Filing ##188604874

Filing E- Filed 12/22/2023

188604874 E-Filed 12/22/2023 03:38:31
03:38:31 PM
PM

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

CASE NO.: 3D2023-1963

LOWER TRIBUNAL CASE NO.: 23-19498

ISABEL DEL PINO-ALLEN

Appellant

vs

SARAH E. EGAN
Appellee

On Appeal from Final Order Granting Summary Judgment

of the Circuit Court for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida in and For
Miami-Dade County

APPELLANT'S INITIAL BRIEF

ISABEL DEL PINO-ALLEN

Appellant, pro se
4371 SW 15 St
Miami, Fi. 33134
Tel.: (305) 491-9225
Fax: (305) 517-3654
E-mail: Idelpinoallen@gmail.com
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii - vi

INTRODUCTION 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND THE FACTS 2-18

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 19-20

STANDARD OF REVIEW 20

ARGUMENT 21-29

THE DISMISSAL OF ALLEN'S DEFAMATION COMPLAINT

AGAINST APPELLEE SARAH EGAN ON THE BASIS THAT
ATTORNEY EGAN HAD ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY WHEN
FALSELY CLAIMING IN A COURT-FILED MOTION THAT
ALLEN WAS MENTALLY UNSTABLE AND HARASSED (AS
DEFINED IN 784.048(a\(b)&(c), F.S.)} CME DOCTORS WHO
FEARED FOR THEIR SAFTEY AND WERE SEEKING THE
COURTS INVOLVEMENT FOR THEIR PROTECTION
CONFLICTS WITH WHAT FLORIDA COURTS HAVE
CONSISTENTLY AFFIRMED STARTING WITH MYERS v.
HODGES, 44 So. 357 (1907) SINCE THE DEFAMATORY
CLAIMS ARE UNRELATED TO THE CAUSE AT HAND OR
SUBJECT OF INQUIRY: WHETHER ANY MALADY
ALLEGED BY ALLEN IN HER AUTO NEGLIGENCE CLAIM
AGAINST EGAN’S CLIENT IS ATTRIBUTABLE TO EGAN’S
CLIENT’S RECKLESS DRIVING

CONCLUSION 29-34

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 34 - 32

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 32

2
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Ange v. State
98 Fla. 538, 541, 123 So. 916, 917 (1929). 15,19, 23, 24, 27

Beck v. Lipkind,
681 So. 2d 795, 795 (Fl. 3d DCA 1996} 43, 15

Cape Publications, inc. v. Reakes

681 So. 2d 795, 795 (Fl. 3d DCA 1996) 14,15

Cardona, Armando v. First BankPuerto Rico,

336 So. 3d, 418 (Fla. 3DCA 2022) 8

Dadic v. Schneider,
722 So. 2d 921, 923 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) 13,14, 15, 20, 26

DelMonico v. Traynor,
116 So. 3d 1205, 1213 (Fla. 20173) 11,15,19, 20,2427

Echevarria, McCalla, Raymer, Barrett& Frappierv. Cole

950 Sn. 2d 380, 383 (Fila. 2007) 12, 15

Fariello v. Gavin
873 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 5th DCA, 2004) 19, 24, 27

Fisher v. Payne,
113 So. 378, 380 (Fla. 1927) 19, 23,24,27

Fridovich v. Fridovich,
598 So. 2d 65, 66 (Fla. 1992) 14,15, 19,23,27,36

Gursky Ragan, P.A. v. Ass'n of Poinciana Villages, Inc.

374 So. 3d 594, 595 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) 11,15

Hope v. Nat'l Alliance of Postal & Fed. Emps

Jacksonville Local No. 320,
649 So.2d 897, 901 (Fla. ist BCA 1995 15, 25, 26
James v. Leigh,
145 So. 3d 1006 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) 42,15,19,24, 27,31

Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A. v.

U.S. Fire Ins. Co
639 So.2d 606 (Fia.1994), 15,19,23,24,27,30

Linafelt v. Beverly Enterprises-Florida,

745 So. 2d 386,389 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) 13, 15

Lipsig v. Ramiawi
760 So. 2d 170, 184 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) 13,15

Masson v. New Yorker Magazine,

501 U.S. 496 (1991) 15

M.W. v. SPCP Group V, LLC,

163 So.3d 518 (Fla. 2015). 7, 8, 9,10,11

Myers v. Hodges.
44 So. 357 (1907) 42,14,15,19,20,21, 23, 27, 29,31

Ozyesilpinar v. Reach PLC.

48 Fla. L.Wekly D1004 (Fla. 3d DCA May 17, 2023)....13, 15

Picchi v. Barnett Bank of SouthFlorida, N.A

521 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 1988) 8

Readon v. WPLG, LLC,

317 So. 3d DCA 2021) 14,15

Ross v. Biank,
958 So. 2d 437, 441 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) 13,15, 28

Schagrin v. Nachi,
683 So. 2d 1173 (Fla 4DCA 1998) 4

Smith v. Cuban Am. Nat Found.

31 So, 2d 702(Fla. 3d DCA. 1999). 14,15

4
Sussman v. Damian.
355 So. 2d 809, 811, (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) 14,15,19,20,24,27

Tableau Fine Art Group, inc. v. Jacoboni,

853 So.2d 299 (Fla. 2003). 3

Taylor v. Alropa Corp.

138 Fla. 137, 189 So. 230 (1939) 23

STATUTES AND RULES

§ 39.201(1), Fla. Stat 28

§ 39.201(1)(a) Fla. Stat 28

§ 784.048 Fla. Stat 3,6

§ 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat 4,9,21

§ 784,048(1\(b), Fla. Stat 4,19,24

§ 784.048(1)(c), Fla. Stat 1,19,21

Florida Rules of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3 6

Florida Rule 12.492 5

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 53 5

Florida Gar Rule 4-8.4 3, 28

Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.210 32

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140fa)(4) 7

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.360 6

Fla, R. Civ. P. 1.360{a){1)(A). 4,5

3
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.500(a) 7,9, 11

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.500(b) 7, 8, 9, 11

Fia. R. Gen. Prac. Admin. 2.330{) 2

Fla. R. Gen. Prac. Admin. 2.230(1) 2,3

6
 INTRODUCTION

This appeal pertains to the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court's dismissal

of Appellant/Plaintiffs ("Allen's") defamation claim against Attorney Sarah

Egan who - while defending a reckless driver in an auto negligence civil

action ~ defamed Allen by falsely stating that, prior to submitting to

compulsory medical examinations, ("CMEs") Allen persistently "harassed

{as defined in §§ 784.048(a)(b)&(c), Fla. Stat.) the CME doctors and

endangered their safety to the extent the doctors had requested the Court's

protection, which Egan sought in twe filed motions, which were granted: the

CME docters denied Egan's malicious claims in their CME reports.

