Republic of the Philippines petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to
SUPREME COURT Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO
MOLINA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely
new ground (in addition to those enumerated in the
Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely,
"psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity,
our courts have been swamped with various petitions
to declare marriages void based on this ground.
Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of
psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos
vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find
difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific
cases. In the present case and in the context of the
herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the
Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be
sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration —
Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the
world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the
present case, finds the need to lay down specific
guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858
affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the
Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,3 Benguet, which
declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano
Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground
of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the
filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified
Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at
the San Agustin Church4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O.
Molina was born; that after a year of marriage,
Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and
irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he
preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends
on whom he squandered his money; that he depended
on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never
honest with his wife in regard to their finances,
resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that
sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of
his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the
sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986
the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of
which their relationship was estranged; that in March
1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went
to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks
later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had
since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus
shown that he was psychologically incapable of
complying with essential marital obligations and was a
highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual
who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that
it would be to the couple's best interest to have their
marriage declared null and void in order to free them
from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage
from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo
admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live
together as husband and wife, but contended that their
misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to
(1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining
her group of friends even after their marriage; (2)
Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties
such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run
the household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following
were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally
married on April 14, 1985 at the Church
of St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child
named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina
was born on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact
for more than three years;
 4. That petitioner is not asking support
for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for
damages;
6. That the common child of the parties
is in the custody of the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her
own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie
Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G.
Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison,
a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and
Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked
as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any
evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial
conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment
declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner
was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in
toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the
Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect
interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity'
(as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and
made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the
case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to
establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in
the world which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the
respondent Court relied5 heavily on the trial court's
findings "that the marriage between the parties broke
up because of their opposing and conflicting
personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the
Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to
as Committee) intended to liberalize the application of
our civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It
concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage,
We view psychologically incapacity as a
broad range of mental and behavioral
conduct on the part of one spouse
indicative of how he or she regards the
marital union, his or her personal
relationship with the other spouse, as
well as his or her conduct in the long
haul for the attainment of the principal
objectives of marriage. If said conduct,
observed and considered as a whole,
tends to cause the union to self-
destruct because it defeats the very
objectives of marriage, then there is
enough reason to leave the spouses to
their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial
judge committed no indiscretion in
analyzing and deciding the instant case,
as it did, hence, We find no cogent
reason to disturb the findings and
conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these
discussions of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that
"opposing and conflicting personalities" is not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that
such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to
the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but
a defect in their psychological nature which renders
them incapable of performing such marital
responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court,
speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that
"psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of 'psychological
incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo
Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of
Manila,7Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear
showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is
an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a
"difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing The
of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting Court
personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological has no
incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties more
failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as questio
married persons; it is essential that they must be shown ns.
to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological
(nor physical) illness. In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his
alleged personality traits were constitutive of
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage
that she and her husband could nor get along with each celebration. While some effort was made to prove that
other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of
problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of
incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part
no incurable psychiatric disorder but only of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of
incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely
testified:8 shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and
blemishes of the beloved.
COURT
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond
Q It is therefore the merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing
recommendation of the law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36
psychiatrist based on of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by
your findings that it is many trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court
better for the Court to decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most
annul (sic) the Reverend Oscar V. Cruz,9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge)
marriage? of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C.
A Yes, Your Honor. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision
Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank
Q There is no hope for these friends of the Court for their informative and
the marriage? interesting discussions during the oral argument on
December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written
A There is no hope, the memoranda.
man is also living with
another woman. From their submissions and the Court's own
deliberations, the following guidelines in the
Q Is it also the stand of interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family
the psychiatrist that the Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the
parties are bench and the bar:
psychologically unfit for
each other but they are (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
psychologically fit with marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
other parties? resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of
the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This
A Yes, Your Honor. is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our
laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
Q Neither are they family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
psychologically unfit for on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the
their professions? nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of
A Yes, Your Honor. the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on
marriage and the family and emphasizes
the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must
be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological
— not physical. although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally
or physically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need
be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may
be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the
time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or
prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity
must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about
the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article
36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee
from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of
contracting marriage: Those who are
unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our
Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to
achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal.
Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is
decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed
civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident
source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given
persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church —
while remaining independent, separate and apart from
each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence
towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing
marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the
nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless
the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court
such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date
the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have
already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes
even more cogent with the use of the foregoing
guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of
Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and
remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno
Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the
result.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:
I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr.
Justice Panganiban but only because of the peculiar
facts of the case. As to whether or not the psychological
incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of
a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of
the law, on the facts of the case. In Leouel Santos
v. Court of Appealsand Julia Rosario-Bedia Santos, G.R.
No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I
maintained, and I still maintain, that there was
psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to
discharge the duties of a wife in a valid marriage. The
facts of the present case, after an indepth study, do not
support a similar conclusion. Obviously, each case must
be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own
facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground
for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case
is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must
take pains in examining the actual millieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling.
upheld petitioner Solicitor General's position that
"opposing and conflicting personalities" is not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, for the latter "is
not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of
their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their
Psychological nature which renders them incapable of
performing such marital responsibilities and duties.
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of
Reynaldo, the husband, did not constitute so much
"psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not
outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of
some marital obligations. "It is not enough to prove that
the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons; it is essential that they must
be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (not physical) illness."
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the
result of mental illness. For if it were due to insanity or
defects in the mental faculties short of insanity, there is
a resultant defect of vice of consent, thus rendering the
marriage annulable under Art. 45 of the Family Code.
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's
Civil Code Revision Committee was to exclude mental
inability to understand the essential nature of marriage
and focus strictly on psychological incapacity is
demonstrated in the way the provision in question
underwent revisions.
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft
provision read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any
party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of
marriage or was psychologically or
mentally incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if
 such lack of incapacity is made manifest
after the celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took
finally produced the following revised provision even
before the session was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack or
incapacity becomes manifest after the
celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation
above has dropped any reference to "wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the
essential nature or marriage" and to "mentally
incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases
refer to "defects in the mental faculties vitiating
consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of
appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a
defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground
for voidable marriage because there is the appearance
of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the
simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there
are sanity is curable. . . . Psychological incapacity does
not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with
consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage."1
My own position as a member of the Committee then
was that psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity
of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term
"psychological or mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar
Cruz opined in he earlier February 9, 1984 session that
this term "is an invention of some churchmen who are
moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered
a weak phrase." He said that the Code of Canon Law
would rather express it as "psychological or mental
incapacity to discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno
opined that sometimes a person may be psychologically
impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority
opinion for the interpretation and application of Art. 36
is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera,
considered the inclusion of the phrase" and is
incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented
that this would give rise to the question of how they will
determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it
would be more problematic. Yet the possibility that one
may be cured after the psychological incapacity
becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out
by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice
Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the
afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for
determining void marriages, viz:
1. lack of one or more
of the essential
requisites of marriage
as contract;
2. reasons of public
policy;
3. special cases and
special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was
subsumed under "special cases and special
situations," hence its special treatment in Art.
36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is
there a ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that
even comes close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing
at the time of the marriage, such marriage which stands
valid until annulled is capable of ratification or
convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of
essential requisites, some marriages are void from the
beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly
the provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to
fresh winds of change in keeping with the more
permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf
from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following
persons are incapable of contracting marriage: "3.
(those) who, because of causes of a psychological
nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations
of marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36
of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law
