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vi Contents
Political Party Systems 339 THE PURSUIT OF PROSPERITY 403

Designing Democracy: Electoral Systems 340 Budget Deficits and the National Debt 404
Is the Party Over? 341 Educational Malaise 409
PARTICIPATION AND INTEREST GROUPS 341 Health Care: A Sick System? 411
Sources and Methods of Influence 342 THE PURSUIT OF EQUALITY 413
The Great Race: Getting Ahead of the PAC 344 Income Distribution: Who Gets What, When,
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission 347 and How? 413
Birth of the Super PAC: Death of the Republic? 349 Racial Discrimination 416
THE INTERNET: POWER TO THE PEOPLE? 350 Affirmative Action or Reverse
THE ECLIPSE OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST 351 Discrimination? 419
SUMMARY 352 Who Deserves Preferential Treatment? 419
KEY TERMS 352 THE PURSUIT OF LIBERTY 420
REVIEW QUESTIONS 353 Liberty and the First Amendment 420
Privacy and the Right to Life 423
12 Political Leadership: The Many Faces of Power 356 THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 424
THE IDEAL LEADER 358 Crime and Punishment 424
Statesmanship 360 Justice as Fair Procedure 425
GREAT LEADERS IN HISTORY 363 The Limits of Legal Protection 425
Rómulo Betancourt (1908–1981) 364 GOALS IN CONFLICT 429
Winston Churchill (1874–1965) 366 SUMMARY 429
Abraham Lincoln (1809–1865) 367 KEY TERMS 430
Anwar al-Sadat (1918–1981) 368 REVIEW QUESTIONS 430
Benazir Bhutto (1953–2007) 370
Aung San Suu Kyi (b. 1945) 371 PARt 4 Politics by Violent Means:
Where Have All The Leaders Gone? 372 Revolution, War, and Terrorism 433
DEMAGOGUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 373
Aaron Burr (1756–1836) 373
Theodore Bilbo (1877–1947) 374 14 Revolution: In the Name of Justice 434
Huey Long (1893–1935) 375 THE FREQUENCY OF REVOLUTIONS 436
Joseph McCarthy (1906–1957) 376 MODERN REVOLUTIONS: TWO TRADITIONS 437
Tom DeLay (b. 1947) 377 The American Revolution 438
LEGISLATORS 378 The French Revolution 441
Legislators as Delegates 379 The Two Revolutions Compared 444
Legislators as Trustees 379 REVOLUTION—A RIGHT OR ALL WRONG? 445
CITIZEN-LEADERS 380 Burke’s “Reflections” 445
Václav Havel (1936–2011) 380 Paine’s Rebuttal 446
Martin Luther King Jr. (1929–1968) 381 Locke’s Right to Revolt 447
Rosa Parks (1913–2005) 382 THE CAUSES OF REVOLUTION 449
Nelson Mandela (1918–2013) 382 The Classical View 449
Wael Ghonim (b. 1980) 383 Modern Theories 450
SUMMARY 384 Some Tentative Conclusions 452
KEY TERMS 385 SUMMARY 456
REVIEW QUESTIONS 385 KEY TERMS 456
REVIEW QUESTIONS 456
13 Issues in Public Policy: Politics, Principles, Priorities,
and Practices 388 15 War: Politics by Other Means 459
THE PURSUIT OF SECURITY 389 THE CAUSES OF WAR 461
Security from Foreign Enemies 389 Human Nature 463
Security from Enemies Within 391 Society 465
Why Not Pot? 395 The Environment 469
Guns “R” Us 396 IN SEARCH OF A DEFINITIVE THEORY 472
Social Security 399 Beyond Politics 472
Security and the Environment 400 Beyond Economics 474
Security and Self-Determination: Sweetening the The Danger of Oversimplification 475
“Pot” 403 TOTAL WAR: WARS EVERYBODY FIGHTS 476
Copyright 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. Due to electronic rights, some third party content may be suppressed from the eBook and/or eChapter(s).
Editorial review has deemed that any suppressed content does not materially affect the overall learning experience. Cengage Learning reserves the right to remove additional content at any time if subsequent rights restrictions require it.
Contents vii
ACCIDENTAL WAR: WARS NOBODY WANTS 476 AFTER THE COLD WAR: RETURN TO
NUCLEAR WAR: WARS NOBODY WINS 477 MULTIPOLARITY? 534
PROXY WARS: WARS OTHERS FIGHT 478 New World, Old Ideas 534
JUST WARS: WARS OTHERS START 479 Globalization 535
The Just War Doctrine 479 The IT Revolution 536
Evaluating the Just War Doctrine 480 The Rebirth of Europe 536
A WAR ON WHAT? THE POLITICS OF Weapons of Mass Destruction 537
HYPERBOLE 483 The End of the World as We Know It? 539
WEAPONS OF MASS DISRUPTION: CYBERWAR 486 A More Level Playing Field 540
WAR AND DEMOCRACY 488 U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: CONTINUITY AMID
Why Democracies Fight 488 CHANGE 541
Superpower or “Chickenhawk Nation”? 489 Power and the National Interest 542
WAR AND DIPLOMACY 489 Blowback: The Curse of Unintended
Consequences 545
SUMMARY 490
The Bush Doctrine 546
KEY TERMS 490
STATECRAFT: BEYOND REALISM 547
REVIEW QUESTIONS 491 Ideals and Self-Interest: The Power of Morality 548
Aggression: Says Who? 549
16 Terrorism: War, Crimes, or War Crimes? 494
Hard Facts about Soft Power 550
WHAT IS TERRORISM? 498
THE MORE THINGS CHANGE . . . 550
THE ORIGINS OF TERRORISM 501
INTERNATIONAL LAW 551
The Logic of Terrorism 503
Usefulness 551
Terrorist Tactics 503
Compliance and Enforcement 551
Acts of Terrorism versus Acts of War 504
International Law in the Modern Era 552
Illegal Enemy Combatants 505
The Limitations of International Law 554
Characteristics of Terrorist Groups 506
Algeria in the 1990s: Nightmare and Prelude 507 THE UNITED NATIONS: OUR MIRROR IN A
TERRORIST OR FREEDOM FIGHTER? 509 MIRROR 556
Historical Background 556
TERRORISM AND SOCIETY 510
The Founding of the United Nations 557
Youthful Recruits 511
The United Nations in the Cold War: 1945 to
The Psychology of Terrorism 512
1991 558
Terrorism and the Media 513
The United Nations after the Cold War: 1991 to the
COUNTERING TERRORISM 514
Present 559
Domestic Legislation 514
THE QUEST FOR WORLD PEACE 562
Cooperation among Nations 516
Unilateral Counterterrorist Measures 517 SUMMARY 563
Private Measures 519 KEY TERMS 564
THE TERRORISTS AMONG US 519 REVIEW QUESTIONS 565
CAN TERRORISM BE DEFEATED? 519
SUMMARY 520
KEY TERMS 521 Afterword: The Power of Knowledge 568
REVIEW QUESTIONS 521 ENDNOTES 569
GLOSSARY 589
PARt 5 Politics without Government 525
INDEX 601
17 International Relations: The Struggle for World

Order 526
GET REAL! MACHIAVELLI AND MORGENTHAU 527
NATION-STATES AND THE BALANCE
OF POWER 529
The Classical System: 1648 to 1945 529
The Sunset of the Old World Order 531
The Cold War: 1945 to 1991 531
P r e f ac e
We live in a global age. Events anywhere in the world affect people everywhere. Terrorist acts, wars,
natural disasters, economic downturns, banking crises, and volatile stock markets are everyday occur-
rences. Signs of entropy are all around us. Climate change and rapidly disappearing biodiversity
threaten the planet and raise questions that cross over into a dark region where eschatology trumps
science. Seismic events in the Indian Ocean, western Sumatra, or northern Japan are localized, but if
they disrupt the global economy, the indirect effects can be far-reaching.
The same applies to political events. The 9/11 terrorist attacks happened in New York City—they
were local—but led to costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The “war on terror” is now a global
phenomenon.
Things change with blinding speed in this age of globalization. We now have smart weapons that
make it possible to use unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), called “drones,” armed with guns and bombs
to kill from a safe distance, one of the recent developments explored in Chapter 15. Remote-controlled
warplanes take the risk out of flying combat missions—a big change in the art and science of war
fighting.
The same technological revolution is also changing the way we make things—all kinds of things.
For example, it’s now possible to use a 3D laser printer to produce everything from medical implants
to high-quality musical instruments, to racing-car parts, and, yes, guns.
Another big change is the rise of a global elite. There were more millionaires in the world than Aus-
tralians in 2015—over 35 million according to Credit Suisse (a Swiss multinational bank and financial
services holding company). An Oxfam study published in 2014 found that the world’s wealthiest 1%
control half of the world’s wealth ($110 trillion). This global trend toward greater economic inequal-
ity and concentration of wealth is also happening in the United States, where the top 1% control 43%
of the nation’s wealth.1
The rise of a new global meritocracy is brain-power driven. In today’s world, more than ever
before, the wealth of nations and individuals is based on entrepreneurial science and engineering—
that is, ideas converted into products for a global marketplace. For example, Chapter 14 looks at the
role Facebook played in the Egyptian uprising in early 2011.
Technology is revolutionizing politics as well as business, but the basic nature of the decision
makers—the people who run things—remains unchanged. Conflict in the world—the struggle for
power—continues unabated, as does the search for peace, order, and justice.
Paradoxically, the limits of power, even in its most concentrated forms, are everywhere apparent—
from ancient places, such as Palestine and Iraq in the Middle East and Afghanistan in Central Asia,
to Europe, where the “euro crisis” threatens to undermine a supranational project six decades in the
making, and the United States with its relatively short history and even shorter memory. The cost of
failed policies and corrupt, incompetent leadership is also apparent in our world—and our nation’s
capital.
But when it comes to the quality of citizenship, the implications of recent advances in telecom-
munications, Internet access, and social networking are not so clear. It’s easier than ever in our wired
world to learn more about what’s going on in the world, be more attuned to the news, and vote more
intelligently than ever before. Despite this ease of learning, studies show a decline in civic knowledge
and education in the United States.
This double deficiency—both at the top and bottom of political society—is a kind of stealth crisis,
one that, not unlike a stealth bomber, gives ample evidence of its existence but continues to go largely
unnoticed. Meanwhile, there is no absence of injustice, intolerance, misguided idealism, zealotry, and
viii
Prefaceix
human suffering—proof enough that the ever-more polluted and crowded planet we inhabit has not
changed for the better, even though the West’s fortunate few are far more secure and comfortable than
the vast majority who live in the so-called developing regions of the globe.
Since Understanding Politics made its debut in 1984, nothing has shaken my conviction that poli-
tics matters. I still believe now, as I did then, that as citizens in a country that claims to be a model
democracy, students need to acquire a working knowledge of the political and economic forces that
shape our world. Ironically, as news and information have become more and more accessible—thanks
in no small part to the Internet—interest in public affairs and a willingness to get involved have
declined. Indeed, many Americans are not engaged in the political process except perhaps to vote.
The study of politics is a gateway to a broader and better understanding of human nature, society,
and the world. This idea is what originally inspired the writing of Understanding Politics. It is also
what has sustained my own interest through multiple revisions—that, plus a sense that the book was,
is, and always will be essentially a work in progress.
A successful introduction to politics must balance two key objectives: (1) dispel anxieties associ-
ated with the attempt to understand political science, especially for the uninitiated; and (2) provide the
intellectual stimulation necessary to challenge today’s college students. This book is testimony to the
fact that the science and philosophy of politics fall squarely within the liberal arts tradition.
Mention of the science and philosophy of politics points to one of the deepest cleavages within
the discipline: analysts who approach politics from the standpoint of science often stress the impor-
tance of power, whereas those who view it through the wide-angle lens of philosophy often empha-
size the importance of justice. But the distinction between power and justice—like that between
science and philosophy—is too often exaggerated.
Moral and political questions are ultimately inseparable in the real world. The exercise of power, in
itself, is not what makes an action political; rather, what makes power political is the debate about its
proper or improper uses and who benefits or suffers as a result. Thus, whenever questions of fairness
are raised in the realm of public policy (for example, questions concerning abortion, capital punish-
ment, or the use of force by police or the military), the essential ingredients of politics are present.
Excessive attention to either the concept of power or that of morality is likely to confound our efforts
in making sense of politics or, for that matter, in finding lasting solutions to the problems that afflict
and divide us. It is necessary to balance the equation, tempering political realism with a penchant for
justice.
Similarly, the dichotomy so often drawn between facts and values is misleading. Rational judg-
ments—in the sense of reasoned opinions about what is good and just—are sometimes more definitive
(or less elusive) than facts. For example, the proposition that “genocide is evil” is true. (Its opposite—
“genocide is good”—is morally indefensible.) It is a well-known fact that Adolf Hitler and the Nazis
committed genocide. We can therefore say that Hitler was evil as a matter of fact and not “simply”
because mass murder is abhorrent to our personal values.
Other value-laden propositions can be stated with a high degree of probability but not absolute
certainty. For example, “If you want to reduce violent crime, first reduce poverty.” Still other questions
of this kind may be too difficult or too close to call—in the abortion controversy, for example, does
the right of a woman to biological self-determination outweigh the right to life? It makes no sense to
ignore the most important questions in life simply because the answers are not easy. Even when the
right answers are unclear, it is often possible to recognize wrong answers—a moderating force in itself.
This book gives due attention to contemporary political issues without ignoring the more endur-
ing questions that often underlie them. For example, a voter’s dilemma as to who would make the
best mayor, governor, or president raises deeper questions: What qualifications are necessary for
public office? What is wrong with a system that all too often fails to produce distinguished—or
x Preface
distinctive—choices? Similarly, conflicts between nation-states or social groups raise philosophical