The lower court judge, during the October 13, 2023 related hearing

correctly labeled Appeilee/Defendant's claims as defamations but erred by

dismissing Allen's defamation complaint by stating that “absolute immunity

does apply as a matter of law." (R 277)

Allen herein establishes the inapplicability of absolute immunity

since the defamatory claims were unrelated to the subject of inguiry:

whether any Allen-claimed malady in her complaint against Attorney

Egan's client was related to Egan’s client’s reckless driving

Record on Appeal references are noted by “R" followed by the

paragraph ("f"} number.

 STATEMENT OF CASE AND THE FACTS
On October 22, 2021 Appellee Sareh Egan - acting as defense

counsel in Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court's Auto Negligence Case No.

2019-014831-CA-01, Isabel del Pino Allen v. Felipe Arencibia Chong - filed

an "Emergency Motion to Prevent Plaintiff from Continuing to Harass the

CME Doctor." (R 24-27) Appellee Egan's motion was ruled on by already

disqualified’ Judge Oscar Rodriguez Fonts during an October 26, 2021

unilaterally-set hearing not attended by Allen, for obvious reasons: a judge

may not rule on a case in which he/she is deemed disqualified

On November 15, 2021 disqualified Judge Rodriguez-Fonts” issued

an order commanding Allen to "stop harassing the CME doctor and his

1 Judge Redriguez-Fonts' noted disqualification, per Rule 2.330(1), was

due to Judge Rodriguez-Fonts’ failure to “take action” on Allen's September
40, 2021 motion to recuse within 30 days, as required by Rule 2.330(1)
2 Judge Rodriguez-Fonts' defiance of Rule 2.330(1) by remaining on the
case, and the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court's failure to respond to Allen's
motion for “an order from the court directing the clerk to reassign the case
prompted Allen to petition a writ of certiora i from this Honorable Court to
invalidate Judge Rodriguez-Fonis' orders issued subsequent to his deemed
disqualification (Refer to Case 3D2021-2241) This Honorable Court
inexplicably issued an order stating that Allen's writ of certiorari request
would be treated as a’péetition for writ of prohibition, despite the fact a writ
of prohibition may not undo already issued orders. After the Eleventh
Circuit Court's General Counsel responded to the "re-labeled” writ petition
on December 7, 2021 stating that Judge Rodriguez-Fonis had disquaiified
himself sua sponte thé previous day, this Court dismissed Allen's writ
petition as “moot,” noting that Rule 2 330()) allowed Allen to request that a
succeeding judge reconsider the disqualified judge issued orders

2
staff" (R 40) whom Allen had yet to meet, thus accepting as truthful Egan's

strategic (since Allen had teld Egan that, per Rule 2.330(1), Allen would not

attend a hearing held by an already-disqualified judge, therefore the

defamatory claim would be uncontested) and calumnious declaration

Appelee/Defendant Egan thus established the deliberate defamatory claim

that Allen consistently terrorized CME doctors in violation of § 784.048

Conceivably believing that a fellow “officer of the court,” Attorney

Egan, would not blatantiy violate Florida Bar Rule 4-8.4 by “engage[ing] in

conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the

administration of justice by falsely claiming that a pro se litigant had

badgered a doctor whom the self-represent litigant was ordered to see, the

succeeding judge declined to reconsider the post disqualification-issued

orders. Additionally, possibly assuming that Allen lacked the capacity to

understand the plain and unambiguous language in judicial rules, the

succeeding judge told Allen that Allen was mistaken and had incorrectly

"Interpreted" Rule 2.330{); the Rule 2.330(!) allowed judges to exceed the

noted 30 days when addressing a motion to recuse,®

* Not only does Rule 2.330()) explicitly state that if a judge does not "take
action” on motion te recuse within 30 days, the motion is deemed granted.
thus unequivocally suggesting that the judge in question would be
disqualified, the Florida Supreme Court, in Tableau Fine Art Group, inc. v.
dacobeni, 853 So.2d 299 (Fla. 2003), affirmed the 30 days requisite

3
 During an April 27, 2023 hearing, the succeeding judge denied

Allen's motion to compel Defendant to adhere to the requiremenis in Rule

1.360(a)(1)(A). The judge ignored Allen's citation of Schagrin v. Nacht, 683

So. 2d 1173 (Fla 4DCA 1996) - a case where certiorari was granted in

relation to a defendant's vague CME order citation that "the scope of the

examination is of a urological nature concerning conditions of the Plaintiff

relating to the accident which is the subject matter of this lawsuit The

succeeding judge agreed with Appellee/Defendant's opposition to Allen's

motion (R 36-37) and told Allen CME orders did not have to be specific

that Allen was mistaken in her interpretation of case law

The succeeding judge's acceptance of Appellee/Defendant Egan's

sophomoric tautology that “the scope of a nephrology exarnination is a

nephrology exam" (R 41) and "the scope of a psychological evaluation isa

psychological exam,” (R 38) connotes the judge's apparent belief that, as a

"demented and uncontrolled unrepresented litigant who harassed and

endangered the safety of medical doctors," Allen was undeserving of

judicial consideration, therefore, whatever Attorney Egan wrote in her order

complied with Rule 1.360(a)(i){A)'s explicit requisite that "[i]he request

[that. a litigant submit to a CME] shall specify a reasonable time, place.

manner, conditions, and scope of the examination (Emphasis Added)

4
 The related May 1, 2023 order, the trial court judge denied Allen's

motion for adherence to Rule 1.360(a)(1)(A), and granted Appellee/

Defendant Egan's "Motion Requesting a Special Master to Attend

Nephrology and Psychological Compulsory Medical Examinations in Order

to Prevent Plaintiff from Contacting and Further Harassing the CME

Dectors,” (R 36- 37} thus further giving credence to Appellee/Defendant's

defamatory claim that Allen harassed CME doctors and rejecting Allen's

vehement assertion, during the related hearing, to the contrary; the judge

also allowed Appellee/Defendant Egan to appoint and directly remunerate

an “independent” Special Master* and rejected Allen's assertion that this

action violated conventional judicial rules.°

Allen lived with the indignity of having been falsely accused of

endangering the safety of CME doctors, and patiently waited until CME

doctors: Psychologist Richard Hamiiton and Nephroiogist Jorge Busse

conducted their respective CMEs and issued their reports where both

denied (R 12, R - 54-57) that Allen had ever harassed them or endangered

their safety - before filing a legal complaint against Defense Counsel Egan

* Retired Judge Jacqueline Hogan-Scola admitted having been hired by

Appellee Attorney Egan and agreed with Allen's claim that Special Masters
are not defense counsel-appointed, but conventionally court-appointed

