(eBook PDF) Introduction to Formal

Logic with Philosophical Applications

by Russell Marcus
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 CONTENTS VII

6.5: Modal Logics 431

6.6: Notes on Translation with M 445

Chapter 7: Logic and Philosophy 455

7.1: Deduction and Induction 455
7.2: Fallacies and Argumentation 466
7.3: Logic and Philosophy of Mind: Syntax, Semantics, and the
Chinese Room 478
7.4: Logic and the Philosophy of Religion 488
7.5: Truth and Liars 503
7.6: Names, Definite Descriptions, and Logical Form 515
7. 7: Logicism 523

Appendix on the Logical Equivalence of the Rules of Equivalence 533

Terms 539
Solutions to Selected Exercises 541
Glossary/Index 595
Preface

“ Who needs another logic textbook?” I got asked a lot as I was writing this one. The
answer is: students and teachers who want to explore both the techniques of formal
logic and their connections to philosophy and other disciplines. 咀1e best approach
to thinking about those connections is both to learn the tools of logic, in careful de-
tail, and to write about them. So this is a formal logic textbook for people who want
to learn or teach the core concepts of classical formal logic, and to think and write
about them.
Introduction to Faγmal Logic w让h Philosophical Applicatio饥s (IFLPA) and I时rod阮
tion to Formal Logic (IPL) are a pair of new logic textbooks, de鸣ned for st叫ents of
formal logic and their instructors to be rigorous, yet friendly and accessible. Unlike
many other logic books, IFLPA and IPL both focus on deductive logic.τhey cover
syntax, semantics, and natural deduction for propositional and predicate logics. 咀1ey
emphasize translation and derivations, with an eye to semantics throughout. Both
books contain over two thousand exercises, enough for in-class work and homework,
with plenty le丘 over for extra practice, and more available on the Oxford website (see
page xv). Since logic is most o丘en taught in philosophy department乌 special attention
is given to how logic is useful for philosophers, and many examples use philosophi-
cal concepts. But the examples in the text are accessible to all students, requiring no
special interest in or knowledge of philosophy, and there are plenty of exercises with
no philosophical content, too.
IFLPA also contains two chapters of stand-alone essays on logic and its application
in philosophy and beyond, with writing prompts and suggestions for further read-
ings.τhese essays help instructors and students to reflect on their formal work, to
understand why logic is important to philosophers, and how it can be applied to other
disciplines, and to students' own lives and studies.

WHY THIS LOGIC BOOK?

Introduction to Formal Logic with Philosophical Applications is the product of both my
growing unease, over years of teaching logic in philosophy departments, and a sud-
den imprudent decision. My unease derived from the ways in which even excellent
IX
X PR EFACE

students finished my logic course without a good understanding of why philosophers

studied the topic. I wanted to show my students connections between formal deduc-
tive logic and broader philosophical topics. I began teaching Philosophy Fridays in
my logic classes at Hamilton College, pu忧ing aside the technical material on truth
tables and derivations, and talking about nonstandard topics, ones that appeared only
in cursory fashion, if at all, in most textbooks. Every other Friday, I would assign a
philosophy reading relating to the course material-for example, Goodman’s 刊e
Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals, a selection from Aristotle's D e Interpretatione,
Qui肘’s “On What τhere Is," Searle's "Minds, Brains, and Programs"-and spend a
class talking with my students about how logic and philosophy connect. Each student
would write a short paper on some topic raised in a Philosophy Friday.
Students responded well to Philosophy Fridays, but the readings I assigned were
o丘en too difficult. As at many schools, Symbolic Logic at Hamilton attracts students
from departments across the college. Most of these students were too unfamiliar
with philosophy to work comfortably with the material I found most interesting.
I received many fine papers and was convinced that my students were leaving the
course with a greater awareness of why we philosophers study logic. But unfortunate
numbers of students let me know that they were not enjoying the difficult, obscure
(to them) readings.
My sudden imprudent decision happened during a logic class, fall 2010, when I
mentioned that if anyone wanted to spend time writing logic problems for a sum-
m吨 while I wrote my own essays for Philosophy Fridays, I would try to find some
funding for the project. A student volunteered, and we spent the summer working.
咀1e result, IFLPA, revised and expanded over the years, has two parts. 咀1e first part,
chapters 1-5, is a nuts-and-bolts introductory formal deductive logic textbook. Chap-
ter 1 is a brief introduction. Chapter 2 covers propositional semantics, leading to the
standard truth-table definition of validity. Chapter 3 covers natural deductions in
propositional logic. Chapter 4 covers monadic predicate logic. Chapter 5 covers full
first-order logic, including identity and functions. This material is straight logic, and
it does not discuss distracting questions in the philosophy of logic.
The central innovation of IFLPA is in its second part. Chapters 6 and 7 contain
stand-alone introductory essays on enrichment topics, along with discussion ques-
tions which can serve as essay prompts and suggestions for further reading. 卫1e first
five chapters may come off as dogmatic, in places. For example, in chapter 2, I intro-
duce the truth table for the material conditional without discussing the deep ques-
tions about that interpretation of 'if ... then .. .' statements. I introduce bivalence
without discussing other options, like three-valued logics. But nearly each section of
the 且rst five cl呻ters contains a set of questions (“ Tell Me More '’), pointing to places
in which such questions are explored in chapters 6 and 7.
Chapter 玩 “Beyond Basic Logic," contains discussions of subtleties arising from
thinking about logic, and it includes some auxiliary formal material.τhere are essays
 PREFACE XI

on the nature of conditionals; some metalogical concepts (completenes叭oundness,

decidability); three吼lued logics; modal logic; and more intricate questions arising
in translation.
Chapter 7,“Logic and Philosophy,'’ mainly contains more-philosophical essays
aimed at showing both the connections between formal logic and other areas of phi-
losophy, and some of the ways in which logic can actually he与 treat philosophical
problems. I discuss philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, philosophy of lan-
guage, metaphysics, truth, and mathematics. I have found these essays to be espe-
cially engaging for students eager to move beyond more formal work.

SPECIAL FEATURES
Each section of IFLPA contains a Summary.
Sections in chapters 1 through 5 contain a list of important points to Keep in
Mind.
Key terms are boldfaced in the text and defined in the margins, and are listed
at the end of each chapter. In addition, all terms are defined in the glossary/
index at the end of the book.
咀1ere are over two thousand exercises in the book.
Exercises are presented progressively, from easier to more challenging.
Translate-and-derive exercises are available in every section on deriva-
tions, helping to maintain students' translation skills.
Translation exercises are supplemented with examples for translation
from formal languages into English.
Regimentations and translations contain both ordinary and philosophi-
cal themes.
Solutions to exercises, about 20 percent of total, are included at the back
of the book. Solutions to translate-and-derive exercises appear in two
parts: first, just the translation, and then the derivation. Solutions to all
exercises are available for instructors.
IFLPA contains several formal topics and exercise types not appearing in
standard logic texts:
Seven rules for biconditionals, parallel to the standard rules for
conditionals.
Exercises asking students to interpret and model short theories.
Two sections on functions at the end of chapter 5.
Exercises asking students to determine whether an argument is valid or
invalid, or whether a proposition is a logical truth or not, and then to
construct either a derivation or a counterexample.
These sections are perfect for stronger students, while easily skipped by
others.
XII PREFACE

Sections of enrichment material on philosophical applications in chapters 6

and 7 all contain essay prompts (“For Fur也er Research and Writing”) and
suggested readings.
Tell Me More entries at the ends of sections, pointing to essays in chapters 6
and 7, encourage students to explore the importance of their formal work.

