
petitions containing the false statements were subscribed and sworn to in
Pasig City, but were filed in Makati City and Tagaytay City. The question posed
was: which court (Pasig City, Makati City and/or Tagaytay City) had jurisdiction
to try and hear the perjury cases?
We ruled that the venues of the action were in Makati City and Tagaytay
City, the places where the verified petitions were filed. The Court reasoned out
that it was only upon filing that the intent to assert an alleged falsehood
became manifest and where the alleged untruthful statement found relevance
or materiality. We cited as jurisprudential authority the case of United States. v.
Cañet 18 which ruled:
It is immaterial where the affidavit was subscribed and sworn,
so long as it appears from the information that the defendant, by
means of such affidavit, "swore to" and knowingly submitted false
evidence, material to a point at issue in a judicial proceeding pending
in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province. The gist of the offense
charged is not the making of the affidavit in Manila, but the intentional
giving of false evidence in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province
by means of such affidavit. [emphasis and underscoring deleted]
In Sy Tiong, the perjured statements were made in a GIS which was

subscribed and sworn to in Manila. We ruled that the proper venue for the
perjury charges was in Manila where the GIS was subscribed and sworn to. We
held that the perjury was consummated in Manila where the false statement
was made. As supporting jurisprudence, we cited the case of Villanueva v.
Secretary of Justice 19 that, in turn, cited an American case entitled U.S. v.
Norris. 20 We ruled in Villanueva that —
Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration well may
affect the dearest concerns of the parties before a tribunal. Deliberate
material falsification under oath constitutes the crime of perjury, and
the crime is complete when a witness' statement has once been made.
The Crime of Perjury: A Background

To have a better appreciation of the issue facing the Court, a look at the
historical background of how the crime of perjury (specifically, Article 183 of
the RPC) evolved in our jurisdiction.
The RPC penalizes three forms of false testimonies. The first is false
testimony for and against the defendant in a criminal case (Articles 180 and
181, RPC); the second is false testimony in a civil case (Article 182, RPC); and
the third is false testimony in other cases (Article 183, RPC). Based on the
Information filed, the present case involves the making of an untruthful
statement in an affidavit on a material matter.
These RPC provisions, however, are not really the bases of the rulings
cited by the parties in their respective arguments. The cited Ilusorio ruling,
although issued by this Court in 2008, harked back to the case of Cañet which
was decided in 1915, i.e., before the present RPC took effect. 21 Sy Tiong, on the
other hand, is a 2009 ruling that cited Villanueva, a 2005 case that in turn
cited United States v. Norris, a 1937 American case. Significantly,
unlike Cañet, Sy Tiong is entirely based on rulings rendered after the
present RPC took effect. 22
The perjurious act in Cañet consisted of an information
charging perjury through the presentation in court of a motion
accompanied by a false sworn affidavit. At the time the Cañet ruling was
rendered, the prevailing law on perjury and the rules on prosecution of
criminal offenses were found in Section 3, Act No. 1697 of the Philippine
Commission, and in Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No. 58 23 for the
procedural aspect.
Section 3 of Act No. 1697 reads: CDEaAI
Sec. 3. Any person who, having taken oath before a competent

tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the Philippine
Islands authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify,
declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony,
declaration, disposition, or certificate by him subscribed is true,
willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material
matter which he does not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury, and
shall be punished by a fine of not more than two thousand pesos and
by imprisonment for not more than five years; and shall moreover,
thereafter be incapable of holding any public office or of giving
testimony in any court of the Philippine Islands until such time as the
judgment against him is reversed.
This law was copied, with the necessary changes, from Sections
5392 24 and 5393 25 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. 26 Act No.
1697 was intended to make the mere execution of a false affidavit punishable in
our jurisdiction. 27
In turn, Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No. 58 provided that
the venue shall be the court of the place where the crime was committed.
As applied and interpreted by the Court in Cañet, perjury was committed
by the act of representing a false document in a judicial proceeding. 28 The venue
of action was held by the Court to be at the place where the false document
was presented since the presentation was the act that consummated the
crime.
The annotation of Justices Aquino and Griño-Aquino in their textbook on
the RPC 29 interestingly explains the history of the perjury provisions of the
present RPC and traces as well the linkage between Act No. 1697 and the
present Code. To quote these authors: 30
Art. 180 was taken from art. 318 of the Old Penal Code and art.
154 of Del Pan's Proposed Correctional Code, while art. 181 was taken
from art. 319 of the old Penal Code and Art. 157 of Del Pan's Proposed
Correctional Code. Said arts. 318 and 319, together with art. 321 of the
old Penal Code, were impliedly repealed by Act 1697, the Perjury Law,
passed on August 23, 1907, which in turn was expressly repealed by
the Administrative Code of 1916, Act 2657. In view of the express
repeal of Act 1697, arts. 318 and 321 of the old Penal Code were
deemed revived. However, Act 2718 expressly revived secs. 3 and 4 of
the Perjury Law. Art. 367 of the Revised Penal Code repealed Act Nos.
1697 and 2718.
It should be noted that perjury under Acts 1697 and 2718
includes false testimony, whereas, under the Revised Penal Code,
false testimony includes perjury. Our law on false testimony is of
Spanish origin, but our law on perjury (art. 183 taken from sec. 3 of Act
1697) is derived from American statutes. The provisions of the old Penal
Code on false testimony embrace perjury committed in court or in some
contentious proceeding, while perjury as defined in Act 1697 includes the
making of a false affidavit. The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on
false testimony "are more severe and strict than those of Act 1697" on
perjury. [italics ours]
With this background, it can be appreciated that Article 183 of

the RPC which provides:
The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person,
who knowingly makes untruthful statements and not being included
in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under
oath, or make an affidavit, upon any material matter before a
competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which
the law so requires. [emphasis supplied; emphases ours]
in fact refers to either of two punishable acts — (1) falsely testifying under
oath in a proceeding other than a criminal or civil case; and (2) making a false
affidavit before a person authorized to administer an oath on any material
matter where the law requires an oath. CTHDcE
As above discussed, Sy Tiong — decided under Article 183 of the RPC —

essentially involved perjured statements made in a GIS that was subscribed
and sworn to in Manila and submitted to the SEC in Mandaluyong City. Thus,
the case involved the making of an affidavit, not an actual testimony in a
proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil. From this perspective, the situs of
the oath, i.e., the place where the oath was taken, is the place where the offense
was committed.By implication, the proper venue would have been the City of
Mandaluyong — the site of the SEC — had the charge involved an actual
testimony made before the SEC.
In contrast, Cañet involved the presentation in court of a motion
supported and accompanied by an affidavit that contained a falsity. With
Section 3 of Act No. 1697 as basis, the issue related to the submission of the
affidavit in a judicial proceeding. This came at a time when Act No. 1697 was the
perjury law, and made no distinction between judicial and other proceedings, and
at the same time separately penalized the making of false statements under
oath (unlike the present RPCwhich separately deals with false testimony in
criminal, civil and other proceedings, while at the same time also penalizing
the making of false affidavits). Understandably, the venue should be the place
where the submission was made to the court or the situs of the court; it could
not have been the place where the affidavit was sworn to simply because this
was not the offense charged in the Information.
The case of Ilusoriocited the Cañet case as its authority, in a situation
where the sworn petitions filed in court for the issuance of duplicate
certificates of title (that were allegedly lost) were the cited sworn statements
to support the charge of perjury for the falsities stated in the sworn petitions.
The Court ruled that the proper venue should be the Cities of Makati and
Tagaytay because it was in the courts of these cities "where the intent to assert
an alleged falsehood became manifest and where the alleged untruthful
statement finds relevance or materiality in deciding the issue of whether new
owner's duplicate copies of the [Certificate of Condominium Title] and
[Transfer Certificates of Title] may issue." 31 To the Court, "whether the
perjurious statements contained in the four petitions were subscribed and
sworn in Pasig is immaterial, the gist of the offense of perjury being the
intentional giving of false statement," 32 citing Cañet as authority for its
statement.
The statement in Ilusorio may have partly led to the present confusion
on venue because of its very categorical tenor in pointing to the considerations
to be made in the determination of venue; it leaves the impression that the
place where the oath was taken is not at all a material consideration, forgetting
that Article 183 of the RPC clearly speaks of two situations while Article 182 of
the RPC likewise applies to false testimony in civil cases.
The Ilusorio statement would have made perfect sense had the basis for
the charge been Article 182 of the RPC, on the assumption that the petition
itself constitutes a false testimony in a civil case. The Cañet ruling would then
have been completely applicable as the sworn statement is used in a civil case,
although no such distinction was made under Cañetbecause the applicable law
at the time (Act No. 1697) did not make any distinction. HDcaAI
If Article 183 of the RPC were to be used, as what in fact appears in

the Ilusorio ruling, then only that portion of the article, referring to the making
of an affidavit, would have been applicable as the other portion refers to false
testimony in other proceedings which a judicial petition for the issuance of a
new owner's duplicate copy of a Certificate of Condominium Title is not
because it is a civil proceeding in court. As a perjury based on the making of a
false affidavit, what assumes materiality is the site where the oath was taken as
this is the place where the oath was made, in this case, Pasig City.
Procedurally, the rule on venue of criminal cases has been subject to
various changes from the time General Order No. 58 was replaced by Rules
106 to 122 of the Rules of Court on July 1, 1940. Section 14, Rule 106 of
the Rules of Court provided for the rule on venue of criminal actions and it
expressly included, as proper venue, the place where any one of the essential
ingredients of the crime took place. This change was followed by the passage of
the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure, 33 the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 34 and the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which all
adopted the 1940 Rules of Criminal Procedure's expanded venue of criminal
actions. Thus, the venue of criminal cases is not only in the place where the
offense was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took place.
In the present case, the Certification against Forum Shopping was made
integral parts of two complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of
replevin against the respondent spouses Eddie Tamondong and Eliza B.
Tamondong, who, in turn, filed a complaint-affidavit against Tomas for
violation of Article 183 of the RPC. As alleged in the Information that
followed, the criminal act charged was for the execution by Tomas of an
affidavit that contained a falsity.
Under the circumstances, Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the applicable
provision; thus, jurisdiction and venue should be determined on the basis of
this article which penalizes one who "make[s] an affidavit, upon any material
matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases
in which the law so requires." The constitutive act of the offense is the making
of an affidavit; thus, the criminal act is consummated when the statement
containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly authorized
person. DHAcET
Based on these considerations, we hold that our ruling in Sy Tiong is

more in accord with Article 183 of the RPC and Section 15 (a), Rule 110 of
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To reiterate for the guidance of
the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury committed through the making of
a false affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is committed at the time the
affiant subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time that
all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When the crime is
committed through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither
criminal nor civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is
given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a
proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement is
submitted, venue may either be at the place where the sworn statement is
submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the oath and the
submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases,
determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information
to be constitutive of the crime committed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for
lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Peralta, Bersamin,
Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Del Castillo, J., is on official leave.
Sereno, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1.Dated April 28, 2010; rollo, pp. 137-143.

2.Id. at 11.
3.Id. at 29-37.
4.Order dated March 26, 2009; rollo, pp. 55-56.
5.Id. at 56.
6.Order dated August 28, 2009, pp. 69-70.

7.30 Phil. 371 (1915).
8.G.R. Nos. 173935-38, December 23, 2008, 575 SCRA 272.
9.Rollo, pp. 142-143.

10.Order dated June 9, 2010; id. at 154.
11.G.R. Nos. 174168 and 179438, March 30, 2009, 582 SCRA 517.
12.United States v. Cunanan, 26 Phil. 376 (1913).
13.Parulan v. Reyes, 78 Phil. 855 (1947).

14.Torres v. Specialized Packaging Development Corporation, G.R. No. 149634, July 6,
2004, 433 SCRA 455.
15.Monfort III v. Salvatierra, G.R. No. 168301, March 5, 2007, 517 SCRA 447, 461.
16.Supra note 2.
17.Ibid.
18.Supra note 7, at 378.
19.G.R. No. 162187, November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 495, 512.
20.300 U.S. 564 (1937). The perjury was based on a false testimony by the
defendant at the hearing before the Senate Committee in Nebraska.
21.The Penal Code for the Philippines which took effect from July 19, 1887 to
December 31, 1931.
22.Took effect on January 1, 1932.
23.Entitled "The Law on Criminal Procedure" which took effect on April 23, 1900.
24.Every person who, having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or
person, in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to
be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that
any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him
subscribed is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes
any material matter which he does not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury.
25.The law refers to subornation of perjury.
26.United States v. Concepcion, 13 Phil. 424 (1909).
27.Id. at 428-429.
28.People v. Cruz, et al., 197 Phil. 815 (1982).
29.Ramon C. Aquino and Carolina Griño-Aquino, 2 THE REVISED PENAL CODE, 1997
ed.
30.Id. at 301-302.
31.Ilusorio v. Bildner, supra note 8, at 283.

32.Id. at 284.
33.Section 14, Rule 110. Place where action is to be instituted. —
(a) In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the
Court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or
any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place.
34.Section 15, Rule 110. Place where action is to be instituted. —

(a) Subject to existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the
offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took
place.
(Union Bank of the Phils. v. People, G.R. No. 192565, [February 28, 2012], 683
|||
PHIL 108-127)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 162187. November 18, 2005.]
CRISTE B. VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. SECRETARY

OF JUSTICE and HORST-KESSLER VON
SPRENGEISEN, respondents.
Gregorio M. Batiller for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Romulo Mabanta Buenaventura Sayoc & Delos Angeles for private
respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACTS OF A QUASI-JUDICIAL

