Bendi Forklift B30 B40 AC Parts

Manual F-523-0711 2011

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cause is superior to the effect, the people is the constituent cause,
the king is the effect, and hath all its royalty from them, by the
conveyance God hath appointed; so that they need not fetch it from
heaven, God gives it by the people, by whom also his power is
limited, and, if need be, diminished from what they gave his
ancestors: hence, if the people constitute and limit the power they
give the king, then they may call him to an account, and judge him
for the abuse of it; but the first is true, as is proven above: ergo.——
The major is undeniable, for sure they may judge their own
creature, and call him to an account for the power they gave him,
when he abuses it, though there be no tribunal formally regal above
him, yet, in the case of tyranny, and violating his trust, there is a
tribunal virtual eminently above him, in them that made him, and
reposed that trust upon him, as is said. 3. The fountain power is
superior to the power derived: the people, though they constitute a
king above them, yet retain the fountain power, he only hath the
derived power: certainly the people must retain more power
eminently, than they could give to the king, for they gave it, and he
receives it with limitations; if he turn mad or incapable, they may put
curators or tutors over him; if he be taken captive, they may appoint
another to exercise the power; if he die, then they may constitute
another, with more or less power; so then if they give away all their
power, as a slave selleth his liberty, and retain no fountain power or
radical right, they could not make use of it to produce any of these
acts: they set a king above them only with an executive power for
their good, but the radical power remains in the people, as in an
immortal spring, which they communicate by succession to this or
that mortal man, in the manner and measure they think expedient;
for otherwise, if they gave all their power away, what shall they
reserve to make a new king, if this man die? What if the royal line
surcease, there be no prophets now sent to make kings; and if they
have power in these cases, why not in the case of tyranny? 4. If the
king be accountable by law, for any act of tyranny done against one
man, then much more is he accountable for many against the whole
state: but the former is true; a private man may go to law before the
ordinary judges, for wronging his inheritance, and the king is made
accountable for the wrong done by him. Now, shall the laws be like
spiders webs, which hold flies, but let bigger beasts pass through?
Shall sentence be past for petty wrongs against a man, and none for
tyrannizing over religion, laws, and liberties of the kingdom? Shall
none be past against parricide or fratricide, for killing his brother,
murdering the nobles, and burning cities? Shall petty thieves be
hanged for stealing a sheep; and does the laws of God or man give
impunity for robbing a whole country of the nearest and dearest
interests they have, to crowned heads, for the fancied character of
royalty, which thereby is forfeited? 5. If there be judges appointed of
God independently, to give out and execute the judgment of the
Lord on all offenders, without exception of the highest; then the king
also must be subject to that judgment; but there are judges
appointed of God independently, to give out and execute the
judgment of the Lord on all offenders, without exception of the
highest. Two things must be here proved; first, that in giving
judgment they do not depend on the king, but are the immediate
vicars of God. Secondly, that the king is not excepted from, but
subject to their judgment, in case he be criminal.

First, They cannot depend upon the king, because they are more
necessary than the king; and it is not left to the king's pleasure
whether there be judges or not. There may be judges without a
king, but there can be no king without judges, nor no justice, but
confusion; no man can bear the people's burden alone, Numb. xi.
14, 17. If they depended on the king, their power would die with the
king; the streams must dry up the fountain; but that cannot be, for
they are not the ministers of the king, but of the kingdom, whose
honour and promotion, though by the king's external call, yet comes
from God, as all honour and promotion does, Psal. lxxv. 7. The king
cannot make judges whom he will, by his absolute power, he must
be tied to that law, Deut. i. 13. To take wise men and understanding,
and known: neither can he make them during pleasure; for if these
qualifications remain, there is no allowance given for their removal.
They are gods, and the children of the most high, appointed to
defend the poor and fatherless, as well as he, Psal. lxxxii. 3, 6. They
are ordained of God for the punishment of evil doers, in which they
must not be resisted, as well as he, Rom. xiii. 1, 2. By me (saith the
Lord) rule—all the judges of the earth, Prov. viii. 16. To them we
must be subject for conscience sake, as being the ministers of God
for good; they must be obeyed for the Lord's sake, as well as the
king; though they are sent of him, yet they judge not for man, but
for the Lord, 2 Chron. xix. 6. hence they sit in his room, and are to
act as if he were on the bench; the king cannot say, the judgment is
mine, because it is the Lord's; neither can he limit their sentence (as
he might, if they were nothing but his deputies) because the
judgment is not his: nor are their consciences subordinate to him,
but to the Lord immediately; otherwise if they were his deputies,
depending on him, then they could neither be admonished, nor
condemned for unjust judgment, because their sentence should
neither be righteous nor unrighteous, but as the king makes it; and
all directions to them were capable of this exception, do not so or
so, except the king command you; crush not the poor, oppress not
the fatherless, except the king command you; yea, then they could
not execute any judgment, but with the king's licence, and so could
not be rebuked for their not executing judgment.

