Journal of Management

1995, Vol. 21, No. 1, 101-118

The Effects of Politics and Power

on The Organizational Commitment
of Federal Executives
Patricia A. Wilson
San Diego State University

This research investigates the effects of power and politics on

organizational commitment. The study develops two theoretical
explanations for orgcnizational commitment in which five
independent variables are embodied: (I) a power-based theory of
commitment (including subunit power, leadership power, leadership
behavior variables); and, (2) theory of politics (including “arbitrary
personnelpractices”and the “political control”variables). Politics and
power are discovered to have a significant effect on the organizational
commitment of executives.

The use of politics and power is endemic to organizations. People come to work
situations with many goals, not just one unified goal. These goals invoke conflict
and competition among workers for the expenditure of scarce resources. This
competition, in turn, effects the use of power and politics. Wildavsky (1964),
Harvey and Mills (1970), Pettigrew (1973), Frost and Hayes (1979), and Pfeffer
(1981) all associated political activity in organizations with the distribution of
resources or other advantages. Pfeffer (1981), and Pfeffer and Salancik (1974)
were especially interested in political behaviors associated with budgetary
decisions.
Although several researchers recognize the presence of politics and the use
of power in organizations, the approaches used to study this topic vary
considerably. Crozier (1964), for example, was among the first to identify
subunit power. He observed how the ability of plant maintenance engineers
to control uncertainty (by being the only group that could repair broken-down
machinery) was a source of power for them. Thompson (1967) also stressed
“uncertainty coping” as a source of power. Salancik and Pfeffer (1977), and
Tushman and Romanelli (1983) argued that those who are able to cope with
uncertainty will adjust their social standing and increase their power in the
organization. Woodward (1965), on the other hand, emphasized one’s critical
function in an organization as a source of power, while Hickson, Hining, Lee,

Direct all Correspondence to: Patricia A. Wilson, San Diego State University, School of Public
Administration and Urban Studies, San Diego, CA 92182-0367.

Copyright @ 1995 by JAI Press Inc. 0149-2063

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102 WILSON

Schneck and Pennings (197 l), Salancik and Pfeffer (1977), Astley and Sachdeva
(1984) identified several important variables including, resource control,
hierarchical authority, non-substitutability, uncertainty coping, and centrality
as sources of power and as connecting links to organizational politics.
Francis E. Rourke’s (1976) identification of an agency’s bases of power
was very similar to the findings of Salancik and Pfeffer and Hickson et. al.
Among the several bases of power he identified were: (1) the nature of an
agency’s expertise; (2) the nature of and size of an agency’s constituencies; and,
(3) the quality of an agency’s leadership (leadership power). Rourke uses the
concept of substitutability/ non-substitutability to explain the nature of an
agency’s expertise, and his discussion of “a strong public constituency as a source
of power in an agency” embodies the concept of resource control as a source
of subunit power (pp. 228-234).
Pfeffer (1981) argued that organizational power is a function of the
structure. Power inheres in one’s structural position, which provides access to
people, information, and financial resources (budgets). Those in power stay in
power by reinforcing the existing structure of the organization.
All of the above studies and others, have failed to investigate the effects
of politics and power on organizational commitment, especially the effects of
these factors on the commitment of top executives in the public sector. This
study will add to what is known about organizational effectiveness with the
development of theories of politics and power as explanations for commitment
levels of Senior Executive Service (SES) managers in the federal government.
Retention of quality workers, performance and/ or productivity are among
the important measures of organizational effectiveness. However, because of
its effect on performance (productivity) and turnover, “commitment” is the
organizational outcome examined in this research. To understand SES
members’ level/degree of commitment to public service it is important to first
review reasons why SES members join, stay in, and decide to leave the federal
government.

Reasons for Joining, Staying In and Leaving Public Sector Employment

Perry and Wise (1990) identified three motivational bases as reasons why
one would want employment in the public sector. Two of these, a norm-based
reason and a rational motive, are especially pertinent to this study. Although
they did not believe that all public employees are driven by these needs, they
argued that “a desire to serve the public interest”, “loyalty to duty and to the
government as a whole”, and “social equity” are normative orientations
commonly used to explain why individuals choose public sector employment
(p. 369). Downs (1967), Wamsley, Goodsell, Rohr, Stivers, White and Wolf
(1987), Karl (1979), and Lasson (1978) also identified “adesire to serve the public
interest” as a normative foundation for public employment. Serving the public
interest involves those administrative and policy activities which provide the
“greatest good for the greatest number of people”.

