Lagman vs.

Medialdea

G.R. No. 231658

July 4, 2017

FACTS:

 May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte declared martial law and suspended the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao, which will last for 60 days.
 Mindanao has been under violence and plagued with terrorism for quite some
time.
 The OSG recognizes that the Court has the authority or power to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law. However, they
should view it under the lens of “grave abuse of discretion” and not the
“yardstick of correctness of facts.”
 The OSG maintains that the sufficiency of factual basis must be assessed from the
POV of the President based on the facts available to him at that time the decision
was made.
 The facts established after the declaration are not considered for the review of the
sufficiency of factual basis of the declaration.
 The President can decide to declare martial law on his own capacity.
 News reports about Marawi are “hearsay evidence, twice removed” and are
inadmissible.


Lagman Petition

1. Claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual basis because
there is no rebellion or invasion in Marawi City or any part of Mindanao.
2. The Declaration and Suspension have no factual basis because the President’s
Report contained “false, inaccurate, contrived and hyperbolic accounts.”
3. Same; because the Report mistakenly included several attacks which as not
related to the Marawi City siege.
4. There is no factual basis considering that the President acted alone and did not
consult the military establishment or ay ranking official before making the
proclamation.
5. The Declaration lacks factual basis because the military has suppressed the ASG
and the Maute Group’s plan to take over Marawi.

Cullamat Petition

1. Seeks the nullification of the Proclamation No. 216 for being unconstitutional
because it lacks sufficient factual basis that there is rebellion in Mindanao and
that public safety warrants it declaration.
2. It also assails the inclusion of the phrase “other rebel groups” because it is vague
and breeds confusion.

Mohamad Petition
 1. Martial law should be a measure of last resort and should only be invoked by the
President only after exhaustion of less severe remedies.

ISSUES:

1. W/N the petitions are the “appropriate proceeding” to invoke the mode of
review of this Court when a Declaration and Suspension are promulgated; (YES)
2. W/N the President in declaring martial law and the suspension of the privilege of
writ of habeas corpus:
a. is required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in his appreciation
of facts;
b. is required to obtain the favorable recommendation thereon the Secretary
of ND;
c. is required to take into account only the situation at the time of the
proclamation, even if subsequent events prove the situation to not have
been accurately reported;
3. W/N the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of factual basis for the
Declaration and Suspension independent of the actual actions taken by Congress
jointly and separately;
4. W/N there were sufficient factual basis for the Declaration and Suspension
5. W/N the exercise of the power of judicial review by this Court involves the
calibration of graduated powers granted the President a Commander-in-Chief,
namely Calling Out powers, suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, and declaration of martial law;
6. W/N Proclamation No. 216 may be considered vague and thus null and void;
7. W/N the armed hostilities mentioned in the Report are sufficient bases:
a. for existence of rebellion
b. for declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus
8. W//N Terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism are equivalent to actual
rebellion;
9. W/N Nullifying the Proclamation will:
a. have the effect of recalling Proclamation No. 55 S. 2016
b. also nullify the acts of the President in calling out armed forces to quell
the violence in Marawi

RULING:

1. The Court agrees that its jurisdiction is sui generis.

2. The President does not have to factually correct, but he should have a sufficient
basis to declare. He also doesn’t need the recommendation of anyone because it’s
his power to declare. The subsequent events do not have an effect on the
declaration.
3. The Court holds that it can simultaneously exercise its power of review,
independently from the Congress.
4. The Court cannot impede on the decision of the President because it is within his
power to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
 corpus provided that the prerequisites were met. The Court (and Congress), can
rule on the declaration even during the time period of Martial Law.
5. The Proclamation No. 216 cannot be tested using the Void-for-Vagueness ruling.
This can only be expressed for free speech cases which does not include the said
declaration.
6. The nullification of the Proclamation will NOT …
7. In sum, the Court’s power to review is limited to the determination of whether
the President in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus had sufficient factual basis.
8. The parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows: 1)
actual rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the first two
requirements must concur; and 3) there is probable cause for the President to
believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion.
9. There is no credence to petitioners’ claim that the bases for the President’s
imposition of martial law and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus were mostly
inaccurate, simulated, false and/or hyperbolic.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS sufficient factual bases for the issuance of Proclamation
No. 216 and DECLARES it as CONSTITUTIONAL. Accordingly, the consolidated
Petitions are hereby DISMISSED.