Now all this is contrary to scripture, which makes the sentence of

the judges undeclinable, when just, Deut. xvii. 11. The Lord's
indignation is kindled, when he "looks for judgment, and behold
oppression, for righteousness, and behold a cry," Isa. v. 7. Neither
will it excuse the judges to say, the king would have it so; for even
they that are subservient to "write grievousness, to turn aside the
needy from judgment," &c. are under the wo, as well as they that
prescribe it, Isa. x. 1, 2. The Lord is displeased when "judgment is
turned away backward, and judgment stands afar off,"——and when
there is no judgment, whatever be the cause of it, Isa. lix. 14, 15.
The Lord threatens he will be "avenged on the nation," when a man
is "not found to execute judgment," Jer. v. 1, 9. And promises, if
they "will execute judgment and righteousness, and deliver the
spoiled out of the hand of the oppressor," he will give them
righteous magistrates, Jer. xxii. 3, 4. but if they do not, he will send
desolation, ibid. He rebukes those that "turn judgment to
wormwood, and leave off righteousness in the earth," Amos v. 7. He
resents it, when "the law is slacked, and judgment doth not go
forth" freely, without overawing or over-ruling restraint, Hab. i. 4.

Can these scriptures consist with the judges dependence on the

king's pleasure, in the exercise and execution of their power?
therefore, if they would avoid the Lord's displeasure, they are to give
judgment, though the king should countermand it. Secondly, That
the king is not excepted from their judgment, is also evident from
the general commands, Gen. ix. 6. "Whoso sheddeth man's blood,
by man shall his blood be shed:" there is no exception of kings or
dukes here: and we must not distinguish where the law
distinguisheth not, Numb. xxxv. 30, 31. Whoso killeth any person,
the murderer shall be put to death by the mouth of witnesses,—ye
shall take no satisfaction for the life of a murderer which is guilty of
death, but he shall be surely put to death. What should hinder then
justice to be awarded upon a murdering king? Shall it be for want of
witnesses? It will be easy to adduce thousands. Or, shall this be
satisfaction for his life, that he is a crowned king? The law saith,
there shall be no satisfaction taken. The Lord speaketh to under
judges, Levit. xix. 5. Ye shall do no unrighteousness in judgment,
thou shalt not respect the person of the poor, nor honour the person
of the mighty. If kings be not among the mighty, how shall they be
classed? Deut. i. 17. Ye shall not respect persons in judgment, but
you shall hear the small as well as the great; you shall not be afraid
of the face of man, for the judgment is God's. If then no man's face
can outdare the law and judgment of God, then the king's majestic
face must not do it; but as to the demerit of blood, he must be
subject as well as another. It is no argument to say, the Sanhedrim
did not punish David for his murder and adultery; therefore it is not
lawful to punish a king for the same; a reason from not doing is not
relevant. David did not punish Joab for his murder, but authorized it,
as also he did Bathsheba's adultery; will that prove, that murders
connived at, or commanded by the king, shall not be punished? Or
that whores of state are not to be called to an account? Neither will
it prove, that a murdering king should not be punished; that David
was not punished, because he got both the sin pardoned, and his
life granted from the Lord, saying to him by the mouth of the
prophet Nathan, Thou shalt not die. But as for the demerit of that
fact, he himself pronounced the sentence out of his own mouth, 2
Sam. xii. 15. "As the Lord liveth, the man that hath done this thing
shall surely die." 'So every king condemned by the law, is
condemned by his own mouth: for the law is the voice of the king.
Why then do we so much weary ourselves concerning a judge,
seeing we have the king's own confession, that is, the law?'
Buchanan de jure regni.

