Mood and Modality

See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.
net/publication/310448020
Modality and mood in functional linguistic approaches
Chapter · January 2016
CITATIONS READS
3 10,656
1 author:
Karin Aijmer
University of Gothenburg
125 PUBLICATIONS 2,203 CITATIONS
SEE PROFILE
Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:
history of language View project
translation studies View project
All content following this page was uploaded by Karin Aijmer on 19 November 2016.
The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

Modality and mood in functional linguistic
approaches
Oxford Handbooks Online
Modality and mood in functional linguistic approaches
Karin Aijmer
The Oxford Handbook of Modality and Mood
Edited by Jan Nuyts and Johan Van Der Auwera
Subject: Linguistics, Semantics, Morphology and Syntax

Online Publication Date: Jul DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199591435.013.22
2015
Abstract and Keywords
The chapter deals with functional approaches to mood and modality. The focus is on
Systemic Functional Grammar (SFG) associated with Halliday’s writings, Dik’s Functional
Grammar (FG), and the mainly American functional school of Role and Reference
Grammar (RRG). The positions taken by these schools can be described as “structuralist-
functionalist” in that they propose models relating form to function. It is shown that a
layered representation in some form is required to account for the role of mood and
modality. Halliday’s interpersonal grammar has been further developed under the
heading of Appraisal. It is typical of this and related theories that it emphasizes the
similarity between modality and other types of attitudes which can be expressed by
language.
Keywords: mood, modality, Role and Reference Grammar (RRG), Functional Grammar (FG), Systemic Functional
Grammar (SFG), Functional Procedural Grammar (FPG), Appraisal
1 Introduction
The beginnings of a functional perspective on modality and mood can be traced back to a
general dissatisfaction with formalist accounts of language resulting in the emergence of
several branches of linguistics which call themselves functional. In this chapter I will
discuss functional approaches to modality and mood.
The chapter will deal with modality and mood in Systemic Functional Grammar (SFG)
associated with Halliday’s writings, Dik’s Functional Grammar (FG), and the mainly
Page 1 of 28
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: Gothenburg University Library; date: 05 March 2016

approaches
American functional school of Role and Reference Grammar (RRG). The position taken by
these schools can be described as “structuralist-functionalist” in that they regard “the
grammar of a language as itself constituting a system, which needs to be described and
correlated with function within discourse” (Butler 2003: xvi). In addition, we have seen
the emergence of a number of functional models recognizing the importance of the
cognitive, social, and interactive context for the study of modality. Modality has, for
instance, been analyzed in terms of its interactional and pragmatic functions to take up
different stances towards the hearer and the message.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 2 introduces the topics, problems and
issues in a functional analysis of modality. Section 3 discusses the school of SFG with a
focus on the definition of modality. Section 4 deals with FG and RRG. Section 5 deals with
cognitive-functional approaches to modality. Section 6 analyzes modality in interactional
terms as (epistemic) stance. Section 7 is the conclusion.
2 Background
Functionalist ideas have had an effect on many areas of linguistics including the study of
modality. In 1992 a symposium on Mood and Modality was held at the University of New
Mexico with the goal of bringing together linguists who had in common that they wanted
to explore modality from many different perspectives in functional linguistics (Bybee and
Fleischman eds. 1995). The participants at the symposium shared a conviction that the
functions of modality are embedded in contexts of social interaction and, consequently,
“cannot be described adequately apart from their contextual moorings in interactive
discourse” (Bybee and Fleischman 1995: 3). There was agreement that the time was ripe
for a broadening of the study of modality to more languages and more focus on the
relationship between form and function.
Page 2 of 28

approaches
The empirical basis for the linguistic study of modality has been widened as a result of
the greater interest in exploring the functions and uses of modal expressions. In
traditional studies of modality focusing on “the grammar of modality” the focus has been
on modal auxiliaries, that is on grammaticalized modal expressions. In a perspective
prioritizing function, the notion of modality can be extended to other types of linguistic
expressions. Nuyts (2001) takes a broad functional perspective on the linguistic
manifestations of (epistemic) modality and distinguishes four different expression types
all found in Western European languages: (1) modal adverbs; (2) modal adjectives; (3)
mental state predicates; (4) modal auxiliaries (Nuyts 2001: 29).
(1) Maybe/probably/certainly… they have run out of fuel.

(2) It is possible/probable/likely/certain… that they have run out of fuel.
(3) I think/believe… they have run out of fuel.
(4) They may/might/must… have run out of fuel.
Perkins (1983: 2) recognized a class of “modal expressions” extending far beyond the
category of modal auxiliaries and including semi-auxiliaries, adjectival, participial and
nominal modal expressions, modal adverbs, and lexical verbs. The expressions can be
deontic such as the deontic participles be permitted to, be urged to or epistemic such as
be assumed to, be believed to, be considered that. Modal adverbs are generally epistemic
and include clearly, evidently, maybe, probably, possibly, surely. According to Perkins
(1983: 2), the close scrutiny of a wide range of modal phenomena also made it clear that
“no two modal expressions could be said to have exactly the same meaning.”
Hunston (2011: 66) argues that we also need to recognize modal-like expressions
appearing in contexts that signal modal meanings though the modal meaning is realized
in ways that are not usually considered modal. The verb decide can, for instance, have a
modal-like meaning in expressions such as it’s up to him to decide where to go.
Functional approaches to modality bring up new issues, perspectives, and views.

According to Nuyts (2001: 7), “the functionalist tenet is understood as a methodological
directive to uncover functional motivations for linguistic forms and structures in grammar
and in discourse.” Modality should be studied both formally and functionally and,
additionally, function should be able to explain the distribution of forms.
An important consequence of the functional perspective is that modality and mood should
be described across a wide range of language types so that the definition of modality is
given a typological dimension. In a pioneering study, Palmer (1986) laid the groundwork
for a functional-typological perspective in research on modality and mood. Although the
enterprise was not carried out systematically, Palmer (1986: 2) showed that the category
of modality can and should be “identified, described and compared across languages.”
Page 3 of 28

approaches
Subsequent analyses comparing across languages have resulted in a number of
functional-typological studies of modality, as shown by the articles on modality in the
World Atlas of Language Structures Online (Haspelmath et al. 2008). Moreover, some
typological studies of modality have an additional diachronic dimension and represent
cross-linguistically relevant connections as grammaticalization paths on a semantic map
(van der Auwera and Plungian 1998). The work by Narrog (2012) is another good
example of how we need typological studies in the grammaticalization tradition studying
the emergence of modal expressions. Narrog studied cross-linguistic diversity in the
emergence and development of deontic modal markers on the basis of samples from 200
languages.
In addition to typological studies of modality, we find many studies of modality in

languages other than English. We can mention Hengeveld (1988) for a study of modality
in Spanish and Nuyts’ (2001) corpus-based study of epistemic modality in several Western
European languages. (See also the studies in Bybee and Fleischman eds. 1995 which
include many different languages.)
3 Modality and mood in Systemic Functional Grammar

