PART 8.

THE LAWYER’S DUTIES TO THE CLIENT

A. Learning Objectives
• To understand the nature of the attorney-client relationship,
its attendant roles and
responsibilities, and its effects;
• To have a deeper understanding and appreciation of the
role of the lawyer as ethical
adviser, and the lawyer’s potential to influence the client’s
behavior, actions, and
decisions.

B. The Attorney-Client Relationship

Questions:

• What is the nature of the attorney-client relationship?

• When and how is the attorney-client relationship created? Why is it

important to know this?

• What are the lawyer’s responsibilities for the duration of the

attorney-client relationship? After the relationship is terminated?

Cases:
• Burbe v. Atty. Magulta, A.C. No. 99-634, June 10, 2002.
Facts: Petitioner Burbe engaged the services of the respondent to help him
recover a claim of money against a creditor. Respondent prepared demand
letters for the petitioner, which were not successful and so the former intimated
that a case should already be filed. As a result, petitioner paid the lawyer his fees
and also included amounts for the filing of the case.
A couple of months passed but the petitioner has not yet received any feedback
as to the status of his case. Petitioner made several follow-ups in the lawyer’s
office but to no avail. The lawyer, to prove that the case has already been filed
even invited petitioner to come with him to the Justice Hall to verify the status of
the case. Petitioner was made to wait for hours in the prosecutor’s office while
the lawyer allegedly went to the Clerk of Court to inquire about the case. The
lawyer went back to the petitioner with the news that the Clerk of Court was
absent that day.

Suspicious of the acts of the lawyer, petitioner personally went to the office of the
clerk of court to see for himself the status of his case. Petitioner found out that no
such case has been filed.

Petitioner confronted Atty. Magulta where he continued to lie to with the excuse
that the delay was being caused by the court personnel, and only when shown
the certification did he admit that he has not at all filed the complaint because he
had spent the money for the filing fee for his own purpose; and to appease
petitioner’s feelings, he offered to reimburse him by issuing two (2) checks,
postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and
P8,000.00, respectively.

Furthermore, respondent wants the Court to believe that no lawyer-client

relationship existed between him and complainant, because the latter never paid
him for services rendered. The former adds that he only drafted the said
documents as a personal favor for the kumpadre of one of his partners.

Issue: Whether or not there exists a lawyer-client relationship..

Held: Yes. A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first
moment complainant asked respondent for legal advice regarding the
former's business. To constitute professional employment, it is not essential
that the client employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It
is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it
material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which
his service had been sought.
If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a
lawyer with a view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the
attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the
professional employment is established.

Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close

personal relationship between the lawyer and the complainant or the
nonpayment of the former's fees. Hence, despite the fact that complainant was
kumpadre of a law partner of respondent, and that respondent dispensed legal
advice to complainant as a personal favor to the kumpadre, the lawyer was duty-
bound to file the complaint he had agreed to prepare -- and had actually
prepared -- at the soonest possible time, in order to protect the client's interest.
Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that lawyers
should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them.

This Court has likewise constantly held that once lawyers agree to take up the
cause of a client, they owe fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in them. They owe entire devotion to the
interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and the defense of the
client's rights, and the exertion of their utmost learning and abilities to the end
that nothing be taken or withheld from the client, save by the rules of law legally
applied.

Similarly unconvincing is the explanation of respondent that the receipt issued by

his office to complainant on January 4, 1999 was erroneous. The IBP Report
correctly noted that it was quite incredible for the office personnel of a law firm to
be prevailed upon by a client to issue a receipt erroneously indicating payment
for something else. Moreover, upon discovering the "mistake" -- if indeed it was
one -- respondent should have immediately taken steps to correct the error. He
should have lost no time in calling complainant's attention to the matter and
should have issued another receipt indicating the correct purpose of the
payment.

In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant -- as

evidenced by the receipt issued by the law office of respondent -- the latter also
violated the rule that lawyers must be scrupulously careful in handling money
entrusted to them in their professional capacity. Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility states that lawyers shall hold in trust all moneys of
their clients and properties that may come into their possession.

Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of
professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the
legal profession. It may be true that they have a lien upon the client's funds,
documents and other papers that have lawfully come into their possession; that
they may retain them until their lawful fees and disbursements have been paid;
and that they may apply such funds to the satisfaction of such fees and
disbursements. However, these considerations do not relieve them of their duty
to promptly account for the money they received. Their failure to do so
constitutes professional misconduct. In any event, they must still exert all effort to
protect their client's interest within the bounds of law.

DISPOSITION:.Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is found guilty of violating Rules 16.01

and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective
upon his receipt of this Decision. Let copies be furnished all courts as well as the
Office of the Bar Confidant, which is instructed to include a copy in respondent's
file

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2002/jun2002/ac_5713_2002.html

• Hadjula v. Atty. Madianda, A.C. No. 6711, July 3, 2007.

FACTS: Complainant Hadjula alleged that she and respondent Atty. Madianda
used to be friends as they both worked at the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP)
whereat respondent was the Chief Legal Officer while she was the Chief Nurse of
the Medical, Dental and Nursing Services. Complainant claimed that, sometime
in 1998, she approached respondent for some legal advice. Complainant further
alleged that, in the course of their conversation which was supposed to be kept
confidential, she disclosed personal secrets and produced copies of a marriage
contract, a birth certificate and a baptismal certificate, only to be informed later by
the respondent that she (respondent) would refer the matter to a lawyer friend. It
was malicious, so complainant states, of respondent to have refused handling
her case only after she had already heard her secrets.
Respondent denied giving legal advice to the complainant and dismissed any
suggestion about the existence of a lawyer-client relationship between them.
Respondent even further states that ther ILLICIT RELATIONSHIP of the
complainant and her illegal and unlawful activities are known in the Bureau of
Fire Protection since she also filed a CHILD SUPPORT case against her lover …
where she has a child …
Moreover,according to the respondent, the alleged DOCUMENTS that the
complainant purportedly have shown to her sometime in 1998, are all part of
public records ….

ISSUE: Whether or not the Atty. Madiana breached her duty of preserving the
confidence of a client and violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD: YES. Respondent was reprimanded and admonished.

RATIO: The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to

seek legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two.
Such relationship imposes upon the lawyer certain restrictions circumscribed by
the ethics of the profession. Among the burdens of the relationship is that which
enjoins the lawyer, respondent in this instance, to keep inviolate confidential
information acquired or revealed during legal consultations.

The seriousness of the respondent’s offense notwithstanding, the Supreme Court

feels that there is room for compassion, absent compelling evidence that the
respondent acted with ill-will. Without meaning to condone the error of
respondent’s ways, what at bottom is before the Court is two former friends
becoming bitter enemies and filing charges and counter-charges against each
other using whatever convenient tools and data were readily available.
Unfortunately, the personal information respondent gathered from her
conversation with complainant became handy in her quest to even the score. At
the end of the day, it appears clear to the Court that respondent was actuated by
the urge to retaliate without perhaps realizing that, in the process of giving vent to
a negative sentiment, she was violating the rule on confidentiality.

DISPOSITION: Atty. Roceles F. Madianda is hereby REPRIMANDED and

admonished to be circumspect in her handling of information acquired as a result
of a lawyer-client relationship. She is also STERNLY WARNED against a
repetition of the same or similar act complained of.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jul2007/ac_6711_2007.html

C. Service to the needy, defenseless, and

oppressed
1) Duty not to reject oppressed or defenseless

• Canon 2, Rules 2.01-2.02, CPR

Rule 2.01 - A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons, the cause of the
defenseless or the oppressed.

Rule 2.02 - In such cases, even if the lawyer does not accept a case, he shall not
refuse to render legal advice to the person concerned if only to the extent
necessary to safeguard the latter's rights.

• Rep. Act No. 10389, Recognizance Act of 2012

REPUBLIC ACT No. 10389

AN ACT INSTITUTIONALIZING RECOGNIZANCE AS A MODE OF GRANTING THE RELEASE

OF AN INDIGENT PERSON IN CUSTODY AS AN ACCUSED IN A CRIMINAL CASE AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:

Section 1. Short Title. – This Act shall be known as the "Recognizance Act of 2012″.

Section 2. Statement of Policy. – It is the declared policy of the State to promote social justice in all
phases of national development, including the promotion of restorative justice as a means to
address the problems confronting the criminal justice system such as protracted trials, prolonged
resolution of cases, lack of legal representation, lack of judges, inability to post bail bond, congestion
in jails, and lack of opportunity to reform and rehabilitate offenders. In consonance with the principle
of presumption of innocence, the 1987 Philippine Constitution recognizes and guarantees the right to
bail or to be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. In furtherance of this policy, the
right of persons, except those charged with crimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, to be released on recognizance before conviction by the Regional Trial Court,
irrespective of whether the case was originally filed in or appealed to it, upon compliance with the
requirements of this Act, is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
Section 3. Recognizance Defined. – Recognizance is a mode of securing the release of any person
in custody or detention for the commission of an offense who is unable to post bail due to abject
poverty. The court where the case of such person has been filed shall allow the release of the
accused on recognizance as provided herein, to the custody of a qualified member of the barangay,
city or municipality where the accused resides.

Section 4. Duty of the Courts. – For purposes of stability and uniformity, the courts shall use their
discretion, in determining whether an accused should be deemed an indigent even if the salary and
property requirements are not met. The courts may also consider the capacity of the accused to
support not just himself/herself but also his/her family or other people who are dependent on him/her
for support and subsistence.

Other relevant factors and conditions demonstrating the financial incapacity of the accused at the
time that he/she is facing charges in court may also be considered by the courts for the purpose of
covering as many individuals belonging to the marginalized and poor sectors of society.

Section 5. Release on Recognizance as a Matter of Right Guaranteed by the Constitution. – The

release on recognizance of any person in custody or detention for the commission of an offense is a
matter of right when the offense is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment:
Provided, That the accused or any person on behalf of the accused files the application for such:

(a) Before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities and Municipal Circuit Trial Court; and

(b) Before conviction by the Regional Trial Court: Provided, further, That a person in custody for a
period equal to or more than the minimum of the principal penalty prescribed for the offense
charged, without application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, or any modifying circumstance,
shall be released on the person’s recognizance.

Section 6. Requirements. – The competent court where a criminal case has been filed against a
person covered under this Act shall, upon motion, order the release of the detained person on
recognizance to a qualified custodian: Provided, That all of the following requirements are complied
with:

(a) A sworn declaration by the person in custody of his/her indigency or incapacity either to post a
cash bail or proffer any personal or real property acceptable as sufficient sureties for a bail bond;

(b) A certification issued by the head of the social welfare and development office of the municipality
or city where the accused actually resides, that the accused is indigent;

(c) The person in custody has been arraigned;

(d) The court has notified the city or municipal sanggunian where the accused resides of the
application for recognizance. The sanggunian shall include in its agenda the notice from the court
upon receipt and act on the request for comments or opposition to the application within ten (10)
days from receipt of the notice. The action of the sanggunian shall be in the form of a resolution, and
shall be duly approved by the mayor, and subject to the following conditions:

(1) Any motion for the adoption of a resolution for the purpose of this Act duly made before the
sanggunian shall he considered as an urgent matter and shall take precedence over any other
business thereof: Provided, That a special session shall be called to consider such proposed
resolution if necessary;
The resolution of the sanggunian shall include in its resolution a list of recommended organizations
from whose members the court may appoint a custodian.

(2) The presiding officer of the sanggunian shall ensure that its secretary shall submit any resolution
adopted under this Act within twenty-four (24) hours from its passage to the mayor who shall act on
it within the same period of time from receipt thereof;

(3) If the mayor or any person acting as such, pursuant to law, fails to act on the said resolution
within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt thereof, the same shall be deemed to have been acted
upon favorably by the mayor;

(4) If the mayor or any person acting as such, pursuant to law, disapproves the resolution, the
resolution shall be returned within twenty-four (24) hours from disapproval thereof to the sanggunian
presiding officer or secretary who shall be responsible in informing every member thereof that the
sanggunian shall meet in special session within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the veto for
the sole purpose of considering to override the veto made by the mayor.

For the purpose of this Act, the resolution of the sanggunian of the municipality or city shall be
considered final and not subject to the review of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, a copy of which
shall be forwarded to the trial court within three (3) days from date of resolution.

(e) The accused shall be properly documented, through such processes as, but not limited to,
photographic image reproduction of all sides of the face and fingerprinting: Provided, That the costs
involved for the purpose of this subsection shall be shouldered by the municipality or city that sought
the release of the accused as provided herein, chargeable to the mandatory five percent (5%)
calamity fund in its budget or to any other available fund in its treasury; and

(f) The court shall notify the public prosecutor of the date of hearing therefor within twenty-four (24)
hours from the filing of the application for release on recognizance in favor of the accused: Provided,
That such hearing shall be held not earlier than twenty-four (24) hours nor later than forty-eight (48)
hours from the receipt of notice by the prosecutor: Provided, further, That during said hearing, the
prosecutor shall be ready to submit the recommendations regarding the application made under this
Act, wherein no motion for postponement shall be entertained.

Section 7. Disqualifications for Release on Recognizance. – Any of the following circumstances

shall be a valid ground for the court to disqualify an accused from availing of the benefits provided
herein:

(a) The accused bad made untruthful statements in his/her sworn affidavit prescribed under Section
5(a);

(b) The accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, habitual delinquent, or has committed a crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(c) The accused had been found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence or has violated the conditions of bail or release on recognizance without valid justification;

(d) The accused had previously committed a crime while on probation, parole or under conditional
pardon;

(e) The personal circumstances of the accused or nature of the facts surrounding his/her case
indicate the probability of flight if released on recognizance;
(f) There is a great risk that the accused may commit another crime during the pendency of the case;
and

(g) The accused has a pending criminal case which has the same or higher penalty to the new crime
he/she is being accused of. 1âwphi1

Section 8. Qualifications of the Custodian of the Person Released on Recognizance. – Except in

cases of children in conflict with the law as provided under Republic Act No. 9344, the custodian of
the person released on recognizance must have the following qualifications:

(a) A person of good repute and probity;

(b) A resident of the barangay where the applicant resides;

(c) Must not be a relative of the applicant within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity; and

(d) Must belong to any of the following sectors and institutions: church, academe, social welfare,
health sector, cause-oriented groups, charitable organizations or organizations engaged in the
rehabilitation of offenders duly accredited by the local social welfare and development officer.

If no person in the barangay where the applicant resides belongs to any of the sectors and
institutions listed under paragraph (d) above, the custodian of the person released on recognizance
may be from the qualified residents of the city or municipality where the applicant resides.

Section 9. Duty of the Custodian. – The custodian shall undertake to guarantee the appearance of
the accused whenever required by the court. The custodian shall be required to execute an
undertaking before the court to produce the accused whenever required. The said undertaking shall
be part of the application for recognizance. The court shall duly notify, within a reasonable period of
time, the custodian whenever the presence of the accussed is required. A penalty of six (6) months
to two (2) years imprisonment shall be imposed upon the custodian who failed to deliver or produce
the accused before the court, upon due notice, without justifiable reason.

Section 10. Role of the Probation Officer. – Upon release of the person on recognizance to the
custodian, the court shall issue an order directing the Probation Office concerned to monitor and
evaluate the activities of such person. The Probation Office concerned shall submit a written report
containing its findings and recommendations on the activities of the person released on
recognizance on a monthly basis to determine whether or not the conditions for his/her release have
been complied with. The prosecution including the private complainant, if any, shall be given a copy
of such report.

Section 11. Arrest of a Person Released on Recognizance. – The court shall order the arrest of the
accused, who shall forthwith be placed under detention, due to any of the following circumstances:

(a) If it finds meritorious a manifestation made under oath by any person after a summary healing,
giving the accused an opportunity to be heard;

(b) If the accused fails to appear at the trial or whenever required by the abovementioned court or
any other competent court without justification, despite due notice;

(c) If the accused is the subject of a complaint for the commission of another offense involving moral
turpitude and the public prosecutor or the mayor in the area where the offense is committed
recommends the arrest to the court; or
(d) If it is shown that the accused committed an act of harassment such as, but not limited to,
stalking, intimidating or otherwise vexing private complainant, prosecutor or witnesses in the case
pending against the accused: Provided, That upon the issuance by the court of such order, the
accused shall likewise become the proper subject of a citizen’s arrest pursuant to the Rules of Court.

Section 12. No Release on Recognizance After Final Judgment or Commencement of Sentence;

Exception. – The benefits provided under this Act shall not be allowed in favor of an accused after
the judgment has become final or when the accused has started serving the sentence: Provided,
That this prohibition shall not apply to an accused who is entitled to the benefits of the Probation Law
if the application for probation is made before the convict starts serving the sentence imposed, in
which case, the court shall allow the release on recognizance of the convict to the custody of a
qualified member of the barangay, city or municipality where the accused actually resides.