as well as empirical questions about why human beings continue to fight and kill one another on a
mass scale.
Although I have tried to minimize the use of names and dates, political ideas cannot be fruitfully
discussed in a historical vacuum. The choice of examples throughout the text is dictated by a particu-
lar understanding of the relationship between politics and history. The consequences of certain events
in the first half of the last century—World Wars I and II, the October Revolution in Lenin’s Russia, the
Holocaust in Hitler’s Germany—are still present today. We too seldom think or talk about “living
history”—about all the ways antecedents (decisions and actions in the past) influence the present and
constrain the future.
Inevitably, some themes and events are discussed in more than one chapter: The world of politics
is more like a seamless web than a chest of drawers. In politics, as in nature, a given event or phenom-
enon often has many meanings and is connected to other events and phenomena in ways that are not
immediately apparent. Emphasizing the common threads among major political ideas, institutions,
and issues helps beginning students make sense of seemingly unrelated bits and pieces of the political
puzzle. Seeing how the various parts fit together is a necessary step toward understanding politics.
Understanding Politics employs a foundation-building approach to the study of politics and gov-
ernment. It begins by identifying political phenomena, such as war and terrorism, that students find
interesting and then seeks to describe and explain them. In an effort to build on students’ natural
curiosity, I try to avoid much of the jargon and many of the technical or arcane disputes that too often
characterize the more advanced literature in the field of political science.
Rather than probe the deepest recesses of a single discipline, the book unapologetically borrows
insights from various disciplines, including history, economics, psychology, and sociology, as well as
philosophy. It is intended to be a true liberal arts approach to the study of government and politics.
The goal is ambitious: to challenge students to begin a lifelong learning process that alone can lead to a
generation of citizens who are well informed, actively engaged, self-confident, and thoughtful and who
have a capacity for indignation in the face of public hypocrisy, dishonesty, stupidity, or gross ineptitude.
Chapter 1, “Introduction: The Study of Politics,” defines the basic concepts of politics and centers
on how and why it is studied. This chapter lays the groundwork for the remainder of the text and
stands alone as its introduction. Chapter 2, “The Idea of the Public Good: Ideologies and Isms,” deals
with basic belief systems, including ideologies of the Right and Left, such as communism and fascism,
and “isms” of the Right and Left, such as liberalism and conservatism.
Part 1, “Comparative Political Systems: Models and Theories,” analyzes utopian, democratic, and
authoritarian forms of government, as well as political systems caught in the difficult transition from
authoritarian to democratic institutions. This part, which comprises Chapters 3 through 6, looks at
different kinds of political regimes in a theoretical light.
Part 2, “Established and Emerging Democracies,” consists of three chapters that examine parlia-
mentary democracies (Chapter 7), transitional states (Chapter 8), and developing countries (Chapter 9).
Virtually all governments in today’s world either aspire to some form of democracy or claim to be
“democratic.” This amazing fact is itself irrefutable evidence of the power of an idea. Though often
abused, the idea of democracy has fired the imaginations of people everywhere for more than two
centuries. In an age when bad news is written in blood and body counts are more likely to refer to
innocent civilians than armed combatants, we would do well to remember that democratic ideals have
never before been so warmly embraced or so widely (if imperfectly) institutionalized.
In Part 3, “Politics by Civil Means: Citizens, Leaders, and Policies,” four chapters (10 through 13)
focus on the political process and public policy. The United States is featured in this section, which
examines citizenship and political socialization, political participation (including opinion polling and
New In the Twelfth Edition xi
voting behavior), political organization (parties and interest groups), political leadership, political
ideologies (or divergent “approaches to the public good”), and contemporary public policy issues.
Part 4, “Politics by Violent Means: Revolution, War, and Terrorism,” examines conflict as a special
and universal problem in politics. It divides the problem into three categories: revolution, terrorism,
and war (corresponding to Chapters 14, 15, and 16, respectively). Viewed from the aftermath of 9/11,
when the president of the United States declared international terrorism to be the preeminent threat
in the world and blurred the distinction between counterterrorist policy and all-out war, Part 4 is
guaranteed to stimulate the curiosity of students and provoke spirited class discussions. Invading and
occupying a country (Iraq) that had nothing to do with the 9/11 attacks, did not possess “weapons of
mass destruction,” and did not pose a threat to the United States was a curious response to the prob-
lem posed by the existence of a malevolent terrorist network (al Qaeda) harbored by a fundamentalist
regime (the Taliban) in a land (Afghanistan) virtually impossible to subdue by conquest and notori-
ously impervious to outside influence. Indeed, this response affords ample opportunity for contempla-
tion about the motives, causes, and consequences of war at the beginning of a new millennium.
Finally, Part 5, “Politics without Government,” introduces students to key concepts in the study of
international relations, describes key patterns, and discusses perennial problems. Chapter 17 examines
the basic principles and concepts in international relations, the evolving structure and context of world
politics, certain key global issues, international law, and role of the United Nations. The Afterword,
“The Power of Knowledge,” is a single paragraph. Students are encouraged to read it first and then read
it at the end of the semester. My hope is that some will remember and apply it.
In this new edition—the twelfth!—I have retained the pedagogical features found in previous edi-
tions with one exception: a short list of learning objectives replaces chapter outlines in this edition. Each
chapter ends with a summary, review questions, and websites and readings resources. For this edition, the
glossary is posted on the book’s website, which you can find at www.cengage.com/login. As in the past,
endnotes for each chapter precede the index at the back of the book. In addition, the text contains a wide
variety of photos, figures, maps, tables, and features, many of which have been revised or replaced with
updated materials.
New in the TWELFth Edition

The twelfth edition has three kinds of features, one of which is totally new. I’m hoping that “Poli-
tics and Pop Culture” will stimulate class discussion and demonstrate how movies and music play
an important role in reflecting or challenging our ideas and opinions, shaping our perceptions, and
heightening our awareness of the issues. Key events and major achievements of enduring importance
are highlighted in “Landmarks in History.” The feature “Politics and Ideas” give students a bird’s-eye
view of perennial questions and key issues in political theory and philosophy.
As always, major developments in the United States and on the world stage have intervened since
the last edition went to press. The previous edition covered the 2012 presidential campaign and the
reelection of the country’s first African American president; the battle of the budget and acrimonious
partisan politics surrounding the so-called fiscal cliff; the use of the filibuster to block votes in the U.S.
Senate; and the deep divisions in U.S. society over such issues as gun control, income inequality, immi-
gration, abortion, health care, tax fairness, gay rights, and gender equality. The new edition covers the
2014 midterm election, the war in Ukraine, the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS) in the Middle East, and
various recent events at home and abroad.
Coverage of the “euro crisis” is expanded and updated. The “agenda” samplers for the four liberal
democracies featured in Chapter 7 (Great Britain, France, Germany, and Japan) reflect developments
through 2012 and the first half of 2013. The material covering India and Israel, two of the world’s
xii Preface
most challenged representative democracies, is updated but, sadly, the existential circumstances—the
predicaments and realities they face—have not changed for either country (and are not likely to
change anytime in the expectable future).
There are other revisions, text enhancements, and new features too numerous to mention. I person-
ally selected much of the art work appearing in recent editions—a lot of work, but worth the effort
and fun to boot. Many of the photographers featured in these pages are amateurs with a good camera,
a great eye, and a generous spirit.
Finally, I also encourage readers to visit my Facebook page, (https://www.facebook.com/thomas.
magstadt), where I regularly post articles and comments.
Supplements for Students and Instructors