In this section I will discuss SFG in some detail since this theory provides the most wide-
ranging account of modality. It has also been an important motor behind recent
developments in studies of modality. In SFG both modality and mood can be described
with reference to the different macro-functions that language can have. The macro-
functions distinguished by Halliday (1970) are the interpersonal, textual, and
representational function. Modality does not have the representational function to
represent or refer to phenomena in the real world but it derives from the interpersonal
macro-function.
[It] serves to establish and maintain social relations: for the expression of social
roles, which include the communication roles created by language itself—for
example the roles of questioner or respondent, which we take on by asking or
answering a question: and also for getting things done, by means of the
interaction between one person and another.
(Halliday 1970: 143)
Page 4 of 28

approaches
Click to view larger
Figure 1. The system of MOOD
The interpersonal macro-function is concerned with the establishment of social relations

and with the participation by the speaker in the speech event in all kinds of personal
interaction. The system of MOOD (capitalized in SFG), rendered in Figure 1, describes
the choices underlying the exchange of information in the clause and the establishment of
the social roles of the speaker and the hearer. MOOD has to with the principles behind
the choice of the indicative and the imperative and between a declarative and
interrogative clause.
A distinction is proposed between declarative and interrogative clauses, associated with

the specific speech roles set up in dialogue which are either “giving” or
“demanding” (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 107). For example, in a declarative clause
the speaker is giving some information to the hearer. In an interrogative clause the
speaker assumes the role of asking for information.
Click to view larger
Figure 2. Simplified network for modality
In the perspective of SFG, modality is closely associated with the MOOD system. Thus,
modality is opened up as a choice if the indicative is chosen. Halliday and Matthiessen
(2004) avoid the philosophical terms epistemic and deontic modality to distinguish
between different modal domains but introduce the categories “modalization” (roughly
epistemic modality) and “modulation” (roughly obligation and inclination). Figure 2
presents a simplified version of the modality network (cf. Halliday and Matthiessen 2004:
128).
Page 5 of 28

approaches
Modalization has to do with “proposition” (the function of the clause in the exchange of
information). Propositions can be affirmed and denied. What the modality system does “is
to construe the region of uncertainty that lies between ‘yes’ and ‘no’” (Halliday and
Matthiessen 2004: 147). There are two kinds of intermediate possibilities: degrees of
probability (possibly/probably/certainly) and degrees of usuality (sometimes/usually/
always) (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 147).
A distinction is made between modality as described above and modulation (scales of

obligation and inclination). Modulation concerns proposals (a clause functioning in the
exchange of “goods and services” rather than information). In a proposal, a distinction is
made between the positive do it and the negative don’t do it. Modulated clauses can be
offers (shall I go home?), requests to the listener (go home) or suggestions that both the
speaker and the hearer do something (let’s go home).
The modal dimensions distinguishing between modal expression types can be organized
as paradigms. The paradigm in Table 1 (cf. Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 148)
describes how “probability” can be organized as a system. Probability can be expressed
by a “finite modal operator” (e.g. will), by a “modal adjunct” (e.g. probably) or a
combination of both (e.g. will probably).
Table 1. The probability paradigm
Certain that must be true that’s certainly true that must certainly be true
Probable that will be true that’s probably true that will probably be true
Possible that may be true that’s possibly true that may possibly be true
Probability is associated with three different values (degrees of certainty). The

justification for the system proposed has to do with what happens when the different
modal elements are negated. The middle row can be illustrated by that’s probably true. It
makes no difference whether we say that’s probably not true or that’s not probably true.
The top and bottom rows in the paradigm behave differently with regard to negation. The
value of the modality is changed when the modal element is negated: “certain+not” =
“not+possible”; “possible+not” = “not+certain.”
Another distinction which is expressed in the paradigm is that between subjective (e.g.
that must be true) and objective modal expressions (e.g. it is certain that it is true). The
distinction also applies to adjectives and adverbs (cf. the subjective I’m certain and the
objective certainly). Halliday recognizes an additional dimension along which expressions
Page 6 of 28

approaches
of modality can vary. When the speaker says I’m certain the source of conviction is
presented as a subjective judgment on the part of the speaker. On the other hand,
certainly or must imply that the source of conviction is implicit only. These options can be
expressed as a feature matrix with four different combinations, shown in Table 2
(Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 150).
Table 2. Distinctions in the modal paradigm
Subjective Objective
Implicit must certainly
Explicit I’m certain that… it is certain that…
The modality paradigm in Table 1 includes both central types of modal expressions, viz.
the modal auxiliaries and the modal adverbs, or “modal adjuncts,” as Halliday calls them.
With epistemic modality certain modal expressions have been treated as grammatical
metaphors. This notion should be understood in a way specific to the theory of SFG.
Traditionally a lexeme with a certain literal meaning can have a transferred or
metaphorical meaning. However in SFG the notion “metaphor” is used to indicate that
there are different ways to express the same meaning. This brings Halliday to the idea of
grammatical metaphor where the variation is mainly in the grammatical form. According
to Halliday and Matthiessen (2004: 613), “[w]ith modality, it is very clear that certain
grammatical environments constitute metaphorical realizations of modality.” In Halliday’s
example I don’t believe that pudding ever will be cooked, I don’t believe functions as an
expression of modality, as can be shown if a tag is added, which will be will it, not don’t I
(Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 613). I don’t believe is a metaphorical realization of what
Halliday refers to as probability. There is a large number of such grammatical metaphors
functioning as resources for the speaker to express a modal attitude. In the Systemic-
Functional perspective they are manifestations of “interpersonal grammatical metaphor,”
i.e. they belong to the interpersonal metafunction associated with modality and mood.
Other metaphorical expressions where modality is realized in a separate clause are, for
example, it is obvious that, it stands to reason that, nobody tries to deny that, it is
particularly difficult to avoid the conclusion that… “and a thousand and one others, all of
which mean ‘I believe’” (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 618).
Halliday’s system of modality thus makes it possible to describe many different types of
modal expressions. It is argued that all the variants met with can have an effect on the
enfolding of the dialogue:
Page 7 of 28

approaches
We have taken the description of modality up to this degree of detail because in
the analysis of discourse, especially the conversational, more dialogic forms, all
these variants are likely to be met with, and their differences in meaning may
have a marked effect on the unfolding and impact of discourse.
(Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 150)
The number of modal forms is considerable: “The actual number of systematic

distinctions that are made in this corner of the language runs well into the tens of
thousands” (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 624).
Halliday’s model has provided the setting for several descriptions of modality and mood.
Tucker (2001) studies “alternative or secondary modal resources” with special regard to
adverbs, and to the adverb possibly in particular. He takes the view of modality that there
is a choice between [modalized] and [not modalized] depending on how the verbal
constituent of the clause is realized. The modalized option is between “primary
modality” (the choice of a modal auxiliary) and “secondary (also referred to as
alternative) modality” (e.g. a modal adverb or another modal expression of a lexical
nature). It is shown that possibly provides a resource for the expression of modality in
contexts where modal auxiliaries are not available to express the same functions. Possibly
can, for example, occur in units at lower ranks than the clause, as in she plans to study
law possibly within a year. On the basis of confirming evidence from a large collection of
corpus data, Tucker concludes that modal adverbs such as possibly “are not simply an
alternative resource [for a modal operator]: they are the only resource [when modal
operators are not available]” (Tucker 2001: 212).
Davies has made several contributions to the study of modality in the framework of SFG.
Davies (1988) analyzes probability judgments realized by may, might, should, and will and
their negations. In order to account for their modal meaning, Davies invokes both the
ideational meaning (probability) and their textual meta-function. For example, part of the
meaning of non-deontic may has to do with discourse relations and falls under the textual
component in a multi-component grammar. This meaning feature can be described as
“contradictory of existing CG [common ground] expectation” (Davies 1988: 164). For
example, in a situation where it rains a lot it would be odd to say it may rain today, while
this would be normal in the Sahara desert. In the desert situation the common ground
contains “it’s highly improbable that it will rain today”—this is denied by the use of may,
which is therefore not felt to be odd (Butler 2003: 499). In a more recent article, Davies
(2001) proposes a semantic model of modality and mood in a linguistic description of
English, developing some suggestions in earlier work (Davies 1979). English modals of
knowledge and belief are analyzed in terms of propositional attitudes and described in a
Page 8 of 28