DOCTRINE

The Calling Out Powers, Suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
and the Declaration of Martial Law are among the extraordinary powers vested upon
the President. It is within his power to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus provided that there is an existing invasion or rebellion, and that
the public safety requires it. He may also Call Out the Armed Forces and Philippine
National Police independently from the decision to declare martial law or suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
 LAGMAN vs PIMENTEL III

GR No. 235935, 236061, 236145

February 6, 2018

Issue:

Can the Petitioners invoke the expanded jurisdiction of the SC (Sec. 1, Art. VIII of
Constitution) in seeking review of the extension of Proclamation no. 216.

Position of Petitioners:

Petitioners question the manner that the Congress approved the extension of martial
law in Mindanao and characterized the same as done with undue haste. Petitioners
premised their argument on the fact that the Joint Rules adopted by both Houses, in
regard to the President's request for further extension.

Petitioners argue that given its critical role in the system of checks and balance, the
Court should review not only the sufficiency of the factual basis of the re-extension but
also its accuracy. They assert that the standard for scrutiny for the present petitions is
sufficiency of factual basis, not grave abuse of discretion. The former is, by
constitutional design, a stricter scrutiny as opposed to the latter. Moreover, the Court is
allowed to look into facts presented before it during the pendency of the litigation. This
includes, for example, admissions made by the Solicitor General and the military during
oral arguments, as they attempted to show compliance with the constitutional
requirements. Petitioners insist that clear and convincing evidence is necessary to
establish sufficient factual basis for the extension of martial law instead of the
"probable cause" standard set in Lagman. In comparison to the initial exercise of the
extraordinary powers of proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, their extension must have had the benefit of
sufficient time to gather additional information not only on the factual situation of an
actual rebellion, but also the initial exercise of the Executive during its initial
implementation.

Position of the Respondent:

The invocation of this Court's expanded jurisdiction under Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution is misplaced. As held in Lagman, the "appropriate proceeding" in Section
18, Article VII does not refer to a petition for certiorari filed under Section 1 or 5 of
Article VIII, as it is not the proper tool to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the proclamation or extension.

Ruling of the Court:

The Court reiterated their earlier ruling in Lagman case where they emphasized that the
Court’s jurisdiction under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII (is special and
specific, different from those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII. It was
further stressed therein that the standard of review in a petition for certiorari is whether
the respondent has committed any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in the performance of his or her functions, whereas under Section
18, Article VII, the Court is tasked to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
President’s exercise of emergency powers.

Hence, the Court concluded that a petition for certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section
5 of Article VIII is not the proper tool to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.

The Court added that to apply the standard of review in a petition for certiorari will
emasculate the Court’s constitutional task under Section 18, Article VII, which was
precisely meant to provide an additional safeguard against possible martial law abuse
and limit the extent of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief.

Finally, the Court held that a certiorari petition invoking the Court’s expanded
jurisdiction is not the proper remedy to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
Congress’ extension of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of
the writ.
 Saguisag v. Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa Jr.

G.R. No. 212444

January 12, 2016

Facts:

 EDCA or Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement is an agreement between

the Philippines and America wherein it authorizes the U.S. military forces to
have access to and conduct activities within certain "Agreed Locations" in the
country.
 After eight rounds of negotiations for two years, the Secretary of National
Defense and the U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines signed the agreement on 28
April 2014. President Benigno S. Aquino III ratified EDCA on 6 June 2014. It was
not transmitted to the Senate on the executive's understanding that to do so was
no longer necessary.
 Senators file Senate Resolution No. (SR) 105.91. The resolution expresses the
"strong sense" of the Senators that for EDCA to become valid and effective, it
must first be transmitted to the Senate for deliberation and concurrence

Issues:

1. Whether the President may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military

bases, troops, or facilities.

2. Whether the provisions under EDCA are consistent with the Constitution, as

well as with existing laws and treaties.

Held: Petition DISMISSED.

1. EDCA is constitutional in its arrangement as an executive agreement.

2. It remains consistent with existing laws and treaties that it purports to

implement.

Rationale

 The manner of the President's execution of the law, even if not expressly granted
by the law, is justified by necessity and limited only by law, since the President
must "take necessary and proper steps to carry into execution the law”. It is the
President's prerogative to do whatever is legal and necessary for Philippine
defense interests (commander-in-chief powers).
 EDCA is considered an executive agreement, therefore may be bound through
the President without the need of senatorial votes for its execution.
  The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity
of subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage.