recognizes only two types of marriages with respect to
their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however,
recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or
annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal
"annuls" a marriage, it actually declares the marriage
null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first
place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be
dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and
consummated marriage between two living Roman
Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment
process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a
Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized
by Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to
capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another
marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not
being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law,
the former being more strict, quite a number of married
couples have found themselves in limbo — freed from
the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church
but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under
state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons
contract new marriages or enter into live-in
relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to
such anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision
Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept
of psychological incapacity into the Family Code — and
classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages
void ab initio or totally in existent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This
Old Code, while it did not provide directly for
psychological incapacity, in effect recognized the same
indirectly from a combination of three old canons:
"Canon #1081 required persons to 'be capable
according to law' in order to give valid consent; Canon
#1082 required that persons 'be at least not ignorant' of
the major elements required in marriage; and Canon
#1087 (the force and fear category) required that
internal and external freedom be present in order for
consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced
two distinct but related grounds for annulment, called
'lack of due discretion' and 'lack of due competence.'
Lack of due discretion means that the person did not
have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the
weddingand therefore the union is invalid. Lack of due
competence means that the person was incapable of
carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she
made during the wedding ceremony.
"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in
the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as
homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation
for a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary
for psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had
reasoned for the first time in several cases that the
capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage
was probably not present in persons who had displayed
such problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of
this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once
the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness
to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for
what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to
accept proof of serious psychological problems that
manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as
proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of
the ceremony.
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional
opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly
important in such cases. Data about the person's entire
life, both before and after the ceremony, were
presented to these experts and they were asked to give
professional opinions about a party's mental at the time
of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged
and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack
of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new
openness in this area did not amount to the addition of
new grounds for annulment, but rather was an
accommodation by the Church to the advances made in
psychology during the past decades. There was now the
expertise to provide the all-important connecting link
between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea
of marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a
covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer
be assumed in annulment cases that a person who
could intellectually understand the concept of marriage
could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability
to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a
mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a
necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.2
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of
incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual
anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that
incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or
carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For
marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of
the spouses to each others' body for heterosexual acts,
but is, in its totality, the right to the community of the
whole of life, i.e., the right to a developing. lifelong
relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the
meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for
marriage as presupposing the development of an adult
personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to
give themselves to each other and to accept the other
as a distinct person; that the spouses must be 'other
oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in
a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the
capacity for interpersonal relationship because marriage
is more than just a physical reality but involves a true
intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the
obligations of marriage depends. according to Church
decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal
relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal
sharing and support is held to impair the relationship
and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential
marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse
is not considered in isolation but in reference to the
fundamental relationship to the other spouse.3
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six
elements necessary to the mature marital relationship:
The courts consider the following
elements crucial to the marital
commitment: (1) a permanent and
faithful commitment to the marriage
partner; (2) openness to children and
partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional
maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6)
an ability to cope with the ordinary
stresses and strains of marriage, etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some
of the psychological conditions that
might lead to the failure of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional
impairment precluding conjugal
communion even with the best
intentions of the parties. Among the
psychic factors possibly giving rise to his
or her inability to fulfill marital
obligations are the following: (1)
antisocial personality with its
fundamental lack of loyalty to persons
or sense of moral values; (2)
hyperesthesia, where the individual has
no real freedom of sexual choice; (3)
the inadequate personality where
personal responses consistently
fallshort of reasonable expectations.
xxx xxx xxx
The psychological grounds are the best
approach for anyone who doubts
whether he or she has a case for an
annulment on any other terms. A
situation that does not fit into any of
the more traditional categories often
fits very easily into the psychological
category.
As new as the psychological grounds
are, experts are already detecting a
shift in their use. Whereas originally the
emphasis was on the parties' inability to
exercise proper judgment at the time of
the marriage (lack of due discretion),
recent cases seem to be
concentrating on the parties' to assume
or carry out their responsibilities an
obligations as promised (lack of due
competence). An advantage to using
the ground of lack of due competence is
that the at the time the marriage was
entered into civil divorce and breakup
of the family almost is of someone's
failure out marital responsibilities as
promisedat the time the marriage was
entered into.4
In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting
personalities" of the spouses were not considered
equivalent to psychological incapacity. As well in Santos
v. Court of Appeals cited in the ponencia, the Court
held that the failure of the wife to return home from
the U.S. or to communicate with her husband for more
then five years is not proof of her psychological
incapacity as to render the marriage a
nullity.5 Therefore, Art. 36 is inapplicable and the
marriages remain valid and subsisting.
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of
Appeals,6 this Court upheld both the Regional Trial
Court and the Court of Appeals in declaring the
presence of psychological incapacity on the part of the
husband. Said petitioner husband, after ten (10)
months' sleeping with his wife never had coitus with
her, a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it was
due to the physical disorder of his wife which, however,
he failed to prove. Goaded by the indifference and
stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic marital
obligation described as "to procreate children based on
the universal principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage," the wife brought the action in the lower
court to declare the marriage null.
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former
Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal
of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on
Psychological incapacity concluded:
If a spouse, although physically capable
but simply refuses to perform his or her
essential marriage obligations, and the
refusal is senseless and constant,
Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the
causes to psychological incapacity than
to stubborn refusal. Senseless and
protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the
prolonged refusal of a spouse to have
sexual intercourse with his or her
spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity.
We declared:
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship
in which the parties found themselves trapped in its
mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital
obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied
judgment of respondent appellate court.
1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein
marriage remains valid and subsisting absent
psychological incapacity (under Art. 36 of the Family
Code) on the part of either or both of the spouses.
VITUG, J., concurring:
I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban in his ponencia, and I find to be
most helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the
bench and the bar in the proper appreciation of Article
36 of Executive Order No. 209 ("The Family Code of the
Philippines"). The term "psychological incapacity" was
neither defined nor exemplified by the Family Code.
Thus —
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.
The Revision Committee, constituted under the
auspices of the U.P. Law Center, which drafted
the Code explained:
(T)he Committee would like the judge
to interpret the provision on a case-to-
case basis, guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts,
may be given persuasive effect since
the provision was taken from Canon
Law.1
Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken
from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law —
Canon 1095. (The following persons)
are incapable of contracting marriage;
(those) —
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of
discretion of judgment concerning
essential matrimonial rights and duties,
to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological
nature are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage —
 that should give that much value to Canon Law
jurisprudence as an aid to the interpretation
and construction of the statutory enactment.2
The principles in the proper application of the law teach
us that the several provisions of a Code must be read
like a congruent whole. Thus, in determining the import
of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, one must
also read it along with, albeit to be taken as distinct
from, the other grounds enumerated in the Code, like
Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise, but for
distinct reasons, render the marriage merely voidable,
or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal
separation. Care must be observed so that these various
circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if
the law were indifferent on the matter.
I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement
in Santos vs. Court of Appeals;3 viz:
(T)he use of the phrase "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code
has not been meant to comprehend all
such possible cases of psychoses as,
likewise mentioned by some
ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low
intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances. . . Article 36 of the
Family Code cannot be taken and
construed independently of, but must
stand in conjunction with, existing
precepts in our law on marriage. Thus
correlated, "psychological incapacity"
should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations
to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion
is implicit under Article 54 of the Family
Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void
marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing
at the inception of marriage, like the
state of a party being of unsound mind
or concealment of drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism, merely renders the
marriage contract voidable pursuant to
Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism,
lesbianism or homosexuality should
occur only during the marriage, they
become mere grounds for legal
separation under Article 55 of the
Family Code. These provisions of the
Code, however, do not necessarily
preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves,
depending on the degree and severity
of the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.4
In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a
ground for then nullity of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code, must be able to pass the following
tests; viz:
First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental,
not physical, in nature;
Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the
inability, not mere refusal, to understand, assume end
discharge the basic marital obligations of living
together, observing love, respect and fidelity and
rendering mutual help and support;
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time
the marriage is contracted although its overt
manifestations and the marriage may occur only
thereafter; and
Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious
and incurable.
It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee
has envisioned Article 36, as not a few observers would
suspect, as another form of absolute divorce or, as still
others would also put it, to be a alternative to divorce;
however, the fact still remains that the language of the
law has failed to carry out, even if true, any such
intendment. It might have indeed turned out for the
better, if it were otherwise, there could be good
reasons to doubt the constitutionality of the measure.
The fundamental law itself, no less, has laid down in
terse language its unequivocal command on how the
State should regard marriage and the family, thus —
Section 2, Article XV:
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the
State.
Section 12, Article II:
Sec. 12. The State recognizes the
sanctity of family life and shall protect
and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution . . . .
Section 1, Article XV:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino
family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total
development. (The 1987 Constitution)
The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here
be significant not so much for the specific issue there
resolved but for the tone it has set. The Court there has
held that constitutional provisions are to be considered
mandatory unless by necessary implication, a different
intention is manifest such that to have them enforced
strictly would cause more harm than by disregarding
them. It is quite clear to me that the constitutional
mandate on marriage and the family has not been
meant to be simply directory in character, nor for mere
expediency or convenience, but one that demands a
meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:
I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr.
Justice Panganiban but only because of the peculiar
facts of the case. As to whether or not the psychological
incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of
a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of
the law, on the facts of the case. In Leouel Santos
v. Court of Appealsand Julia Rosario-Bedia Santos, G.R.
No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I
maintained, and I still maintain, that there was
psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to
discharge the duties of a wife in a valid marriage. The
facts of the present case, after an indepth study, do not
support a similar conclusion. Obviously, each case must
be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own
facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground
for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case
is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must
take pains in examining the actual millieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling.
upheld petitioner Solicitor General's position that
"opposing and conflicting personalities" is not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, for the latter "is
not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of
their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their
Psychological nature which renders them incapable of
performing such marital responsibilities and duties.
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of
Reynaldo, the husband, did not constitute so much
"psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not
outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of
some marital obligations. "It is not enough to prove that
the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons; it is essential that they must
be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (not physical) illness."
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the
result of mental illness. For if it were due to insanity or
defects in the mental faculties short of insanity, there is
a resultant defect of vice of consent, thus rendering the
marriage annulable under Art. 45 of the Family Code.
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's
Civil Code Revision Committee was to exclude mental
inability to understand the essential nature of marriage
and focus strictly on psychological incapacity is