And there needs be no other difficulty to find a tribunal for a

murdering king, than to find one for a murderer; for a judgment
must acknowledge but one name, viz. of the crime. If a king then be
guilty of murder, he hath no more the name of a king, but of a
murderer, when brought to judgment; for he is not judged for
kingship, but for his murder; as when a gentleman is judged for
robbery, he is not hanged, neither is he spared, because he is a
gentleman, but because he is a robber. See Buchanan above. 6. If
the people's representatives be superior to the king in judgment,
and may execute judgment without him, and against his will, then
they may also seek account of him; for if he hath no power but from
them, and no power without them to act as king, (no more than the
eye or hand hath power to act without the body) then his power
must be inferior, fiduciary, and accountable to them; but the former
is true, the peoples representatives are superior to the king in
judgment, and may execute judgment without him, and against his
will. In scripture we find the power of the elders and heads of the
people was very great, and in many cases superior to the king;
which the learned Dr. Owen demonstrates in his preliminary
exercitations on the epistle to the Hebrews, and proves out of the
Rabbins, that the kings of the Jews might have been called to an
account, and punished for transgressing of the law. But in the
scripture we find, (1.) They had a power of judgment with the
supreme magistrate in matters of religion, justice and government.
Hamor and Shechem would not make a covenant with Jacob's sons,
without the consent of the men of the city, Gen. xxxiv. 20. David
behoved to consult with the captains of thousands, and every leader,
if it seemeth good to bring again the ark of God, 1 Chron. xiii. 1, 2,
3. So also Solomon could not do it without them, 1 Kings viii. 1.
Ahab could not make peace with Benhadad against the consent of
the people, 1 Kings xx. 8. The men of Ephraim complain that
Jephthah, the supreme magistrate, had gone to war against the
children of Ammon without them, and threatned to burn his house
with fire, which he only excuses by the law of necessity, Judges xii.
1, 2, 3. The seventy elders are appointed of God, not to be the
advisers only and helpers of Moses, but to bear a part of the burden
of ruling and governing the people, that Moses might be eased,
Numb. xi. 14, 17. Moses upon his sole pleasure, had not power to
restrain them in the exercise of judgment given of God.