AUTHOR: Thomas M. Magstadt
ISBN: 9781305641174
TITLE: Instructor Companion Website for Magstadt, Understanding
Politics, 12e
This Instructor Companion Website is an all-in-one multimedia online resource for class preparation,
presentation, and testing. Accessible through Cengage.com/login with your faculty account, you will
find the following ancillaries available for download: book-specific Microsoft® PowerPoint® presenta-
tions; a Test Bank compatible with multiple learning management systems; an Instructor’s Manual;
Microsoft® PowerPoint® Image Slides; and a JPEG Image Library.
The Test Bank, offered in Blackboard, Moodle, Desire2Learn, Canvas, and Angel formats, contains
specific Learning Objective multiple-choice and essay questions for each chapter. Import the test bank
into your LMS to edit and manage questions, and to create tests.
The Instructor’s Manual contains chapter-specific learning objectives, an outline, key terms with
definitions, and a chapter summary. Additionally, the Instructor’s Manual features a critical thinking
question, lecture launching suggestion, and an in-class activity for each learning objective.
The Microsoft® PowerPoint® presentations are ready-to-use, visual outlines of each chapter. These
presentations are easily customized for your lectures and offered along with chapter-specific Micro-
soft® PowerPoint® Image Slides and JPEG Image Libraries. Access the Instructor Companion Website
at www.cengage.com/login.
AUTHOR: Thomas M. Magstadt
ISBN: 9781305641198
TITLE: IAC Cognero for Magstadt, Understanding Politics, 12e
Cengage Learning Testing Powered by Cognero is a flexible, online system that allows you to author,
edit, and manage test bank content from multiple Cengage Learning solutions, create multiple test ver-
sions in an instant, and deliver tests from your LMS, your classroom, or wherever you want. The test
bank for Understanding Politics, 12e contains specific Learning Objective multiple-choice and essay
questions for each chapter.
AUTHOR: Gale
TITLE: CourseReader 0-30: Introduction to Political Science
PAC ISBN: 9781133232162
IAC ISBN: 9781133232155
CourseReader: Introduction to Political Science allows you to create your reader, your way, in just minutes.
This affordable, fully customizable online reader provides access to thousands of permissions-cleared
Acknowledgmentsxiii
readings, articles, primary sources, and audio and video selections from the regularly updated Gale
research library database. This easy-to-use solution allows you to search for and select just the material
you want for your courses. Each selection opens with a descriptive introduction to provide context, and
concludes with critical-thinking and multiple-choice questions to reinforce key points. COURSEREADER
is loaded with convenient tools like highlighting, printing, note-taking, and downloadable PDFs and
MP3 audio files for each reading. COURSEREADER is the perfect complement to any Political Science
course. It can be bundled with your current textbook, sold alone, or integrated into your learning man-
agement system. COURSEREADER 0-30 allows access to up to thirty selections in the reader. Please
contact your Cengage sales representative for details.
Acknowledgments
Through twelve editions and more than two decades, many individuals associated with several differ-
ent publishing houses and universities have helped make this book a success. Among the scholars and
teachers who reviewed the work for previous editions in manuscript, offering helpful criticisms and
suggestions, were the following:
Donald G. Baker, Southampton College, Long Island University
Peter Longo, University of Nebraska at Kearney
Iraj Paydar, Bellevue Community College
Ruth Ann Strickland, Appalachian State University
Sean K. Anderson, Idaho State University
Daniel Aseltine, Chaffey College
Thomas A. Kolsky, Montgomery County Community College
Linda Valenty, California Polytechnic State University—San Luis Obispo
Andrei Korobkov, Middle Tennessee University
Ethan Fishman, University of South Alabama
Mack Murray, Seattle Community College
Lawrence Okere, University of Arkansas
Keith Milks, Nash Community College
Frank Bean, Garden City Community College
Jean-Gabriel Jolivet, South-Western College
Jose Lopez-Gonzalez, Towson University
Naomi Robertson, Macon State College
For the current edition, that vital role fell to reviewers: Julian Westerhout, Illinois State University;
Abdalla Battah, Minnesota State University, Mankato; Kwame Dankwa, Albany State University; and
Darlene Budd, University of Central Missouri.
I wish to express my appreciation to Amy Bither, my editor for this edition. Good editors are price-
less, and Amy is one of the very best I’ve had the pleasure to work with over a span of more than three
decades. Thanks are also due to Carolyn Merrill, Product Team Manager at Cengage, to Kay Mikel who
handled the copyediting, and to Anupriya Tyagi for managing the process of moving the book from
manuscript to market. Thanks to the entire Cengage team for getting this twelfth edition out in a timely
fashion. Finally, as always, I owe a huge debt of gratitude to my family and friends, especially Mary Jo
(who died in 1990), Becky, Michael, David, Amy, Alexa, Barbara, and, last but not least, the Coffee Boys
of Westwood Hills: Dr. Stan Nelson (1928–2013), Glion Curtis, Grant Mallet, Hugh Brown, Dr. George
Pagels, Howard Martin, Dr. Gary Ripple, Harris Rayl, and Professor Emeritus G. Ross Stephens.
A b o u t th e A u thor
Thomas M. Magstadt earned his doctorate at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International
Studies (SAIS). He has taught at the Graduate School of International Management, Augustana Col-
lege (Sioux Falls), the University of Nebraska at Kearney, the Air War College, and the University of
Missouri–Kansas City, and, most recently, the University of Kansas. He has also chaired two politi-
cal science departments, worked as a foreign intelligence analyst, served as Director of the Midwest
Conference on World Affairs, and lectured as a Fulbright Scholar in the Czech Republic. In addi-
tion to publishing articles in newspapers, magazines, and professional journals, Dr. Magstadt is the
author of An Empire If You Can Keep It (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2004);
Nations and Governments: Comparative Politics in Regional Perspective, fifth edition (Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth/ Cengage Learning, 2005); Contemporary European Politics (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/
Cengage Learning, 2007); and The European Union on the World Stage: Sovereignty, Soft Power, and
the Search for Consensus (BookSurge, 2010).
xiv
C H A P T E R 1
Introduction
The Study of Politics
Learning Objectives
1 Discuss the value of studying politics.
2 Identify the three basic elements of politics, as well as the
dynamics of each.
3 Analyze the methods, models, and approaches for studying
politics.
4 Evaluate whether politics brings out the best or the worst in
human nature—or both.
2 CHAPTER 1 Introduction
P
olitics is not for the faint-hearted. There is virtually never a day without a
crisis at home or abroad. Whenever we catch the news on our radio, TV,
or computer, we are reminded that we live in a dangerous world.
In 2008, the spectacle of the world’s only superpower paralyzed by extreme
partisanship and teetering on the brink of a “fiscal cliff” loomed like a gather-
ing storm. No sooner had that danger receded than a new threat arose in the
Middle East in the form of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).
There were even rumors of a coming end-of-the-world apocalypse—December
21, 2012, to be exact, the final day of the old Mayan calendar.
The politically charged atmosphere and the pervasive sense of an impend-
ing crisis was nothing new, but two events dominated the news in 2008. First,
a financial meltdown and plummeting stock market wiped out fortunes and
rocked the global economy to its very foundations. Second, Barack Obama
became the first African American elected to the nation’s highest office.
Political culture plays a big role in shaping public policy, and optimism is
part of America’s political DNA. Despite a deepening recession, there was a new
sense of hope—perhaps it was the beginning of the end of two costly wars and
the dawn of a new era in America. But by 2012 hope had given way to anger
and disappointment.
What happened? In 2009, President Obama had moved to revive the U.S.
economy, which had fallen into the deepest recession since the Great Depres-
sion of the 1930s. But the economic stimulus package he pushed through Con-
gress, where the Democrats enjoyed a solid majority in both the House and
Senate, was widely viewed as a Wall Street “bailout”—a massive multibillion
dollar gift to the very financial institutions that had caused the problem. It was
also criticized as a “jobless recovery”; unemployment rose to nearly 10% and
youth unemployment (16- to 19-year-olds) rose about 25% in 2010. Nearly
half of young people aged 16 to 24 did not have jobs, the highest number since
World War II.
The conservative media (most notably FOX News) and the amorphous Tea
Party movement eagerly exploited growing public discontent, handing the Dem-
ocrats a crushing defeat in the 2010 midterm elections. Republicans regained
control of the House and cut deeply into the Democrats’ majority in the Senate
(see especially Chapters 11 and 13).
Obama also spearheaded a controversial health care reform that satis-
fied few, confused everyone, and angered many voters on both sides of the
acrimonious debate. His decision to order a “surge” in Afghanistan, com-
mitting 30,000 more U.S. troops to an unpopular and unwinnable war, did
not placate Congress or greatly improve his standing in the opinion polls,
nor did his decision to withdraw the last U.S. combat troops from Iraq in
December 2011.
Despite a constant chorus of criticism and a vicious media campaign of
attack ads from the right, Obama was elected to a second term in 2012. He
defeated Republican Mitt Romney by a margin of 5 million votes (51% to 47%
of the popular vote) while taking 61% of the electoral votes. The embattled
president’s troubles in dealing with a recalcitrant Republican majority in Con-
gress, however, continued unabated. His decision in the fall of 2014 to launch
Why Study Politics?3
a major bombing campaign against ISIS in Iraq and Syria—in effect, resuming
a war that had officially ended three years earlier—did not appease the opposi-
tion or boost his popularity, which fell to new lows in 2014.
The president’s popularity—or lack thereof—was a major factor in setting
the stage for the Republican victory in the 2014 midterm elections when vot-
ers gave the GOP a majority in the Senate. Republicans also gained seats in the
House (where they had won back control in 2010). But President Obama acted
decisively in the days following the election, confounding his critics and com-
mentators who had branded him a “lame duck.”
We know politics is something that happens in Washington, D.C., or in Aus-
tin, Texas, and other state capitals, but some of us forget that politics is a perva-
sive fact of life— others never forget it. That very fact often gives those “others”
a big advantage, which can be the difference between success and failure.
For any democracy to succeed in the long run, it is vital that citizens pay
attention, learn to think for themselves, and vote intelligently. Political literacy
is vital to a viable and sustainable representative government—what we com-
monly call “democracy.”
The alternative is revolution, a drastic measure and a last resort—one
American colonists chose in 1776 and the Confederate South chose in 1860. As
we will see in Chapter 14, revolutions are convulsive and quixotic. They often
result in less freedom for the people, not more.
A popular slogan (and bumper sticker) reminds us that “Freedom Isn’t
Free.” It’s true. At a minimum, being a good citizen requires us to have a basic
understanding of the ideas, institutions, and issues that constitute the stuff of
politics. This book is an attempt to foster just such an understanding.
WHY STUDY POLITICS?