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 THE ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITMENT OF FEDERAL EXECUTIVES 103

There are also rational motives, which are “sometimes grounded in

individual utility maximization”, for desiring civil service employment (Perry
& Wise, 1990, p. 368). Kelman (1987) and Rawls (1971) believed that a persons
maybe be drawn to the public sector because such employment lets them
participate in the process of policy formulation, and such involvement, in and
of itself, can reinforce an individual’s image of self importance. In summary,
then, the “desire to serve the public interest” and the “desire to participate in
the process of policy formulation” are believed to be reasons why SES members
sought careers as civil servants.
On the other hand, the following are among the strongest reasons SES
members give for staying in public service: they enjoy the work, they want to
have an impact on public affairs, the retirement system, and job security, current
annual and sick leave benefits. It is important to note that the need to participate
in public policy formulation (to serve the public interest) explains both why
persons choose public service employment and stay in such careers.
Although there have been many reasons given by executives for leaving
the federal government [including: the negative image associated with Federal
employment; lack of promotion potential, and salary levels (See “The 1984
Report on the Senior Executive Service” and “Working For America’)], in a
1985 study done by the United States General Accounting Office (GAO), two
reasons, (1)“dissatisfaction with top management” and (2)“dissatisfaction with
political appointees”, were among the reasons rated as very important out of
the 55 considered (“Senior Executive Service: Reasons Why.. .“).
These two reasons motivated the development of theories of power and
politics as explanations for commitment presented in this research. More
explicit explanations of the source of SES members’ dissatisfaction with
political appointees and/or top management are needed. Why were they
dissatisfied with these groups? Although the GAO study did not specify the
nature of the dissatisfaction that SES members had with top managers and
political appointees, it is believed that politics and power struggles were
involved.
While power and politics are related topics, they are believed to be
conceptually and empirically different phenomena. Power is defined as the
“capacity of social actors [organizational members] to achieve desired objectives
or results” (Astley & Sachdeva, 1984, p. 104). The concept of politics, on the
other hand, refers “to the structure and process of the use of authority and power
to effect definitions of goals, directions, other major parameters of the
organization.. .” (Wamsley & Zald, 1973, p. 18). Madison, Allen, Porter,
Renwick and Mayes (1980) defined organizational politics as “a process of
influence or the ‘management of influence’ . . .while power is a reservoir of
potential influence.. . ‘(p. 81). Mintzberg (1984), on the other hand, posited that:

Politics may be considered to constitute one among a number of

systems of influence in the organization.. . The system of politics.. .
may be described as reflecting power that is technically illegitimate
(or, perhaps more accurately ‘alegitimate’) in its means (and sometimes

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in its ends as well” . . .[Political behavior in organizations is] “neither

formally authorized, widely accepted, nor officially certified. As a
result, political behavior is typically divisive and conflictive, often
pitting individuals or groups against formal authority, accepted
ideology, and/ or certified expertise, or else against each other (p. 134).

Mintzberg (1983, 1984, 1985) believed that there is a negative relationship

between interpersonal relationships, performance and productivity, and
pervasive and prolong politics in organizations. His definition of organizational
politics images the conceptualization of the politics investigated in this study.

Power-Based Theory
The public bureau (i.e., the federal government) provides a unique setting
in which to study organizational power and politics. It is an organization in
which the work provides an opportunity for its managers/ executives to become
involved in the implementation of public policy. Public policies and programs
are driven by power struggles and politics.
SES members, as organizational managers and primary implementors of
federal policy, are inadvertently involved in political activities because the
implementation and managerial processes themselves involve political activities
and power struggles. Pfeffer (1981) maintained that “management (which
involves the implementation of policy) is itself a political activity” (p. xi). Stone
(1980) also felt that the implementation process is a political process. He defined
implementation as the “concrete activity that comes as follow-through to a
previously set goal” (p. 13). He argued that as a continuing process of
specification and reassessment, it (the implementation process) inescapably
brings about goal modification and becomes a political process” (p. 13). The
implementation process is a significant part of the policy-making process, In
their roles as implementors then, career executives become “instruments” of the
political process. As instruments, SES members become entangled in a web
(a political “hot bed”) of many conflicting and competing goals, values, and
demands. Between these goals and the actual implementation processes are
centers of power, e.g., elected officials, special interests groups, private citizens,
bureaucratic professionals, each with competing interests. Stone (1980)
explained further that:

the political sociologist sees implementation as an integral part of the

political process, as a phase of policy formation in which centers of
power and interest interpose themselves between goals and the
concrete plans to achieve those goals (p. 19).