5 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 53, Florida Rule 12.492

for Egan's repeated malicious defamatory claims which are unrelated to

the subject of inquiry of Egan's defense in an auto negligence ciaim:

whether any malady alleged by Allen in her claim against Egan's client was

caused by Appellee/Defendant Egan's client's reckless. driving

Considering the fact the rulings of the judge who succeeded the

disqualified judge, which include denying Allen's motion for the adherence

of Rule 1.360 and allowing Appellee/Defendant to appoint and directly

remunerate an “independent Special Master," it is obvious Egan's strategy

succeeded in derailing Allen's case and prejudicing Allen before the judge®

On July 13, 2023, Allen filed the instant defamation claim against

Attorney Sarah Egan (R 10-68) noting that "[i]t is undisputed that viciously

defaming an opponent by accusing her/him of: (a) harassment, as

specifically defined in §784.048; (b) endangering the safety of CME

doctors, and (c) mentally unstable behavior, is not only malicious, but aiso

irrelevant to defending a person charged with reckless driving and

violations of Florida Statutes." (R 21)

5 Allen, a former newspaper reporter whose job required impartiality, notes

that a judge's obligation - per Florida’s Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3
which states that "A Judge Shall Perform the Duties of Judicial Office
impartially and Diligently” - is much more sacrosanct than that of a writer
Nonetheless, considering the massive amount of research that is required
of judges, it would be conceivable to assume that judges rely on the ethical
judgment and insight of fellow attorneys when ruling on cases involving
self-represented litigants. This puts pro se litigants at a disadvantage

6
 After several failed attempts by the Miami-Dade Sheriff's Office to

serve Appellee/Defendant Egan the summons, Egan's putative attorney

Scott Cole, emailed Allen imposing his "condition" for accepting the

ummons: that Allen agree to August 25, 2023 for Egan fo respond to th

complaint. Allen replied to Cole's "condition" stating: "| believe the proper

venue to request an extension to reply to a cornplaint is to file a motion for

an extension, if you do so | will not eppose it." (R 74)

Since Appellee/Defendant forewent filing a motion for an extension

and failed to reply to Allen's defamation complaint within the required 20

days, per Rule 1.140(a}(1), Allen filed a motion for Court Default on August

17, 2023. (R 68-70) The same day, Appellee/Defendant filed a "Motion to

Strike Plaintiffs Motion for Default and Motion for Sanctions," (R 75-93)

where Appellee/ Defendant cited WLW. v. SPCP Group V_ LLC, 163 So.3d

518 (2015) to deceitfully implying that Rule 1.500(a), a Default by the Clerk,

and Ruie 1.500(b), a Default by the Court, were the same by suggesting

that a Court Default was inappropriate since Allen knew that Appellee/

Defendant Egan was represented by counsel who "Intend[ed] to defend the

case.” (R77)

in its averment regarding the alleged prohibition of a Court Default

Appellee/Defendant deceitfully misinterpreted this Court's notation in

7
Armando Cardona v. First BankPuerto Rico, 336 So. 3d, 418 (Fla. 3DCA

2022), where this Honorable Court affirmed its earlier notation in MW. v

SPCP Grp. V_ LLC, 163 So. 3d 518, 521 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) that: “In case

after case, the Florida courts have held that a party cannot obtain an ex

parte default when the party knows that the opposing side is represented

by counsel and intends to defend on the merits." /bid

Appellee/Defendant purposely distorted this Court's citation related to

an ex parte (or Clerk's Default} by suggesting that no default is appropriate

if plaintiff knows the defendant is represented by counsel. (R 79)

In her August 27, 2023 response to Appellee/Defendant's Motion to

Strike Default, Allen explicitly cited this Court's reference to MW. v. SPCP

Group V, LLC, in its ruling of Armando Cardona v. First BankPuerto Rico

336 So. 3d, 418 (Fla. 3DCA 2022) (R 209-213) and made the distinction

between a Default by the Clerk and a Court's Default, wnen Allen wrote

Plaintiffs [Allen's] “Motion for Entry of Default” was directed to

this Court and fully cornplied with Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.500(o). The
fact that a Notice of Hearing was filed proves that Plaintiff did not
"sneak up" on Defendant, as the latter implies with a citation of a
nongermane case. Additionally, the Florida Supreme Court held
in Picchi v. Barnett Bank of SouthFlorida, NA, 521 Se. 2d 1090
(Fla. 1988) that a Defendant whose. counsel filed a Notice of
Appearance - as Defendant did in the instant case - was not
entitled to a Notice of a Hearing on a Motion for Default, but that
there was an entitlement to service of the Motion for a Default
which Plaintiff, oro se did in the instant case. (R 209-210)

8
 During an August 24, 2023 related hearing, the trial court judge

denied Allen's motion for a court default without requesting that Appellee/

Defendant explicate its deceitful reference to MLW. v. SPCP Group V. LLC

The Court issued an order denying entry of default a week later (R 219)

in the related September 5, 2023 Motion for Reconsideration, (R 246.

228) Allen noted that, contrary to what Appeliee/Defendant-drafted order

denying Allen's motion stated - which incorrectly claims that the court heard

from both parties (R 214) - “opposing counsel did not utter a word during

the August 30th, 2023 [regarding the applicability of M.W._v. SPCP Group

V_ELC, which pertained to an already-granted clerk default (per Rule

4.500(a)) to a court default, per Rule 1.500(b)}.