They were not the magistrate's depending deputies, but in the act
of judging, they were independent, and their consciences as
immediately subjected to God as the superior magistrate, who was
to add his approbative suffrage to their actings, but not his directive
nor imperative suffrage of absolute pleasure, but only according to
the law; he might command them to do their duty, but he could do
nothing without them. (2.) They had power, not derived from the
prince at all, even a power of life and death. The rebellious son was
to be brought to the elders of the city, who had power to stone him,
Deut. xxi. 18, 24. They had power to punish adultery with death,
Deut. xxii. 21. They had power to cognosce whom to admit into, and
whom to seclude from the cities of refuge: so that if the king had
commanded to take the life of an innocent man, they were not to
deliver him, Josh. xx. throughout. But besides the elders of cities,
there were the elders and heads of the people, who had judicial
power to cognosce on all criminal matters, even when Joshua was
judge in Israel we find they assumed this power, to judge of that
matter of the two tribes and the half, Josh. xxii. 30. And they had
power to make kings, as Saul and David, as was shewed: and it
must needs follow, they had power to unmake them in case of
tyranny. (3.) They had power to conveen, even without the indiction
of the ruler, as in that, Josh. xxii. They conveen without him; and
without advice or knowledge of Samuel, the ruler, they conveen to
ask a king, 1 Sam. viii. And without any head or superior, they
conveen and make David king, notwithstanding of Ishbosheth's
hereditary right. Without and against tyrannous Athaliah's consent,
they conveen and make Joash king, and cared not for her Treason,
treason, 2 Kings xi. But now the king alone challenges the
prerogative power of calling and dissolving parliaments as he
pleases, and condemns all meetings of estates without his warrant,
which is purely tyrannical; for, in cases of necessity, by the very law
of nature, they may and must conveen. The power is given to the
king only by a positive law, for order's sake; but otherwise, they
have an intrinsical power to assemble themselves. All the forecited
commands, admonitions, and certifications, to execute judgment,
must necessarily involve and imply a power to conveen, without
which they could not be in a capacity for it: not only unjust
judgment, but no judgment, in a time when truth is fallen in the
streets, and equity cannot enter, is charged as the sin of the state;
therefore they must conveen to prevent this sin, and the wrath of
God for it: God hath committed the keeping of the commonwealth,
not to the king's only, but also to the people's representatives and
heads. And if the king have power to break up all conventions of this
nature, then he hath power to hinder judgement to proceed, which
the Lord commands: and this would be an excuse, when God
threatens vengeance for it. We would not execute judgment,
because the king forbade us. Yet many of these forementioned
reproofs, threatnings, and certifications were given, in the time of
tyrannous and idolatrous kings, who, no doubt, would inhibit and
discharge the doing of their duty; yet we see that was no excuse,
but the Lord denounces wrath for the omission. (4.) They had power
to execute judgment against the will of the prince. Samuel killed
Agag against Saul's will, but according to the command of God, 1
Sam. xv. 32. Against Ahab's will and mind Elijah caused kill the
priests of Baal, according to God's express law, 1 Kings xviii. 40. It is
true it was extraordinary, but no otherwise than it is this day; when
there is no magistrate that will execute the judgment of the Lord,
then they who have power to make the magistrate, may and ought
to execute it, when wicked men make the law of God of none effect.
So the princes of Judah had power, against the king's will, to put
Jeremiah to death, which the king supposes, when he directs him
what to say to them, Jer. xxxviii. 25. They had really such a power,
though in Jeremiah's case it would have been wickedly perverted.
See Lex Rex, q. 19, 20. (5.) They had a power to execute judgment
upon the king himself, as in the case of Amaziah and Uzziah, as shall
be cleared afterwards. I conclude with repeating the argument: if
the king be accountable, whensover this account shall be taken, we
are confident our disowning him for the present will be justified, and
all will be obliged to imitate it: if he be not, then we cannot own his
authority, that so presumptuously exalts himself above the people.