INTRODUCTION TO FORMAL LOGIC OR INTRODUCTION TO

FORMAL LOGIC WITH PHILOSOPHICAL APPLICATIONS?
TWO BOOKS-YOUR CHOICE
As IFLPA went through the review process at Oxford, it became clear that some in-
structors were interested main忖 in the first five cl呻ters, which focused on formal
logic, and did not see a use for the enrichment material in chapters 6 and 7. While I
have found that the enrichment material has increased my students' enjoyment and
understanding of the formal work, different instructors have different goals. So we
have also produced an abbreviated version of this book. Introduction to Formal Logic
(IPL) is a nuts-and-bolts introductory formal deductive logic textbook, mainly just
the first five chapters of IFLPA, though it also contains the two sections on subtleties
of translation from IFLPA, as well as the section on fallacies and argumentation.
The formal material is the same in IPL and IFLPA: the same examples, the same ex-
ercises, and the same numberings. Instructors and students may work together with
either version and move freely between the two books.

USING INTRODUCTION TO FORMAL LOGIC

WITH PHILOSOPHICAL APPLICATIONS
咀1e 且rst five chapters of IFLPA proceed sequentially through standard formal logic.
Mostly, instructors will move through as much material as they desire, from the start.
There are three possible exceptions.
First, the first three sections of chapter 1 are mainly background and not really nec-
essary to cover; there are no exercises in those sections.
Second, one of my goals for IFLPA was a better discussion of semantics, especially
for predicate logic, a topic many logic books elide or exclude. Instructors who wish to
skip this material (especially sections 4.7 and 5.2) will need to support students for
the further work on distinguishing valid from invalid arguments in sections 4.8 and
5.3, or just skip the relevant exercises in those sections.
τhird, section 3.6 contains seven natural deduction rules governing inferences with
biconditionals that do not appear in standard logic texts. This section can be skipped,
though instructors might want to be careful in assigning subsequent exercises that
use biconditionals. All later inferences will be derivable, but some exercises will be
more difficult than they would be with the extra rules from section 3.6.
 PR EFACE XIII

Philosophical Applications: The Enrichment

Material in Chapters 6 and 7
The sections of enrichment material on philosophical applications in chapters 6 and
7 are truly independent, from chapters 1-5, and from each other.τhis allows instruc-
tors to choose the sections that interest them or that they believe will most interest
their students.
Sections in both chapters include writing prompts ("For Further Research and
飞咿ritin
吨 g") and additional readin
吨 g suggestion
瓜
lS. E
exercises. Both chapters are written to help students start to see the role, implicit and
explicit, of logic in contemporary philosophy. While I have tried to be even-handed,
my choices of topics do not reflect the discipline as a whole, and my choices of how to
cover those topics may seem idiosyncratic, since I have omitted or elided some promi-
nent and important views.τhese results are inevitable for short introductory essays
on topics on which there are no settled views. My goal is to find ways to stimulate my
students' interests and to help them start to think and to write about why we study
logic, not to cover everything.
Due to space constraints, we are not able to include all of the sections I have written
for chapters 6 and 7. Omitted sections, also standing alone, are available as supple-
ments to the text on Oxford ’s website. For chapter 6, the supplementary material in-
cludes a treatment of adequate sets of propositional operators, alternative notations,
alternative methods of proof, rules of passage and prenex normal form, and second-
order logic. For chapter 7, the online supplementary material includes more work on
logic and the philosophy of science, infinity, quantification and ontological commit-
ment, and the color incompatibility problem. Instructors may print and distribute
those sections to their students.
τhere are different ways in which one can use chapters 6 and 7. I cover some sec-
tions, such as sections 6.1 on subtleties of translation or 6.2 on conditionals, at the
same time that I cover the formal work and assign students the readings as prepa-
ratory for classes. Alternatively, I use some of the sections as biweekly pauses, my
Philosophy Fridays, during which I try to seed student interests in various topics. I
have students write a short essay, due toward the end of the course, in which they are
asked to make connections between formal logic and the outside world. Philosophy
Fr叫ays motivate my students to think about their essay topics. Since there is more
enrichment material in the last two chapters than can be covered comfortably in a
semeste鸟 I teach some different topics each year.
τhe enrichment sections may also be assigned to strong students as independent
work. For example, some mathematics or computer science students who come to
logic, perhaps looking for a humanities course within their comfort zones, find work-
ing independently on the sections on three-valued logics or Hilbert-style systems edi-
fying and satisfying.
To help students and teachers figure out when best to read and discuss the enrich-
ment material, I have provided two tools. First, I have included suggestions ("Tell Me
XIV PREFACE

More”) at the end of most sections.τhese suggestions point to sections in chapter 6

or 7, or to the supplementary material on the Oxford website, that can help illuminate
the concepts of the relevant technical material in chapters 1-5.
Second, I have prepared the following chart of guidelines. 卫1ese guidelines indi-
cate which formal topics are presupposed in each enrichment section, so instructors
can know at a glance whether a section is appropriate for students at any point in the
course. I have included in the chart suggestions for integrating both the sections in
the book and the supplementary sections available only on Oxford ’s website. When
you are considering assigning a section of enrichment material to your class, a quick
glance at the relevant row of this chart may be useful.

Suggestions for Integrating Enrichment Material on Philosophical Applications

[ Section Su仰st川la cement N叫川esuppositions 仙川omments

6.1: Notes on A丘er2.S Logical equivalence 咀1e section uses the truth-table defini-
Translation with PL tion of equivalence to justify some trans-
lations in PL.
一
6.2: Conditionals
－－－－－－－－－斗－－－－－
I A丘er2.S
•----
Logical equivalence and You can do this section a bit earlier, but
tautology you do need the basic truth tables.
6.3 ：咀1ree-Valued Logics I A丘er 2.6 Basic truth tables and the The section mentions logical truths, and
truth-table definition of the discussion ofvalidity might make
validity more sense a丘er 3.5.
6.4: Metalogic Anywhere Mentions proof and truth, but doesn’ t
presuppose the technical work on it
6.5: Modal Logics A丘er 3.3 Truth tables, truth functions, Focuses exclusively on propositional
and some natural deduction modal logics
(modus ponens)
•---- •--- 一
6.6: Notes on After 4.7 Translation and semantics This section is about translation in M but
Translation with 岛f forM uses the derivation rules through 4.6 and
the semantics in 4.7.
6S.7：咀1e Propositions A丘er2.S Tautology 咀1ere are mentions of disjunctive syl-
of Propositional Logic logism, quantification, and languages of
predicate logic.
6S.8: Adequacy A丘er 2.6 Basic truth tables It’s useful, but not necessary, to have dis-
cussed validity.
6S.9: Logical Truth, A丘er 2.5 Tautology and logical truth 咀1e section mentions logical truths of F,
Analyticity, and but not in detail. Still, it might be better
Modality a丘er 3.8 and 3.9 when students prove
logical truths using natural deductions.
←一－
6S.10: Alternative A丘er 4.1 All logical operators, includ- You could do it earlier if you gloss over -
Notations ing quantifiers, and the truth the quantifiers; there’s not much about
tables them.
6S.ll: Axiomatic A丘er 3.8 Logical truths and proofs of τhe section mentions predicate logic but
Systems them doesn't use it.
 PREFACE XV