To successfully implement policy which serves public interest (i.e., “the greatest
good for the greatest number of people’), then, requires power. SES members,
as implementors, need power to be able to neutralized those power centers which
have agendas other than the public interest. If such centers of power are
interposed between goal establishment (goals set by Congress) and goal

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 THE ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITMENT OF FEDERAL EXECUTIVES 105

implementation, then the nature and effects of power needed to successfully

implement policy which truly serves public interest (as opposed to only the
demands of special groups), and ensure organizational commitment of the
implementators, are important to identify and understand. The use, control and
distribution of power are fundamental activities in implementation processes.
Power determines who gets what, when and how (Morgan, 1986, p. 158).
The power-based theory includes the subunit power, leadership power,
leadership behavior variables. Subunit power and leadership power are believed
to have the most significant effects on commitment. The degree of influence
that SES members could have on public policy is as much a function of the
power of the subunit and of the leadership in the subunit, as it is their own
managerial skills and experiences.
Subunit power embodies those elements which are essential for the survival
of agencies in government and for the implementation/influence of public
policy. Expert work skills and experiences (non-substitutable skills), as opposed
to general administrative skills, which are needed by government will ensure
the power of the subunits. Resource control (both constituent and financial
support) are needed for the survival of the agency (work units). Communication
networks are needed for both the survival of an agency as well as for the
influence of policy. The ability to cope with uncertainty also enhances the power
of a work unit and agency. [Resource control, network centrality, coping with
uncertainty, and non-substitutability (Astley & Sachdeva, 1984; Hickson et al.,
1974; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977) are concepts used in the literature to define
subunit power. These will be explained later.]
The concept of leadership power includes both technical and conceptual
abilities, as well as political skill. In reference to technical and conceptual
abilities, those supervisors who have leadership power have “the ability to
administer to another person information, knowledge, or expertise” (Hinkins
& Schreisheim, 1988, p. 48). SES members are themselves experts in the
management and implementation of federal programs. Their education,
longevity and experiences in the federal government have ensured their abilities
in these areas. Only those supervisors with greater conceptual abilities and/or
technical abilities can administer to SES members the information, knowledge,
and expertise needed to improve policy implementation processes and enhance
executives’ participation in the influence of public policy, which in turn could
increase their level of commitment.
Technical and conceptual skills are not the only components of leadership
power, however. In the context of a political environment, leadership power
takes on another meaning. Within this framework, leadership power refers to
the political ability of the leader to accomplish the goals of the subunit by
“ensuring a favorable response to the agency from outside groups and
organizations that control resources upon which it (the subunit/agency)
depends”(Rourke, 1976, pp. 241-242). The significance of a politically powerful
leader is evident when one considers the political nature of the federal
government discussed above.

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The third variable, leadership behavior, examines SES members’

perceptions of the way their supervisors use, control and distribute their power
within the context of a supervisor-subordinate relationship. Supervisors can use
power in two general ways: (1) they can use power to dominate and subjugate
subordinates by keeping them weak and dependent on the leader or, (2) they
can exercise power in a cautious, responsible manner with the objective of
internalizing motivation and organizational commitment in subordinates (Yukl,
1981, p. 59). The behavior used by supervisors to control and motivate their
workers will affect job satisfaction and commitment in organizations.

Theory of Politics
The theories of politics and power provide different explanations for SES
members’ levels of committee. Within the context of the relationship between
leadership power and commitment, for example, the power-based theory of
commitment hypothesizes that career executives are not commitment to federal
employment because of their supervisors’ lack of leadership power. The theory
of politics, on the other hand, involves measuring the effects of “arbitrary
personnel practices” and “political control”variables on the SES members’ level
of commitment.
Provisions of the 1978 Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), which created
the Senior Executive Service, expanded managerial prerogatives to the extent
that serious doubts have been raised about the balance between responsiveness
and neutrality of the federal government over time. The major questions are:
By eliminating many of the protections against political abuse of executive
authority and granting agency managers (i.e., SES members’ supervisors) the
wide latitude to appoint, transfer, and/or remove SES members, has the
political neutrality of federal service been undermined and are senior executives
subjected to abusive political pressure (“The Government’s Managers”, pp. 53-
59)? The examination of the effects of “arbitrary personnel practices” variable
on commitment will explores executives’ opinions about these questions.
This variable examines the abuse of power, relating to personnel matters,
by those in positions superior to SES members. It is posited that those in
positions superior to career executives make arbitrary and capricious personnel
decisions involving career executives, for reasons other than managerial
efficiency and/ or effectiveness, i.e., for reasons other than the successful
accomplishment of organizational goals.
According to a Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the
Senior Executive Service, career executives believe that the SES has been
politicized. They reported:

Many SES members believe that political criteria have been used in
appraising performance, allocating rewards, and imposing sanctions,
including making punitive reassignments.. .some of these fears.. .are
not entirely unfounded.. . for instance, the-White counselor Edwin
Meese, [Office of Personnel Management] OPM Director Donald
Devine, and [Office of Management and Budget] OMB Deputy

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 THE ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITMENT OF FEDERAL EXECUTIVES 107

Director Joseph Wright signed a draft of a memorandum to agency

heads urging them to construe SES performance appraisals as a
“vehicle to insure that Administration initiatives and policies are
appropriately carried out and that the primary objectives of the
President are accomplished. ..the substance of the draft was
incorporated into the final memorandum circulated to agency heads
(“The Government’s Managers”, pp. 55-56).