10. If we will further consider the nature of magistracy, it will

appear what authority can conscientiously be owned, to wit, that
which is power, not authorised power, not might or force; moral
power, not merely natural. There is a great difference betwixt these
two: natural power is common to brutes, moral power is peculiar to
men; natural power is more in the subjects, because they have more
strength and force; moral power is in the magistrate, they can never
meet adequately in the same subject; natural power can, moral only
may warrantably exercise rule; natural power is opposed to
impotency and weakness, moral to illicitness or unlawfulness; natural
power consists in strength, moral in righteousness; natural power
may be in a rout of rogues making an uproar, moral only in the
rulers; they cannot be distinguished by their acts, but by the
principle from which the acts proceed; in the one from mere force, in
the other from authority. The principle of natural power is its own
might and will, and the end only self; moral hath its rise from
positive constitution, and its end is public safety. The strength of
natural power lies in the sword, whereby its might gives law; the
strength of moral power is in its word, whereby reason gives law,
unto which the sword is added for punishment of contraveeners:
natural power takes the sword, Matth. xxvi. 52. Moral bears the
sword, Rom. xiii. 4. In natural power the sword is the cause; in
moral it is only the consequent of authority; in natural power the
sword legitimates the sceptre; in moral the sceptre legitimates the
sword: the sword of the natural is only backed with metal, the sword
of the moral power is backed with God's warrant: natural power
involves men in passive subjection, as a traveller is made to yield to
a robber; moral power reduces to conscientious subordination.
Hence the power that is only natural, not moral authority, not power,
cannot be owned; but the power of a tyrant's and usurper's is only
natural, not moral, authority, not power: Ergo it cannot be owned.
The major cannot be denied; for it is only the moral power that is
ordained of God, unto which we must be subject for conscience
sake. The minor also; for the power of tyrants is not moral, because
not authorized, nor warranted, or ordained of God by his preceptive
ordinance, and therefore no lawful magistratical power. For the
clearer understanding of this, let it be observed, there are four
things required to the making of a moral or lawful power; the matter
of it must be lawful, the person lawful, the title lawful, and the use
lawful. 1. The matter of it, about which it is exerted, or the work to
be done by it, must be lawful and warranted by God: and if it be
unlawful it destroys its moral being. As the pope's power, in
dispensing with divine laws, is null and no moral power; and so also
the king's power, in dispensing with both divine and human laws is
null. Hence that power, which is, in regard of matter unlawful, and
never warranted by God, cannot be owned; but absolute power,
which is the power of tyrants and usurpers, (and particularly of this
of ours) is in regard of matter unlawful, and never warranted by
God: Ergo—2. The person holding the power must be such as not
only is capable of, but competent to the tenure of it, and to whom
the holding of it is allowed; and if it be prohibited, it evacuates the
morality of the power. Korah and his company arrogated to
themselves the office of the priesthood, this power was prohibited to
them, their power then was a nullity. As therefore a person that
should not be a minister, when he usurps that office is no minister;
so a person that should not be a magistrate, when he usurps that
office, is no magistrate. Hence, a person that is incapable and
incompetent for government cannot be owned for a governor; but
the duke of York is such a person, not only not qualified as the word
of God requires a magistrate to be, but by the laws of the land
declared incapable of rule, because he is a papist, a murderer, an
adulterer, &c. 5. There must be a moral power, a lawful title and
investiture, as is shewed above; which, if it be wanting, the power is
null, and the person but a scenical king, like John of Leyden. This is
essentially necessary to the being of a magistrate; which only
properly distinguishes him from a private man; for when a person
becomes a magistrate, what is the change that is wrought in him?
what new habit or endowment is produced in him? he hath no more
natural power than he had before, only now he hath the moral
power, right and authority to rule, legally impowering him to govern.
Let it be considered, what makes a subordinate magistrate, whom
we own as such; it must be only his commission from a superior
power, otherwise we reject him; if one come to us of his own head,
taking upon him the stile and office of a bailiff, sheriff or judge, and
command our persons, demand our purses, or exact our oaths; we
think we may deny him, not taking ourselves to owe him any
subjection, not owning any bond of conscience to him; why?
because he hath no lawful commission. Now, if we require this
qualification in the subordinate, why not in the supreme? Hence,
that magistrate, that cannot produce his legal investiture, cannot be
owned; but the duke of York cannot produce his legal investiture, his
admission to the crown upon oath and compact, and with the
consent of the subjects, according to the laws of the land, as is
shewed above: therefore——4. There must also be the lawful use of
the power; which must be not only legal for its composure, but right
for its practice; its course and process in government must be just,
governing according to law, otherwise it is mere tyranny: for what is
government, but the subjecting of the community to the rule of
governors, for peace and order's sake, and the security of all their
precious interests? and for what end was it ordained, and continued
among men, but that the stronger may not domineer over the
weaker? and what is anarchy, but the playing the rex of the natural
power over the moral? Hence, that power which is contrary to law,
evil and tyrannical, can tie none to subjection; but the power of the
king, abused to the destruction of laws, religion and liberties, giving
his power and strength unto the beast, and making war with the
Lamb, Rev. xvii. 13, 14. is a power contrary to law, evil and
tyrannical: therefore it can tie none to subjection: wickedness by no
imaginable reason can oblige any man. It is objected by some, from
Rom. xiii. 1. There is no power but of God; the usurping power is a
power: therefore it is of God, and consequently we owe subjection
to it. Ans. 1. The original reading is not universal, but this: for there
is no power if not from God: which confirms what I plead for, that
we are not to own any authority, if it be not authorized by God.