Section 13. Separability Clause. – If any provision of this Act or the application of such provision to
any person or circumstance is declared invalid, the remainder of this Act or the application of such
provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected by such declaration.

Section 14. Repealing Clause. – All laws, decrees and orders or parts thereof inconsistent herewith
are deemed repealed or modified accordingly, unless the same are more beneficial to the accused.

Section 15. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official
Gazette or in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Approved,

2) Duty not to decline representation on account of status

• Canon 14, CPR

CANON 14 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT REFUSE HIS SERVICES TO THE
NEEDY.

• Rule 14.01, CPR

Rule 14.01 - A lawyer shall not decline to represent a person solely on account
of the latter's race, sex. creed or status of life, or because of his own opinion
regarding the guilt of said person.
• Mandatory Legal Aid Service for Practicing Lawyers, Bar Matter No.
2012 approved February 10, 2009 Page 15 of 20

3) Duty to serve as counsel de oficio

• Rule 14.02, CPR

Rule 14.02 - A lawyer shall not decline, except for serious and sufficient cause,
an appointment as counsel de officio or as amicus curiae, or a request from the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any of its chapters for rendition of free legal
aid.

• ROC Rule 138, Sec. 31

Section 31. Attorneys for destitute litigants. — A court may assign an attorney to render
professional aid free of charge to any party in a case, if upon investigation it appears that the
party is destitute and unable to employ an attorney, and that the services of counsel are
necessary to secure the ends of justice and to protect the rights of the party. It shall be the duty
of the attorney so assigned to render the required service, unless he is excused therefrom by
the court for sufficient cause shown.

• ROC Rule 138, Sec. 20 (h)

Section 20. Duties of attorneys. — It is the duty of an attorney:
(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the
defenseless or oppressed;

• ROC Rule 116, Sec. 6-8

Sec. 6. Duty of court to inform accused of his right to counsel. – Before
arraignment, the court shall inform the accused of his right to counsel and ask
him if he desires to have one. Unless the accused is allowed to defend himself in
person or has employed counsel of his choice, the court must assign a counsel
de officio to defend him.

Sec. 7. Appointment of counsel de officio. – The court, considering the gravity

of the offense and the difficulty of the questions that may arise, shall appoint as
counsel de officio such members of the bar in good standing who, by reason of
their experience and ability, can competently defend the accused. But in localities
where such members of the bar are not available, the court may appoint any
person, resident of the province and of good repute for probity and ability, to
defend the accused.
Sec. 8. Time for counsel de officio to prepare for arraignment. – Whenever a
counsel de office is appointed by the court to defend the accused at the
arraignment, he shall be given a reasonable time to consult with the accused as
to his plea before proceeding with the arraignment.

• ROC Rule 124, Sec. 2

Sec. 2. Appointment of counsel de officio for the accused. – If it appears
from the record of the case as transmitted that (a) the accused is confined in
prison, (b) is without counsel de parte on appeal, or (c) has signed the notice of
appeal himself, ask the clerk of court of the Court of Appeals shall designate a
counsel de officio.

• P.D. No. 543

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 543 August 21, 1974

AUTHORIZING THE DESIGNATION OF MUNICIPAL JUDGES AND

LAWYERS IN ANY BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE TO ACT AS
COUNSEL DE OFICIO FOR THE ACCUSED WHO ARE INDIGENT IN PLACES
WHERE THERE ARE NO AVAILABLE PRACTICING ATTORNEYS

WHEREAS, under existing law, Municipal Judges and other lawyers in the
government service are prohibited from practicing law;

WHEREAS, there are some places where there are no available legal
practitioners, as a result of which the trial of cases in court is delayed to the
prejudice particularly of detention prisoners;

WHEREAS, for the protection of the rights of the accused who cannot afford to
hire lawyers from other places and to prevent miscarriage of justice, it is
necessary that they be provided with counsel;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines,

by virtue of the powers in me vested by the Constitution as commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081,
dated September 21, 1972, and General Order No. 1, dated September 22,
1972, as amended, do hereby order and decree as follows:

Section 1. Designation of Municipal Judges and lawyers in any branch of the

government service, as counsel de oficio. In places where there are no available
practicing lawyers, the District Judge or Circuit Criminal Court Judge shall
designate a municipal judge or a lawyer employed in any branch, subdivision or
instrumentality of the government within the province, as counsel de oficio for an
indigent person who is facing a criminal charge before his court, and the services
of such counsel de oficio shall be duly compensated by the Government in
accordance with Section thirty-two, Rule One Hundred Thirty Eight of the Rules
of Court.

If the criminal case wherein the services of a counsel de oficio are needed is
pending before a City or municipal court, the city or municipal judge concerned
shall immediately recommend to the nearest District Judge the appointment of a
counsel de oficio, and the District Judge shall forthwith appoint one in
accordance with the preceding paragraph.

For purposes of this Decree an indigent person is anyone who has no visible
means of support or whose income does not exceed P300 per month or whose
income even in excess of P300 is insufficient for the subsistence of his family,
which fact shall be determined by the Judge in whose court the case is pending,
taking into account the number of the members of his family dependent upon him
for subsistence.

Section 2. Repealing Clause. All laws and decrees inconsistent with this Decree
are hereby repealed.

Section 3. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect immediately.

DONE in the City of Manila, this 21st day of August, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and seventy-four.

• Ledesma v. Climaco, G.R. No. 23815, June 28, 1974

FACTS: Atty. Ledesma was the counsel de parte of one of the accused when he
was appointed as Election Registrar by the Commission on Elections. He then
filed a motion withdrawing as such, but Judge Climaco denied it and appointed
him as counsel de officio for the two defendants. Again, Atty. Ledesma filed a
motion to withdraw on the ground that his appointment requires full time, but the
Judge still denied it. Consequently, the defense obtained 8 postponements.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Ledesma should be allowed to withdraw as counsel

de officio considering his appointment as Election Registrar.

RULING: No. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, the
welfare of the accused could be prejudiced as stressed by Chief Justice Moran in
People v. Holgado in these words: ” Even the most intelligent or educated man
may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and;
without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he
does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily
to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to
be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a
constitutional right and it is so implemented that under rules of procedure it is not
enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is
not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is
essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and
he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.”

It has to be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. It could be that for some lawyers, especially the neophytes in the
profession, being appointed counsel de oficio is an irksome chore. However, the
admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that
there are times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes
precedence over the promptings of self-interest.

DISPOSITION: Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the

Bar in the defense of an accused. Such a consideration could have sufficed for
petitioner not being allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio. For he did betray
by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for the task entrusted to him, to put matters
mildly. He did point though to his responsibility as an election registrar. Assuming
his good faith, no such excuse could be availed now. There is not likely at
present, and in the immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his time. It may
likewise be assumed, considering what has been set forth above, that petitioner
would exert himself sufficiently to perform his task as defense counsel with
competence, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a
member of the profession in good standing. The admonition is ever timely for
those enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that there are times, and this is
one of them, when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the
promptings of self-interest.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against petitioner.

FULL TEXT:
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1974/jun1974/gr_l_23815_1974.html

• People v. Sta. Teresa, G.R. No. 130663, March 20, 2001

Facts: Angeles Sta. Teresa was found by the trial court to be guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of raping his 12-year old daughter, and was given the penalty
of death. The case is now on automatic review.

When accused was arraigned, he pleaded not guilty. After 9 days, his counsel
de oficio Atty. Adriano made a manifestation that the accused wanted to change
his plea of not guilty to a plea of “guilty.” The prosecution no longer presented
testimonial evidence and merely presented exhibits to which counsel de oficio did
not comment nor object. During the promulgation of RTC’s decision, counsel
failed to appear and the trial judge had to appoint another counsel de oficio for
the purpose of promulgation.

Issue: W/N counsel de officio discharged his duties properly

Held: NO.
● The abbreviated and aborted presentation of the prosecution evidence and
the improvident plea of guilty was not in accordance with requirements of
due process
● In People v. Bermas:
"x x x The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due
process which basically means that a person must be heard before being
condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a person's basic
rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed
perfunctorily.

"The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in
the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and
objections. The right to counsel means that the accused is amply accorded
legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause
for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active
involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the
case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his
 being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental
procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an
accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of
his sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an efficient and
truly decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory
representation."
● Using the above standard, the defense counsel's conduct falls short of the
commitment and zeal required of him as appellant's attorney. Barely nine
(9) days after appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charged, his
counsel de oficio made a manifestation in open court that his client is
changing his plea to that of "guilty
● Considering the gravity of the offense charged and the finality of the
penalty, we find Atty. Adriano's performance as counsel de oficio utterly
wanting. As a lawyer sworn to uphold justice and the law, he had the duty
to exert utmost efforts to defend his client and protect his rights, no matter
how guilty or evil he appears to be. This duty becomes more compelling if
his client is accused of a grave crime and is in danger of forfeiting his life if
he is convicted
● To buttress the lack of zeal shown in defending appellant, Atty. Adriano
failed to appear during the promulgation of the assailed RTC Decision. In
fact, the trial judge appointed another counsel de oficio, Atty. Bayani
Dalangin, for the purpose of promulgating the aforesaid Decision
● The right to counsel means more than just the presence of a lawyer in the
courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections.
Counsel must provide effective legal assistance and commit himself to the
cause for the defense. There must be active involvement by the lawyer
and he must be well-versed on the case, the procedures, law, and
jurisprudence.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the Decision dated May 28, 1997 of the Regional
Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 27, is hereby SET ASIDE and Criminal
Case No. 7411 is remanded to it for further proceedings, with all deliberate
speed, in accordance with this Decision.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2001/mar2001/gr_130663_2001.html

4) Valid grounds for refusal

• Rule 14.03, CPR

Rule 14.03 - A lawyer may not refuse to accept representation of an indigent
client unless:

(a) he is not in a position to carry out the work effectively or competently;

(b) he labors under a conflict of interest between him and the prospective client
or between a present client and the prospective client.

5) Same standard of conduct for paying and non-paying

clients

• Rule 14.04, CPR

Rule 14.04 - A lawyer who accepts the cause of a person unable to pay his
professional fees shall observe the same standard of conduct governing his
relations with paying clients.

• A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC, September 10, 2009 effective September 27,

2009
A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC August 28, 2009

RE: REQUEST OF NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID1 TO EXEMPT

LEGAL AID CLIENTS FROM PAYING FILING, DOCKET AND OTHER FEES.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

On September 23, 2008 the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) promulgated Resolution No. 24, series of 2008. 2 The
resolution requested the IBP’s National Committee on Legal Aid 3 (NCLA) to ask
for the exemption from the payment of filing, docket and other fees of clients of
the legal aid offices in the various IBP chapters. Resolution No. 24, series of
2008 provided:

RESOLUTION NO. 24, SERIES OF 2008

RESOLUTION OF THE IBP–MISAMIS ORIENTAL CHAPTER FOR

THE IBP NATIONAL LEGAL AID OFFICE TO REQUEST THE
COURTS AND OTHER QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES, THE PHILIPPINE
MEDIATION CENTER AND PROSECUTOR’S OFFICES TO
EXEMPT LEGAL AID CLIENTS FROM PAYING FILING, DOCKET
AND OTHER FEES INCIDENTAL TO THE FILING AND LITIGATION
OF ACTIONS, AS ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS OR ON APPEAL.

WHEREAS, Section 1, Article I of the Guidelines Governing the

Establishment and Operation of Legal Aid Offices in All Chapters of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (otherwise known as
["]Guideline[s] on Legal Aid["]) provides: Legal aid is not a matter of
charity. It is a means for the correction of social imbalances that may
often lead to injustice, for which reason, it is a public responsibility of
the Bar. The spirit of public service should therefore unde[r]ly all legal
aid offices. The same should be so administered as to give maximum
possible assistance to indigent and deserving members of the
community in all cases, matters and situations in which legal aid may
be necessary to forestall injustice.

WHEREAS, Section 2 of the same provides: In order to attain the

objectives of legal aid, legal aid office should be as close as possible
to those who are in need thereof – the masses. Hence, every chapter
of the IBP must establish and operate an adequate legal aid office.

WHEREAS, the Legal Aid Office of the IBP–Misamis Oriental Chapter

has long been operational, providing free legal services to numerous
indigent clients, through the chapter’s members who render volunteer
services in the spirit of public service;

WHEREAS, the courts, quasi-judicial bodies, the various mediation

centers and prosecutor’s offices are collecting fees, be they filing,
docket, motion, mediation or other fees in cases, be they original
proceedings or on appeal;

WHEREAS, IBP Legal Aid clients are qualified under the same
indigency and merit tests used by the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO),
and would have qualified for PAO assistance, but for reasons other
than indigency, are disqualified from availing of the services of the
PAO, like the existence of a conflict of interests or conflicting defenses,
and other similar causes;

WHEREAS, PAO clients are automatically exempt from the payment

of docket and other fees for cases, be they original proceedings or on
appeal, by virtue of the provisions of Section 16–D of R.A. 9406 (PAO
Law), without the need for the filing of any petition or motion to declare
them as pauper litigants;

WHEREAS, there is no similar provision in any substantive law or

procedural law giving IBP Legal Aid clients the same benefits or
privileges enjoyed by PAO clients with respect to the payment of
docket and other fees before the courts, quasi-judicial bodies and
prosecutor’s offices;

WHEREAS, the collection of docket and other fees from the IBP Legal
Aid clients poses an additional strain to their next to non-existent
finances;

WHEREAS, the quarterly allowance given by the National Legal Aid

Office to the IBP Misamis Oriental Chapter is insufficient to even cover
the incidental expenses of volunteer legal aid lawyers, much less
answer for the payment of docket and other fees collected by the
courts, quasi-judicial bodies and prosecutor’s offices and mediation
fees collected by the Philippine Mediation Center;

NOW THEREFORE, on motion of the Board of Officers of the IBP–

Misamis Oriental Chapter, be it resolved as it is hereby resolved, to
move the IBP National Legal Aid Office to make the necessary
requests or representations with the Supreme Court, the Philippine
Mediation Center, the Department of Justice and the National
Prosecution Service and other quasi-judicial agencies to effect the
grant of a like exemption from the payment of filing, docket and other
fees to the IBP Legal Aid clients as that enjoyed by PAO clients,
towards the end that IBP Legal Aid clients be automatically exempted
from the filing of the abovementioned fees;

RESOLVED FURTHER, that copies of this Resolution be furnished to

Supreme Court Chief Justice Honorable Reynato S. Puno, IBP
National President Feliciano M. Bautista, the IBP Board of Governors,
Secretary of Justice Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, the National Supervisor
of the Philippine Mediation Center, the National Labor Relations
Commission, the Civil Service Commission and other quasi-judicial
bodies and their local offices;

RESOLVED FINALLY to move the IBP Board of Governors and

National Officers to make the necessary representations with the
National Legislature and its members to effect the filing of a bill before
the House of Representatives and the Senate granting exemption to
IBP Legal Aid clients from the payment of docket, filing and or other
 fees in cases before the courts, quasi-judicial agencies and
prosecutor’s offices and the mediation centers.

Done this 23rd day of September 2008, Cagayan De Oro City.

Unanimously approved upon motion severally seconded.4

The Court noted Resolution No. 24, series of 2008 and required the IBP, through
the NCLA, to comment thereon.5

In a comment dated December 18, 2008,6 the IBP, through the NCLA, made the
following comments:

(a) Under Section 16-D of RA7 9406, clients of the Public Attorneys’ Office (PAO)
are exempt from the payment of docket and other fees incidental to the institution
of action in court and other quasi-judicial bodies. On the other hand, clients of
legal aid offices in the various IBP chapters do not enjoy the same exemption.
IBP’s indigent clients are advised to litigate as pauper litigants under Section 21,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court;

(b) They are further advised to submit documentary evidence to prove

compliance with the requirements under Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
i.e., certifications from the barangay and the Department of Social Welfare and
Development. However, not only does the process involve some expense which
indigent clients could ill-afford, clients also lack knowledge on how to go about
the tedious process of obtaining these documents;

(c) Although the IBP is given an annual legal aid subsidy, the amount it receives
from the government is barely enough to cover various operating expenses;8

(d) While each IBP local chapter is given a quarterly allocation (from the legal aid
subsidy),9 said allocation covers neither the incidental expenses defrayed by
legal aid lawyers in handling legal aid cases nor the payment of docket and other
fees collected by the courts, quasi-judicial bodies and the prosecutor’s office, as
well as mediation fees and

(e) Considering the aforementioned factors, a directive may be issued by the

Supreme Court granting IBP’s indigent clients an exemption from the payment of
docket and other fees similar to that given to PAO clients under Section 16-D of
RA 9406. In this connection, the Supreme Court previously issued a circular
exempting IBP clients from the payment of transcript of stenographic notes.10

At the outset, we laud the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the IBP for its effort to
help improve the administration of justice, particularly, the access to justice by
the poor. Its Resolution No. 24, series of 2008 in fact echoes one of the
noteworthy recommendations during the Forum on Increasing Access to Justice
spearheaded by the Court last year. In promulgating Resolution No. 24, the
Misamis Oriental Chapter of the IBP has effectively performed its duty to
"participate in the development of the legal system by initiating or supporting
efforts in law reform and in the administration of justice."11

We now move on to determine the merits of the request.