demonstrated in the way the provision in question
underwent revisions.
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft
provision read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any
party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of
marriage or was psychologically or
mentally incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if
such lack of incapacity is made manifest
after the celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took
finally produced the following revised provision even
before the session was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack or
incapacity becomes manifest after the
celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation
above has dropped any reference to "wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the
essential nature or marriage" and to "mentally
incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases
refer to "defects in the mental faculties vitiating
consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of
appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a
defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground
for voidable marriage because there is the appearance
of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the
simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there
are sanity is curable. . . . Psychological incapacity does
not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with
consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage."1
My own position as a member of the Committee then
was that psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity
of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term
"psychological or mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar
Cruz opined in he earlier February 9, 1984 session that
this term "is an invention of some churchmen who are
moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered
a weak phrase." He said that the Code of Canon Law
would rather express it as "psychological or mental
incapacity to discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno
opined that sometimes a person may be psychologically
impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority
opinion for the interpretation and application of Art. 36
is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera,
considered the inclusion of the phrase" and is
incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented
that this would give rise to the question of how they will
determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it
would be more problematic. Yet the possibility that one
may be cured after the psychological incapacity
becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out
by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice
Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the
afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for
determining void marriages, viz:
1. lack of one or more
of the essential
requisites of marriage
as contract;
2. reasons of public
policy;
3. special cases and
special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was
subsumed under "special cases and special
situations," hence its special treatment in Art.
36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is
there a ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that
even comes close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing
at the time of the marriage, such marriage which stands
valid until annulled is capable of ratification or
convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of
essential requisites, some marriages are void from the
beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly
the provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to
fresh winds of change in keeping with the more
permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf
from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following
persons are incapable of contracting marriage: "3.
(those) who, because of causes of a psychological
nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations
of marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36
of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law
recognizes only two types of marriages with respect to
their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however,
recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or
annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal
"annuls" a marriage, it actually declares the marriage
null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first
place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be
dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and
consummated marriage between two living Roman
Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment
process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a
Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized
by Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to
capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another
marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not
being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law,
the former being more strict, quite a number of married
couples have found themselves in limbo — freed from
the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church
but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under
state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons
contract new marriages or enter into live-in
relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to
such anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision
Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept
of psychological incapacity into the Family Code — and
classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages
void ab initio or totally in existent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This
Old Code, while it did not provide directly for
psychological incapacity, in effect recognized the same
indirectly from a combination of three old canons:
"Canon #1081 required persons to 'be capable
according to law' in order to give valid consent; Canon
#1082 required that persons 'be at least not ignorant' of
the major elements required in marriage; and Canon
#1087 (the force and fear category) required that
internal and external freedom be present in order for
consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced
two distinct but related grounds for annulment, called
'lack of due discretion' and 'lack of due competence.'
Lack of due discretion means that the person did not
have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the
weddingand therefore the union is invalid. Lack of due
competence means that the person was incapable of
carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she
made during the wedding ceremony.
"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in
the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as
homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation
for a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary
for psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had
reasoned for the first time in several cases that the
capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage
was probably not present in persons who had displayed
such problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of
this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once
the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness
to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for
what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to
accept proof of serious psychological problems that
manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as
proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of
the ceremony.
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional
opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly
important in such cases. Data about the person's entire
life, both before and after the ceremony, were
presented to these experts and they were asked to give
professional opinions about a party's mental at the time
of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged
and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack
of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new
openness in this area did not amount to the addition of
new grounds for annulment, but rather was an
accommodation by the Church to the advances made in
psychology during the past decades. There was now the
expertise to provide the all-important connecting link
between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea
of marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a
covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer
be assumed in annulment cases that a person who
could intellectually understand the concept of marriage
could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability
to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a
mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a
necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.2
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of
incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual
anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that
incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or
carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For
marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of
the spouses to each others' body for heterosexual acts,
but is, in its totality, the right to the community of the
whole of life, i.e., the right to a developing. lifelong
relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the
meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for
marriage as presupposing the development of an adult
personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to
give themselves to each other and to accept the other
as a distinct person; that the spouses must be 'other
oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in
a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the
capacity for interpersonal relationship because marriage
is more than just a physical reality but involves a true
intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the
obligations of marriage depends. according to Church
decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal
relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal
sharing and support is held to impair the relationship
and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential
marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse
is not considered in isolation but in reference to the
fundamental relationship to the other spouse.3
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six
elements necessary to the mature marital relationship:
The courts consider the following
elements crucial to the marital
commitment: (1) a permanent and
faithful commitment to the marriage
partner; (2) openness to children and
partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional
maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6)
an ability to cope with the ordinary
stresses and strains of marriage, etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some
of the psychological conditions that
might lead to the failure of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional
impairment precluding conjugal
communion even with the best
intentions of the parties. Among the
psychic factors possibly giving rise to his
or her inability to fulfill marital
obligations are the following: (1)
antisocial personality with its
fundamental lack of loyalty to persons
or sense of moral values; (2)
hyperesthesia, where the individual has
no real freedom of sexual choice; (3)
the inadequate personality where
personal responses consistently
fallshort of reasonable expectations.
xxx xxx xxx
The psychological grounds are the best
approach for anyone who doubts
whether he or she has a case for an
annulment on any other terms. A
situation that does not fit into any of
the more traditional categories often
fits very easily into the psychological
category.
As new as the psychological grounds
are, experts are already detecting a
shift in their use. Whereas originally the
emphasis was on the parties' inability to
exercise proper judgment at the time of
the marriage (lack of due discretion),
recent cases seem to be
concentrating on the parties' to assume
or carry out their responsibilities an
obligations as promised (lack of due
competence). An advantage to using
the ground of lack of due competence is
that the at the time the marriage was
entered into civil divorce and breakup
of the family almost is of someone's
failure out marital responsibilities as
 promisedat the time the marriage was
entered into.4
In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting
personalities" of the spouses were not considered
equivalent to psychological incapacity. As well in Santos
v. Court of Appeals cited in the ponencia, the Court
held that the failure of the wife to return home from
the U.S. or to communicate with her husband for more
then five years is not proof of her psychological
incapacity as to render the marriage a
nullity.5 Therefore, Art. 36 is inapplicable and the
marriages remain valid and subsisting.
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of
Appeals,6 this Court upheld both the Regional Trial
Court and the Court of Appeals in declaring the
presence of psychological incapacity on the part of the
husband. Said petitioner husband, after ten (10)
months' sleeping with his wife never had coitus with
her, a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it was
due to the physical disorder of his wife which, however,
he failed to prove. Goaded by the indifference and
stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic marital
obligation described as "to procreate children based on
the universal principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage," the wife brought the action in the lower
court to declare the marriage null.
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former
Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal
of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on
Psychological incapacity concluded:
If a spouse, although physically capable
but simply refuses to perform his or her
essential marriage obligations, and the
refusal is senseless and constant,
Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the
causes to psychological incapacity than
to stubborn refusal. Senseless and
protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the
prolonged refusal of a spouse to have
sexual intercourse with his or her
spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity.
We declared:
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship
in which the parties found themselves trapped in its
mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital
obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied
judgment of respondent appellate court.
1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein
marriage remains valid and subsisting absent
psychological incapacity (under Art. 36 of the Family
Code) on the part of either or both of the spouses.
VITUG, J., concurring:
I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban in his ponencia, and I find to be
most helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the
bench and the bar in the proper appreciation of Article
36 of Executive Order No. 209 ("The Family Code of the
Philippines"). The term "psychological incapacity" was
neither defined nor exemplified by the Family Code.
Thus —
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.
The Revision Committee, constituted under the
auspices of the U.P. Law Center, which drafted
the Code explained:
(T)he Committee would like the judge
to interpret the provision on a case-to-
case basis, guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts,
may be given persuasive effect since
the provision was taken from Canon
Law.1
Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken
from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law —
Canon 1095. (The following persons)
are incapable of contracting marriage;
(those) —
 1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of
discretion of judgment concerning
essential matrimonial rights and duties,
to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological
nature are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage —
that should give that much value to Canon Law
jurisprudence as an aid to the interpretation
and construction of the statutory enactment.2
The principles in the proper application of the law teach
us that the several provisions of a Code must be read
like a congruent whole. Thus, in determining the import
of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, one must
also read it along with, albeit to be taken as distinct
from, the other grounds enumerated in the Code, like
Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise, but for
distinct reasons, render the marriage merely voidable,
or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal
separation. Care must be observed so that these various
circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if
the law were indifferent on the matter.
I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement
in Santos vs. Court of Appeals;3 viz:
(T)he use of the phrase "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code
has not been meant to comprehend all
such possible cases of psychoses as,
likewise mentioned by some
ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low
intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances. . . Article 36 of the
Family Code cannot be taken and
construed independently of, but must
stand in conjunction with, existing
precepts in our law on marriage. Thus
correlated, "psychological incapacity"
should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations
to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion
is implicit under Article 54 of the Family
Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void
marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing
at the inception of marriage, like the
state of a party being of unsound mind
or concealment of drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism, merely renders the
marriage contract voidable pursuant to
Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism,
lesbianism or homosexuality should
occur only during the marriage, they
become mere grounds for legal
separation under Article 55 of the
Family Code. These provisions of the
Code, however, do not necessarily
preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves,
depending on the degree and severity
of the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.4
In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a
ground for then nullity of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code, must be able to pass the following
tests; viz:
First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental,
not physical, in nature;
Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the
inability, not mere refusal, to understand, assume end
discharge the basic marital obligations of living
together, observing love, respect and fidelity and
rendering mutual help and support;
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time
the marriage is contracted although its overt
manifestations and the marriage may occur only
thereafter; and

Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious

and incurable.

It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee

has envisioned Article 36, as not a few observers would
suspect, as another form of absolute divorce or, as still
others would also put it, to be a alternative to divorce;
however, the fact still remains that the language of the
law has failed to carry out, even if true, any such
intendment. It might have indeed turned out for the
better, if it were otherwise, there could be good
reasons to doubt the constitutionality of the measure.
The fundamental law itself, no less, has laid down in
terse language its unequivocal command on how the
State should regard marriage and the family, thus —

Section 2, Article XV:

Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social

institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the
State. G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

Section 12, Article II: LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,

Sec. 12. The State recognizes the
sanctity of family life and shall protect
and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution . . . .
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA
ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.

Section 1, Article XV: VITUG, J.:

Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino
family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total
development. (The 1987 Constitution)
The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here
be significant not so much for the specific issue there
resolved but for the tone it has set. The Court there has
held that constitutional provisions are to be considered
mandatory unless by necessary implication, a different
intention is manifest such that to have them enforced
strictly would cause more harm than by disregarding
them. It is quite clear to me that the constitutional
mandate on marriage and the family has not been
meant to be simply directory in character, nor for mere
expediency or convenience, but one that demands a
meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely,
controversial provision introduced by the Family Code is
Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July
1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at
the instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings
into fore the above provision which is now
invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of
 the court a quo1 and the Court of
Appeal,2 Leouel persists in beseeching its
application in his attempt to have his marriage
with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the
rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met
Julia. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for
Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two
exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge
Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly
thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived
with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La
Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a
baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The
ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to
happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent
interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses
family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start
a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when
and where the couple should start living independently
from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express
resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his
own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of
America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so
dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on
01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time
by long distance telephone. She promised to return
home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989.
She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the
United States, where he underwent a training program
under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he
desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch
with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home,
Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of Negros
Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of
marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code"
(docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served
by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in
Negros Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer
(through counsel), opposed the complaint and denied
its allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the
petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and
incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a
decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the
court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had
repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court,
Julia ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she
would neither appear nor submit evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed
the complaint for lack of merit.3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter
affirmed the decision of the trial court.4
The petition should be denied not only because of its
non-compliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a
certification of non-shopping, but also for its lack of
merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or
at the very least to communicate with him, for more
than five years are circumstances that clearly show her
being psychologically incapacitated to enter into
married life. In his own words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no
affection for (him) because respondent
Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all
these years to communicate with the
petitioner. A wife who does not care to
inform her husband about her
whereabouts for a period of five years,
more or less, is psychologically
incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological
incapacity." The deliberations during the sessions of the
Family Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the
Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import of
the provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall
be void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any
party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of
marriage or was psychologically or
mentally incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if
such lack of incapacity is made manifest
after the celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted
from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.)
Reyes suggested that they say "wanting
in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo)
Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in
the sufficient use." On the other hand,
Justice Reyes proposed that they say
"wanting in sufficient reason." Justice
Caguioa, however, pointed out that the
idea is that one is not lacking in
judgment but that he is lacking in the
exercise of judgment. He added that
lack of judgment would make the
marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia
Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of
judgment is more serious than
insufficient use of judgment and yet the
latter would make the marriage null and
void and the former only voidable.
Justice Caguioa suggested that
subparagraph (7) be modified to read:
"That contracted by any
party who, at the time
of the celebration, was
psychologically
incapacitated to
discharge the essential
marital obligations,
even if such lack of
incapacity is made
manifest after the
celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the
phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of
reason of judgment to understand the
essential nature of marriage" refers to
defects in the mental faculties vitiating
consent, which is not the idea in
subparagraph (7), but lack of
appreciation of one's marital
obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since
"insanity" is also a psychological or
mental incapacity, why is "insanity" only
a ground for annulment and not for
declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice
Caguioa explained that in insanity,
there is the appearance of consent,
which is the reason why it is a ground
for voidable marriages, while
subparagraph (7) does not refer to
consent but to the very essence of
marital obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in
subparagraph (7), the word "mentally"
be deleted, with which Justice Caguioa
concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers
to retain the word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that
subparagraph (7) refers to psychological
impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno
stated that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but
not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-)
Luciano said that it is called selective
impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the
confusion lies in the fact that in
inserting the Canon Law annulment in
the Family Code, the Committee used a
language which describes a ground for
voidable marriages under the Civil
Code. Justice Caguioa added that in
Canon Law, there are voidable
marriages under the Canon Law, there
are no voidable marriages Dean Gupit
said that this is precisely the reason
why they should make a distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon
Law, the defects in marriage cannot be
cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the
problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground
for void ab initio marriages? In reply,
Justice Caguioa explained that insanity
is curable and there are lucid intervals,
while psychological incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno
suggested that the phrase "even if such
lack or incapacity is made manifest" be
modified to read "even if such lack or
incapacity becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity,
at the time of the marriage, it is not
apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are
two interpretations of the phrase
"psychological or mentally
incapacitated" — in the first one, there
is vitiation of consent because one does
not know all the consequences of the
marriages, and if he had known these
completely, he might not have
consented to the marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor
of making psychological incapacity a
ground for voidable marriages since
otherwise it will encourage one who
really understood the consequences of
marriage to claim that he did not and to
make excuses for invalidating the
marriage by acting as if he did not
understand the obligations of marriage.
Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way
of providing for divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point
is that in the case of incapacity by
reason of defects in the mental
faculties, which is less than insanity,
there is a defect in consent and,
therefore, it is clear that it should be a
ground for voidable marriage because
there is the appearance of consent and
it is capable of convalidation for the
simple reason that there are lucid
intervals and there are cases when the
insanity is curable. He emphasized that
psychological incapacity does not refer
to mental faculties and has nothing to
do with consent; it refers to obligations
attendant to marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof.
(Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if
they do not consider it as going to the
very essence of consent. She asked if
they are really removing it from
consent. In reply, Justice Caguioa
explained that, ultimately, consent in
general is effected but he stressed that
his point is that it is not principally a
vitiation of consent since there is a valid
consent. He objected to the lumping
together of the validity of the marriage
celebration and the obligations
attendant to marriage, which are
completely different from each other,
because they require a different
capacity, which is eighteen years of age,
for marriage but in contract, it is
different. Justice Puno, however, felt
that psychological incapacity is still a
kind of vice of consent and that it
should not be classified as a voidable
marriage which is incapable of
convalidation; it should be convalidated
but there should be no prescription. In
other words, as long as the defect has
not been cured, there is always a right
to annul the marriage and if the defect
has been really cured, it should be a
defense in the action for annulment so
that when the action for annulment is
instituted, the issue can be raised that
actually, although one might have been
psychologically incapacitated, at the
time the action is brought, it is no
longer true that he has no concept of
the consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the
question: Will not cohabitation be a
defense? In response, Justice Puno
stated that even the bearing of children
and cohabitation should not be a sign
that psychological incapacity has been
cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological
incapacity is still insanity of a lesser
degree. Justice Luciano suggested that
they invite a psychiatrist, who is the
expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa,
