International Journal of Clinical and Experimental

Hypnosis

ISSN: 0020-7144 (Print) 1744-5183 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/nhyp20

Automaticity and Hypnosis: A Sociocognitive

Account

Steven Jay Lynn

To cite this article: Steven Jay Lynn (1997) Automaticity and Hypnosis: A Sociocognitive
Account, International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 45:3, 239-250, DOI:
10.1080/00207149708416126

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00207149708416126

Published online: 31 Jan 2008.

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 AUTOMATICITY AND HYPNOSIS:
A Sociocognitive Account
STEVEN JAYLYNN2
State University o f N m York at Singhamton

Abstract:This article provides an overview of a new theory of sug-

gested involuntariness in hypnosis, developed in conjunction with
Irving Kirsch. The theory is based on the following ideas. First, high
hypnotizableparticipants enter hypnosiswith a conscious intention to
feel and behave in line with suggested experiences and movements.
Second, people who are easily hypnotized hold firm expectations that
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they will succeed in following the suggestionsof the hypnotist. Third,

the intention and expectation in turn function as response sets in the
sense that they trigger the hypnotic response automatidy. Fourth,
given the intention to feel and behave in line with the hypnotist's
suggestions,hypnotized individuals show no hesitation to experience
the suggested movementsas involuntarybecause (a)these movements
are actually triggered automatically,and (b)the intention to cooperate
with the hypnotist as well as the expectation to be able to do so create
a heightened readiness to experiencethese actions as involuntq.

The ability of hypnotic suggestions to transform mundane actions into

seemingly effortless, automatic, and involuntary behaviors has in-
trigued students of hypnosis for more than 200 years. Indeed, the experi-
ence of suggestion-related involuntariness has come to be so closely
allied with hypnosis that it is viewed by many as the acid test of whether
a response is genuinely "hypnotic" or a sham (seeLynn, Rhue, & Weekes,
1990).
Just how such seemingly automatic responses arise has been the
subject of considerable debate, with conceptualizations of hypnotic in-
voluntariness delineating the boundaries of competing theories of hyp-
nosis. This article will present an overview of a new sociocognitive
account of suggested involuntariness developed in collaboration with
Irving Kirsch. A more fully developed explication of this theory can be
found in Kirsch and Lynn (in press); however, the present article elua-

Manuscript submitted October 4,1996; finalrevision received January 21,1997.

'An earlier version of this article was presented at the Niagara-on-theLake Hypnosis
Conference, sponsoredby Bmck University, St. Catharines, Ontario, Canada, August 1996.
2Requests for reprints should be addressed to Steven Jay LYM, Ph.D., Psychology
Department, State University of New York at Binghamton, Binghamton, NY 13902-6000.

The International Journal of Clinical and Expaimental e s i s , Vol XLX No.3, July1997 239-250
Q 1997 The Intrmrrtionnl Journal ofclinical and Erperimental Hypnaris

239
 240 SI” JAYLYNN

dates how behaviors that are experienced as involuntary are triggered

by situational and self-generated events.
Our account modifies both Lynn’s earlier sociocognitive theory of
hypnotic involuntariness (Lynn, Rhue, & Weekes, 1989;Lynn et al., 1990)
and Kirsch’s response expectancy theory (Kirsch, 1985,1990,1991)in
important ways by contending that people’s interpretations of their
responses as involuntary are not entirely mistaken and by more closely
relating the topic of hypnosis to a broader range of theories and phenom-
ena associated with the automatiaty of mundane actions. Our theory is
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in keeping with went theory in social and cognitive psychology (Bargh,