Allen noted that the fact the Court "forewent asking Counsel for a

response vis-4-vis Plaintiff's assertion that the citation ofa VW. iv. SPOP

Group V, LLC case was tantamount to deception.” (R 216, footnote)

Alten also referenced the judge's cryptic assertion, during the hearing, that

he was certain the appellate court would reverse his ruling if he were to

grant a court default since "courts value substance over style," (R 217)

thus suggesting that appellate courts would “look ihe other way" and grant

an attorney his/her "style" to deny a pro se's appeal since it is

assumed that said appeal lacks "substance." Allen further noted that

5
 While Plaintiff [Allen] understands that no lower court judge
wishes for an appeliate court to reverse the judge's
decision, [Allen] respectfully avers that a conceivable
reversal of this court's order granting piaintifi's motion
for an entry of default, would have been accompanied
by an explanation from the appellate court vis-a-vis the
conceivable lower court's “error" in granting a plaintiffs
motion for entry of default, directed at the court, filed
twenty one (21) days after opposing counsel accepted the
summons and filed days after opposing counsel accepted
the summons and filed a notice of appearance, but failed
tor file a response to the complaint. The appellate court's
explanation, in the event the appellate court overruled
the trial court's decision, would add to the “body of
knowledge" and clarify matters to the benefit of all. (R
217 - 218) (Emphasis part of the original)

The trial court judge ignored Allen's September 5, 2023 Motion for

Reconsideration (R 216- 228) as well as Allen's September 6, 2023 letter,

(R 229-235) where Allen referenced Appelle/Defense Counsel's purposefu!

misrepresentation of MW. v. SPCP Group V. LLC and noted that "it is

conceivably ‘safer’ to assume that an attorney's mation adhered to the law

while a self-represented litigant's does not, which suggests that it would be

safe’ to dispense with reading filings involving an attorney and a pro se

litigant, and automatically side with the attorney, especially if the attorney

claims that the litigant is "vexatious" and “oppressive” in addition to

conniving, mentally unstable and prone to violence." (R 229 -230)

Allen proceed to appeal to this Court and was astonished when this

Honorable Court dismissed Allen's September 27, 2023 writ of certiorari

10
petition (3D2023-1745) on September 28, 2023, thus. sparing Appellee/

Defendant from justifying its deceitful citation of MW. v. SPCP Group V,

LLC, and its circuitous reference to a Clerk's Default, per Rule 1.500(a), to

deviously suggest that Rules 1.500(a) and 1.500(b) are indistinguishabie.

Prior to its motion to dismiss Allen's Motion for a Court Default.

Appeliee/Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint altogether (R

94-102) citing Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So. 2d 65, 66 (Fla. 1992) and

Gursky Ragan, P.A. v. Ass'n of Poinciana Villages, Inc., 314 So. 3d 594.

595 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) te justify an attorney's "right" to be deceitful by

misrepresenting the notation in De/Monico_y. Traynor, 116 So. 3d 1205

4213 (Fla. 2013) that: “the earnest though mistaken zeal of a litigant who

seeks to redress his wrongs and for the ardent and excited feelings of the

fearless, conscientious lawyer, who must necessarily make his client's

cause his own.” /bid.

With its misrepresentation of De/Monico’s intent, Appellee/Defendant

suggested that “conscientious” Defense Counsel Egan, “fearlessly, ardently

and excitedly” falsely claimed that the person whose automobile her client

had wrecked, Appellant/Plaintiff Allen, acted in a mentally unstable manner

habitually harassed CME doctors, and endangered their safety, in an effort

to make her client's defense “her own" and thus convince the court that any

i
maladies claimed by Allen in her legal complaint against her client were

unrelated to her client-prompted collision

Additionally Appellee/Defendant misreferenced Myers v. Hodges, 44

So. 357 (Fla. 1907), Echevarria, MeCalla. Raymer Barrett & Frappierv.

Cole, 950 So. 2d 380, 383 (Fla. 2007), and James v. Leigh, 145 So. 3d

1006, 1007 (Fla. ist DCA 2014} to deceptively claim that “the falsity or

maliciousness of the statements [that Allen harassed CME doctors who

had expressed fear for their safety, was] irrelevant to the application of the

absolute litigation privilege" (R 98) and to falsely suggest that the above:

noted cases did not impose restrictions when it comes to absolute immunity

and defamatory claims made in the course of litigation, but that case law

gave attorneys carfe blanche when defaming litigants

Appellee/Defendant blatantly overlooked the caveat noted in each of

the cases: that defamatory statements are subject to absolute immunity “so

long as-the statements are relevant to the subject of inquiry," James _v.

Leigh, 145 So. 3d 1006, 1007 (Fla. ist DCA 2014) It is undeniable thai’

Appellee/Defendant Egan's claim that Allen habitually terrorized CME

doctors who feared for their safety, is pet relevant to the subject of inquiry

concerning whether the ailments alleged by Allen in her auto negligence

complaint were caused by Egan's client-prompted collision

12
 Appeliee/Defendant also deceitfully cited Dadic v. Schneider, 722 So.

2d 921, 923 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) and Ross v. Blank, 958 So. 2d 437, 441

(Fla. 4th DCA 2007), to categorize Appellee/Defendant Egan's defamation

and as “the exact kind of case the Supreme Court of Florida had in mind

when it created the absolute litigaticn privilege [since] Ms. Egan's

statements were made during the course of litigation in direct response to

Plaintiffs continued improper communications with Dr. Busse’s office which

the trial court found to be harassment (Compl. at 7 31)" (R 98)’

Appellee/Defendant Egan then "did a 180° by labeling the purposely

malicious claim that "Allen had endangered the safety of CME doctors who

were afraid for their safety" as “Demonstrably True Or Pure Opinion,” and

ited Beck v. Lipkind. 681 Se. 2d 794, 795 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996);

Ozvesilpinar v. Reach PLC, 48 Fla. L. Weekly D1004 (Fla. 3d DCA May 17,

2023) and Lipsig v. Ramlawi, 760 So. 2d 170, 184 (Fia, 3d DCA 2000) to

note that "[sltatements that are pure epinien are insufficient to sustain. a

claim for defamation." (R 98)

Appellee/Defendant Egan further "padded" the motion to disrniss, by

eferencing Linafelt v. Beverly Enterorises-Florida, inc., 745 So. 2d 386.

; Appellee/Defendant Egan seemingly banked on the Court's not referring

to Egan's citation cf 4] 31 since said citation does not even remotely state
anything of what Egan alleges in the motion (R18)

13
389 (Fla. ist DCA 1999); Cape Publications, Inc, v. Reakes, 840 So. 2d

277, 280 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Readon v. WPLG, LLC, 317 So. 3d 1228.

