SEONGYI YUN

South Korea in 2022

Election Mudslinging, Threats from the North, and Deepening
Economic Uncertainty

ABSTRACT
At the presidential and local levels, progressives were replaced by conservatives
in 2022. But the National Assembly is still dominated by the opposition
Democratic Party, so the government is more divided than ever. As a conser-
vative government came into power in South Korea, North Korea fired the most
missiles ever, and inter-Korean relations were very strained. The economy is in
serious condition due to inflation, interest rate hikes, and slowing growth.
K E Y W O R D S : change of government, divided government, political polar-
ization, missile threats, economic recession

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: A TIGHT RACE BETWEEN

UNFAVORABLE CANDIDATES

Ahead of the 20th presidential election, which happened on March 9, 2022,

the ruling Democratic Party (DP) and its main opposition, the People Power
Party (PPP), were fighting more fiercely than ever before (Chang and Yun
2022, 45). The PPP’s approval rating rebounded enough to let it compete
with the DP (47), and the PPP’s Yoon Suk-yeol defeated the DP’s Lee
Jae-myung, bringing a change of government. Voter turnout was 77%, or
about the same as in the previous presidential election. But this election was
different in many ways from any other since democratization.
First, the candidates of both major parties were political outsiders who had
never been members of the National Assembly. Lee Jae-myung had been the

SEONGYI YUN is Professor of Political Science at Kyung Hee University, Seoul, South Korea.
Email: <yun31@khu.ac.kr>.

Asian Survey, Vol. 63, Number 2, pp. 225–234. ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. © 2023 by
The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission
to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Reprints and
Permissions web page, https://www.ucpress.edu/journals/reprints-permissions. DOI: https://doi.org/
10.1525/as.2023.63.2.225.

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226  ASIAN SURVEY 63:2

mayor of Seongnam City and the governor of Gyeonggi Province, but he had
no experience at the national level. And Yoon Seok-yeol was a former pros-
ecutor general who had never held an elected office.
Second, both candidates were widely considered unappealing. As the
Financial Times (2022) put it, “Lee [Jae-myung] and his conservative oppo-
nent Yoon Suk-yeol, a former chief prosecutor and political neophyte, are
neck and neck in a contest that has been defined by scandal, mudslinging,
family drama and insinuations of corruption, criminality, nepotism, fraud,
dictatorial tendencies, superstitious practices and abuse of office.” In a survey
conducted on February 25, two weeks before the election, 56% of respondents
disapproved of Lee Jae-myung, and 54% disapproved of Yoon Seok-yeol (Sisa
Journal 2022b).
Third, both candidates declined to run on policy and instead focused on
their opponent’s moral shortcomings. Neither articulated policy planks or
guiding principles they would bring to the workings of their government. In
the 2007 presidential campaign, candidate Lee Myung-bak made the “747
promise”: South Korea would reach 7% annual growth, with income of
USD 40,000 per capita, and become the world’s seventh-largest economy.
In the 2012 campaign, Park Geun-hye pledged to “democratize the economy
and expand welfare.” And in the 2017 campaign, in her post-impeachment
situation, Moon Jae-in pledged to create “a country no one has ever experi-
enced” and to ensure “equal opportunities, fair procedures, and just results.”
In contrast, in this most recent presidential campaign, promises were made at
the neighborhood, rather than the national, level. Lee Jae-myung promised to
make health insurance help with hair loss treatment, to reduce fees at a golf
course, to legalize tattoos, to create a city park, and to establish a village
cafeteria. Yoon Seok-yeol promised to raise soldiers’ monthly salary to
2 million won (about USD 1,600), to create a pet park, and to install parti-
tions in taxis to protect the driver. Both candidates, unable to develop a plat-
form that would attract voters’ support, were reduced to attacking the moral
character of their opponent. Yoon attacked Lee by mentioning a corruption
case related to the Daejang-dong development project, which took place
while he was the mayor of Seongnam; Lee harped on Yoon’s shamanism
controversy (Sisa Journal 2022a).1

1. Shamanism often gets involved in South Korean politics. Choi Soon-sil, a confidante of
former president Park Geun-hye, was accused of having ties to shamanism and running state affairs
 YUN / SOUTH KOREA IN 2022  227

Fourth, unlike in past elections, gender emerged as an important variable.