Politics in public service is a concern because it often times leads to negative

personnel management, i.e., political abuse of a merit system, which in turn
leads to decay and destruction of government.
The “political control” variable investigates SES members’ opinions
regarding the degree to which political neutral objectives of the SES personnel
system are successfully accomplished, and their importance to the members.
In a highly charged, politicized work environment, utilitarian values are
compromised for decisions which advance a particular political agenda (that
which is in the interest of a particular interest group) as opposed to “that which
promotes the public interest”. Politics within this context refers to those
activities which promote the interests of the “strongest party or group”, as
opposed to enhancing the interests of a representative society-i.e., “the greatest
good for the greatest number of people”.
“A politically neutral bureaucracy” is a value which, in public
administration theory at least, is believed to be implicit in the need to “serve
the public interest.” As previously discussed, Perry and Wise theorized the
public servants are motivated by “that which is in the public interest”-“the
will of the State”. Political interference usurps career executives’ efforts to
promote the public interests and could decrease their level of commitment.

Research Hypotheses
The two theoretical models embody five (5) independent variables. The
power-based theory includes the subunit power, leadership power, and
leadership behavior variables. Hypotheses one, two, and three predict that there
are statistically significant and positive relationships between commitment and:
(1) subunit power; (2) leadership power, and; (3) leadership behavior,
respectively.
Secondly, the theory of politics includes the “arbitrary personnel practices”
and the “political control” variables. Hypothesis four predicts significant and
inverse relationships between the dependent variable and “arbitrary personnel
practices”. (Hypotheses 4A and 4B predict negative relationships between
commitment and SES members direct and indirect experiences with their
supervisors’ use of arbitrary personnel practices, respectively. A “direct
experience” with arbitrary personnel practices means that SES members were
the personal victims of such actions, while an “indirect experience” means that
these executives witnessed such practices being used on their colleagues.)
Finally, it is hypothesized that there will be a statistically significant and positive
relationship between the dependent variable and the “political control”variables

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108 WILSON

[both “importance of political control” (Hypothesis 5A) and “successful

accomplishment of political control” (Hypothesis 5B)]. It is believed that the
level of importance SES members attach to this objective is an indication of
the degree to which they identify with and internalize the objectives of their
work (i.e, the work itself) and is also, therefore, an indication of their degree
of commitment.

Method and Procedure

Sample
From a list of 5,687 SES members, supplied by the U.S. Office of Personnel
Management, a stratified random sample’ of 1340 SES members from 14
cabinet departments and two agencies in the federal government were sent
survey questionnaires. There were 942 responses received; a response rate of
70.29%. Men and women constituted 91.2% and 8.8%, respectively, of the
sample. Approximately 35% held masters’ degrees and/or some additional
graduate work, 22.6% held doctorates. Over 97% held career appointments and
less than 3% were political appointees. Approximately 50% were between 46
and 55 years of age, with the age range of 51-55 being the most frequently
occurring category.
Dependent Variable
The commitment scale measured SES members strength of loyalty,
involvement, and identification with their subunits using a short version (9-
items) of the Mowday, Steers and Porter’s (1979) instrument. The response
format employed a 5-point Likert-type scale (ranging from strongly agree to
strongly disagree). This variable has a reliability coefficient of 0.8957.

Independent Variables
As previously discussed, power is defined as the “capacity of social actors
[organizational members] to achieve desired objectives or results” (Astley &
Sachedeva, 1984, p. 104). Social actors within an organization are believed to
have power when they affect outcomes of the organization.
The term “subunit” refers to the SES members’ work unit (within the
department), which includes the SES members themselves, their subordinates,
and the SES members’ supervisors. Subunit power refers to SES members’
perceptions of the capacity of all social actors, collectively, in their work units,
to achieve their goals/ mission. Substitutability/ non substitutability, network
centrality, “coping with uncertainty”, and resource control (see Astley &
Sachedeva; Hickson et al.; Salancik & Pfeffer) are theoretical concepts used
to define and operationalize the subunit power concept. They are defined as
follows:

Non-substitutability/ substitutability refers to the extent to which

members and/ or tasks of a subunit can be replaced by other members
and/ or tasks of other subunits.