Access to Justice:

Making an Ideal a Reality

Access to justice by all, especially by the poor, is not simply an ideal in our
society. Its existence is essential in a democracy and in the rule of law. As such,
it is guaranteed by no less than the fundamental law:
Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate
legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.12
(emphasis supplied)

The Court recognizes the right of access to justice as the most important pillar of
legal empowerment of the marginalized sectors of our society.13 Among others, it
has exercised its power to "promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights"14 to open the doors of justice to the
underprivileged and to allow them to step inside the courts to be heard of their
plaints. In particular, indigent litigants are permitted under Section 21, Rule 3 15
and Section 19, Rule 14116 of the Rules of Court to bring suits in forma pauperis.

The IBP, pursuant to its general objectives to "improve the administration of

justice and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively,"17 assists the Court in providing the poor access to justice. In
particular, it renders free legal aid under the supervision of the NCLA.

A New Rule, a New Tool

for Access to Justice

Under the IBP’s Guidelines Governing the Establishment and Operation of Legal
Aid Offices in All Chapters of the IBP (Guidelines on Legal Aid), the combined
"means and merit tests" shall be used to determine the eligibility of an applicant
for legal aid:

ARTICLE VIII

TESTS
 SEC. 19. Combined tests. – The Chapter Legal Aid Committee or the
[NCLA], as the case may be, shall pass upon the request for legal aid
by the combined application of the means test and merit test, and the
consideration of other factors adverted to in the following sections.

SEC. 20. Means test. – The means test aims at determining whether
the applicant has no visible means of support or his income is
otherwise insufficient to provide the financial resources necessary to
engage competent private counsel owing to the demands for
subsistence of his family, considering the number of his dependents
and the conditions prevailing in the locality.

The means test shall not be applicable to applicants who fall under the
Developmental Legal Aid Program such as Overseas Filipino Workers,
fishermen, farmers, women and children and other disadvantaged
groups.

SEC. 21. Merit test. – The merit test seeks to ascertain whether or not
the applicant’s cause of action or his defense is valid and chances of
establishing the same appear reasonable.

SEC. 22. Other factors. – The effect of the Legal Aid Service or of the
failure to render the same upon the Rule of Law, the proper
administration of justice, the public interest involved in given cases and
the practice of law in the locality shall likewise be considered.

SEC. 23. Private practice. – Care shall be taken that the Legal aid is
not availed of to the detriment of the private practice of law, or taken
advantage of by anyone for personal ends.

SEC. 24. Denial. – Legal aid may be denied to an applicant already

receiving adequate assistance from any source other than the
Integrated Bar.

The "means and merit tests" appear to be reasonable determinants of eligibility

for coverage under the legal aid program of the IBP. Nonetheless, they may be
improved to ensure that any exemption from the payment of legal fees that may
be granted to clients of the NCLA and the legal aid offices of the various IBP
chapters will really further the right of access to justice by the poor. This will
guarantee that the exemption will neither be abused nor trivialized. Towards this
end, the following shall be observed by the NCLA and the legal aid offices in IBP
chapters nationwide in accepting clients and handling cases for the said clients:

A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC (IRR): Re: Rule on the Exemption From the Payment of
Legal Fees of the Clients of the National Committee on Legal Aid and of the
Legal Aid Offices in the Local Chapters of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines

Rule on the Exemption From the Payment of Legal Fees of the Clients of
the National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) and of the Legal Aid Offices in
the Local Chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)

ARTICLE I

Purpose

Section 1. Purpose. – This Rule is issued for the purpose of enforcing the right of
free access to courts by the poor guaranteed under Section 11, Article III of the
Constitution. It is intended to increase the access to justice by the poor by
exempting from the payment of legal fees incidental to instituting an action in
court, as an original proceeding or on appeal, qualified indigent clients of the
NCLA and of the legal aid offices in local IBP chapters nationwide.

ARTICLE II

Definition of Terms

Section 1. Definition of important terms. – For purposes of this Rule and as used
herein, the following terms shall be understood to be how they are defined under
this Section:

(a) "Developmental legal aid" means the rendition of legal services in public
interest causes involving overseas workers, fisherfolk, farmers, laborers,
indigenous cultural communities, women, children and other disadvantaged
groups and marginalized sectors;

(b) "Disinterested person" refers to the punong barangay having jurisdiction over
the place where an applicant for legal aid or client of the NCLA or chapter legal
aid office resides;

(c) "Falsity" refers to any material misrepresentation of fact or any fraudulent,

deceitful, false, wrong or misleading statement in the application or affidavits
submitted to support it or the affidavit of a disinterested person required to be
submitted annually under this Rule which may substantially affect the
determination of the qualifications of the applicant or the client under the means
and merit tests;

(d) "Legal fees" refers to the legal fees imposed under Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court as a necessary incident of instituting an action in court either as an original
proceeding or on appeal. In particular, it includes filing or docket fees, appeal
fees, fees for issuance of provisional remedies, mediation fees, sheriff’s fees,
stenographer’s fees (that is fees for transcript of stenographic notes) and
commissioner’s fees;

(e) "Means test" refers to the set of criteria used to determine whether the
applicant is one who has no money or property sufficient and available for food,
shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family;

(f) "Merit test" refers to the ascertainment of whether the applicant’s cause of
action or his defense is valid and whether the chances of establishing the same
appear reasonable and

(g) "Representative" refers to the person authorized to file an application for legal
aid in behalf of the applicant when the said applicant is prevented by a
compelling reason from personally filing his application. As a rule, it refers to the
immediate family members of the applicant. However, it may include any of the
applicant’s relatives or any person or concerned citizen of sufficient discretion
who has first-hand knowledge of the personal circumstances of the applicant as
well as of the facts of the applicant’s case.

ARTICLE III

Coverage

Section 1. Persons qualified for exemption from payment of legal fees. – Persons
who shall enjoy the benefit of exemption from the payment of legal fees
incidental to instituting an action in court, as an original proceeding or on appeal,
granted under this Rule shall be limited only to clients of the NCLA and the
chapter legal aid offices.

The said clients shall refer to those indigents qualified to receive free legal aid
service from the NCLA and the chapter legal aid offices. Their qualifications shall
be determined based on the tests provided in this Rule.

Section 2. Persons not covered by the Rule. – The following shall be disqualified
from the coverage of this Rule. Nor may they be accepted as clients by the NCLA
and the chapter legal aid offices.

(a) Juridical persons; except in cases covered by developmental legal aid or

public interest causes involving juridical entities which are non-stock, non-profit
organizations, non-governmental organizations and people’s organizations
whose individual members will pass the means test provided in this Rule;

(b) Persons who do not pass the means and merit tests;

(c) Parties already represented by a counsel de parte;

(d) Owners or lessors of residential lands or buildings with respect to the filing of
collection or unlawful detainer suits against their tenants and

(e) Persons who have been clients of the NCLA or chapter legal aid office
previously in a case where the NCLA or chapter legal aid office withdrew its
representation because of a falsity in the application or in any of the affidavits
supporting the said application.

Section 3. Cases not covered by the Rule. – The NCLA and the chapter legal aid
offices shall not handle the following:

(a) Cases where conflicting interests will be represented by the NCLA and the
chapter legal aid offices and

(b) Prosecution of criminal cases in court.

ARTICLE IV

Tests of Indigency

Section 1. Tests for determining who may be clients of the NCLA and the legal
aid offices in local IBP chapters. – The NCLA or the chapter legal aid committee,
as the case may be, shall pass upon requests for legal aid by the combined
application of the means and merit tests and the consideration of other relevant
factors provided for in the following sections.

Section 2. Means test; exception. – (a) This test shall be based on the following
criteria: (i) the applicant and that of his immediate family must have a gross
monthly income that does not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum
wage of an employee in the place where the applicant resides and (ii) he does
not own real property with a fair market value as stated in the current tax
declaration of more than Three Hundred Thousand (₱300,000.00) Pesos.

In this connection, the applicant shall execute an affidavit of indigency (printed at

the back of the application form) stating that he and his immediate family do not
earn a gross income abovementioned, nor own any real property with the fair
value aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person
attesting to the truth of the applicant’s affidavit. The latest income tax return
and/or current tax declaration, if any, shall be attached to the applicant’s affidavit.

(b) The means test shall not be applicable to applicants who fall under the
developmental legal aid program such as overseas workers, fisherfolk, farmers,
laborers, indigenous cultural communities, women, children and other
disadvantaged groups.
Section 3. Merit test. – A case shall be considered meritorious if an assessment
of the law and evidence at hand discloses that the legal service will be in aid of
justice or in the furtherance thereof, taking into consideration the interests of the
party and those of society. A case fails this test if, after consideration of the law
and evidence presented by the applicant, it appears that it is intended merely to
harass or injure the opposite party or to work oppression or wrong.

Section 4. Other relevant factors that may be considered. – The effect of legal aid
or of the failure to render the same upon the rule of law, the proper administration
of justice, the public interest involved in a given case and the practice of law in
the locality shall likewise be considered.

ARTICLE V
Acceptance and Handling of Cases

Section 1. Procedure in accepting cases. – The following procedure shall be

observed in the acceptance of cases for purposes of this Rule:

(a) Filing of application – An application shall be made personally by the

applicant, unless there is a compelling reason which prevents him from doing so,
in which case his representative may apply for him. It shall adhere substantially
to the form made for that purpose. It shall be prepared and signed by the
applicant or, in proper cases, his duly authorized representative in at least three
copies.

Applications for legal aid shall be filed with the NCLA or with the chapter legal aid
committee.

The NCLA shall, as much as possible, concentrate on cases of paramount

importance or national impact.

Requests received by the IBP National Office shall be referred by the NCLA to
the proper chapter legal aid committee of the locality where the cases have to be
filed or are pending. The chapter president and the chairman of the chapter’s
legal aid committee shall be advised of such referral.

(b) Interview – The applicant shall be interviewed by a member of the chapter

legal aid committee or any chapter member authorized by the chapter legal aid
committee to determine the applicant’s qualifications based on the means and
merit tests and other relevant factors. He shall also be required to submit copies
of his latest income tax returns and/or current tax declaration, if available, and
execute an affidavit of indigency printed at the back of the application form with
the supporting affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of the
applicant’s affidavit.lawph!l
After the interview, the applicant shall be informed that he can follow up the
action on his application after five (5) working days.

(c) Action on the application – The chapter legal aid committee shall pass upon
every request for legal aid and submit its recommendation to the chapter board
of officers within three (3) working days after the interview of the applicant. The
basis of the recommendation shall be stated.

The chapter board of officers shall review and act on the recommendation of the
chapter legal aid committee within two (2) working days from receipt thereof;
Provided, however, that in urgent matters requiring prompt or immediate action,
the chapter’s executive director of legal aid or whoever performs his functions
may provisionally act on the application, subject to review by the chapter legal
aid committee and, thereafter, by the chapter board of officers.
The action of the chapter board of officers on the application shall be final.

(d) Cases which may be provisionally accepted. – In the following cases, the
NCLA or the chapter legal aid office, through the chapter’s executive director of
legal aid or whoever performs his functions may accept cases provisionally
pending verification of the applicant’s indigency and an evaluation of the merit of
his case.

(i) Where a warrant for the arrest of the applicant has been issued;

(ii) Where a pleading has to be filed immediately to avoid adverse effects to the
applicant;

(iii) Where an appeal has to be urgently perfected or a petition for certiorari,

prohibition or mandamus filed has to be filed immediately; and

(iv) Other similar urgent cases.

(e) Assignment of control number – Upon approval of the chapter board of

officers of a person’s application and the applicant is found to be qualified for
legal assistance, the case shall be assigned a control number. The numbering
shall be consecutive starting from January to December of every year. The
control number shall also indicate the region and the chapter handling the case.

Example:

Region18 Chapter Year Month Number

GM - Manila - 2009 - 03 - 099

(f) Issuance of a certification – After an application is approved and a control
number duly assigned, the chapter board of officers shall issue a certification that
the person (that is, the successful applicant) is a client of the NCLA or of the
chapter legal aid office. The certification shall bear the control number of the
case and shall state the name of the client and the nature of the judicial action
subject of the legal aid of the NCLA or the legal aid office of a local IBP chapter.

The certification shall be issued to the successful applicant free of charge.

Section 2. Assignment of cases. – After a case is given a control number, the

chapter board of officers shall refer it back to the chapter legal aid committee.
The chapter legal aid committee shall assign the case to any chapter member
who is willing to handle the case.
In case no chapter member has signified an intention to handle the case
voluntarily, the chapter legal aid committee shall refer the matter to the chapter
board of officers together with the names of at least three members who, in the
chapter legal aid committee’s discretion, may competently render legal aid on the
matter. The chapter board of officers shall appoint one chapter member from
among the list of names submitted by the chapter legal aid committee. The
chapter member chosen may not refuse the appointment except on the ground of
conflict of interest or other equally compelling grounds as provided in the Code of
Professional Responsibility,19 in which case the chapter board of officers shall
appoint his replacement from among the remaining names in the list previously
submitted by the chapter legal aid committee.

The chapter legal aid committee and the chapter board of officers shall take the
necessary measures to ensure that cases are well-distributed to chapter
members.

Section 3. Policies and guidelines in the acceptance and handling of cases. –

The following policies and guidelines shall be observed in the acceptance and
handling of cases:

(a) First come, first served – Where both the complainant/plaintiff/petitioner and
defendant/ respondent apply for legal aid and both are qualified, the first to seek
assistance shall be given preference.

(b) Avoidance of conflict of interest – Where acceptance of a case will give rise to
a conflict of interest on the part of the chapter legal aid office, the applicant shall
be duly informed and advised to seek the services of a private counsel or another
legal aid organization.

Where handling of the case will give rise to a conflict of interest on the part of the
chapter member assigned to the case, the client shall be duly informed and
advised about it. The handling lawyer shall also inform the chapter legal aid
committee so that another chapter member may be assigned to handle the case.
For purposes of choosing the substitute handling lawyer, the rule in the
immediately preceding section shall be observed.

(c) Legal aid is purely gratuitous and honorary – No member of the chapter or
member of the staff of the NCLA or chapter legal aid office shall directly or
indirectly demand or request from an applicant or client any compensation, gift or
present for legal aid services being applied for or rendered.

(d) Same standard of conduct and equal treatment – A chapter member who is
tasked to handle a case accepted by the NCLA or by the chapter legal aid office
shall observe the same standard of conduct governing his relations with paying
clients. He shall treat the client of the NCLA or of the chapter legal aid office and
the said client’s case in a manner that is equal and similar to his treatment of a
paying client and his case.

(e) Falsity in the application or in the affidavits – Any falsity in the application or in
the affidavit of indigency or in the affidavit of a disinterested person shall be
sufficient cause for the NCLA or chapter legal aid office to withdraw or terminate
the legal aid. For this purpose, the chapter board of officers shall authorize the
handling lawyer to file the proper manifestation of withdrawal of appearance of
the chapter legal aid office in the case with a motion for the dismissal of the
complaint or action of the erring client. The court, after hearing, shall approve the
withdrawal of appearance and grant the motion, without prejudice to whatever
criminal liability may have been incurred.

Violation of this policy shall disqualify the erring client from availing of the
benefits of this Rule in the future.

(f) Statement in the initiatory pleading – To avail of the benefits of the Rule, the
initiatory pleading shall state as an essential preliminary allegation that (i) the
party initiating the action is a client of the NCLA or of the chapter legal aid office
and therefore entitled to exemption from the payment of legal fees under this
Rule and (ii) a certified true copy of the certification issued pursuant to Section
1(e), of this Article is attached or annexed to the pleading.

Failure to make the statement shall be a ground for the dismissal of the action
without prejudice to its refiling.

The same rule shall apply in case the client, through the NCLA or chapter legal
aid office, files an appeal.
(g) Attachment of certification in initiatory pleading – A certified true copy of the
certification issued pursuant to Section 1(e), of this Article shall be attached as
an annex to the initiatory pleading.

Failure to attach a certified true copy of the said certification shall be a ground for
the dismissal of the action without prejudice to its refiling.

The same rule shall apply in case the client, through the NCLA or chapter legal
aid office, files an appeal.