approaches
model which is based on epistemic logic and extended so as to incorporate probabilities.
Propositional attitudes are expressed as operators on the proposition, such as
“necessary,” “possible,” and “probable.” Some examples are given in (5) (quoted from
Butler 2003: 500):
(5)
The propositional operators allow the analyst to formulate implicational relations

between them. Necessary belief in the truth of p implies, for example, possible belief in
the truth of p (Davies 2001: 225).
The indicative and the subjunctive moods can be analysed with the help of the same
propositional attitudes, as in (6):
(6)
Halliday’s interpersonal grammar has been further developed by Martin (2000) under the
heading of Appraisal. In the system of “Appraisal,” a distinction is made between
different types of evaluation such as Affect (the expression of emotion), Judgment
(dealing with moral assessment), and Appreciation (aesthetic commentary). Modality in a
narrow sense is referred to as Engagement and defined as “a system of options” “to
indicate the speaker’s degree of commitment to the appraisal being expressed, and is
expressed through modality and related systems” (Hunston and Thompson 2000: 142). An
additional category is Amplification (grading). Both modality and other (non-modal) types
of evaluation are central notions signaling what speakers (or writers) are attempting to
achieve in their texts.
The system of Engagement is a theory of how we use modality to do things with language
(White 2003). Engagement includes modal resources associated with evidentiality,
Page 9 of 28

approaches
modality, and hedging, “that is to say, values of probability, usuality, reality phase (it
seems, apparently), projection and other attributing or speech reporting
resources” (White 1998: no page numbering). The theory is “dialogical” or interactive
and accounts for the functions of modality in actual contexts of use. Modality is, for
example, not only used to convey certainty (or uncertainty) but speakers use expressions
of certainty to acknowledge the contentiousness of discourse and to “engage with
alternative voices and positions” (White 2003: 261). In Engagement theory, categories
are introduced to describe how modal elements are used strategically (for agreeing but
also for challenging, persuasion, manipulation). The speaker can concur with explicit or
implicit voices by using of course, naturally, obviously. Other modal alternatives (it
seems, I think) recognize the possibility that there is some tension between what the
speaker thinks and alternative voices and are understood as more argumentative. The
categories proposed such as the concurrence function or counter-expectation have turned
out to be useful to analyze modality in text types such as discussions, debates, or court
proceedings, replacing functional categories such as hedge or emphasizer (cf. Simon-
Vandenbergen and Aijmer 2007a).
4 Functional Grammar and Role and Reference Grammar

According to Dik (1997), modality and mood do not constitute a unified semantic domain
which could be given a single cover-definition. Mood is restricted to the category of
modal devices expressed through grammatical means while modality refers to the
semantic area. “Therefore we first distinguish a number of modality types, which we then
assign to different parts of the structure of the clause” (Dik 1997: 241).
Page 10 of 28

approaches
According to Goossens (1996) one of the earliest treatments of modality in FG was

Bolkestein’s (1980) analysis of modal expressions denoting necessity and obligation in
Latin. This study inspired his own analysis of English modal auxiliaries within this
framework (Goossens 1985, 1987). Goossens (1985) proposed that the modalization of
predications can be constructed in three different ways: through the addition of an
operator to the main predicate, through a predicate formation rule (comparable to what
elsewhere is often called a “lexical rule,” modifying the basic “predicate frame” of the
main predicate), or through the selection of an independent, full modal predicate. He
presents an FG view of the grammaticalization processes undergone by the English
modals in their development from Old to Present-day English. He shows that the shifts
undergone by the modal auxiliaries can be described on a “grammaticalization scale”
within FG capturing degrees of grammaticalization. The following scale is proposed:
(7) full predicates > predicate formation > predicate operators
It is tentatively suggested that modals expressing facultative (root) modality and deontic
modality should be dealt with as full predicates, that epistemic modals involve predicate
formation and that modals in future and conditional senses could be accounted for as
predicate operators (Goossens 1985: 216).
Both the later versions of FG (essentially, after Hengeveld 1988) and RRG propose
models characterized by a hierarchical representation of modality, in which different
semantic types of modality affect the “state of affairs” in different ways, depending on the
semantic scope of each (the wider the scope, the higher the category is situated in the
hierarchy). The first systematic account of this in the general framework of FG is
Hengeveld (1988). Hengeveld distinguishes between three types of modality with
additional modal distinctions within each group, situated at different “levels” in the
scopal hierarchy:
I. Inherent modality (level 1 modalities) refers to the linguistic means through which
the speaker “can characterize the relation between a participant in a SoA [state of
affairs] and the potential actualization of that SoA” (Hengeveld 1988: 233). It covers
distinctions such as ability (can, be able to), volition (e.g. be willing to), obligation,
and permission. The different types of inherent modality have in common that they
are internal to the SoA.
Page 11 of 28

approaches
II. Objective modal distinctions (level 2 modalities) are concerned with the speaker’s
evaluation of the actuality of a SoA in terms of his or her knowledge of possible
situations. A distinction is made between epistemic and deontic modality depending
on the type of knowledge on which the speaker bases his or her evaluation. Thus,
two types of knowledge can be distinguished (Hengeveld 1988: 137):
(a) Knowledge of possible situations obtaining in S’s conception of reality or of a
hypothesized situation.
(b) Knowledge of possible situations relative to some system of moral, legal or
social conventions.
Based on the analysis of how the SoA designated by a predication is compatible with
either type of knowledge, different scales of modal meanings can be established:
(a) Epistemic objective modalities:
Certain-probable-possible-conceivable-impossible
(b) Deontic objective modalities:
Obligatory-customary-permissible-acceptable-forbidden
III. Epistemological modalities (level 3 modalities) pertain to the propositional

content and is part of the information the speaker wants to convey to the hearer.
This covers, first of all, subjective epistemic modality, through which the speaker
takes personal responsibility for the content of the proposition and signals how
certain he or she is about its truth. According to Hengeveld, epistemological
modality also includes evidentiality. By means of evidential modalities the speaker
expresses his or her assessment of the quality of the proposition in terms of how the
evidence has been arrived at. Further sub-types can be distinguished: inferential
(indirectly arrived at by inference); experiential (based on direct personal
experience); quotative (what has been heard from others).
Hengeveld’s (1988) study of the alternation of the subjunctive/indicative variation in