AGENCY AS AFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS; GENERALLY CONCLUSIVE
UPON THE SUPREME COURT; EXCEPTION NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. —
Rule 45 of theRules of Court provides that only questions of fact may be raised
in a petition for review on certiorari. Findings of facts of a quasi-judicial agency,
as affirmed by the CA, are generally conclusive on the Court, unless cogent
facts and circumstances of such a nature warranting the modification or
reversal of the assailed decision were ignored, misunderstood or
misinterpreted. Thus, the Court may delve into and resolve factual issues in
exceptional cases. The petitioner has failed to establish that any such
circumstance is present in the case at bar.
2. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; INFORMATION; PROBABLE CAUSE;
DEFINED AND CONSTRUED. — Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal
information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the private
respondent is probably guilty thereof. It is such a state of facts in the mind of
the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to
believe or entertain an honest or strong suspicion that a thing is so. The term
does not mean "actual or positive cause"; nor does it import absolute
certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding
of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient
evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a
trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge."
The determination of its existence lies within the discretion of the prosecuting
officers after conducting a preliminary investigation upon complaint of an
offended party. The Resolution of the Secretary of Justice declaring the
absence or existence of a probable cause affirmed by the CA is accorded high
respect. However, such finding may be nullified where grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is established.
3. CRIMINAL LAW; PERJURY; DEFINED; ELEMENTS. — Perjury is the willful
and corrupt assertion of a falsehood under oath or affirmation administered
by authority of law on a material matter. The elements of the felony are: (a)
That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon
a material matter. (b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a
competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath. (c) That in that
statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of
a falsehood. (d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is
required by law or made for a legal purpose. A mere assertion of a false
objective fact, a falsehood, is not enough. The assertion must be deliberate
and willful. Perjury being a felony by dolo, there must be malice on the part of
the accused. Willfully means intentionally; with evil intent and legal malice,
with the consciousness that the alleged perjurious statement is false with the
intent that it should be received as a statement of what was true in fact. It is
equivalent to "knowingly." "Deliberately" implies meditated as distinguished
from inadvertent acts. It must appear that the accused knows his statement
to be false or as consciously ignorant of its truth. Perjury cannot be willful
where the oath is according to belief or conviction as to its truth. A false
statement of a belief is not perjury. Bona fide belief in the truth of a statement
is an adequate defense. A false statement which is obviously the result of an
honest mistake is not perjury.
4. ID.; ID.; TWO ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS TO PROVE PERJURY, EXPLAINED.
— There are two essential elements of proof for perjury: (1) the statement
made by the defendants must be proven false; and (2) it must be proven that
the defendant did not believe those statements to be true. Knowledge by the
accused of the falsity of his statement is an internal act. It may be proved by
his admissions or by circumstantial evidence. The state of mind of the accused
may be determined by the things he says and does, from proof of a motive to
lie and of the objective falsity itself, and from other facts tending to show that
the accused really knew the things he claimed not to know. A conviction for
perjury cannot be sustained merely upon the contradictory sworn statements
of the accused. The prosecution must prove which of the two statements is
false and must show the statement to be false by other evidence than the
contradicting statement.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J :
p
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 of

the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 76999 dismissing the petition
for certiorari assailing the finding of the Secretary of Justice that no probable
cause exists against private respondent Horst-Kessler Von Sprengeisen for
perjury.
The Antecedents
On April 2, 1996, the Refractories Corporation of the Philippines (RCP)
filed a protest before the Special Committee on Anti-Dumping of the
Department of Finance against certain importations of Hamburg Trading
Corporation (HTC), a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws
of the Philippines. The matter involved 151.070 tons of magnesite-based
refractory bricks from Germany. 2 The case was docketed as Anti-Dumping
Case No. I-98.
The protest was referred to the Bureau of Import Services (BIS) of the
Department of Trade and Industry, to determine if there was a prima facie case
for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7843, the Anti-Dumping Law. Sometime
in February 1997, the BIS submitted its report to the Tariff Commission,
declaring that a prima facie case existed and that continued importation of
refractory bricks from Germany would harm the local industry. It adopted the
amount of DM 1,200 per metric ton as the normal value of the imported
goods. 3
The HTC received a copy of the said report on February 14, 1997.
However, before it could respond, the chairman of the Tariff Commission
prodded the parties to settle the matter amicably. A conference ensued
between RCP Senior Vice President and Assistant General Manager Criste
Villanueva and Jesus Borgonia, on the one hand, and HTC President and
General Manager Horst-Kessler Von Sprengeisen and Sales Manager Dennis
Gonzales, on the other. During the conference, the parties agreed that the
refractory bricks were imported by the HTC at a price less than its normal value
of DM 1,200, and that such importation was likely to injure the local industry.
The parties also agreed to settle the case to avoid expenses and protracted
litigation. HTC was required to reform its price policy/structure of its
importation and sale of refractory bricks from Germany to conform to the
provisions of R.A. No. 7843 and its rules and regulations. Jesus Borgonio
thereafter prepared and signed a compromise agreement containing the
terms agreed upon which Villanueva and Borgonia signed. 4 Bienvenido Flores,
an Office Clerk of RCP, delivered the agreement to HTC at the 9th Floor of
Ramon Magsaysay Center Building, 1680 Roxas Boulevard, Manila by Von
Sprengeisen's approval. 5
However, Von Sprengeisen did not sign the agreement. Borgonia revised
the agreement by inserting the phrase "based on the findings of the BIS" in
paragraph 1 thereof. Villanueva and Borgonia signed the agreement and had
the same delivered to the office of HTC on April 22, 1997 by Lino M. Gutierrez,
a technical assistant of RCP. Gonzales received the agreement and delivered
the same to Von Sprengeisen. After 20 minutes, Gonzales returned, with the
agreement already signed by Von Sprengeisen. 6 Gonzales, who had also
signed, then gave it to Gutierrez. On the same day, Notary Public Zenaida P.
De Zuñiga notarized the agreement. 7 Gonzales delivered a copy of the
notarized Agreement to HTC. 8
RCP submitted the compromise agreement to the Tariff Commission.
During the May 9, 1997 hearing before the Commission for the approval of the
agreement, a representative of HTC appeared. He offered no objection to the
Agreement. The Commission submitted its report to the Special Committee
which rendered a decision declaring that, based on the findings of the BIS, the
normal value of the imported refractory bricks was DM 1,200 per metric ton.
HTC received a copy of the decision on March 4, 1998. Neither RCP nor HTC
appealed the decision to the Court of Tax Appeals.
In the meantime, HTC imported refractory bricks from Germany anew
and noted that the normal value of the said importation under the decision of
the Special Committee based on the BIS report was DM 1,200 per metric ton.
On July 28, 1998, the HTC filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside and/or Vacate
Judgment with the Special Committee on Anti-Dumping, praying that such
decision be declared null and void on the following grounds:
1. THE FRAUD HAD BEEN COMMITTED BY THE PROTESTANT DURING
THE NEGOTIATION FOR THE PREPARATION OF THE COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT. TEAICc
2. THAT INSERTIONS AND/OR SUBSTITUTION OF THE FACTS NOT

AGREED UPON WAS DELIBERATELY AND SURREPTITIOUSLY MADE BY
THE PROTESTANT IN THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT WITHOUT THE
KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT OF THE PROTESTEE. 9
The motion was verified by Von Sprengeisen. The HTC averred therein
that Villanueva violated Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code when he
surreptitiously inserted the phrase "based on the findings of the BIS" in the
agreement without the knowledge and consent of Von Sprengeisen and
despite their agreement to put behind them the findings of the BIS. Appended
to the motion was an Affidavit of Merit executed by Von Sprengeisen in which
he alleged, inter alia, that sometime in February 1997, the BIS came out with
its Report declaring that the normal value of the magnesite-based refractory
bricks was DM 1,200 per metric ton; before HTC could respond to the report,
Villanueva invited him to a conference for the purpose of finding the best
solution to the pending case before the Commission; he and Gonzales
attended the meeting during which it was agreed, by way of a compromise,
that the parties will accept the amount of DM 1,050 per metric ton as the
normal value for all magnesite-based refractory bricks from Germany; when
he received the draft of the compromise agreement prepared by Villanueva,
he approved the same; subsequently, Villanueva transmitted a compromise
agreement already signed by him to Von Sprengeisen for his review, approval
and signature; believing that the compromise agreement reproduced the
contents of the first compromise agreement, he signed the second agreement
without reading it; when he received, on March 4, 1998, a copy of the decision
of the Tariff Commission based on the compromise agreement of the parties
wherein the committee adopted the findings and recommendations of the BIS
(that the normal value of the shipment was DM 1,200 per metric ton), he was
shocked because he never agreed to the use of such findings for the
reformation of its price policies; there was, in fact, an agreement between him
and Villanueva to put behind them the findings of the BIS; he called up
Villanueva at his office but failed to contact him despite several attempts;
suspecting that something amiss happened, he had the draft of the first
compromise agreement retrieved but his secretary failed to locate the same;
it was only sometime later that his secretary found the folder-file containing
the draft and was appalled to discover that Villanueva had substantially altered
the first draft of the compromise agreement; this made him conclude and
confirm his suspicion that Villanueva, thru deceit and fraud, induced him to
sign the compromise agreement to the prejudice of the HTC. 10
The RCP opposed the motion. But, in a parallel move, Villanueva, in his
capacity as Senior Vice President and Assistant General Manager of RCP, filed
a criminal complaint for perjury against Von Sprengeisen in the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Manila. Appended thereto was a complaint-affidavit
executed by Villanueva wherein he declared, inter alia, that Von Sprengeisen
made the following false statements in the Urgent Motion, thus:
a. [Complainant] was the one who called up his office, inviting him to
a meeting for the purpose of finding the best and most
equitable solution to the case (p. 3, Urgent Motion);
b. RCP and Hamburg Trading agreed to put behind them the findings
and recommendations of the Bureau of Import Services (BIS)
with respect to the anti-dumping protest filed by RCP (p. 3,
Urgent Motion);
c. The original version of the Compromise Agreement sent to him was
merely a draft (p. 3, Urgent Motion);
d. The phrase "based on the findings of the Bureau of Import Services"

was inserted in paragraph 1 of the final Compromise
Agreement without his knowledge and consent (p. 3, Urgent
Motion); and
e. [Complainant] was the one who surreptitiously inserted the

aforesaid phrase (p. 3, Urgent Motion). 11
Villanueva also alleged that Von Sprengeisen made the following false
statements in his Affidavit of Merit:
a. [Complainant] invited him to a conference for the purpose of
finding the best solution to the case;
b. [Complainant and he] agreed to put behind [them] the findings and
recommendation of the BIS submitted to the Secretary of
Finance;
c. We agreed to the amount of DM 1,050/ton as the normal value for
all magnesite-based refractory bricks from Germany;
d. The original version of the Compromise Agreement sent to him was

merely a draft; and
e. Through deceit and fraud, [complainant] induced [respondent] to
sign the final Compromise Agreement. 12
In his Counter-Affidavit, Von Sprengeisen averred that whoever called

the other for a conference was not a material matter. Since the first draft of
the Compromise Agreement transmitted to him was by fax, he asked the
complainant to send to him the hard copy of the Agreement for his signature.
He further narrated that when he received the hard copy of the compromise
agreement, he did not bother to review since he assumed that it contained the
same provisions in the faxed copy. He did not suggest that the phrase "based
on the findings of the BIS" be inserted in the hard copy of the agreement
because he and Villanueva were at odds on the BIS finding the normal price of
the goods was DM 1,200 per metric ton. He insisted that it would have been
senseless of him to agree to such insertion; as such, he did not make any willful
and deliberate assertion of any falsehood as to any material fact. 13
Investigating Prosecutor Francisco G. Supnet found no probable cause

for perjury against the private respondent and recommended the dismissal of
the complaint. Second Assistant City Prosecutor Leoncia Dimagiba reviewed
the resolution of Prosecutor Supnet and found probable cause for perjury
against the private respondent for alleging in his Affidavit of Merit that he was
induced to sign the compromise agreement through fraud and deceit.
According to the Second Assistant City Prosecutor, the allegation of the private
respondent "thru deceit and fraud to sign the final Compromise Agreement"
was a deliberate assertion of a falsehood, designed as it was merely to give
the BIS the impression that private respondent was misled into agreeing to
the compromise agreement. She further opined that the allegation was
perjurious, considering that the private respondent had sufficient time to pass
upon the Compromise Agreement and could have availed the services of legal
minds who could review the terms and conditions thereof before signing the
same; 14 hence, she recommended the reversal of Prosecutor Supnet's
resolution and the filing of the information. The City Prosecutor approved the
recommendation of the Second Assistant City Prosecutor. Accordingly, an
Information for perjury was filed against the private respondent with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila.
The private respondent appealed the resolution to the Secretary of
Justice, who reversed the resolution of the City Prosecutor on September 20,
2002. According to the Justice Secretary, the complainant failed to establish
the materiality of the alleged false assertions and that the said assertions were
willful and deliberate. Moreover, the allegations in the Affidavit of Merit are
not altogether false since the intention of the parties in executing the
compromise agreement was precisely to put behind the ruling of the BIS,
despite which the complainant inserted the condition that the parties would
be bound by such findings and recommendations. 15 The decretal portion of
the resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed resolution of the City Prosecutor of
Manila is hereby REVERSED. The City Prosecutor is directed to
withdraw the information for perjury against respondent Horst-
Kessler von Sprengeisen and to report the action taken within ten (10)
days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED. 16
Villanueva then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the
resolution of the Justice Secretary, alleging therein that grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, was committed in
issuing the said resolution. 17 The private respondent, for his part, sought the
dismissal of the petition alleging that, as found by the Justice Secretary, there
was no probable cause against him for perjury. 18
On February 13, 2004, the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the
resolution of the Justice Secretary. 19
The CA declared that, as posited by the Office of the Solicitor General in
its comment on the petition, the parties had agreed to put behind them the
findings and recommendations of the BIS with respect to the anti-dumping
protest. The appellate court stated that its finding is buttressed by the fact that
the amount of DM 1,050 was not mentioned in the first compromise
agreement and that, under such agreement, the HTC obliged itself "to reform
its pricing policy and structure with respect to refractory products being
imported to and sold in the Philippines in accordance with the provisions
of R.A. No. 7843and its implementing rules and requirements." The CA
emphasized that it was inclined to believe that there was no meeting of the
minds of the parties when the petitioner inserted the phrase "based on the
findings of the BIS" in the revised compromise agreement; hence, there could
not have been perjury when the private respondent executed the Affidavit of
Merit and the Urgent Motion to Set Aside and/or Vacate Judgment. The CA also
agreed with the findings of the Secretary of Justice that the insertion of the
condition in the compromise agreement that the parties would be bound by
the BIS findings and recommendation gave the private respondent reason to
believe that he was deceived by the petitioner into signing the Agreement; as
such, the private respondent's allegation in his Affidavit of Merit, that he was
induced to signing the Compromise Agreement through fraud and deceit, was
not altogether false. Consequently, the CA ruled, the private respondent did
not make any willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood. 20 The appellate
court conformed to the disquisitions of the Secretary of Justice in the assailed
resolution and concluded that the private respondent did not, in the Affidavit
of Merit, make a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood. 21
Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with this
Court against private respondent Von Sprengeisen and the Secretary of
Justice, insisting that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to excess or lack of jurisdiction in dismissing the petition and affirming the
assailed resolution. HIaAED
The petitioner maintains that, during the preliminary investigation, he
adduced substantial evidence to prove probable cause for perjury against the
private respondent. He maintains that probable cause does not mean actual
and positive causes; nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based
on opinion and reasonable belief. It is enough that it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. He avers that,
contrary to the claim of the private respondent in his Affidavit of Merit, the
meeting between him and Jesus Borgonio, on the one hand, and the private
respondent and HTC Sales Manager Dennis Gonzales, on the other, was
arranged by the latter and not by him. As gleaned from the draft and final
copies of the compromise agreement, the parties made express reference to
the prima facie findings of the BIS that the actual export price of HTC was
below the fair market value. By agreeing that such findings of the BIS be
included in the Compromise Agreement, the said private respondent impliedly
agreed to such findings as basis of the price for which HTC would sell the
German-made magnesite-based refractory bricks in the Philippines. The
petitioner avers that the fact that the amount of DM 1,050 per metric ton was
not specifically mentioned in the compromise agreement was of no
importance, considering the parties' acceptance of such findings is based
on R.A. No. 7843. He points out that the private respondent could not have
failed to notice the difference between the first draft and the final copy of the
agreement before signing it because, as alleged by Lino Gutierrez in his reply
affidavit, it took the private respondent twenty minutes or so after receiving
the agreement to review the final draft before signing it. Moreover, the Urgent
Motion to Set Aside and/or Vacate Judgment signed by the private respondent
was filed more than 15 months from the execution of the compromise
agreement and after four months from the Tariff Commission's approval
thereof.
The petitioner argues that it is incredible that during the interregnum of
19 months, the private respondent failed to discover the revisions/insertions
in the final draft of the compromise agreement. Considering the premises, the
petitioner submits, the private respondent's filing of the Urgent Motion for and
in behalf of HTC was merely an afterthought, to enable the latter to escape
compliance with the terms and conditions of the Agreement.
The petitioner further insists that the insertion of the contested phrase
in the final draft of the compromise agreement was necessary although it may
not be in the best interest of HTC. He posits that the falsehoods made by the
private respondent in his Urgent Motion and Affidavit of Merit were material
to the proceedings in the Anti-Dumping Office of the Tariff Commission
because these were used to set aside the compromise agreement executed
by the parties.
In his Comment on the petition, the private respondent avers that the
issues raised by the petitioner are factual, hence, improper in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The determination of
the existence of a probable cause is primarily an administrative sanction of the
Secretary of Justice. He insists that the findings of the Justice Secretary should
be accorded great respect, especially since the same were upheld by the CA.
He asserts that the petitioner failed to establish in the CA and in this Court that
the Justice Secretary committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction in her resolution.
The petition has no merit.
The pivotal issue in this case is factual — whether or not, based on the
records, there was probable cause for the private respondent's indictment for
perjury.
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that only questions of fact may be
raised in a petition for review on certiorari. Findings of facts of a quasi-judicial
agency, as affirmed by the CA, are generally conclusive on the Court, unless
cogent facts and circumstances of such a nature warranting the modification
or reversal of the assailed decision were ignored, misunderstood or
misinterpreted. Thus, the Court may delve into and resolve factual issues in
exceptional cases. The petitioner has failed to establish that any such
circumstance is present in the case at bar. 22
The Court finds that the public respondent did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed resolution, and that the CA did not commit any reversible error in its
assailed decision and resolution. If at all the public respondent erred in issuing
the assailed resolution, such is merely an error in the exercise of jurisdiction,
reversible by a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court especially so where, as in this case, the issues before the CA were factual
and not legal. The absence or existence of probable cause in a given case
involves a calibration and a reexamination of the evidence adduced by the
parties before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila and the probative
weight thereof. The CA thus ruled correctly when it dismissed the petition
before it.
Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, has been

defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that
a crime has been committed and that the private respondent is probably guilty
thereof. It is such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead
a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe or entertain an honest
or strong suspicion that a thing is so. The term does not mean "actual or
positive cause;" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on
opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not
require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained
of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception
of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge." 23
The determination of its existence lies within the discretion of the
prosecuting officers after conducting a preliminary investigation upon
complaint of an offended party. 24 The Resolution of the Secretary of Justice
declaring the absence or existence of a probable cause affirmed by the CA is
accorded high respect. However, such finding may be nullified where grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is established. 25
Perjury is defined and penalized in Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code,
thus:
Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn
affirmation. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon
any person who, knowingly making untruthful statements and not
being included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall
testify under oath or make an affidavit upon any material matter
before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases
in which the law so requires.
Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of
an oath, shall commit any of the falsehoods mentioned in this and the
three preceding articles of this section shall suffer the respective
penalties provided therein.
Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration may affect the

earnest concerns of the parties before a tribunal. The felony is consummated
when the false statement is made. 26
The seminal modern treatment of the history of perjury concludes that
one consideration of policy overshadows all others — the measures taken
against the offense must not be so severe as to discourage aggrieved parties
from lodging complaints or testifying. 27 As quoted by Dean Wigmore, a
leading 19th Century Commentator, noted that English law, "throws every
fence round a person accused of perjury, for the obligation of protecting
witnesses from oppression or annoyance, by charges, or threats of charges, of
having made false testimony is far paramount to that of giving even perjury its
deserts." 28
Perjury is the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood under oath or
affirmation administered by authority of law on a material matter. 29 The
elements of the felony are:
(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed
an affidavit upon a material matter. IEAacS
(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a

competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath.
(c) That in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful
and deliberate assertion of a falsehood.
(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity
is required by law or made for a legal purpose. 30
A mere assertion of a false objective fact, a falsehood, is not enough. The

assertion must be deliberate and willful. 31Perjury being a felony by dolo, there
must be malice on the part of the accused. 32 Willfully means intentionally; with
evil intent and legal malice, with the consciousness that the alleged perjurious
statement is false with the intent that it should be received as a statement of
what was true in fact. It is equivalent to "knowingly." "Deliberately" implies
meditated as distinguished from inadvertent acts. 33 It must appear that the
accused knows his statement to be false or as consciously ignorant of its
truth. 34
Perjury cannot be willful where the oath is according to belief or
conviction as to its truth. A false statement of a belief is not perjury. Bona
fide belief in the truth of a statement is an adequate defense. 35 A false
statement which is obviously the result of an honest mistake is not perjury.
There are two essential elements of proof for perjury: (1) the statement
made by the defendants must be proven false; and (2) it must be proven that
the defendant did not believe those statements to be true. 36
Knowledge by the accused of the falsity of his statement is an internal
act. It may be proved by his admissions or by circumstantial evidence. The
state of mind of the accused may be determined by the things he says and
does, from proof of a motive to lie and of the objective falsity itself, and from
other facts tending to show that the accused really knew the things he claimed
not to know. 37
A conviction for perjury cannot be sustained merely upon the
contradictory sworn statements of the accused. The prosecution must prove
which of the two statements is false and must show the statement to be false
by other evidence than the contradicting statement. 38 The rationale of this
principle is thus:
. . . Proof that accused has given contradictory testimony under
oath at a different time will not be sufficient to establish the falsity of
testimony charged as perjury, for this would leave simply one oath of
the defendant as against another, and it would not appear that the
testimony charged was false rather than the testimony contradictory
thereof. The two statements will simply neutralize each other; there
must be some corroboration of the contradictory testimony. Such
corroboration, however, may be furnished by
evidence aliunde tending to show perjury independently of the
declarations of testimony of the accused. 39
The term "material matter" is the main fact subject of the inquiry, or any
circumstance which tends to prove that fact, or any fact or circumstance which
tends to corroborate or strengthen the testimony related to the subject of the
inquiry, or which legitimately affects the credence of any witness who testified.
In this case, a matter is material if it has a material effect or tendency to
influence the Commission in resolving the motion of HTC one way or the other.
The effects of the statement are weighed in terms of potentiality rather than
probability. 40 The prosecution need not prove that the false testimony
actually influenced the Commission. 41
The private respondent did err when he declared, in the motion of the
HTC and his affidavit, that it was the petitioner who invited him to a
conference. The truth of the matter is that it was Gonzales who did so.
Nonetheless, the issue of who called for a conference is of de
minimis importance because, after all, the parties agreed to meet after having
been prodded by the Chairman of the Commission to settle the case instead
of going through the tribulations and expenses of a protracted litigation. No
adverse inference (related to the merits of their respective contention in this
case) can be ascribed as to whoever called the conference. After all, parties are
even urged to settle cases amicably. cDCSTA
Besides, as correctly declared by the Second Assistant City Prosecutor in

her resolution:
The allegation that it was complainant who invited respondent
to the meeting may not be a deliberate lie. Respondent may not have
known who arranged the meeting, but as he was able to talk to
complainant, he presumed that it was complainant who extended the
invitation. Moreover, the identity of the one who initiated the meeting
is not material considering that there was a meeting of the minds of
the Parties. 42
The Court also agrees with the contention of the private respondent that
the copy of the first agreement transmitted to him was a fax copy of the draft,
and that, contrary to the allegations of the private respondent, such
agreement was prepared by Borgonia and not by the petitioner. As gleaned
from page two of the agreement, the particulars of the residence certificates
of the petitioner and the private respondent were not typewritten, hence,
cannot as yet be notarized. As claimed by the private respondent, a copy was
transmitted to him for his personal review, and if he found it to be in order,
the petitioner and Borgonia would prepare and sign the agreement and give
it back to him for review and signature, with the particulars of his community
tax certificate indicated in the final copy.
Undeniably, the identity of the person who prepared or caused to
prepare the compromise agreement subsequently signed by the petitioner
and the private respondent was of prime importance because only such person
should be charged for perjury. The private respondent erroneously stated in his
Affidavit of Merit and Urgent Motion that it was the petitioner who prepared
the agreement that was signed by the parties. It turned out that it was
Borgonia who prepared the first and the second copies. However, the private
respondent cannot be held liable for perjury since it was Borgonia who
prepared the agreement and not the petitioner. The Court agrees with the
following contention of the private respondent in his counter-affidavit:
4.6 While complainant claims that it was not he but Mr. Borgonia who
made the insertions, there is no doubt that, indeed, the
insertions were made into the document. Since complainant is
the signatory to the Compromise Agreement, it is but natural
for one to presume that he had made the insertions. At the
same time, I can not be expected to know that it was Mr.
Borgonia, as claimed by complainant, who made such
insertions. 43
Indeed, Borgonia was merely the Manager of the Management

Information Group of RCP, whereas the petitioner was no less than its Senior
Vice President and Assistant General Manager, Borgonia's superior. Unless
and until approved by the petitioner, any agreement prepared by Borgonia
was merely a piece of paper, barren of any legal effect. In this case, the
compromise agreement prepared by Borgonia had the
petitioner's imprimatur. Borgonia was merely a witness to the agreement. For
all legal intents and purposes, the petitioner had the compromise agreement
prepared under his supervision and control. It cannot thus be concluded that
the private respondent made a deliberate falsehood when he alleged that the
agreement was prepared by the petitioner.
The Court is not persuaded by the petitioner's claim that, during the
conference, he and the private respondent agreed that, based on the BIS
report, the normal value of the imported refractory bricks per metric ton was
DM 1,200, and that such report would be used as basis for the revision of the
price policy and structure of HTC.
It bears stressing that, during the conference, the petitioner and the
private respondent had agreed on three aspects of the case: (1) based on
the prima facie findings of the BIS, the normal value of the goods per meter
ton was DM 1,200 and that the actual export price of HTC was below the fair
market value; (2) to terminate the case, HTC will have to adjust and revise its
price policy and structure for imported refractory bricks to conform to R.A. No.
7843 and rules and regulations implementing the law; and (3) if HTC fails or
refuses to comply with its undertaking, RCP will be entitled to a writ of
execution without need of demand. However, the petitioner and the private
respondent could not have agreed on such base price; the petitioner insisted
on the amount recommended by the BIS (DM 1,200) while the private
respondent insisted on DM 950. There was an impasse. By way of a
compromise, the parties agreed to do away with the BIS recommended base
value and agreed for HTC to base the normal value of the importation per
metric ton under R.A. No. 7843 and the rules issued implementing the law.
This is gleaned from the affidavit of Borgonia:
13. During the meeting, Mr. von Sprengeisen suggested that the
value of DM 1,050/ton be applied as the price at which Hamburg
Trading would sell German-made magnesite-based refractory bricks
in the Philippines. Mr. Villanueva did not agree to the suggested value,
as we considered it low. In the end, both parties decided to base the
determination of the price on the provisions of Republic Act No.
7843 and its implementing rules and regulations. . . . 44
Borgonia prepared the first compromise agreement and incorporated

therein the agreement of the petitioner and the private respondent arrived at
during the conference, thus:
1. For the purpose of buying peace and by way of concession in order
to end litigation, the SECOND PARTY undertakes and commits
to reform its pricing policy and structure with respect to
refractory products being imported interest sold in the
Philippines in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act
7843 and its implementing rules and regulations. 45
If, as claimed by the petitioner in his Affidavit-Complaint, he and the

private respondent had agreed that HTC will use as basis for its price policy
and structural revision, the BIS report, for sure, Borgonia would have
incorporated the said agreement in the first compromise agreement. He did
not, and Borgonia has not offered any explanation for such failure. The
petitioner signed the draft of the agreement without any plaint or revision. It
was only in the second compromise agreement that was later signed by the
petitioner and the private respondent that Borgonia incorporated the phrase
"based on the findings of the BIS." Borgonia and the petitioner made the
insertion on their own, without the a priori consent of the private respondent.
The Court is not convinced by the petitioner's contention (and that of
Borgonia in his Affidavit) that the petitioner and the private respondent had
agreed to leave the final determination of the base value or price of
importation per metric ton to a third party (BIS). The private respondent could
not have agreed to the use of the BIS report because, as mentioned, he had
strenuously objected to its use as basis for the revision of its price policy and
structure. For HTC to admit that the BIS finding of DM 1,200 per metric ton was
the normal value of the refractory bricks from Germany for the purpose of
resolving the anti-dumping case is one thing; but for HTC to agree to be bound
by the BIS recommendation for the purpose of revising its price policy and
structure is completely a different matter. cAaTED
With the petitioner and the private respondent's admission of the prima
facie findings of the BIS, the Commission can prepare its recommendation to
the Special Committee on the protest of the RCP to the HTC importation
subject of the case. Thereafter:
D. The Special Committee shall, within fifteen (15) days after
receipt of the report of the Commission, decide whether the article in
question is being imported in violation of this section and shall give
due notice of such decision. In case the decision of dumping is in the
affirmative, the special committee shall direct the Commissioner of
Customs to cause the dumping duty, to be levied, collected and paid,
as prescribed in this section, in addition to any other duties, taxes and
charges imposed by law on such article, and on the articles of the
same specific kind or class subsequently imported under similar
circumstances coming from the specific country.
In the event that the Special Committee fails to decide within

the period prescribed herein, the recommendation of the Commission
shall be deemed approved and shall be final and executory. 46
On the matter of the revision or adjustment of the price policy and
structure of HTC, the parties had agreed to accomplish the same in due time.
It goes without saying that the RCP retained the right to object to or protest to
the price policy and structure revision of HTC.
The agreement of the petitioner and the private respondent not to be
bound by the base value in the BIS report for the revision of its price policy
and structure is not unexpected because: (1) the findings of the BIS are
only prima facie, meaning to say, not conclusive, and HTC was accorded a
chance to base its price policy and structure on evidence and informations
other than those contained in the BIS report; (2) the normal value of the
imported refractory bricks may fluctuate from time to time, hence, the need
for any importer to revise its price policy and structure from time to time; and
(3) the base value to be used by HTC in revising its price policy would be
scrutinized and resolved initially by the Commission, by the Special Committee
and by the Court of Tax Appeals on appeal.
The process agreed upon by the petitioner and the private respondent
was not only practical and fair, but in accord with law as well.
In fine, the private respondent did not commit any falsehood in the
Urgent Motion and his Affidavit of Merit when he declared that he and the
petitioner put behind them the BIS report, and agreed to use R.A. No.
7843 and the rules and regulations implementing the same to determine the
base price for the revision of the price policy and structure of HTC.
Admittedly, the respondent did not object to the offending phrase
before and after signing the agreement and for a considerable stretch period
until HTC filed its motion. However, we do not agree with the contention of the
petitioner that such failure of the respondent to object to the offending phrase
for such period of time amounted to an admission that, indeed, the private
respondent was aware of the offending phrase in the Agreement, and to his
agreement thereto; and estopped the private respondent from alleging that
he was deceived by the petitioner into signing the Compromise Agreement. In
his appeal to the DOJ, the private respondent declared that:
3.9 True, respondent-appellant may have been remiss and
lacking in circumspect in failing to review the hard copy Compromise
Agreement and notice the insertion. Being in the trading business,
respondent-appellant personally handles hundreds of documents
daily and is on the telephone for most of the day communicating with
suppliers and customers. And he had no reason to believe that either
complainant-appellee or Mr. Borgonia would make such an insertion,
especially after respondent-appellant had accepted the fax
Compromise Agreement wording and conveyed such acceptance to
complainant-appellee's office. Respondent-appellant also had to
reason to even think that such a surreptitious insertion would be
made; after all, he had a very warm and friendly meeting with
complainant-appellee and Mr. Borgonia and came out of it with a
feeling that he could trust complainant-appellee (p. 4, Annex "C").
3.10 Hence, when respondent-appellant alleges that he was
induced to sign the hard copy Compromise Agreement through fraud
and deceit, respondent-appellant honestly believes that he was misled
into signing it. He was misled by the fact that he had been sent the fax
Compromise Agreement by complainant-appellee, that he had
conveyed its acceptability to complainant-appellee and now
requested for the hard copy for execution, that he had been led to
trust that the findings and recommendation of the BIS were being put
behind them and that complainant-appellee had agreed to such a
compromise. The transmittal of the hard copy Compromise
Agreement, without any notice or mention by complainant-appellee
or complainant-appellee's office that it contained insertions or
wording different from the fax Compromise Agreement, and on
respondent-appellant's understanding that the wording of the hard
copy Compromise Agreement would be exactly the same as the fax
Compromise Agreement, constitutes the fraud or deceit allegedly by
respondent-appellant. 47
In his rejoinder-affidavit, the private respondent explained that:

2. Again, contrary to the allegations in the Reply-Affidavits, I was
unable to review the Compromise Agreement delivered by Mr.
Gutierrez on 22 April 1997 as I was busy with numerous calls
and business at the time it was delivered. Also, I had been led
to believe in our meetings with Mr. Villanueva and Mr. Borgonia
that I could trust them. So, after having seen the fax
Compromise Agreement and being amenable to it, I trusted
that they would send a genuine hard copy. As it turned out, I
was mistaken. 48
Moreover, even before filing the Urgent Motion and signing the Affidavit
of Merit, the private respondent tried for several times to contact the
petitioner, but the latter failed to return his calls. This reinforced the suspicion
of the private respondent that the insertion of the offending phrase was not,
after all, inadvertent but deliberate, calculated to deceive him to the prejudice
of HTC. The private respondent may be blamed for putting too much trust and
confidence on the petitioner, but he certainly cannot be indicted for perjury
for lack of probable cause.
The petitioner failed to append to his petition records of the
Commission that the private respondent appeared for HTC, on May 9, 1997,
before the Commission for the hearing on the Compromise Agreement; and
showing that the private respondent did not object thereto.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76999 is
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Chico-Nazario, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1.Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., with Associate Justices

Buenaventura J. Guerrero and Regalado E. Maambong, concurring; Rollo,
pp. 28-A-44.
2.Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7843 reads:

SEC. 3. Section 301, Part 2, Title II, Book I of the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 301. Dumping Duty. —

"A. Whenever the Secretary of Finance or the Secretary of Trade and Industry
(hereinafter called the 'Secretary') receives an anti-dumping petition from
the domestic industry or the Secretary has reason to believe, from any
invoice or other document or newspaper, magazine or information or
translation thereof by any reputable language translator made available by
any government agency or interested party, that a specific kind or class of
foreign article, is being imported into, or sold or is likely to be sold in the
Philippines at a price less than its normal value, the importation or sale of
which might injure, or retard the establishment of, or is likely to injure an
industry producing like articles in the Philippines, the Secretary shall, within
twenty (20) days from receipt of such petition or information, determine
a prima facie case of dumping. Within five (5) days from such receipt, he
shall notify the protestee-importer and require him to submit within ten
(10) days from such notice evidence from the producer of the imported
article duly authenticated by the Philippine consular or trade office to
support the normal value of such product. If no such evidence is submitted
within the prescribed period, the Secretary shall base his decision on the
available pertinent data.
"Pending determination of a prima facie case of dumping, the petitioner may
petition that the release from the Bureau of Customs of the alleged
dumped product be withheld. If the Secretary determines that on the face
of the petition and documents presented, there exists an imminent danger
of injury to a particular industry as a result of the alleged dumping, he shall
direct the Commissioner of Customs to hold the release of the questioned
importation, upon filing by the petitioner of a bond equal to the alleged
margin of dumping. The bond shall answer for damages which the
importer may suffer as a result of the holding of the release of the
questioned importation, in case the Secretary finds that there is no prima
facie case. However, the petitioner's liability for damages shall not exceed
the amount of his bond. This bond shall be cancelled once a prima faciecase
has been determined by the Secretary. The Secretary may, motu proprio,
hold the release of the questioned articles based on his information that an
imminent danger of injury exists to a particular industry as a result of the
alleged dumping.
"The Secretary upon the determination of a prima facie case of dumping shall so
advise the Tariff Commission (hereinafter called the 'Commission') and
shall instruct the Commissioner of Customs to hold the release of the
goods or articles in question, unless the protestee/importer shall have filed
a cash bond not less than the provisionally estimated dumping duty plus
the applicable regular duty based on the documentary evidence submitted
with the dumping protest, to answer for the payment of such duties, fees
and charges if a dumping case is established. If the protest is dismissed, the
cash deposit shall be returned to the importer within ten (10) days from the
finality of the order."
The law has been amended by Republic Act No. 8752, otherwise known as
the Anti-Dumping Act of 1999.
3.Rollo, p. 113.
4.Rollo, pp. 45-46.

5.Id. at 80.
6.Id. at 78-79.
7.Id. at 47-48.
8.Id. at 64.
9.Rollo, p. 49.
10.Rollo, pp. 55-56.

11.Id. at 66-67.
12.Rollo, p. 67.
13.Id. at 71-77.
14.Rollo, pp. 87-88.
15.Rollo, p. 116.
16.Ibid.
17.Id. at 123-136.
18.Id. at 137-146.
19.Id. at 28-44.
20.Rollo, pp. 42-43.
21.Ibid.
22.(1) . . . the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise
and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension
of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went
beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of
fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
(Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110871, 2 July 1998, 291 SCRA 656)
23.Baytan v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 153945, 4 February 2003, 396 SCRA 703,
citing Allado v. Diokno, 232 SCRA 192 (1994).
24.Advincula v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131144, 18 October 2000, 343 SCRA 583.
25.Santos v. Orda, Jr., G.R. No. 158236, 1 September 2004, 437 SCRA 504; Lui v.
Matillano, G.R. No. 141176, 27 May 2004, 429 SCRA 449.
26.U.S. v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564 (1937).

27.Bronston v. U.S., 409 U.S. 352 (1973) citing Study of Perjury, reprinted in Report
of New York Revision Commission, Legis, Doc. No. 60, p. 249 (1935).
28.Bronston v. U.S., supra.
29.U.S. v. Estraña, 16 Phil. 520 (1910).
30.Diaz v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 65006, 31 October 1990, 191 SCRA 86.
31.Padua v. Paz, A.M. No. P-00-1445, 30 April 2003, 402 SCRA 21.
32.People v. Abaya, 74 Phil. 59 (1942).
33.Welch v. State, 157 S.W. 946; Ferguson v. State, 35 S.W. 369, cited in 70 C.J.S.
Perjury §30, p. 473.
34.Butler v. McKey, 138 F.2d 373 (1943).
35.Saavedra, Jr. v. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 93173, 15 September 1993, 226
SCRA 438.
36.State v. Barkwell, 600 S.W.2d 497 (1979).

37.U.S. v. Sweig, 441 F.2d 114 (1971); U.S. v. Jones, 374 F.2d 414 (1967); U.S. v.
Bergman, 354 F.2d 931 (1966); U.S. v. Kelly, 540 F.2d 990 (1976).
38.U.S. v. Capistrano, 40 Phil. 902 (1920).

39.People v. McClintic, 160 N.W. 461 (1916).
40.U.S. v. Berardi, 629 F.2d 723 (1980).
41.U.S. v. Lococo, 450 F.2d 1196 (1971).
42.Rollo, p. 87.
43.Rollo, p. 76.
44.Rollo, p. 64.
45.Id. at 45.
46.Section 301 of the Tariff and Customs Code as amended by Republic Act No.
7843.
47.Rollo, pp. 98-99.
48.Id. at 81.
(Villanueva v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 162187, [November 18, 2005], 512
|||
PHIL 145-170)
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 142011. March 14, 2003.]
ALFONSO C. CHOA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES and LENI CHOA, respondents.
The Law Firm of Mirano Mirano & Mirano for petitioner.

Oscar C. Fernandez for private respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner, a Chinese national, was found guilty of perjury by the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 3, Bacolod City, for having
alleged false statements in his petition for naturalization. Petitioner filed a
motion for a reconsideration, contending, among others, that there was
no basis to convict him of perjury because almost two years prior to the
filing of the Information, his motion to withdraw the petition for
naturalization containing the alleged false statements was granted by the
MTCC, hence, the alleged false statements were no longer existing or had
become functus officio. The MTCC denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. Both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals
affirmed his conviction.
The Supreme Court affirmed petitioner's conviction. According to
the Court, all the elements of perjury are present at the time petitioner
filed his petition for naturalization. Petitioner willfully and deliberately
alleged false statements concerning his "residence" and "moral character"
in his petition for naturalization, and were sufficiently proven by the
prosecution. The petition for naturalization was duly subscribed and
sworn to by petitioner before Notary Public Filomino B. Tan, Jr., a person
competent and authorized by law to receive and administer oath.
Petitioner also testified under oath on his false allegations before the trial
court. The allegations in the petition regarding "residence" and "moral
character" are material matters because they are among the very facts in
issue or the main facts which are the subject of inquiry and are the bases
for the determination of petitioner's qualifications and fitness as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. The Court also ruled that the fact that
petitioner withdrew his petition is immaterial because such withdrawal
only terminated the proceedings for naturalization and did not extinguish
his culpability for perjury he already committed.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; PERJURY; ELEMENTS; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — All

these elements are present in the instant case. Petitioner willfully and
deliberately alleged false statements concerning his "residence" and "moral
character" in his petition for naturalization. This was sufficiently proven by the
prosecution, as succinctly noted by the Court of Appeals in its assailed
Decision. The petition for naturalization was duly subscribed and sworn to by
petitioner before Notary Public Filomino B. Tan, Jr., a person competent and
authorized by law to receive and administer oath. Also, petitioner started
testifying under oath on his false allegations before the trial court. The
allegations in the petition regarding "residence" and "moral character"
are material matters because they are among the very facts in issue or the main
facts which are the subject of inquiry and are the bases for the determination of
petitioner's qualifications and fitness as a naturalized Filipino citizen. The
necessity of declaring a truthful and specific information on the "residence"
and "moral character" in the petition for naturalization has been underscored
by this Court in Chua Kian Lai vs. Republic. Fully cognizant of the truth
surrounding his moral character and residence, petitioner instead declared
falsely in his verified petition for naturalization that "he has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualification under C.A. No. 473." Clearly, he
willfully asserted falsehood under oath on material matters required by law. ScHAIT
2. ID.; ID.; WITHDRAWAL OF PETITION CONTAINING FALSE MATERIAL

STATEMENTS DID NOT EXTINGUISH CULPABILITY FOR PERJURY ALREADY
COMMITTED; CASE AT BAR. — We cannot go along with the submission of the
petitioner and the Solicitor General that petitioner could no longer be
prosecuted for perjury in view of the withdrawal of the petition for
naturalization containing his false material statements. In this jurisdiction, it is
not necessary that the proceeding in which the perjury is alleged to have been
committed be first terminated before a prosecution for the said crime is
commenced. At the time he filed his petition for naturalization, he had
committed perjury. As discussed earlier, all the elements of the crime were
already present then. He knew all along that he wilfully stated material falsities
in his verified petition. Surprisingly, he withdrew his petition without even
stating any reason therefor. But such withdrawal only terminated the
proceedings for naturalization. It did not extinguish his culpability for perjury he
already committed. Indeed, the fact of withdrawal alone cannot bar the State
from prosecuting petitioner, an alien, who made a mockery not only of the
Philippine naturalization law but the judicial proceedings as well. And the
petition for naturalization tainted with material falsities can be used as
evidence of his unlawful act.
3. ID.; ID.; ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE COMMUNICATION RULE IS GRANTED IN
AID AND FOR THE ADVANTAGE OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE; IT
CANNOT BE INVOKED WHERE THE FALSE STATEMENT MADE RENDERS THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE A MOCKERY; CASE AT BAR.
— Sison and Aquino both involve libel cases. In Sison, this Court categorically
stressed that the term "absolute privilege" (or "qualified privilege") has an
"established technical meaning, in connection with civil actions for libel and
slander." The purpose of the privilege is to ensure that "members of the
legislature, judges of courts, jurors, lawyers, and witnesses may speak their
minds freely and exercise their respective functions without incurring the risk
of a criminal prosecution or an action for the recovery of damages. It is granted
in aid and for the advantage of the administration of justice." Certainly, in the
present case, petitioner cannot seek refuge under the absolutely privileged
communication rule since the false statements he made in his petition for
naturalization has instead made a mockery of the administration of justice.
The Flordelis case is likewise not in point. There, Flordelis was charged with
perjury for having alleged false statements in his verified answer. This Court
held that no perjury could be committed by Flordelis because "an answer to a
complaint in an ordinary civil action need not be under oath," thus, "it is at once
apparent that one element of the crime of perjury is absent . . ., namely, that the
sworn statement complained of must be required by law."
4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO EQUAL
PROTECTION CANNOT BE INVOKED TO PROTECT ONE'S CRIMINAL ACT. —
Anent the alleged violation of petitioner's constitutional right to equal
protection, suffice it to state that such right cannot be invoked to protect his
criminal act. In People vs. Cainglet, this Court emphatically stressed that "every
interest of public policy demands that perjury be not shielded by artificial
refinements and narrow technicalities. For perjury strikes at the administration of
the laws. It is the policy of the law that judicial proceedings and judgments be fair
and free from fraud, and that litigants and parties be encouraged to tell the truth,
and that they be punished if they do not." TCASIH
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J : p
Alfonso Chan Choa, petitioner, is a Chinese national. On April 25, 1989,

he filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 41, Bacolod City, a verified
petition for naturalization, 1 docketed as Special Proceeding No. 5395.
During the initial hearing of the case on August 27, 1990, petitioner
testified on direct examination but he was not able to finish the same. On
August 29, 1990, he filed a motion to withdraw his petition for
naturalization. 2 The trial court granted the motion in its Resolution dated
September 28, 1990, 3 which partly reads:
"The petitioner, Alfonso Chan Choa, has not yet finished
testifying on direct-examination. Although the petitioner has not
stated in his said 'Motion To Withdraw Petition' the reason why he is
withdrawing his petition at this stage of the proceedings, the
petitioner can not be compelled to continue with his petition for
naturalization.
"In view thereof, the petitioner, Alfonso Chan Choa, is allowed

to withdraw his petition for naturalization.CHATEa
"SO ORDERED."
Meanwhile, on August 5, 1992, State Prosecutor Pedro D. Delfin on detail

at Bacolod City, acting upon the complaint of petitioner's wife, Leni, filed an
Information 4 with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 3, Bacolod
City, charging petitioner with perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal
Code, docketed as Criminal Case No. 50322. The Information reads:
"That on or about 30th day of March, 1989, in the City of
Bacolod, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the herein accused did then and there, willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and knowingly made untruthful statements or falsehoods
upon material matters required by the Revised Naturalization Law
(C.A. No. 473) in his verified 'Petition for Naturalization' dated April 13,
1989 (sic), 5 subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Felomino B.
Tan, Jr., who is authorized to administer oath, which petition bears
Doc. No. 140, Page No. 29, Book No. XXIII, series of 1989, in the
Notarial Register of said Notary Public, by stating therein the following,
to wit:
'5.) I am married to a Filipino. My wife's name is Leni Ong Choa
and now resides at 46 Malaspina Street, Bacolod City. I have two
(2) children whose names, dates and places of birth, and
residence are as follows:
Name Date of Birth Place of Birth Residence
ALBRYAN July 19, 1981 Bacolod City 46 Malaspina St.,