6S.12: Rules of Passage A丘er 5.3 Rules forF

6S.13: Second-Order A丘er 5.5 Identity theory I do this section a丘er functions and con-
Logic and Set Theory nect it to 7.7: Logicism.
7.1: Deduction and Anywhere 咀1e discussion of inference makes more
Induction sense a丘er work in chapter 3.
7.2: Fallacies and Anywhere Arguments and validity Deductions in both PL and Mare men-
Argumentation tioned in passing, early.
7.3: Logic and A丘er4.7 Syntax and semantics I usually do this section earlier, empha-
Philosophy of Mind sizing the syntax and semantics of PL,
but it makes more sense a丘er the seman-
tics of Mor F.
7.4: Logic and the A仕er 1.5 Regimentation into premise/
Philosophy of Religion conclusion form; validity and
soundness
7.5: Truth and Liars A丘er4.6 Proof in M, including indirect
proof
7.6: Names, Definite A丘er 5.4 Identity theory, specifically
Descriptions, and definite descriptions
Logical Form
7.7: Logicism A丘er 5.4 Identity theory Discussions of functions (5.6) and
second-order logic (6S.13) can be helpful
in se忧ing up the project.
7S.8: Logic and Science A丘er 3.5 Natural deductions, especially
MP and MT
7S.9: Infinity Anywhere 咀1e section introduces and uses some
very basic set theory, and invokes the
general concepts of formalization.
7S.10: Quanti且cation A丘er4.7 Quantification, especially
and Ontological quantifier exchange; seman-
Commitment tics for Mand F
7S.ll: Atomism and A丘er4.7 岛f 咀1ere is discussion of the limits of first-
Color Incompatibility order logic, but really only Mis needed.

STUDENT AND INSTRUCTOR RESOURCES

A rich set of supplemental resources is available to support teaching and learning
in this course. These supplements include Instructor Resources on the Oxford
University Press Ancillary Resource Center (ARC); intuitive, auto-graded as-
sessments and other student resources on Dashboard by Oxford University Press; a
free Companion Website for students; and downloadable Learning Management
System Cartridges. For access to these resources, please visit www.oup.com/us/
marcus.
XVI PREFACE

卫1e ARC houses a wealth of Instructor Resources:

• A customizable, auto-graded Computerized Test Bank
• An Instructor’s Manual, which includes the following:
• AMicroso丘 Word document containing the questions from the Comput-
erized Test Bank
• A traditional “ Pencil-and-Paper" version of the Test Bank, containing the
same questions as the Computerized Test Bank, but converted for use
in hard-copy exams and homework assignments, including open-ended
questions that allow students to develop extended analysis, such as com-
pleting truth tables and doing proofs
• Complete answers to every set of exercises in the book-over 2,000
exercises
• Bulleted Chapter Summaries, which allow the instructor to scan the
important aspects of each chapter quickly and to anticipate section
discussions
• PowerPoint Lecture Outlines to assist the instructor in leading class-
room discussion
• Sample syllabi
• Downloadable Course Cartridges which allow instructors to import the com-
puterized test bank and student resources from the Companion Website into
their school ’s Learning Management System
Dashboard at www.oup.com/ us/ dashboard delivers a wealth of Student Re-
sources and auto-graded activities in a simple, intuitive, and mobile device-friendly
format. Dashboard contains:
• A fully-integrated eBook version of the text
• Level-One and Level-Two Quizzes, autograded and linked to the Learning Ob-
jectives for easy instructor analysis of each student’s topic-specific strengths
and weaknesses.
• A ProoιChecking Module for solving symbolic proofs that allows students to
enter proof solutions, check the their validity, and receive feedback, both by
line and as a whole, as well as Truth Table Creation Modules, all feeding auto-
matically into a Gradebook that offers instructors the chance to view students'
individual a忧empts
• Quiz Creation Capability for instructors who wish to create original quizzes in
multiple-choice, true/ false, multiple-select, long-answer, short- answe鸟 order­
ing, or matching question formats, including customizable answer feedback
and hints
• A built-in, color-coded Gradebook that allows instructors to monitor student
progress from virtually any device
• Chapter Learning Objectives adapted from the book ’s chapter headings
 PREFACE XVII

• Interactive Flashcards of Key Terms and their definitions from the book
• Tools for student communication, reference, and planning, such as messaging
and spaces for course outlines and syllabi
Access to Dashboard can be packaged with Introduction to Formal Logic with Philo-
sophical Applications at a discount, stocked separately by your college bookstore, or
purchased directly at www.oup.com/ us/ dashboard.
The free Companion Website found at www.oup.com/ us/ marcus contains supple-
mental Student Resources:
• Student Self-Quizzes
• Interactive Flashcards of Key Terms and their definitions from the book
• Bulleted Chapter Summaries
• Additional content to supplement Chapters 6 and 7, including:
• 6.7 Laws of Logic
• 6.8 Adequacy
• 6.9 Logical Truth Analyticity and Modality
• 6.10 Alternate Notations
• 6.11 Axiomatics
• 6.12 Rules of Passage
• 6.13 Second Order Logic
• 7.8 Scientific Explanation and Confirmation
• 7.9 Infinity
• 7.10 Quantification and Commitment
• 7.11 Color Incompatibility
To find out more information or to order Dashboard access or a Course Cartridge
for your Learning Management System, please contact your Oxford University Press
representative at 1 800-280-0280.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
咀1e first dra丘 of this book was written in the summer of 2011. I worked that sum-
mer alongside my student Jess Gutfleish, with support of a Class of 1966 Faculty
Development Award from the Dean of Faculty’s O面ce at Hamilton College, in the
archaeology teaching lab at Hamilton. I wrote the text, and she worked assiduously
and indefatigably writing exercises; I had di面culty keeping up with her. I am inef-
fably grateful to Jess for all of her hard work and the mountain of insidiously difficult
(as well as more ordinary) logic problems she devised. Jess worked on more prob-
lems in spring 2014, and Spencer Livingstone worked with her. Deanna Cho helped
enormously with the section summaries and glossary, supported by the philosophy
department at Hamilton College. Spencer Livingstone and Phil Parkes worked dur-
ing summer 2015, helping me with some research and writing still further exercises.
XVIII PR EFACE