Spanish is situated within this framework. The occurrence of subjunctive or indicative
follows for example from the context in which the verb appears including contexts with
different types of (objective) modality. However, the mood alternation must consider a
number of different factors such as different readings of verbs like creo “think,” the
person of the speaker and the mitigation of the speech act force.
Another element of mood is sentence type. In Dik’s view, sentence types are considered
to be grammaticalized carriers of basic illocutions of linguistic expression (illocutionary
operators) (Hengeveld 1988: 231). The basic illocutions (declarative, interrogative,
imperative, exclamative) are integrated into the grammar as “illocutionary operators” at
a fourth level in the scopal hierarchy. The declarative operator, for example, has the
Page 12 of 28

approaches
following paraphrase: “DECL: S wishes A to add the content of the linguistic expression
to his pragmatic information” (Hengeveld 1988: 232).
A layered representation in some form seems to be required in a structural description of

modality for different languages. The FG layered structure representation has, for
instance, been introduced by Vet (1998) to study epistemic modal expressions of
possibility in French. However, there is little agreement about what the layered system
looks like and how many levels are needed (cf. also van der Auwera 2001). Goossens
(1996) confronts “standard” FG with the “facts” about can/could, will/would and must
based mainly on Coates (1983). It is suggested that the model will have to be refined or
revised in order to accommodate these observations. There are, for instance, examples of
will in which it is used as a marker of prediction (illustrating future tense) merging with a
subjective epistemic use (predictability). Such examples show there is no clear
demarcation between tense marking and subjective epistemic markers, although they are
assumed to be placed at a different levels. Harder (1998), too, turns attention to the
difficulties facing a description of modality in a model assuming that categories either
belong to one layer or the other or that a modal item has to be either lexical or
grammatical. Following in Goossens’ footsteps he suggests that a model “with several
slots for what is in some sense the ‘same’ element” can be used to capture the properties
of modal elements which cannot be adequately described as either lexical or grammatical
but represent degrees of grammaticalization (Harder 1998: 212).
Other treatments of the layered system of modality (and other semantic dimensions),
sometimes diverging from Hengeveld’s (1988) original proposal, can be found in
Hengeveld (1989), Dik (1997), and (in the context of the more recent successor of FG,
Functional Discourse Grammar) Hengeveld and Mackenzie (2008).
In RRG modal meanings are spread over different operators modifying the proposition or
part of the proposition, organized in the context of a hierarchical system which is
comparable to that in FG. A distinction is made between “modality,” “status,” and
“illocutionary force” operators. The operator modality is used to refer to what is generally
called the root or deontic sense of the modal auxiliaries (Van Valin and LaPolla 1997: 41).
Status as an operator is used for epistemic modality as well as external negation and
categories like realis and irrealis. According to Van Valin and LaPolla (1997: 41) there is,
for instance, a semantic relation between realis and necessity as expressed by a modal
auxiliary must with an epistemic reading, and between epistemic may and irrealis. A third
type of operator relates to illocutionary force. It refers to whether “an utterance is an
assertion, a question, a command or an expression of wish” (Van Valin and LaPolla 1997:
41). The operators modify different layers of the clause. Modality is a so-called core
operator defined in terms of its scope relations. “We can paraphrase John must leave as
Page 13 of 28

approaches
John is obliged to leave which suggests that root modality codes a relationship between a
core argument, the subject and the action” (Van Valin and LaPolla 1997: 45). The status
(epistemic modality) and illocutionary force operators, on the other hand, are clausal
since they have the whole clause in their scope.
It is noteworthy that Van Valin and LaPolla (1997) find no use for a separate category
mood in their theory: “Modality, status and illocutionary force are all conflated in
traditional grammar under the term ‘mood’. We will not use ‘mood’ as a theoretical term
because it is important to keep these concepts distinct” (Van Valin and LaPolla 1997: 42).
Van Valin and La Polla do not, for instance, regard subjunctive mood as a separate
category but as a combination of irrealis and illocutionary force.
As a final remark, it should be pointed out that layering as the only principle
oversimplifies the description of the functions of modal forms by neglecting their
cognitive-pragmatic functions or their association with discourse. Both FG and RRG can
be criticized for focusing on a grammatical or structural approach to language: there is a
distinct tendency “to limit attention exclusively to purely linguistic concepts and
analytical categories, and to work in terms of “encapsulated” grammar models which
disregard anything surpassing the strictly linguistic dimension” (Nuyts 2001: 6).
5 A cognitive-functional approach to epistemic modality

Functional approaches to modality are now converging with cognitive perspectives
(Goossens 2007). This is also evidenced by functional models which are both cognitive
and functional. Functional Procedural Grammar (FPG) (De Schutter and Nuyts 1983;
Nuyts 1989; Nuyts 2001) is an example:
[it] attempts to offer a global encompassing overview—a ‘blueprint’—of the

process of language production, from the level of conceptual representation
onwards. Such a theory is needed to comprehensively feature the full variety of
notions, structures and procedures deemed relevant for understanding linguistic
behaviour, and to conceive of their possible organization in the cognitive systems
responsible for their behavior.
(Nuyts 2001: 272).
Functional Procedural Grammar is a cognitively oriented model providing a description of

the production process and “what is behind it” (including a description of the
communication situation and a model of the hearer’s knowledge and attitudes; Nuyts
Page 14 of 28

approaches
2001: 275). The speaker consults this “universe of interpretation” during the production
process in order to make decisions about how to code information linguistically (e.g. with
regard to social conventions and rules). The layering characteristic of many functional
approaches is used to describe modality at the conceptual rather than the structural
level. On the other hand, “at the linguistic level there is probably very little, if anything at
all, left of layered structure, senso strictu” (Nuyts 2001: 315). The account of layering at
the linguistic level is a matter of characterizing the structural properties and behavior of
different modal “expression types” including principles combining elements to a coherent
structure (Nuyts 2001: 315).
According to Nuyts (2001), a comparison of different expression types may contribute to

our understanding both of the types studied and of modality in general: “Thus, we may
expect to find linguistic correspondences between the alternatives which are due to the
shared basic meaning of epistemic modality, but we can also expect to find (partial)
linguistic differences between them due to differences in the other functional dimensions
involved in their use” (Nuyts 2001: 30). In a pioneering “paradigmatic” study, Nuyts
compared epistemic adverbs and adjectives, mental state verbs, and auxiliaries, in order
to establish the functional factors explaining the choice between these expression types.
This can be illustrated by means of how the “opposition” between adjectives, as in it is
probable that this is true, and adverbs, as in probably this is true, is analyzed. Both
alternatives can be chosen to express that something is true with (in these specific
examples) a high degree of certainty (the epistemic meaning). However, a closer analysis
of how they are used shows that they have a different distribution and different
conditions of use. The (modal) adverbs are, for instance, more frequent than the (modal)
adjectives in the three West Germanic languages studied (English, Dutch, German). The
usage differences should be explicable in terms of functional dimensions or factors. A
number of functional factors are proposed making it possible to describe similarities and
differences between modal adjectives and adverbs. Modal elements can be
“performative” (involving the speaker’s own evaluation) or descriptive (reporting the
epistemic qualification of a state of affairs). However, modal adverbs cannot be used
descriptively, while adjectives can. Nuyts also contrasted modal adjectives and adverbs in
terms of the distinction between subjective vs. intersubjective (the category of
(inter)subjectivity): the adverbs do not code this dimension, while the adjectives do. The
latter more specifically typically code intersubjectivity, which explains why they are, for
instance, frequent in results on reports of scientific results where the conclusions can be
shared by everyone. However, the most important factor differentiating between the use
of a modal adjective and an adverb has to do with the information structure. The modal
adjective unlike the corresponding adverb can acquire strong focality in the discourse
context. On the basis of such factors we can arrive at a principled description of the
Page 15 of 28

approaches
similarities and differences between adjectives and adverbs as rendered in Table 3