TREATIES EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS

Formal documents which require Become binding through executive action
ratification with the approval of two- without the need of a vote by the Senate or by
thirds of the Senate Congress
International agreements involving International agreements
political issues or changes of national embodying adjustments of detail, carrying
policy and those involving out well established national policies and
agreements of a permanent character traditions and those involving arrangements
of a more or less temporary nature
Considered superior to executive Must remain traceable to an express or
agreements and is regarded as being on implied authorization under the Constitution,
the same level as a statute as they are statutes, or treaties
products of the acts of the Executive and
the Senate
If there is an irreconcilable conflict, a Cannot create new international obligations
later law or treaty takes precedence over that are not expressly allowed or reasonably
one that is prior implied in the law they purport to
implement. Once inconsistent with either a
law or a treaty are considered ineffective

 The term "international agreements" does not include the term "executive
agreements.
 EDCA increases the likelihood that, in an event requiring a defensive response,
the Philippines will be prepared alongside the U.S. to defend its islands and
insure its territorial integrity pursuant to a relationship built on previous treaties,
particularly the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951 (MDT) and Visiting Forces
Agreement of 1999 (VFA).
 Saguisag vs Executive Secretary
GR 212426 Jan 12, 2016

Facts:

Petitioners, as citizens, taxpayers and former legislators, questioned before the SC the
constitutionality of EDCA (Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement), an agreement
entered into by the executive department with the US and ratified on June 6, 2014.
Under the EDCA, the PH shall provide the US forces the access and use of portions of
PH territory, which are called Agreed Locations. Aside from the right to access and to
use the Agreed Locations, the US may undertake the following types of activities within
the Agreed Locations: security cooperation exercises; joint and combined training
activities; humanitarian and disaster relief activities; and such other activities that as
may be agreed upon by the parties.

Mainly, petitioners posit that the use of executive agreement as medium of agreement
with US violated the constitutional requirement of Art XVIII, Sec 25 since the EDCA
involves foreign military bases, troops and facilities whose entry into the country
should be covered by a treaty concurred in by the Senate. The Senate, through Senate
Resolution 105, also expressed its position that EDCA needs congressional ratification.

Issues:

1. W/N the petitions as “citizen’s suit” satisfy the requirements of legal standing in
assailing the constitutionality of EDCA
2. W/N the petitioners have legal standing as “taxpayers”
3. W/N the petitions qualify as “legislator’s suit”
4. W/N the SC may exercise its Power of Judicial Review over the case
5. W/N the non-submission of the EDCA agreement for concurrence by the Senate
violates the Constitution

Ruling:

1. No. In assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act, petitioners suing as

citizens may dodge the requirement of having to establish a direct and personal
interest if they show that the act affects a public right. But here, aside from
general statements that the petitions involve the protection of a public right, and
that their constitutional rights as citizens would be violated, the petitioners failed
to make any specific assertion of a particular public right that would be violated
by the enforcement of EDCA. For their failure to do so, the present petitions
cannot be considered by the Court as citizens’ suits that would justify a disregard
of the aforementioned requirements.
2. No. Petitioners cannot sue as taxpayers because EDCA is neither meant to be a
tax measure, nor is it directed at the disbursement of public funds.
 A taxpayer’s suit concerns a case in which the official act complained of directly
involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. Here,
those challenging the act must specifically show that they have sufficient interest
in preventing the illegal expenditure of public money, and that they will sustain
a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed act. Applying that
principle to this case, they must establish that EDCA involves the exercise by
Congress of its taxing or spending powers. A reading of the EDCA, however,
would show that there has been neither an appropriation nor an authorization of
disbursement.

3. No. The power to concur in a treaty or an international agreement is an

institutional prerogative granted by the Constitution to the Senate. In a
legislator’s suit, the injured party would be the Senate as an institution or any of
its incumbent members, as it is the Senate’s constitutional function that is
allegedly being violated. Here, none of the petitioners, who are former senators,
have the legal standing to maintain the suit.
4. Yes. Although petitioners lack legal standing, they raise matters
of transcendental importance which justify setting aside the rule on procedural
technicalities. The challenge raised here is rooted in the very Constitution itself,
particularly Art XVIII, Sec 25 thereof, which provides for a stricter mechanism
required before any foreign military bases, troops or facilities may be allowed in
the country. Such is of paramount public interest that the Court is behooved to
determine whether there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Executive Department.
5. No. The EDCA need not be submitted to the Senate for concurrence because it is
in the form of a mere executive agreement, not a treaty. Under the Constitution,
the President is empowered to enter into executive agreements on foreign
military bases, troops or facilities if (1) such agreement is not the instrument that
allows the entry of such and (2) if it merely aims to implement an existing law or
treaty.