ONG CHOA Bacolod City
CHERYL May 5, 1983 Bacolod City 46 Malaspina St.,
LYNNE ONG Bacolod City
CHOA
xxx xxx xxx

'10) I am of good moral character, I believe in the principles
underlying the Philippine Constitution. I have conducted myself
in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period
of my residence in the Philippines in my relations with the
constituted government as well as with the community in which
I am living.'
xxx xxx xxx
when in truth and in fact, said accused knew that his wife Leni
Ong Choa and their two (2) children were not then residing at said
address at # 46 Malaspina Street, Villamonte, Bacolod City, having left
the aforesaid residence in 1984, or about five (5) years earlier and
were then residing at Hervias Subdivision, Bacolod City; that contrary
to his aforesaid allegation in his verified Petition for Naturalization,
accused, while residing at 211 106 Street, Greenplains Subdivision,
Bacolod City, has been carrying on an immoral and illicit relationship
with one Stella Flores Saludar, a woman not his wife since 1984, and
begetting two (2) children with her as a consequence, as he and his
wife, the private offended party herein, have long been separated
from bed and board since 1984; which falsehoods and/or immoral and
improper conduct are grounds for disqualification to become a citizen
of the Philippines.
"Act contrary to law."
Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued

thereafter.ECAaTS
After trial, the MTCC rendered a Decision 6 dated February 21, 1995
finding petitioner guilty of perjury, as charged, thus:
"FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense which he is presently
charged, and there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances
that may be considered, the accused is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional and to pay the
costs."
Petitioner filed a motion for a reconsideration, 7 contending, among

others, that there is no basis to convict him of perjury because almost two
years prior to the filing of the Information, his motion to withdraw the petition
for naturalization containing the alleged false statements was granted by the
MTCC, hence, the alleged false statements were no longer existing or
had become functus officio.
The MTCC, in its Order 8 dated March 31, 1995, denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 54, Bacolod City, in a
Decision dated September 12, 1996, affirmed the MTCC judgment. 9
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review,
docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 19968. In his comment, the Solicitor General
recommended the acquittal of petitioner, contending that the withdrawal of
his petition for naturalization rendered the same functus officio, thus making
the questioned false statements inexistent.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated June 8, 1999, 10 affirmed the
RTC Decision with modification, thus:
"WHEREFORE, finding the appealed decision of the Regional
Trial Court to be in accordance with law and evidence, we AFFIRM the
same with the modification that petitioner-accused-appellant Alfonso
Choa is sentenced to suffer imprisonment, after applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law without any aggravating or mitigating
circumstance, for a period of three (3) months of arresto mayor, to one
(1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional.
"SO ORDERED."
In convicting petitioner, the Appellate Court adopted as its own the RTC's
findings as follows: HaTISE
"Evidence presented clearly proved that all the above-

enumerated elements (of perjury) have been duly executed by the
accused. His allegations in his petition regarding his, his wife's and
children's residences and his positive averment of the fact that he is
of good moral character and had conducted himself in an
irreproachable manner during his stay in the Philippines are material
matters in connection with his petition for naturalization as they are
essential facts required by Sec. 7 of C.A. No. 473 for one to fulfill for
the acquisition of Philippine citizenship. They are the very facts which
would be the subject of inquiry by the court hearing the petition and the
same would be the basis of the court's ruling whether one is qualified and
granted Philippine citizenship.
"Paragraph 2 of Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code provides
that the statement or affidavit is to be made before a competent
officer, authorized to receive and administer oath. The information
shows that the statement was duly subscribed and sworn to before
Notary Public Felomino B. Tan, Jr., a person competent and authorized
by law to receive and administer oath and the same was entered in
his notary register as Doc. No. 140, Page No. 29, Book No. XXIII, Series
of 1989.
"That the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of
falsehood could be gleaned from the discrepancies in his given
addresses. In his petition for naturalization he gave No. 46 Malaspina
Street, Villamonte, Bacolod City as his and his wife's residence, while
in the birth certificates and the affidavit of admission of paternity of
both Fonsella Kae Saludar and Steve Albert Saludar, he gave No. 211,
106 Street, Greenplains Subdivision, Bacolod City as his address
besides from the fact that while may have been residing in the above-
stated addresses, his wife and children have been staying at Hervias
Subdivision, Bacolod City since the latter part of 1984. Furthermore,
cohabiting openly with another woman not his wife and siring (2)
children with the same, in open defiance with the norm of morality of
the community where monogamy is the accepted practice, is very
inconsistent with his allegations of a moral life, proper and
irreproachable, considering that the accused, by his own admission is
a graduate of the University of St. La Salle, a school known for its high
academic and moral standards. These assertions are not only willful
and deliberate but a perversion of truth which the law is mandated to
punish.
"Section 7 of C.A. 473 provides:
'Any person desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship
shall file with the competent Court, a petition in triplicate,
accompanied by two (2) photographs of the petitioner, setting
forth his name and surname; his present and former residence,
his occupation; the place and date of his birth, whether single
or married, the name, age, birthplace and residence of the wife
and each of the children. . . . . . . .' (italics supplied)
"The above-cited provisions are the pertinent law which
specifically requires any person desiring to acquire Philippine
citizenship to accomplish, thus complying with the fourth element of
the crime of perjury. (pp. 119-120, Original Records, Vol. II)" 11
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the

Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated February 22, 2000. 12
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari. 13
Both the petitioner and the Solicitor General in their respective
pleadings contend that the challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals should
be reversed because: (a) not all the elements of the crime of perjury are
present; and (b) the withdrawal of the petition for naturalization which
contains the alleged untruthful statements bars the prosecution of petitioner
for perjury.
Thus, the issue here is whether petitioner may be convicted of perjury
based on the alleged false statements he stated in his petition for
naturalization withdrawn almost two years prior to the filing of the
Information for perjury.
The petition is unmeritorious.
Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code under which petitioner has been
charged and convicted, provides: DIETHS
"Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn

affirmation. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon
any person who, knowingly making untruthful statements and not
being included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall
testify under oath, or make an affidavit, upon any material matter
before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases
in which the law so requires.
"Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu
of an oath, shall commit any of the falsehoods mentioned in this and
the three preceding articles of this section, shall suffer the respective
penalties provided therein."
The elements of perjury are:

1. The accused made a statement under oath or executed
an affidavit upon a material matter;
2. The statement or affidavit was made before a competent
officer authorized to receive and administer oath;
3. In that statement or affidavit, the accused made

a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and
4. The sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required
by law or made for a legal purpose. 14
All these elements are present in the instant case. Petitioner willfully and
deliberately alleged false statements concerning his "residence" and "moral
character" in his petition for naturalization. This was sufficiently proven by the
prosecution, as succinctly noted by the Court of Appeals in its assailed
Decision.
The petition for naturalization was duly subscribed and sworn to by
petitioner before Notary Public Filomino B. Tan, Jr., a person competent and
authorized by law to receive and administer oath. Also, petitioner started
testifying under oath on his false allegations before the trial court.
The allegations in the petition regarding "residence" and "moral
character" are material matters because they are among the very facts in
issue or the main facts which are the subject of inquiry 15 and are the bases for
the determination of petitioner's qualifications and fitness as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. Thus, C.A. No. 473 provides:
"SEC. 2. Qualifications. — Subject to section four of this Act, any
person having the following qualifications may become a citizen of the
Philippines by naturalization:
xxx xxx xxx

"Third. He must be of good moral character and believes in the
principles underlying the Philippine Constitution, and must have
conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the
entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the
constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living;
xxx xxx xxx

"SEC. 7. Petition for citizenship. — Any person desiring to acquire
Philippine citizenship shall file with the competent court, a petition in
triplicate, accompanied by two photographs of the petitioner; setting
forth his name and surname; his present and former places of residence;
his occupation; the place and date of his birth; whether single or
married and if the father of children, the name, age, birthplace
and residence of the wife and of the children; . . .; a declaration that he
has the qualifications required by this Act, specifying the same, and that
he is not disqualified for naturalization under the provisions of this Act; . .
. ." (Italics supplied)
cDSaEH
The necessity of declaring a truthful and specific information on the
"residence" and "moral character" in the petition for naturalization has been
underscored by this Court in Chua Kian Lai vs. Republic, 16 thus:
"One qualification for Philippine citizenship is that the
petitioner 'must be of good moral character.' That circumstance
should be specifically alleged in the petition.
xxx xxx xxx

"The law explicitly requires that the applicant should indicate
in his petition 'his present and former places of residence' (Sec. 7, Com.
Act No. 473). That requirement is designed to facilitate the verification
of petitioner's activitieswhich have a bearing on his petition for
naturalization, especially so as to his qualifications and moral character,
either by private individuals or by investigative agencies of the
government, by pointing to them the localities or places wherein
appropriate inquiries may be made (Keng Giok vs. Republic, 112 Phil.
896). Moreover, the suppression of that information might constitute
falsehood which signifies that the applicant lacks good moral character
and is not, therefore, qualified to be admitted as a citizen of the
Philippines." (Italics supplied)
Fully cognizant of the truth surrounding his moral character and

residence, petitioner instead declared falsely in his verified petition for
naturalization that "he has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualification under C.A. No. 473." 17Clearly, he willfully asserted falsehood
under oath on material matters required by law.
We cannot go along with the submission of the petitioner and the
Solicitor General that petitioner could no longer be prosecuted for perjury in
view of the withdrawal of the petition for naturalization containing his false
material statements. In this jurisdiction, it is not necessary that the proceeding
in which the perjury is alleged to have been committed be first terminated
before a prosecution for the said crime is commenced. 18 At the time he filed
his petition for naturalization, he had committed perjury. As discussed earlier,
all the elements of the crime were already present then. He knew all along that
he wilfully stated material falsities in his verified petition. Surprisingly, he
withdrew his petition without even stating any reason therefor. 19 But such
withdrawal only terminated the proceedings for naturalization. It did not
extinguish his culpability for perjury he already committed. Indeed, the fact of
withdrawal alone cannot bar the State from prosecuting petitioner, an alien,
who made a mockery not only of the Philippine naturalization law but the
judicial proceedings as well. And the petition for naturalization tainted with
material falsities can be used as evidence of his unlawful act.
Petitioner then claims that since the petition for naturalization is a
pleading, the allegations therein are absolutely privileged and cannot be used
for any criminal prosecution against him, citing Sison vs. David, 20 People vs.
Aquino 21 and Flordelis vs. Himalaloan. 22
The argument is unavailing. Sison and Aquino both involve libel cases.
In Sison, this Court categorically stressed that the term "absolute privilege" (or
"qualified privilege") has an "established technical meaning, in connection
with civil actions for libel and slander." The purpose of the privilege is to ensure
that "members of the legislature, judges of courts, jurors, lawyers, and
witnesses may speak their minds freely and exercise their respective functions
without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an action for the
recovery of damages. It is granted in aid and for the advantage of the
administration of justice." 23 Certainly, in the present case, petitioner cannot
seek refuge under the absolutely privileged communication rule since the false
statements he made in his petition for naturalization has instead made a
mockery of the administration of justice. STcEaI
The Flordelis case is likewise not in point. There, Flordelis was charged
with perjury for having alleged false statements in his verified answer. This
Court held that no perjury could be committed by Flordelis because "an
answer to a complaint in an ordinary civil action need not be under oath," thus,
"it is at once apparent that one element of the crime of perjury is absent . . .,
namely, that the sworn statement complained of must be required by law." 24
Anent the alleged violation of petitioner's constitutional right to equal
protection, suffice it to state that such right cannot be invoked to protect his
criminal act.
In People vs. Cainglet, 25 this Court emphatically stressed that "every
interest of public policy demands that perjury be not shielded by artificial
refinements and narrow technicalities. For perjury strikes at the administration of
the laws. It is the policy of the law that judicial proceedings and judgments be fair
and free from fraud, and that litigants and parties be encouraged to tell the truth,
and that they be punished if they do not."
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby
DENIED. The appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Panganiban, Corona and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 473 (An Act to Provide for the Acquisition of
Philippine Citizenship by Naturalization).
2.Records of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 3, Bacolod City, in
Criminal Case No. 50322, at 313.
3.Id. at 313-314.
4.Rollo at 43-44.
5.The Petition for Naturalization is actually dated March 30, 1989 but was filed on
April 25, 1989.
6.Records of the MTCC at 347-358; Rollo at 45-57.

7.Id. at 359-368.
8.Id. at 403-405.
9.Rollo at 58-64.
10.Penned by Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, now a member of this Court, and
concurred in by Justices Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. and Renato C. Dacudao; id.at
140-150.
11.Id. at 145-146.
12.Id. at 174.
13.Filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
14.Saavedra, Jr. vs. Department of Justice, 226 SCRA 438, 445 (1993) citing Diaz vs.
People, 191 SCRA 86, 93 (1990); see also Burgos vs. Aquino, 249 SCRA 504
(1995).
15.United States vs. Estraña, 16 Phil. 520 (1910).
16.59 SCRA 40 (1974).
17.Exhibit "J-3", MTCC Records at 105.

18.United States vs. Estraña, supra.
19.Exhibit "9", supra.
20.1 SCRA 60 (1961).

21.18 SCRA 555 (1966).
22.84 SCRA 477 (1978).

23.People vs. Aquino, supra at 561.
24.Flordelis vs. Himalaloan, supra at 481.
25.123 Phil. 568 (1966).
||| (Choa v. People, G.R. No. 142011, [March 14, 2003], 447 PHIL 230-244)
THIRD DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-95-1063. February 9, 1996.]
ALFONSO C. CHOA, complainant, vs. JUDGE ROBERTO S.