1994), which indicates that intentional behavior may be triggered auto-
matically even when it is novel and may require sustained attention.
To understand how behaviors are triggered automatically, it is first
necessary to understand what is meant by the terms response expecfuncies
and intentions.Kirsch (1985)has defined response expectancies as antici-
pations of automatic reactions in response to particular stimuli. The
most important feature of these expectanaes is that they tend to be self-
confirming, in that they tend to generate the expected subjective re-
sponse, along with its physiological substrate. The placebo effect is the
prototype of a self-confirmingresponse expectancy (Kirsch, 1985).
Both intentions and response expectancies are predictions of the
occurrence of a behavior. They differ in the person’s perception about
the volitional status of the behavior. One intends to emit a voluntary
response, but expects to emit an automatic response. Thus, intentions
and response expectanaes can be thought of as two subtypes of response
sets. Expectancies and intentions are temporary states of readiness to
respond in particular ways to particular stimuli. The distinctionbetween
them rests on the person’s understanding of the voluntariness of the
response. If the response is interpreted as volitional, the set is an inten-
tion; if it is interpreted as nonvolitional, the set is an expectancy.
For example, in the game Simon Says, players are direded to make
movements, whereas in hypnosis, involuntary movements are sug-
gested. In both cases, the person has adopted a response set to carry out
the suggested actions. But in the first case, the interpretation is that the
action is carried out intentionallx and even though the prepared re-
sponse may occur automatically the mediating response set can be
categorized as an intention. Conversely in the second case, the expecta-
tion is that the response will play itselfout, and the mediating set would
be characterized as an expectancy. Thus, the distinction is one of inter-
pretation The difference between an intention and an expectancy is in
the person’s interpretation of the causality of the behavior.
The ability of response expectanaes to generate movements derives
from the characteristicsthey share with intentions. Both are response sets
when the appropriate triggering conditions are encountered. In the
remainder of the article, I will argue that the behaviors that follow ideo-
 ALJTOMATIUTYAND HYF'NOSIS 241

motor and challenge suggestionsare cognitivelyprepared responses that

are triggered by suggestion and subjective cues.
Our theory is premised on the idea that although a certain degree of
ambivalence may be associated with responding to hypnotic sugges-
tions, most people who enter hypnotic situationswant to be hypnotized,
and they intend to do their best to fulfill the requirements of the hypnotic
role. This intention to respond to hypnosis is shown by correlations
between responsiveness and attitudes toward hypnosis (Kirsch, Silva,
Comey & Reed, 1995),by the influence of rapport on hypnotic respond-
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ing (see Lynn & Rhue, 1991), by the eagerness with which students
volunteer for hypnosis experiments, and by their compliance with the
various instructions(i.e., eye closure, arm extension-explicitdirectives
with no implication of involuntariness)that often precede suggestions
(i.e., "your hand will feel increasingly light and want to rise off the
surface"+tives that convey the implication that the experiences
suggested are to occur involuntarily;Hilgard, 1965).
But hypnosis involves more than mere compliance. One of the re-
quirements of the hypnotic role is to respond to suggestions for automat-
ic movements. A"central demand" of hypnosis is that participants come
to appraise their goal-directed responses to suggestions as involuntary
"happenings." Participants' representations of hypnosis often consist of
the belief that hypnotizable individuals are passive and receptive and the
idea that hypnotic suggestions are carried out automatically or effort-
lessly (seeLynn & Rhue, 1991).
Participants who wish to experience hypnosis thus intend not merely
to execute suggested movementsbut also to experience them as nonvoli-
tional. Without such experiences, the hypnotic response would be less
than complete. Data indicate that participants do not intend to make
suggested movements voluntarily; instead, they expect those movements
to occur without voluntary effort (Lynn et al., 1990;Silva & Kirsch, 1992).
F~wthermore,expedancies are important in generating and shaping hyp-
notic behavior. Hypnotic inductionshave no specificprocedural compo-
nents other than the hypnotic label (Kirschet al., 1995; Sheehan & Perry,
1976), and hypnotic experiences and responses are exquisitely sensitive
to culturally induced and instructionally manipulated expectancies (see
reviews by Kirsch, 1990; Lynn et al., 1990). More specific to the issue of
involuntariness, Lynn,Nash, Rhue, Frauman, and Sweeney (1984) re-
ported that voluntary control over hypnotic responses-as gauged by the
ability of highly responsive participants to resist suggestio-ould be
influenced strongly by expectancy-alteringinformation. Similarly,mea-
sured expectancies are highly correlated with behavioral and subjective
responses to suggestions, and expectancy manipulations can increase
responsiveness greatly (see Kirsch & Lynn,in press). These data suggest
that the subjective experience of hypnosis, including the experience of
 242 STEVEN JAYLYNN

involuntariness, may be shaped by expectancy (cf. Lynn et al., 1990;