Sophie Gaulkin made many editing suggestions and Reinaldo Camacho assisted me
with new exercises. Jess, Spencer, and Rey were all indescr也ably supportive and use-
ful as teaching assistants and error-seeking weapons. Students in my logic classes at
Hamilton, too numerous to mention, found many typos. Andrew Winters, using a
dra丘 of the text at Slippery Rock University in 2016, sent the errors he and his stu-
dents discovered, and made many helpful suggestions.
At the behest of Oxford, the following people made helpful comments on dra丘s of
the book, and I am grateful for their work:
Joshua Alexander, Siena College
Brian Barnett, St. John Fisher College
Larry Behrendt, Mercer County Community College
Thomas A. Blackson, Arizona State University
Dan Boisvert, University ofNorth Carolina, Charlotte
Jeff Buechner, Rutgers University, Newark
Eric Chelstrom, Minnesota State University
Chris Dodsworth, Spring Hill College
Michael Futch, University of Tulsa
Nathaniel Goldberg, Washington and Lee University
Nancy Slonneger Hancock, Northern Kentucky University
Brian Harding, Texas Woman’s University
Reina Hayaki, University of Nebraska, Lincoln
Marc A. Hight, Hampden Sydney College
Jeremy Hovda, KU Leuven
Gyula Klima, Fordham University
Karen Lewis, Barnard College
Leemon McHenry, California State University, Northridge
John Piers Rawling, Florida State University
Reginald Rayme鸟 University of North Carolina, Charlotte
Ian Schnee, Western Kentucky University
Aeon Skoble, Bridgewater State University
Michael Stoeltzner, University of South Carolina
Harold τhorsrud, Agnes Scott College
Mark Tschaepe, Prairie View A&M University
Andrew Winters, Slippery Rock University of Pennsylvania
I am grateful also to Robert Miller, Executive Editor at Oxford, and Alyssa Palazzo,
Associate Editor, for supporting both IPL and IFLPA.
卫1ank you to Margaret Gentry and the Dean of Faculty’s o面ce at Hamilton. I am
grateful to Nathan Goodale and Tom Jones for le忧ing us have their lab in which to
work, summer 2011. I also owe thanks to the many students who have he怡ed me
construct an innovative Logic course, and for the constant, unwavering support of me
and my course by the Hamilton College philosophy department. 咀1anks to Marianne
Janack for example 4.2.27 and to Alan Ponikvar for example 7.2.10.
 PREFA CE XIX

More remotely, I am deeply grateful to authors of the logic books I ’ve studied and
with which I ’ve taught, especially Irving Copi ’s Symbolic Logic, Geoffrey Hunter’s
Metalogic, Elliott Mendelson’s Introduction to Mathematical Logic, Patrick Hurley’s A
Concise Introduction to Logic,John Nolt ’s Logics, and Graham Priest's An Introduction
to Non-Classical Logic. Elliott Mendelson and Melvin Fi忧ing were especially influ-
ential logic teachers of mine; they made logic elegant and beautiful. I studied Copi ’s
logic with Richard Schuldenfrei, whose encouragement I appreciate. And I am grate-
ful to Dorothea Frede, into whose Ancient Philosophy class I brought my excitement
about logic, for her patience as I discovered (by regimenting his arguments through
tl时erm) that, no, Plato wasn't making simple logical errors.
Most important！弘 I am grateful to my wife, Emily, and my children, Marina and
Izzy, who suffered through many summers that could have been more fun for them so
that I could have the logic book I wanted.
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1.1: DEFINING ’ LOGIC ’

An Introduction to Formal Logic and Its Application to Philosophy is a textbook in for-
mal deductive logic and its relation to philosophy. If you work through the material
in the first five chapters, you can gain a good sense of what philosophers and logicians
call deductive arguments. In the sixth and seventh chapters, you can read about some
connections between logic and philosophy.
Let ’s start by trying to characterize to what the terms ‘ logic’ and ‘ argument' refer.
Consider the following claims that someone might use to define those terms.
1.1.1 Logic is the study of argument.
Arguments are what people who study logic study.
Two aspects of the pair of sentences in 1.1.1 are worth noticing. First, they provide
a circular definition that makes the characterizations nearly useless. If you do not
understand the terms 'logic' and 'argument', then the sentences in 1.1.1 are not going
to help you, except for showing that the two terms are related.
Second, the circularity of this pair of definitions is a formal result that can be seen
in other pairs of purported definitions, like the pairs of sentences in 1.1.2 and 1.1.3.
1.1.2 Sheep are the things that shepherds tend.
Shepherds are things that tend sheep.
1.1.3 Glubs are extreme cases of wizzles.
Wizzles are ordinary forms of glubs.
In 1.1.2, you might not notice the problem of the formal property of circularity
because you already know the meanings of the terms involved. In 1.1.3, the problem
should be obvious. Without knowing what glubs and wizzles are, 1.1.3 is useless, and
its uselessness is a product of its poor form. 咀1is textbook is about such formal results.

1
2 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCING LOGIC

Returning to the definitions of 'logic’ and 'argument', notice that in contrast to

1.1.1, 1.1.4 is not formally circular.
1.1.4 Logic is the study of argument.
An argument is a set of statements, called premises, together with
a claim, called the conclusion, which the premises are intended to
support or establish.
1.1.4 explains the meaning of one term,' logic’F by using other ones, like 'statement ’
and ‘establish ’. If such a definition is to be informative, these other terms should be
more familiar. If not, we can continue the process, as at 1.1.5.
1.1.5 To establish a claim is to justify or provide evidence for it.
A statement is a declarative sentence that has a truth value.
Truth values include truth and falsity. Some interesting logics have
other truth values: three (e.g., truth, falsity, and indeterminacy) or
in白nitely many. In this book we will focus on just truth and falsity.

Pairing 1.1.4 and 1.1.5, we see a characterization oflogic as the rules ofwhat follows
from what, of which consequences derive from which assumptions.
We make inferences all the time: if I buy this book, I won't have enough money for
the cup of coffee I wanted; if I make a turn here, I'll end up in Waterville; she must be
angry with me because she hasn’ t returned my email. When we think about the con-
sequences of our actions or the reasons some event has occurred, we are using logic.
Good logic is thus a precond让ion for all good reasoning.
Some inferences are better than others. I am well justified in inferring that it is a丘er
dawn from the light peeking through my window shades. I am not well justified in
believing that it is nine in the morning from the fact that it was six in the morning an
hour ago; that ’s an error. 卫1is book is devoted to some general principles of evaluating
certain kinds of arguments, called deductive arguments.
Deductive arguments are contrasted with inductive arguments, though the diι
ference between them is di伍cult to specify both precisely and briefly. Roughl如 in a
deductive argument, the conclusion follows without fail, necessaril如 from the prem-
ises.τhe conclusions of inductive arguments are supported by their premises, more or
less depending on the argument, but not guaranteed. Inductive arguments are o丘en
(though not always) generaliz延ions from particular expe由nces and can be under-
mined by further evidence.
Logic and mathematics are largely characterized by their uses of deduction, though
statistical inferences are not purely deductive. Sciences involve both deduction and
induction, broadly speaking, though there are other methods of inference, like in-
ference to the best explanation. 咀1e best way to understand the difference between
deduction and induction is to work through the material in chapters 1-5 and contrast
that kind of reasoning with others.
When evaluating an argument, we can perform two distinct steps. First, we can see
whether the conclusion follows from the assumptions. An argument whose conclu-
sion follows from its premises is called valid. Chapter 2 is dedicated to constructing
 1.2: LOGIC AND LANGUAGES 3

a precise notion of deductive validity, of what follows, for propositional logic. Indeed,
the notion of validity is the central topic of the book.
A second step in evaluating an argument is to see whether the premises are true.
In a valid deductive argument, if the premises are true, then the conclusion must be
true.τhis result is what makes deductive logic interesting and is, in a sense, the most
important sentence of this entire book: in a valid deductive argument, if the premises
are true, then the conclusion must be.
An Introduction to Formal Logic and Its Application to Philosophy is dedicated to the
first step in the process of evaluating arguments. ’The second step is not purely logi-
cal, and it is largely scientific. Roughly speaking, we examine our logic to see if our
reasoning is acceptable and we examine the world to see if our premises are true. Al-
though we prefer our arguments both to be valid and to have true premises, this book
is dedicated main与 to the form of the argument, not to its content.
You might wonder whether the logic in this book, formal deductive logic, repre-
sents how we actually reason or whether it sets out rules for proper reasoning. ls logic
descriptive or prescriptive? Before we can start to answer this question, we have to
see what our logic looks like. 卫1e nature of some elementary systems of formal logic
is the focus of the first five chapters of this book. In the sixth and seventh chapters, I
discuss a variety of philosophical questions arising from or informed by the study of
formal logic. The sections of these chapters may be read along with the formal mate-
rial in the first five chapters.