(adapted from Nuyts 2001: 103):
Table 3. Functional factors in the use of adverbs vs. adjectives
Adverb Adjective
(Inter)subjectivity — +
Descriptive use — (+)
Focalized use — ++
((+)) not a major factor in its use
(+) the dimension is frequently responsible for the selection of the expression type
(++) the most important factor for understanding the selection of the expression type
(—) the expression is never triggered by the factor
In addition, modal adjectives and adverbs are used to achieve certain rhetorical or
strategic effects. According to Nuyts, speakers use epistemic expressions to make
“different types of strategic adjustments to an utterance,” for example, for reasons of
politeness (Nuyts 2001: 44). However, in Nuyts’ analysis the corpus data did not reveal
any special strategies of the rhetorical type for either the adverbs or the adjectives in
particular (they did reveal such strategies for the mental state verbs).
In a follow-up study using Nuyts’ criteria to compare modal adjectives and adverbs,
Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer (2007b) looked at the adjectival expressions it is
certain/it is obvious/it is clear and their adverbial correspondences in a sample of
present-day English. Two factors in particular were capable of explaining a large number
of the adjectival uses, viz. “presenting the assessment as objective and contrasting the
assessment with another modal evaluation” (Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer 2007b:
443). A comparison with the corresponding adverbs showed that they were exploited
rhetorically in a different way from the adjectives. Certainly has, for instance, developed
additional rhetorical functions such as emphasizer while obviously can be used to express
solidarity (in conversation) as well as superiority in argumentation. With clearly, on the
other hand, no secondary rhetorical function was found.
Page 16 of 28

approaches
6 Discourse-functional and interactional approaches to

modality
The label “functional” is now also used with regard to various “discourse-functional”
approaches to modality. These are not specifically bound to a particular theoretical model
of language and grammar but have in common that they pay attention to the role of
modality in an interactional or discourse perspective.
The notion “stance” is used in different disciplines such as linguistics, anthropology,

sociolinguistics, and discourse-functional linguistics (Englebretson 2007: 1; Ochs 1996;
Hunston and Thompson 2000; Kärkkäinen 2003; Biber 2006) to refer to the functions of
modal elements in the communication situation. Related terms are “commitment” (Stubbs
1986), “evidentiality” (Chafe 1986), “metadiscourse” (Hyland and Tse 2004), and
“engagement” (White 2003). In this section I will rely on the definition of “stance” by the
anthropologist Ochs (1996).
According to Ochs, epistemic stance “refers to knowledge or belief vis-à-vis some focus of
concern, including degrees of certainty of knowledge, degrees of commitment to truth of
propositions and sources of knowledge, among other epistemic qualities” (Ochs 1996:
410). It is distinct from affective stance, i.e. feelings or emotions, although both types of
stance can be assumed to be expressed in the communication situation. According to
Ochs, stance can be indexically associated with (all other) features of the social situation
in which communication takes place. As a result of their indexical properties epistemic
stance markers can acquire a rich interactional meaning. They can, for example, be
indexically linked to a particular social activity such as debating or to a social or
professional speaker identity.
The extended meaning of epistemic stance can be illustrated by the following example
quoted from Ochs (1996: 423) and taken from Goodwin (1990: 154), which represents the
discourse of pre-adolescent Black children. In their conversation about collecting bottles
the children used modal verbs such as can and could “to constitutively index not only the
epistemic stance of possible or uncertain worlds, but also the act of
suggesting” (Goodwin 1990: 154):
(8)
Bea: We could go around looking for more bottles.
((Discussing where to break bottle rims))
Martha: We could use a sewer.
((Discussing keeping the activity secret from boys))
Page 17 of 28

approaches
Kerry: We can limp so nobody know where we getting them from.
Martha does not use could to express uncertainty but to signal that she is making a
suggestion (“we could use a sewer to break the bottle”).
Modal elements can index multiple stances. In the case of a medical doctor (in American
society) the display of certainty (indicated for example by the use of the adverb certainly)
may be used to construct a professional identity as well as stances of being
“knowledgeable, objective and caring” (Ochs 1996: 419). Epistemic stance can also be
closely linked to argumentation and other rhetorical strategies, in particular hedging
(Lakoff 1972; Holmes 1984). According to Holmes (1984), the reasons for modifying a
speech act may, for example, be to increase solidarity (positive politeness if the speech
act is favorable to the hearer) or to express more distance if the speech act can be
experienced as intrusive (negative politeness). Haviland (1989: 40) gives examples where
the evidential particle nan “perhaps” in Tzotzil can serve as an interactional device to
express hesitation or to challenge the hearer if the context is argumentative.
Stance is pervasive in language and can be realized linguistically in many different ways.
However there is generally no agreement about the range of grammatical and lexical
resources which can be used to take up a modal stance in the interaction. Stubbs (1986:
2) proposes a programme where “markers of commitment and detachment require to be
studied through prolonged fieldwork, ethnography and textual analysis.” Markers of
commitment include a large number of elements including modal verbs, adjectives,
adverbs, and lexical verbs but also for instance hedges (sort of) and reported speech.
Stubbs’ call for a new research program focusing on modality in text and discourse has
had a huge response. This is witnessed in the literature on evaluative language,
commitment, stance, hedging. A comprehensive grammar of modality along the lines
suggested by Stubbs must not only consider all the different ways in which modal
expressions interact in the text, but also the role of more “narrow” combinations, e.g. of
modal auxiliaries and adverbs (Hoye 1997).
Stance belongs to aspects of language which are jointly constructed and negotiated by
the speaker and hearer in the communication situation. As a result, the focus is shifted to
the examination of how modality is used in interaction in real time (“interactional
linguistics”; cf. for instance Ford and Thompson 1996: 2). Marking epistemic stance “is
firmly rooted in and engendered by the interaction between the conversational
participants: stance displays manifest aspects of that interaction such as managing
routine trouble spots, engaging in more strategic recipient design, pursuing uptake or
signalling completion of one’s turn-of-talk” (Kärkkäinen 2003: 183).
Page 18 of 28

approaches
Discourse-functional studies have in common both that modality is studied in authentic
data on the basis of large corpora and that the functions associated with the modal
expressions are explained in terms of the structure of discourse (for example an
understanding of what goes on in conversation) or on the basis of such factors as speech
or writing, text type, and situations.
Several types of modal expressions have been analysed from a discourse perspective.
Coates (1983) studied the modal auxiliaries in English in actual use on the basis of a large
corpus. She showed, for example, that the modal auxiliaries occurred with different
frequencies in speech and in writing. Coates (1987) represents a more “holistic” approach
to modality, where the object of study is shifted from the modal auxiliaries in several
large (spoken and written) corpora to a wider range of expression types in “the
microcosm of one or two spoken texts” (Coates 1987: 111). The focus is on I think, sort of,
and tag questions.
Downing’s (2001) study of surely opened the way to research on modal adverbials as
stance-taking. Downing describes surely within the framework of Chafe’s (1986) analysis
of evidentiality, as an example of “interactive devices or resources for redefining common
ground between interlocutors” (Downing 2001: 251). It is shown that surely can express a
large number of interpersonal stances including confrontation and contradictory
meanings depending on whether surely co-occurs with an I-subject or a you-subject.
On the basis of a theory of how stance can be expressed we have seen a number of
comparisons between text-types (registers) such as political discourse, media discourse
and academic discourse. Biber and Finegan (1988, 1989) have shown how sophisticated
statistical methods (cluster analysis) can be used to identify speech styles marked by
“stance adverbials.” In their 1988 study six different categories of stance adverbials were
identified and the frequency of each type was computed in texts of the (written)
Lancaster–Oslo–Bergen (LOB) Corpus and the (spoken) London–Lund Corpus (LLC). Texts
that were maximally similar in their exploitation of stance adverbials were grouped into
clusters. The clusters were then interpreted in terms of the discourse functions of the
adverbials and the situational characteristics of the text. Their study showed that the
discourse function of the adverbials could be at variance with their literal meanings.
Surely adverbials (certainly, indeed, obviously, evidently, etc.) were for example
associated with a “generally persuasive stance requesting affirmation by marking certain
assertions as beyond dispute” (Biber and Finegan 1988: 31).
Biber and Finegan (1989) widened the analysis to stance markers in general (including
adverbs, verbs, and adjectives) drawn from different corpora. The stance markers were
divided into different categories based on both semantic and grammatical criteria and
Page 19 of 28