Spanos, 1986).
How can expedanaes be translated into responses that have an
involuntary quality?According to Gollwitzer (1993),an implementation
intention is a consaous decision to execute an act in a specified environ-
mental circumstance. Implementation intentions link anticipated situ-
ations to intendedbehaviors in the sense of "When X occurs, I'll execute
Y." This type of intention has been shown to lead to the automatic
initiation of the intended behavior when the situation specified in the
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implementation intention is encountered. The concept is relevant here

because it allows us to understand that even the initiation of novel
behavior is associated with automatic processes-and not just the initia-
tion of behavior that has been habitualized by frequent and consistent
pairing of a given situation with a specific behavior.
An important feature of the hypnotic situation that may seem at
variance with Gollwitzer's (1993)model is that the responses and their
triggers are not generally specified in advance. If the person is not told
what hypnotic suggestions will be given, how can an implementation
intention be formed? Instead of forming intentions for specific actions,
hypnotized individuals appear to cede or delegate some control of their
experienceand behavior to the hypnotist (Hilgard,1986,1991).However,
the phenomenon of delegating control and carrying out suggestions
supplied by another person is not unique to hypnosis and does not
require dissociation. It occurs, for example, when a person driving an
unfamiliarroute cedes some control to a navigator. The implementation
intention in these cases is to executethe behavior requested by the other
person.
This might be termed a generalizedimplementation intention (Kirsch
& Lynn, in press). The hypnotized person's intention can be charac-
terized as a motivated cognitive commitment to respond (Lynn et al.,
1991;Sheehan, 1991)or as an experiential set marked by the willingness
to experiencesuggested events as occurringeffortlessly and nonvolition-
ally (Tellegen, 1981).
To relate the concept of generalized implementation intention to the
concept of response expectancy, it is necessary to do more than point to
the structural similaritiesbetween intentions and response expedanaes.
Gollwitzer's (1993)distinction between goal intentions and implemen-
tation intentions is relevant hem. When formed, goal intentions "end
deliberation over the wishes and desires and set priorities by transform-
ing some of them into binding goals'' (Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994,p. 96).
That is, hypnotizable partiapants enter the hypnotic session with the
goal intention to feel and behave as hypnotized people do. When people
have a strong expectancy to succeed with respect to this goal, this should
lead to particularly strong goal intentions, which means that the person
will have a high commitment to achieve the goal. As a consequence, such
 people furnish their goal intentions with a generalized implementation
intention to readily respond to the hypnotist and fulfill suggested de-
mands. By so doing, the suggested behaviors become executed very
swiftly,with relatively little demand on attention, and may be accompa-
nied by a feeling of automatiaty or involuntariness.
This account provides an explanation of how participants respond to
so-called challenge suggestions, in addition to straightforward ideomo-
tor suggestions. Challenge suggestions are so named because they chal-
lenge the individual to try to inhibit or engage in a particular suggested
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activity. For example, the hypnotist might suggest to the person that his
or her hand and arm are stiff like a bar of iron and reinforce the sug-
gestion by stating, "And you know how stiff and rigid a bar of iron is."
The hypnotist might challenge the person to bend the stiff arm by stating,
"Now try to bend it, just try." It is evident that the challenge suggestion
actually consists of two messages: One to bend the arm, and another to
test how stiff and rigid it is. However, to pass the suggestion, the person
must at least tacitly recognize that the specific goal is for the arm to feel
so stiff and rigid that it will seem impossibleto bend. Ahigh commitment
to implement this goal will be reflected in the person's tensing the arm
to the point that even if substantial effort is exerted to bend the arm, it
will be difficult to do so.
This example illustrates another point: Although responses may be
triggered automatically suggestion alone is not sufficient to trigger
them. Instead, suggested physical movements are preceded by altered
subjective experiences (Silva & Kirsch, 1992).In the case of the response
to the challenge suggestion, for example, the expectation is not only that
the arm will feel stiff but also that it will feel so stiff that it cannot be bent.
Most people will pass the challenge suggestion only if they succeed in
generating a sensation of stiffness suffiaent to allow them to interpret
their inability-to-bend-their-armbehavior as nonvolitional. Their expe-
rience is not that they are intentionally unable to bend their arm, but
rather that they are doing something that is consistent with their subjec-
tive experience. The subjective experiences of both stiffness and invol-
untariness are generated, at least in part, by the expectancies of their
occurrence, and the feeling of stiffness is one of the cues that must be
present for the response to be triggered.
Support for the contention that experienced sensations are a trigger-
ing cue for behavioral responses is provided by recent studies in which
correlations of responsiveness with expectancies were examined. Mea-
sures of hypnotic response expectancy usually focus on predicting be-
havioral responses. In the more recent studies, measures of expected
subjective experiences were added (Gearan, Schoenberger, & Kirsch,
1995; Kirsch et al., 1995). Consistent with our hypothesis, these two
measures are very highly correlated. More impressively,despitethe very
high proportion of shared variance (70%),subjectiveresponse expectan-
 244 STEVEN JAYLY”