TELL ME MORE ::.. I

• How does deductive logic differ from inductive logic? See 7.1: Deduction and Induction.

1.2: LOGIC AND LANGUAGES

’Thereare (at least) three kinds of languages in this book. First, most of the book is
written in a natural language, English. Other natural languages include Spanish and
Swahili. Second, there are the formal languages that we will discuss in careful detail.
As these formal languages are our main objects of study, we can call them the object
languages.
Between formal and natural languages is a third kind of language made of elements
of the other two and used to study a formal language. 卫1is metalanguage is mostly
English. You might not even think of it as a language separate from English, and for
the most part you need not think about the metalanguage too carefully. But it in-
cludes some technical terms that do not occur in ordinary English. For example, the
rules of inference we will examine in chapter 3 are written using Greek letters. 卫1ey
are parts of the metalanguage we use to tell us how to work in the object language.
We can add these same meta-linguistic rules to any natural language to form a meta-
language made mostly out of Spanish or Swahili. Our metalanguage thus differs from
4 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCING LOGIC

any particular natural language. I will not specify the metalanguage as precisely as
the object languages.
It is customary to give names to object languages. Chapters 2 and 3 focus on one
object language that I will call PL, for propositional logic. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss
three further formal languages:
M Monadic （日rst-order) predicate Logic
F Full (firs仁order) predicate logic
FF Full (firsιorder) predicate logic with functors
For each formal language we study, we will specify a syntax and a semantics. ’The
syntax gives the vocabulary of the language, series of symbols like letters and terms
like 飞，＇， ::::,, and :3, along with rules for forming formulas. The semantics allows us to
interpret the language, to understand it as meaningful, rather than just an empty set
of squiggles. 卫1ere are different possible interpretations of the symbols just as there
are different meanings to most words or different languages using the same letters.
We speci马r an interpret甜on of an object language by thinking of ourselves as step-
ping outside of those languages into metalanguages. We might sa如 for example, that
we will use the letter γin the object language to stand for the statement expressed
in English by 'Prunes are dried plums’. We will also study derivations (or proofs) in
each language.
卫1ere are advantages to both natural languages and formal languages. Natural lan-
guages are excellent for ordinary communication. Formal languages are excellent for
precision, especially for clarifying ambiguities. Much of the formal material in this
book is based on Frege's Begr你schr（卢（1879); Begr你schr侨 means 'concept writing ’-

In his preface, Frege compared natural languages and formal languages to an eye and
a microscope, respectively:
I believe I can make the relationship of my Begrl侨·schrift to ordinary Lan-
guage clearest if I compare it to that of the microscope to the eye. The Latter,
due to the range of its apP.Licability, due to the flexibility with which it is
able to adapt to the most diverse circumstances, has a great superiority over
the microscope. Considered as an optical instrument, it admittedly reveals
many imperfections, which usually remain unnoticed only because of its in-
timate connection with mental life. But as soon as scientific purposes place
great demands on sharpness of resolution, the eye turns out to be inadequate.
The microscope, on the other hand, is perfectly suited for such purposes.
Many students, when they begin to study logic, find it to be an amusing toy.二 There
are careful rules for working in the object language. Once you learn those rules, it
can be fun to play with them. When I started studying logic, in college, I couldn’ t
believe that one could earn credit for filling out truth tables, translating English into
formal languages, and constructing derivations. It was like ge忧ing credit for eating
candy. I love puzzles and games; logic seemed to be too much fun to be serious or
important.
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The Project Gutenberg eBook of Les trente-six
situations dramatiques
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Title: Les trente-six situations dramatiques

Author: Georges Polti

Release date: November 5, 2023 [eBook #72036]

Language: French

Original publication: Paris: Mercure de France, 1895

Credits: Laurent Vogel and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team

at https://www.pgdp.net (This book was produced from
scanned images of public domain material from the Google
Books project.)

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LES

TRENTE-SIX SITUATIONS DRAMATIQUES ***
Les trente-six situations
dramatiques,
par Georges Polti.
Gozzi soutenait qu’il ne peut y avoir que 36
situations tragiques. Schiller s’est donné
beaucoup de peine pour en trouver davantage ;
mais il n’en trouva pas même autant que Gozzi.

(Gœthe, Entretiens avec

Eckermann.)

PARIS
ÉDITION DV « MERCVRE DE FRANCE »
15, RVE DE L’ÉCHAVDÉ-SAINT-GERMAIN, 15

1895
Tous droits réservés.
 DU MÊME AUTEUR

La Théorie des Tempéraments (1889). 1 fr. »

(Voir, à ce sujet, lettre dans le Courrier du Soir du 1er septembre
1891.)
Notation des Gestes, avec dessin. (1892). 0 fr. 75

Il a été tiré des 36 Situations Dramatiques, outre 480 exemplaires

sur papier teinté (à 3 fr. 50), 20 exemplaires sur Hollande (à 7 fr.) et
5 sur Japon Impérial (à 10 fr.).
 A MADAME TOUTTAIN

ACCEPTE
CE GAGE DE RECONNAISSANCE
EN MÉMOIRE
DU GRAND MORT AIMÉ
QUI NOUS RELIE
DE TON FRÈRE, — DE MON PÈRE…

1er novembre 1894

G. P.
 LES

36 Situations Dramatiques

Gozzi soutenait qu’il ne peut y avoir que 36

situations tragiques. Schiller s’est donné
beaucoup de peine pour en trouver davantage ;
mais il n’en trouva pas même autant que Gozzi.

(Gœthe, Entretiens avec

Eckermann.)

36 situations seulement !
Cet énoncé qu’aucun renseignement n’accompagne, ni de la part
de Gozzi, ni de celle de Gœthe ou de Schiller, et qui pose le
problème sans le résoudre, avait de quoi tourmenter.
Car celui qui affirmait — me répétais-je toujours — par ce
nombre restreint une loi si fortement synthétique, avait justement
l’imagination la plus fantasque : ce Gozzi, c’était l’auteur de Turandot
et du Roi Cerf, deux œuvres, or, presque sans analogues, l’une sur
la situation de l’Énigme et l’autre sur les phases de la
métempsycose ; c’était le créateur d’un système dramatique, du
fiabesque, et, par lui, l’esprit arabe chez nous transfusé, ont pu
naître Hoffmann, Jean-Paul Richter et Poe.
 Encore l’exubérance du Vénitien m’aurait-elle, peut-être, fait
douter, puisqu’une fois lancé ce chiffre de 36, il s’était tu…
Mais l’ardent et sévère kantien, Schiller, le prince des
esthéticiens modernes et le maître du drame vraiment historique, ne
s’était-il pas, à son tour, devant ce précepte, « donné beaucoup de
peine » (et de la peine d’un Schiller !), y ajoutant ainsi pour nous
l’autorité de sa critique puissante et de sa riche mémoire ?
M’objectais-je alors, pour hésiter, le seul point commun aux deux
poètes, un goût vif de l’abstrait, — Gœthe, antipode exact du
systématisme, esprit d’observateur, et qui, sa vie durant, évolua,
m’apparaissait, méditant encore l’obsédant sujet, — bien des
années après la mort de Schiller, bien des années après leurs
fécondes causeries, et à l’époque où s’achevait Faust, cette
suprême combinaison des éléments les plus contrastés [1] .
[1] C’est Gœthe qui le déclare : Je dois, dit-il, l’intrigue
à Calderon, la vision à Marlowe, la scène du lit à
Cymbeline, la chanson ou sérénade à Hamlet, le
prologue au livre de Job. On peut y ajouter : le premier
prologue imité des Hindous, la scène du trépied
renouvelant les nécromancies épiques, la visite à la
guenon, digne de Théocrite, de nombreux ressouvenirs
picturaux (scène première issue de Rembrandt ; mimes
de la promenade, de la taverne, du puits, d’origine
flamande), la fin inspirée de Dante, etc., etc.

