Boethius (2881 words) [PDF] Albrecht Classen (University of Arizona) Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius, commonly only called

Boethius and in Roman t imes spelled Boetius (ca. 475/77 524 or 525 C. E.), was one of the most influentia l philosophers in late antiquity and has had a tremendous impact on the entire i ntellectual and cultural world of the West since then, powerfully straddling the divide between Antiquity and the Middle Ages. Most famously, he composed a trea tise shortly before his death, De consolatione philosophiae (On the Consolation of Philosophy), which promises to answer many of the fundamental questions human s face when they are treated unjustly, are afraid of dying, and have to deal wit h the quintessential unfairness of life in which the good seem to suffer and the bad seem to triumph. But Boethius also wrote many treatises on a wide range of scholarly subject matters through which he became, so to speak, the schoolmaster of the West. He laid the foundation for the artes liberales (liberal arts) thro ugh his studies of philosophy, science, music, and religion, and invented the te rm of quadrivium for the four-part study area comprising arithmetic, geometry, a stronomy, and music. He relied heavily on ancient Greek philosophy (Isocrates an d Plato), and in his Principles of Arithmetic he drew much from Nicomachus of Ge rasa s Introduction to Arithmetic (early 2nd century C.E.). In his De institutione musica (Principles of Music, ca. 503), in part based on a treatise by Cassiodor us (ca. 490-ca. 590), on some thoughts by Vitruvius (1st c. B.C.E.) on architect ural patterns and designs, and on Saint Augustine (354-430), he explored in grea t detail this subtle subject matter as well, providing guidelines that were to b e followed for the next thousand years to come. His father, Flavius Manlius Boethius, after having been city-prefect and praetor ian prefect, was elected consul in 487, just one year after the Byzantine genera l Odoacer had deposed the last Western Roman Emperor, Romulus Augustulus in 476. Odoacer himself was killed in 493 by the Ostrogothic king Theoderic the Great ( 471-526), who thus established his own Germanic rule in Italy, without abandonin g the basic political structure as inherited from the Romans. Boethius entered p ublic life at an early age and was appointed sole consul in Rome in 510. One of the greatest joys of his later life was to witness that his two sons, Symmachus and Boethius, were elected companion consuls at the same time in 522. After his father s early death probably shortly after 487 Boethius was raised by t he powerful and deeply learned Symmachus, who himself had been consul in 485. Th is provided Boethius with many cultural opportunities at a time when the knowled ge of Greek culture and literature was waning in Italy. Significantly, Symmachus knew Greek and admired the Neoplatonists, which had a great influence on the yo ung man under his tutelage. Later Boethius even married his daughter, Rusticiana . Tragically, Boethius himself was subsequently, and probably unjustly, indicted of having committed state treason, allegedly having collaborated with Byzantium , or Eastern Rome, to plot against Theoderic with the goal of unifying Italy wit h its enemy. In his Consolatio philosophiae he defended himself, arguing that he had only worked on establishing constructive relationships between the Roman Se nate and the Byzantine emperor, and had worked hard to defend the privileges of the Senate, but this was all to no avail because he did not even get a hearing. While in prison in Pavia, Boethius reflected upon his situation and condition, a nd composed his famous treatise just before he was executed by stoning in 524 or 525. Boethius proved to be a superior philologist and philosopher when he translated in part the works of Aristotle and Plato from Greek to Latin, trying to preserve as much as possible from the ancient Greek culture for posterity. His complete

