9489/31/ON/21 NHS2022

The author started the passage with an inquiry on USSR’s desire, further suggesting how
clueless US in trying to understand Stalin’s next moves on strategies in Europe with special
mention over Germany. While US confusion and anxiety was clear to see, knowing the huge
contrast of governing systems between US and the USSR, whose leader Stalin was the single
decision-maker (dictatorship). According to the author, US was caught unprepared and
inexperienced in dealing with dictatorship whose leader single-handedly made all decision.
But then the author lamented how prone Stalin was to paranoia and further commented
how Stalin himself was not sure with his definition of “security” for USSR. Thus, it was clear
the issue on Germany remained unstable and would likely to trigger troubles ahead. Just
before the outbreak of berlin blockade, the author elaborated how confused the US was
with USSR’s preference for the future of Germany. The author listed down 3 possibilities to
the Soviet, thus made US went haywire (emotionally disturbed), US was not able to predict
whether USSR might want a united communist Germany which would mean take over the 3
German sectors under French, British & US or to witness a weakened Germany, politically or
economically or to severely ‘squeeze’ Germany with demands of endless reparations, from
Germany to the extent of dismantling mentals from German factories and transported them
to Russia and remained unused and wasted. In addition, the author added further how the
USSR even appointed some of the former Nazi to lead eastern zone much to the disgust of
the west.
Regardless of Ussr’s preferred fate for Germany, the author made it clear of how
assertive/firm US in rejecting for a united Germany under soviet control, as it consequently
would put the security of western nations to be at stake. This could mean geographical
border security as well as in ruining European economic recovery considering how US Grand
Marshall was pushing for a strong liberal-democratic Germany to be established. To the US,
an economically dependent weakened Germany would be a disaster for European
economic recovering as Germany was one of the strong economic powerhouse of Europe.
Therefore, the US felt it was important to rebuild german economy back to it feet, even if it
meant to break it apart and the process would require currency reform to take place. The
author made it clear how unworthy the existing currency, “German mane” was considering
the high inflation rate that hit post-war Germany that resorted for preference to circulation
of USD as the ‘twisted currency’ and mostly used on the black market.

It seems that the author could understand how hard for US to not do drastic actions, in
terms of currency issues as he added how Truman was pressured by his own secretary to
pass monetary reform in order for businesses to function properly and include a condition
to exclude the soviet sector of Germany considering how different and incompatible
capitalism and communism were. The author acknowledges how this drastic decision of
introducing a new currency later known as Bizonia in the western sector if Germany marked
the irreversible division of Germany. Meanwhile, the author commented how intense it was
to witness the soviet’s point of view in seeing how predictable the west was with their
policies and clearly the Russian were not in limbo as a result of constant activity of spying
and intelligence reports they received. The Russian knew in advance of the west
anticipation of making their part of German sector into adopting a fully capitalist system
with a new currency in hand, having the knowledge and fill understanding think it was no
longer a surprise to see how uncooperative the 4 – power council was. The last
agreement/meeting that the grand alliance had was Potsdam agreement in may 1945 and it
was interesting how observant the author in stating how the Russians’ showed their lack of
interest. The Russians by then fully realized how Germany was bound to be dried, and true
close proximity between soviet satellite state of east Germany and capitalist liberal
democracy west Germany. Fear of capitalist encirclement began to crept in along with
border security, made Stalin to reveal his true color. By labelling Stalin as a ‘predator’, the
author implied how dangerous Stalin was and the author’s use of word ‘lunged’ further
indicated how Stalin made a calculative move to berlin with berlin blockade to solve
problems once and for all.

As implied previously of how calculated Stalin was in blocking berlin with clear risk
assessment – the soviet made many excuses in obstructing land transportation and
communication network between wester zones to eastern zones in order to reach west
berlin. The wide range of excuses that ranged from ‘defective wagons’, ‘crowded stations’
to ‘urgent repairs’ were unreasonable and by the time the announcement of new currency
‘deutsche mark’ was made, chaotic economic instability followed. The inflation rate
skyrocketed with the $2300 required to buy a carton of cigarettes suggesting instability and
USSR further worsened the situation by blocking west berlin and cutting off electricity. It
seemed west Berliners were doomed as the metropolitan city lacked food supplies and
might not survive

In conclusion, US’ inexperience, lack of sensitivity and poor handily of relations with Russia
in handling Germany’s currency reform was noticeable. US’ lack of patience and kept on
exerting pressure to get things done in their own way without giving much effort to see how
cautions USSR was in terms of economic reform in Germany. Despite that, USSR was also to
be blamed for not making it clear of its intention and keeping things in the dark was not
helping as US could not read USSR’s mind. This to me seems to be post revision but USSR
seems to be more at fault as the author clearly indicated trying ti take a forced-take over of
west berlin and had no problems to resort to blackmail rather than taking the initiative of
negotiating through the 4—power council. Clearly the incompatibility between 2 super
powers were clear as US was being impatient and demanded quick answers and actions
while USSR was taking too much time and delayed things on purpose. Their economic
ideology of how ownership and distribution of wealth also differed made division of
Germany as inevitable