Je n’en savais, toutefois, pas plus long…

Seul, en France, Gérard de Nerval avait embrassé, un court
instant, de ce point de vue si haut, l’ensemble des productions
scéniques, dans un article de L’Artiste sur la Jane Grey de Soumet.
Avec quel dandysme, malheureusement ! Ayant, à ses débuts, voulu
savoir le chiffre des actions possibles au théâtre, il en trouva 24,
raconte-t-il. Pas plus que ses devanciers, il ne nous dit lesquelles.
En revanche, les bases qu’il fournit ne peuvent satisfaire. Recourant,
en effet, à la classification caduque des péchés capitaux, il se voit,
d’abord, forcé d’en éliminer deux, gourmandise et paresse, et, à peu
près, un troisième, la luxure… « ce serait don Juan peut-être… » On
ne saisit pas mieux ce que l’avarice a fourni comme énergie
tragique, et je discerne mal pour la contexture entière du drame, une
divergence marquée de directions entre l’orgueil (l’esprit de tyrannie,
sans doute) et la colère, à moins de n’admettre que leurs
manifestations les plus opposées, et de risquer, à ce coup, de
confondre celles de la colère avec celles de l’envie. Aussi bien eût
fait Labrunie de conserver l’ex-huitième péché, la tristesse, qui lui
aurait été utile, vis-à-vis de Manfred par exemple. Plus loin, le
meurtre, désigné comme un facteur pour obtenir, en l’unissant tour à
tour à chacun des autres, plusieurs des données, ne peut être
accepté comme tel, puisqu’il est le commun accident, possible dans
toutes, et le plus fréquent qui s’y produise. Enfin, le seul titre nommé
par Nerval, Rivalité de reine et de sujette, ne convient, on le
constatera, qu’à une sous-classe de l’une non pas des 24, mais des
36 situations dramatiques [2] .
[2] J’ai remplacé le mot « tragique » de l’épigraphe par
celui de « dramatique ». Les familiers de Gœthe savent
que pour lui (qui fut un des « classiques » allemands) les
deux termes sont synonymes dans ce passage. Du reste,
nous allons le constater, nos drames ne possèdent pas
de situations différentes de celles des tragédies, ni des
« pièces », mais ils en enchevêtrent en général plusieurs,
que déjà la tragédie dite implexe déroulait
successivement.

Outre Nerval pourtant, personne plus n’a touché, à la manière si

vraiment technique qu’on devine chez Gozzi, aux secrets de
l’invention, et j’aperçois seulement, dans un ordre d’idées, quoique
analogue, bien éloigné : la célèbre théorie de M. Sarcey sur la scène
à faire, théorie en général très mal comprise d’une époque que le
didactisme, c’est-à-dire la réflexion artistique, épouvante ; — des
notes intimes de M. Dumas qui furent publiées contre son gré, si
mes souvenirs d’enfant sont fidèles, il y a quelques années par le
Temps et qui donnaient ce double schéma de Corneille et de
Racine, pour le premier une héroïne disputée par deux héros, pour
le second un héros disputé par deux héroïnes ; — et, en dernier lieu,
des travaux, çà et là, de M. Valin sur la composition…
Et c’est tout, absolument tout.
… Enfin, — pour abréger, — je retrouvai les 36 situations, telles
que dut les posséder Gozzi, et telles qu’on les retrouvera plus loin ;
car ce fut bien, ainsi qu’il l’avait indiqué, 36 catégories que je dus
créer afin d’y répartir convenablement les innombrables œuvres
melpoméniennes. Ce nombre n’a rien cependant, je me hâte de le
dire, de cabaliste ni de mystique ; on pourrait à la rigueur en choisir
un légèrement plus ou moins élevé ; mais je considère celui-là
comme le plus vraisemblable. Je m’abstiendrai d’exposer aucune
des soixante et quelques théories que, pour ma distraction
personnelle, j’ai esquissées dans le dessein d’aboutir par voie
inverse, déductive, au précepte gozzien : ces exercices
d’imagination sont parfois agréables, mais ils finissent le plus
souvent par ruiner ce qu’ils prétendaient établir ; toute théorie
s’écroulant à son tour, — tandis qu’une observation, un canon
esthétique demeurent.
Or, à ce fait de déclarer qu’il n’y a pas plus de 36 situations
dramatiques, va s’attacher un singulier corollaire, à savoir qu’il n’y a,
de par la vie, que 36 émotions. Ainsi, 36 émotions au maximum,
voilà la saveur de l’existence ; voilà ce qui va et vient sans relâche,
ce qui remplit l’histoire comme des flots la mer et ce qui en est la
substance, puisque c’est celle de l’humanité, dans les ténèbres des
bois africains comme « Sous les Tilleuls » ou aux lueurs électriques
du Boulevard, et l’était dès l’âge des corps à corps avec le lion des
montagnes, et la sera, indubitablement, aux plus infinies distances
du futur ; puisque, de ces 36 émotions, — pas une de plus, — nous
colorons, non ! nous comprenons ce qui nous est étranger, jusqu’à la
vie végétale et au mécanisme cosmique, — et que d’elles sont et
seront à jamais construites nos théogonies et nos métaphysiques,
tant de chers « au-delà ! »… 36 situations, 36 émotions, pas une de
plus.
Il est donc compréhensible que ce soit devant la scène, où se
mélangent infatigablement ces 36 émotions, qu’un peuple arrive à
naître à la définitive conscience de lui-même ; aussi les Grecs
commençaient-ils leurs villes par les bases d’un théâtre. Il est
également naturel que, seules, les très grandes et complètes
civilisations aient présenté une conception dramatique particulière et
que, réciproquement, une de ces conceptions nouvelles doit être
révélée à chaque évolution de la société [3] ; d’où l’obscure et fidèle
attente de notre siècle devant les cénotaphes d’un art qui, depuis
longtemps et pour des raisons, paraît-il, commerciales, ne s’y trouve,
à proprement dire, plus.
[3] M. Strindberg, dans le Magazin de janvier 1892,
n’est pas, cependant, de cet avis, parce qu’il a constaté
que les plus grands centres commerciaux et de culture
philosophique, tels que Londres et les cités allemandes,
ne possèdent pas de théâtre vraiment original. Mais à
mon tour, persuadé qu’aucune de ces villes n’a en réalité
l’activité intellectuelle du Londres shakespearien ou du
Weimar de Gœthe, je dénie aux spéculations, tant
commerciales que philosophiques, l’honneur d’être les
signes absolus de la civilisation. Les républiques
italiennes de la Renaissance eurent d’heureux rivaux de
commerce dans les Ottomans ; le Paris du XIIe siècle en
eut dans la hanse rhénane, Rome antique dans
Carthage, Athènes dans Corinthe. Florence fut peu
philosophique ; elle eût été plutôt théologique et fut
surtout politicienne : elle eut son théâtre. De même pour
le Paris ogival ; de même pour Rome ; de même pour
Athènes. Car elle est bien absurde la tradition tenace qui
fait d’Athènes la patrie de la philosophie : Ioniens et
Éléates, cette « gauche » et cette « droite » éternelles de
l’antagonisme des métaphysiciens, étaient des
Asiatiques ; dans l’île orientale de Samos naquit
Pythagore, et Cypriote était Zénon, — ces deux plus
solides moralistes pratiques ; Aristote, né sur les confins
de la Macédoine, s’explique uniquement comme le
« lemme » historique d’Alexandre devant Hellas ; la
Grande Grèce, c’est-à-dire l’Italie méridionale et molle,
était fertile en philosophes. Mais, si dans Athènes nous
avons une fois compté Platon, qui fut esclave et s’imbut
d’orientalisme, Socrate qui n’a même pas le visage d’un
Grec ni même d’un Méditerranéen, puis Antisthène et
 Épicure, qui rééditèrent simplement, l’un avec
charlatanisme, l’autre avec érudition, les doctrines
ioniennes, il ne nous reste plus un philosophe à mettre à
la charge de la ville tragique, religieuse et démocratique
qui, d’instinct, haïssait les philosophes et, comme on dit,
les « persécuta ».