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 THE ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITMENT OF FEDERAL EXECUTIVES 109

The centrality of subunits refers to the degree to which subunit

members’ activities are interlinked into the organizational system (or
critical to the functions of the organization) and, the degree to which
the subunits are the center point of information in the federal
government.
Uncertainty is defined as a lack of information about future events,
so that alternatives and their outcomes are unpredictable.
Resource Control refers to the ability of subunits to secure the human
and financial resources necessary to accomplish their mission.

The reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s alpha) for the subunit power scale is
0.7509. The variable consisted of 13 items, which operationalized concepts of
resource control, coping with uncertainty, non-substitutability and/ or network
centrality. Respondents were asked to give their opinions (using a response scale
ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree) regarding the degree of power
in their subunits. Examples of the operationalization of the 13 statements are
as follows:

1. My subunit has the ability to secure the financial resources necessary

to accomplish its mission.
2. The employees in my subunit have unique technical expertise and/
or training which is difficult to replace.
3. The activities of this subunit are greatly interlinked with the activities
of other subunits in the federal government.

The concept of “leadership power” refers to SES members’ perceptions of

their supervisors’ capabilities in their internal and external responsibilities. This
concept has a two-part definition: professional (expert) power and political
power. Professional power refers to the “ability (of supervisors within the work
units) to administer to another [subordinates] information, knowledge, or
expertise” (Hinkins and Schriesheim, 1988a). (This instrument is adapted from
Hinkins and Schriesheim’s, 1988b, “expert power” scale.)
Political power refers to SES members’ supervisors’ ability to attract to
their subunits both financial support and public constituent support necessary
for the subunit to succeed. The 6 items which operationalize this variable have
a Cronbach’s alpha equal to 0.8991. The response scale ranges from “strongly
agree” to “strong disagree”. Examples of the 6 statements which operationalized
this variable are as follows:

1. My supervisor can provide me with needed technical knowledge.

2. My supervisor has the “clout” necessary to get the job done.
3. My supervisor is capable of getting the resources he/she needs to get
things done.

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The “leadership behavior” variable measures how supervisors use their

power over SES members: whether they use power to subjugate or uplift senior
executives, the extent to which the supervisors are “democratic” or
“authoritarian” relative to decision making in the work environment, the degree
to which they a establish a centralized/decentralized work structure (i.e., the
degree to which they share power), their level of concern regarding the growth
and development of their subordinates. The 12 variable items are descriptions
of specific kinds of behaviors which can be attributed to supervisor-subordinate
relationships. The scale’s reliability coefficient is 0.9318. Examples of the 12
statements which operationalized this variable are as follows:

1. My supervisor allows me to become involved in the formulation of

agenda for policy.
2. My supervisor shows me a lot of trust and respect.
3. My supervisor ensures that employees fully realize their potential.
4. My supervisor makes decisions in my area of responsibility without
consulting with me.

The “arbitrarypersonnelpractices’” variable investigates executives’ direct

(personal) and indirect (the witnessing of arbitrary personnel practices used on
others in the department) experiences in the following areas: (1) “Shelving an
executive by detailing or reassigning him/ her to duties not of an executive
nature; (2) Trying to force an executive to resign; (3) Arbitrarily lowering an
executive’s performance rating; (4) Artificially structuring a reduction-in-force
in order to remove a specific executive; (5) Arbitrarily demoting an executive.
The 5 point Likert scale has responses ranging from “Never Happened to me”
to “Happened to me many times”. Cronbach’s alphas are 0.8530 and 0.8558,
respectively, for items operationalizing both the “personal experience with
politics”, and “indirect experience with politics” variables.
The “‘political control” variable is operationalized with the aggregated use
of three SES objectives:3

1. To ensure that the ratio of career executives to political appointees

allows for program continuity and policy advocacy in the management
of public programs.
2. To provide for an executive system which is guided by the public
interest and free from improper political interference.
3. To protect senior executives from arbitrary and capricious actions.

SES members’ opinions regarding the importance and successful

accomplishment of these goals (with Cronbach’s alphas equal to .8807 and
.8804, respectively) are measured for their cumulative effects on executives’
commitment to federal service. The Likert scale includes responses ranging from
“very important” to “very unimportant”, and “very successful” to “very
unsuccessful”, respectively.