translation of Aristotle s Logic was the only one available until the twelfth cent ury, but his own commentaries have been lost. Moreover, he published two treatis es on topical argumentation, In Ciceronis Topica and De topicis differentiis (bo th ca. 518), which did not receive much acclaim during his own life time and bec ame foundational only in the Middle Ages. For Boethius, logic has to be divided into three parts, that which defines, that which divides, and that which deduces . There are three types of arguments, those of necessity, those of ready believa bility, and those of sophistry. Boethius also composed five tractates on theolog y, altogether his Opuscula sacra, in which he relied heavily on St. Augustine, a nd yet distinguished himself from his model by emphasizing much more the disjunc tion between reason and faith in a dialectical fashion as taught by Aristotle, t hereby solving the problem which was later to vex scholars and theologians until the eleventh century (Lanfranc of Canterbury and Anselm of Canterbury). Simply put, Boethius differentiated between fides as a form of divine revelation and ra tio as a natural form of epistemology, or as a way of learning all things materi al. It would be fair to say that Boethius was deeply influenced by Proclus (before 3 90-446) and the Neoplatonists, especially in his attempt to incorporate dialecti cs in all of his thinking. Although a Christian himself, he relied on pagan reli gions and philosophies. His early writings on arithmetic and music (De instituti one arithmetica, 502; a commentary of Porphyrios s Esagogue, 504 or 505; then a tr anslation of that work in 508 or 509; two commentaries on Aristotle s Perihermenei as, 507-509; the translation and commentary of Aristotle s Categorias, 509 or 510) were hailed as major accomplishments, which attracted him also to King Theoderi c who, once he had been appointed as consul in 510, asked him for several favors , such as building a sundial and a water-clock, and then to select a special har pist to be sent to the Frankish king Clovis. Both his extensive writings and his extraordinary cultural development gained him much public respect, although his fame truly ascended only in the Middle Ages and beyond. The same year when his two sons were installed as consuls in Rome (522), Boethiu s was appointed as Master of the Offices, an important administrative position, but it brought him into conflict with many of the Ravenna courtiers where Theode ric ruled and who eventually succeeded to get him imprisoned and charged with st ate treason, probably because he tried to insist on the legality of court procee dings against an alleged traitor of Theoderic, the Senator Albinus. In addition, the political scene around the king had grown unstable and threatening, which t riggered Theoderic s harsh reactions toward the false accusations of a conspiracy against him, thus eliminating one of his most trusted and important advisors and administrators. Boethius s theoretical writings include the following treatises and commentaries: In Porphyrii Isagogen, editio princeps (ca. 504-505); De syllogismis categoricis (ca. 505-506); Liber de divisione (between 505 and 509); In Porphyrii Isagogen, editio secunda (ca. 507-509); In Aristotelis Categorias (ca. 509-511); Contra E utychen et Nestorium (512); In Aristotelis Perihermeneias, editio prima (ca. 151 3); In Aristotelis Perihermeneias, editio secunda (ca. 515-516); De syllogismis hypotheticis (between 516 and 522); De Trinitate and Utrum Pater et Filius et Sp iritus Sanctus de divinitate substantialiter praedicentur (521); In Ciceronis To pica (before 522); De topicis differentiis (before 523); and his now lost commen tary on Aristoteles (Commentarii in Librum Aristotelis Perihermeneias, ca. 513-5 16). One indicator confirming Boethius s huge influence on the entire history of philos ophy in the Middle Ages and far beyond might be his introduction of critical phi losophical terms such as potentia, actus, universale, accidens, contigens, defin ire, determinare, differentia, divisio, which all laid the foundation of medieva l scholasticism. The problems of dialectics fascinated Boethius so much that the composed a number of pertinent treatises sometime between 510 and 520, such as

Introductio ad categoricos syllogismos, De differentiis topicis, De syllogismo c ategorico, De syllogismo hypothetico, and De divisione. Even geometry attracted his attention, as testified by his treatise De geometria, almost a literal rendi tion of Euclid s Elementa. Boethius s studies dedicated to the trivium and the quadr ivium became fundamental for the entire medieval teaching system (artes liberale s) and were present in virtually every school and monastery library, not to ment ion late-medieval university libraries. His most lasting accomplishment undoubtedly was and continues to be his Consolat io philosophiae. Although many critics have argued that, considering the vast st orehouse of sources which Boethius used, most famously Martianus Capellas s The Ma rriage of Philology and Mercury, Plato s dialogues, Cicero s philosophical dialogues , and Augustine s Soliloquy, there was not much originality in his own work (Courc elle; for detailed commentaries see Gruber), recent scholarship