Il résulte enfin de là qu’après avoir concentré ces « points de

vue » du théâtre comme dans un panorama, nous allons y voir
circuler, en quelque sorte, l’essentiel cortège de notre race : dans
leurs costumes caractéristiques et bigarrés, Bacheliers chinois
pinçant de leurs mandores, Rois hindous sur leurs chars, Héros nus
d’Hellas, Chevaliers légendaires, Aventuriers de cape et d’épée,
Damis aux longues perruques blondes, Nymphes étincelantes de
pierreries, Agnès aux paupières frangées, chastes Vierges
athénaïennes, grandes Impudiques de l’adultère et de l’inceste,
hiératiques Confidents et Confidentes, Compères s’esclaffant,
Apothicaires, Gourous de la cause religieuse grotesques interprètes,
Satyres sautillant sur leurs jambes de bouc, laids Esclaves, Diables
rouges à cornes vertes, bégayants Tartaglias, Graciosos farcis
d’anecdotes, Clowns shakespeariens, Bouffons hugolesques,
Théoriciens à « queues-de-pie » se réchauffant au bord de la rampe,
précédés de gongs les Magistrats, Ascètes bouddhiques immobiles,
Péris, Sacrificateurs en robes blanches, Martyrs dont l’auréole brille,
Alcades, Ulysses trop habiles, Jeunes hommes purs, Fous
sanglants, épouvantables Rakchasas, Messagers dispersant aux
vents du ciel les calamités, Chœurs pleins de nostalgie, Prologues
symboliques, oui, la voilà rassemblée, notre humanité, et s’agitant à
son plus ardent période de fièvre, — mais toujours présentant
quelqu’une des faces du prisme que posséda Gozzi.
Ces 36 faces, que j’ai entrepris de reconstituer, doivent être, par
conséquent, fort évidentes et n’avoir rien d’utopique. De quoi nous
ne serons persuadés qu’après les avoir vues se répéter, avec une
aussi invariable netteté, dans toutes les époques et dans tous les
genres. Le lecteur ne trouvera, il est vrai, dans mon exposé très
sommaire, qu’un millier [4] d’exemples cités, desquels environ 800
empruntés à la scène ; mais j’ai compris dans ce nombre les œuvres
les plus dissemblables et les plus célèbres, celles dont les autres ne
sont guère que de plus ou moins habiles ou voulues mosaïques.
C’est ainsi qu’il y verra les principaux drames de la Chine, des Indes,
de Judée ; puis, — cela va de soi, — le théâtre grec. Seulement, au
lieu de nous en tenir aux 32 tragédies classiques, nous mettrons à
profit ces travaux de l’hellénisme, malheureusement enfouis dans
leur latin pour l’indolence du public d’aujourd’hui, et qui permettent
de reconstituer, dans leurs grandes lignes, des centaines de chefs-
d’œuvre, quelques-uns plus étonnants que ceux que nous admirons,
et tous offrant, dans l’ombre où on les relégua, l’intégrale fraîcheur
du beau non dévoilé. Ensuite, laissant de côté, pour l’instant, une
indication détaillée des mystères persans et médiévistes, lesquels
d’ailleurs dépendent à peu près sans exception de deux ou trois
situations, et qui attendent une étude très particulière, nous
parcourrons les auteurs espagnols, nos classiques français, les
Italiens et le renouvellement romantique depuis le Cycle
shakespearien, par l’Allemagne, jusque chez nous et dans le reste
de la littérature moderne. Et nous aurons éprouvé d’une façon, il me
semble, définitive cette théorie des 36 situations, quand nous
l’aurons, après cela, mise en contact avec la production théâtrale
d’une période récente de dix années (soit : 1881-90). — Deux cents
exemples environ seront ensuite pris dans les genres littéraires
voisins du dramatique : roman, épopée, histoire, et dans la réalité.
[4] Ce qui fait cinq à six mille personnages à faire
évoluer sous ses yeux, travail de tactique déjà terrible
dans un espace aussi restreint.

Car cette exploration peut et doit être poursuivie, pour donner

des résultats, sur nature : je veux dire par là en politique, aux
tribunaux, dans la vie quotidienne. Je ne puis aujourd’hui qu’indiquer
au chercheur, s’il veut descendre jusqu’aux moindres nuances, les
patientes nomenclatures qui en sont dressées par les ouvrages de
casuistique brahmaniques et chrétiens ; veut-il au contraire s’élever,
en méditant les résultats presque immuables, aux principes mêmes,
il les retrouvera, un peu épars, mais lucidement dégagés, dans le
code, ce livre de chevet pour l’écrivain scénique… Au milieu de ces
investigations, la présente étude lui paraîtra bientôt une sorte
d’introduction à un intarissable, un merveilleux cours où
conflueraient momentanément, dans leur primordiale unité, histoire,
poésie gnomique, écrits moralistes (et a-moralistes), humorisme,
psychologie, droit, épopée, roman, conte, fable, mythe, prophétie,
proverbe… et qui s’appellerait quelque chose comme le Cours de
l’Existence…
Il nous est du moins loisible d’observer dès ici, du haut de notre
théorie, mainte question, pour nous capitale :
Quelles sont les situations dramatiques négligées par notre
époque, si fidèle en revanche à ressasser les mêmes, peu
nombreuses ? Quelles sont au contraire les plus usitées ? Quelles
les plus négligées et quelles les plus usitées de chaque époque,
genre, école, écrivain ? Les raisons de ces préférences ?…
Interrogations identiques devant les classes et sous-classes des
situations.
D’un tel examen (il n’y faut que patience), d’abord va ressortir la
liste des combinaisons (situations et classes ou sous-classes
d’icelles) actuellement en friche, et qui restent encore à exploiter par
conséquent pour l’art contemporain ; et, deuxièmement, comment
cette adaptation peut se faire : à savoir par l’application des mêmes
moyens qui ont servi naguère pour rajeunir les premières données.
Chemin faisant, il nous arrivera encore de relever, à l’intérieur de
telle ou telle de ces 36 catégories, un cas unique, — sans parenté
immédiate, produit de quelque inspiration vigoureuse, et dont
aucune des 35 sœurs ne contient l’analogue. Mais, en déterminant
alors avec soin le degré exact qui convient à ce cas parmi les sous-
classes de la Situation à laquelle il appartient [5] , nous pourrons
constituer ensuite, dans chacune des 35 autres, une sous-classe
symétrique à celle-là : ainsi seront créées 35 intrigues générales
absolument vierges. Celles-ci donneront, pour peu qu’on se plaise à
les traiter d’après le goût des innombrables écoles passées et
présentes, — 35 séries de « pastiches originaux » ; et, en outre, 35
scénarios nouveaux, d’une figure, certes, autrement imprévue que la
plupart de nos drames, inspirés soit de livres, soit d’une réalité qui,
vue à la clarté d’anciennes lectures, révélait à la vue leurs seuls
reflets, tant que, parmi son obscur labyrinthe, nous n’avions pas,
pour nous guider, le précieux fil avec Gozzi disparu.
[5] J’indique à la fin de ce travail comment on doit s’y
prendre pour subdiviser n’importe laquelle des 36
situations.