The words are only relative to higher powers, in a restricted sense

and at most are but indefinite, to be determined according to the
matter; not all power simply, but all lawful power. 2. It is a fallacy
from what is said according to a certain thing, there is no power but
of God, that is no moral power, as universal negatives use to be
understood, Heb. v. 4. No man taketh his honour unto himself, but
he that is called of God; which is clear, must not be understood for
the negation of the fact, as if no man at all doth or ever did take
unto himself that honour, for Korah did it, &c. but, no man taketh it
warrantably, with a moral right and God's allowance without God's
call: so also the universal imperative, in that same text, must not be
taken absolutely without restriction; for if every soul without
exception were to be subject, there could be none left to be the
higher powers; but it is understood with restriction to the relation of
a subject. So here, no power but of God, to be understood with
restriction to the relation of a lawful magistrate. It is also to be
understood indiscriminately, in reference to the divers species, sorts
and degrees of lawful power, supreme and subordinate, whether to
the king as supreme, or to governors, &c. as Peter expresses it: or
whether they be Christian or pagan; it cannot be meant of all
universally, that may pretend to power, and may attain to prevailing
potency; for then by this text, we must subject ourselves to the
papacy now intended to be introduced; and indeed if we subject
ourselves to this papist, the next thing he will require will be that. 3.
To the minor proposition, I answer, the usurping power is a power; it
is power, I grant, that it is power, or authority, I deny.

Therefore it is of God by his providence, I concede; by his

ordinance, I deny. Consequently we owe subjection to it, I deny. We
may be subject passively, I grant. Actively, out of conscience, I deny.
But some will object, 2. Though the power be usurped, and so not
morally lawful in all these respects; yet it may do good, its laws and
administrations may be good. Answ. I grant all is good that ends
well, and hath a good beginning. This cannot be good which hath a
bad principle, good from the entire cause. Some government for
constitution good, may, in some acts, be bad; but a government for
constitution bad cannot, for the acts it puts forth, be good. These
good acts may be good for matters but formally they are not good,
as done by the usurper: they may be comparatively good, that is
better so than worse; but they cannot be absolutely, and in a moral
sense good: for to make a politic action good, not only the matter
must be warrantable, but the call also. It may indeed induce
subjects to bear and improve to the best, what cannot be remedied;
but cannot oblige to own a magistratical relation.

II. The nature of the power thus discovered, let us see the nature
of that relative duty, which we owe and must own as due to
magistrates, and what sort of owning we must give them; which, to
inquire a little into, will give light to the question. All the duty and
deference the Lord requires of us, towards them whom we must
own as magistrates, is comprehended in these two expressions,
honour required in the fifth command, and subjection required in
Rom. xiii. 1. &c. 1 Pet. ii. 13. &c. Whomsoever then we own as
magistrates, we must own honour and subjection as due to them:
and if so be, we cannot, upon a conscientious ground, give them
honour and subjection, we cannot own them as magistrates. The
least deference we can pay to magistrates is subjection, as it is
required in these words; Let every soul be subject to the higher
powers, and, submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the
Lord's sake. But this cannot be given to tyrants and usurpers;
therefore no deference can be paid to them at all: and consequently
they cannot be owned. That this subjection, which is required to the
higher powers, cannot be owned to tyrants, will be apparent, if we
consider, 1. The subjection required is orderly subjection to an
orderly power, that we be regularly under him that is regularly
above; but usurpation and tyranny is not an orderly power, orderly
placed above us; therefore we cannot be orderly under it. This is
gathered from the original language, where the powers to be
subjected to, are ordained of God and the ordinance of God, and he
that resisteth the power is counter-ordered, or contrary to his
orderly duty; so the duty is to be subject. They are all words coming
from one root, which signifies to order; so that subjection is to be
placed in order under another relative to an orderly superiority; but,
to occupy the seat of dignity unauthorized, is an ataxy, a breaking of
order, and bringing the commonwealth quite out of order. Whereby it
may appear, that, in relation to an arbitrary government, there can
be properly no orderly subjection. 2. The thing itself must import
that relative duty which the fifth command requires; not only a
passive stooping endurance, or a feigned counterfeit submission, but
a real active duty including obedience to lawful commands; and not
only so, but support and maintenance; and that both to the acts of
his administration, and to his standing and keeping his station,
assisting him with all our abilities, both human and Christian; and
not only as to the external acts of duties, but the inward motions of
the heart, as consent, love, reverence, and honour, and all sincere
fealty and allegiance.

But can a subjection of this extent be paid to a tyrant or usurper?