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 THE ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITMENT OF FEDERAL EXECUTIVES 111

Statistical Analyses
A survey questionnaire was mailed to the executives. Pearson’s product-
moment correlations and stepwise regression analysis are the statistical
procedures performed in this research. All of the variables are measured by
a Likert-type, 5-point rating scale. For each executive, the numbers representing
each response to each variable item (variables items of both the independent
and dependent variables) were added, which resulted in each respondent having
a single summary score for each variable. The summary scores for each executive
were used in the correlations and regression procedures. The analyses are based
on respondents' perceptions, opinions and/ or feelings regarding the items which
comprise each variable. This is believed to be a valid approach because a person’s
commitment to an organization is usually based on his/her perceptions of
organizational events, situations and/or behaviors rather than a reaction to
“objective” fact. By concentrating on the respondents’ perceptions of who is
powerful, how power is used or abused, and who or what is political, one can
derive an accurate description of “the world of everyday thought and
experiences,” which Calder (1977) calls “first-degree constructs.”
Findings

Pearson S Product-Moment Correlations

Pearson’s product-moment correlations (simple correlations) were
performed to determine the relationship among all the independent variables,
and between the independent variables and the dependent variable. (In simple
correlations, each independent variable is analyzed for its effect on each of the
other independent variables and the dependent variable, without controlling
for the other variables.
All of the,power variables correlated with commitment as was predicted.
There were positive and significant relationships 0, < .OOl) between
commitment and subunit power, leadership power, and leadership behavior,
respectively. The correlations between the dependent variable and these power
variables were as follows: .4573; .5265; .5747, respectively. While hypotheses
one, two and three are supported by these correlations, the leadership power
and leadership behavior variables had higher correlations with commitment
than did the subunit power variable.
The political variables also had significant correlations @ < .OOl) with
commitment variable. Hypothesis four (4A and 4B) is supported, SES members’
experiences with both direct and indirect arbitrary personnel practices had a
significant and negative effect on their level of commitment. However, their
indirect experiences (i.e., the witnessing of their supervisors’ use of arbitrary
personnel practices on others in their work units) had a higher correlation with
this dependent variable (-.3510) than did their direct experiences (-.2791).
The relationships between commitment and the “importance” and
“successful accomplishment” of political control variables, respectively, were
demonstrated with correlation coefficients equal to .1616 and .3976, respectively
0, < .OOl). Hypothesis five (5A and 5B) is also supported.

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Table 1. Zero-Order (Simple) Correlations Between the Power and

Political Variables and Commitment
Independent Variables Commitment

1. Subunit Power .4573 (p < .ool)

2. Leadership Power S265 (p < Ml)
3. Leadership Behavior s747 @ < Ml)
4. Arbitrary Personnel Practices
4A. Direct -.2791 @ < .OOl)
4B. Indirect -.3510 @ <.ool)
5. Political Control
5A. Importance .1616 @ < .ool)
5B. Success .3976 @ < .OOl)

In summary, in the Pearson S product-moment correlations, Hypotheses

I, 2,3, 4A, 4B, 5A, and 5B are fully supported. See Table I below.

Stepwise Regression
Performing the stepwise regression procedure gave increased precision to
the relationships between all the independent variables and the dependent
variable. While considering all independent variables simultaneously, the
stepwise technique entered into the regression equation, one at a time, only those
variables which were significant at the .05 level or better. First, this procedure
entered the most significant variable, and then produced, first, the correlation
coefficient of this first variable with the dependent variable and, second, the
first variable’s coefficient of determination (R2) for the dependent variable.
Next, the second variable was entered. The procedure then produced one
correlation coefficient and one coefficient of determination for the first and
second variables together, and so on. This procedure is repeated several times
until the regression procedure produced one cumulative correlation coefficient
and one coefficient of determination for all the significant independent variables
entered together.
Leadership behavior was the first variable entered. It correlated with
commitment at the .70636 level, with an R squared (R2) of .49894, p = .OOOO.
Second, the subunit power variable was entered. Together, the leadership
behavior and subunit variables had a correlation coefficient and a coefficient
of determination of .74419 and .55382, respectively. The relationship between
these two independent variables and commitment was significant at the .OOOO
level, p = .OOOO.Subunit power accounted for an additional .05487 of the
variance in SES members’ level of commitment.
The leadership behavior, subunit power, and “importance of political
control” variables, together, had a correlation coefficient and a coefficient of
determination of .76259 and .58154, respectively (p = .OOOO).Considering the
relationship between the dependent variable and these 3 independent variables,
“importance of political control” accounted for a little more than 2% (.02772)
of the variance in SES members’ level of commitment. The variable which

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 THE ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITMENT OF FEDERAL EXECUTIVES 113

Table 2: Stepwise Regression: r, r2, r2 Change, and Significance Level Change

of Important Independent Variables
Order of Variables r2 Sign. F
Entered r ? Change Change