The belief that anybody with a college education will have a basic understand-
ing of political ideas, institutions, and issues is wishful thinking. There is a
mountain of evidence showing it’s simply not true; moreover, there is a moun-
tain of empirical evidence to prove it. To begin to understand the power of poli-
tics—and the politics of power—we have to make a careful study and, above
all, keep an open mind.
Self-Interest
Because personal happiness depends in no small degree on what government
does or does not do, we all have a considerable stake in understanding how
government works (or why it is not working). Federal work-study programs,
state subsidies to public education, low-interest loans, federal grants, and court
decisions that protect students’ rights are but a few examples of politics and
public policy that directly affect college students. For farmers, crop subsidies,
price supports, and water rights are crucial policy issues. Environmental regula-
tions are often the target of intense lobbying on the part of power companies,
the oil and gas industry, and mining interests.
Taxes are a hot button for nearly everybody. Most people think they pay too
much and others pay too little. Do you know anybody who wants to pay more
in taxes? Can you think of one wealthy individual who argues that people in his
income bracket ought to pay more? (Hint: His initials are W.B.)
Through the study of politics, we become more aware of our dependence
on the political system and better equipped to determine when to favor and
when to oppose change. At the same time, such study helps to reveal the limits
of politics and the obstacles to bringing about any major change in a society. It
is sobering to consider that each of us is only one person in a nation of millions
(and a world of billions), most of whom have opinions and prejudices no less
firmly held than our own.
The Public Interest

What could be more vital to the public interest in any society than the moral
character and conduct of its citizens? Civil society is defined by and reflected in
the kinds of everyday decisions and choices made by ordinary people leading
ordinary lives. At the same time, people are greatly influenced by civil society
and the prevailing culture and climate of politics. We are all products of our cir-
cumstances to a greater extent than most of us realize (or care to admit). Politics
plays a vital role in shaping these circumstances, and it is fair to say the public
interest hangs in the balance.
BASIC CONCEPTS OF POLITICS

Politics has been defined as “the art of the possible,” as the study of “who gets
politics what, when, and how,” as the “authoritative allocation of values,” and in various
The process by which
a community selects other ways. Many people think politics is inherently corrupt and corrupting—
rulers and empowers hence the term “dirty politics.” Is this true? Can you think of any exceptions?
them to make decisions, We may not agree on how to define politics, but we know what it is when we
takes action to attain see it—and we don’t like what we see. We are quick to blame “politics” as the
common goals, and main cause of problems not only in society but also in families, schools, and the
reconciles conflicts
within the community. workplace. Likewise, college students are typically unaware of the anger and
tumult that often animate campus politics.
Like other disciplines, political science has a lexicon and language all its
own. We start our language lesson with three words that carry a great deal of
political freight: power, order, and justice.
Power
Power is the currency of all politics. Without power, no government can make
power and enforce laws, provide security, regulate the economy, conduct foreign pol-
The capacity to
influence or control the
icy, or wage war. There are many kinds of power. In this book, we are interested
behavior of persons and in political power. Coercion plays an important role in politics, but political
institutions, whether by power cannot be equated with force. Indeed, the sources of power are many and
persuasion or coercion. varied. A large population, a booming economy, a cohesive society, and wise
leadership—all are examples of quite different power sources.
We often define power in terms of national wealth or military spending.
We once called the most formidable states Great Powers; now we call them
“superpowers.” Power defined in this way is tangible and measurable. Critics
of this classical view make a useful distinction between “hard power” and “soft
Basic Concepts of Politics 5
power.” Hard power refers to the means and instruments of brute force or coer-
cion, primarily military and economic clout. Soft power is “attractive” rather
than coercive: the essence of soft power is “the important ability to get others
to want what you want.”1
Power is never equally distributed. Yet the need to concentrate power in
the hands of a few inevitably raises three big questions: Who wields power? In
whose interests? And to what ends?
The most basic question of all is “Who rules?” Sometimes we have only to
look at a nation’s constitution and observe the workings of its government to
find the answer. But it may be difficult to determine who really rules when the
government is cloaked in secrecy or when, as is often the case, informal patterns
of power are very different from the textbook diagrams.
The terms power and authority are often confused and even used inter-
changeably. In reality, they denote two distinct dimensions of politics. Accord-
ing to Mao Zedong, the late Chinese Communist leader, “Political power flows
from the barrel of a gun.” Political power is clearly associated with the means
of coercion (the regular police, secret police, and the army), but power can also
flow from wealth, personal charisma, ideology, religion, and many other sources,
including the moral standing of a particular individual or group in society. authority
Authority, by definition, flows not only (or even mainly) from the barrel Command of the
of a gun but also from the norms society accepts and even cherishes. These obedience of
norms are moral, spiritual, and legal codes of behavior, or good conduct. Thus, society’s members
authority implies legitimacy—a condition in which power is exercised by com- by a government.
mon consensus through established institutions. Note this definition does not legitimacy
mean, nor is it meant to imply, that democracy is the only legitimate form of The exercise of
political power in a
government possible. Any government that enjoys the consent of the governed
community in a way
is legitimate—including a monarchy, military dictatorship, or theocracy. that is voluntarily
The acid test of legitimate authority is not whether people have the right to accepted by the
vote or to strike or dissent openly, but how much value people attach to these members of that
rights. If a majority of the people are content with the existing political order just community.
as it is (with or without voting rights), the legitimacy of the ruler(s) is simply not legitimate
in question. But, as history amply demonstrates, it is possible to seize power and authority
to rule without a popular mandate or public approval, without moral, spiritual, The legal and
moral right of a
or legal justification—in other words, without true (legitimate) authority. government to
A military power seizure—also known as a coup d’etat—typically involves a rule over a specific
plot by senior army officers to overthrow a corrupt, incompetent, or unpopular population and
civilian ruler. One well-known recent example happened in Egypt in July 2013, control a specific
following many months of turmoil and the outcome of a presidential election territory; the term
legitimacy usually
that became unacceptable to the military. implies a widely
Power seizures also occurred in Mauritania and Guinea in 2008 and in Thailand recognized claim
as recently as 2014; many contemporary rulers, especially in Africa, have come to of governmental
power in this manner. Adolf Hitler’s failed “Beer Hall Putsch” in 1923 is a famous authority and
example of an attempted power seizure. Such attempts often fail, but they are usu- voluntary
acceptance on
ally evidence of political instability—as the case of Weimar Germany illustrates. the part of the
Claiming authority is useless without the means to enforce it. The right to population(s)
rule—a condition that minimizes the need for repression—hinges in large part directly affected.
on legitimacy or popularity.
Legitimacy and popularity go hand in hand. Illegitimate rulers are unpop-