approaches
their frequencies were again computed. Using this method the authors identified, for
instance, a cluster characterized by its involved conversational style and the use of
hedges, emphatics, certainty verbs, doubt verbs, certainty adverbs, etc. (Biber and
Finegan 1989: 110).
Conrad and Biber (2000) studied adverbial markers of stance in speech and in writing
and in different registers. The patterns discovered were then interpreted functionally in
relation to communicative characteristics of each genre. The authors suggested, for
example, that the frequent occurrence of certain adverbials in conversation (probably,
actually, really, sort of) “is consistent with several contextual characteristics of
conversation, particularly the focus on interpersonal interactions, the conveying of
personal assessments and opinions, and the lack of time for planning or revision which
makes precise word choice difficult” (Conrad and Biber 2000: 65). The authors showed
that there are differences depending on whether the register is conversation, news
reportage, or academic prose. Epistemic stance was, for example, rarely signaled in news
reportage but several different types of epistemic stance adverbials were found in
academic prose. Conrad and Biber also drew attention to the social functions of stance
adverbials. Perhaps and maybe could, for instance, be used to convey that a suggestion
was made.
Biber (2006) compared modal verbs, stance adverbials such as obviously and structures
with a first person subject (e.g. I think) across different types of (written and spoken)
“university registers” such as classroom teaching, class management talk, textbooks, and
written course management language. The study showed that, in general, stance was
more frequent in the spoken than in the written genres. However, there were important
register differences cutting across the division between the spoken and written mode.
Stance features were, for instance, in general more frequent in both classroom
management and course management than in academic registers.
A common device to express stance is I think (and other complement-taking predicates). I

think has also been discussed diachronically in terms of grammaticalization. According to
Nuyts (2001: 107), “these predicates are notoriously difficult to deal with, much more so
than the adverbs and adjective, mainly because of their complex semantic structure and
their mysterious linguistic behavior, which often defies standard expectations regarding
the grammatical category of verbs.”
I think (that it is true) behaves differently from complement-taking predicates in general

since I think can also be inserted in the middle of the utterance or in final positions.
Grammaticalization has been taken to explain many of the mysterious properties of I
think including its discourse functions. Thompson and Mulac (1991) traced the
Page 20 of 28

approaches
development of I think from a complement-taking verb with a first person subject to its
end-point as “an epistemic fragment” expressing a degree of speaker commitment. They
did not use diachronic data but argue, on the basis of quantitative and qualitative
evidence from present-day English, that grammaticalization must have taken place along
the lines suggested. According to Thompson and Mulac, the change is dependent on the
frequency of I think and the blurring of the distinction between main and subordinate
clause associated with the deletion of that.
Thompson and Mulac’s historical account is not generally accepted but has given rise to a
number of “counter-proposals” tracing the development on the basis of empirical data
from different periods in the history of English. Brinton (1996) argues in favor of an
adverbial origin of the parenthetical I think on the basis of data from Old English and
onwards. According to Brinton, the parenthetical construction can be derived from a type
of relative construction attached to the main clause. Diagrammatically (adapted from
Fischer 2007: 105):
(9)
Stage I: They are poisonous. That I think.
Stage II: They are poisonous {that I think, as/so I think}.
Stage III: They are poisonous, I think. OR They are poisonous, as I think.
Stage IV: I think, they are poisonous./They are, I think, poisonous.
Fischer (2007), on the other hand, argues that the parenthetical element was not part of
a complex clause as claimed by Thompson and Mulac or from a relative clause as in
Brinton’s analysis. She shows on the basis of a large number of examples that I think
occurred both in independent clauses and as a complement clause from the beginning.
She therefore concludes that the parenthetical I think and related phrases “are best seen
as formulaic tokens, undergoing lexicalization rather than grammaticalization” (Fischer
2007: 112).
I think is a frequent modal expression in spoken language (Aijmer 1997). The functions of
I think, I believe, etc. have been described by labels such as hedging or booster which are
more closely associated with discourse than with epistemic modality (commitment,
certainty/uncertainty; Kaltenböck 2010). Kärkkäinen (2003, 2007) takes the study of the
functions of I think (and I guess) even further than other discourse-functional analyses by
relating them to the positions they occupy in the sequential structure of the discouse. She
shows that I think and similar predicates are not just hedges or politeness markers but
that they can become markers of discourse organization (discourse markers) signaling
boundaries or acting as frames at points of transition in the discourse.
Page 21 of 28

approaches
Another approach has been to study the distribution of I think in different text types and
social situations. Simon-Vandenbergen (2000) showed, on the basis of its frequencies in
the British National Corpus, that I think was particularly frequent in television debates
where speakers are constantly trying to formulate their opinions (Simon-Vandenbergen
2000: 45). A comparison between casual conversation and political interviews showed
that different types of I think were used in different social contexts. “Whether or not I
think is relatively more frequent in conversation or in political interviews, speakers do not
primarily use I think to express uncertainty but to convey ‘this is my opinion’” (Simon-
Vandenbergen 2000: 60). Politicians do not use I think to be hedging but use it in their
struggles for power in the interaction. I think has also been found to be frequent in
topical discussion and debates in a BBC radio programme (White and Sano 2006).
7 Conclusion
Modality has been dealt with in different branches of functional linguistics emerging as a
reaction to the formal approach represented by generative grammar. The functional
approaches to modality in SFG, FG, and RRG have in common that they propose models
relating form to function. They allow for a detailed description of a number of distinctions
expressed by modality. However, the focus is on the grammatical description of modality.
Moreover, the starting-point for the study of modality is usually the modal auxiliaries.
However, modality must be conceived broadly as going beyond the modal auxiliaries if we
take a functional view on how the semantic domain of modality is realized.
It follows that the study of modality includes both grammaticalized and lexical forms.
Recently there has also been more focus on the functions of modal expressions in
interaction and in longer texts. In discourse-functional approaches, modality is defined as
“stance.” This notion brings into play the interaction of modality with the social situation
and with the speaker–hearer negotiation going on in the discourse. Epistemic stance
provides the resources by means of which speakers construct a social or professional
persona, and express attitudes and alignments towards what is said; modal expressions
are also involved in social acts such as requests or suggestions. We can expect stance to
be expressed differently depending on the social situation or the activity. This has been
shown by numerous corpus-based studies comparing modal expressions across different
text types or discourse genres (e.g. academic discourse). Another tendency in modality
studies has been to emphasize the similarity between modality and other types of
attitudes which can be expressed by language. Modality can, for instance, be considered
as a part of the general study of evaluative language, including not only expressions by
Page 22 of 28

approaches
means of which speakers express how certain they are about what is said but also
judgments of good or bad.
References
Aijmer, Karin (1997). ‘I think—an English modal particle,’ in T. Swan and O. Jansen
Westvik (eds), Modality in Germanic Languages. Historical and comparative perspectives.
Berlin & New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1–47.
Biber, Douglas (2006). ‘Stance in Spoken and Written University Registers,’ Journal of
English for Academic Purposes 5: 97–116.
Biber, Douglas and Edward Finegan (1988). ‘Adverbial Stance Types in English,’
Discourse Processes 11: 1–34.
Biber, Douglas and Edward Finegan. (1989). ‘Styles of Stance in English: Lexical and
grammatical marking of evidentiality and affect,’ Text 9: 93–124.
Bolkestein, A. Machtelt (1980). Problems in the Description of Modal Verbs: An

investigation of Latin. Assen: Van Gorcum.
Brinton, Laurel J. (1996). Pragmatic Markers in English: Grammaticalization and

discourse functions. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
Butler, Christopher S. (2003). Structure and Function. A guide to three major structural-
functional theories. Part 1. Approaches to the simplex clause. Amsterdam and
Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Bybee, Joan and Suzanne Fleischman (eds) (1995). Modality in Grammar and Discourse.
Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Bybee, Joan and Suzanne Fleischman (1995). ‘Modality in grammar and discourse: An
introductory essay,’ in J. Bybee and S. Fleishman (eds), Modality in Grammar and
Discourse. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1–14.
Chafe, Wallace (1986). ‘Evidentiality in English Conversation and Academic Writing,’ in