(h) Signing of pleadings – All complaints, petitions, answers, replies, memoranda

and other important pleadings or motions to be filed in courts shall be signed by
the handling lawyer and co-signed by the chairperson or a member of the
chapter legal aid committee, or in urgent cases, by the executive director of legal
aid or whoever performs his functions.

Ordinary motions such as motions for extension of time to file a pleading or for
postponement of hearing and manifestations may be signed by the handling
lawyer alone.

(i) Motions for extension of time or for postponement – The filing of motions for
extension of time to file a pleading or for postponement of hearing shall be
avoided as much as possible as they cause delay to the case and prolong the
proceedings.

(j) Transfer of cases – Transfer of cases from one handling lawyer to another
shall be affected only upon approval of the chapter legal aid committee.

Section 4. Decision to appeal. – (a) All appeals must be made on the request of
the client himself. For this purpose, the client shall be made to fill up a request to
appeal.

(b) Only meritorious cases shall be appealed. If the handling lawyer, in

consultation with the chapter legal aid committee, finds that there is no merit to
the appeal, the client should be immediately informed thereof in writing and the
record of the case turned over to him, under proper receipt. If the client insists on
appealing the case, the lawyer handling the case should perfect the appeal
before turning over the records of the case to him.

Section 5. Protection of private practice. – Utmost care shall be taken to ensure

that legal aid is neither availed of to the detriment of the private practice of law
nor taken advantage of by anyone for purely personal ends.

ARTICLE VI

Withdrawal of Legal Aid and Termination of Exemption

Section 1. Withdrawal of legal aid. – The NCLA or the chapter legal aid
committee may, in justifiable instances as provided in the next Section, direct the
handling lawyer to withdraw representation of a client’s cause upon approval of
the IBP Board of Governors (in the case of the NCLA) or of the chapter board of
officers (in the case of the chapter legal aid committee) and through a proper
motion filed in Court.

Section 2. Grounds for withdrawal of legal aid. – Withdrawal may be warranted in

the following situations:

(a) In a case that has been provisionally accepted, where it is subsequently

ascertained that the client is not qualified for legal aid;

(b) Where the client’s income or resources improve and he no longer qualifies for
continued assistance based on the means test. For this purpose, on or before
January 15 every year, the client shall submit an affidavit of a disinterested
person stating that the client and his immediate family do not earn a gross
income mentioned in Section 2, Article V, nor own any real property with the fair
market value mentioned in the same Section;

(c) When it is shown or found that the client committed a falsity in the application
or in the affidavits submitted to support the application;

(d) When the client subsequently engages a de parte counsel or is provided with
a de oficio counsel;

(e) When, despite proper advice from the handling lawyer, the client cannot be
refrained from doing things which the lawyer himself ought not do under the
ethics of the legal profession, particularly with reference to their conduct towards
courts, judicial officers, witnesses and litigants, or the client insists on having
control of the trial, theory of the case, or strategy in procedure which would tend
to result in incalculable harm to the interests of the client;

(f) When, despite notice from the handling lawyer, the client does not cooperate
or coordinate with the handling lawyer to the prejudice of the proper and effective
rendition of legal aid such as when the client fails to provide documents
necessary to support his case or unreasonably fails to attend hearings when his
presence thereat is required; and

(g) When it becomes apparent that the representation of the client’s cause will
result in a representation of conflicting interests, as where the adverse party had
previously engaged the services of the NCLA or of the chapter legal aid office
and the subject matter of the litigation is directly related to the services previously
rendered to the adverse party.
Section 3. Effect of withdrawal. – The court, after hearing, shall allow the NCLA
or the chapter legal aid office to withdraw if it is satisfied that the ground for such
withdrawal exists.

Except when the withdrawal is based on paragraphs (b), (d) and (g) of the
immediately preceding Section, the court shall also order the dismissal of the
case. Such dismissal is without prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have
been incurred if the withdrawal is based on paragraph (c) of the immediately
preceding Section.

ARTICLE VII

Miscellaneous Provisions

Section 1. Lien on favorable judgment. – The amount of the docket and other
lawful fees which the client was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any
judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless the court
otherwise provides.

In case, attorney’s fees have been awarded to the client, the same shall belong
to the NCLA or to the chapter legal aid office that rendered the legal aid, as the
case may be. It shall form part of a special fund which shall be exclusively used
to support the legal aid program of the NCLA or the chapter legal aid office. In
this connection, the chapter board of officers shall report the receipt of attorney’s
fees pursuant to this Section to the NCLA within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof. The NCLA shall, in turn, include the data on attorney’s fees received by
IBP chapters pursuant to this Section in its liquidation report for the annual
subsidy for legal aid.1awphi1

Section 2. Duty of NCLA to prepare forms. – The NCLA shall prepare the
standard forms to be used in connection with this Rule. In particular, the NCLA
shall prepare the following standard forms: the application form, the affidavit of
indigency, the supporting affidavit of a disinterested person, the affidavit of a
disinterested person required to be submitted annually under Section 2(b), Article
VI, the certification issued by the NCLA or the chapter board of officers under
Section 1(f), Article V and the request to appeal.

The said forms, except the certification, shall be in Filipino. Within sixty (60) days
from receipt of the forms from the NCLA, the chapter legal aid offices shall make
translations of the said forms in the dominant dialect used in their respective
localities.

Section 3. Effect of Rule on right to bring suits in forma pauperis. – Nothing in

this Rule shall be considered to preclude those persons not covered either by
this Rule or by the exemption from the payment of legal fees granted to clients of
the Public Attorney’s Office under Section 16-D of RA 9406 to litigate in forma
pauperis under Section 21, Rule 3 and Section 19 Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court.

Section 4. Compliance with Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service. – Legal aid
service rendered by a lawyer under this Rule either as a handling lawyer or as an
interviewer of applicants under Section 1(b), Article IV hereof shall be credited for
purposes of compliance with the Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service.

The chairperson of the chapter legal aid office shall issue the certificate similar to
that issued by the Clerk of Court in Section 5(b) of the Rule on Mandatory Legal
Aid Service.

ARTICLE VIII
Effectivity

Section 1. Effectivity. – This Rule shall become effective after fifteen days
following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

The above rule, in conjunction with Section 21, Rule 3 and Section 19, Rule 141
of the Rules of Court, the Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service and the Rule of
Procedure for Small Claims Cases, shall form a solid base of rules upon which
the right of access to courts by the poor shall be implemented. With these rules,
we equip the poor with the tools to effectively, efficiently and easily enforce their
rights in the judicial system.

A Final Word

Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Where there is a right, there must be a remedy. The remedy must not only be
effective and efficient, but also readily accessible. For a remedy that is
inaccessible is no remedy at all.

The Constitution guarantees the rights of the poor to free access to the courts
and to adequate legal assistance. The legal aid service rendered by the NCLA
and legal aid offices of IBP chapters nationwide addresses only the right to
adequate legal assistance. Recipients of the service of the NCLA and legal aid
offices of IBP chapters may enjoy free access to courts by exempting them from
the payment of fees assessed in connection with the filing of a complaint or
action in court. With these twin initiatives, the guarantee of Section 11, Article III
of Constitution is advanced and access to justice is increased by bridging a
significant gap and removing a major roadblock.
WHEREFORE, the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines is hereby COMMENDED for helping increase the access to justice by
the poor. The request of the Misamis Oriental Chapter for the exemption from the
payment of filing, docket and other fees of the clients of the legal aid offices of
the various IBP chapters is GRANTED. The Rule on the Exemption From the
Payment of Legal Fees of the Clients of the National Committee on Legal Aid
(NCLA) and of the Legal Aid Offices in the Local Chapters of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) (which shall be assigned the docket number A.M. No. 08-
11-7-SC [IRR] provided in this resolution is hereby APPROVED. In this
connection, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to cause the publication of the said
rule in a newspaper of general circulation within five days from the promulgation
of this resolution.

The Office of the Court Administrator is hereby directed to promptly issue a

circular to inform all courts in the Philippines of the import of this resolution.

SO ORDERED.

• Rep. Act No. 6033

REPUBLIC ACT No. 6033

AN ACT REQUIRING COURTS TO GIVE PREFERENCE TO CRIMINAL

CASES WHERE THE PARTY OR PARTIES INVOLVE ARE INDIGENTS.

Section 1. Any provision of existing law to be contrary notwithstanding and with

the exception of habeas corpus and election cases and cases involving detention
prisoners, and persons covered by Republic Act Numbered Four thousand nine
hundred eight, all courts shall give preference to the hearing and/or disposition of
criminal cases where an indigent is involved either as the offended party or
accused. The trial in these cases shall commence within three days from date of
arraignment and no postponement of the hearings shall be granted except on the
ground of illness of the accused or other similar justifiable grounds. City and
provincial fiscals and courts shall forthwith conduct the preliminary investigation
of a criminal case involving an indigent within three days after its filing and shall
terminate the same within two weeks.

Section 2. As used in this Act, the term "indigent" shall refer to a person who has
no visible means of income or whose income is insufficient for the subsistence of
his family, to be determined by the fiscal or judge, taking into account the
members of his family dependent upon him for subsistence.
Section 3. An indigent who is the offended party, respondent or an accused in a
criminal case and who desires to avail of the preference granted under this Act
shall file a sworn statement of the fact of his being indigent and the said sworn
statement shall be sufficient basis for the court or fiscal to give preference to the
trial and disposition of such criminal case.

Section 4. Any willful or malicious refusal on the part of any fiscal or judge to
carry out the provisions of this Act shall constitute sufficient ground for
disciplinary action which may include suspension or removal.

Section 5. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

• Rep. Act No. 6034

REPUBLIC ACT No. 6034

AN ACT PROVIDING TRANSPORTATION AND OTHER ALLOWANCES FOR

INDIGENT LITIGANTS.

Section 1. Any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, any

indigent litigant may, upon motion, ask the Court for adequate travel allowance to
enable him and his indigent witnesses to attendant the hearing of a criminal case
commenced by his complaint or filed against him. The allowance shall cover
actual transportation expenses by the cheapest means from his place of
residence to the court and back. When the hearing of the case requires the
presence of the indigent litigant and/or his indigent witnesses in court the whole
day or for two or more consecutive days, allowances may, in the discretion of the
Court, also cover reasonable expenses for meal and lodging.
For the purpose of this Act, indigent litigants shall include anyone who has no
visible means of income or whose income is insufficient for his family as
determined by the Court under Section 2, hereof.

Section 2. If the court determines that the petition for transportation allowance is
meritorious, said court shall immediately issue an order directing the provincial,
city or municipal treasurer to pay the indigent litigant the travel allowance out of
any funds in his possession and proceed without delay to the trial of the case.
The provincial, city or municipal treasurer shall hold any such payments as cash
items until reimbursed by the national government.

Section 3. All payments of travel allowances made by provincial, city and

municipal treasurer under this Act as of October 31 each year, shall be
transmitted to the Commissioner of the Budget not later than November 30 each
year for inclusion in the annual General Appropriations Act. The necessary sum
is hereby authorized to be appropriated out of the funds in the National Treasury
not otherwise appropriated.

Section 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

• Rep. Act No. 6035

REPUBLIC ACT No. 6035

AN ACT REQUIRING STENOGRAPHERS TO GIVE FREE TRANSCRIPT OF

NOTES TO INDIGENT AND LOW INCOME LITIGANTS AND PROVIDING A
PENALTY FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF.

Section 1. A stenographer who has attended a hearing before an investigating

fiscal or trial judge or hearing commissioner of any quasi-judicial body or
administrative tribunal and has officially taken notes of the proceeding thereof
shall, upon written request of an indigent or low income litigant, his counsel or
duly authorized representative in the case concerned, give within a reasonable
period to be determined by the fiscal, judge, commissioner or tribunal hearing the
case, a free certified transcript of notes take by him on the case.

Section 2. A litigant who desires to avail himself of the privilege granted under
Section one hereof shall, at the investigation, hearing, or trial, establish his status
as an indigent or low income litigant and the investigating fiscal or judge or
commissioner or tribunal hearing the case shall resolve the same in the same
proceeding.

For the purpose of this Act, an "indigent or low income litigant" shall include
anyone who has no visible means of support or whose income does not exceed
P300 per month or whose income even in excess of P300 per month is
insufficient for the subsistence of his family, which fact shall be determined by the
investigating fiscal or trial judge or commissioner or tribunal hearing the case
taking into account the number of the members of his family dependent upon him
for subsistence.

Section 3. Any stenographer who, after due hearing in accordance with the
pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 2260, as amended, has been found to
have violated the provisions of Section one of this Act or has unreasonable
delayed the giving of a free certified transcript of notes to an indigent or low
income litigant shall be subject to the following disciplinary actions:
(a) suspension from office for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days upon finding
of guilt for the first time;

(b) suspension from office for not less than thirty (30) days and not more than
sixty (60) days upon finding of guilt for the second time; and

(c) removal from office upon finding of guilt for the third time.

Section 4. This Act shall apply to all indigent or low income litigants who, at the
time of its approval, have pending cases in any fiscal office, court, or quasi-
judicial body or administrative tribunal.

Section 5. The Department of Justice shall prescribe such rules and regulations
as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act, and the Department
Head concerned shall provide the necessary supplies and authorize the use of
government equipment by the stenographers concerned.

Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

• Rep. Act No. 6036

REPUBLIC ACT No. 6036

AN ACT PROVIDING THAT BAIL SHALL NOT, WITH CERTAIN

EXCEPTIONS, BE REQUIRED IN CASES OF VIOLATIONS OF MUNICIPAL
OR CITY ORDINANCES AND IN CRIMINAL OFFENSES WHEN THE
PRESCRIBED PENALTY FOR SUCH OFFENSES IS NOT HIGHER THAN
ARRESTO MAYOR AND/OR A FINE OF TWO THOUSAND PESOS OR BOTH.
Section 1. Any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, bail shall
not be required of a person charged with violation of a municipal or city
ordinance, a light felony and/or a criminal offense the prescribed penalty for
which is not higher than six months imprisonment and/or a fine of two thousand
pesos, or both, where said person has established to the satisfaction of the court
or any other appropriate authority hearing his case that he is unable to post the
required cash or bail bond, except in the following cases:

(a) When he is caught committing the offense in flagranti;

(b) When he confesses to the commission of the offense unless the confession is
later repudiated by him in a sworn statement or in open court as having been
extracted through force or intimidation;
(c) When he is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or jumped bail;

(d) When he is found to have previously violated the provisions of Section 2

hereof;

(e) When he is found to be a recidivist or a habitual delinquent or has been

previously convicted for an offense to which the law or ordinance attaches an
equal or greater penalty or for two or more offenses to which it attaches a lighter
penalty;

(f) When he commits the offense while on parole or under conditional pardon;
and

(g) When the accused has previously been pardoned by the municipal or city
mayor for violation of municipal or city ordinance for at least two times.

Section 2. Instead of bail, the person charged with any offense contemplated by
Section 1 hereof shall be required to sign in the presence of two witnesses of
good standing in the community a sworn statement binding himself, pending final
decision of his case, to report to the Clerk of the Court hearing his case
periodically every two weeks. The Court may, in its discretion and with the
consent of the person charged, require further that he be placed under the
custody and subject to the authority of a responsible citizen in the community
who may be willing to accept the responsibility. In such a case the affidavit herein
mentioned shall include a statement of the person charged that he binds himself
to accept the authority of the citizen so appointed by the Court. The Clerk of
Court shall immediately report the presence of the accused person to the Court.
Except when his failure to report is for justifiable reasons including circumstances
beyond his control to be determined by the Court, any violation of this sworn
statement shall justify the Court to order his immediate arrest unless he files bail
in the amount forthwith fixed by the Court.

Section 3. This Act shall apply to all person who, at the time of its approval, are
under temporary detention for inability to post bail for charges contemplated by
Section 1 above.

Section 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

• Rep. Act No. 9406 (2007), Sec. 16-D

D. Fidelity to client's cause

(1) Duty of fidelity to the client's cause

• CPR Canon 17
CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT
AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED
IN HIM.

• Angalan vs. Delante, 578 SCRA 113 (2009)

FACTS: In april 1971, herein complainants mortgaged 8.102 hectares of their
property to the Eustaquio spouses in consideration of a loan in the amount of
P15,000. The Eustaqios prepared a document and sked the complainants to sign
it; but because complainants were illiterates, they affixed their marks instead. It
turned out that the document was a deed of absolute sale and not a real estate
mortgage. Hence, TCT No. 9926 was issued in the name of Navarro Eustaquio.

Complainants engaged the services of respondent Atty. Leonido Delante in

November 1970 as shown in the receipt by respondent of P12,000 representing
full payment of his professional fees from the complainants. Thereafter, an
amicable settlement was entered into between complainants and the Eustaquios
which stipulated that the complainants would repurchase the lot at P30,000. But
since the complainants did not have the money, Atty. Delante advanced the
money to complainants, possessed the property and gathered its produce.