ular rulers. Such rulers are faced with a choice: relinquish power or repress
opposition. Whether repression works depends, in turn, on the answer to three
questions. First, how widespread and determined is the opposition? Second,
does the government have adequate financial resources and coercive capabilities
to defeat its opponents and deter future challenges? Third, does the government
have the will to use all means necessary to defeat the rebellion?
If the opposition is broadly based and the government waivers for whatever
order
In a political context, reason, repression is likely to fail. Regimes changed in Russia in 1917 and 1992
refers to an existing or following failed attempts to crush the opposition. Two other examples include
desired arrangement Cuba in 1958, where Fidel Castro led a successful revolution, and Iran in 1978,
of institutions based where a mass uprising led to the overthrow of the Shah. A similar pattern was
on certain principles,
evident in many East European states in 1989, when repressive communist
such as liberty, equality,
prosperity, and security. regimes collapsed like so many falling dominoes.
Also often associated If people respect the ruler(s) and play by the rules without being forced to
with the rule of law do so (or threatened with the consequences), the task of maintaining order and
(as in the phrase “law stability in society is going to be much easier. It stands to reason that people
and order”) and with
who feel exploited and oppressed make poorly motivated workers. The per-
conservative values such
as stability, obedience, verse work ethic of Soviet-style dictatorships, where it was frequently said, “We
and respect for pretend to work and they pretend to pay us,” helps explain the decline and fall
legitimate authority. of Communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, dramatized by the
society spontaneous tearing down of the Berlin Wall in 1989.
An aggregation of
individuals who share Order
a common identity. Order exists on several levels. First, it denotes structures, rules, rituals, procedures,
Usually that identity is
at least partially defined
and practices that make up the political system embedded in every society. What
by geography because exactly is society? In essence, society is an aggregation of individuals who share a
people who live in close common identity. Usually that identity is at least partially defined by geography,
proximity often know because people who live in close proximity often know each other, enjoy shared
each other, enjoy shared experiences, speak the same language, and have similar values and interests. The
experiences, speak the
same language, and
process of instilling a sense of common purpose or creating a single political alle-
have similar values and giance among diverse groups of people is complex and works better from the bot-
interests. tom up than from the top down. The breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia
social contract in the early 1990s, after more than seven decades as multinational states, suggests
A concept in political new communities are often fragile and tend to fall apart quickly if there are not
theory most often strong cultural and psychological bonds under the political structures.
associated with The Russian-backed secessionist movement that threatened to break up
Thomas Hobbes, Jean-
Ukraine in 2014-15 also illustrates the obstacles to maintaining order in a
Jacque Rousseau,
and John Locke; the newly independent country where a national minority group is geographically
social contract is an concentrated. Russian-speakers in parts of eastern Ukraine bordering on Russia
implicit agreement constitute a solid majority and remain fiercely loyal to Moscow. The same is
among individuals true in Crimea (previously part of Ukraine), where most people welcomed Rus-
to form a civil society
sia’s armed intervention. Russia annexed this strategically important region (the
and to accept certain
moral and political whole of the Crimean Peninsula) in March of 2014.
obligations essential to The idea that individuals become a cohesive community through an unwrit-
its preservation. ten social contract has been fundamental to Western political thought since the
seventeenth century. Basic to social contract theory is the notion that the right
to rule is based on the consent of the governed. Civil liberties in this type of
community are a matter of natural law and natural rights—that is, they do not
depend on written laws but rather are inherent in Nature. Nature with a capital
N is a set of self-evident truths that, in the eyes of social contract theorists, can
be known through a combination of reason and observation. A corollary of this
theory is that whenever government turns oppressive, when it arbitrarily takes
away such natural rights as life, liberty, and (perhaps) property, the people have
a right to revolt (see Chapter 14).
Government is a human invention by which societies are ruled and binding
rules are made. Given the rich variety of governments in the world, how might we government
The persons and
categorize them all? Traditionally we’ve distinguished between republics, in which institutions that
sovereignty (see below) ultimately resides in the people, and governments such as make and enforce
monarchies or tyrannies, in which sovereignty rests with the rulers. Today, almost rules or laws for the
all republics are democratic (or representative) republics, meaning political systems larger community.
wherein elected representatives responsible to the people exercise sovereign power.2 republic
Some political scientists draw a simple distinction between democracies, A form of
which hold free elections, and dictatorships, which do not. Others emphasize government in
which sovereignty
political economy, distinguishing between governments enmeshed in capitalist
resides in the
or market-based systems and governments based on socialist or state-regulated people of that
systems. Finally, governments in developing countries face different kinds of country, rather than
challenges than do governments in developed countries. Not surprisingly, more with the rulers.
economically developed countries often have markedly more well-established The vast majority
of republics today
political institutions—including political parties, regular elections, civil and crimi-
are democratic
nal courts—than most less developed countries, and more stable political systems. or representative
In the modern world, the state is the sole repository of sovereignty. A sover- republics, meaning
eign state is a community with well-defined territorial boundaries administered that the sovereign
by a single government capable of making and enforcing laws. In addition, it power is exercised
by elected
typically claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of force; raises armies for the
representatives who
defense of its territory and population; levies and collects taxes; regulates trade are responsible to
and commerce; establishes courts, judges, and magistrates to settle disputes and the citizenry.
punish lawbreakers; and sends envoys (ambassadors) to represent its interests
abroad, negotiate treaties, and gather useful information. Entities that share some
but not all of the characteristics of states include fiefdoms and chiefdoms, bands
and tribes, universal international organizations (such as the United Nations),
and regional supranational organizations (such as the European Union).
In the language of politics, state usually means country. France, for instance,
may be called either a state or a country. (In certain federal systems of government,
a state is an administrative subdivision, such as New York, Florida, Texas, or Cali-
fornia in the United States; however, such states within a state are not sovereign.)
The term nation is also a synonym for state or country. Thus, the only way to
know for certain whether state means part of a country (for example, the United
States) or a whole country (say, France or China) is to consider the context. By the
same token, context is the key to understanding what we mean by the word nation.
A nation is made up of a distinct group of people who share a common
background, including geographic location, history, racial or ethnic characteris-
tics, religion, language, culture, or belief in common political ideas. Geography
heads this list because members of a nation typically exhibit a strong collective
sense of belonging associated with a particular territory for which they are will-
state ing to fight and die if necessary.
In its sovereign form, an
independent political- Countries with relatively homogeneous populations (with great similarity
administrative unit that among members) were most common in old Europe, but this once-defining
successfully claims the characteristic of European nation-states is no longer true. The recent influx
allegiance of a given of newcomers from former colonial areas, in particular the Muslim majority
population, exercises countries of North Africa, the Arab world, and South Asia, and post–Cold War
a monopoly on the
legitimate use of coercive east-west population movements in Europe have brought the issue of immi-
force, and controls the gration to the forefront of politics in France, Germany, the United Kingdom,
territory inhabited by its Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, and even the Scandinavian countries. Belgium,
citizens or subjects; in its on the other hand, provides a rare example of a European state divided cultur-
other common form, a ally and linguistically (French-speaking Walloons and Dutch-speaking Flemish)
state is the major political-
administrative subdivision from the start.
of a federal system and, India, Russia, and Nigeria are three highly diverse states. India’s constitution
as such, is not sovereign officially recognizes no fewer than eighteen native tongues! The actual number
but rather depends on spoken is far larger. As a nation of immigrants, the United States is also very
the central authority diverse, but the process of assimilation eventually brings the children of new-
(sometimes called the
“national government”) comers, if not the newcomers themselves, into the mainstream.3
for resource allocations The nation-state is a state encompassing a single nation in which the over-
(tax transfers and whelming majority of the people form a dominant in-group who share common
grants), defense cultural, ethnic, and linguistic characteristics; all others are part of a distinct
(military protection and out-group or minority. This concept is rooted in a specific time and place—that
emergency relief ), and
regulation of economic is, in modern Western Europe. (See “Landmarks in History” for the story of
relations with other the first nation-state.) The concept of the nation-state fits less comfortably in
federal subdivisions other regions of the world, where the political boundaries of sovereign states—
(nonsovereign states) many of which were European colonies before World War II—often do not
and external entities coincide with ethnic or cultural geography. In some instances, ethnic, religious,
(sovereign states).
or tribal groups that were bitter traditional enemies were thrown together in
sovereignty new “states,” resulting in societies prone to great instability or even civil war.
A government’s capacity
to assert supreme power
Decolonization after World War II gave rise to many polyglot states in which
successfully in a political various ethnic or tribal groups were not assimilated into the new social order.
state. Many decades later, the all-important task of nation-building in these new
country states is still far from finished. Thus, in 1967, Nigeria plunged into a vicious
As a political term, civil war when one large ethnic group, the Igbo, tried unsuccessfully to secede
it refers loosely to a and form an independent state called Biafra. In 1994, Rwanda witnessed one of
sovereign state and is the bloodiest massacres in modern times when the numerically superior Hutus
roughly equivalent to slaughtered hundreds of thousands of Tutsis, including women and children. In
“nation” or “nation-state”;
country is often used as early 2008, tribal violence in Kenya’s Rift Valley and beyond claimed the lives
a term of endearment— of hundreds of innocent people following the outcome of a presidential election
for example, in the that many believed was rigged.
phrase “my country ’tis In India, where Hindus and Muslims frequently clash and sporadic violence
of thee, sweet land of breaks out among militant Sikhs in Punjab and where hundreds of languages
liberty” in the patriotic
song every U.S. child and dialects are spoken, characterizing the country as a nation-state misses the
learns in elementary point altogether. In Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon), Hindu Tamils have long waged
school; country has an a terrorist guerrilla war against the majority Singhalese, who are Buddhist.
emotional dimension not Even in the Slavic-speaking parts of Europe, age-old ethnic rivalries have
present in the word state. caused the breakup of preexisting states. The Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and
dmarks
an
L
in
The Peace of Westphalia (1648): The Origins of the Modern Nation-State System
Histor
Dawn of the Nation-State System: Europe in 1648.
Figure 1.1 y
(Continued)
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greatly embarrassed to deal with it.[293] Any reply that should
repudiate either the treaty obligation or the principles of American
liberty and self-government was out of the question; any reply that
should affirm either the one or the other was fatal to the system
established by Congress in Louisiana. John Randolph, on whose
shoulders the duty fell, made a report on the subject. “It is only under
the torture,” said he, “that this article of the treaty of Paris can be
made to speak the language ascribed to it by the memorialists;” but
after explaining in his own way what the article did not mean, he
surprised his audience by admitting in effect that the law of the last
session was repugnant to the Constitution, and that the people of
Louisiana had a right to self-government.[294] Senator Giles said in
private that Randolph’s report was “a perfect transcript of Randolph’s
own character; it began by setting the claims of the Louisianians at
defiance, and concluded with a proposal to give them more than they
asked.”[295]
Under these influences the three delegates from the creole
society succeeded in getting, not what they asked, but a general
admission that the people of Louisiana had political rights, which
Congress recognized by an Act, approved March 2, 1805, to the
extent of allowing them to elect a General Assembly of twenty-five
representatives, and of promising them admission into the Union
whenever their free inhabitants should reach the number of sixty
thousand. Considering that the people of Louisiana were supposed
to be entitled to “all the rights, advantages, and immunities of
citizens,” Messieurs Sauvé, Derbigny, and Destréhan thought the
concession too small, and expressed themselves strongly on the
subject. Naturally the British minister, as well as other ill-affected
persons at Washington, listened eagerly to the discontent which
promised to breed hostility to the Union.
“The deputies above mentioned,” wrote Merry to his Government,
[296] “who while they had any hopes of obtaining the redress of their
grievances had carefully avoided giving any umbrage or jealousy to
the Government by visiting or holding any intercourse with the agents
of foreign Powers at this place, when they found that their fate was
decided, although the law had not as yet passed, no longer abstained
from communicating with those agents, nor from expressing very
publicly the great dissatisfaction which the law would occasion among
their constituents,—going even so far as to say that it would not be
tolerated, and that they would be obliged to seek redress from some
other quarter; while they observed that the opportunity they had had of
obtaining a correct knowledge of the state of things in this country,
and of witnessing the proceedings of Congress, afforded them no
confidence in the stability of the Union, and furnished them with such
strong motives to be dissatisfied with the form and mode of
government as to make them regret extremely the connection which
they had been forced into with it. These sentiments they continued to
express till the moment of their departure from hence, which took
place the day after the close of the session.”
Another man watched the attitude of the three delegates with
extreme interest. Aaron Burr, March 4, 1805, ceased to hold the
office of Vice-president. Since the previous August he had awaited
the report of his friend Colonel Williamson, who entered into
conferences with members of the British ministry, hoping to gain their
support for Burr’s plan of creating a Western Confederacy in the
Valley of the Ohio. No sooner was Burr out of office than he went to
Merry with new communications, which Merry hastened to send to
his Government in a despatch marked “Most secret” in triplicate.[297]
“Mr. Burr (with whom I know that the deputies became very
intimate during their residence here) has mentioned to me that the
inhabitants of Louisiana seem determined to render themselves
independent of the United States, and that the execution of their
design is only delayed by the difficulty of obtaining previously an
assurance of protection and assistance from some foreign Power, and
of concerting and connecting their independence with that of the
inhabitants of the western parts of the United States, who must always
have a command over them by the rivers which communicate with the
Mississippi. It is clear that Mr. Burr (although he has not as yet
confided to me the exact nature and extent of his plan) means to
endeavor to be the instrument of effecting such a connection.”
For this purpose Burr asked the aid of the British government,
and defined the nature of the assistance he should need,—a British
squadron at the mouth of the Mississippi, and a loan of half a million
dollars.
“I have only to add that if a strict confidence could be placed in
him, he certainly possesses, perhaps in a much greater degree than
any other individual in this country, all the talents, energy, intrepidity,
and firmness which are required for such an enterprise.”
Pending an answer to this proposal, Burr was to visit New
Orleans and make himself the head of creole disaffection.
Merry was launched into the full tide of conspiracy. At the close of
Jefferson’s first term he saw reason to hope that he might soon
repay with interest the debt of personal and political annoyance
which he owed. While Yrujo was actively engaged in bringing upon
Madison the anger of Spain and France, Merry endeavored to draw
his Government into a system of open and secret reprisals upon the
President.
That the new French minister was little better disposed than
Merry and Yrujo has been already shown; but his causes for ill-will
were of a different and less personal nature. Before Turreau’s arrival
at Washington in November, 1804, Pichon in one of his last
despatches declared that Jefferson had already alienated every
foreign Power whose enmity could be dangerous to the United
States.
“The state of foreign relations offers a perspective which must put
Mr. Jefferson’s character to proof,” Pichon wrote to Talleyrand in
September, 1804.[298] “The United States find themselves
compromised and at odds with France, England, and Spain at the
same time. This state of things is in great part due to the indecision of
the President, and to the policy which leads him to sacrifice everything
for the sake of his popularity.”
The complaint was common to all French ministers in the United