Since democratization, region and generation have been the most important
determinants of voting behavior. In this election, among voters in their
twenties, gender became an important differentiator. Historically, voters in
of that age have leaned toward candidates from the progressive party. But this
time, among voters between the ages of 18 and 29, 59% of the men voted for
the conservative Yoon, and only 36% for the progressive Lee—while 58% of
the women voted for Lee, and 34% for Yoon. This strong gender split was not
seen in other age groups (Yonhap News 2022a).
The evolution of gender issues into a political rift began with young men’s
disappointment with the Moon Jae-in administration and the ruling DP.
Moon declared at the beginning of his term that he would be a feminist
president, which displeased these young men. Meanwhile, the PPP used
a strategy to attract the support of young male voters. Lee Jun-seok, a poli-
tician in his thirties who symbolizes this generation of young men, was
elected as leader of the PPP. Yoon pledged during his campaign to abolish
the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family. He posted this pledge to his
Facebook page, and it received great support from internet communities with
members mostly in their twenties and thirties. Yoon also won the support of
male voters in their twenties, who are subject to conscription, by promising
to raise soldiers’ salaries.
In contrast, Lee Jae-myung cultivated support among young women. In
a conversation with young job seekers, he said that “feminism is a movement
to create a better world” (Kim 2022, 5). He recruited Park Ji-hyun, a female
activist in her twenties who had uncovered a digital sex trafficking scandal.
This garnered strong support from women in their twenties and thirties. Lee
also posted a video asking for support on an internet community of mostly
young female users. The strategy worked well. Right before the election
young women were strongly united in support—even fandom—of Lee. They
spread words of praise, photos, and videos about Lee across the internet.

-
from behind the scenes. Choi’s actions prompted an investigation that led to Park’s impeachment.
Yoon was suspected of having a shaman mentor when joining the party primary. During a TV debate
with other contestants, he appeared with the letter king written on his palm. Kim Keon-hee, Yoon’s
wife, was alleged to have close ties to shamanism and to have introduced certain shamans to her
husband.
228  ASIAN SURVEY 63:2

DIVIDED GOVERNMENT AND DEEPENING POLITICAL HOSTILITY

All through the presidential and local elections, conflict between the ruling
and opposition parties intensified, leading to mutual distrust and hatred. The
politics of dialogue and compromise disappeared, and politicians focused on
blaming and wounding the other side.
The election would be recorded as featuring the worst mudslinging ever,
between the worst-liked candidates ever. It resulted in a change of govern-
ment from liberal to conservative for the next five years, ending a pattern of
regime changes every 10 years, in place since democratization. However, in
the National Assembly, the opposition DP maintains a majority, with 169 out
of 299 seats, so the government is divided. The ruling PPP, which regained
the presidency, and the opposition DP have been at odds over every single
agenda item since the election. Both parties have promised cooperative gov-
ernance, but neither has offered any concessions.
Since the inauguration of the Yoon Seok-yeol administration, conflict
between the president and the opposition parties, between the ruling and
opposition parties, and between the conservatives and the progressives has
been intensifying. Indeed, the entire Korean society is divided in two, fueling
hatred and hostility. The hostile politics that have appeared over the past year
can be summarized as follows.
First, there has been no “political honeymoon.” The hostility between
Yoon’s government and the opposition party is more serious than ever before.
The hostile politics seen in the campaign continued after the inauguration.
President Yoon took office in May but did not meet with the opposition
leader until the end of the year. In the past, presidents have invited opposi-
tion leaders to exchange opinions on various pending issues, usually by asking
for cooperation during the Budget Assembly or by sharing results after over-
seas tours. The Lee Myung-bak administration invited opposition leaders to
the Blue House on the 53rd day, and the Park Geun-hye administration on
the 47th day. President Moon Jae-in visited the opposition party’s headquar-
ters on the day of his inauguration, met with the floor leader, and asked for
cooperation between the ruling and opposition parties.
Second, the formation of the cabinet was delayed for a long time, and
many former prosecutors were appointed to the cabinet and the presidential
office. The Yoon Seok-yeol administration took 181 days to complete its first
cabinet. For comparison, the Lee Myung-bak administration took 17 days,
 YUN / SOUTH KOREA IN 2022  229