CHIONGSON, respondent.
Raymundo A. Quiroz for complainant.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; JUDGES; CHARGE OF GRAVE MISCONDUCT,

GROSS BIAS AND PARTIALITY, AND HAVING KNOWINGLY RENDERED AN
UNJUST JUDGMENT, DEVOID OF MERIT. — Respondent is charged with grave
misconduct, gross bias and partiality, and having knowingly rendered an
unjust judgment in a Criminal Case for Perjury initiated by the complainant's
wife. This complaint arose from the alleged untruthful statements in the
complainant's Petition for Naturalization. Respondent Judge found the
complainant herein guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of perjury.
The complainant moved for a reconsideration of the judgment but respondent
Judge denied said motion. Hence, the complainant filed the instant complaint.
The allegations in the complaint are utterly devoid of merit. Good faith and
good motive did not seem to have inspired the filing of the complaint. As
correctly pointed out by the respondent, if the complainant and his counsel
honestly believed that the allegations in the Information in the perjury case
did not constitute an offense, they should have filed a motion to quash. Under
Section 3(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, the accused may move to quash
the complaint or information on this ground. The complainant never did; he
was arraigned and entered into trial. Although his failure to do so did not
operate as a waiver of the said ground pursuant to Section 8 of the same Rule,
it showed, nevertheless, his admission of the weakness of the ground. If he
had perceived it to be strong, he would not have wasted an opportunity to put
an early end to the ordeal of a prolonged litigation. Besides, this ground had
not at all been invoked by him. The withdrawal of the Petition for
Naturalization did not and cannot amount to a recall of the questioned
untruthful statements. Neither could it extinguish any offense which may have
been committed by reason of such untruthful statements. As to the
respondent Judge's being a next-door neighbor of the complainant's wife —
the complainant in the perjury case — it must be stressed that that alone is
not a ground for either a mandatory disqualification under the first paragraph
or for a voluntary disqualification under the second paragraph of Section 1,
Rule 137 of the Rules of Court. In any event, the complainant has failed to
disclose in his complaint that he had raised this matter at any time before the
rendition of the judgment. In fact, the summary of the grounds of his motion
for reconsideration in the respondent's order denying the said motion does
not include this matter. If indeed the complainant honestly believed in the
justness of the grievance, he would have raised it in an appropriate pleading
before the trial court. Finally, the nature and character of the complainant's
grievances relative to the respondent's judgment finding the former guilty of
perjury may only be properly ventilated in an appropriate judicial proceeding,
such as an appeal from the judgment. This kind of recourse, whether made in
addition to a regular appeal from the judgment, or in lieu thereof, if none had
been made, is clearly without any basis and cannot be tolerated for it robs
Judges of precious time which they could otherwise devote to the cases in their
courts or to the unclogging of their dockets. CDta
2. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; DUTIES AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE

BAR. — Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz, counsel for the complainant, must have
been aware of the utter lack of merit of the charges against the respondent.
As a Member of the Philippine Bar he is bound: (1) by his oath, not to, wittingly
or willingly, promote or sue any groundless, false, or unlawful suit nor give aid
nor consent to the same; (2) by Section 20 (c), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
to counsel or maintain such action or proceedings only as appear to him to be
just; and (3) to uphold the Code of Professional Responsibility. It was
incumbent upon him to give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and
probable results of the complainant's case with the end in view of promoting
respect for the law and legal processes. He should, therefore, be required to
show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for his
apparent failure to observe the foregoing duties and responsibilities.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., J :
p
The uncomplicated issues in this administrative complaint have been

properly joined with the filing of the respondent's comment as required in the
1st Indorsement of 18 August 1995 of Hon. Bernardo P. Abesamis, Deputy
Court Administrator. No further pleadings need be required from the parties.
In the complaint signed by Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz as counsel for the
complainant and verified by the latter, the respondent is charged with grave
misconduct, gross bias and partiality, and having knowingly rendered an
unjust judgment in Criminal Case No. 50322 entitled, "People of the Philippines
vs. Alfonso C. Choa."
Criminal Case No. 50322 was for Perjury and initiated by the
complainant's wife, Leni L. Ong-Choa, through the filing of a letter-complaint
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City. This complaint arose
from the alleged untruthful statements or falsehoods in the complainant's
Petition for Naturalization dated 30 March 1989 which was docketed as Case
No. 5395, of Branch 41 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City.
In due course, an Information was filed, in the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MCTC) of Bacolod City by the Office of the Prosecutor, charging the
complainant herein with perjury allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 30th day of March, 1989, in the City of
Bacolod, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the herein accused, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and knowingly made untruthful statements of [sic]
falsehoods upon material matters required by the
Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. No. 473) in his verified "Petition for
Naturalization" dated April 13, 1989, subscribed and sworn to before
Notary Public Felomino B. Tan, Jr., who is authorized to administer
oath[s], which petition bears Doc. No. 140; Page No. 29; Book No. XXIII;
and Series of 1989, in the Notarial Register of said Notary Public, by
stating therein the following, to wit:
5. I am married to a Filipino. My wife's name is Leni Ong

Choa and now resides at 46 Malaspina Street, Bacolod City. I
have two (2) children, whose names, dates and places of birth,
and residences are as follows:
NAME DATE PLACE RESIDENCE
OF BIRTH OF BIRTH
ALBRYAN July 19, Bacolod 46 Malaspina St.,

ONG CHOA 1981 City Bacolod City
CHERYL LYNNE May 5, Bacolod 46 Malaspina St.,

ONG CHOA 1983 City Bacolod City
xxx xxx xxx

10. I am of good moral character, I believe in the
principles underlying the Philippine Constitution. I have
conducted myself in a proper and irreproachable manner
during the entire period of my residence in the Philippines in
my relations with the constituted government as well as with
the community in which I am living.
xxx xxx xxx

When in truth and in fact said accused knew that his wife Leni
Ong Choa and their two (2) children were not then residing at the said
address at No. 46 Malaspina Street, Villamonte, Bacolod City, having
left the aforesaid residence in 1984, or about five (5) years earlier and
were then residing at Hervias Subdivision, Bacolod City, that contrary
to his aforesaid allegations in his verified Petition for Naturalization,
accused while residing at 211, 106 Street, Greenplains Subdivision,
Bacolod City, has been carrying on an immoral and illicit relationship
with one Stella Flores Saludar, a woman not his wife since 1984, and
begotting [sic] two (2) children with her as a consequence, as he and
his wife, the private offended party herein, have long been separated
from bed and boards [sic] since 1984; which falsehoods and/or
immoral and improper conduct are grounds for disqualifications [sic]
of [sic] becoming a citizen of the Philippines.
Act contrary to law.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 50322 and was assigned to
Branch III thereof where the respondent is the presiding Judge.
After trial, the respondent Judge rendered judgment on 21 February
1995 and found the complainant herein guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of perjury. The respondent Judge accordingly sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of six months and one day of prision correccional and to pay the
costs.
The complainant moved for a reconsideration of the judgment alleging
that: (1) there is no basis for the conviction since his petition for naturalization
had been withdrawn and therefore had become functus officio; (2) the petition
for naturalization is a pleading, hence its allegations are privileged; and (3) his
prosecution violates the equal protection clause of theConstitution. The last
ground is founded on an admission made by a representative of the Office of
the Solicitor General of her lack of knowledge of any perjury case filed based
on a withdrawn or dismissed petition for naturalization. CDTInc
The respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit in an order dated 31 March 1995.
The complainant filed the instant complaint on 14 July 1995 and prayed
for the removal of the respondent Judge from office. As grounds therefor, he
alleges that:
(1) The respondent Judge is guilty of Grave Misconduct, Gross Bias and
Partiality, and Knowingly Rendering An Unjust Judgment when
he intentionally failed to divulge the next-door-neighbor
relationship between him and the family of Leni Ong Choa and
to disqualify himself from sitting in the criminal case on such
ground as part of the grand design and preconceived intention
to unjustly convict the complainant of the crime charged
without due process.
(2) The allegations in the Information do not constitute the offense of

perjury.
(3) The petition having been withdrawn with finality, it has
become functus officio and it is as if the Petition was not filed at
all so that whatever false statements were contained therein
were no longer required by law and had ceased to be on a
material matter.
(4) The respondent Judge admitted for prosecution Exhibit "P"
(handwritten list of properties) even if this was self-serving as it
was undated and unsigned; and — Exhibit "Q" (letter of Leni
Ong Choa's counsel to the complainant) even if it was also self-
serving as there was no showing that he received the letter.
(5) The respondent Judge has sentenced the complainant to suffer a

penalty higher than that provided by law, without applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
The respondent Judge refutes the charge in his Comment dated 12

September 1995, thus:
He denies being the next-door-neighbor of Leni Ong Choa there
being a house, belonging to the Sia family, separating his house and
that of Leni Choa; he and the rest of the members of his family are not
acquainted with Leni Choa or any member of her family and had not
exchanged greetings nor is he even a nodding acquaintance of Leni
Choa or any member of her family.
He asserts that if the allegations in the Information do not

constitute an offense, the complainant should have filed a Motion to
Quash but he did not. Just the same, when the complainant stated in
the Petition that he together with his wife and children lived at 46
Malaspina St., Bacolod City, he committed a falsehood under oath
because the truth is two (2) years before the filing of the Petition, his
wife and two (2) children were not living with him anymore, making
him liable for perjury.
Respondent also avers that the complainant is not of good

moral character contrary to what he stated in the Petition for
Naturalization since he is conducting an extra-marital relationship
with Stella Flores Saludar, his former employee, with whom he has
begotten two (2) children. As a matter of fact, a case for concubinage
against complainant was filed and is now pending in Court.
According to the respondent, a reading of the Order granting
the Motion to Withdraw the Petition will show that the Prosecutor
representing the Office of the Solicitor General opposed the Motion to
Withdraw the Petition for the reason that the complainant had
abandoned his wife and two (2) children, is not giving them support
and is now living with his paramour.
On the claim of the complainant that his petition for
naturalization has became functus officio in view of its withdrawal,
hence no longer existent, the respondent Judge maintains that the
withdrawal reduced the petition tofunctus officio only for the purpose
of the Special Proceedings but not when it is used as evidence in other
cases.
On the issue of the admissibility of the Exhibits P, Q and R, the
respondent Judge contends that Exhibits P, Q and R were duly
identified by Leni Ong Choa and her testimonies on these were found
to be credible by the Court.
Finally, respondent Judge asserts that the Indeterminate

Sentence Law is not applicable in the perjury case as the penalty
imposed by the court did not exceed one (1) year.
The respondent Judge then prays for the dismissal of the complaint for
being patently without merit and for the censure and reprimand of the
complainant's counsel with a warning to refrain from filing similar harassment
suits.
In the Evaluation contained in a Memorandum dated 17 November 1995
and duly approved by the Court Administrator, Hon. Zenaida N. Elepaño,
Deputy Court Administrator, makes the following findings and conclusions:
EVALUATION: A careful study of the records shows that the allegations of
the complainant are devoid of any merit.
The charge that respondent Judge and Leni Choa are neighbors
[sic] appears to be petty under the circumstances. Granting that they
are indeed next-door neighbors does not necessarily mean that
respondent Judge has violated Rule 137 of the Rules of Court for
Disqualification of Judges. Nowhere in said Rule is it ordained that
being the neighbor of a party litigant is reason enough for the Judge
to disqualify himself from hearing the former's case.
With respect to the complainant's claim that the allegations in

the information do not constitute the offense of perjury, an
administrative proceeding is not the forum to decide whether the
judge has erred or not, especially as complainant has appealed his
conviction.
Even if the matter can be examined, we do not find any error in
the Court's decision.
The elements of perjury as enumerated in the case of People of

the Philippines vs. Bautista (C.A., 40 O.G. 2491) are as follows:
(a) Statement in the affidavit upon material matter made under
oath;
(b) The affiant swears to the truthfulness of the statements is
his affidavit before a competent officer authorized to
administer oath;
(c) There is a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood; and
(d) Sworn statement containing the falsity is required by law.

It cannot be denied that the petition for naturalization filed by
Alfonso C. Choa was made under oath and before a competent officer
authorized to administer oath as shown by the records (p. 4,
APPENDIX "A"). This petition for naturalization is required by law as a
condition precedent for the grant of Philippine citizenship (Section
7, Com. Act No. 473).
The question now boils down to whether there is a willful and
deliberate assertion of falsehood.
As shown by the records (p. 1, APPENDIX "A"), Alfonso C. Choa
declared in his petition dated 30 March 1989 that his wife Leni Ong
Choa resides at 46 Malaspina St., Bacolod City while in the
administrative complaint he filed against respondent Judge, he stated
that his wife Leni Ong Choa left their family residence (46 Malaspina
St., Bacolod City) in the latter part of 1984 (p. 6, par. 2 of Adm.
Complaint). This simply means that when he filed his petition for
naturalization, Leni Ong Choa was not residing at the abovementioned
address anymore.
It was also proven that Alfonso C. Choa had a child with a
woman not his wife and he himself signed the birth certificate as the
father of that child (p. 4, APPENDIX "E"). This is contrary to what he
declared in his petition that he is of good moral character which is
required under the Naturalization Law (par. 3, Sec. 2, Com. Act No.
473).
There was therefore a deliberate assertion of falsehood by
Alfonso C. Choa to warrant conviction for perjury as found by Judge
Chiongson.
As to the complainant's claim that the withdrawal of the petition
makes it functus officio, we sustain the respondent Judge's view that
the Petition can be used as evidence in another case. In the case
of People of the Philippines vs. Cainglet (16 SCRA 748) the Court held
that "every interest of public policy demands that perjury be not
shielded by artificial refinements and narrow technicalities. For
perjury strikes at the very administration of the laws (Jay vs.
State, [1916] 15 Ala. App. 255, 43 So. 137). It is the policy of the law that
judicial proceedings and judgment shall be fair and free from fraud,
and that litigants and parties be encouraged to tell the truth and that
they be punished if they do not (People vs. Niles, 300 Ill., 458, 133 N.E.
252, 37 A.R.L. 1284, 1289)."
On whether the judge erred in not applying the Indeterminate

Sentence Law to the case, we cite Section 2 of R.A. No.
4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law) which provides in part that "This
Act shall not apply to . . . those whose maximum term of imprisonment
does not exceed one year, . . ." Since the penalty for perjury under
Article 183 of theRevised Penal Code is arresto mayor in its maximum
period which is one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months
toprision correccional in its minimum period which is six (6) months
and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months, the respondent
Judge was correct in not applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
As earlier stated, the foregoing discussion is in no way the final
appreciation of the Court's decision which is on appeal, but is made
only to illustrate the utter lack of merit of this charge. Counsel for the
complainant must be reprimanded for assisting in the filing of this
complaint.
Deputy Court Administrator Elepaño then recommends:

Premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that this
complaint against Judge Roberto S. Chiongson be DISMISSED for lack
of merit. It is further recommended that Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz be
REPRIMANDED for assisting in the filing of a patently unmeritorious
complaint.
We fully agree with Deputy Court Administrator Elepaño that the
allegations in the complaint are utterly devoid of merit. Good faith and
good motive did not seem to have inspired the filing of the complaint.
Indeed, as correctly pointed out by the respondent, if the complainant
and his counsel honestly believed that the allegations in the Information in the
perjury case did not constitute an offense, they should have filed a motion to
quash. Under Section 3(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, the accused may
move to quash the complaint or information on this ground. The complainant
never did; he was arraigned and entered into trial. Although his failure to do
so did not operate as a waiver of the said ground pursuant to Section 8 of the
same Rule, it showed, nevertheless, his admission of the weakness of the
ground. If he had perceived it to be strong, he would not have wasted an
opportunity to put an early end to the ordeal of a prolonged litigation. Besides,
this ground had not at all been invoked by him, as shown in the order of 31
March 1995 denying the complainant's motion for the reconsideration.
The withdrawal of the Petition for Naturalization did not and cannot
amount to a recall of the questioned untruthful statements. Neither could it
extinguish any offense which may have been committed by reason of such
untruthful statements.
As to the respondent Judge's being a next-door neighbor of the
complainant's wife — the complainant in the perjury case — it must be
stressed that that alone is not a ground for either a mandatory disqualification
under the first paragraph or for a voluntary disqualification under the second
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court. In any event, the
complainant has failed to disclose in his complaint that he had raised this
matter at any time before the rendition of the judgment. In fact, the summary
of the grounds of his motion for reconsideration in the respondent's order
denying the said motion does not include this matter. If indeed the
complainant honestly believed in the justness of this grievance, he would have
raised it in an appropriate pleading before the trial court.
Finally, the nature and character of the complainant's grievances relative
to the respondent's judgment finding the former guilty of perjury may only be
properly ventilated in an appropriate judicial proceeding, such as an appeal
from the judgment.
This kind of recourse, whether made in addition to a regular appeal from
the judgment, or in lieu thereof, if none had been made, is clearly without any
basis and cannot be tolerated for it robs Judges of precious time which they
could otherwise devote to the cases in their courts or to the unclogging of their
dockets.
Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz, counsel for the complainant, must have been
aware of the utter lack of merit of the charges against the respondent. As a
Member of the Philippine Bar he is bound: (1) by his oath, not to, wittingly or
willingly, promote or sue any groundless, false, or unlawful suit nor give aid
nor consent to the same; (2) by Section 20(c), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to
counsel or maintain such action or proceedings only as appear to him to be
just; and (3) to uphold the Code of Professional Responsibility. It was
incumbent upon him to give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and
probable results of the complainant's case (Rule 15.05, Canon 15, Code of
Professional Responsibility) with the end in view of promoting respect for the
law and legal processes (Canon 1, Id.). He should, therefore, be required to
show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for his
apparent failure to observe the foregoing duties and responsibilities.
WHEREFORE, for want of merit, the instant complaint is DISMISSED.
For the reasons above stated, Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz is hereby
directed to SHOW CAUSE, within fifteen (15) days from notice hereof, why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with for his apparent failure to comply with
his duties and responsibilities above stated. Llibris
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
(Choa v. Chiongson, A.M. No. MTJ-95-1063 (Resolution), [February 9, 1996], 323
|||
PHIL 438-452)
SECOND DIVISION
[A.M. No. P-94-1081. October 25, 1995.]
VIRGINIA E. BURGOS, complainant, vs. JOSEFINA R. AQUINO,

Court Stenographer, RTC, Branch 19, Malolos,
Bulacan, respondent.
Jone Liu Chiang for complainant.

Public Attorney's Office for respondent. cdll
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; NATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS.

— Proceedings in administrative investigation are not strictly governed by the
technical rules of evidence. They are summary in nature.
2. ID.; COURT PERSONNEL; REQUIRED STANDARD OF MORALITY. — The
Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of court personnel must be
free from any whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to his duties in the
judicial branch but also to his behavior outside the court as a private
individual. There is no dichotomy of morality; a court employee is also judged
by his private morals. These exacting standards of morality and decency have
been strictly adhered to and laid down by the Court to those in the service of
the judiciary.
3. CRIMINAL LAW; PERJURY, DEFINED; WHEN LIABLE. — Under Article
183 of the Revised Penal Code, perjury is the deliberate making of untruthful
statements upon any material matter before a competent person authorized
to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires. The required Civil
Service Form 212 submitted by respondent to form part of her personal file is
an official document. Her deliberate omission to disclose her child without a
valid justification makes her liable for perjury.
DECISION
PUNO, J :
p
This administrative matter refers to the charge of immorality

brought by complainant against respondent, for maintaining illicit
relations with complainant's husband which eventually begot them a
child, a daughter named Jocelyn A. Burgos.
The letter-complaint of complainant states:
"Sir:
Ito po ay may kinalaman sa isang empleyado ninyo sa Branch
19, Malolos, Bulacan na si Josefina R. Aquino, court stenographer.
Nais ko pong paimbistigahan siya sa pagkaimmoral dahil siya
po ay may-anak sa aking asawa.
Nito nga pong mga nagdaan panahon ay hindi ko na pinapansin
pero grabe na po ang mga gawain. Nuon pong isang taon, April 1993,
napagalaman ko na nagbababad sa office ng asawa ko, kasama ang
kanyang anak. Nakikialam sa mga gawain sa office at nagpapanggap
pang Mrs. siya ng asawa ko. Maluag siyang nakaaalis sa office niya
nuong panahon na iyon na walang pumupuna. Sa katunayan po ay
kalakip nito ang papeles na nilalakad niya kahit office hour. Hindi siya
mapigil sa pagpunta sa office ng asawa ko, sa dahilan mag-iiskandalo
raw siya. Tumagal po iyon ng mahabang panahon sapagkat hindi ko
po ugali ang pumunta sa office ng asawa ko.
Napagalaman ko lang po ito nang umuwi ang anak ko na
sumama sa office ng asawa ko. Hindi po tumigil ng kapupunta ruon
kahit na nanduon ang anak ko. Hindi naman po kilala ng anak ko.
Hindi na po matiis ng mga tao sa office kaya sinabi sa anak ko.
Isinumbong sa akin ng anak ko.
Kinabukasan po ay isinumbong ko sa judge ng Branch 19.
Pinagsabihan siya. Nangako na hihiwalay na raw siya. Hindi na raw
kami guguluhin. Hindi po tumupad. Ang pagpunta lang po sa office
ang sinunod pero patuloy pa rin po ang paghahabol sa asawa ko.
Ayaw pong tumigil. Matalas po at walang kahihiyan.
Nito pong nakaraang linggo May 26 at 28, 1994 nagbantay na
naman po ang anak sa harapan ng office ng asawa ko. Hindi po
tumigil. Alam po ito ng buong compound ng kapitolyo. Kilalang-kilala
po siya sa gawain nga immoral. Hindi po ako nagsisinungaling.
Totoong lahat ito. Siguro po ay nauunawaan ninyo ako, dahil may ina
rin po kayo na katulad ko na napakasakit kapag niloko. Dapat na
pong masugpo itong gawain ng ganitong mga babae, kung hindi po
natin papansinin ay marami pang pamilya na masisira. Masyado na
po akong nasasaktan.
Kalakip po rito ang mga papeles na siya ay may anak.
Gumagalang,
(Sgd.) Gng. Virginia E. Burgos" 1
We asked the respondent to file her Comment. In her Comment, she

admitted that she had an illicit relation with complainant's husband. The illicit
relation allegedly happened prior to her employment in the judiciary. She
claimed that the affair occurred in 1979 and their love child, Jocelyn, was born
on March 19, 1980. 2 She joined the judiciary only on July 9, 1981 as Court Clerk
Interpreter I at the Municipal Trial Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan and was promoted to
Stenographic Reporter. She later transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 19, in 1983. She now avers that she had severed her relation with
Atty. Burgos arising from their disagreement over support.
In her Reply, complainant maintained that her husband and

respondent are still "on." She had also demanded the respondent to
disallow her daughter from using the family name Burgos.
We referred the letter-complaint to Executive Judge Natividad G.
Dizon, Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 19, for investigation.
In her report and recommendation, dated March 17, 1995, Judge Dizon
found the following:
xxx xxx xxx
"The parties, through counsel, agreed that they will just submit
their respective position papers relative to their respective
contentions. No testimonial evidence was presented but only
documentary."
xxx xxx xxx
It appears from the Personal Data Sheet submitted by the respondent
to the Supreme Court, under Column No. 20 that: in 1974 to September 30,
1979, she was employed as Clerk Stenographer in the Fiscal's Office which is a
clear indication that when she got pregnant with her child she was in the
government service. Also in Item No. 27 of said Personal Data Sheet, under
references, it can be noted that she named Atty. Francisco Burgos as one of
her references.
It is a given fact, as the records clearly show, that when respondent had
an affair with the husband of the complainant which resulted in the birth of
the love child, respondent was in the government service. The admission in
the Answer (Exh. "B") of the respondent that she was a victim of amorous
advances of complainant's husband sometime in 1979 and out of that
relationship a child was born confirmed the fact that respondent, while in the
government service committed a disgraceful and immoral act for which
respondent may be subjected to disciplinary action. Now, whether the
relationship with the husband of the complainant is still subsisting, complainant
submitted documents typed by the respondent at the office of complainant's
husband showing that in the said pleadings typewritten below are the
initials 'fcb\jo' and also complainant claims that respondent brags about her being
a mistress and introduces herself as the legal wife and goes to the office of her
paramour almost everyday during office hours (Letter to the undersigned attached
as Annex '4'). Complainant also claims that her husband supports respondent
and the child. However, she did not present evidence to prove such. Therefore,
except for the fact that there was admission on the part of the respondent that
complainant's husband is the father of respondent's child and the relationship
was during the time she was an employee of the Fiscal's Office, no sufficient
evidence was presented that the relationship is subsisting while respondent
was in the judiciary." 3
Judge Dizon recommended respondent's suspension from service.
We then referred the report to the Office of the Court Administrator for
evaluation. In its Memorandum, dated June 19, 1995, it held:
"This Office finds merit on the conclusion of the investigating
Judge that indeed the respondent committed an immoral act while in
the government service, regardless of whether or not it was
committed when employed in the Judiciary. At the time she gave birth
to her child, the respondent may not be in the government service.
However, the child was conceived when she was still in the Fiscal's
Office where the complainant's husband likewise worked. It could be
presumed undisputably that the reason for her resignation is because
of her conception eventually giving birth to her child.
This Office went deeper in its evaluation inquiring further on

the personal record of herein respondent. Her personal record
reveals that respondent was employed as Clerk-Typist in the Office of
the Governor of Malolos, Bulacan from August 1, 1974 to April 22,
1976, and from April 23, 1976 to September 30, 1979 as Clerk
Stenographer in the Fiscal's Office on the same province. She resigned
from the Fiscal's Office and subsequently got herself employed as
Court Interpreter in MTC, Guiguinto, Bulacan on July 9, 1981. While it
is true that in all her personal record from the time she assumed office
in the Judiciary, she declares her status as single with a child named
Jocelyn Aquino born on March 19, 1980, however, in one of her
personal data sheets dated October 26, 1982, respondent did not
declare her child. Moreover, it is worthy to note that in her Statement
of Assets and Liabilities dated July 11, 1984, April 30, 1990, May 14,
1992, April 5, 1993, and April 13, 1994, her only child, though declared,
already carries the name Jocelyn A. Burgos. The reason for the change
in her child's surname was not explained.
It is to be emphasized that the offense of disgraceful and
immoral conduct is punishable by DISMISSAL from the service.
Whether or not the immoral relationship still subsist is no longer
material. Documents submitted by a government employee to form
part of his/her personal file are official documents. Any alteration or
material changes in the content thereof without a valid justification is
tantamount to falsification which is likewise penalized by DISMISSAL
from the service. It could be added that in these official documents,
the employee declares under the penalty of perjury that all statements
given in the document are true and correct to the best of his
knowledge and belief. It appears from these documents and in the
record of the case that no doubt, herein respondent is guilty of
immorality and committed an act of falsifying her own records and
therefore, guilty of perjury, which merit a severe punishment." 4
We agree with the findings of the Office of the Court Administrator.

Respondent has admitted her illicit relationship with Atty. Francisco C.
Burgos, complainant's husband in 1979 which gave life to their love child,
Jocelyn, in 1980. She, however, denies the charge of complainant that she
continues to carry on her dalliance with Atty. Burgos. LLcd
The evidence proves the charge of complainant. Complainant

submitted pleadings in various courts filed by her husband, Atty. Burgos
and typed by respondent. These pleadings are: (1) Motion for Extension to
File Brief filed in the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 13785, dated April 1,
1993; 5 (2) Motion to Reset, dated April 12, 1993, and filed in Civil Case No. 423
in the Municipal Trial Court of Pulilan, Bulacan; 6 and (3) Position Paper, dated
May 12, 1993, filed also in the Municipal Trial Court of Pulilan, Bulacan in Civil
Case No. 423. 7 All these pleadings bear the initials "fcb/jo" and which were typed by
the respondent in the office of Atty. Burgos. As the legitimate wife of Atty. Burgos, it
is not difficult for complainant to obtain copies of these pleadings. It is not also
far fetched for respondent to type them for she is a court stenographer. Given these
circumstances, it behooved the respondent to disprove the charge that her
relationship with complainant's husband has not ceased. She did nothing to meet
this burden. We hold that the evidence on record is substantial enough to conclude
that respondent did not stop her illicit relationship with complainant's husband.
Proceedings in administrative investigation are not strictly governed by the
technical rules of evidence. They are summary in nature.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of court
personnel must be free from any whiff of impropriety, not only with
respect to his duties in the judicial branch but also to his behavior outside
the court as a private individual. 8There is no dichotomy of morality; a court
employee is also judged by his private morals. 9 These exacting standards of
morality and decency have been strictly adhered to and laid down by the Court
to those in the service of the judiciary. 10 Respondent, as a court stenographer,
did not live up to her commitment to lead a moral life. Her act of maintaining
relation with Atty. Burgos speaks for itself. cdlex
Likewise, the records reveal that when respondent applied in the

judiciary she filled up the prescribed personal information sheet, Civil
Service Form 212, dated October 26, 1982 and did not disclose the existence
of her daughter. The form itself gives this warning: "I declare under penalties
of perjury that the answers given above are true and correct to the best of my
knowledge and belief ." Despite the warning, she professed that her statements
were true. 11 Under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code, perjury is the
deliberate making of untruthful statements upon any material matter before a
competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so
requires. The required Civil Service Form 212 submitted by respondent to form
part of her personal file is an official document. Her deliberate omission to
disclose her child without a valid justification makes her liable for perjury. 12
IN VIEW HEREOF, respondent Josefina R. Aquino is meted the penalty of
suspension from office for six (6) months for immorality and perjury. Let a
copy of this decision be entered in respondent's personal record.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur. cda
Footnotes
1.Exhibit "A"; Rollo, pp. 2-4.
2.Comment; Rollo, p. 8.
3.Rollo, pp. 112-114.
4.OCA Report, pp. 3-4.
5.Exhibit "C-1".
6.Exhibit "C-2".
7.Exhibit "C-3".
8.See Imbing v. Tiongson, A.M. No. MTJ-91-595, February 7, 1994, 229 SCRA 690.
9.Supra at page 697.
10.Sicat v. Alcantara, Adm. No. R-6-RTJ, May 11, 1988, 161 SCRA 284.
11.Administrative Report, p. 3.
12.See Bermejo v. Barrios, No. L-23614, February 27, 1970, 31 SCRA 764.
||| (Burgos v. Aquino, A.M. No. P-94-1081, [October 25, 1995], 319 PHIL 622-629)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 93173. September 15, 1993.]
HONORIO SAAVEDRA, JR., petitioner, vs. DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, BRANCH 67, and
GREGORIO M. RAMOS, respondents.
Andres B. Soriano for petitioner.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J :p
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking the nullification