W. Chafe and J. Nichols (eds), Evidentiality: The linguistic coding of epistemology.
Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 261–272.
Coates, Jennifer (1983). The Semantics of the Modal Auxiliaries. London: Croom Helm.
Coates, Jennifer (1987). ‘Epistemic Modality and Spoken Discourse,’ Transactions of the
Philological Society 85(1): 110–131.
Page 23 of 28

approaches
Conrad, Susan and Douglas Biber (2000). ‘Adverbial Marking of Stance in Speech and
Writing,’ in S. Hunston and G. Thompson (eds), Evaluation in text. Authorial stance and
the construction of discourse. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 56–73.
Davies, Eirian (1979). On the semantics of Syntax. London: Croom Helm.
Davies, Eirian (1988). ‘On Different Possibilities in the Syntax of English,’ in J. D. Benson,
M. J. Cummings, and W. S. Greaves (eds), Linguistics in a Systemic Perspective.
Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 155–184.
Davies, Eirian (2001). ‘Propositional Attitudes,’ Functions of Language 8: 217–250.
De Schutter, Georges and Jan Nuyts (1983). ‘Toward an Integrated Model of a functional
grammar,’ in S. Dik (ed.), Advances in Functional Grammar. Dordrecht: Foris, 387–404.
Dik, Simon (1997). The Theory of Functional Grammar. Part 1: The structure of the
clause. 2nd edn. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
Downing, Angela (2001). ‘“Surely you knew!” Surely as a marker of evidentiality and
stance,’ Functions of Language 8: 253–285.
Englebretson, Robert (2007). ‘Introduction,’ in R. Englebretson (ed.), Stancetaking in

Discourse. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1–25.
Fischer, Olga (2007). ‘The Development of English Parentheticals: A case of

grammaticalization?,’ in U. Smit, S. Dollinger, J. Hüttner, G. Kaltenböck, and U. Lutzky
(eds), Tracing English Through Time. Explorations in language variation: In honour of
Herbert Schendl on the occasion of his 65th birthday. Wien: Braumüller, 99–114.
Ford, Cecilia and Sandra Thompson (1996). ‘Interactional Units in Conversation:

Syntactic, interactional and pragmatic resources for the management of turns,’ in E.
Ochs, E. Schegloff, and S. Thompson (eds), Interaction and Grammar. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 134–184.
Goodwin, Marjorie H. (1990). He-Said-She-Said: Talk as social organization among black

children. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Goossens, Louis (1985). ‘Modality and the Modals. A problem for functional grammar,’ in
A. M. Bolkestein, C. de Groot and J. L. Mackenzie (eds), Predicates and Terms in
Functional Grammar. Dordrecht: Foris, 203–217.
Goossens, Louis (1987). ‘Modal Shifts and Predication Types,’ in J. van der Auwera and L.
Goossens (eds), Ins and Outs of the Predication. Dordrecht and Providence, RI: Foris, 21–
37.
Page 24 of 28

approaches
Goossens, Louis (1996). ‘English Modals and Functional Models: A confrontation,’

Antwerp Papers in Linguistics 86: 1–50.
Goossens, Louis (2007). ‘The Modal Auxiliaries of English, π—operators in Functional

Grammar and “grounding”’, in M. Hannay and G. J. Steen (eds), Structural-functional
Studies in English Grammar. In honour of Lachlan Mackenzie. Amsterdam and
Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 159–173.
Halliday, M. A. K. (1970). ‘Language Structure and Language Function,’ in J. Lyons (ed.),

New Horizons in Linguistics. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 140–165.
Halliday, M. A. K and Christian M. I. M, Matthiessen (2004). An Introduction to

Functional Grammar. 3rd edn. London: Arnold.
Harder, Peter (1998). ‘Modality in English: Polysemy and content-syntactic layering,’ in J.

van der Auwera, F. Durieux, and L. Lejeune (eds), English as a Human Language. To
honour Louis Goossens. München: LINCOM EUROPA, 212–220.
Haspelmath, Martin, Matthew S. Dryer, David Gil, and Bernard Comrie (eds) (2008). The
World Atlas of Language Structures Online. Munich: Max Planck Digital Library.
Haviland, John. (1989). ‘ Fighting Words: Evidential particles, affect and argument,’ in J.
Aske, N. Berry, L. Michaelis, and H. Filip (eds), Proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual
Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistic Society on Grammar and Cognition, February 14–16
1987. California: Berkeley Linguistic Society, 343–354.
Hengeveld, Kees (1988). ‘Illocution, Mood and Modality in a Functional Grammar of

Spanish,’ Journal of Semantics 6: 227–269.
Hengeveld, Kees (1989). ‘Layers and Operators in Functional Grammar.’ Journal of

Linguistics 25: 127–157.
Hengeveld, Kees and Lachlan Mackenzie (2008). Functional Discourse Grammar: A

Typologically-based Theory of Language Structure. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Holmes, Janet (1984). ‘Modifying Illocutionary Force,’ Journal of Pragmatics 8: 345–365.
Hoye, Leo (1997). Adverbs and Modality in English. London and New York: Longman.
Hunston, Susan (2011). Corpus Approaches to Evaluation. London and New York:
Routledge.
Page 25 of 28

approaches
Hunston, Susan and Geoff Thompson (2000). Editors’ introduction to Chapter 8. ‘Beyond
exchange: APPRAISAL systms in English’ by J. R. Martin,’ in S. Hunston and G. Thompson
(eds), Evaluation in Text. Authorial stance and the construction of discourse. Oxford:
Oxford University Press., 142–143.
Hyland, Ken and Polly Tse (2004). ‘Metadiscourse in Academic Writing: A reappraisal,’
Applied Linguistics 25: 156–177.
Kaltenböck, Gunther (2010). ‘Pragmatic Functions of Parenthetical I think,’ in G.

Kaltenböck, W. Mihatsch, and S. Schneider (eds), New Approaches to Hedging. United
Kingdom: Emerald, 237–266.
Kärkkäinen, Elise (2003). Epistemic Stance in English conversation. Amsterdam/

Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Kärkkäinen, Elise (2007). ‘The Role of I guess in conversational stance-taking,’ in R.