1. Leadership Behavior .70636 .49894 .49894 .OOOO

2. Subunit Power .74419 S5382 .05487 .OOOO
3. Importance of Political
Control .76259 .58154 .02772 .OOOO
4. Indirect Arbitrary
Personnel Experience .77081 .59415 .01261 .OOOO

operationalized SES members’ indirect experience with arbitrary personnel

practices (when entered into the stepwise procedure along with the above 3
variables) accounted for a little more than 1% (.01261) of the variance in the
dependent variable. All four variables together had a correlation coefficient and
a coefficient of determination of .77081 and .59415, respectively. Hypotheses
1,3,4B, and 5A were supported. See Table 2 below.
Unlike the Pearson’s product-moment correlations, which investigated the
effect of one variable at a time on the dependent variable, the result of stepwise
regression procedure is a much more significant and useful measurement for
these analyses because it simultaneously considered the effects of all independent
variables on the dependent variable. In an organizational setting, it is highly
probable that several/many factors, operating at the same time, will influence
organizational members’ degree commitment. In summary, in both the
Pearson’s product-moment correlations and in the stepwise regression
procedures, leadership behavior, subunit power, the “importance of the political
control objectives’: and SES members’ indirect experiences with arbitrary
personnelpractices were found to be the best predictors of commitment among
the executives.

Discussion
The relationship between leadership behavior and organizational
commitment found in this research has human resource management and
structural implications. The leadership behavior variable investigated SES
members’ perceptions of their supervisors in the workplace. It examined
executives’ perceptions of their supervisors’ use (or abuse), control and
distribution (sharing) of power; whether they used power to subjugate or uplift
senior executives; the extent to which the supervisors were “democratic” or
"authoritarian" relative to decision making in the work environment, the degree
to which the organizational structure of the personnel system was centralized/
decentralized.
McClelland (1970) posited that there are two fundamentally different
approaches to the use of power. One way for leaders to use (or abuse) power
is by dominating, subjugating, and weakening subordinates. Certainly SES

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114 WILSON

members, who are highly educated and experienced executives, would be

dissatisfied with such dehumanizing leadership if it existed in the federal
government. Such leadership kills morale, initiative and creativity and can lead
to worker rebellion. Yukl(198 1) argued:

. . over time the organization will suffer from this kind of leadership.
There will be less initiative and creativity in dealing with new problems,
[and a less commitment]. . .If followers begin to tire of their dependence
and come to resent their lack of influence and autonomy, they may
eventually rebel against the leader, just as children of authoritarian
parents often do when they grow old (p. 59).

In contrast, another way that leaders can use power is by “uplifting”

subordinates. Leaders who delegate authority, share information, and allow
subordinates to participate in decision-making (create a decentralized structure),
tend to maximize the internal motivation, self-control and commitment of
subordinates. One major reason SES members might have expressed
dissatisfaction with political appointees and/ or top management may have been
because they did not share significant and/or sufficient decision-making
authority with the career executives on issues concerning policy and programs.
They may have created a centralized structure where power to make decisions
was highly concentrated in the hands of those above the SES members.
Pfiffner (1987), for example, observed that the Reagan Administration felt
that career executives would try to sabotage any administration that was trying
to achieve significant change. As a result, Reagan’s political appointees (SES
members’ supervisors) held tight control on career executives. The negative
feelings of political appointees about career executives often resulted in a “jigsaw
puzzle management” scheme in which career executives were allowed to supply
information, but they were not allowed to become “involved in the formulation
of agenda related to policy objectives”(p. 59). In other words, their public service
skills and experiences were not used, and they were not allowed an opportunity
to influence policy.
On the other hand, the “uplifting approach”does not weaken subordinates.
Those who use this approach attempt to build the skills and self-confidence
of workers (Yukl, 1981). They have knowledge about human behavior and
interpersonal processes. They have an understanding about how the
empowerment of workers through training and participatory decision-making
(decentralization), how their own behavior and concern about subordinates’
growth and development, and how their sense of subordinates’ personal worth
and importance, can affect workers’ commitment and most probably their
productivity, as well as their retention in the workplace.
The relationship between commitment and SES members’ indirect
experiences with the arbitrary personnel practices also has managerial
implications. This independent variable measured the degree to which
executives witnessed their supervisors’ use coercive power. The use of coercive
power is the most ineffective way to manage workers, especially workers as

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 THE ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITMENT OF FEDERAL EXECUTIVES 115

highly trained as top executives. Those who are under the supervisor of leaders
who use coercive power are very unlikely to be committed to the organization
and very likely to resist the supervisor’s leadership. Yukl(l981) argued:

Effective leaders try to avoid using coercive power except when

absolutely necessary, because it is likely to create resentment and erode
their referent power. With coercion there ,is no chance of gaining
subordinate commitment, and even willing compliance is difficult to
achieve (p. 55).