States, and meant little more than that all Presidents and policies
displeased them by stopping short of war on England, which was the
object of French diplomacy; but this letter also showed that in
Pichon’s eyes the President had no friends. When Turreau arrived, a
few weeks afterward, he quickly intimated that the President need
expect from him not even such sentimental sympathy as had been
so kindly given by Pichon.
At the same moment it was noticed that Jefferson changed his
style of dress. “He has improved much in the article of dress,” wrote
Senator Plumer in December, 1804;[299] “he has laid aside the old
slippers, red waistcoat, and soiled corduroy small-clothes, and was
dressed all in black, with clean linen and powdered hair.” Apparently
the President had profited by the criticisms of the British minister,
and was willing to avoid similar comments from the new French
envoy; but he supposed that the Frenchman would show equal
civility, and assume an equally republican style. He was mistaken.
November 23, undisturbed by Merry’s experience, Turreau
presented himself at his first audience in full regimentals, and with so
much gold lace that Jefferson was half inclined to resent it as an
impertinence.[300] Turreau next refused to meet Merry at dinner. He
followed up these demonstrations by embracing the cause of Yrujo,
and ridiculing Madison to his face. He began by warning his
Government that “these people have been thoroughly spoiled; it is
time to put them back into their place.”[301]
Turreau became intimate with the deputies from Louisiana, and
notified Talleyrand that a separation of the western country from the
Union was universally expected. Already, within three months of his
arrival, he put his finger on the men who were to accomplish it.[302]
Destréhan, he said, was a man of high merit; “but being only
moderately ambitious, and head of a numerous family,—having
acquired, too, a great personal esteem,—he is not likely to become
the principal mover in innovations which are always dangerous
without a combination of evidently favorable chances. It is still less
likely that he will ever be the instrument of strangers who should
seek to excite troubles for their personal advantage.” As for Sauvé,
much inferior to his colleague in abilities, he would be guided by
Destréhan’s influence. Derbigny was different. “Young still, with wit,
ready expression, and French manners, I believe him to be greedy of
fortune and fame; I suspect that every rôle will suit him, in order to
acquire the one or the other; but there are men of more importance
whom circumstances are taking to Louisiana.”
Then Turreau, for the information of Talleyrand, drew a portrait of
the military commander of Upper Louisiana, who had his
headquarters at St. Louis, and whose influence on future events was
to be watched.
“General Wilkinson is forty-eight years of age. He has an amiable
exterior. Though said to be well-informed in civil and political matters,
his military capacity is small. Ambitious and easily dazzled, fond of
show and appearances, he complains rather indiscreetly, and
especially after dinner, of the form of his government, which leaves
officers few chances of fortune, advancement, and glory, and which
does not pay its military chiefs enough to support a proper style. He
listened with pleasure, or rather with enthusiasm, to the details which I
gave him in regard to the organization, the dress, and the force of the
French army. My uniform, the order with which I am decorated, are
objects of envy to him; and he seems to hold to the American service
only because he can do no better. General Wilkinson is the most
intimate friend, or rather the most devoted creature, of Colonel Burr.”
Talleyrand had become acquainted with Burr in the United States,
and needed no warnings against him; but Turreau showed himself
well-informed:
“Mr. Burr’s career is generally looked upon as finished; but he is far
from sharing that opinion, and I believe he would rather sacrifice the
interests of his country than renounce celebrity and fortune. Although
Louisiana is still only a Territory, it has obtained the right of sending a
delegate to Congress. Louisiana is therefore to become the theatre of
Mr. Burr’s new intrigues; he is going there under the ægis of General
Wilkinson.”
Perhaps Turreau received this information from Derbigny, which
might account for his estimate of the young man. Certainly Derbigny
knew all that Turreau reported, for in an affidavit[303] two years
afterward he admitted his knowledge.
“In the winter of 1804–1805,” Derbigny made oath, “being then at
Washington City in the capacity of a deputy from the inhabitants of
Louisiana to Congress, jointly with Messrs. Destréhan and Sauvé, he
was introduced to Colonel Burr, then Vice-president of the United
States, by General Wilkinson, who strongly recommended to this
deponent, and as he believes to his colleagues, to cultivate the
acquaintance of Colonel Burr,—whom he used to call ‘the first
gentleman in America,’ telling them that he was a man of the most
eminent talents both as a politician and as a military character; and ...
General Wilkinson told him several times that Colonel Burr, so soon
as his Vice-presidency would be at an end, would go to Louisiana,
where he had certain projects, adding that he was such a man as to
succeed in anything he would undertake, and inviting this deponent to
give him all the information in his power respecting that country; which
mysterious hints appeared to this deponent very extraordinary, though
he could not then understand them.”
What Derbigny in 1807 professed not to have understood,
seemed in 1804 clear to Turreau and Merry as well as to others.
Turreau closed his catalogue by the significant remark: “I am not the
only person who thinks that the assemblage of such men in a
country already discontented is enough to give rise to serious
troubles there.” The treasonable plans of Burr and Wilkinson were a
matter of common notoriety, and roused anxious comment even in
the mind of John Randolph, who was nursing at home the
mortification of Judge Chase’s acquittal.[304] Randolph complained
of “the easy credulity of Mr. Jefferson’s temper,” which made the
President a fit material for intriguers to work upon. Certainly at the
close of his first administration Jefferson seemed surrounded by
enemies. The New England Federalists, the Louisiana creoles, Burr
and his crew of adventurers in every part of the Union, joined hands
with the ministers of England and Spain to make a hostile circle
round the President; while the minister of France looked on without a
wish to save the government whose friendship Bonaparte had
sought to obtain at the cost of the most valuable province and the
most splendid traditions of the French people.
CHAPTER XVIII.
After aiding to negotiate the Louisiana treaty at Paris, in April
and May, 1803, Monroe, as the story has already told, being
forbidden by Bonaparte to pursue his journey to Madrid, followed his
alternative instructions, to take the post which Rufus King was
vacating in London. King left England in the middle of May, 1803;
Monroe arrived in London July 18, when the war between England
and France was already two months old.
The mild Addington ministry was still in power, and nothing had
yet happened to excite Monroe’s alarm in regard to British policy in
the United States. On the contrary, the ministry aided the Louisiana
purchase with readiness that might reasonably have surprised an
American minister, while the friendliest spirit was shown by Lord
Hawkesbury in all matters of detail. Except the standing dispute
about impressments, every old point of collision had been
successfully removed by King, whose two conventions,—the one for
discharging British debts recognized by treaty, the other for settling
the boundaries of New England and of the northwest territory,—
seemed to free the countries for the first time from the annoying
inheritance of disputes entailed by the definitive treaty which closed
the Revolutionary War in 1783. The calm which seemed to prevail
throughout England in regard to her relations with America
contrasted sharply with the excitement shown by the English people
in all their allusions to the Corsican demon, as they thought him,
whose regiments, gathering at Boulogne, they might expect to see at
any moment encamped at Hastings, where no hostile camp-fire had
burned since the night, seven hundred years before, when the body
of an English king, hedged about with the dead bodies of a whole
English aristocracy, lay stiff and stark on the bloody hillside, victims
of another French adventurer. England was intent on her own
imminent dangers; and under the strain which the renewal of her
painful efforts brought with it, she was glad to leave America alone.
Yet calm as the atmosphere appeared to be, signs of future storm
were not wholly wanting. Had Monroe been naturally anxious, he
might, without seeking far, have found cause for anxiety serious
enough to take away all appetite for Spanish travel, and to hold him
close to his post until some one should consent to relieve him from
an ungrateful and unpromising duty. The American minister at
London in 1804 could hope to gain nothing either for his country or
for himself, and he stood always on the verge of disaster; but when
he was required to take a “high tone” in the face of a nation almost
insane with anxiety, he challenged more chances of mortification
than any but a desperate politician would have cared to risk.
Monroe had at first nothing to do but to watch the course of public
opinion in England. During the autumn of 1803, while President
Jefferson and Secretary Madison at Washington received Merry with
a changed policy, and all through the winter, while Washington was
torn by “canons of etiquette” and by contests of strength between
Jefferson, Madison, Casa Yrujo, and Merry, the United States
minister in London was left at peace to study the political problems
which bore on his own fortunes and on those of his friends at home,
as well as on the interests of the Union.
Beneath the calm of general society mutterings of discontent
from powerful interests could be heard,—occasional outbursts of
jealousy, revivals of old and virulent passions, inveterate prejudices,
which made as yet but little noise in the Press or in Parliament, but
which rankled in the breasts of individuals. One of the earlier
symptoms of trouble came in a familiar shape. For twenty years,
whenever a question had arisen of hostility to American trade or of
prejudice against American character, the first of Englishmen to
stimulate it, and the loudest to proclaim the dangers of Great Britain,
had been John Baker Holroyd, Earl of Sheffield, whose memory
might have been lost under the weight of his pamphlets had it not
been embalmed in the autobiography of Gibbon. Lord Sheffield felt
such devotion to the British navigation laws as could be likened only
to the idolatry which a savage felt toward his fetich; one might almost
have supposed that to him the State, the Church, and the liberties of
England, the privileges of her nobility, and even the person of her
sovereign, were sacred chiefly because they guaranteed the safety
of her maritime system. This fanaticism of an honest mind led to
results so extravagant as to become at times ridiculous. The
existence of the United States was a protest against Lord Sheffield’s
political religion; and therefore in his eyes the United States were no
better than a nation of criminals, capable of betraying their God for
pieces of silver. The independence of America had shattered the
navigation system of England into fragments; but Lord Sheffield
clung the more desperately to his broken idol. Among the portions
which had been saved were the West Indian colonies. If at that day
the navigation laws had one object more important than another, it
was to foster the prosperity of these islands, in order that their sugar
and molasses, coffee and rum, might give freight to British shippers
and employment to British seamen; but to Lord Sheffield the islands
were only a degree less obnoxious than the revolted United States,
for they were American at heart, complaining because they were
forbidden to trade freely with New York and Boston, and even
asserting that when the navigation laws were strictly enforced their
slaves died of starvation and disease. Lord Sheffield seriously
thought them ungrateful to murmur, and held it their duty to perish in
silence rather than ask a relaxation of the law.
The rupture of the Peace of Amiens, in May, 1803, set Lord
Sheffield again at work; and unfortunately the material lay ready to
his hand. The whole subject of his discourse related to a single fact;
but this fact was full of alarm to the English people. The
extraordinary decrease of British tonnage in the American trade, the
corresponding increase of American shipping, and the loud
exultation of the Yankees over the British shipmasters were proofs of
the danger which menaced England, whose existence depended on
maritime strength. In the month of February, 1804, Lord Sheffield
published a pamphlet,[305] which dwelt on these calamities as due to
the wanton relaxation of the navigation laws and the senseless
clamor of the colonies. He was answered in a pamphlet[306] written
by one of the colonial agents; and the answer was convincing, so far
as Lord Sheffield’s argument was concerned, but his array of
statistics remained to disturb the British mind.
Monroe might therefore count on having, some day, to meet
whatever mischief the shipping interest of Great Britain could cause.
No argument was needed to prove that the navy would support with
zeal whatever demands should be made by the mercantile marine.
There remained the immense influence of the West Indian colonies
to consider; and if this should be brought into active sympathy with
the shipowners and the royal marine against American trade, no
minister in England—not even Pitt himself at the height of his power
—would be strong enough to resist the combination.
The staple product of the West Indian islands was sugar, and
owing to several causes the profits of the planters had until 1798
been large. The insurrection of the Haytian negroes in 1792
annihilated for the time the supply of sugar from St. Domingo; prices
rose in consequence, and a great increase in the number of sugar
plantations naturally followed. Several of the Dutch and French
islands fell into the hands of England, and adventurers flocked to
them, eager to invest British capital in new sugar-fields. Under this
impulse the supply again increased. Cuba, Porto Rico, Guadeloupe,
and at last St. Domingo itself under Toussaint’s rule poured sugar
into the market. American ships carried French and Spanish sugar to
Europe until it became a drug. The high price lasted till 1798; in that
year Pitt even imposed a heavy additional duty upon it as a sure
source of revenue. In 1799 the effect of over-production first became
apparent. During the next few years the price of sugar fell, until great
suffering began to prevail in the islands, and the planters wrote
piteous letters of distress to England. Their agents wrote back that
the English market was flooded with colonial produce: “Send no
more sugar home; give it away rather!” was their advice,—and the
colonists, without the means of purchasing even the necessaries of
life, supplicated government to let them send their sugar to the
United States, to be exchanged for American produce.[307]
This the government dared not do, for the shipping interest must
in such a case be sacrificed. Debarred from this outlet for their
produce, the colonists looked about them for some other resource;
and since they were not allowed to act independently of the
shipmasters, they saw no other course than to join hands with the
shipping interest, and to invoke the aid of the navigation laws. The
glut of the European market was caused by American neutrals, who
were allowed to carry French and Spanish sugars from the West
Indies to Europe. If this neutral trade could be stopped, the supply of
French and Spanish sugar would be left to rot in Cuba and
Guadeloupe, while British colonial produce would enjoy a monopoly
throughout Europe.
Even before the Peace of Amiens this policy gained many
adherents, and the Peace tended to strengthen their influence. The
Addington ministry was not only weak in character, but timid in
policy; and by a natural reaction it threw restless and ambitious
younger statesmen into an attitude of protest. A new departure was
felt to be necessary; and the nervous energy of England, strained
almost to insanity by the anxieties of ten years’ desperate danger,
exhausted itself in the cry for one great commanding spirit, who
should meet Bonaparte with his own weapons on his own field.
This cry produced George Canning. Of him and his qualities
much will be said hereafter, when his rise to power shall have made
him a more prominent figure; here need be noticed only the forces
which sought assertion through him, and the nature of the passions
which he was peculiarly qualified to express. At all times nations
have been most imperilled by the violence of disappointed or terrified
interests; but the danger was never so great as when these interests
joined to a greed for selfish gain the cry for an unscrupulous chief.
Every American schoolboy once knew by heart the famous outburst
of Canning, which began, “Away with the cant of ‘measures, not
men’!” but of the millions of persons who read or heard this favorite
extract few understood its meaning to American interests and
feelings. This celebrated speech, made Dec. 8, 1802, at a time when
Addington’s cautious ministry still held office, was intended to dwarf
Addington and elevate Pitt,—to ridicule caution and extol violence.
“Sir,” cried Canning, “to meet, to check, to resist, to stand up against
Bonaparte, we want arms of the same kind. I vote for the large
military establishments with all my heart; but for the purpose of
coping with Bonaparte, one great, commanding spirit is worth them
all.”
“Arms of the same kind” were, speaking generally, irresponsible
violence and disregard of morality. The great, commanding spirit of
the moment was Mr. Pitt; but between the lines of this speech, by the
light of its author’s whole career, the secret was easily read that in
his opinion the man of the future who could best meet Bonaparte on
his own ground with his own weapons was not William Pitt, but
George Canning.
After many months of warfare against Addington, Canning was
gratified. In May, 1804, Addington retired from office, carrying into
the House of Lords the new title of Lord Sidmouth, while Pitt returned
to power. No one of note returned with him. His old colleague, Lord
Grenville, refused to join his Administration, and Charles James Fox
was personally excluded by King George. To fill the Foreign Office
Pitt could find no better man than Lord Harrowby,—a personage of
very second-rate importance in politics. With a Cabinet so weak as
to command little respect, and reactionary as was required to suit the
King’s growing prejudices, Pitt was obliged to disguise his
feebleness by the vigor of his measures. While creating, by
expenditure of money, a new coalition against Napoleon, he was
unable to disregard the great moneyed and social interests which
were clamoring for a spirited policy against neutrals and especially
against America. In private he avowed his determination to re-
establish the old system, and his regret that he should ever have
been, most reluctantly, induced to relax the maritime rights of Britain.
[308]
That Monroe should have been the last person in London to