When the complainants tried to repay the money and recover the property, Atty.
Delante refused. Complainants learned that Delante transferred the title of the
property to his name as evidenced by TCT No. T-57932.

On April 30, 204, complainants filed with the RTC of Davao a complaint for (1)
nullification of the deed of absolute sale, and (2) nullification of TCT No. T-57932;
and on December 28, 2005 charged respondent with gross violation of the Code
Professional Responsibility. In April 2007, complainants filed with the Court a
motion to withdraw the complaint for disbarment and an affidavit of desistance.

ISSUES:

(1.) whether or not a motion to withdraw the complaint for disbarment and an
affidavit of desistance terminates the disbarment proceeding;

(2.) whether or not respondent committed grave violation of the Code of

Professional Responsibility when he bought the property of his clients without
their consent and against their will.

HELD:

A motion to withdraw the complaint for disbarment and an affidavit of desistance

is immaterial. Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court states that, “No
investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance,
settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of charges, or failure of the
complainant to prosecute the same.”

Respondent violated Canons 16 and 17 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility. Canon 16 states that lawyers shall hold in trust all properties of
their clients that may come into their possession. Respondent should have held
in trust TCT No. T-9926 and returned the property to complainants upon
demand. Instead of holding in trust the property of complainants, respondent (1)
transferred the title of the property to his name, (2) refused to return the property
to complainants, and (3) referred to complainants’ charges as malicious and
untruthful.

Canon 17 states that lawyers shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in them. Respondent should have been mindful of the trust and
confidence complainants reposed in him. Complainants allege that they are
illiterate and that the Spouses Eustaquio took advantage of them. Complainants
engaged the services of respondent in the hope that he would help them recover
their property. Instead of protecting the interests of complainants, respondent
took advantage of complainants and transferred the title of the property to his
name.

Considering the depravity of respondent’s offense, the Court finds the

recommended penalty too light. Violation of Canons 16 and 17 constitutes gross
misconduct. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Court
for gross misconduct.

A person who takes the 8.102-hectare property of his illiterate clients and who is
incapable of telling the truth is unfit to be a lawyer.

The Court finds Atty. Leonido C. Delante GUILTY of violating Canons 16 and 17
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court DISBARS him
from the practice of law and ORDERS that his name be stricken from the Roll
of Attorneys.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Leonido C. Delante GUILTY

of violating Canons 16 and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, the Court DISBARS him from the practice of law and ORDERS
that his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/feb2009/ac_7181_2009.html

• Quilban v. Robinol
FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/apr1989/am_2144_1989.html

• Cantiller vs. Potenciano, 180 SCRA 246 (1989)

Facts: Humberto V. Potenciano is a practicing lawyer and a member of the
Philippine Bar under Roll No. 21862. He is charged with deceit, fraud, and
misrepresentation, and also with gross misconduct, malpractice and of acts
unbecoming of an officer of the court.

An action for ejectment was filed against Peregrina Cantiller. The court issued a
decision against the latter. A notice to vacate was then issued against Cantiller.
Cantiller then asked the respondent to handle their case. The complainant was
made to sign by respondent what she described as a “[h]astily prepared, poorly
conceived, and haphazardly composed petition for annulment of judgment”.

The petition was filed with the Regional Trial Court in Pasig, Manila. Respondent
demanded from the complainant P l,000.00 as attorney’s fee. However the judge
of the said court asked the respondent to withdraw as counsel by reason of their
friendship.

Later, Cantiller paid Potenciano P2,000.00 as demanded by the latter which was
allegedly needed to be paid to another judge who will issue the restraining order
but eventually Potenciano did not succeed in locating the judge.

Complainant paid P 10,000.00 to Potenciano by virtue of the demand of the

latter. The amount was allegedly to be deposited with the Treasurer’s Office of
Pasig as purchase price of the apartment and P 1,000.00 to cover the expenses
of the suit needed in order for the complainant to retain the possession of the
property. But later on Cantiller found out that the amounts were not necessary to
be paid. A demand was made against Potenciano but the latter did not answer
and the amounts were not returned.

Contrary to Potenciano’s promise that he would secure a restraining order, he

withdrew his appearance as counsel for complainant. Complainant was not able
to get another lawyer as replacement. Hence, the order to vacate was eventually
enforced and executed.

Issue: Whether or not Potenciano breached his duties as counsel of Cantiller.

Held: When a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he thereby covenants that he will
exert all effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion. The failure to exercise
due diligence or the abandonment of a client’s cause makes such lawyer
unworthy of the trust which the client had reposed on him. The acts of
respondent in this case violate the most elementary principles of professional
ethics.

The Court finds that respondent failed to exercise due diligence in protecting his
client’s interests. Respondent had knowledge beforehand that he would be asked
by the presiding judge to withdraw his appearance as counsel by reason of their
friendship. Despite such prior knowledge, respondent took no steps to find a
replacement nor did he inform complainant of this fact.

Lawyers should be fair, honest, respectable, above suspicion and beyond

reproach in dealing with their clients. The profession is not synonymous with an
ordinary business proposition. It is a matter of public interest.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, after considering the entirety of the

circumstances present in this case, this Court finds Atty. Humberto V. Potenciano
to be guilty of the charges against him and hereby SUSPENDS him from the
practice of law for an indefinite period until such time he can demonstrate that he
has rehabilitated himself as to deserve to resume the practice of law.

Finally, respondent is hereby ordered to return to complainant herein the sum of

eleven thousand pesos (P11,000.00) with legal interest from the date of this
resolution until it is actually returned.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/dec1989/am_3195_1989.html

• In re Maquera, 435 SCRA 417 (2004)
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, Atty. Leon G. Maquera is required to SHOW
CAUSE, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution, why he should
not be suspended or disbarred for his acts which gave rise to the disciplinary
proceedings against him in the Superior Court of Guam and his subsequent
suspension in said jurisdiction.

The Bar Confidant is directed to locate the current and correct address of Atty.
Maquera in Guam and to serve upon him a copy of this Resolution.

In the meantime, Atty. Maquera is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
ONE (1) YEAR or until he shall have paid his membership dues, whichever
comes later.
FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/jul2004/bm_793_2004.html

• Mattus v. Villaseca, A.C. No. 7922, October 1, 2013

FACTS: The complainant, German Bernardo D. Mattus and Dexter Aligan were
the accused in a case for estafa thru falsification of public document. The
complainant and her husband, German, engaged the services of Atty. Villaseca
to represent them in the proceedings. The complainant maintained that she and
German were convicted due to Atty. Villaseca’s gross and inexcusable
negligence in performing his duties as their counsel.

In her complaint-affidavit, the complainant alleged, among others, that Atty.

Villaseca: (1) was often absent during court hearings but still collected
appearance fees; (2) frequently sought the postponement of trial when he was
present; (3) failed to ask the RTC to direct a National Bureau of Investigation
expert to examine the signatures of the spouses Leslie and Zuraida Porter2 in
the special power of attorney (SPA); (4) failed to file a demurrer to evidence
despite having been granted sufficient time by the RTC to submit one; (5) failed
to present evidence on behalf of the defense, and only filed a memorandum; (6)
did not inform her and German of the dates of the presentation of defense
evidence and the promulgation of judgment; and (7) erroneously indicated the
wrong case number in the notice of appeal. According to the complainant, Atty.
Villaseca’s negligence in handling the case resulted in her own and her
husband’s conviction.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty Villaseca showed an uttered disregard of his clients’
cause. YES

RULING: The court increased Atty. Villaseca’s period of suspension from the
practice of law from one (1) year (recommended by the IBP) to five (5) years.

A lawyer "is expected to exert his best efforts and ability to preserve his client's
cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his client likewise serves the ends
of justice." Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer
owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him. He owes entire devotion to the interest of the client,
warm zeal in maintenance and defense of his client’s rights, and the exertion of
his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from
his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. A lawyer who performs his
duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also
serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect
of the community to the legal profession.

Atty. Villaseca’s failure to submit a demurrer to evidence to explain such

omission constitutes inexcusable negligence; it showed his lack of devotion and
zeal in preserving his clients’ cause. We point out that nine months had lapsed
from the time the RTC granted Atty. Villaseca 20 days to file the demurrer to the
time it ruled that he was deemed to have waived his right to file this pleading.
Clearly, Atty. Villaseca’s actuations violated Rule 12.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which states that "a lawyer shall not, after
obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the
period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his
failure to do so."

The Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to
the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him." It further mandates that "a lawyer shall serve his client
with competence and diligence." It also states that "a lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable."

Atty. Villaseca’s failure to present any testimonial, object or documentary

evidence for the defense reveals his lack of diligence in performing his duties as
an officer of the Court; it showed his indifference towards the cause of his clients.
Considering that the liberty and livelihood of his clients were at stake, Atty.
Villaseca should have exerted efforts tore but the presented prosecution
evidence. He could have presented the complainant and/or her husband to the
witness stand, instead of just opting to file a memorandum. Or, at the very least,
the reason for this move should have been fully explained to the clients, and later
to the IBP and to this Court. But no such explanation ever came. We are thus left
with the stark reality that Atty. Villaseca failed to file, despite the promise made to
the lower court, a demurrer to evidence. After failing in this first line of defense for
his clients, it should have been incumbent upon Atty. Villaseca to present
evidence for the defense, but again, he unexplainably failed to do this, leaving
the lower court with no evidence to appreciate except that of the prosecution, to
the detriment of his clients’ cause.
Atty. Villaseca’s negligence in the present case had much graver implications, as
the legal matter entrusted to him involved not merely money or property, but the
very liberty and livelihood of his clients. When Atty. Villaseca agreed to handle
the complainant’s criminal case, he became duty-bound to serve his clients with
competence and diligence, and to champion their cause with whole-hearted
fidelity. By failing to afford his clients every remedy and defense that is
authorized by the law, Atty. Villaseca fell short of what is expected of him as an
officer of the Court. We cannot overstress the duty of a lawyer to uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.

All told, Atty. Villaseca showed a wanton and utter disregard to his clients’ cause;
his failure to exercise due diligence in attending to their interest in the criminal
case caused them grave prejudice. Under the circumstances, the court found a
five-year suspension from the practice of law to be a sufficient and appropriate
sanction against him. The increased penalty serves the purpose of protecting the
interest of the Court, the legal profession and the public.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE premises considered, we find Atty. Albert T.

Villaseca guilty of negligence, in violation of Rules 12.03 and 18.03 and Canon
17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for five (5) years, effective upon his receipt of this Decision,
and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be
dealt with more severely.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/oct2013/ac_7922_2013.html

(2) Duty to give candid, honest advice on merits and
prospects of case

• CPR Rule 15.05: Candid, honest advice on prospects of case

• Rule 7, Sec. 3, Rules of Court

• Lopez v. Aquino, G.R. No. L-28078, April 29, 1971

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is ordered dismissed and petitioner's
counsel shall pay treble costs. The writ of preliminary injunction issued of
November 7, 1967 is hereby dissolved and upon promulgation of this decision,
respondent may proceed immediately with the enforcement and execution by the
intestate court of the appellate court's judgment of January 20, 1967, in his favor.
This decision shall be noted in the personal record of the counsel for petitioner
and of their associate attorney, Teodoro P. Regino, who signed and verified the
petition. So ordered.
FULL TEXT: G.R. No. L-28078 (lawphil.net)

• Gillego v. Diaz, G.R. No. L-27428, May 29, 1971

"The circumstances surrounding this litigation definitely prove that appeal is
frivolous and a plain trick to delay payment and prolong litigation unnecessarily.
Such attitude deserves severe condemnation, wasting as it does, the time that
the courts could well devote to meritorious cases." In Lopez vs. Aquino
promulgated last month, the Court exhorted counsel that "the cooperation of
litigants and their attorneys is needed so that needless clogging of the court
dockets with umneritorious cases may be avoided. There must be more faithful
adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of Court which provides that 'the
signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is
good ground to support it; and that it is interposed for delay' and expressly
admonishes that 'for a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to
disciplinary action'."
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed and
petitioner's counsel shall pay treble costs in both instances.
FULL TEXT: G.R. No. L-27428 (lawphil.net)
• Canon 8, Canons of Professional Ethics Page 16 of 20

(3) Duty to discourage litigation and settle controversies

outside of court whenever possible

• CPR Rule 1.03: Not encourage any suit or proceeding

• Saburnido vs. Madrono, G.R. AC No. 4497, Sept. 26, 2001 - DONE
DISPOSITION:WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Florante E. Madroño is found
GUILTY of gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
one year with a WARNING that a repetition the same or similar act will be dealt
with more severely. Respondent's suspension is effective upon his receipt of
notice of this decision. Let notice of this decision be spread in respondent's
record as an attorney in this Court, and notice of the same served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all the courts concerned.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2001/sep2001/ac_4497_2001.html

• CPR Rule 1.04

• CPR Rule 15.04

• Castaneda vs. Ago, 65 SCRA 505 (1975) - DONE

DISPOSITION: ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals under
review is set aside. Civil case Q-7986 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal is
ordered dismissed, without prejudice to the re-filing of the petitioners'
counterclaim in a new and independent action. Treble costs are assessed
against the spouses Pastor Ago and Lourdes Yu Ago, which shall be paid by
their lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Luison. Let a copy of this decision be made a part of
the personal file of Atty. Luison in the custody of the Clerk of Court.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1975/jul1975/gr_l_28546_1975.html

• ADR Act of 2004, Rep. Act No. 9285, Chapters 1 & 2

(4) Duty to serve client with competence and diligence

• CPR Canon 18

• Tejano v. Baterina, A.C. No. 8235, January 27, 2015

FACTS: Joselito Tejano charged Judge Dominador Arguelada and his lawyer,
Benjamin Baterina for allegedly acting in conspiracy with one another to take
possession of his family’s property. According to him, he filed a case for recovery
of possession and damages in Civil Case No. 4046-V against the Province of
Ilocos Sur when the latter built an access road traversing their property without
instituting an expropriation proceeding.

The case was raffled to Branch 21 of the Vigan City RTC in October 1988. Prior
to his appointment to the court, Judge Arguelada was the prosecutor in Branch
21 and represented the province of Ilocos Sur. In his affidavit, Tejano alleged that
the judge and Atty. Baterina colluded with each other in the former’s bid to take
over his family’s property, as shown by the fact that the judge was collecting
rentals from the squatters in the property. With respect to Atty. Baterina, Tejano
alleged that the latter miserably failed to advance his cause. Specifically, Tejano
alleged that Atty. Baterina:

1) failed to object when the judge waived their right to present evidence after
several postponements of the hearing, despite the fact that his mother was ill at
the hospital;

2) manifested in open court that he would file a motion for reconsideration of the
order, but did not file the same;

3) manifested in open court that he would not be presenting any more witnesses
without consulting them; and

4) failed to file his formal offer of exhibits despite order from the court.

Since the OCA had no jurisdiction to hear the case against Baterina, the latter
referred the case to the Court, which required Baterina to file his Comment. In his
Compliance after the court required him to show cause why he should not be
held liable for failing to file his comment, Baterina explained that he is
recuperating from a kidney ailment; he explained that the reason he could not
attend the case was that in 2002, he was suspended from the practice of law for
two years, which fact he made known to Tejano mother and sister. Even so, the
trial court did not appoint a lawyer for the plaintiff, and proceeded to hear the
case without the plaintiff's lawyer. The culprit in Tejano predicament was the
displayed bias and undue conflict of interest of Judge Arguelada.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Baterina is guilty of gross Negligence

HELD: YES. The Code of Professional Responsibility governing the conduct of

lawyers, states:

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE

AND DILIGENCE.

xxxx

RULE 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

RULE 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case
and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.

Lawyers have a “fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their
clients,” and must act “in accordance with the values and norms of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.”When a
lawyer agrees to take up a client’s cause, he makes a commitment to exercise
due diligence in protecting the latter’s rights. Once a lawyer’s services are
engaged, “he is duty bound to serve his client with competence, and to attend to
his client’s cause with diligence, care and devotion regardless of whether he
accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.”” A lawyer’s acceptance to
take up a case “impliedly stipulates [that he will] carry it to its termination, that is,
until the case becomes final and executory.”Atty. Baterina’s duty to his clients did
not automatically cease with his suspension. At the very least, such suspension
gave him a concomitant responsibility to inform his clients that he would be
unable to attend to their case and advise them to retain another counsel. A
lawyer – even one suspended from practicing the profession – owes it to his
client to not “sit idly by and leave the rights of his client in a state of uncertainty.””
The client “should never be left groping in the dark” and instead must be
“adequately and fully informed about the developments in his case.”Atty. Baterina
practically abandoned this duty when he allowed the proceedings to run its
course without any effort to safeguard his clients’ welfare in the meantime. His
failure to file the required pleadings on his clients’ behalf constitutes gross
negligence in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and renders
him subject to disciplinary action.The penalties for a lawyer’s failure to file the
required brief or pleading range from warning, reprimand, fine, suspension, or in
grave cases, disbarment.