and the Park Geun-hye administration took 51 days. Yoon’s prime minister,
Han Deok-soo, received his letter of appointment after 48 days, the longest
wait for any prime minister. Meanwhile, President Yoon pushed through the
appointments of 14 high-ranking officials without a National Assembly per-
sonnel hearing report (Seoul Economy 2022a). Both the president and the
opposition parties are to some extent responsible for the delay in the cabinet.
President Yoon, a career prosecutor rather than a politician, has a strong
distrust of politicians, and this has been reflected in his appointments.
Among positions at the level of vice-minister or presidential secretary or
higher, 15 of his appointees have been former prosecutors.
The DP, with its majority in the National Assembly, was in no hurry to
accept Yoon’s cabinet appointments. In the formation of their first cabinets,
Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye each appointed one State Council mem-
ber without a National Assembly hearing report; and Moon Jae-in did this
with two members; but Yoon Seok-yeol did it with seven (Jeon 2022, 3).
On September 29, 168 lawmakers, including 166 members of the DP,
passed a bill to dismiss foreign minister Park Jin. The DP argued that
president Yoon’s diplomatic tours to the United Kingdom, the United States,
and Canada undermined national interests without any results. The opposi-
tion party insisted that the foreign minister be held accountable for the failure
as the minister in charge. It was only the seventh time since the establishment
of the Republic of Korea that a proposal to dismiss a member of the State
Council passed a plenary session of the National Assembly. But President
Yoon vetoed the measure. On December 11, a proposal to dismiss Lee Sang-
min, minister of public administration and security (to hold him accountable
for the Itaewon disaster) passed the plenary session of the National Assembly,
but was vetoed by the president. These two bills illustrate the deepening
hostility between the president and the opposition parties.
Third, as a result of all these hostile politics, the legislative activities of the
National Assembly were impaired. In the last five months of the 21st National
Assembly, bill-passing fell to one-third of the rate in the 20th National
Assembly, and the number of bills proposed was unusually small. The 21st
National Assembly passed 612 bills in its second half (July 4 to December 30),
compared to 1,772 bills in the same period of the 20th National Assembly
(Seoul Economy 2022b). This clearly showed the problems with the divided
government.
230  ASIAN SURVEY 63:2

Hostility between the ruling and opposition parties is expected to continue

into 2023. As the judicial jeopardy surrounding DP leader Lee Jae-myung
continues, the conflict increasingly consists of mudslinging. After losing the
presidential election, Lee immediately resumed leadership of the opposition
party. It is unusual for a candidate who has lost the presidential election to
return to the political front immediately, without a break. After becoming of
member of the National Assembly in a by-election held with the local elec-
tions of June 1, in August at the party convention Lee was elected party leader
by the greatest margin ever. However, dark clouds have been swirling around
him since the presidential election, including the Daejang-dong land specu-
lation scandal, Ssangbangwool’s suspicious payment of attorney fees that Lee
should have paid, and dubious donations to the Seongnam Football Club.
Several of his aides have been arrested, one after another, and Lee Jae-myung
himself is in the prosecution’s sights.