cies predicted hypnotic behavior and experience sigruficantly,even with

behavioral expectancies controlled (Gearan et al., 1995). Conversely,
with subjective response expectancies controlled, behavioral expectan-
cies fail to predict responding.
The presence of suggestion-dated sensations will not necessarily
trigger an automaticresponseif the participant’s expectanciesdo not link
sensations with movements. For example, in one countersuggestion
study,we (Lynn,Nash, Rhue, Frauman, & Stanley, 1983)found that high
hypnotizable participants moved in response to suggestions despite
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being instructed by the hypnotist to only think and imagine along with
suggestions. In this condition, participants reported many suggestion-
related sensations and viewed these sensations as confirming their re-
sponsiveness to the suggestions. However, in a condition in which par-
ticipants were not hypnotized but were asked to imagine the suggested
events while they attempted to Esist the suggestions, they experienced
just as many sensations as the hypnotized persons but nevertheless
failed to respond to the suggestions. In this condition, the participants’
posthypnotic reports indicated that they viewed the sensations as a
signal to do their best to interrupt their tendency to respond to the
suggestion and successfully resist responding.
In a follow-up study (Lynn d al., 1989),when participants were led to
associate responding to suggestions with imagining suggested move-
ments, they behaved like the hypnotized participants in our previous
experiment. That is, they responded to suggestions despite the fact that
they were instructed to resist tbe suggestions. In this study, there was a
.64 correlation between the degree to which partiapants thought that
imaginingin response to a countasuggestionwas associatedwith move-
ments and their actual suggestion-relatedresponses.
Social psychologicaltheorists (see Lynn et al., 1990)have argued that
hypnotic behavior is strategic, yet virtually no theory of hypnosis argues
that hypnotized participants are necessarily conscious of the strategies
they use. These strategies are generated, in part, by situational demand
characteristics. In fact, whether during hypnosis or not, people are
generallyunaware of many of the contingenciesthat affect their behavior
or the ways in which their responses are generated. That is why intro-
spection fails as a means of testing psychological theory.
In what sense, then, if any,is hypnotic behavior strategic?It is strategic
in the sense that almost all overt behavior is strategic and that certain
goal-related activities in which hypnotized participants engage increase
the probability of successfully passing suggestions. Of course, as in
nonhypnotic actions, hypnotic performances are not strategic in the
sense that they are executed consciously. As a nonhypnotic example,
consider the following description of the actions of a professional tennis
player: “The professional tennis player does not consciously decide to
run to a certain spot on the court, but moves there ’instinctively‘based
 on the relevant cues: the speed of the bali, the angle of the opponent’s
racket, expectancies of where the return shot will land based on consid-
erable experience in that same situation” (Bargh & Barndollar, 1996,
p. 460). Relatedly,Sheehan (1991)and McConkey (1991)have noted that
hypnotizable persons often devise ingenious ways of responding to