Further, Atty. Baterina’s reckless disregard for orders and directives of the courts
is unbecoming of a member of the Bar. His conduct has shown that he has little
respect for rules, court processes, and even for the Court’s disciplinary authority.
Not only did he fail to follow the trial court’s orders in his clients’ case, he even
disregarded court orders in his own disciplinary proceedings. Considering Atty.
Baterina’s medical condition at that time, a simple explanation to the Court would
have sufficed. Instead, however, he simply let the orders go unheeded,
neglecting his duty to the Court. Lawyers, as this Court has previously
emphasized, “are particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes
and are expected to stand foremost in complying with court directives being
themselves officers of the court.” As such, Atty. Baterina should “know that a
resolution of this Court is not a mere request but an order which should be
complied with promptly and completely.”

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, Atty. Benjamin F. Baterina is found GUILTY of

gross negligence. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for five (5) years.
He is also STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar offense
will be dealt with more severely.

FULL TEXT: https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2015januarydecisions.php?

id=2

• Llunar v. Ricafort, A.C. No. 6484, June 16, 2015

FACTS: In September, 2000, Adelita engaged the services of Atty. Romulo
Ricafort for the recovery of a parcel of land owned by the Banez family but which
was fraudulently registered to a different name. The lot was the subject of
foreclosure proceedings, hence, Adelita gave to Atty. Ricafort the amount of
P95,000.00 (partial redemption fee, as filing fees, and attorneys fees). Three
years later, complainant learned that Atty. Ricafort did not file any case with the
RTC of Legazpi City, hence, she demanded the return of P95,000.00. The latter
averred that there was a complaint for annulment of title filed against Ard
Cervantes, though not him, but by another lawyer. Thus, he was willing to refund
the amount less the P50,000.00 which he gave to Atty. Abitria. Adelita refused to
recognize the case filed by Atty. Abitria, insisting she did not hire him as counsel;
also, the complaint was filed three years late and the property cannot be
redeemed from the bank anymore.She also learned that Atty. Ricafort was
indefinitely suspended from the practice of law since 2002 in A.C. No. 5054, thus
she suspected it was the reason why another lawyer filed the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Ricafort should be held administratively liable

RULING: The respondent in this case committed several infractions making him
liable for grave misconduct. First, the respondent did not exert due diligence in
handling the complainant’s case. He failed to act promptly in redeeming the
complainant’s property within the period of redemption. What is worse is the
delay of three years before a complaint to recover the property was actually filed
in court. The respondent clearly dilly-dallied on the complainant’s case and
wasted precious time and opportunity that were then readily available to recover
the complainant’s property. Under these facts, the respondent violated Rule
18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which states that “a
lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him liable.”

Second, the respondent failed to return, upon demand, the amounts given to him
by the complainant for handling the latter’s case. On three separate occasions,
the respondent received from the complainant the amounts of P19,000.00,
P70,000.00, and P6,500.00 for purposes of redeeming the mortgaged property
from the bank and filing the necessary civil case/s against Ard Cervantes. The
complainant approached the respondent several times thereafter to follow up on
the case/s to be filed supposedly by the respondent who, in turn, reassured her
that actions on her case had been taken.

After the complainant discovered three years later that the respondent had not
filed any case in court, she demanded that the respondent return the amount of
P95,000.00, but her demand was left unheeded. The respondent later promised
to pay her, but until now, no payment of any amount has been made. These facts
confirm that the respondent violated Canon 16 of the CPR, which mandates
every lawyer to “hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that
may come into his possession”1 and to “account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client.” 2 In addition, a lawyer’s failure to
return upon demand the funds or property he holds for his client gives rise to the
presumption that he has appropriated these funds or property for his own use to
the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. 3

Third, the respondent committed dishonesty by not being forthright with the
complainant that he was under indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
The respondent should have disclosed this fact at the time he was approached
by the complainant for his services. Canon 15 of the CPR states that “a lawyer
shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his clients.” The respondent lacked the candor expected of
him as a member of the Bar when he accepted the complainant’s case despite
knowing that he could not and should not practice law.

Lastly, the respondent was effectively in the practice of law despite the indefinite
suspension imposed on him. This infraction infinitely aggravates the offenses he
committed. Based on the above facts alone, the penalty of suspension for five (5)
years from the practice of law would have been justified, but the respondent is
not an ordinary violator of the profession’s ethical rules; he is a repeat violator of
these rules.

DISPOSITION: The respondent is found guilty of Grave Misconduct in his

dealings with his client and in engaging in the practice of law while under
indefinite suspension, and thus impose upon him the ultimate penalty of
DISBARMENT.
FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/jun2015/ac_6484_2015.html

• Rule 18.01
Rule 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which he knows or
should know that he is not qualified to render. However, he may render such
service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a
lawyer who is competent on the matter.

• Rule 18.02
Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation.

• Rule 18.03: Not to neglect legal matters

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

• Legarda vs. CA, 209 SCRA 722 (1992)

TOPIC: AUHTORITY TO APPEAR, AUTHORITY TO BIND CLIENTS,
COMPENSATION, ATTY’S LIEN

“It should be remembered that the moment a lawyer takes a client's cause; he
covenants that he will exert all effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion. A
lawyer who fails to exercise due diligence or abandons his client's cause makes
him unworthy of the trust reposed on him by the latter.”

Ponente: PER CURIAM (By the Court as a Whole), 1992

FACTS:

Legarda was the defendant in a case where private respondent, New Cathay
House compels her to sign the lease agreement in order to operate a restaurant
therein. After hearing, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the Court.
After which, Atty. Coronel entered his appearance as counsel for the petitioner.
Petitioner failed to file her answer within the extended period granted by the
court. Upon motion by Private Respondent, she was declared in default, thereby
paving the way for the presentation of evidence ex parte (without notice to or
argument from the adverse party).Lower Court rendered a decision by default in
which damages were charged against petitioner. No appeal was made by the
respondent thus, the decision became final, and upon motion of respondent, a
writ of execution was ordered. Petitioner’s property was levied and sold at public
auction. The one-year redemption period has expired, in which, a final deed of
sale was issued by the Sheriff.Petitioner with new counsel filed a petition for the
annulment of the decision before the Court of Appeals. However, it was through
Atty. Coronel that they filed a consolidated comment in which they alleged that
she was deceived by a representative of New Cathay House; which made her to
believe that the respondent would withdraw the file complaint against her, upon,
their agreement on the conditions of lease. This prompt her to advice her lawyer
not to file an answer to the complaint anymore. Court of Appeals dismissed the
Appeal pronouncing that, based on the facts; it is a case of simple neglect from
Petitioner’s Counsel who simply failed to answer on the defendants behalf.With
no further motion from the petitioner and her counsel, the Court of Appeals’
decision became final. Petitioner was then ordered to vacate her property.
Legarda with a new counsel sought relief (petition for Certiorari) in the Supreme
Court alleging, among others, that she was deprived of proper representation in
court and divested her of property through the gross negligence of her previous
counsel, Atty. Coronel. Supreme Court found merit in petitioner’s motion and
ordered the annulment of all the decisions rendered by the lower court. It also
ordered Atty. Coronel to show cause why he should not be held administratively
liable for his acts and omissions which caused grave injustice to the petitioner.
Even after he was granted a 30 day extension, he failed to respond to the Court’s
order, and asked for another extension on the grounds that he was hospitalized.

DECISION:

Atty. Coronel's failure to exercise due diligence in protecting and attending to the
interest of his client caused the latter material prejudice. The Court held that the
facts of the case clearly showed that Atty. Coronel violated Canon 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which mandates that "A lawyer shall serve his
client with competence and diligence." He failed to observe particularly Rule
18.03 of the same Code which requires that "A lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable."

DISPOSITION: The second motion for extension of Atty. Coronel was denied,
and he was suspended for 6 months for gross negligence in the defense of
petitioner Legarda.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1991/mar1991/gr_94457_1991.html

• Endaya vs. Oca, 410 SCRA 344 (2003)
Facts:

A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed against Artemio Endaya and his
wife. An answer was prepared by Mr. Ramirez for the spouses. At the beginning
of the preliminary conference, spouses appeared without counsel. Endaya
sought the services of the Public Attorney’s Office. Atty. Oca was assigned to
handle the case. At the continuation of the prelim conference, Oca filed motion
for amendment of answer. Motion was denied. The judge then ordered all parties
to submit their affidavits and position papers. The court also said that 30 days
after the submission of the last paper or upon expiration of the period for filing,
judgment shall be rendered on the case. Oca failed to submit any affidavit or
position paper. Nonetheless, the complaint for unlawful detainer was dismissed
because those who filed the case were not really parties-in-interest. The case
was appealed to RTC. Oca failed to submit anything again. RTC reversed the
MTC decision. Spouses were ordered to vacate the property and pay a certain
amount for rentals. Endaya confronted Oca about the decision. Oca feigned that
he did not receive anything. Upon checking with the clerk of court, Oca did
indeed receive a copy of the decision. Hence this administrative complaint.

Issue:

W/N Oca committed professional misconduct

Held: YES.

In his comment, Oca put up the defense that he did not file any paper in the
MCTC because it would just be a repetition of the answer. Endaya filed his reply
which just reiterated what he put in his complaint. SC ordered Oca to file a
rejoinder. Guess what, Oca once again failed to file anything. Oca explained that
he failed to file a rejoinder because he believed in good faith that it was no longer
necessary. In the IBP investigation, Oca once again failed to submit anything.

Oca only appeared once in the MCTC and practically abandoned the spouses
thereafter. The facts show that Oca failed to employ every legal and honorable
means to advance the cause of his client. For intentionally failing to submit the
pleadings required by the court, respondent practically closed the door to the
possibility of putting up a fair fight for his client. Oca cannot just appear only once
for the spouses. A lawyer continues to be a counsel of record until the lawyer-
client relationship is terminated. Oca’s story shows his appalling indifference to
his clients’ cause, deplorable lack of respect for the courts and a brazen
disregard of his duties as a lawyer.
 However, Endaya misrepresented that the original answer was prepared by a
non-lawyer when in fact it was prepared by a lawyer. He also assured Oca that
he had strong evidence to support their case. Endaya never gave anything to
Oca to support their claim.The PAO is burdened with a heavy caseload. Given
these circumstances the professional conduct of Oca does not warrant
disbarment.

DISPOSITION: Respondent Atty. Wilfredo Oca is ordered SUSPENDED from

the practice of law for two (2) months from notice, with the warning that a
similar misconduct will be dealt with more severely.

FULL TEXT:
shttps://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2003/sep2003/
ac_3967.php

• Carandang vs. Obmina, A.C. No. 7813, April 21, 2009

FACTS:

Carandang lost in an eviction case. He confronted his counsel, Atty. Obmina, on

why he had not inform him about his case and for not appealing the same in the
higher court. Carandang claimed that if only his counsel inform him about his
case, his reglementary period to appeal the decision should not have been
lapsed.Consequently, Carandang filed a sworn-statement in the Commission on
Bar discipline of the IBP stating his complaint about what Atty. Obmina done to
his case. After the investigation, the IBP ruled that the respondent who has in his
possession the complete files and address of the complainant, should have
exerted efforts to even notify Mr. Carandang as to what happened to his case.
Whether the decision is adverse [to] or in favor of his client, respondent is duty
bound to notify the clients pursuant to Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Ethics which provides that "a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence." Further under Rule 18.03 of Canon 18, "a lawyer shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable." Lastly, under Rule 18.04, "a lawyer shall keep the client
informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to
client’s request for information." That as a result of the respondent’s failure to
notify the complainant, the latter lost the case leading to his eviction. Thus, the
IBP suspended Atty. Obmina from the practice of law for 1 year.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Obmina be suspended from the practice of law?
RULING: YES.

Canon 18 states that "[a] lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence." Rules 18.03 and 18.04 provide that "[a] lawyer shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable" and "[a] lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of
his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for
information."

Contrary to Atty. Obmina’s promise, there is no evidence on record that Atty.

Obmina took the initiative to notify Carandang of the trial court’s adverse
decision. Atty. Obmina again put Carandang at fault for failure to advance the
appeal fee. Atty. Obmina’s futile efforts of shifting the blame on Carandang only
serve to emphasize his failure to notify Carandang that the trial court already
promulgated a decision in Civil Case No. B-5109 that was adverse to
Carandang’s interests. Atty. Obmina cannot overlook the fact that Carandang
learned about the promulgation of the decision not through Atty. Obmina himself,
but through a chance visit to the trial court. Instead of letting Carandang know of
the adverse decision himself, Atty. Obmina should have immediately contacted
Carandang, explained the decision to him, and advised them on further steps
that could be taken. It is obvious that Carandang lost his right to file an appeal
because of Atty. Obmina’s inaction. Notwithstanding Atty. Obmina’s subsequent
withdrawal as Carandang’s lawyer, Atty. Obmina was still counsel of record at
the time the trial court promulgated the decision in Civil Case No. B-5109.In
Tolentino v. Mangapit, we stated that:

As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform her client of

whatever information she may have acquired which it is important that the client
should have knowledge of. She should notify her client of any adverse decision
to enable her client to decide whether to seek an appellate review thereof.
Keeping the client informed of the developments of the case will minimize
misunderstanding and [loss] of trust and confidence in the attorney.

The relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever present

the need for the lawyer to inform timely and adequately the client of important
developments affecting the client’s case. The lawyer should not leave the client
in the dark on how the lawyer is defending the client’s interests.

DISPOSITION: The Court AFFIRMS the resolution of the IBP Board of

Governors approving and adopting the report and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner. Accordingly, Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina is found
GUILTY of violation of Canon 18 and of Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The Court SUSPENDS Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina
from the practice of law for one year, and WARNS him that a repetition of the
same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/ac_7813_2009.html

• Agot vs. Rivera, 732 SCRA 12 (2014)

Legal Ethics; Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 18, Rule 18.03; Canon 16, Rule
16.01

FACTS: Respondent undertook to facilitate and secure the release of a US

immigrant visa in complainant’s favor prior to the scheduled wedding. In
consideration therefor, complainant paid respondent the amount of P350,000.00
as downpayment and undertook to pay the balance of P350,000.00 after the
issuance of the US visa. The parties likewise stipulated that should complainant’s
visa application be denied for any reason other than her absence on the day of
the interview and/or for records of criminal conviction and/or any court issued
hold departure order, respondent is obligated to return the said downpayment.
However, respondent failed to perform his undertaking within the agreed period.
Worse, complainant was not even scheduled for interview in the US Embassy.
As the demand for refund of the down payment was not heeded, complainant
filed a criminal complaint for estafa and the instant administrative complaint
against respondent.

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner found

respondent administratively liable, and accordingly, recommended that he be
meted the penalty of suspension for a period of four (4) months, with a warning
that a repetition of the same would invite a stiffer penalty. The Investigating
Commissioner found respondent guilty of engaging in deceitful conduct for: (a)
misrepresenting himself as an immigration lawyer; (b)failing to deliver the
services he contracted; and (c) being remiss in returning complainant’s
downpayment of P350,000.00.

ISSUE: Should respondent be held administratively liable for violating the Code
of Professional Responsibility?
RULING: YES. As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a
high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair
dealing. In this regard, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides:

CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE

LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.

In the instant case, respondent misrepresented himself as an immigration lawyer,

which resulted to complainant seeking his assistance to facilitate the issuance of
her US visa and paying him the amount of P350,000.00 as downpayment for his
legal services.

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE

AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglecta legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Under Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, once a lawyer takes up the cause of his
client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such
client’s cause with diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or
for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed upon him. Therefore, a lawyer’s neglect of a legal matter
entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he
must be held administratively liable, as in this case.

CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL SUMS OF MONEYS

AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS
POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.
Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due
or upon demand.

Verily, the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and
prescribes on a lawyer a great fidelity and good faith. The highly fiduciary nature
of this relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for the money or
property collected or received for or from his client. Thus, a lawyer’s failure to
return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client, as in this case,
gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use
in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation
of general morality as well as of professional ethics.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis P. Rivera (respondent) is

found guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of Canon
16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
two (2) years, effective upon the finality of this Decision, with a stem warning that
a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.1âwphi1

Furthermore, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant Chamelyn A.

Agot the legal fees he received from the latter in the amount of ₱350,000.00
within ninety (90) days from the finality of this Decision. Failure to comply with the
foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.

FULL TEXT:
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/aug2014/ac_8000_2014.html#:~:text=Agot
%20(complainant)%20against%20respondent%20Atty.&text=Rivera
%20(respondent)%2C%20charging%20him,her%20money%20despite
%20several%20demands.