NORTH KOREAN THREATS

North Korea fired 65 missiles in 2022. Eight were intercontinental ballistic

missiles (ICBMs), including a Hwasong-17 capable of hitting the US main-
land. North Korea has also accelerated its Five Strategic Weapons Tasks,
including the development of hypersonic missiles. In particular, tensions
were heightened by new legislation covering nuclear force, suggesting a pre-
emptive strike. During the joint South Korea–US air exercise Vigilant Storm
(October 31 to November 5), which North Korea strongly objected to, more
than 30 missiles were fired, including about 25 in one day (November 2). For
the first time in history, one of these shots fell near the territorial waters of
South Korea, south of the Northern Limit Line, and an air raid warning
sounded in Ulleung-gun, Gyeongsangbuk-do (NEWSIS 2022).
In addition to missile launches and artillery fire, North Korea carried out
other provocative acts against South Korea throughout the year, including
hacking, espionage, and drone invasions of airspace. On December 26, sev-
eral North Korean unmanned reconnaissance aircraft patrolled the skies over
Seoul and its metropolitan area for more than seven hours. South Korean
forces failed to intercept any of them, and at least one returned to North
Korea. Meanwhile, a South Korean KA-1 aircraft, which had been scrambled
to intercept the drones, crashed (Yonhap News 2022b).
 YUN / SOUTH KOREA IN 2022  231

Several reasons can be given for this unprecedented level of provocation in

2022. The first is to show off North Korea’s improved missile technology and
nuclear capabilities. In September 2022, the Nuclear Forces Policy Act
strengthened the country’s aggressive nuclear doctrine, and this was followed
by a series of missile launch tests from the end of September. Throughout the
year North Korea tested several types of missiles, including short-, medium-,
and long-range missiles, hypersonic missiles, submarine-launched missiles,
and cruise missiles. Second, North Korea was trying to pressure the United
States to engage in dialogue. North Korea did not launch a missile in 2018,
when dialogue was more possible. Since 2019 the possibility has faded, and
missiles have been launched continuously. The idea is to put pressure on the
United States by threatening the security of South Korea and Japan, which
are US allies. The test launches of ICBMs such as the Hwasong-15 and
Hwasong-17 also showed them to have a long enough range to attack the
US mainland.
Third, North Korea would like to goad South Korea into breaking the
Pyongyang Declaration of September 19, 2018, and then blame South Korea
for the breach. Fourth, we may suppose that this brinksmanship is partly
intended to divert attention from North Korea’s ongoing COVID-19 crisis
and food shortages.
President Yoon Seok-yeol was an ardent critic of the Moon Jae-in admin-
istration’s North Korea policy. During the campaign, he charged that the
Moon government’s conciliatory stance limited South Korea’s role in the
international community. Whereas the Moon Jae-in administration advo-
cated a peace process that valued friendly relations with North Korea and
China, the Yoon Seok-yeol administration stresses the comprehensive
strengthening and expansion of the ROK–US alliance. Since his inaugura-
tion, President Yoon has reacted strongly to North Korea’s missile launches,
using expressions such as “stern retribution,” “resolute response,” and “strong
condemnation.” In particular, on December 29, President Yoon emphasized
the need for “overwhelmingly superior war preparations” to preserve peace in
the face of North Korea’s provocations (JoongAng Ilbo 2022c).
Meanwhile, in a speech on Liberation Day (August 15) President Yoon
presented an “audacious initiative” for North Korea policy. He proposed that
South Korea would fully support North Korea’s economic development if
North Korea follows the path of denuclearization. Specific components of the
initiative include a large-scale food support program; support for power
232  ASIAN SURVEY 63:2

generation, transmission, and distribution infrastructure; port and airport

modernization projects; support for modernization of hospitals and medical
infrastructure; international investment and financial support programs; and
technical support programs to improve agricultural productivity. The Moon
Jae-in administration’s Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula focused on
laying the groundwork for peace through political and military cooperation;
Yoon proposes to give North Korea a lift through economic cooperation The
Yoon government wanted to improve relations with North Korea through
economic support, in view of North Korea’s serious economic difficulties
(JoongAng Ilbo 2022b).
But the prevailing view is that the confrontation and tension on and
around the Korean Peninsula will continue. In his speech at the Supreme
People’s Assembly, in September, chairman Kim Jong-un proclaimed the
legalization of nuclear force and declared that he would further strengthen
the country’s nuclear forces as soon as possible. As long as North Korea
maintains this Cold War posture, tensions on the Peninsula are likely to
persist (Kyunghyang Shinmun 2022)