know the secret thoughts of Pitt was not surprising. The Board of
Trade commonly exerted more influence than the Foreign Office over
the relations of England with the United States; and George Rose,
Vice-President of the Board of Trade, Pitt’s devoted friend and a Tory
after Lord Sheffield’s heart, would never have chosen Monroe as a
confidant of schemes under discussion in his department. Lord
Harrowby was but the mouthpiece of other men. From him Monroe
could expect to hear only what had already been decided.
Nevertheless a little study of the mercantile interests of the city, and
a careful inquiry into the private opinions of men like Rose and
Canning, might have thrown some light on the future, and would
naturally have roused anxiety in the mind of Monroe.
Pitt’s return to power, with the intention of changing the American
policy which had been pursued since the negotiation of Jay’s treaty,
happened very nearly to coincide with the arrival at the Foreign
Office of Merry’s most alarming despatches, announcing that
Madison required the total abandonment of impressments, the
restriction of blockades and the right of search, and complete
freedom in the colonial trade, as the conditions on which the
friendship of the United States could be preserved. The
announcement of President Jefferson’s high tone was accompanied
by the British minister’s account of his own social mortifications by
the President and the Secretary of State; of the Senate’s refusal to
approve the fifth article of Rufus King’s boundary convention, in
order to attack the British right of navigating the Mississippi; and by
drafts of bills pending in Congress, under which any British admiral,
even though it were Nelson himself, who should ever have taken a
seaman out of an American vessel, was to be arrested in the streets
of the first American port where he might go ashore, and to suffer
indefinite imprisonment among thieves and felons in the calaboose.
May 30, 1804, Monroe had his first interview with Lord Harrowby.
In such cases the new secretary, about to receive a foreign minister,
commonly sent for the late correspondence, in order to learn
something about the subjects on which he was to have an opinion.
Beyond a doubt Lord Harrowby had on his table the despatches of
Merry, written between November and April, which he probably
finished reading at about the moment when Monroe was announced
at the door.
Under such circumstances, Monroe reported to his Government
that Lord Harrowby’s manners were designedly unfriendly; his
reception was rough, his comments on the Senate’s habit of
mutilating treaties were harsh, his conduct throughout the interview
was calculated to wound and to irritate.[309] After this unpromising
experience, two months were allowed to pass without further
demonstration on either side. Then Lord Harrowby called Monroe’s
attention to the twelfth article of Jay’s treaty, which regulated the
commercial relations between the British West Indies and the United
States, and which had expired by limitation. He suggested its
renewal, according to its old terms, until two years after the next
general peace. To this offer Monroe replied, with the utmost
frankness, “that the President wished to postpone this matter until he
could include impressment and neutral rights in the treaty; that we
must begin de novo; that America was a young and thriving country;
that in 1794 she had had little experience, since then she understood
her interests better; and that a new treaty should omit certain things
from that of 1794, and include others. The most urgent part was that
which respected our seamen.”[310]
An approaching contact of opposite forces always interests men’s
imagination. On one side, Pitt and Lord Harrowby stood meditating
the details of measures, which they had decided in principle, for
taking from the United States most of the commercial advantages
hitherto enjoyed by them; on the other side stood Monroe and
Jefferson, equally confident, telling the Englishmen that very much
greater advantages must be conceded. That one or the other of
these forces must very soon give way was evident; and if ever an
American minister in London needed to be on the alert, with every
faculty strained to its utmost, the autumn of 1804 was such a
moment. Monroe, aware of his danger, gave full warning to the
President. Even as early as June 3, after his first interview with Lord
Harrowby, he wrote that a change of policy was imminent. “My most
earnest advice is to look to the possibility of such a change.”[311]
Lord Harrowby also gave every reasonable warning. His reply to
Monroe’s demands for further negotiation was simple,—nothing
need be expected from him. He refused to do any business at all, on
the plea of other occupations incident to the formation of a new
ministry.[312] Monroe sent him the draft of the comprehensive treaty
which Madison had forwarded, but Lord Harrowby declined for the
present to discuss it. Then Monroe came to the conclusion that his
presence in London was no longer necessary; and accordingly, Oct.
8, 1804, he started for Paris and Madrid. Until July 23, 1805, the
legation at London was left in charge of a secretary.
A month after his departure, Lord Harrowby wrote a letter of
instructions[313] to Merry in reply to the series of despatches
received from Washington.
“His Majesty’s government,” he said, “have perceived with
considerable concern, from some of your most recent despatches, the
increasing acrimony which appears to pervade the representations
that have been made to you by the American Secretary of State on
the subject of the impressment of seamen from on board of American
ships. The pretension advanced by Mr. Madison that the American
flag should protect every individual sailing under it on board of a
merchant-ship is too extravagant to require any serious refutation. In
the exercise of the right, which has been asserted by his Majesty and
his predecessors for ages, of reclaiming from a foreign service the
subjects of Great Britain, whether they are found on the high seas or
in the ports of his own dominions, irregularities must undoubtedly
frequently occur; but the utmost solicitude has been uniformly
manifested by his Majesty’s government to prevent them as far as
may be possible, and to repress them whenever they have actually
taken place.”
Intending to pursue the same course in the future, the
Government would without delay give the strictest orders to its naval
officers “to observe the utmost lenity in visiting ships on the high
seas, and to abstain from impressments in the ports of the United
States.”
In regard to commercial questions, Lord Harrowby offered to
consider the treaty of 1794 as in force until some new arrangement
could be formed. Until the decision of the President should be
known, it was “intended to propose to Parliament to lodge the power
of regulating the commerce with America in the King in Council, in
the same manner as before the treaty of 1794.” The offer of
considering the treaty as in force “must be regarded as a boon to
America; and it was made merely under the persuasion that if
accepted it would be accepted with a view to maintain a friendly
relation between the two countries, and to avoid in the interval
everything which could lead to interrupt it. If this system is followed in
America, it will be followed here in every respect with an anxious
desire for the continuance of harmony and cordiality.”
The same conditional and semi-threatening disposition toward
good-will ran through the rest of these instructions. In regard to the
boundary convention, his Majesty’s government would at all times be
ready to reopen the whole subject; “but they can never acquiesce in
the precedent which in this as well as in a former instance the
American government has endeavored to establish, of agreeing to
ratify such parts of a convention as they may select, and of rejecting
other stipulations of it, formally agreed upon by a minister invested
with full powers for the purpose.”
Finally, Merry was to “avoid, as far as possible, any language
which might be conceived to be of a menacing or hostile tendency,
or which might be construed into an indication of a desire on the part
of his Majesty’s government to decline any discussion of the several
points now pending between the two countries.” Lord Harrowby
clearly wished to encourage discussion to the utmost. He left the
“canons of etiquette” unnoticed, and offered not even a hint at any
change of policy meditated by his Government.
So matters remained in England during the last months of
President Jefferson’s first term. On both sides new movements were
intended; but while those of the United States government were
foreseen and announced in advance by Merry, those of the British
ministry were hidden under a veil of secrecy, which might perhaps
have been no more penetrable to Monroe had he remained in
London to watch them than they were to him in his retreat at
Aranjuez.
To the world at large nothing in the relations of the United States
with England, France, or Spain seemed alarming. The world knew
little of what was taking place. Only men who stood between these
forces could understand their movements and predict the moment of
collision; but if these men, like Merry, Turreau, and Yrujo, had been
asked March 3, 1805, to point out the brightest part of Jefferson’s
political horizon, they would probably have agreed with one voice
that everything in Europe threatened disaster, and that the only
glimpse of blue sky was to be seen on the shores of Africa. The
greatest triumph to be then hoped from Jefferson’s peace policy was
the brilliant close of his only war.
During the year 1804 the little American fleet in the
Mediterranean made famous some names which within ten years
were to become more famous still. With the “Constitution,” the only
heavy frigate on the station after the loss of the “Philadelphia,” and
with half-a-dozen small brigs and schooners, Preble worked manfully
at his task of annoying the Pacha of Tripoli. Three years’ experience
showed that a mere blockade answered no other purpose than to
protect in part American commerce. It had not shaken the Pacha in
the demand of black-mail as his condition of peace. Bainbridge, still
held a prisoner in the town, believed that Jefferson must choose
between paying what the Pacha asked, or sending eight or ten
thousand men to attack him in his castle. Black-mail was the life of
the small pirate rulers, and they could not abandon it without making
a precedent fatal to themselves, and inviting insurrection from their
subjects. Preble could only strike the coast with fear; and during the
summer of 1804 he began a series of dashing assaults with the
“Constitution,” helped by four new craft,—the “Argus” and “Syren,”
fine sixteen-gun brigs; the “Nautilus” and “Vixen,” fourteen-gun
schooners; the “Enterprise,” of twelve guns, and a captured
Tripolitan brig of sixteen guns, re-named the “Scourge,”—all
supported by eight small gunboats borrowed from the King of Naples
who was also at war with Tripoli. Thus commanding a force of about
one hundred and fifty guns, and more than a thousand men, August
3, carrying his flag-ship into the harbor, Preble engaged the
Tripolitan batteries at very short range for two hours. Fortunately, the
Mussulmans could not or did not depress their guns enough to injure
the frigate, and after throwing many broadsides into the batteries and
town, Preble retired without losing a man. His gunboat flotilla was
equally daring, but not so lucky. One division was commanded by
Lieutenant Somers, the other by Stephen Decatur. They attacked the
Tripolitan gunboats and captured three, besides sinking more; but
James Decatur was killed. A few days afterward, August 7, the
attack was repeated, and some five hundred 24-lb. shot were thrown
into the batteries and town. August 24 a third bombardment took
place within the month; and although Preble knew that Barron was
near at hand with a strong reinforcement, August 29 he carried his
flotilla a fourth time into the harbor, and again threw several hundred
solid shot into the town. A fifth bombardment, the heaviest of all, took
place early in September. In these affairs, so poor was the Tripolitan
gunnery or courage that the Americans suffered almost no loss
beyond that of a few spars. The only serious disaster, besides the
death of James Decatur, was never explained. Preble, wishing to try
the effect of a fireship, on the night of September 4 sent one of his
best officers, Lieutenant Somers, into the harbor with the ketch
“Intrepid” filled with powder, bombs, and shell. The “Argus,” “Vixen,”
and “Nautilus” escorted Somers to shoal water, and waited for him to
rejoin them in his boats. They saw the batteries fire upon him; then
they heard a sudden and premature explosion. All night the three
cruisers waited anxiously outside, but Somers never returned. He
and his men vanished; no vestige or tidings of them could ever be
found.
Considering Preble’s narrow means, the economy of the
Department, and the condition of his small vessels, nothing in
American naval history was more creditable than the vigor of his
blockade in the summer of 1804; but he could not confidently assert
that any number of such attacks would force the Pacha to make
peace. A week after the loss of Somers in the “Intrepid” Commodore
Samuel Barron arrived, bringing with him nearly the whole available
navy of the United States, and relieved Preble from the command.
Preble returned home, and was rewarded for his services by a gold
medal from Congress. Two years afterward he died of consumption.
Barron had with him such a force as the United States never
before or since sent in hostile array across the ocean,—two forty-
fours, the “Constitution” and the “President;” two thirty-eight gun
frigates, the “Constellation” and the “Congress;” the “Essex,” of
thirty-two guns; the new brigs, “Hornet” of eighteen, and the “Syren”
and “Argus” of sixteen; the twelve-gun schooners “Vixen,” “Nautilus,”
and “Enterprise;” ten new, well-built American gunboats; and two
bomb-vessels. With the exception of the frigates “Chesapeake” and
“United States,” hardly a sea-going vessel was left at home.
Commanded by young officers like John Rodgers and Stephen
Decatur, Chauncey, Stewart, and Isaac Hull, such a squadron
reflected credit on Robert Smith’s administration of the navy.
Nevertheless the Pacha did not yield, and Barron was obliged by
the season to abandon hope of making his strength immediately felt.
Six months later the commodore, owing to ill-health, yielded the
command to John Rodgers, while the Pacha was still uninjured by
the squadron. As the summer of 1805 approached, fear of Rodgers’s
impending attack possibly helped to turn the Pacha’s mind toward
concession; but his pacific temper was also much affected by events
on land, in which appeared so striking a combination of qualities,—
enterprise and daring so romantic and even Quixotic that for at least
half a century every boy in America listened to the story with the
same delight with which he read the Arabian Nights.
A Connecticut Yankee, William Eaton, was the hero of the
adventure. Born in 1764, Eaton had led a checkered career. At
nineteen he was a sergeant in the Revolutionary army. After the
peace he persisted, against harassing difficulties, in obtaining what
was then thought a classical education; in his twenty-seventh year
he took a degree at Dartmouth. He next opened a school in Windsor,
Vermont, and was chosen clerk to the Vermont legislature. Senator
Bradley, in 1792, procured for him a captain’s commission in the
United States army. His career in the service was varied by
insubordination, disobedience to orders, charges, counter-charges, a
court-martial, and a sentence of suspension not confirmed by the
Secretary of War. In 1797 he was sent as consul to Tunis, where he
remained until the outbreak of the war with Tripoli in 1801. Tunis was
the nearest neighbor to Tripoli, about four hundred miles away; and
the consul held a position of much delicacy and importance. In the
year 1801 an elder brother of the reigning Pacha of Tripoli resided in
Tunis, and to him Eaton turned in the hope of using his services.
This man, Hamet Caramelli, the rightful Pacha of Tripoli, had been
driven into exile some eight or nine years before by a rebellion which
placed his younger brother Yusuf on the throne. Eaton conceived the
idea of restoring Hamet, and by this act of strength impressing all the
Mahometan Powers with terror of the United States. In pursuit of this
plan he spent more than twenty thousand dollars, embroiled himself
with the Bey of Tunis, quarrelled with the naval commanders, and in
1803 returned to America to lay his case before the President and
Congress.