however, reiterated that psychological
incapacity is not a defect in the mind
but in the understanding of the
consequences of marriage, and
therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a
help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same
manner that there is a lucid interval in
insanity, there are also momentary
periods when there is an understanding
of the consequences of marriage.
Justice Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked
that the ground of psychological
incapacity will not apply if the marriage
was contracted at the time when there
is understanding of the consequences
of marriage.5
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include
physical incapacity to copulate among
the grounds for void marriages. Justice
Reyes commented that in some
instances the impotence that in some
instances the impotence is only
temporary and only with respect to a
particular person. Judge Diy stated that
they can specify that it is incurable.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the term
"incurable" has a different meaning in
law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated
that "psychological incapacity" can also
be cured. Justice Caguioa, however,
pointed out that "psychological
incapacity" is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the
present draft provision, it is enough to
show that at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, one was
psychologically incapacitated so that
later on if already he can comply with
the essential marital obligations, the
marriage is still void ab initio. Justice
Caguioa explained that since in divorce,
the psychological incapacity may occur
after the marriage, in void marriages, it
has to be at the time of the celebration
of marriage. He, however, stressed that
the idea in the provision is that at the
time of the celebration of the marriage,
one is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital
obligations, which incapacity continues
and later becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however,
pointed out that it is possible that after
the marriage, one's psychological
incapacity become manifest but later
on he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice
Caguioa opined that the remedy in this
case is to allow him to remarry.6
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article
as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage
contracted by any party
who, at the time of the
celebration, was
psychologically
incapacitated, to
comply with the
essential obligations of
marriage shall likewise
be void from the
beginning even if such
incapacity becomes
manifest after its
solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if"
be substituted with "although." On the
other hand, Prof. Bautista proposed
that the clause "although such
incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization" be deleted since it may
encourage one to create the
manifestation of psychological
incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed out
that, as in other provisions, they cannot
argue on the basis of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also
include mental and physical
incapacities, which are lesser in degree
than psychological incapacity. Justice
Caguioa explained that mental and
physical incapacities are vices of
consent while psychological incapacity
is not a species of vice or consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said
on the matter in the minutes of their
February 9, 1984 meeting:
"On the third ground,
Bishop Cruz indicated
that the phrase
"psychological or
mental impotence" is
an invention of some
churchmen who are
moralists but not
canonists, that is why it
is considered a weak
phrase. He said that the
Code of Canon Law
would rather express it
as "psychological or
mental incapacity to
discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they
deleted the word "mental" precisely to
distinguish it from vice of consent. He
explained that "psychological
incapacity" refers to lack of
understanding of the essential
obligations of marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members
that, at the last meeting, they have
decided not to go into the classification
of "psychological incapacity" because
there was a lot of debate on it and that
this is precisely the reason why they
classified it as a special case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked
that, since there having been
annulments of marriages arising from
psychological incapacity, Civil Law
should not reconcile with Canon Law
because it is a new ground even under
Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With
this common provision in Civil Law and
in Canon Law, are they going to have a
provision in the Family Code to the
effect that marriages annulled or
declared void by the church on the
ground of psychological incapacity is
automatically annulled in Civil Law? The
other members replied negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired
if Article 37 should be retroactive or
prospective in application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its
retroactivity because it is their answer
to the problem of church annulments of
marriages, which are still valid under
the Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice
Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned
about the avalanche of cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the
issue to a vote, which the Committee
approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof.
Romero were for prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean
Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director
Eufemio were for retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put
in the prescriptive period of ten years
within which the action for declaration
of nullity of the marriage should be filed
in court. The Committee approved the
suggestion.7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision
Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision
with less specificity than expected, has in fact, so
designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its
application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a
member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by
Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita
vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994);
thus:8
The Committee did not give any
examples of psychological incapacity for
fear that the giving of examples would
limit the applicability of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis.
Rather, the Committee would like the
 judge to interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals
which, although not binding on the civil
courts, may be given persuasive effect
since the provision was taken from
Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the
New Code of Canon Law,9 which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of
contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of
discretion of judgment concerning
essentila matrimonial rights and duties,
to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological
nature are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps
all that persuasive for having no juridical or secular
effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at
the time of the code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot
be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at
least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal
provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving
an account on how the third paragraph of Canon 1095
has been framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon
does not leave any doubt that the
legislator intended, indeed, to broaden
the rule. A strict and narrow norm was
proposed first:
Those who cannot
assume the essential
obligations of marriage
because of a grave
psycho-sexual anomaly
(ob gravem anomaliam
psychosexualem) are
unable to contract
marriage (cf. SCH/1975,
canon 297, a new
canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological
anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam
psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980, canon
1049);
then the same wording was retained in
the text submitted to the pope
(cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological
nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual
to psychological anomaly, then the
term anomaly was altogether
eliminated. it would be, however,
incorrect to draw the conclusion that
the cause of the incapacity need not be
some kind of psychological disorder;
after all, normal and healthy person
should be able to assume the ordinary
obligations of marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological
incapacity" defies any precise definition since
psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on
Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada
and LeRoy Wauck, the following explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following:
(a) a true inability to commit oneself to
the essentials of marriage. Some
psychosexual disorders and other
disorders of personality can be the
psychic cause of this defect, which is
here described in legal terms. This
particular type of incapacity consists of
a real inability to render what is due by
the contract. This could be compared to
the incapacity of a farmer to enter a
binding contract to deliver the crops
which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this
 inability to commit oneself must refer
to the essential obligations of marriage:
the conjugal act, the community of life
and love, the rendering of mutual help,
the procreation and education of
offspring; (c) the inability must be
tantamount to a psychological
abnormality. The mere difficulty of
assuming these obligations, which
could be overcome by normal effort,
obviously does not constitute
incapacity. The canon contemplates a
true psychological disorder which
incapacitates a person from giving
what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to
R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the
marriage is to be declared invalid under
this incapacity, it must be proved not
only that the person is afflicted by a
psychological defect, but that the
defect did in fact deprive the person, at
the moment of giving consent, of the
ability to assume the essential duties of
marriage and consequently of the
possibility of being bound by these
duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr.
Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic
Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing
disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the
deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee
itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been
meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical
authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and
like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void
and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their
Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American
Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II
for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family
Code cannot be taken and construed independently of,
but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in
our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological
incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article
68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations
to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage
is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon
the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit
under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers
children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of
nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the
inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of
unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism,
merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If
drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage,
they become mere grounds for legal separation under
Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the
Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the
possibility of these various circumstances being
themselves, depending on the degree and severity of
the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters
are established, every circumstance that may have
some bearing on the degree, extent, and other
conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be
carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate
and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The
well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists,
and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines
might be helpful or even desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime
commitment. We should continue to be reminded that
innate in our society, then enshrined in our Civil Code,
and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family
Code, is that —
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of
permanent union between a man a
woman entered into in accordance with
law for the establishment of conjugal
and family life. It is the foundation of
the family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property
relations during the marriage within the
limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino
family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total
development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the
State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly
the basic nucleus of our laws on marriage and the
family, and they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure
at all, can come close to the standards required to
decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and
understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even
desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither
law nor society itself can always provide all the specific
answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno Kapunan and Mendoza,
JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied
opinion as Mr. Justice Vitug's ponencia. But, after an
extended reflection on the facts of this case, I cannot
see my way clear into holding, as the majority do, that
there is no ground for the declaration of nullity of the
marriage between petitioner and private respondent.
To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been
shown to be psychologically incapacitated to comply
with at least one essential marital obligation, i.e. that of
living and cohabiting with her husband, herein
petitioner. On the other hand, it has not been shown
that petitioner does not deserve to live and cohabit
with his wife, herein private respondent.
There appears to be no disagreement that the term
"psychological incapacity" defies precision in definition.
But, as used in Article 36 of the Family Code as a ground
for the declaration of nullity of a marriage, the intent of
the framers of the Code is evidently to expand and
liberalize the grounds for nullifying a marriage, as well
pointed out by Madam Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in
her separate opinion in this case.
While it is true that the board term "psychological
incapacity" can open the doors to abuse by couples who
may wish to have an easy way out of their marriage,
there are, however, enough safeguards against this
contingency, among which, is the intervention by the
State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against
collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of
evidence.
In their case at bench, it has been abundantly
established that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-
Santos exhibits specific behavior which, to my mind,
shows that she is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill
her essential marital obligations, to writ:
 a. It took her seven (7) months after she
left for the United States to call up her
husband.
b. Julia promised to return home after
her job contract expired in July 1989,
but she never did and neither is there
any showing that she informed her
husband (herein petitioner) of her
whereabouts in the U.S.A.
c. When petitioner went to the United
States on a mission for the Philippine
Army, he exerted efforts to "touch
base" with Julia; there were no similar
efforts on the part of Julia; there were
no similar efforts on the part of Julia to
do the same.
d. When petitioner filed this suit, more
than five (5) years had elapsed, without
Julia indicating her plans to rejoin the
petitioner or her whereabouts.
e. When petitioner filed this case in the
trial court, Julia, in her answer, claimed
that it is the former who has been
irresponsible and incompetent.
f. During the trial, Julia waived her right
to appear and submit evidence.
A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her
partner in marriage is a basic ground rule in marriage,
unless there are overpowering compelling reasons such
as, for instance, an incurable contagious disease on the
part of a spouse or cruelty of one partner, bordering on
insanity. There may also be instances when, for
economic and practical reasons, husband and wife have
to live separately, but the marital bond between the
spouses always remains. Mutual love and respect for
each other would, in such cases, compel the absent
spouse to at least have regular contracts with the other
to inform the latter of his/her condition and
whereabouts.
In the present case, it is apparent that private
respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos has no intention
of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband, or
maintaining contact with him. In fact, her acts
eloquently show that she does not want her husband to
know of her whereabouts and neither has she any
intention of living and cohabiting with him.
To me there appears to be, on the part of private
respondent, an unmistakeable indication of
psychological incapacity to comply with her essential
marital obligations, although these indications were
made manifest after the celebration of the marriage.
It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for
this Court to give a much too restrictive interpretation
of the law and compel the petitioner to continue to be
married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her
marital duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to
exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved
in the ruling the Court makes today. Is it not, in effect
directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of
petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to
maintain illicit relations with another woman or women
with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply
because he is denied by private respondent, his wife,
the companionship and conjugal love which he has
sought from her and to which he is legally entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family
Code is a sanction for absolute divorce but I submit that
we should not constrict it to non-recognition of its
evident purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an
opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his
marriage a nullity by reason of his wife's psychological
incapacity to perform an essential marital obligation.
I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE
the marriage between petitioner Leouel Santos and
private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID on
the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code.
ROMERO, J., concurring:
I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner
is not entitled to have his marriage declared a nullity on
the ground of psychological incapacity of private
respondent.
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision
Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law
Center, I wish to add some observations. The
letter1 dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V.
Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil
Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman
Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of
the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family
Code.
During its early meetings, the Family
Law Committee had thought of
including a chapter on absolute divorce
in the draft of a new Family Code (Book
I of the Civil Code) that it had been
tasked by the IBP and the UP Law
Center to prepare. In fact, some
members of the Committee were in
favor of a no-fault divorce between the
spouses after a number of years of
separation, legal or de-facto. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to
prepare a proposal for an action for
dissolution of marriage and the effects
thereof based on two grounds: (a) five
continuous years of separation between
the spouses, with or without a judicial
decree of legal separation, and (b)
whenever a married person would have
obtained a decree of absolute divorce
in another country. Actually, such a
proposal is one for absolute divorce but
called by another name. Later, even the
Civil Code Revision Committee took
time to discuss the proposal of Justice
Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil
Code Revision Committee and Family
Law Committee started holding joint
meetings on the preparation of the
draft of the New Family Code, they
agreed and formulated the definition of
marriage as —
"a special contract of
permanent partnership
between a man and a
woman entered into in
accordance with law for
the establishment of
conjugal and family life.
It is an inviolable social
institution whose
nature, consequences,
and incidents are
governed by law and
not subject to
stipulation, except that
marriage settlements
may fix the property
relations during the
marriage within the
limits provided by law."
With the above definition, and
considering the Christian traditional
concept of marriage of the Filipino
people as a permanent, inviolable,
indissoluble social institution upon
which the family and society are
founded, and also realizing the strong
opposition that any provision on
absolute divorce would encounter from
the Catholic Church and the Catholic
sector of our citizenry to whom the
great majority of our people
belong, the two Committees in their
joint meetings did not pursue the idea
of absolute divorce and instead opted
for an action for judicial declaration of
invalidity of marriage based on grounds
available in the Canon Law. It was
thought that such an action would not
only be an acceptable alternative to
divorce but would also solve the
nagging problem of church annulments
of marriages on grounds not recognized
by the civil law of the State. Justice
Reyes was thus requested to again
prepare a draft of provisions on such
action for celebration of invalidity of
marriage. Still later, to avoid the
overlapping of provisions on void
marriages as found in the present Civil
Code and those proposed by Justice
Reyes on judicial declaration of
invalidity of marriage on grounds
similar to the Canon Law, the two
Committees now working as a Joint
Committee in the preparation of a New
Family Code decided to consolidate the
present provisions on void marriages
with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The
result was the inclusion of an additional
kind of void marriage in the
enumeration of void marriages in the
present Civil Code, to wit:
"(7) Those marriages
contracted by any party
who, at the time of the
celebration, was
wanting in the sufficient
use of reason or
 judgment to marriages; marriage to a man who,
understand the because of some personality disorder or
essential nature of disturbance, cannot support a family;
marriage or was the foolish or ridiculous choice of a
psychologically or spouse by an otherwise perfectly
mentally incapacitated normal person; marriage to a woman
to discharge the who refuses to cohabit with her
essential marital husband or who refuses to have
obligations, even if such children. Bishop Cruz also informed the
lack of incapacity is Committee that they have found out in
made manifest after tribunal work that a lot of machismo
the celebration." among husbands are manifestations of
their sociopathic personality anomaly,
as well as the following implementing provisions: like inflicting physical violence upon
their wives, constitutional indolence or
"Art. 32. The absolute laziness, drug dependence or addiction,
nullity of a marriage and psychological anomaly. . . .
may be invoked or (Emphasis supplied)
pleaded only on the
basis of a final Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the
judgment declaring the Family Code, the Revision Committee referred to above
marriage void, without intended to add another ground to those already listed
prejudice to the in the Civil Code as grounds for nullifying a marriage,
provision of Article 34." thus expanding or liberalizing the same. Inherent in the
inclusion of the provision on psychological incapacity
"Art. 33. The action or was the understanding that every petition for
defense for the declaration of nullity based on it should be treated on a
declaration of the case-to-case basis; hence, the absence of a definition
absolute nullity of a and an enumeration of what constitutes psychological
marriage shall not incapacity. Moreover, the Committee feared that the
prescribe." giving of examples would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. But
xxx xxx xxx the law requires that the same be existing at the time of
marriage although it be manifested later.
It is believed that many hopelessly
broken marriages in our country today Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity,
may already dissolved or annulled on just like any other provision of law, is open to abuse. To
the grounds proposed by the Joint prevent this, "the court shall take order the prosecuting
Committee on declaration of nullity as attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of
well as annulment of marriages, thus the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the
rendering an absolute divorce law parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated
unnecessary. In fact, during a or suppressed."2 Moreover, the judge, in interpreting
conference with Father Gerald Healy of the provision on a case-to-case basis, must be guided by
the Ateneo University as well as "experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
another meeting with Archbishop Oscar psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts,
the Joint Committee was informed that may be given persuasive effect since the provisions was
since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has taken from Canon Law."3
been declaring marriages null and void
on the ground of "lack of due The constitutional and statutory provisions on the