subtle cues and suggestionsin the hypnotic context, which highlight the
constructive nature of responding to suggested events.
Let us consider the case of amnesia suggestions.Amnesia suggestions
initially instruct partiapants to take an active role in the pnxless of forget-
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ting (e.g., “I want you to forget”). However, the wording of the sugges-
tion is thensubtly transformed to imply that the target material disappears
effortlessly and involuntarily (e.g., “The words are disappearing. ...You
will be unable to remember the words . . . they are disappearing from
your mind”; Spanos & Radtke, 1982).To fulfill the goal of forgetting the
target material, some participants adopt a strategy that involves them
focusing their attention on feelings of relaxation, heaviness, or other
hypnosis-related sensations, or otherwise distracting themselves by
imaginingevents other than the target material (Spanos& Radtke, 1982).
This strategy involves simply ’hot thinking” about what it is they might
remember if they thought about it. It is not so much that amnestic
individuals ”cannot,” in fact, recall the target material so much as they
“do not,’’ given the strategy they tacitly adopt.
Even though certain actions increase the probability of successful
responses, partiapants who engage in those activities are neither neces-
sarily consciously role playing nor acting in a premeditated manner.
Furthermore, the examplerevealsthat successfullyraponding to a sugges-
tioncanreflectan accurateperception of the experiential “state of affairs”
the participant has managed to achieve.
Note that what are being triggered in hypnosis are behaviors. For
suggestions like amnesia and visual hallucination, the question of
wheths behavior is triggered automatically is not relevant, in that there
is no overt behavior that needs to be experienced as involuntq. With
respect to suggestions for hallucinations, for example, most successful
responders will readily tell you that they intentionally tried to imagine
the suggested experience (Comey & Kirsch, 1995). For negative halluci-
nations and amnesia, trying to generate the experience directly is not
likely to be a very successful strategy, because it may produce ironic
effects (see Ansfield & Wegner, 1996). Those who are successful are not
trying to forget or not see,but they may be successfully not attending.
The examples of challenge suggestions and amnesia further reveal
two features of the way in which response sets activate behavioral or
conceptual schemas. First, once established, they can fade from aware-
ness, yet continue to determine behavior (Asch’s studies as cited in
enex, 1909). To successfully ”not think” about the target material, one
need not remain consciously focused on the fact that one is attending
 246 STEVEN JAYLYNN

to feelings of relaxation, for example, rather than to the target material.

Second, once a response set is in place, conscious intervention may be
needed to inhibit the response, rather than to activate it (Kirsch & Lynn,
in press).
Indeed, many of the responses I have discussed capitalize on the
automaticity of everyday thoughts and actions. It is well known that
routinized skills are performed automaticallyin a very flexible manner.
However, even novel and creative behaviors are composed of thoughts
and actions that are well learned, routinized, and performed automat-
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ically One of Hilgard’s important contributions to hypnosis theory is his