In addition to managerial implications, this research also have public policy

implications--implications for a politically neutral government. Two of the
political control objectives were “to protect senior executives from arbitrary and
capricious actions” and “to provide for an executive system which is guided
by the public interest and free from improper political interference”. The
successful implementation and/or enforcement of these objectives need the
budgetary attention and policy development of Congress and the President.
Joint efforts of the Congress and the President toward policy development and
budgetary allocations which will ensure the full funding and staffing of the Merit
System Protection Board and the Office of the Special Counsel at all times might
ensure a politically neutral and meritorious government, which in turn might
improve the commitment of senior career executives. Full funding and staffing
of these offices might ensure the kind of investigations and appropriate
punishment of all arbitrary, capricious and /or political activities relating to
public personnel, especially federal executives.
Another of the political control objectives was to “ensure that the ratio
of career executives to political appointees allows for program continuity and
policy advocacy in the management of public programs”. Current law allows
up to 25yo of an agency’s senior executives to be non-career appointees. While
it may be very difficult to establish a set number or percentage of non-career
executives in each governmental agency for the purpose of achieving “program
continuity and policy advocacy”, a reduction in the number of political
appointees (those who have an average work life in government of 17 months
or less) could possibly enhance the successful accomplishment of this objective,
and possibly improve the commitment of career executives (The Report and
Recommendations of the National Committee on the Public Service, pp. 17-
19).
The Volcker Commission believed that excessive numbers of presidential
appointees (political appointees) may actually dilute effective presidential
leadership for two main reasons. First, neither the President nor the White
House can effectively supervise large numbers of presidential appointees, who
often times come to government with their own political constituencies and
agendas. This situation may actually undermine the President’s efforts to
establish and enforce a coherent and well coordinated program. Second, most
career executives, because of their longevity in public service, have experience
and knowledge which exceed the public service experience and knowledge of

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116 WILSON

political appointees. However, the President and/or the White House, by

interposing political appointees between themselves and career executives, may
actually distance themselves from the most relevant information.
The Commission also recommended that the President and Congress
mandate continuing and systematic development of highly competent career
executives for sub-cabinet appointments. To fill such positions with career
executives would mean a policy change involving a reduction in the number
of non-career executives allowed in a particular department or agency (See the
Report and Recommendations of the National Commission on the Public
Service, 1989, p. 19).
By allowing career executives to fill more of these positions, two things
could happen. First, the President, and his other top leaders, would have an
excellent source of administrative professionalism and experience. Second,
subunit power may be enhanced (and in turn, improve the commitment of
executives, according to these findings). Subunit power would increase as a
result of career executives’ increase in network centrality. In such positions,
executives would acquire vital information and political associations, as well
as higher-level policy experiences, which would greatly enhance the power of
their subunits. (One’s structural position in an organization can be one great
source of power). As previously mentioned, Pfeffer (1981) argued that one’s
structural position in an organization provides access to people, information,
and financial resources (budgets), i.e., the necessary “tools” to successfully
influence and/ or implement policy.
In conclusion, this research provided empirical support for the effects of
team power, good leader-member relations, and political control on the
commitment levels of top executives in the federal government. The important
question here concerns the external validity of these relationships. Would these
variables influence the commitment levels of persons in organizations in which
the work itself does not involve the implementation of public policy, e.g., in
the private sector ? In part, the operationalization of the political control
variable, and its relationship to organizational commitment may be unique to
this research. It is reasonable to predict, however, that subunit power, leadership
behavior, and arbitrary personnel practices would affect the organizational
commitment of thoye in the private sector also, i.e., in situations where the
workers are not involve in the implementation of public policy. Elaborations,
support and/or challenges relative to the theories of power and politics as
determinants of commitment are encouraged and welcomed.
Notes
1. The author acknowledges the assistance of the U.S. General Accounting Office in drawing the sample
to whom the survey questionnaire was sent. Attribute and statistical sampling were both used to determine
the sample size. A mathematical equation was used to determine the sample size(n) for each department/
agency. (One solved the equation for n to derive the sample size for each stratum.) Mathematically,
the equation is written:

E = t 4 pq/n(l = n/N)

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where: t =
the confidence level which was 1.96 (95% confidence level);
n =
the sample size in each department/agency;
N =
the actual number of SES members in the department/agency;
p =
.5 (the estimate rate of occurrence of a particular attribute and yields the largest sample size
within each department/agency);
q = 5 (1 minus p);
E = the tolerable error of the estimate rate of occurrence.

2. The items which comprised this measurement were taken from a study of the attitudes of senior executives
who left their positions during the 1983-1988 calendar years, conducted by the Merit Systems Protection
Board (See “Survey of Former Senior Executive Service Members”, 1989).
3. These three objectives were taken directly from the 1978 Civil Service Reform Act.

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