Puisque nous l’avons, déroulons-le.

 I re SITUATION
Implorer

(Le titre technique, formé des éléments dynamiques

indispensables, serait : Un Persécuteur, un Suppliant et une
Puissance indécise.)

On trouvera, parmi la collection d’exemples que j’offre, trois

nuances. Dans la première, la « Puissance indécise » est un
personnage distinct qui délibère : doit-il céder, prudent et inquiet
pour ceux qu’il aime, devant la menace du persécuteur ou bien,
généreusement, à la prière du faible ?… Dans la seconde nuance,
— au moyen d’une contraction analogue à celle qui fait du
syllogisme l’enthymème des rhéteurs, ou, si l’on veut, au moyen de
la même différence qui existe entre la balance, classique emblème
du cas précédent, et le peson, emblème de celui-ci, — cette
« Puissante indécise » n’est plus qu’un attribut du « Persécuteur »,
une arme dans sa main encore suspendue : sa colère ou sa piété
vont-elles répondre ? écoute ! grâce !… Au contraire, dans la
troisième nuance, l’élément « Suppliant » se dédouble en
« Persécuté » et « Intercesseur » ; et ce n’est plus entre trois ni deux,
mais entre quatre acteurs principaux que se joue l’action.
Ces trois nuances (A, B, C) se divisent comme il suit :
A 1 — Fugitifs implorant un puissant contre leurs
ennemis. — Exemples entiers : les Suppliantes et les Héraclides
d’Eschyle, les Héraclides d’Euripide, le Minos de Sophocle. Cas où
le fugitif est coupable : Oiclès et Chrysès de Sophocle, les
Euménides d’Eschyle. Exemple fragmentaire : le 2e acte du Roi
Jean de Shakespeare. Exemples ordinaires : scène du protectorat
dans les colonies.
2 — Implorer assistance pour accomplir un pieux devoir
interdit. — Ex. entiers : les Éleusiniennes d’Eschyle et les
Suppliantes d’Euripide. Ex. historique : l’enterrement de Molière. Ex.
ordinaire : dans une famille divisée de croyances, l’enfant a recours
au parent coreligionnaire pour pratiquer son culte.
3 — Implorer un asile pour mourir. — Ex. ent. : Œdipe à
Colone. Ex. fragm. : la mort de Zineb, dans Mangeront-ils ? de Hugo.
B 1 — Un naufragé demande hospitalité. — Ex. ent. :
Nausicaa et les Phéaciens de Sophocle. Ex. fragm. : le 1er acte des
Troyens de Berlioz.
2 — Chassé par les siens qu’on déshonora, implorer la
charité. — Ex. : les Danaès d’Eschyle et d’Euripide ; Acrisius de
Sophocle ; Alopé, Augé et les Crétoises d’Euripide. Ex. ordinaires :
une bonne part des quinze à vingt mille aventures qui, chaque
année, aboutissent au bureau des Enfants-Assistés. — Cas spécial
de l’enfant recueilli : — début du Rêve de Zola.
3 — Chercher sa guérison, sa libération, son pardon, une
expiation : — Philoctète à Troie de Sophocle, les Mysiens
d’Eschyle, Télèphe d’Euripide, les Champairol (M. Fraisse, 1884).
Ex. historique : Barberousse pénitent. Ex. ordinaires : recours en
grâce, confession dans le catholicisme, etc.
4 — Solliciter la reddition d’un corps, d’une relique : —
Les Phrygiens d’Eschyle. Ex. histor. : ambassades des Croisés aux
musulmans. Ex. ordinaires : réclamation des cendres d’un grand
homme enseveli à l’étranger, du corps d’un supplicié ou d’un parent
mort à l’hôpital. — A noter que les Phrygiens et le XXIVe chant de
l’Iliade qui les a inspirés forment transition vers la situation XII
(Vaincre un refus).
 C 1 — Supplier un puissant pour des êtres chers : — Ex.
ent. : Esther ; fragmentaire : « celle qui fut Gretchen » au
dénouement de Faust ; historique : Franklin à la cour de Louis XVI.
— Ex. symétrique à A 3 : les Propompes d’Eschyle.
2 — Supplier un parent en faveur d’un autre parent : —
Eurysacès de Sophocle.
Eh bien, nul n’a plus songé, ou peu s’en faut, à cette 1re situation
dans le théâtre moderne ; sauf de la nuance C 1 (proche du culte
poétique et doux de la Vierge et des Saints), il n’en existe aucun
exemple pur, sans doute parce que les modèles antiques en étaient
disparus ou peu fréquentés, et surtout que, Shakespeare, Lope ni
Corneille n’ayant eu le temps de transformer à son tour ce thème
selon l’idéal de complexité extérieure, particulier au goût nouveau,
les successeurs de ces grands hommes auront trouvé ce 1er sujet
trop nu pour leur siècle. Comme si une donnée était nécessairement
plus simple qu’une autre ! comme si toutes celles qui ont lancé
depuis, sur notre scène, leurs innombrables rameaux, n’avaient pas
commencé par montrer la même simplicité vigoureuse dans leur
tronc !
… C’est du moins par notre prédilection du complexe que je
m’explique la grâce dont a bénéficié la seule nuance C, — où, d’une
façon naturelle, une 4e figure (d’essence, malheureusement,
quelque peu parasite et monotonisante), l’« Intercesseur », s’ajoutait
à la trinité Persécuteur-Suppliant-Puissance.
De quelle variété, cependant, cette trinité n’est-elle pas
susceptible ! Le Persécuteur… un ou multiple, volontaire ou
inconscient, avide ou vindicatif, et déployant le subtil réseau de la
diplomatie ou se révélant sous le formidable appareil des plus
grandes dominations contemporaines ; le Suppliant… éloquent ou
auxiliaire naïf de son propre ennemi, juste ou coupable, humble ou
grand ; et le Puissant… soit neutre, soit gagné à l’une ou à l’autre
des parties, environné peut-être des siens que le danger effraye et
inférieur en forces au Persécuteur, peut-être trompé à des
apparences de droit, obligé peut-être de sacrifier quelque haute
conception, tantôt raisonneur, tantôt sensible, ou bien vaincu par une