linkage of hypnotic phenomena to general cognitive psychology. As
Hilgard (1986, 1991) notes, actions are thought to be controlled by
hierarchically organized, interactive, sensorimotor schemas. According
to Norman and Shallice (1986),at the top of this hierarchy is a central
control structure or supervisoryattentional system that selects or biases
the selection of the act that is to be performed. It is this highest level of
the hierarchy that is identified with consciousness and intentionality,
with component schemas capable of being triggered by particular envi-
ronmental stimuli.
One consequence of thish i e r d c a l control of action is that much of
behavior is performed automatically Because consciousness is required
only in the initial selection of the highest level source schema, in the
absence of unexpected complications, complex acts can be performed
with little or no awareness, and without intentional activation of the
component behaviors. Because the directions for hypnotic actions, feel-
ings, and thoughts are supplied by the hypnotist and his or her sugges-
tions, there is little need to devote much conscious energy or activity to
initiating the behavioral componentof the response. Attention is needed,
however, to generate and monitor the subjectiveexperience that triggers
the behavioral response. Just as with any other skill, however, the greater
the person’s ability, the less effort is required to execute the response.
In short, many of the thoughts and actions associated with classical
hypnotic phenomena can occur automatically even though conscious
attention may be required to generate the subjective experiences that
trigger them.
Our theory is able to accommodatea wide variety of observations and
experimental findings in the hypnosis literature that are not addressed
by neodissociation or dissociated control theories. Many studies docu-
ment the influence of culturally based expectancies and response sets,
the importance of motivation to experience suggested effects, and the
influence of the way suggestions are worded and questions are posed to
partiapants, as well as the importance of rapport with the hypnotist and
performance standards.
Ability measures, such as imaginative ability and fantasy proneness,
may bolster perceptions of involuntariness to the extent that they en-
 hance positive response expectancies and response attributions to the
influence of the suggestionsor the hypnotist. They also may increase the
likelihood that people will experience the subjective sensations that are
the essence of suggestive responding and the triggering conditions for
the behavioral components of responses. In contrast, those participants
who are unable to experience suggested effects and have difficulty in
responding are likely to focus on molecular components of their re-
sponses (e.g., the lifting of their arm),which should disrupt performance
and hinder the interpretation of involuntariness (see Lynn et al., 1990).
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Although our theory acknowledges that multiple and interactive

variables can affect suggestion-relatedinvoluntariness, our theory does
not require the existence of an amnesic barrier or a construct like the
hidden observer, as posited by Hilgard's neodissociation theory. Our
theory owes a debt of gratitude to Woody and Bowers's (1994)theory,
which was the first to draw attention to the potential of the Norman and
Shallice (1986)model for explainingthe phenomenon of hypnotic invol-
untariness. Whereas our theory parallels the theory of dissociated con-
trol (Bowers, 1992;Woody & Bowers, 1994) in its contention that re-
sponses can be triggered automatically,it does so without postulating a
special condition resembling frontal lobe dysfunction. This allows for
self-hypnosis as well as hetemhypnosis. The differencebetween the two
is in the specification of the triggering conditions. In heterohypnosis, the
response set linksresponding to the hypnotist's words; in self-hypnosis,
responding is linked to the person's own intentionally generated
thoughts. Also, in our model, suggested experiences are triggering con-
ditions for behavioral responses.
Our theory also differs from Bowers's theory in that we contend that
hypnotic responses require attentional resources. The reason for this is
not the initiation of the motor movements, which in themselves may be
quite simple and require little attention. Instead, attention may be re-
quired for the generation and monitoring of the subjective experiences
that are among the triggering conditions required for emitting the re-
sponse. The response expectancy for arm levitation, for example, is that
the arm will rise by itself. This means that a sufficiently convincing
experience of lightness must be perceived for upward movements to be
triggered. The required degree of lightness may vary from person to
person, as shown by research on the effects of performance standards on
hypnotic responding (Lynn, Green, & Jacquith, 1996).
Our theory underlines the constructive nature of human experience.
Subjective experiences, including the experience of volition and invol-
untariness-in and out of hypnosis-m constructions, influenced as
much by beliefs, schemas, and response expectancies as they are by
situationalstimuli. For thisreason, there is no need to construe hypnosis
as a special or unique state of consciousness, as is done in dissociated
control theory, when explaining the experienced involuntariness of sug-
 248 STEVEN JAY LYNN

gested responses.Nor does it require the presence of an amnesticbarrier,

as postulated in neodissociation theory. Instead, the interpretation of
suggested responses as involuntary is made possibleby the high degree
of automatiaty that is characteristic of all complex behavior.