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(eBook PDF) Understanding Politics:

Ideas, Institutions, and Issues 12th

Political Party Systems 339 THE PURSUIT OF PROSPERITY 403

17 International Relations: The Struggle for World

distinctive—choices? Similarly, conflicts between nation-states or social groups raise philosophical

New in the TWELFth Edition

Supplements for Students and Instructors

WHY STUDY POLITICS?

The Public Interest

BASIC CONCEPTS OF POLITICS

Legitimacy and popularity go hand in hand. Illegitimate rulers are unpop-

The complaint was common to all French ministers in the United

That Monroe should have been the last person in London to

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Ebook PDF Understanding Politics Ideas Institutions and Issues 12th Edition PDF

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Ebook PDF Understanding Politics Ideas Institutions and Issues 12th Edition PDF

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(eBook PDF) Understanding Politics:

Ideas, Institutions, and Issues 12th

Political Party Systems 339 THE PURSUIT OF PROSPERITY 403

17 International Relations: The Struggle for World

distinctive—choices? Similarly, conflicts between nation-states or social groups raise philosophical

New in the TWELFth Edition

Supplements for Students and Instructors

WHY STUDY POLITICS?

The Public Interest

BASIC CONCEPTS OF POLITICS

Legitimacy and popularity go hand in hand. Illegitimate rulers are unpop-

The complaint was common to all French ministers in the United

That Monroe should have been the last person in London to

You might also like

17 International Relations: The Struggle for World