1234 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) and Smith v. Cuban Am. Nat. Found., 731 So. 2d

702 (Fila. 3d DCA 1999) to superfiuously affirm the obvious: that truthful

staternents are not defamatory

Allen's October 5, 2023 “Opposition io Defendant's Motion to Dismiss

and Memorandum of Law," (R 242-253) addresses each claim and legal

citation in Appellee/Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, including the verifiably

false claim that "Plaintiffs continued communications with Dr. Busse and

his staff constituted harassment is supported by Plaintiffs own complaint

and attachments therein. (Compl. at ¥ 35-43, 50. 59)°" (R100)

During the October 13, 2023 hearing on Defendant's Motion to

Dismiss, Appellee/Defendant attempted to elucidate, for the benefit of the

trial court's judge, the alleged propriety of absolute immunity, when stating:

If you look at the Sussman case. [Sussman v. Damian, 355

So. 2d 809, 811, (Fla. 9d DCA 1977)] which is the case Ms

8 Again, possibly knowing the judge would accept its claims without
verifying their veracity and would overlook Appellee/Defendant's distortion
of facts, Appeliee/Defendsant audaciously cited non-existent information
there is nothing in {f] 35-43 of Allen's complaint (R 19-21) that remotely
suggests:Allen admitted to harassment. Additionally, Allen concludes her
complaint with 7 50; there are no. ff] 51-59 in the complaint. (R 22-23)

14,
 Allen relied on in her responses’, one lawyer said to
another in a deposition, Sussman said to Damian, You, sir
are a darnn liar, quote/unquote Absolute immunity
attached to that according to the Third DCA because it was
made during the statement was made during a
deposition. And they were talking about discovery who
produced what, but it was thai state was made during a
deposition the Third DCA said absolute immunity attaches.
(R 268)

Appellee/Defendant, therefore, equated an attorney's calling

another attorney “a liar" during a deposition in the Sussman case, to

° The claim that Allen solely relied on Sussman is purposely deceitful

Allen referenced the following absolute immunity-related cases in her
motion opposing dismissal: Myers _v. Hodges, 44 Se. 357 (1907);
Echevarria, MeCalla, Raymer, Barrett & Frappier v. Cole, 950 So.2d 380
(Fla.2007), DeiMonico v. Traynor, 116 So.3d 1205 (Fla. 2013); Fridovich v.
Fridovich, 598 So.2d 85, 66, (Fla.1992); Levin, Middlebrooks. Mabie,
Thomas, Maves & Mitchell, P.A. v. U.S. Fire ins. Co. 639 So.2d
606 (Fla.1994): Ange v. State, 98 Fla. 538, 541, 123 So. 916, 917 (1929);
Hope v. Nat Alliance of Postal & Fed, Emps., Jacksonville Local No. 32@,
649 So.2d 697, 901 (Fla. ist DCA 1995); James v. Leigh, 145 So. 3d 1006
(Fla. 1st DCA 2014)Dadic v, Schneider, 722 Sa. 2d 921, 923 (Fla. 4th DCA
1998) Linafelt v. Beverly Enterprises-Florida, 745 So. 2d 386,389 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1999); Cape Publications, Inc. v. Reakes, 840 So. 277, 280 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2003) and Readon v. WPLG, LLG, 317 Se. 3d DCA 2021) Smith ev
Cuban Am, Nat Found., 731 So. 2d 702(Fla. 3d DCA 1989) Masson v. New
Yorker Magazine, 507 US. 496 (1991); Beck v. Lipkind, 681 So. 2d
795, 795 (Fi. 3d DCA 1996); and Lipsig v. Ramiawi, 760 So. 2d 170.
184 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) Ozyesilpinar_v. Reach PLC, 48 Fla
L.Wekiy D1004 (Fla. 3d DCA May 17, 2023); Gursky Ragan, PA, v.
Ass’n of Poinciana Villages Inc. 314 So. 3d 594, (Fla. 3d DCA 2020), and
Ross v. Blank, 958 So. 2d 437, 441 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (R 242-253)

15
the instant case, where an attorney requested the court's assistance

to restrain a self-represented litigant's alleged continued harassment

of CME doctors who, according to. the denouncing attorney, were

fearful for their safety. Counsel further maliciously, mendaciously

and deviously stated

| wanted to point out that as Ms. Allen admits in the

complaint at paragraphs 14, 34 and 45, the courts have
granted both motions. So clearly the courts have already
found those allegations were true. The Court heard
argument on the motions and granted them both. (R 266)

Appellee/Defendant audaciously flaunts. its effrontery with the

ludicrous claim that since Allen noted in her claim that "the Court, in

Case No.: 2019-014831-CA-01, granted Attorney Sarah Egan's two

motions for the Court's intervention in stopping Allen from ‘further harassing

CME doctors,' and issued two orders aimed at ensuring the doctors’ safety

from an allegedly 'mentally irnbalanced’ pro se litigant, (R 21-22, 45 of

Allen's complaint, also noted in fff 14 and 34, R 14 & R 79) the allegations

that Allen was a mentally unstable litigant and endangered the safety of

CME doctors had to have been true.

Appellee/Defendant had no qualm about deceptively implying

the Court also heard arguments from Plaintiff when stating that "the

Court heard arguments on the motions and granted them." (R 266)

16
 As can be verified in the already-disqualified judge's November

15, 2023-issued order, “pro se Plaintiff, Isabel del Pino Allen, advising

she would not be appearing at the hearing and who in fact did fail to appear

and with Sarah Egan, Esquire, and Michael Brand, Esquire, counsel for

Defendant, Felipe Arencibia Chong both present, and the Court having

considered the record and hearing argument from Defense counsel at the

hearing,” (R 40) As Allen stated during October 13, 2023 hearing

| didn't go to the hearing, because he [Judge Oscar

Rodriguez Fonts] was disqualified. And | believe thal |
have every right to look for the ruies. He was disqualified
And | told Ms. Egan that | wouldn't go. (R 270)

Regarding the April, 2023 order issued by the judge who succeeded

the disqualified judge, Allen noted the following regarding the successor

judge's following suit and reiterating what his disqualified predecessor did

The second time that it was you probably doubt whai I'm
saying that Mr. Oscar Rogriguez Fonts did not respond to
my -- respond to the motion to recuse within 30 days --he
was disqualified. But | would like you to check what I'm
saying, check the veracity of my claims. So, but the reason
I'm asking is because he’s an officer of the law. 1 am
nobody. | am just a regular person. So obviously you
tend to believe someone with authority’. So i would
ask you to verify this to say that it's true. (Emphasis added)

*° Allen's shown temerity in asserting her right and challenging a court's

ruling should imply that Allen does not believe that a "regular person” is
"nobody." However, being a realist, Allen understands that officers of the
court would believe a fellow officer of the court to the detriment of pro ses

7
 {The judge who succeeded the disqualified judge] doubted
that this man, that your colleague, Oscar Rodriguez Fonts
had continued ruling in a case in which he was disqualified
So he naturally granted the motion [requesting that
Allen be compeiled to “stop harassing CME doctors],
didn't ask for anything. He just believed [what Egan
stated in her motion: that Allen threatened the CME
doctors‘ safety]. (R 271-272)