ECONOMIC HARDSHIP

The worsening income polarization and economic inequality put a heavy

burden on the Moon Jae-in government (Chang and Yun 2022, 49). In 2022,
economic recession and inflation emerged globally, and South Korea was no
exception. The Yoon Seok-yeol government has faced grim economic indi-
cators one after another amid high prices, high interest rates, and high
exchange rates. In its Economic Policy Direction announced in June, the
new government foreshadowed massive deregulation and tax cuts. This eco-
nomic approach was embodied in the 2022 Tax Reform Bill and the 2023
Budget Bill. In addition, the government revealed its plan to implement
market-based economic policies, saying, “We will boldly change the stance
of economic operation to overcome the economic crises of low growth,
inflation, and polarization.” (JoongAng Ilbo 2022a).
In 2022, South Korea’s economy suffered from difficulties in every aspect,
including economic growth, trade, inflation, and real estate. A Korea Devel-
opment Institute (2022) report estimated that South Korea’s economic
growth would slow from 4.1% in 2021 to 2.7% in 2022 and 1.8% in 2023;
meanwhile, the export growth rate would be cut in half, from last year’s
 YUN / SOUTH KOREA IN 2022  233

10.8% to 4.3% this year, and only 1.6% next year. Concerns over a global
economic slowdown are growing in the aftermath of a steep US interest rate
hike and an ultra-strong dollar. As the Chinese economy slows, South Korea’s
exports, such as semiconductors, will also suffer. The contribution of net
exports (exports minus imports) to growth has been deteriorating, from
1.7 percentage points in the first quarter of 2002 to –1 point in the second
quarter and –1.8 points in the third quarter.
In 2022, exports increased by 7.1% year-on-year to USD 690 billion,
imports increased by 19.5% to USD 735 billion, and the trade balance
recorded a deficit of USD 45 billion. Despite difficult external conditions,
such as China’s COVID-19 lockdown, economic slowdown, and the
Russia–Ukraine war, exports in 2022 hit a record high. Meanwhile, oil prices
rose due to the war and energy imports such as crude oil, natural gas, and coal
soared, resulting in a sharp increase in total imports. Thus the trade balance
showed a deficit (for the first time since global financial crisis of 14 years ago)
despite the improvement in exports (Institute for International Trade 2022, 7).
A sharp increase in the standard interest rate also brought economic insta-
bility. In July the Bank of Korea raised that rate by 0.5 points, from 1.75% per
annum to 2.25%. This was the biggest such jump since March 2008, when
standard interest was introduced as a policy tool. But more increases fol-
lowed: to 2.5% in August, 3% in October, and 3.25% in November (Money
Today 2022).
In 2021 housing prices soared, and real estate inequity was recorded as the
biggest mistake of the Moon Jae-in administration (Chang and Yun 2022,
48). In 2022 the situation was completely different. As the standard interest
rate rose, real estate prices fell sharply. According to the National Housing
Price Trend Survey, apartment prices nationwide fell by 4.79% (cumula-
tively) from January to November. This is the biggest drop not only during
the same period but also on an annual basis since December 2003, when the
Real Estate Agency began investigating apartment prices. The cumulative
transaction volume of apartment sales (January to October) across the coun-
try was less than half of that in the same period in 2021—down from about
600,000 to about 260,000 (Asia Economy 2022).
234  ASIAN SURVEY 63:2

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