• Rule 18.04: Inform client of status of case

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and
shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.
• Blanza vs. Arcangel, 21 SCRA 1 (1967)
FACTS: On April, 1955, Atty. Arcangel volunteered to help them in their
respective pension claims in connection with the death of their husbands, both
P.C. soldiers. They handed Arcangel pertinent documents and also affixed their
signatures on blank papers. After which, they noticed that respondent lost
interest and no progress was made. After 6 years they finally asked respondent
to return the said documents but the latter refused. Upon questioning by Fiscal
Rana to whom the case was referred by the Solicitor General respondent
admitted having received the documents but explained that it was for photo
stating purposes only. His failure to immediately return them was due to
complainants’ refusal to hand him money to pay for the photo stating costs which
prevented him from withdrawing the documents. Anyway, he had already
advanced the expenses himself and turned over the documents to the fiscal.
Fiscal found respondents explanation satisfactory and recommended the
respondents exoneration. However, Sol Gen feels that respondent deserves at
least a severe reprimand considering his failure to attend to complainants
pension claims for 6 years; his failure to immediately return the documents
despite repeated demands.

ISSUE: WON Atty. Arcangel is guilty of professional non-feasance

HELD: NO. Respondent’s explanation for the delay in filing the claims in
returning the documents has not been controverted by complainants. On the
contrary, they admitted that respondent asked them to shoulder the photostating
expenses but they did not give him any money. Hence, complainants are partly
to blame.

Moreover, the documents and their photostats were actually returned by

respondent during the fiscal’s investigation with him paying for the photostating
costs himself. As for the alleged failure of the respondent to all her documents to
omplainant Pasion, the former denies this. the affidavit of Mrs. Blanza pardoning
respondent cannot prejudice complainant.

DISPOSITION: Accordingly, the case against respondent is dismissed. So

ordered.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1967/sep1967/ac_492_1967.html

• Abay vs. Montesino, 417 SCRA 77 (2003)
Atty. Montesino failed to file the appellant’s brief of his client NIT in a civil
case, resulting to the dismissal of the appeal. Respondent claims that this was
due to him deeming it futile to pursue the appeal and wanting to take another
legal course of action to protect his client’s rights. The IBP and SC found him
guilty of violating CPR and suspended him for 6 months with warning.

IMPORTANT PEOPLE

Eduardo T. Abay – complainant, stockholder of NIT

Atty. Raul Montesino – respondent

FACTS:

1. Atty. Montesino was the counsel of Negros Institute of Technology in

an action for Cancellation of Title of Ownership, Recovery of
Ownership and Possession and Damages with Preliminary
Injunction against Vicente Galo’s estate. RTC dismissed the case on
Apr. 27, 1995.

2. Nov. 3, 1995 – RTC denied the respondent’s MR. Respondent filed a

Notice of Appeal in the CA but failed to submit the appellant’s
brief even after a total of 120 days extension (beyond the 45
reglementary period). Mar. 19, 1999 – CA dismissed the appeal.

3. Complainant prays for the disbarment of respondent alleging that the

latter abandoned the appeal without knowledge of NIT and never
told that the appeal had already been dismissed.

4. Respondent avers that his failure to file the brief was due to his
discovery that the property sought to be recovered was subject to
another civil case as a result of overlapping rights of transfers: a
Contract of Sale in favor of Florserfina Grandea and a Contract of
Mortgage in favor of Ludovico Hidalgo.

5. Thus, respondent advised NIT to abandon the appeal and file instead
an appropriate Complaint against Grandea and Hidalgo to recover
the properties. However, complainant demanded to continue with
the appeal. Thinking that his advice was the best way to protect his
client’s rights, he let the period to submit appellant’s brief lapse.

6. The IBP Commissioner found him guilty of violating the CPR and
expressed that the respondent should have given due importance to
 the decision of his client. She recommended a suspension of 6
months with warning, which was adopted by the IBP Board in its
Resolution.

ISSUE: W/N respondent was guilty of violating the CPR for failing to file his
client’s appellant’s brief?

HELD: YES.

· Respondent’s failure to file appellant’s brief was a violation of

Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

o Not filing an appellant’s brief is prejudicial because such could

result to the dismissal of the appeal, as in this case.
Respondent failed to exercise due diligence, and his
abandonment of his client’s cause made him unworthy of the
trust that is reposed in him.

o Even if respondent was honestly protecting the interests of

complainant, the former still had no right to waive the appeal
without the latter’s knowledge and consent. If he felt unable to
continue his retainership, he should have properly withdrawn
his appearance and allowed the client to appoint another
lawyer.

· Respondent also violated Rule 12.03 for failing to file the

appellant’s brief despite being granted several extensions.

· Lawyers owe fidelity to their clients cause. Regardless of their

personal views, they must present every remedy or defense
within the authority of the law in support of that cause.

DOCTRINE

Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case
and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for
information.

DISPOSITION: Atty. Raul T. Montesino is found guilty of negligence;

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six months and WARNED that a
repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.
FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/dec2003/ac_5718_2003.html

• Lagua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 173390, June 27, 2012

FACTS:

● April 2003, RTC rendered decision finding accused guilty of homicide. On

June 2003, he filed a Very Urgent Petition for Bail Pending Appeal, which
the CA granted without objection from the Office of the Solicitor.
● On Nov 2003, Order of release upon bond was issued in his favor by
Division Clerk of CA.
● On October 2003, petitioner received order from CA requiring the filing of
Appellant’s Brief within 45 days. Petitioner filed a motion for extension,
twice.
● Despite the two extensions, petitioner Lagua still failed to file his
appellant’s brief.
● On 5 May 2004, the CA ordered him through counsel to show cause,
within five days from receipt, why the appeal should not be dismissed. He
again failed to submit his brief within the reglementary period and to
comply with the Court’s Resolution. Thus, on 1 September 2004, the CA
issued a Resolution declaring the appeal abandoned and accordingly
dismissed pursuant to the Rules
● On Oct. 2004, petitioner’s counsel of record, Atty. Salvador Quimpo,
manifested to the Court that he had already withdrawn as defense of
counsel for petitioner, but he failed to secure the latter's conformity.
● Atty Barrientos was his new counsel.
● Despite the court’s consideration for petitioners failure in complying the
Show Cause Order and new non-extendible period, petitioner again failed
to seasonably file his brief, prompting the CA to issue the first assailed
Resolution dated 25 November 2005, which, for the second time, declared
his appeal abandoned and accordingly dismissed. CA also dismissed
motion for reconsideration to the second assailed resolution and ordered
Appellant’s Brief to be expunged from the records.
● Petitioner comes to this Court alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the lower court in declaring the appeal abandoned, pointing to the
negligence and errors of his counsel as the cause of the two-year delay in
coming up with the brief. Petitioner reasons that there... would be no
 prejudice to the People if his appeal is reinstated, and that he has a good
defense that can lead to his acquittal.

ISSUE:
W/N there is a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court in
declaring the appeal abandoned, pointing to the negligence and errors of his
counsel as the cause of the two-year delay in coming up with the brief.

RULING:
● We dismiss the Petition.
● The Court cannot tolerate habitual failure to follow the procedural rules,
which are indispensable for the orderly and speedy disposition of
justice. Otherwise these rules would be rendered useless
● In the present case, accused Lagua was given more time, not only to file
his Appellant’s Brief, but also to secure new counsel to adequately prepare
the appeal. The CA issued two Show Cause Orders and two Resolutions
declaring the appeal as abandoned. Despite these issuances, his second
Motion for Reconsideration was filed 18 days after his receipt of the
second and final CA Resolution. To our mind, this delay is indicative of
sheer laxity and indifference on his part, for which he has lost the statutory
right of appeal. Even during the intervening period after counsel has
withdrawn, litigants are expected to be vigilant and conscious of the status
of their cases
● The enforcement of such judgment should not be hampered or evaded, for
the immediate enforcement of the parties’ rights, confirmed by final
judgment, is a major component of the ideal administration of justice. This
is the reason why we abhor any delay in the full execution of final and
executory decisions. Thus, a remedy intended to frustrate, suspend, or
enjoin the enforcement of a final judgment must be granted with caution
and upon a strict observance of the requirements under existing laws and
jurisprudence

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED. The assailed

Resolutions issued by the Court of Appeals on 25 November 2005 and 17 May
2006 in CA-G.R. CR No. 27423 are hereby AFFIRMED.

FULL TEXT: G.R. No. 173390 (lawphil.net)

(5) Duty to represent client with zeal within the
bounds of the law
• CPR Canon 19
CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL
WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.

• CPR Rule 19.01

Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the
lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or
threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage
in any case or proceeding.

• CPR Rule 19.02

Rule 19.02 - A lawyer who has received information that his client has, in the
course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall
promptly call upon the client to rectify the same, and failing which he shall
terminate the relationship with such client in accordance with the Rules of Court.

• CPR Rule 19.03

Rule 19.03 - A lawyer shall not allow his client to dictate the procedure in
handling the case.

• Rule 138, Sec. 20 (d)

Section 20. Duties of attorneys. — It is the duty of an attorney:
(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such
means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the
judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law;

• Millare vs. Atty. Montero, 246 SCRA 1

FACTS:

Pacifica Millare, the mother of the complainant, obtained a favorable judgment

from the MTC of Abra which ordered Elsa Dy Co to vacate the premises subject
of the ejectment case (Civil Case No. 844). Co, through respondent as counsel,
appealed the decision to the RTC. She neither filed a supersedeas bond nor paid
the rentals adjudged by the MTC.

The RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC. The CA dismissed Co's appeal
from the decision of the RTC for failure to comply with Section 22 of B.P. Blg.
129 and Section 22(b) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines. According to the CA,
Co should have filed a petition for review and not an ordinary appeal. The
judgment of the MTC became final and executory on November 19,
1986.Respondent filed a total of six appeals, complaints or petitions to frustrate
the execution of the MTC judgment in Civil Case No. 844, to wit:

(1) Civil Case No. 344 — Appeal from the decision rendered in Civil Case No.
844 of the Municipal Trial Court, Bangued, Abra, with the Regional Trial Court,
Abra; (2) CA-G.R. CV No. 11404 — Appeal from the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Abra;(3) CA-G.R. SP No. 11690 — An Action For the Annulment of
Decisions And/Or Reformation or Novation of Decisions filed with the Court of
Appeals; (4) G.R. No. 86084 — Petition For Review On Certiorari filed with the
Supreme Court; (5) CA-G.R. SP No. 17040 — Appeal And/Or Review By
Certiorari, Etc. filed also with the Court of Appeals; and, (6) SP Civil Action No.
624 — Petition For Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus with Preliminary Issuance
of Prohibitory Order filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Bangued, Abra.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not respondent resorted to devious and underhanded means to

delay the execution of the judgment rendered by the MTC adverse to his clients.
YES

2. Whether or not respondent is guilty of forum shopping. YES

HELD:

Under Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required

to represent his client "within the bounds of the law." The Code enjoins a
lawyer to employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his
client (Rule 19.01) and warns him not to allow his client to dictate the procedure
in handling the case (Rule 19.03). In short, a lawyer is not a gun for hire. Under
Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to exert
every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the
same cause (Rule 12.02). A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of a judgment or misuse court processes (Rule 12.04) The rights of
respondent's client in Civil Case No. 844 of the MTC were fully protected and her
defenses were properly ventilated when he filed the appeal from the MTC to the
RTC. But respondent thereafter resorted to devious and underhanded means to
delay the execution of the judgment rendered by the MTC adverse to his client.

The said decision became executory even pending its appeal with the RTC
because of the failure of Co to file a supersedeas bond and to pay the monthly
rentals as they fell due. Furthermore, his petition for annulment of the decisions
of the MTC and RTC which he filed with the CA (CA-G.R. No. 11690) was
defective and dilatory. According to the CA, there was no allegation therein that
the courts had no jurisdiction, that his client was denied due process, or "that the
judgments in the former cases were secured through fraud." Judging from the
number of actions filed by respondent to forestall the execution of the same
judgment, respondent is also guilty of forum shopping. The Court explained that
forum shopping exists when, by reason of an adverse decision in one forum,
defendant ventures to another for a more favorable resolution of his case By
having wilfully and knowingly abused his rights of recourse in his efforts to get a
favorable judgment, which efforts were all rebuffed, respondent violated the duty
of a member of the Bar to institute actions only which are just and put up such
defenses as he perceives to be truly contestable under the laws.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, respondent is SUSPENDED for one year.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1995/jul1995/ac_3283_1995.html

(6) Duty to impress upon client the duty to

comply with laws
• CPR Rule 15.07: Compliance with laws and principles of fairness
Rule 15.07. - A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws
and the principles of fairness.

• CPR Rule 1.02: Not to counsel or abet defiance of the law

Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the
law or at lessening confidence in the legal system
• CPR Rule 19.02: Call upon client to rectify fraud
Rule 19.02 - A lawyer who has received information that his client has, in the
course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall
promptly call upon the client to rectify the same, and failing which he shall
terminate the relationship with such client in accordance with the Rules of Court.

• CPR Rule 19.03: Not allow client to dictate procedure in handling

case
Rule 19.03 - A lawyer shall not allow his client to dictate the procedure in
handling the case.

• Rule 138, Sec. 23: Authority of attorneys to bind clients

Section 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. — Attorneys have authority
to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in
writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure.
But they cannot, without special authority, compromise their client's litigation, or
receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but the full amount in cash.

• Rule 138, Sec. 26: Procedure for change of attorney Page 17 of 20

Section 26. Change of attorneys. — An attorney may retire at any time from
any action or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court.
He may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, without the
consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on
hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution,
the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the
court in place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given
to the advance party.

A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place,
but if the contract between client and attorney has been reduced to writing and
the dismissal of the attorney was without justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to
recover from the client the full compensation stipulated in the contract. However,
the attorney may, in the discretion of the court, intervene in the case to protect
his rights. For the payment of his compensation the attorney shall have a lien
upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in
pursuance of such judgment, rendered in the case wherein his services had been
retained by the client.
(7) Duty to refrain from impropriety that influences the court

• CPR Canon 13
CANON 13 - A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS CAUSE
AND REFRAIN FROM ANY IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE,
OR GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING THE COURT.

• CPR Rule 13.01: Not cultivate familiarity with judges

Rule 13.01 - A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to,
nor seek opportunity for cultivating familiarity with Judges.

• In re De Vera, 385 SCRA 285 (2002)

Facts:
Petitioner lawyers Oliver L. Garcia, Emmanuel Ravanera and Tony Velez filed a
petition seeking the disqualification of respondent lawyer Leonard De Vera from
being elected Governor of Eastern Mindanao in the 16th Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Regional Governor's Elections.

Petitioner Garcia is the Vice-President of Bukidnon IBP Chapter, while petitioners

Ravanera and Velez are the past president and the incumbent President,
respectively, of the Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter. Petitioners contended that
respondent's transfer from Pasay, Parañaque, Las Piñas and Muntinlupa (PPLM)
Chapter to Agusan del Sur Chapter is a brazen abuse and misuse of the rotation
rule, a mockery of the domicile rule and a great insult to the lawyers of Eastern
Mindanao for it implied that there is no lawyer from the region qualified and
willing to serve the IBP.

Petitioners also submitted that respondent De Vera lacks the requisite moral
aptitude for the position. According to petitioners, respondent De Vera was
previously sanctioned by the Supreme Court for irresponsibly attacking the
integrity of the SC Justices during the deliberations of the plunder law. They
further alleged that respondent De Vera could have been disbarred in the United
States for misappropriating his client's funds had he not surrendered his
California license to practice law.

Respondent De Vera argued that the Court has no jurisdiction over the present
controversy contending that the election of the officers of the IBP, including the
determination of the qualification of those who want to serve the organization, is
purely an internal matter governed as it is by the IBP By-Laws and exclusively
regulated and administered by the IBP. Respondent also averred that an IBP
member is entitled to select, change or transfer his chapter or transfer his
chapter membership under Section 19, Article II and Section 29-2, Article IV of
the IBP By-Laws. He also stressed that the right to transfer membership is also
recognized in Section 4, 139-A of the Rules of Court which is exactly the same
as the first of the above-quoted provision of the IBP By-Laws.

On the moral integrity question, respondent De Vera denies that he exhibited

disrespect to the Court or to any of its members during its deliberations on the
constitutionality of the plunder law. As for the administrative complaint filed
against him by one of his clients when he was practicing law in California, which
in turn compelled him to surrender his California license to practice law, he
maintains that it cannot serve as basis for determining his moral qualification (or
lack of it) to run for the position he is aspiring for.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the Court has no jurisdiction over the IBP.
2. Whether or not the respondent is disqualified from being elected Governor in
the IBP.