of Department of Justice (DOJ) Resolution dated 6 November 1989 1 which
dismissed petitioner's Petition for Review of the Provincial Prosecutor's
Resolution dated 25 July 1988 2finding probable cause for perjury against
petitioner, and DOJ Resolution dated 7 March 1990 3 denying reconsideration.
On 2 July 1987, the owners of Pine Philippines, Inc. (PPI for brevity),
including private respondent Gregorio M. Ramos, sold their shares of stock to
petitioner Honorio Saavedra, Jr., for P1.2 million payable in installments. A
"Memorandum of Agreement" and a "Deed of Assignment" were executed to
evidence the transaction. The former document contained an automatic
rescission clause in case any installment was not paid on its due date. LLjur
Payments were made in the total amount of P936,380.00, leaving a

balance of P263,620.00 payable on 15 September 1987. On said date,
however, petitioner withheld payment for the reason that the sellers failed to
comply with their warranties. Nevertheless, the balance was deposited in
escrow subject to release once the warranties were complied with.
On 5 November 1987, petitioner filed in behalf of PPI a verified civil
complaint for damages 4 against private respondent, alleging that he
(petitioner) was the President and principal stockholder of the company. By
way of answer, respondent Ramos questioned petitioner's capacity to sue in
behalf of PPI, claiming that petitioner ceased to be its president when the sale
of the PPI shares of stock to him was automatically rescinded on 15 September
1987.
After executing a document entitled "Rescission of Memorandum of
Agreement," Ramos and his group filed a case 5 on 20 November 1987 with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) praying that the rescission be
declared valid and legal. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss alleging lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the SEC but the same was denied on 11 December
1987. Petitioner went to the Supreme Court which, on 21 March 1988, upheld
the jurisdiction of the SEC and ruled that under Sec. 5, par. (b), of P.D. No. 902-
A, the SEC has "primary and exclusive" jurisdiction over the twin issues of
ownership and automatic rescission, they being intracorporate
disputes. 6 Accordingly, proceedings in Civil Case No. 55247 were
suspended. cdrep
On 7 December 1987, during the pendency of SEC Case No. 3257, private
respondent filed a criminal case for perjury against petitioner with the
Provincial Prosecutor's Office in Pasig alleging that petitioner perjured himself
when he declared in the verification of the complaint in Civil Case No. 55247
that he was the President of PPI. 7 In his answer-affidavit, petitioner contended
that since the issues of ownership and automatic rescission were still pending
and unresolved in the SEC, there was no basis to the charge that he asserted
a falsehood by claiming to be the President of the company especially when
he was such per records extant with the SEC. 8
By Resolution dated 25 July 1988, the Provincial Prosecutor found a
prima facie case for perjury against petitioner and on 26 October 1988 filed
the corresponding Information with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, docketed
as Crim. Case No. 74919. 9 The evidence supporting the charge was the
Secretary's Certificate dated 5 December 1987 reflecting private respondent's
election as President of PPI by the former owners thereof when they convened
following the automatic revocation of the "Memorandum of Agreement" and
"Deed of Assignment."
Petitioner sought a review of the foregoing Resolution with public
respondent DOJ but the latter subsequently came up with the Resolution now
under consideration, upholding the finding of probable cause for perjury,
ruling as follows: 10
"There is probable cause against you for prosecution as evidenced
by the Secretary's Certificate dated December 5, 1987 extant on record.
This evidence is a mute but eloquent witness affirming the claim of Ramos
that he is the rightful President of PPI. Indeed, the Secretary's Certificate
alluded to readily shows that the original membership of the Board
was reconvened and reassembled, proving the fact that the
presidency of PPI is lodged with Ramos. prLL
"Moreover, in view of the rescission of the memorandum of

agreement, deed of assignment and contract of lease, you lost your
rights and interest over the shares of stock previously delivered to you
by virtue of the subject agreement. Consequently, you likewise lost
your right to assume management over the corporation PPI. When
you thus stated in your complaint that you were President of PPI, such
assertion constituted a lawful (sic) and deliberate assertion of
falsehood" (italics supplied).
A Motion for Reconsideration having proved unsuccessful, petitioner

took the instant recourse.
Petitioner contends that respondent DOJ gravely abused its discretion
when it affirmed the findings of the Provincial Prosecutor that he made a
"deliberate assertion of falsehood" on the basis of the conclusion that
automatic rescission had set in. For, the jurisdiction to rule on that question of
automatic rescission is lodged with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Since the issue has not yet been resolved, the DOJ should have deferred the
proceedings.
There is merit in the petition. In Saavedra, Jr. v. SEC, we categorically
pronounced that:
". . . the dispute at bar is an intracorporate dispute that has
arisen between and among the principal stockholders of the
corporation due to the refusal of the defendants (now petitioners) to
fully comply with what has been covenanted by the parties. Such
dispute involves a controversy 'between and among stockholders,'
specifically as to plaintiffs' right, as stockholders, over unpaid
assignment of shares and the validity of defendants' acquisition of the
same. In other words, the present case involves an intracorporate
dispute as to who has the right to remain and act as owners-stockholders
of the corporation.
"Pursuant to PD No. 902-A, as amended, particularly Section

5(b) thereof, the primary and exclusive jurisdiction over the present
case properly belongs to the SEC . . ." (emphasis supplied). 11
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot and will not
determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction
of an administrative tribunal 12 having been so placed within its special
competence under a regulatory scheme. In such instances the judicial process
is suspended pending referral to the administrative body for its view on the
matter in dispute. 13
Consequently, if the courts cannot resolve a question which is within the
legal competence of an administrative body prior to the resolution of that
question by the administrative tribunal, especially where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative agency to ascertain
technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to
comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered, 14 much less
can the Provincial Prosecutor arrogate to himself the jurisdiction vested solely
with the SEC.
In the case at bar, the applicable regulatory statute is P.D. No. 902-
A conferring upon the SEC the legal competence to rule on intracorporate
disputes, which competence had already been upheld by us in a number of
cases. 15 Considering that it was definitely settled in Saavedra, Jr. v. SEC that the
issues of ownership and automatic rescission are intracorporate in nature,
then the Provincial Prosecutor, clearly, has no authority whatsoever to rule on
the same. In fact, if we were to uphold the validity of the DOJ Resolutions
brought before us, as respondents suggest, we would be sanctioning a flagrant
usurpation or preemption of that primary and exclusive jurisdiction which SEC
already enjoys. Obviously, it cannot be done. Thus, the Provincial Prosecutor
upon being confronted with the issue of whether the sale of stocks to
petitioner was automatically cancelled while in the course of determining
probable cause for perjury, should have withheld filing any information
against the accused. LLpr
Public respondent DOJ in attempting to justify the action of the

Provincial Prosecutor avers that the latter is empowered to make a preliminary
ruling on the matter for the purpose of finding probable cause against
petitioner, and that petitioner may raise the pendency of the issue before the
SEC as his defense at the trial proper.
We are not persuaded. The duty of a prosecutor during preliminary
investigation is not only to find evidence to warrant continuation of the
criminal process against an accused. Of equal importance, and it has been
repeated often enough, is his duty to protect the innocent from hasty,
expensive and useless trials. 16 This duty, in addition to the "primary and
exclusive" jurisdiction of the SEC, demands the outright termination of the
criminal prosecution of petitioner which, at the very outset, was already bereft
of factual and legal bases. Indeed, the prosecution of petitioner cannot be
based on a mere Secretary's Certificate which cannot attest to the validity of
the automatic rescission, hence, cannot likewise settle the question as to who
between petitioner and private respondent is the lawful President of PPI.
Besides, the Secretary's Certificate is dated 5 December 1987, while the
alleged false statement was made on 5 November 1987, or one month before
when the verified complaint for damages was filed. Quite obviously, the
truthfulness of a statement, or lack of it, cannot be made to depend on a
certificate that was not existing yet when the statement in question was made.
Even assuming the validity of Ramos' election as President of PPI as reflected
in the Secretary's Certificate, it does not prove that petitioner was not
President on 5 November 1987 when the civil action was instituted.
Be that as it may, the outcome of SEC Case No. 3257 is not determinative
of whether or not the charge for perjury against petitioner can prosper. Even
if private respondent Ramos succeeds in proving the validity of the automatic
rescission of the sale before the SEC, it does not necessarily mean that the
criminal prosecution has basis. There are four (4) elements of the crime of
perjury to be taken into account in determining whether there is a prima
facie case, to wit: (a) that the accused made a statement under oath or
executed an affidavit upon a material matter; (b) that the statement or affidavit
was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer
oath; (c) that in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and
deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and, (d) that the sworn statement or
affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose. 17
Clearly, mere assertion of a falsehood is not enough to amount to
perjury. The assertion must be deliberate and willful. While there may have
been a falsehood asserted, which we are not prepared to accept, no evidence
exists to show that the same was done deliberately and willfully. On the
contrary, the records tend to show that the assertion was done in good faith,
in the belief that the non-payment of the last installment price was justified by
the sellers' non-compliance with their warranties. Besides, petitioner alleges
that he has deposited the balance in escrow, which is not disputed.
Consequently, a finding of probable cause does not follow as a matter of
course even if SEC decides adversely against petitioner, for an essential
element of the crime appears to be wanting in the case before us, i.e., that the
falsehood is willful and deliberate.
Moreover, as a rule, pleadings need not be verified unless otherwise
required by the Rules of Court, and no rule requires complaints for damages,
as in the case before us, to be under oath. Since the complaint filed by
petitioner against private respondent is not required to be verified, another
essential element of the crime of perjury is absent, i.e., that the sworn
statement containing the falsity is required by law. Consequently, petitioner
cannot be prosecuted on the basis of an alleged falsehood made in a verified
pleading which is not mandated by law to be verified. 18
Verily, there is grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the Resolution
of 25 July 1988 finding a prima facie case for perjury against petitioner. A
fortiori, the assailed DOJ Resolutions must be struck down as having been
issued without sufficient factual and legal bases. Correspondingly, the
Information filed with the Pasig Trial Court pursuant thereto must likewise be
dismissed. LLpr
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned Resolutions

dated 6 November 1989 and 7 March 1990 of respondent Department of
Justice sustaining the Provincial Prosecutor in finding probable cause for
perjury against petitioner are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
Conformably herewith, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 67, or
whichever branch of the same court Crim. Case No. 74919 entitled "People v.
Honorio Saavedra, Jr.," may be assigned, is directed to DISMISS the case. The
bailbond posted for the provisional liberty of the accused, if any, is cancelled
and released. LLphil
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Davide, Jr. and Quiason, JJ ., concur.
Griño-Aquino, J ., on official leave.
Footnotes
1.Penned by then Undersecretary Artemio G. Tuquero, Rollo, pp. 26-28.

2.Rollo, pp. 30-32.
3.Rollo, p. 29.
4.Pine Philippines, Inc. v. Gregorio M. Ramos, Civil Case No. 55427, RTC, Br. 166,
Pasig.
5.Ramos v. Saavedra, Jr, SEC Case No. 3257.
6.Saavedra, Jr. v. SEC, G. R. No. 80879, 21 March 1988, 159 SCRA 57.
7.I. S. No. 87-10773.
8.Rollo, p. 19.
9.Raffled to Branch 67.

10.Rollo, p. 27.
11.Note 6, p. 60.
12.Brett v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G. R. No. 74223, 27 November 1990, 191
SCRA 687, 698.
13.Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 88550, 18 April 1990,

184 SCRA 426, 432.
14.Note 6, pp. 61-62. See also Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v. Samar
Mining Co., Inc., 94 Phil. 932 (1954).
15.Wack Wack Condominium Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 78490, 23
November 1992, 215 SCRA 850, 855; Rural Bank of Salinas, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G. R. No. 96674, 26 June 1992, 210 SCRA 510, 514; Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 93832, 23 August 1991,
201 SCRA 124, 134; Philippine School of Business Administration v. Leano,
G.R. No. 58468, 24 February 1984, 127 SCRA 778, 782.
16.People v. Poculan, G. R. Nos. 70565-67, 9 November 1988, 167 SCRA 176,
192; Rodis, Sr. v. Sandiganbayan, G. R. Nos. 71404-09, 26 October 1988, 166
SCRA 618, 623.
17.Diaz v. People, G.R. No. 65006, 31 October 1990, 191 SCRA 86, 93.
18.Flordelis v. Himalaloan, No. L-48088, 31 July 1978, 84 SCRA 477.
||| (Saavedra, Jr. v. DOJ, G.R. No. 93173, [September 15, 1993])

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THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 218969. January 18, 2021.]

FERNANDO PANTE y RANGASA,petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF THE

This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of

The Factual Antecedents:

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court:

xxx xxx xxx

2. CA rollo,pp. 67-83; penned by Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia and concurred

4. Records, pp. 327-338; penned by Presiding Judge Marvel C. Clavecilla.

13. Id. at 189.

16. TSN, May 19, 2010, pp. 9-10.

19. Id. at 9-11.

22. CA rollo,pp. 18-32.

28. CA rollo,p. 58.

31. Rollo,pp. 10-27.

33. REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 308, par. 2 (1).

36. Fantastico v. Malisce, Sr.,750 Phil. 120, 133-134 (2015),citing People v.

38. Id. at 135.

40. People v. Mores,712 Phil. 480, 494 (2013).

43. Id. at 730-731.

46. TSN, October 5, 2011, p. 10.

53. Punongbayan-Visitacion v. People of the Philippines,823 Phil. 212, 222-223 (2018).

3. People v. Avila,supra note 1.

2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or

17. Id. at 6-7.

[G.R. No. 212191. September 5, 2018.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RICHARD

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal filed by herein accused-

2. Penned by Judge Bernabe B. Mendoza; records, pp. 126-141.

5. See Pre-Trial Order, id. at 54-55.

10. Id. at 20-22.

19.TSN, October 29, 2010, pp. 9-22.

29.People v. Manchu, et al., 593 Phil. 398, 409 (2008).

36.People v. Ambatang, G.R. No. 205855, March 29, 2017.

39.People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806, 845 (2016).

42.People v. Jugueta, supra note 39.

n Note from the Publisher: Written as "who's" in the official document.

[G.R. No. 199208. July 30, 2014.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,vs.TRINIDAD A.

All 30 cases were consolidated and jointly heard. Upon agreement of

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

12. In Criminal Case No. 03-2189, reclusion perpetua and to

18. In Criminal Case No. 03-2195, reclusion perpetua and to

24. In Criminal Case No. 03-2201, reclusion perpetua and to

The Court's Ruling

Thus, the elements of Qualified Theft, committed with grave abuse of

4. That it be done without the owner's consent;

6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence. 8

However, instead of executing her duties, she deliberately misled the

xxx xxx xxx

*Designated additional member per Raffle dated 17 October 2012.

[G.R. No. 230669. June 16, 2021.]

REX SORONGON, 1 petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 2 (Petition)

The CA held it beyond dispute that petitioner borrowed and received

The Court further emphasized in Nery that in order for novation to

Even if the instant case is viewed from the standpoint of the