has, once again, strongly suggested the opposite (Marenbon). Boethius s unique success with his tr eatise over the next thousand years also indicates that he had successfully shap ed an innovative philosophical approach which answered many questions both then and today. Boethius presents us with himself stuck in prison, lamenting his destiny, poorly consoled by the muses, when the allegorical figure of Philosophy appears, who c hases away the muses (poetry) and engages in intensive dialogues with the narrat or, applying logic and rhetoric to free him from depression and melancholy. Appr oaching her task almost like a medical doctor, she probes where the roots of Boe thius s symptoms might rest, which make him complain so badly about the turn of ev ents in his life. Philosophy immediately recognizes that her student has forgott en the principal lesson, pertaining to the essence of human life. At first she a lerts him to the essential nature of Fortune which is never resting, always chan ging, completely untrustworthy, and unstable. As it turns out, there is nothing in life, whether material possessions, family, fame, political power, or even ph ysical health, that can be completely relied on. Our life is determined by conti ngency, that is unpredictability and lack of reliance. Moreover, we are told, al l things we own here in this world, including love and success, are only given o n loan, hence can be taken away at any moment in time. Consequently, we must enj oy them while we have them, and not lament their loss when this inevitably occur s. Neither friendship nor love, neither wealth nor political power can provide t rue happiness. There is no real misfortune because the loss of a thing, a person, or a friend o nly reveals the truth of fortune, meaning that it is not forever. Misfortune pro ves to be of great advantage, in fact, because it reveals, for instance, who is a true friend and who is not. So, misfortune is intimately connected with truth itself. In addition, Philosophy emphasizes that Boethius has forgotten what he h as already received as gifts in his life for which he ought to be grateful, and not lament their losses (family, love, political fame, responsibilities, etc.). The critical issue proves to be that true happiness does not rest outside of one s life, in material objects or in people, but only within oneself. It can be iden tified as that which makes a person self-sufficient, powerful, venerable famous, and joyful (III, 9, p. 55). One aspect all by itself is being mirrored by all oth ers, and all of them combined create true happiness, which only God can represen t because we humans live in a fragmented world. What this means it that there is an inner, true, happiness, and an outer, false, happiness, which most people st rive for in their blindness. However, we as individuals are empowered to aim for that true goal, and in that effort we only need to follow our own inner instinc t toward that good, which is God, who is happiness all by Himself. This also app lies to all creatures, plants, and even stones, since all want to be good or to partake in the good and realize their potentiality. The easiest example to eluci date that proposition proves to be a plant which dies if it does not try hard to find the best location for its growth or makes the best out of that location to achieve the desired goal. A plant that deliberately seeks out a dry, shady plac

e where it cannot survive simply dies because it acts against its own nature, wh ereas the desire for the good determines all. But this does not yet answer the question why there are evil people in this worl d, that is, why Boethius, or any other person, has to suffer unfairly and agains t all reason. Philosophy provides a solution for that conundrum by pointing out that every creature has the drive toward God implanted in itself. True happiness consists of being self-sufficient, unified, and good, which can only be found i n God, the supreme good. Following the own inner instinct toward that good makes life possible and brings everything within the reach of happiness, or God. Cons equently, nothing which conforms with its own nature tries to oppose God (III, 12, p. 67). Since God is good, He cannot create evil; hence evil does not really ex ist, at least in philosophical terms. In real life, there are many evil people, as Boethius himself experienced only too well. But in Book IV Philosophy undersc ores that only the good are truly powerful, and find the way toward happiness, w hile the evil represent the very opposite, even if they acquire wealth, politica l power, and fame, which are all