Englebretson (ed.), Stance-Taking in Discourse: Subjectivity, evaluation, interaction.
Lakoff, George. (1972). ‘Hedges: A study in meaning criteria and the logic of fuzzy
concepts,’ in Papers from the Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistics Society 8: 236–
287.
Martin, J. R. (2000). ‘Beyond Exchange: APPRAISAL systems in English,’ in S. Hunston

and G. Thompson (eds), Evaluation in Text. Authorial stance and the construction of
discourse. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 143–175.
Narrog, Heiko (2012). Modality, Subjectivity and Semantic Change. A cross-linguistic

perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nuyts, Jan (1989). Functional Procedural Grammar: An overview. Amsterdam: Working

Papers in Functional Grammar 31.
Nuyts, Jan (2001). Epistemic Modality, Language, and conceptualization: A cognitive-

pragmatic perspective. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Ochs, Elinor. (1996). ‘Linguistic Resources for Socializing Humanity,’ in J. J. Gumperz and
S. C. Levinson (eds), Rethinking Linguistic Relativity, 407–437. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Palmer, F. R. (1986). Mood and Modality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Perkins, Michael. R. (1983). Modal Expressions in English. London: Pinter.
Page 26 of 28

approaches
Simon-Vandenbergen, Anne-Marie (2000). ‘The functions of I think in Political Discourse,’

International Journal of Applied Linguistics 10: 41–63.
Simon-Vandenbergen, Anne-Marie, and Karin Aijmer (2007a). The Semantic Field of

Modal Certainty. A corpus-based study of English adverbs. Berlin and New York: Mouton
de Gruyter.
Simon-Vandenbergen, Anne-Marie, and Karin Aijmer (2007b). ‘The discourse

Functionality of Adjectival and Adverbial Epistemic Expressions: Evidence from present-
day English.,’ in C. S. Butler, R. Hidalgo Downing, and J. Lavid (eds), Functional
Perspectives on grammar and discourse: In honour of Angela Downing. Amsterdam and
Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 327–347.
Stubbs, Michael (1986). ‘A Matter of Prolonged Field Work: Notes towards a modal
grammar of English,’ Applied Linguistics 7: 1–25.
Thompson, Sandra and Anthony Mulac. (1991). ‘A Quantitative Perspective on the

Grammaticalization of Epistemic Parentheticals in English,’ in E. C. Traugott and B.
Heine (eds), Approaches to Grammaticalization, vol. 2, 313–329. Amsterdam: John
Benjamins.
Tucker, Gordon (2001). ‘Possibly Alternative Modality,’ Functions of Language 8: 183–

215.
van der Auwera, Johan (2001). ‘Modality: Domains, layers and parts of speech,’ in M. J.
Pérez Quintero. (ed.), Challenges and developments in Functional Grammar. La Laguna,
Tenerife: Universidad de la Laguna, 237–247.
van der Auwera, Johan and Vladimir A. Plungian (1998). ‘Modality’s Semantic Map,’
Linguistic Typology 2: 79–124.
Van Valin, Robert D. and Randy J. LaPolla (1997). Syntax: Structure, meaning and
function. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Vet, Co (1998). ‘Epistemic Modality in the Layered Structure of the Utterance,’ in M.

Hannay and A. M. Bolkestein (eds.), Functional Grammar and Verbal Interaction.
White, Peter R. R. (1998). Towards a Grammar of Power and Solidarity-Developments in

the Linguistics of Evaluation, Inter-subjectivity and Ideological Position. Paper presented
at 10th Euro-International Systemic Functional Workshop.
Page 27 of 28

approaches
White, Peter R. R. (2003). ‘Beyond Modality and Hedging: A dialogic view of the language
of intersubjective stance,’ Text 23: 259–284.
White, Peter R. R. and Motoki Sano, (2006). ‘Dialogistic Positions and Anticipated
Audiences—A framework for stylistic comparisons,’ in K. Aijmer and A.-M. Simon-
Vandenbergen (eds), Pragmatic Markers in Contrast. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 189–214.
Karin Aijmer
Karin Aijmer is professor emerita in English linguistics at the University of
Gothenburg, Sweden. Her research interests focus on pragmatics, discourse
analysis, modality, corpus linguistics, and contrastive analysis. Her publications
include Conversational routines in English: Convention and Creativity (1996), English
Discourse Particles. Evidence from a Corpus (2002), The Semantic Field of Modal
Certainty: a Study of Adverbs in English (with co-author) (2007), Pragmatics. An
Advanced Resource Book for Students (with co-author) (2012), and Understanding
Pragmatic Markers. A Variational Pragmatic Analysis (2013). She is co-editor of
Pragmatics of Society (2011) and of A Handbook of Corpus Pragmatics (2014).
Access is brought to you by
Page 28 of 28
View publication stats

Mood and Modality

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Mood and Modality

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

Modality and mood in functional linguistic approaches

Chapter · January 2016

history of language View project

translation studies View project

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

Subject: Linguistics, Semantics, Morphology and Syntax

Abstract and Keywords

Subscriber: Gothenburg University Library; date: 05 March 2016

Subscriber: Gothenburg University Library; date: 05 March 2016

(1) Maybe/probably/certainly… they have run out of fuel.

Functional approaches to modality bring up new issues, perspectives, and views.

Subscriber: Gothenburg University Library; date: 05 March 2016

In addition to typological studies of modality, we find many studies of modality in

3 Modality and mood in Systemic Functional Grammar

(Halliday 1970: 143)

Subscriber: Gothenburg University Library; date: 05 March 2016

Click to view larger

Figure 1. The system of MOOD

The interpersonal macro-function is concerned with the establishment of social relations

A distinction is proposed between declarative and interrogative clauses, associated with

Click to view larger

Figure 2. Simplified network for modality

Subscriber: Gothenburg University Library; date: 05 March 2016

A distinction is made between modality as described above and modulation (scales of

Table 1. The probability paradigm

Probability is associated with three different values (degrees of certainty). The

Subscriber: Gothenburg University Library; date: 05 March 2016

Table 2. Distinctions in the modal paradigm

Implicit must certainly

Explicit I’m certain that… it is certain that…

Subscriber: Gothenburg University Library; date: 05 March 2016

(Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 150)

The number of modal forms is considerable: “The actual number of systematic

Subscriber: Gothenburg University Library; date: 05 March 2016

The propositional operators allow the analyst to formulate implicational relations

Subscriber: Gothenburg University Library; date: 05 March 2016

4 Functional Grammar and Role and Reference Grammar

Subscriber: Gothenburg University Library; date: 05 March 2016

According to Goossens (1996) one of the earliest treatments of modality in FG was

(7) full predicates > predicate formation > predicate operators

Subscriber: Gothenburg University Library; date: 05 March 2016

III. Epistemological modalities (level 3 modalities) pertain to the propositional

Hengeveld’s (1988) study of the alternation of the subjunctive/indicative variation in

Subscriber: Gothenburg University Library; date: 05 March 2016

A layered representation in some form seems to be required in a structural description of

Subscriber: Gothenburg University Library; date: 05 March 2016

5 A cognitive-functional approach to epistemic modality

[it] attempts to offer a global encompassing overview—a ‘blueprint’—of the

(Nuyts 2001: 272).

Functional Procedural Grammar is a cognitively oriented model providing a description of

Subscriber: Gothenburg University Library; date: 05 March 2016

According to Nuyts (2001), a comparison of different expression types may contribute to

Subscriber: Gothenburg University Library; date: 05 March 2016

similarities and differences between adjectives and adverbs as rendered in Table 3

Table 3. Functional factors in the use of adverbs vs. adjectives

Descriptive use — (+)

((+)) not a major factor in its use

(—) the expression is never triggered by the factor

Subscriber: Gothenburg University Library; date: 05 March 2016

6 Discourse-functional and interactional approaches to

The notion “stance” is used in different disciplines such as linguistics, anthropology,