EDCA is in the form of an executive agreement since it merely involves

“adjustments in detail” in the implementation of the MTD and the VFA. These
are existing treaties between the Philippines and the U.S. that have already been
concurred in by the Philippine Senate and have thereby met the requirements of
the Constitution under Art XVIII, Sec 25. Because of the status of these prior
agreements, EDCA need not be transmitted to the Senate.
 Kulayan v. Tan

G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012

Facts:

On 15 January 2009, members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) kidnapped three
members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in the vicinity of
the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu. Following the incident, Governor Tan of Sulu
organized the Sulu Crisis Management Committee, which included the forming of the
Civilian Emergency Force (CEF), a group of armed male civilians coming from different
municipalities, who were redeployed to surrounding areas of Patikul. The organization
of the CEF was embodied in a “Memorandum of Understanding” entered into between
three parties: the provincial government of Sulu; the AFP; and the PNP. The Whereas
clauses of the Memorandum alluded to the extraordinary situation in Sulu, and the
willingness of civilian supporters of the municipal mayors to offer their services in
order that “the early and safe rescue of the hostages may be achieved.”

On 31 March 2009, Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009

(Proclamation 1-09), declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. It cited the
kidnapping incident as a ground for the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act
pursuant to the Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows on the Provincial Governor the
power to carry out emergency measures during man-made and natural disasters and
calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to
suppress disorder and lawless violence. In the same Proclamation, Governor Tan called
upon the PNP and the CEF to set up checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general
search and seizures including arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure public
safety. Subsequently, a Guideline on the implementation of Proclamation 1-09 was
issued which included among others suspension of all Permits to Carry Firearms
Outside of Residence (PTCFORs) issued by the Chief of the PNP, and allowed civilians
to seek exemption from the gun ban only by applying to the Office of the Governor and
obtaining the appropriate identification cards. The said guidelines also allowed general
searches and seizures in designated checkpoints and chokepoints.

Petitioners, who are residents of Patikul, Sulu, filed this Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition.

Petitioners contend that Proclamation No. 1 and its Implementing Guidelines were
issued ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of
the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency
powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and commander-
in-chief of the armed forces. Additionally, petitioners claim that the Provincial
Governor is not authorized by any law to create civilian armed forces under his
command, nor regulate and limit the issuances of PTCFORs to his own private army.

Respondents deny that Proclamation 1-09 was issued ultra vires, as Governor Tan
allegedly acted pursuant to Sections 16 and 465 of the Local Government Code, which
empowers the Provincial Governor to carry out emergency measures during calamities
and disasters, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to
suppress disorder, riot, lawless violence, rebellion or sedition. Furthermore, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sulu authorized the declaration of a state of emergency
as evidenced by Resolution No. 4, Series of 2009 issued on 31 March 2009 during its
regular session.

Issue:

WON Section 465, in relation to Section 16, of the Local Government Code authorizes
the respondent governor to declare a state of emergency, and exercise the powers
enumerated under Proclamation 1-09, specifically the conduct of general searches and
seizures. Subsumed herein is the secondary question of whether or not the provincial
governor is similarly clothed with authority to convene the CEF under the said
provisions.

Ruling:

NO. Only the President is vested with calling-out powers, as the commander-in-chief of
the Republic. Springing from the well-entrenched constitutional precept of One
President is the notion that there are certain acts which, by their very nature, may only
be performed by the president as the Head of the State. One of these acts or
prerogatives is the bundle of Commander-in-Chief powers to which the “calling-out”
powers constitutes a portion.
 Alfredo Lim vs COMELEC and Joseph Estrada

GR 206666 Jan. 21,2015

Facts:

In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for the
crime of plunder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual
absolute disqualification. On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President
Estrada, explicitly stating that he is restored to his civil and political rights.

In 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President. None of
the disqualification cases against him prospered but he only placed second in the
results.

In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of
Candidacy, this time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of
Manila.

Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada before the
Comelec stating that Estrada is disqualified to run for public office because of his
conviction for plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with
perpetual absolute disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local
Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).

The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President Estrada’s
right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him
by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.

Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Alfredo Lim, who garnered
the second highest votes, intervened and sought to disqualify Estrada for the same
ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor of
Manila.

Issue:

May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office despite having been
convicted of the crime of plunder which carried an accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification to hold public office?

Ruling:
Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political
rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of
this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is
complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41
of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional
interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles
36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to and accepted by
former President Estrada does not actually specify which political right is restored, it
could be inferred that former President Arroyo did not deliberately intend to restore
former President Estrada’s rights of suffrage and to hold public office, orto otherwise
remit the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. Even if her intention was the
contrary, the same cannot be upheld based on the pardon’s text.