During the October 13, 2023 hearing on Appellee/Defendant's motion

to dismiss, the lower court judge correctly classified Appellee's claim that

Allen was mentally unstable and presented a threat to the safety of CME

doctors as “defamation,” thus acknowledging the faisity of the claim. The

trial court judge, however, erred by granting Appellee/Defendant's motion

to dismiss by stating

O.K. folks, without further arguments | find that this absolute

immunity does apply as a rmnatter of law under these
circumstances; that the defamation did bare some relation to the
actions in this case and was done in the scope of the litigation so
Mr, Cole, | will....it doesn’t mean | am right, foiks, the Third
DCA will ultimately hold forth on this. So Mr. Cole i will grant
your motion for dismissal with prejudice. And if you want you can
just put for the reasons stated on the record,’’ (R 276-277)
(Erphasis Added)

| Allen proffers that trial court judge's advice that the summary judgment
order be vague and simply state "forthe reasons stated on the record" (R
277) was intended to facilitate this Court's conceivable "P.C.A," in the event
Allen overlooked the "instructions" and failed to request a transcript of the
hearing. Appellee followed the trial judge's advice. (R 281)

18
 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Forida Supreme Court's century-old unequivocal explanation that for

defamatory claims transmitted in the course of judicial proceedings to be

absolutely privileged, [the defamation] must be connected with, or relevant

r material to, the cause in hand or subject of inquiry," Myers v. Hodges, 44

So. 357 (1907), has been consistently affirmed in Fisher v. Payne, 113 So.

378, 380 (Fla. 1927); Ange v. State, 98 Fla. 538, 540-541, 123 So. 916

917 (1929); Fridovich vy. Fridovich, 598 So.2d 65, 66, (Fla.1992); Levin.

Middiebrooks, Mabie. Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, PA v. United States Fire

ins. Co., 639 So.2d 606, 607 (Fla.1994); Fariello v. Gavin, 873 So. 2d 1243

(Fla. 5th DCA, 2004); James v. Leigh, 145 So. 3d 1006 (Fla. 1st DCA

2014); Sussman v. Damian, 355 Sa. 2d 809, 811, (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) and

DelMonico v. Traynor, 116 So.3d 1205 (Fla. 2013), among others.

Appeliee/Defendant Egan's Court-admitted defamatory claim that

Allen was mentally-unstable and habitually harassed (as defined in §§

784.048(a\(b)&(c), Fla. Stats.) CME doctors who feared for their safety and

were seeking the Court's involvement for their protection, is unrelated to

the subject of Inquiry: whether any malady alleged by Allen in her

claim against Egan's client (Case No.: 2019-014831-CA-01) were

caused by Appellee/Defendant Egan's client's reckless driving

19
 Allen, en passant, points out that Appellee/Defencdant Egan's

defamation was not only irrelevant to the cause in hand or subject of

inquiry,” Myers v. Hodges, 44 So. 357 (1907) but also deliberately

malicious, by specifying that Appellee Egan's initial “Emergency Motion to

Prevent Plaintiff [Allen] from Continuing to Harass the CME Doctor’ (

8) was unilaterally-scheduled by Appellee/Defendant Egan to be heard by

an already- disqualified judge, during a hearing Egan knew Allen would not

be attending (due to the defiant judge's noted disqualification) and thus

Allen would not contest the malicious claim, thus making it easy for the

already-disqualified judge to grant Egan's motion, as a matter of course.

Nonetheless, Allen’s instant appeal pertains solely to the triai court's

erroneous claim that "absolute immunity was applicable to Appellee Egan

Court-admitted defamation. The trial court judge erred by affirming during

the related October 13, 2023 hearing, that “absolute immunity does apply

as .a matter of jaw under these circumstances.” (R 276)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The review is de novo. DelMoni co 116 So.3d 1205 (Fla.

v. Traynor,

2013); Sussman vy, Damian, 355 So. 2d 809, 811, (Fla. 3d DCA 1977);

Dadie v. Schneider, 722 So. 2d 921, 923 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)

20
 ARGUMENT

THE DISMISSAL OF ALLEN'S DEFAMATION COMPLAINT

AGAINST APPELLEE SARAH EGAN ON THE BASIS THAT
ATTORNEY EGAN HAD ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY WHEN
FALSELY CLAIMING IN A COURT-FILED MOTION THAT
ALLEN WAS MENTALLY UNSTABLE AND HARASSED (AS
DEFINED IN 784.048(a)(b)&(c), F.S.) CME DOCTORS WHO
FEARED FOR THEIR SAFTEY AND WERE SEEKING THE
COURT'S INVOLVEMENT FOR THEIR PROTECTION
CONFLICTS WITH WHAT FLORIDA COURTS HAVE
CONSISTENTLY AFFIRMED STARTING WITH MYERS v.
HODGES, 44 So. 357 (1907) SINCE THE DEFAMATORY
CLAIMS ARE UNRELATED TO THE CAUSE AT HAND OR
SUBJECT OF INQUIRY: WHETHER ANY MALADY
ALLEGED BY ALLEN IN HER AUTO NEGLIGENCE CLAIM
AGAINST EGAN’S CLIENT IS ATTRIBUTABLE TO EGAN’S
CLIENT'S RECKLESS DRIVING.

The Florida Supreme Court’s century-old ruling in Myers v. Hodges,

44 So. 357 (1907) that

In order that defamatory words, published by parties, counsel or

witnesses in the due course of a judicial procedure, may be
absolutely privileged, they must be connected with, or
relevant_or material to, the cause in hand or subject_of
inquiry. lfithey be so published and are so relevant or
pertinent to the subject of inquiry. ibid (Emphasis Added)

has been consistently affirmed in cases concerning an attorney's absolute

immunity when defaming a litigant in the attorney's defense of a client.

Florida Courts, in subsequent cases, have explicated the intended

meaning of “pertinence” and “relevance” vis-a-vis the “subject of why

defamatory claims by attorneys would enjoy absolute immunity.