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Automatismus und Hypnose: Eine SoziokognitiveDarstellung

Steven Jay Lynn

Zusammenfassung Dieser Artikel liefert eine fiersicht uber einer neuen
Theorie von suggerierter Unfreiwilligkeit in Hypnose, die zusammen mit
Irving Kirsch entwickelt wurde. Die Theorie basiert auf folgenden Ideen: 1.
Hoch suggestible Probanden gehen in Hypnose mit der b e d t e n Intention
sich entsprechend der suggerierten Erfahrungenund Bewegungen zu fiihlen
und zu verhalten. 2. Probanden die leicht hypnotisierbar sind, haben feste
Emartungen, daS sie den folgenden Suggestionen des Hypnotiseurs folgen
werden. 3. Die Intention und Erwartungwirkenin der Folge als Reaktion Sets,
in der Art, daS sie die hypnotische Reaktion automatisch auslosen 4. Unter
 250 STEVEN JAYLYNN

der Intention sich entsprechendder Suggestionendes Hypnotiseurszu fiihlen

und zu verhalten, zogern hypnotisierte Probanden, die suggerierten
Bewegungen als unfreiwilligm erleben, da (a)diese Bewegungentatsachlich
automatisch ausgelost sind, und (b) die Intention mit dem Hypnotiseur zu
kooperieren ebenso wie die Erwartung, dam f a g zu sein, zu einer erhShten
Bereitschaft fiihren, diese Handlungen als unfreiwillig zu erfahren.

Automaticite?et hypnose: un compte rendu socio cognitif

Steven Jay Lynn
Downloaded by [University of California Santa Barbara] at 20:05 25 October 2015

RCsumk Cet article prbente un sumo1d'une nouvelle thkorie, dCveloppCe en

conjonction avec Irving Kirsch et portant sur l'automaticiti5 suggi5riie durant
l'hypnose. La thCorie est basCe sur les principes suivants: 1. Les sujets forte-
ment hypnotisables entrent en hypnose avec une intention consciente de se
sentir et de se comporter selon les expkriences et mouvements sugge?re?s.2. Les
gens qui sont facilement hypnotisables s'attendent fermement de rCussir 1
suivre les suggestions de l'hynotiseur. 3. L'intention et les attentes fonction-
nent en retour comme des patrons de dponses, en ce sens qu'ils initient
automatiquement la r6ponse hypnotique. 4.. Considerant l'intention de se
sentir et de se comporter selon les suggestions de l'hypnotiseur, les sujets
hypnotisb ne dkmontrent pas d'hi5sitation 1 expiirimenter les mouvements
suggCds de fason automatique car (a) ces mouvements sont, de fait, initics
automatiquementet (b) l'intention de coopCrer avec l'hypnotiseur, aussi bien
que les'attentes d'en Qtrecapable, renforcent la pdparation 1 exphrimenter ces
actions de fason automatique.

Automatismo e hipnosis: un informe soaocognitivo

Steven Jay Lynn

Resumen. Este articulo provee una visi6n general de una nueva teoria de lo
involuntario sugerido en hipnosis, desarrollada conjuntamente con Irving
Kirsch. La teoria est&basada en las siguientes ideas: 1.Particpantesaltamente
hipnotizables entran en hipnosis con una intenci6n conciente de sentir y
actuar de acuerdo con experienaas y movimientos sugeridos. 2. Gente que es
ficilmente hipnotizable mantiene firmes expectativas que tendrh Cxito en
seguir la sugestibn del hipnotizador. 3. La intenci6n y la expectativa a su vez
funcionan como respuesta instalada en el sentido que disparan automiiti-
camente la respuesta hipndtica. 4. Dada la intencidn de sentir y actuar de
acuerdo con las sugestiones del hipnotizador, 10s individuos hipnotizados no
muestran hesitacibn en experimentar 10s movimientos sugeridos como invol-
untarios porque a) actualmente estos movimientos son dispardos automdti-
camente y b) la intenci6n de cooperar con el hipnotizador asi como la expec-
tativa de ser capaz de hacerlo crean una elevada propensi6n a experimentar
estas acciones como involuntarias.