subject to the contingency of Fortuna. They do as plants might do that seek too dry land to grow, and hide in shade when they n eed sunshine. All beings aim for the good as part of their instinct or nature, a nd the good ultimately reach that goal, while the evil simply fail in that effor t. From that point of view only the good are powerful, while the evil are the we akest of them all. Although in practical terms the wicked often exert power to their advantage, it does not derive from their own strength, which would be the instinct toward the good. So, in reality, the evil ones have no power at all and ought to be pitied (IV, 2). The more the wicked achieve their personal goal, the further away do th ey slide from their true destiny, which consists of goodness, or God. Their triu mph proves to be their very own defeat and destruction. This leads Philosophy to conclude that the wicked ones . . . are happier if they suffer punishment than if no deserved punishment constrains them (IV, 4, p. 81). True happiness resides, a fter all, in the supreme good, or God, and the further one is from that goal, th e more miserable one is. The remaining sections of Book IV and Book V explain fundamental concerns pertai ning to the correlation of Providence and Fate, and then regarding free will and God s existence at all times simultaneously. Philosophy illustrates how the entir e universe is arranged in cosmic order, governed by God, although chaos and inju stice seem to rule on earth. In chapter 6 of Book IV we are given a concluding s tatement as comprehensive and definitive as can be: The only force which transfor ms evil things into good is that of God, when he aptly exploits them to draw out of them an element of good, for some sort of order pervades all things . . . so that nothing in the realm of Providence may be left to chance (p. 92). Altogether, we can easily identify Boethius as the most important transmitter of Greek philosophy to the Latin world since Cicero and to the Middle Ages before t he Arabs (Gruber 2003, col. 704). His treatise on The Consolation of Philosophy a chieved the greatest success only since the Carolingian era, but his Opuscula sa cra were as influential as his many philosophical and scientific writings throug hout the ages. We must recognize in Boethius one of the greatest philosophers of his time, but with his studies on the Artes and the Organon he also emerged as the crucial catalyst and founder of all western education by providing the essen tial tools of trade for logic . . . and fundamental manuals (Gruber, 2003, col. 70 5). His Consolation is as fresh and powerful as it was when Boethius composed it filled with anxiety about his imminent death. A literary, philosophical, theolo gical, and scientific genius was innocently killed when he died in 524 or 525. References Boethius: His Life, Thought and Influence, ed. Margaret Gibson (Oxford: Basil Bl

ackwell, 1981). Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy. Trans. with an Introd. and Notes by P. G. Walsh (1999; Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). Boethius s De topicis differentiis, trans., with notes and essays on the text, by Eleonore Stump (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 1978). Henry Chadwick, Boethius: The Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology, and Philos ophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981). Pierre Courcell, La Consolation de Philosophie dans la tradition littraire (Paris : tudes Augustiniennes, 1967). Joachim Gruber, Kommentar zu Boethius De Consolatione Philosophiae. Texte und Ko mmentare - eine altertumswissenschaftliche Reihe, 9 (Berlin and New York: Walthe r de Gruyter, 1978). , Boethius, Brill s Encyclopedia of the Ancient World: New Pauly, ed. Hubert Cancik a nd Helmuth Schneider. English Ed. Christine F. Salazar et al.. Vol. 2 (Leiden an d Boston: Brill, 2003), cols. 701-06. John Marenbon, Boethius. Great Medieval Thinkers (Oxford and New York: Oxford Un iversity Press, 2003). The Cambridge Companion to Boethius, ed. John Marenbon (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni versity Press, 2009). McInerny, Ralph, Boethius, Medieval Philosophers, ed. Jermiah Hackett. Dictionary of Literary Biography, 115 (Detroit and London: Gale Research, 1992), 110-17. Edmund Reiss, Boethius. Twayne's World Authors Series, 672 (Boston: Twayne Publi shers, 1982). Ferdinand Sassen, Boethius - Lehrmeister des Mittelalters, orig. 1938 (in Dutch), Boethius, ed. Manfred Fuhrmann and Joachim Gruber. Wege der Forschung, CDLXXXIII (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1984), 82-124.