Can we support those we are bound to suppress? Shall we love the
ungodly, and help those that hate the Lord? Can we consent, that
we and our posterity should be slaves? Can we honour them who
are vile, and the vilest of men; how high soever they be exalted? 3.
The ground of this subjection is for conscience sake, not for wrath,
that is, so far and so long as one is constrained by fear, and, to
avoid a greater evil, to stoop to him, but out of conscience of duty,
both that of piety to God who ordained magistracy, and that of
equity to him who is his minister for good, and under pain of
damnation if we break this orderly subjection, Rom. xiii. 2, 5. But
can it be imagined, that all this is due to a tyrant and usurper? Can it
be out of conscience, because he is the Lord's minister for good?
The contrary is clear, that he is the devil's drudge serving his
interest: Is resistance to tyrants a damnable sin? I hope to prove it
to be a duty. 4. If subjection to tyrants and usurpers will inveigle us
in their snares, and involve us in their sin and judgment, then it is
not to be owned to them; but the former is true; therefore the latter.
In the foregoing head I drew an argument, for withdrawing from
and disowning the prelatic ministers, from the hazard of partaking in
their sin, and of being obnoxious to their judgment, because people
are often punished for their pastor's sins; Aaron and his sons
polluting themselves, would have brought wrath upon all the people,
Lev. x. 6. because the teachers had transgressed against the Lord,
therefore was Jacob given to the curse, and Israel to reproaches,
Isa. xliii. 27, 28. and all these miseries lamented by the church, were
inflicted for the sins of her prophets, and the iniquities of her priests,
Lam. iv. 13. the reason was, because they owned then, followed
them, countenanced them, complied with them, or connived at
them, or did not hinder, or else disown them. The same argument
will evince the necessity of withdrawing our subjection from, and
disowning, usurping, and tyrannical rulers, when we cannot hinder
their wickedness, nor give any other testimony against them, to
avert the wrath of the Lord. If the defections of ministers will bring
on the whole nation desolacing judgments; then much more have
we reason to fear it, when both magistrates and ministers are
involved in, and jointly carrying on, and caressing and encouraging
each other in promoting a woful apostasy from God: when the heads
of the house of Jacob and princes of the house of Israel, abhor
judgment, and pervert all equity. The heads judge for reward, and
the priests teach for hire, and the prophets divine for money, and
yet lean upon the Lord, and say, is not the Lord among us: none evil
can come upon us. Then we can expect nothing, but that Zion for
their sake shall be plowed as a field, and Jerusalem become heaps,
and the mountain of the house as the high places of the forest, Mic.
iii. 9, 11, 12. Certain it is, that subjects have smarted sore for the
sins of their rulers: for Saul's sin, in breaking covenant with the
Gibeonites, the land suffered three years famine, 2 Sam. xxi. 1. and
the wrath of the Lord could not be appeased, till seven of his sons
were hanged up unto the Lord. What then shall appease the wrath
of God, for the unparalleled breach of covenant with God in our
days? For David's sin of numbering the people, 70,000 men died by
the pestilence, 2 Sam. xxiv. 5. For Jeroboam's sin of idolatry, who
made Israel to sin, the Lord threatens to give Israel up, because of
the sins of Jeroboam, I Kings xiv. 16. only they escaped this
judgment, who withdrew themselves and fell into Judah. For Ahab's
sin of letting go a man whom the Lord had appointed to utter
destruction, the Lord threatens him, thy life shall go for his life, and
thy people for his people, 1 Kings xx. 42. Because Manasseh, king of
Judah, did many abominations, therefore the Lord threatened to
bring such evil upon Jerusalem and Judah, that whosoever heard it,
his ears should tingle, &c. 2 Kings xxi. 11, 12. and notwithstanding
of his repentance and the reformation in the days of Josiah,
notwithstanding the Lord turned not from the fierceness of his great
wrath, wherewith his anger was kindled against Judah, because of
all the provocations that Manasseh had provoked him withal, 2 Kings
xxiii. 26. which was accomplished by the hands of the Chaldeans, in
Jehoiakim's time. Surely, at the commandment of the Lord, came
this upon Judah, to remove them out of his sight, for the sins of
Manasseh according to all that he did, and also for the innocent
blood which he shed,——which the Lord would not pardon, 2 Kings
xxiv. 3, 4. And Jeremiah further threatens, that they should be
removed into all kingdoms of the earth, because of Manasseh for
that which he did in Jerusalem, Jer. xv. 4. Certainly passages were
recorded for our learning, Rom. xv. 4. and for our examples, to the
intent we should not do as they did, 1 Cor. x. 6. and for our
admonition, ver. 11. Whence we may be admonished, that it is not
enough to keep ourselves free of public sins of rulers; many of those
then punished, were free of all actual accession to them; but they
became accessory to, and involved in the guilt of them, when they
did not endeavour to hinder them, and bring them to condign
punishment for them, according to the law of God, which respecteth
not persons; or, at least, because they did not revolt from them, as
Libnah did: there might be other provocations on the peoples part,
no doubt, which the Lord did also punish by these judgments; but
when the Lord specifies the sin of rulers as the particular procuring
cause of the judgment; it were presumption to make it the occasion
only of the Lord's punishing them: for plain it is, if these sins of
rulers had not been committed, which was the ground of the
threatening and execution, the judgment would have been
prevented; and if the people had bestirred themselves as became
them, in repressing and restraining such wickedness, they had not
so smarted; and when that sin, so threatened and punished, was
removed, then the judgment itself was removed or deterred. It is
just and necessary, that the subjects, being jointly included with
their rulers in the same bond of fidelity to God, be liable to be
punished for their rebellion and apostacy, when they continue under
the bond of subjection to them. But how deplorable were our
condition, if we should stand obnoxious to divine judgments, for the
atheism, idolatry, murders, and adulteries of our rulers, and yet be
neither authorized nor capacitated to hinder it, nor permitted to
withdraw ourselves from subjection to them? But it is not so; for, the
Lord's making us responsible for their debt, is an impowering us
either to repress their wickedness when he gives us capacity, or at
least to save ourselves harmless from their crimes, by disowning
them; that being the only way of standing no longer accountable for
their souls.