23
 Pro Se Appellant Allen, respectfully and most deferentially preffers

that falsely claiming that a plaintiff, in an automobile negligence case, is so

‘off-the-wall’ and mentally unbalanced that opposirig counsel is “forced” to

request (through two motions for judicial orders) the court’s intervention to

protect CME doctors who had expressed to counsel fear for their “safety

(& 19-88) is hardly relevant or pertinent to an attorney's defense of a

reckless driver's culpability in relation to any alleged malady claimed by the

plaintiff to have been prompted by the reckless driving — even when the

attorney's litigation strategy involves requiring that the plaintiff in the

litigation submit to CME examinations

Allen respectfully submits that the “conceivabie argument" that - since

Attorney Egan’s defense strategy, in an auto negligence action, included

requesting that Allen submit to CMEs - claiming that Allen was endangering

the CME doctors’ safety made the defamation “relevant or pertinent to the

subject of inquiry,” is tantamount to

(1) the permissibility of a defense counsel, in a medical malpractice

case, falsely claiming that the plaintiff had contracted several

venereal diseases and was putting potential sex partners at risk due

to the plaintiff's disregard for his/their/her health and safety, on the

basis that any defamatory claim pertaining the plaintiff's health would

22
 be "relevant"; would have some "relation to the proceedings,” or

would have "some connection” to the plaintiff's health concerns, or

(2) the permissibility of a mortgagor's defense counsel's falsely claiming

that a mortgagee's agent involved in foreclosure proceedings" of the

mortgagor's home, was harassing the mortgagor's children and

endangering their mental health and safety by telling the children that

their parents would be responsible for potentially making the family

homeless, on the basis that any defarnatory claim pertaining to a

foreclosure praceedings on a mortgagor's home would be "relevant
would have “some connection” or some "relation to the proceedings

Florida courts have consistently noted that for an attorney to enjoy

absolute immunity, the attorney's defamation "must be connected with, or

relevant or material to, the cause in hand or sublect of inquiry,” Myers v.
Hedges, 44 So. 357 (1907) has been affirmed by Ange v State, 98 Fla

538, 540-541, 123 So. 916, 917 (1929); Fisherv. Payne, 113 So. 378, 380
(Fla. 1927): Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So.2d 85, 66 (Fla.1992) Levin,
Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes& Mitchell, PA. v. United States Fire

” The Court explained the applicability of immunity in foreclosure-related

Taylor v. Alropa Corp., 138 Fla. 137, 189 So. 230 (1939) where the Court
stated:"[t]he words [concerning fiduciary duties in a mortgaged property]
appearing in the pleading were relevant and were properly used in
connection with the foreciosure proceeding,” (Emphasis Added)

23
ins. Co., 639 So.2d 606, 607 (Fla.1994); Fariellov. Gavin, 873 So. 2d 1243

(Fla. 5th DCA, 2004); James v. Leigh, 145 So. 3d 1006 (Fla. ist DCA

2014); Sussman _v. Damian, 355 So. 2d 809, 811, (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)

DeiMonico v. Traynor, 116 So.3d 1205 (Fla. 2013)

in Ange v. State, 98 Fla. 538, 540-541, 123 So, 916, 917 (1929) the

Florida Supreme Court cited the caveat that grants absolute immunity when

it noted that the “privilege extends fo the protection of the judge, parties

counsel and witnesses, and arises immediately upon the doing of any act

required or permitted by law-in the due course of the judicial

proceedings or asnecessarily. preliminary thereto.” {bid (Emphasis

Added). Allen respectfully avers that damaging a litigant's reputation (and

purposely derailing a pro se litigant's case by prejudicing the lit gant before

a judge with claims of the pro se litigant's mental instability and “wacko

behavior) by falsely accusing the litigant of threatening the safety of CME

doctors is hardly “required" or "necessary" to an attorney's defense ofa

reckless driver in an automobile negligence case or to demonstrate that

injuries claimed by a plaintiff were not caused by the reckless driver

the
Florida Gourts' Construal of "Relevance"; "Relation to
Proceedings," and “Some Connection to the Matters which are
to jec
Sub t .
the Grievance

24
 Florida's First District Court of Appeal cited criteria regarding whai

ought to be inferred as “relevance and pertinence to a subject of inquiry" in

relation to absolute immunity vis-a-vis defamatory claims by public officials

including attorneys, in Hope v, Nat, Alliance. Jacksonville. 649 So 2d 897

901 (Fla. iDCA 1995) - a case pertaining a labor union's proceedings

regarding racial tensions in the work place, and the union's allegedly faise

claim, in a letter to Appellant (Postal Worker Clifford Hope 's) superviso:

that "[Hope] collaborated in the death of the young black male killed by
friend of Clifford Hope] James Reese {and that it was] widely known that

Mr. Hope [was] an accessory to murder in that he destroyed the murder

weapon." /bid.

In its ruling, the appellate court explained why absolute immunity was

pertinent in Hope v. Nat, Alliance. Jacksonville by noting the following

[ihe statements at issue were related to and within the scope of

the grievance process. The terms and conditions of
employment which were the subject of the grievance
involved charges of racial harassment of black employees
by James Reese, and the condoning of this behavior by
supervisory personnel, including appellant. The alleged
defamatory statement claimed that there was a concerted effort
by appellant and Mr. Reese against a black man in connection
with a murder. f this statement was true and widely known
it would contribute to the racial tension in the workplace
and be evidence of the condoning of discriminatory
behavior by the supervisors. /bid. (Emphasis Added)

25
 Unlike the preceding case - where the Court explicated why the faise

claims attributed to Appellant Hope were related to a labor union's inquiry

regarding racial tensions in the work place where Hope. was 4 supervisor

which implies Hope had a say regarding alleged racial harassment - if the

false claim that Allen habitually harassed CME doctors and endangered

their safety, said defamatory claim would not be related to an inquiry

concerning whether Allen's alleged injuries were elated to the auto

accident whose perpetrator Appellee/Defendant Egan was defending in an

auto negligence legal claim.

Florida's Fourth Appellate Court shed further light into what ought to

be inferred by "relation to the proceedings" in Dagic v. Schneider, 722 So

2d 921, 923 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) - a case involving, among others claims.

an attorney's defamatory statements in a motion to withdraw from

representation of his clients. The 4DCA explicitly noted why Attorney

Schneider's allegations, deemed defamatory by his former clients, the

Dadics, were absolutely privileged, noting that “Schneider made the

statements during the course of judicial proceedings to inform the court of

the reasons for the motion” /bid

Unlike the preceding case ~ where the Court explicitly noted why

Atiorey Schneider had made allegations in @ motion in an effort to seek

26
 leave to withdraw from the case - Appellee/Defendant Attorney Egan
blatantly lied to the Court by falsely stating that she (Egan) had “no. choice

but to request an Order from the Court preventing [Allen] from

continuing to harass

Considering the verifiable fact both CME doctors denied that Allen
had ever harassed them, let alone their alleged request for the Court's

protection against Allen, the only discernible motive for Appellee/Defendant

Egan's gratuitous defamatory claims would have to be to maliciously. and

irreparably damage Allen's reputation and good name

Allen respectfully proffers that it would be preposterous to assume

that Florida courts’ intent in: Myers v. Hodges, 44 So. 357 (1907); Ange v.