discretion" for causes that, in other family4 will remain the lodestar which our society will
jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for hope to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of
divorce, like teen-age or premature Article 36 is not to be taken as an abandonment of the
ideal which we all cherish. If at all, it is a recognition of
the reality that some marriages, by reason of the
incapacity of one of the contracting parties, fall short of
this ideal; thus, the parties are constrained to find a way
of putting an end to their union through some legally-
accepted means.
Any criticism directed at the way that judges have
interpreted the provision since its enactment as to
render it easier for unhappily-married couples to
separate is addressed, not to the wisdom of the
lawmakers but to the manner by which some members
of the Bench have implemented the provision. These
are not interchangeable, each being separate and
distinct from the other.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied
opinion as Mr. Justice Vitug's ponencia. But, after an
extended reflection on the facts of this case, I cannot
see my way clear into holding, as the majority do, that
there is no ground for the declaration of nullity of the
marriage between petitioner and private respondent.
To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been
shown to be psychologically incapacitated to comply
with at least one essential marital obligation, i.e. that of
living and cohabiting with her husband, herein
petitioner. On the other hand, it has not been shown
that petitioner does not deserve to live and cohabit
with his wife, herein private respondent.
There appears to be no disagreement that the term
"psychological incapacity" defies precision in definition.
But, as used in Article 36 of the Family Code as a ground
for the declaration of nullity of a marriage, the intent of
the framers of the Code is evidently to expand and
liberalize the grounds for nullifying a marriage, as well
pointed out by Madam Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in
her separate opinion in this case.
While it is true that the board term "psychological
incapacity" can open the doors to abuse by couples who
may wish to have an easy way out of their marriage,
there are, however, enough safeguards against this
contingency, among which, is the intervention by the
State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against
collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of
evidence.
In their case at bench, it has been abundantly
established that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-
Santos exhibits specific behavior which, to my mind,
shows that she is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill
her essential marital obligations, to writ:
a. It took her seven (7) months after she
left for the United States to call up her
husband.
b. Julia promised to return home after
her job contract expired in July 1989,
but she never did and neither is there
any showing that she informed her
husband (herein petitioner) of her
whereabouts in the U.S.A.
c. When petitioner went to the United
States on a mission for the Philippine
Army, he exerted efforts to "touch
base" with Julia; there were no similar
efforts on the part of Julia; there were
no similar efforts on the part of Julia to
do the same.
d. When petitioner filed this suit, more
than five (5) years had elapsed, without
Julia indicating her plans to rejoin the
petitioner or her whereabouts.
e. When petitioner filed this case in the
trial court, Julia, in her answer, claimed
that it is the former who has been
irresponsible and incompetent.
f. During the trial, Julia waived her right
to appear and submit evidence.
A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her
partner in marriage is a basic ground rule in marriage,
unless there are overpowering compelling reasons such
as, for instance, an incurable contagious disease on the
part of a spouse or cruelty of one partner, bordering on
insanity. There may also be instances when, for
economic and practical reasons, husband and wife have
to live separately, but the marital bond between the
spouses always remains. Mutual love and respect for
each other would, in such cases, compel the absent
spouse to at least have regular contracts with the other
to inform the latter of his/her condition and
whereabouts.
In the present case, it is apparent that private
respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos has no intention
of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband, or
maintaining contact with him. In fact, her acts
eloquently show that she does not want her husband to
know of her whereabouts and neither has she any
intention of living and cohabiting with him.
To me there appears to be, on the part of private
respondent, an unmistakeable indication of
psychological incapacity to comply with her essential
marital obligations, although these indications were
made manifest after the celebration of the marriage.
It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for
this Court to give a much too restrictive interpretation
of the law and compel the petitioner to continue to be
married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her
marital duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to
exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved
in the ruling the Court makes today. Is it not, in effect
directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of
petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to
maintain illicit relations with another woman or women
with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply
because he is denied by private respondent, his wife,
the companionship and conjugal love which he has
sought from her and to which he is legally entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family
Code is a sanction for absolute divorce but I submit that
we should not constrict it to non-recognition of its
evident purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an
opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his
marriage a nullity by reason of his wife's psychological
incapacity to perform an essential marital obligation.
I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE
the marriage between petitioner Leouel Santos and
private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID on
the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code.
ROMERO, J., concurring:
I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner
is not entitled to have his marriage declared a nullity on
the ground of psychological incapacity of private
respondent.
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision
Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law
Center, I wish to add some observations. The
letter1 dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V.
Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil
Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman
Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of
the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family
Code.
During its early meetings, the Family
Law Committee had thought of
including a chapter on absolute divorce
in the draft of a new Family Code (Book
I of the Civil Code) that it had been
tasked by the IBP and the UP Law
Center to prepare. In fact, some
members of the Committee were in
favor of a no-fault divorce between the
spouses after a number of years of
separation, legal or de-facto. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to
prepare a proposal for an action for
dissolution of marriage and the effects
thereof based on two grounds: (a) five
continuous years of separation between
the spouses, with or without a judicial
decree of legal separation, and (b)
whenever a married person would have
obtained a decree of absolute divorce
in another country. Actually, such a
proposal is one for absolute divorce but
called by another name. Later, even the
Civil Code Revision Committee took
time to discuss the proposal of Justice
Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil
Code Revision Committee and Family
Law Committee started holding joint
meetings on the preparation of the
draft of the New Family Code, they
agreed and formulated the definition of
marriage as —
"a special contract of
permanent partnership
between a man and a
woman entered into in
accordance with law for
the establishment of
conjugal and family life.
 It is an inviolable social kind of void marriage in the
institution whose enumeration of void marriages in the
nature, consequences, present Civil Code, to wit:
and incidents are
governed by law and "(7) Those marriages
not subject to contracted by any party
stipulation, except that who, at the time of the
marriage settlements celebration, was
may fix the property wanting in the sufficient
relations during the use of reason or
marriage within the judgment to
limits provided by law." understand the
essential nature of
With the above definition, and marriage or was
considering the Christian traditional psychologically or
concept of marriage of the Filipino mentally incapacitated
people as a permanent, inviolable, to discharge the
indissoluble social institution upon essential marital
which the family and society are obligations, even if such
founded, and also realizing the strong lack of incapacity is
opposition that any provision on made manifest after
absolute divorce would encounter from the celebration."
the Catholic Church and the Catholic
sector of our citizenry to whom the as well as the following implementing
great majority of our people provisions:
belong, the two Committees in their
joint meetings did not pursue the idea "Art. 32. The absolute
of absolute divorce and instead opted nullity of a marriage
for an action for judicial declaration of may be invoked or
invalidity of marriage based on grounds pleaded only on the
available in the Canon Law. It was basis of a final
thought that such an action would not judgment declaring the
only be an acceptable alternative to marriage void, without
divorce but would also solve the prejudice to the
nagging problem of church annulments provision of Article 34."
of marriages on grounds not recognized
by the civil law of the State. Justice "Art. 33. The action or
Reyes was thus requested to again defense for the
prepare a draft of provisions on such declaration of the
action for celebration of invalidity of absolute nullity of a
marriage. Still later, to avoid the marriage shall not
overlapping of provisions on void prescribe."
marriages as found in the present Civil
Code and those proposed by Justice xxx xxx xxx
Reyes on judicial declaration of
invalidity of marriage on grounds It is believed that many hopelessly
similar to the Canon Law, the two broken marriages in our country today
Committees now working as a Joint may already dissolved or annulled on
Committee in the preparation of a New the grounds proposed by the Joint
Family Code decided to consolidate the Committee on declaration of nullity as
present provisions on void marriages well as annulment of marriages, thus
with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The rendering an absolute divorce law
result was the inclusion of an additional unnecessary. In fact, during a
 conference with Father Gerald Healy of
the Ateneo University as well as
another meeting with Archbishop Oscar
Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga,
the Joint Committee was informed that
since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has
been declaring marriages null and void
on the ground of "lack of due
discretion" for causes that, in other
jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for
divorce, like teen-age or premature
marriages; marriage to a man who,
because of some personality disorder or
disturbance, cannot support a family;
the foolish or ridiculous choice of a
spouse by an otherwise perfectly
normal person; marriage to a woman
who refuses to cohabit with her
husband or who refuses to have
children. Bishop Cruz also informed the
Committee that they have found out in
tribunal work that a lot of machismo
among husbands are manifestations of
their sociopathic personality anomaly,
like inflicting physical violence upon
their wives, constitutional indolence or
laziness, drug dependence or addiction,
and psychological anomaly. . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
the provision on a case-to-case basis, must be guided by
"experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts,
may be given persuasive effect since the provisions was
taken from Canon Law."3
The constitutional and statutory provisions on the
family4 will remain the lodestar which our society will
hope to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of
Article 36 is not to be taken as an abandonment of the
ideal which we all cherish. If at all, it is a recognition of
the reality that some marriages, by reason of the
incapacity of one of the contracting parties, fall short of
this ideal; thus, the parties are constrained to find a way
of putting an end to their union through some legally-
accepted means.
Any criticism directed at the way that judges have
interpreted the provision since its enactment as to
render it easier for unhappily-married couples to
separate is addressed, not to the wisdom of the
lawmakers but to the manner by which some members
of the Bench have implemented the provision. These
are not interchangeable, each being separate and
distinct from the other.

Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the

Family Code, the Revision Committee referred to above
intended to add another ground to those already listed
in the Civil Code as grounds for nullifying a marriage,
thus expanding or liberalizing the same. Inherent in the
inclusion of the provision on psychological incapacity
was the understanding that every petition for
declaration of nullity based on it should be treated on a
case-to-case basis; hence, the absence of a definition
and an enumeration of what constitutes psychological
incapacity. Moreover, the Committee feared that the
giving of examples would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. But
the law requires that the same be existing at the time of
marriage although it be manifested later.

Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity,

just like any other provision of law, is open to abuse. To
prevent this, "the court shall take order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of
the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the
parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated
or suppressed."2 Moreover, the judge, in interpreting
 Case digest
Santos v CA 240 SCRA 20 Jan. 4, 1995
FACTS:
Plaintiff Leouel Santos married defendant Julia Bedia on
September 20, 1986. On May 18, 1988, Julia left for the
U.S. She did not communicate with Leouel and did not
return to the country. In 1991, Leouel filed with the RTC
of Negros Oriental, a complaint for voiding of the
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC
dismissed the complaint and the CA affirmed the
dismissal.
ISSUE: Does the failure of Julia to return home, or at the
very least to communicate with him, for more than five
years constitute psychological incapacity?
HELD: No, the failure of Julia to return home or to
communicate with her husband Leouel for more than
five years does not constitute psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by a)
gravity, b) juridical antecedence, and c) incurability
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article
68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations
to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated.
Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands
aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation.
Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always
provide all the specific answers to every individual
problem
Petition is denied.
268 SCRA 198, February 13, 1997
________________________________________
Republic of the Philippines v. CA and Molina
Panganiban
Facts : On April 14, 1985, plaintiff Roridel O Molina
married Reynaldo Molina which union bore a son. After
a year of marriage, Reynaldo show signs of immaturity
and irresponsibility as a husband and father as he
preferred to spend more time with his friends,
depended on his parents for assistance, and was never
honest with his wife in regard to their finances resulting
in frequent quarrels between them. The RTC granted
Roridel petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage
which was affirmed by CA.
Issue : Do irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personality constitute psychological incapacity?
Ruling : There is no clear showing that the psychological
defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to be more
of a “difficulty” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in
the performance of some marital obligations.
Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and
“conflicting personalities” in no wise constitute
psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that
the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons; it is essential that they must
be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (not physical) illness.
The evidence merely adduced that Roridel and her
husband could not get along with each other. There
had been no showing of the gravity of the problem,
neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability.
The following guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby
handed down for the guidance of the bench and the
bar:
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity.
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological
– not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical.
The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the
time of the celebration” of the marriage.
Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically of
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may
be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of
the same sex.
Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes.
The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Article 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles
220,221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven
be evidence and included in the text of the decision.
Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article
36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee
from the 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
became effective in 1983.
The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition.
Verions 2 Republic of the Philippines v. CA and Molina
FACTS
Respondent Roridel Molina married Reynaldo
Molina on April 14, 1985. After a year of marriage,
Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity and
irresponsibility” as a husband and a father exhibited by
his preference to spend time with friends, squandering
money, dependence on his parents and dishonesty
involving finances. Inevitably, this resulted in quarrels
and by March 1987, Roridel quit her job and moved in
with her parents in Baguio. Reynaldo left her and their
child a few weeks thereafter.
On Aug. 16, 1990, Roridel filed a verified
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the
grounds of psychological incapacity of the husband. The
trial court declared the marriage void, which the CA
affirmed in toto; hence, the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether there is psychological incapacity
HELD
No. The case of Roridel and Reynaldo merely
constituted incompatibility among the estranged
spouses. The law intended to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity only to the most serious cases
of personality disorders that must have existed at the
time marriage is celebrated. Irreconcilable differences
or conflicting personalities are not incapacities that
would hinder the fulfillment of the essential marital
obligations of the parties. The characteristics of gravity,
judicial antecedence and incurability are not present in
the case.
Due to the improper interpretations and
applications arrived at by the lower courts on this
particular issue, the SC found it wise to construe the law
and lay down guidelines in interpretation and
application of Art. 36. Here, the SC sought the help of
two amici curiae – considered an external aid in
statutory construction. The guidelines set forth are
thus: (1) the burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff; (2)
the root cause of psychological incapacity must be
medically or clinically identified, alleged in the
complaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly
explained in the decision; (3) the incapacity must be
proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of
marriage; (4) the incapacity must be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must
be grave enough to disable fulfillment of essential
marital obligations; (6) the essential marital obligation
must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family
Code as regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to
225 of the same code as regards parents and their
children; (7) interpretation made by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
are to be given great weight; and (8) the fiscal and the
Solicitor-General must appear as counsel for the State.