12. It remains to consider the ends for which government was

institute by God, and constitute by men; from whence I argue, that
government, that destroys the ends of government, is not to be
owned; but tyranny, and especially this under which we howl,
destroys all the ends of government; therefore it is not to be owned.
The minor I prove thus, That government, that destroys all religion
and safety, destroys all the ends of government; but this popish and
arbitrary absolute power, destroys religion and safety; therefore—it
is evident, both from the laws of nature and revelation, that the
ends of government are the glory of God, and the good of mankind.
The first is the glory of God, the ultimate end of all ordinances; to
which whatever is opposite, is not to be owned by them that fear
him: whatever power then is destructive to religion, and is applied
and employed against the glory of the universal King, and for
withdrawing us from our fealty and obedience to him, is nothing but
rebellion against the supreme Lord and Lawgiver, and a traiterous
conspiracy against the Almighty, and therefore not to be owned: and
they are enemies to religion, or strangers to it, who are not sensible
this hath been the design of the present government, at least these
twenty-seven years, to overturn the reformed covenanted religion,
and to introduce popery. Hence, seeing a king at his best and
highest elevation, is only a mean for preserving religion, and for this
end only chosen of the people to be keeper of both tables of the
law, he is not to be regarded, but wholly laid aside, when he not
only moves without his sphere, but his motion infers the ruin of the
ends of his erection, and when he employs all his power for the
destruction of the cause of Christ, and advancement of antichrist,
giving his power to the beast; he is so far from deserving the
deference of the power ordained of God, that he is to be looked
upon, and treated as a traitor to God, and stated enemy to religion
and all righteousness. The second end of government is the good of
the people, which is the supreme and cardinal law; the safety of the
people is the supreme law. Which cannot be denied, if it be
considered, 1. For this only the magistrate is appointed of God to be
his minister for the people's good, Rom. xiii. 4. and they have no
goodness but as they conduce to this end: for all the power they
have of God is with this proviso, to promote his people's prosperity.
(It were blasphemy to say, they are his authorised ministers for their
destruction) to which if their conduct degenerate, they degrade
themselves, and so must be disowned. He is therefore, in his
institution, no more than a mean for this end; and himself cannot be