State, 98 Fla. 538, 540-541, 123 So. 916, 917 (1929); Fisher v. Payne, 113
So. 378, 380 (Fla. 1927): Fridovich_v. Fridovich, 898 So.2d 65
66, (Fla.1992); Levin, Middiebrooks, Mabie, Thomas Mayes & Mitchell,
PA. y. United States Fire Ins Co., 639 So.2d 606, 607 (Fla.1994)
Sussman v. Damian, 355 So. 2d 8098, 811, (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
Fariello y. Gavin, 873 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); DelMonica
v. Traynor, 118 So.3d 1205 (Fla. 2013), and James v Leigh, 145 So. 3d
1006 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) was to give attorneys a sense of omnipotence by

27
allowing a nolens volens “legal strategy" to be used to gain an upper hand

by allowing attorneys to abuse and demean opposing litigants

The ADCA clarified when. statements perceived to be defamatory

must be made, in Ross v, Blank, 958 So. 2d 437, 441 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)

a case which pertained to litigation privileges of a psychologist to a court.

appointed custodial evaluator and a guardian ad litem. Tne Court agreed

with Appellee Dr. Diane Blank that her statements concerning suspected

child abuse, “were made in accordance with the mandatory reporting

requirements imposed on (Dr. Blank] by section 39 201(1), Florida Statutes

and that staternents made in compliance there with are immune from civil

liability pursuant to section 39.203(1)(a), Florida Statutes" as well as

made in the course of legal proceedings." Ibid. (Emphasis Added) As

opposed to the statements by Bank in Ross v. Blank, Appellee/Defendant

Egan's defamatory claims were not related to the proceedings

Far from being “required” to fabricate the claim that Allen harassed

CME doctors who had expressed fear for their safety - in a case where

Appellee/Defendant Egan was defending a reckless driver and attempting

to prove that Allen-alleged maladies not reiated to Allen's auto negligence

claim against Appeliee/Defendant Egan's client, Attorney Egan had the

moral duty, per Florida Bar Rule 4-8.4, to not “engage in conduct in

28
 onnection with the prectice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice Unquestionably, an attorney's request that the Court issue
jucicial orders to restrain a pro se litigant by falsely
claiming that the pro se
litigant was habitually harassing CME doctors and causi
ng these to fear for
their safety, is prejudicial to the administration of justice

CONCLUSION

The facts exposed and the case law cited in this appeal, amply
demonstrate that the trial judge erred when ruling that
“absolute immunity
does apply as a matter of law under these c rcumstanices."
(R 277)
The criterion for the applicability of absolute inamaunity
to defamatory
words is that they be "connected with, or relevant or mater
ial fo, the cause
in hand or subject of inquiry Myers v. Hodges, 53 Fla. 197, 209, 44 So
357, 361 (1907). The applicability of absolute immunity is
inappropriate in the instant case Appellee/Defendant's defamatory claim

that Allen terrorized CME doctors who feared for their safety
, is immaterial
to the subject of inquiry pertinent to Attorney Egan's
defense intended to
prove that the injuries and ailments alleged by Allen in her complaint
against Egan's client were unrelated to Egan's client's reckless
driving
The Florida Supreme Court explicated the rationale
oehind absolute

29
immunity in Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas. Mayes & Mitchell, P.A.v.

United States Fire Ins, Co.Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So.2d 65, (Fla.1992}

(referencing Fridovich v. Fridovich,) by pointing to "the balancing of tw

competing interests: the right of an individual to enjoy a reputation

unimpaired by defamatory attacks versus the right of the public interest to a

free and full disclosure of facts in the conduct of judicial proceedings Ibid

It is incontrovertible that damaging Self-Represented Litigant Allen's

Allen
reputation by wantonly allowing Appellee/Defendant Egan io defame

by falsely stating that Allen endangered the safety of CME doctors whom
prove that
Allen had not yet met - in a case where Egan was attempting to

injuries alleged by Allen in a complaint against Egan's client-provoked

collision were unrelated to the collision- is not only prejudicial to Allen

but to the public interest as well

While the verifiable facts exposed in this appeal reveal that Appeliee/

Egan's defamation was purposely malicious” in addition to

Defendant
reckless
immaterial to subject of inquiry pertinent to Egan’s defense of a

Egan's atternpt to substantiate that Allen-alleged injuries were

driver and

Plaintiff
3 As noted herein, Egan's initial “Emergency Motion to Prevent
Doctor." maliciously
[Allen] from Continuing to Harass the CME
ding
established" the false claim that Allen harassed doctors. The succee
and the
judge's refusal to invalidate the disqualified judge-issued orders
ding judge
judge's subsequent similar order substantiates that the succee
paid credence to Appellee/Defendant's defamatory claim

30
 unrelated to Attorney Egan's client-cause collision - which indicates that

qualified immunity would not be applicable, Myers v. Hodges, 53 Fla. 197

208, 44 So. 357, 361 (1907) - Allen's appeal pertains to the trial court
judge's specific dictate that absolute immunity does apply as a matter of

law under these circumstances.” (R 277)

Appellant, pro se, isabel del Pino Allen respectfully request that, after
perusing the facts noted in this appeal vis-a-vis the pertinent case law
which specifies that for an attorney to enjoy absolute immunity when
making a defamatory statement, "so long as the statements are relevant to

the subject of inquiry," James v. Leigh, 145 So. 3d 1008, 1007 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2014); Myers v. Hodges, 53 Fla. 197, 209, 44 So. 357, 364 (1907),
this Honorable Court grant Allen's appeal and issue remanding this case to

the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court for furthe proceedings.

Isabel dei Pino Allen

Appellant, pro se
4871 SW 15 St
Miami, Fl. 33134
idelpinoallen@gmail.com
(305) 491-9225

CERTIFIATE OF SERVICE

| hereby certify that on this 22nd day of December, 2023, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing has been sent to: Luke Savage, Counsels for

31
the Appellee at: scoti.cole@csklegal.com; francesca.ste' n@eskiegal.com;

mary.rigau@csklegal.com, and charo fagundez@cskiegal.com.

Isabel del Pino Allen

Appellant, pro se

CERTIFICATE OF CONIPLIANCE

| hereby certify that this 32-page, 7,386-word Appellant initial Brief,

written in Arial 14-point font, complies with the requisites noted in Rule

9.210 of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure

isabel del Pino Allen

Appellant, pro se

32