Held:
1. On the issue of jurisdiction, the Court affirmed its right to hear and decide the
present controversy. Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution conferred on
the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules affecting the IBP and implicit in
the constitutional grant is the power to supervise all the activities of the IBP,
including the election of its officers. The power of supervision over the IBP has
been demonstrated in the past when it looked into the irregularities which
attended the 1989 elections of the IBP National Officers. The Court likewise
amended several provisions of the IBP By-Laws.

2. The Court upheld respondent De Vera in his contention that a member of the
IBP is entitled to select, change or transfer his chapter membership. Section 19
of the IBP By-Laws allows a member to change his chapter membership, subject
only to the condition that the transfer must be made not less than three months
prior to the election of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer wishes to
transfer. In the case at bar, respondent De Vera's transfer to the Agusan del Sur
IBP Chapter is valid as it was done more than three months ahead of the chapter
elections held on February 27, 2003.

The Court also ruled that there is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides
that one must be morally fit before he can run for IBP governorship. The Court
emphasized that the disqualification of a candidate involving lack of moral fitness
should emanate from his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law by
the Court or conviction by final judgment of an offense which involves moral
turpitude.

In In Re: Published Alleged Threats Against Members of the Court in the Plunder
Law Case Hurled by Atty. Leonard De Vera, Respondent De Vera was found
guilty of indirect contempt of court and was imposed a fine in the amount of
Twenty Thousand Pesos for his remarks contained in two newspaper articles
published in the Inquirer. The Court held that the statements were aimed at
influencing and threatening the Court to decide in favor of the constitutionality of
the Plunder Law. The ruling cannot serve as a basis to consider respondent De
Vera immoral. The act for which he was found guilty of indirect contempt does
not involve moral turpitude. Moral turpitude as "an act of baseness, vileness or
depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to
society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and man, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good
morals."

On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while
he was still practicing law in California, he explained that no final judgment was
rendered by the California Supreme Court finding him guilty of the charge. Bare
allegations and unsubstantiated by evidence are not equivalent to proof.

The Court also ruled that petitioners are not the proper parties to bring the suit
under Section 40 of the IBP By-Laws which provides that only nominees can file
a written protest setting forth the ground therefor. Petitioner Garcia is from
Bukidnon IBP Chapter, while the other petitioners, Ravanera and Velez, are from
the Misamis Oriental IBP and are not qualified to run for IBP governorship of
Eastern Mindanao pursuant to the rotation rule enunciated in Sections 37 and 38
of the IBP By-Laws. The Court also held that the instant petition was premature
as no nomination of candidates has been made by the members of the House of
Delegates from Eastern Mindanao, and assuming that respondent De Vera gets
nominated, he can always opt to decline the nomination.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the Petition to disqualify respondent Atty.

Leonard De Vera to run for the position of IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao in
the 16th election of the IBP Board of Governors is hereby DISMISSED. The
Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 30 May 2003 which
enjoined the conduct of the election for the IBP Regional Governor in Eastern
Mindanao is hereby LIFTED. Accordingly, the IBP Board of Governors is hereby
ordered to hold said election with proper notice and with deliberate speed.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/dec2003/ac_6052_2003.html

• Nestle Phil., Inc. vs. Sanchez, 154 SCRA 542 (1987)

FACTS:

-During the period July 8-10, 1987, members of the respondent labor unions
(Union of Filipino Employees and Kimberly Independent Labor Union for
Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia) intensified the intermittent pickets
they had been conducting since June 17, 1987 in front of the Padre Faura gate of
the Supreme Court building. They set up pickets' quarters on the pavement in
front of the Supreme Court building, at times obstructing access to and egress
from the Court's premises and offices of justices, officials and employees. They
constructed provisional shelters along the sidewalks, set up a kitchen and littered
the place with food containers and trash in utter disregard of proper hygiene and
sanitation. They waved their red streamers and placards with slogans, and took
turns haranguing the court all day long with the use of loudspeakers.

These acts were done even after their leaders had been received by Justices
Pedro L. Yap and Marcelo B. Fenian as Chairmen of the Divisions where their
cases are pending, and Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro
Employees, had been called in order that the pickets might be informed that the
demonstration must cease immediately for the same constitutes direct contempt
of court and that the Court would not entertain their petitions for as long as the
pickets were maintained. Thus, on July 10, 1987, the Court en banc issued a
resolution giving the said unions the opportunity to withdraw graciously and
requiring the leaders of the respondent union leaders to appear before the Court
on July 14, 1987 at 10:30 A.M. and then and there to SHOW CAUSE why they
should not be held in contempt of court. Atty. Jose C. Espinas was further
required to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be administratively dealt with.

On the appointed date and time, the above-named individuals appeared before
the Court, represented by Atty. Jose C. Espinas, apologizing for their actions
described and assuring that the acts would not be repeated. Atty. Espinas
likewise manifested to the Court that he had explained to the picketers why their
actions were wrong and that the cited persons were willing to suffer such penalty
as may be warranted under the circumstances. He, however, prayed for the
Court's leniency considering that the picket was actually spearheaded by the
leaders of the "Pagkakaisa ng Mang. gagawa as Timog Katagalogan"
(PAMANTIK), an unregistered loose alliance of about seventy-five (75) unions in
the Southern Tagalog area, and not by either the Union of Filipro Employees or
the Kimberly Independent Labor union.

Atty. Espinas further stated that he had explained to the picketers that any delay
in the resolution of their cam is usually for causes beyond the control of the Court
and that the Supreme Court has always remained steadfast in its role as the
guardian of the Constitution.

To confirm for the record that the person cited for contempt fully understood the
reason for the citation and that they win abide by their promise that said incident
will not be repeated, the Court required the respondents to submit a written
manifestation to this effect, which respondents complied with on July 17, 1987

ISSUE: WON THE RESPONDENTS and ATTY. ESPINAS SHOULD BE HELD

IN DIRECT CONTEMPT OF COURT?

HELD: NO. Contempt charges dismissed.

The respondents who are nonlawyers are not knowledgeable in her intricacies of
substantive and adjective laws. They are not aware that even as the rights of free
speech and of assembly are protected by the Constitution, any attempt to
pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of either right
amounts to an abuse thereof, is no longer within the ambit of constitutional
protection, nor did they realize that any such efforts to influence the course of
justice constitutes contempt of court. The duty and responsibility of advising
them, therefore, rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of
record. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, when his attention was called by this Court, did his
best to demonstrate to the pickets the untenability of their acts and posture. It is
their duty as officers of the court to properly apprise their clients on matters of
decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice, and to labor leaders of the
importance of a continuing educational program for their members.

The Court will not hesitate in future similar situations to apply the full force of the
law and punish for contempt those who attempt to pressure the Court into acting
one way or the other in any case pending before it. Grievances, if any, must be
ventilated through the proper channels, i.e., through appropriate petitions,
motions or other pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the Courts as
impartial administrators of justice entitled to "proceed to the disposition of its
business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its
functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice.

Courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune
from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence
produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be
uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the contempt charges against herein

respondents are DISMISSED. Henceforth, no demonstrations or pickets intended
to pressure or influence courts of justice into acting one way or the other on
pending cases shall be allowed in the vicinity and/or within the premises of any
and all courts.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1987/sep1987/gr_75209_1987.html

• Lantoria vs. Bunyi, 209 SCRA 528

FACTS: An administrative complaint was filed by Lantoria against Bunyi, a
member of the Philippine Bar, on the ground that Bunyi committed acts of graft
and corruption, dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of a member of the IBP, and
corruption of the judge and bribery in relation to Bunyi’s handling of a civil case
wherein Bunyi was counsel of Mrs. Mascarinas. The latter was the owner of the
farm involved and Lantoria is the supervisor and manager of the said farm. Three
civil cases presided by Judge Galicia involved an ejectment suit of squatters in
the said farm where the defendants were declared in default.

Correspondences between Lantoria and Bunyi showed that Bunyi initially

enclosed a letter in an envelope addressed to Judge Galicia in a confidential and
private manner. Judge Galicia thru the mediation of Lantoria informed Bunyi that
he is willing to let Bunyi write the decisions for the 3 civil cases. Lantoria informed
the same to Bunyi which later delivered the 3 decisions thru Lantoria.
 Three years later, Lantoria file the present case against Bunyi alleging that
they won the said cases because Bunyi wrote the decisions in those cases.
Bunyi contends that Lantoria had knowledge of the request of Judge Galicia to
Bunyi as the said judge had two salas before him. Also, Bunyi contends that the
drafting of the decision was not an idea spawned by him. Furthermore, he
contends that his participation is merely on revision.

The solicitor general investigated the matters and found that Bunyi
prepared the draft of the decisions and that he had previous communications
with the judge regarding drafting the same. Moreover, Bunyi admitted that he
prepared the said decisions and that the subject letters do exist. The Solicitor
General found Bunyi guilty of highly unethical and unprofessional conduct for
failure to perform his duty, as an officer of the court, to help promote the
independence of the judiciary and to refrain from engaging in acts which would
influence judicial determination of a litigation in which he is counsel. The Solicitor
General recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for a period of one (1) year.

Lantoria did not attend hearing of the case and later filed his withdrawal of
the same. Bunyi gave an apology but he denied the allegations of offering a gift
to Judge Galicia.

ISSUE: Whether or not Bunyi violated Rule 13.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for lawyers

HELD: YES. The determination of the merits of the instant case should proceed
notwithstanding withdrawal of complaint due to the Bunyi having admitted that
the letters in question truly exist, and that he even asked for an apology from the
Court, for whatever effects such letters had on his duty as a lawyer.

Clearly, respondent violated Canon 13 of the Professional Ethics on attempts to

exert personal influence on the court. A lawyer should not communicate or argue
privately with the judge as to the merits of a pending cause and deserves rebuke
and denunciation for any device or attempt to gain from a judge special personal
consideration or favor.

In the new Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer's attempt to influence

the court is rebuked, as shown in Canon 13 and Rule 13.01, respectively.
CANON 13 – A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from
any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing
the court. Rule 13.01 – A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or
hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for, cultivating familiarity with judges.

Court finds Bunyi guilty of unethical practice in attempting to influence the court
where he had pending civil case.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Irineo L. Bunyi is hereby

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year from the date
of notice hereof.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1992/jun1992/am_1769_1992.html

• CPR Rule 15.06: Not to claim influence

Rule 15.06. - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any
public official, tribunal or legislative body.

• Mercado vs. Security Bank, 482 SCRA 501 (2006)

FACTS: On December 12, 2003, Jose Teofilo T. Mercado and Ma. Agnes R.
Mercado, petitioners, filed with the Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari
assailing the Court of Appeals (a) Decision dated May 27, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 71570 dismissing their petition for annulment of judgment; and (b) its
Resolution dated October 23, 2003 denying their motion for reconsideration.
Such petition were denied twice because of petitioner’s failure to show a
reversible error had been committed by the Appellate Court. This prompted
petitioner Jose Teofilo Mercado to write Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide assailing
the latter of his partiality by alleging that he pressured the Justice Angelina
Sandoval-Gutierrez, the ponente handling the petitioner’s case, to favor his
adversary Security Bank Corporation. He alleged that this information was
transmitted to him by his counsel, Atty. Jose P. Villanueva, who he claims is a
close friend of the ponente. Petitioner further alleged that an irregularity or
bribery attended the denial of his petition for review by insinuating that the travels
of Atty. Villanueva and the ponente abroad were financed by respondent bank.

On November 2, 2004, Chief Justice Davide required Mercado’s lawyer, Atty.

Jose P. Villanueva, to comment on the letter and show cause why he should not
be held in contempt of court. Likewise, the Third Division ordered Mercado to
personally appear on November 22, 2004 and show cause why he should not be
held in contempt of court.

Petitioner apologized and explained that he should not be punished for contempt
of court because the contemptuous statements in his letter merely reiterate the
tenor of Atty. Villanueva’s statements and that he wrote the letter while he was
"under the impulse of personal stress" as he was losing his residential house.

Atty. Villanueva, on the other hand, denied the petitioner's allegations. He also
stressed that there was no correlation between the ponente’s trip to the United
States and his trip to London.

Thereafter, the Third Division designated Court of Appeals Justice Renato C.

Dacudao as Commissioner to receive evidence on the factual issues involved in
the contempt incident.

On May 18, 2005, Justice Dacudao submitted his Investigation, Report and
Recommendation. He found Mercado "guilty of improper conduct tending to bring
the authority and the administration of justice by the Court into disrespect when
he openly belittled, degraded, and embarrassed the Highest Court of the land,
particularly the Chief Justice x x x." However, he held that "there was no showing
that he acted with malice and/or in bad faith or that he was properly motivated."
Thus, he recommended that Mercado be fined in the sum of five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00).

The Court concluded, though it was not categorically stated by Justice Dacudao,
that Atty. Villanueva was in fact the source of the unfounded accusation that
Chief Justice pressured the ponente.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Jose P. Villanueva is guilty of contempt of court by

committing a breach of the Code of Professional Responsibility due to reasons
claimed by petitioner Mercado.

HELD: Yes, Atty. Jose P. Villanueva is guilty of indirect contempt of court.

Rule 15.06 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a
lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official,
tribunal or legislative body." Further, Rule 15.07 provides that "a lawyer must
impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness."
Atty. Villanueva took the forbidden course. In informing Mercado that he was "a
very very good, close and long time friend" of the ponente, Atty. Villanueva
impressed upon the former that he can obtain a favorable disposition of his case.
However, when his petition was dismissed twice, Mercado’s expectation
crumbled. This prompted him to hurl unfounded, malicious, and disrespectful
accusations against Chief Justice Davide and the ponente.

We have repeatedly admonished lawyers from making bold assurances to their

clients. A lawyer who guarantees the successful outcome of a litigation will exert
heavy pressure and employ any means to win the case at all costs. But when the
case is lost, he will blame the courts, placing them under a cloud of suspicion. As
what happened in this case, Atty. Villanueva’s statements led Mercado, not only
to suspect but also to believe, that the entire Court, together with Chief Justice
Davide and the ponente, could be pressured or influenced.

Responsibility enjoins lawyers to observe and maintain the respect due to courts
and the judicial officers. Atty. Villanueva’s conduct, no doubt, degraded the
integrity and dignity of Chief Justice Davide and the ponente and this Court as
well.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, Jose Teofilo T. Mercado and Atty. Jose P.

Villanueva are declared GUILTY of indirect contempt of court. They are
FINED P50,000.00 each and WARNED that a repetition of similar acts will
warrant a more severe penalty.

FULL TEXT: G.R. No. 160445 - JOSE TEOFILO T. MERCADO, ET AL. v.

SECURITY BANK CORPORATION : February 2006 - Philipppine Supreme Court
Decisions (chanrobles.com)
(8) Duty to exercise good faith in business transactions with
clients

• CPR Rule 15.08: Dual profession

Rule 15.08. - A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation
concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is
acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.

• Nakpil vs. Valdez, 286 SCRA 758 (1998)

FACTS:Jose Nakpil was interested in a piece of property situated in Moran,
Baguio. He went into an agreement with Atty. Carlos Valdes for the latter to buy
the property in trust for Nakpil. Valdes did buy the property by contracting 2
loans. The lands’ titles were transferred to his name.

When Jose Nakpil died, Imelda Nakpil (his wife) acquired the services of Valdes
and his accounting and law firms for the settlement of the estate of Jose Nakpil.
What Valdes did was to exclude the property in Baguio from the list of assets of
Jose Nakpil (he actually transferred the property to his company, the Caval
Realty Corporation) while including the loans he contracted.

What Imelda did was to file a suit for reconveyance in the CFI.While the case
was pending, Imelda also filed an administrative complaint or disbarment against
Valdes. The CFI dismissed the action for reconveyance. The CA reversed the
CFI.The complaint for reconveyance went up to the SC and was decided in favor
of Nakpil. The SC held that Valdes only held the lots in trust for Nakpil.

ISSUE:W/n Atty. Valdes should be administratively sanctioned for his acts,

namely:

o Excluding the property in Baguio from the estate of Jose Nakpil;

• Including his loans as claims on the estate; and

• Apparently, representing conflicting interests when his accounting firm prepared

the list of claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN against the estate of Jose
Nakpil, which was represented by his law firm.

HELD:The SC found Valdes guilty of misconduct and suspends him for 1

year.The Court held that the first two acts clearly show that Valdes broke the
trust reposed on him by Imelda Nakpil when the latter agreed to use his
professional services as a lawyer and an accountant. As to the third charge, we
hold respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests which is proscribed by
Canon 15 Rule15.03. In the case at bar, there is no question that the interests of
the estate and that of its creditors are adverse to each other. Respondent's
accounting firm prepared the list of assets and liabilities of the estate and,
at the same time,computed the claims of two creditors of the estate. There
is clearly a conflict between the interests of the estate which stands.

DISPOSITION: The Court finds respondent ATTY. CARLOS J. VALDES guilty of

misconduct. He is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year effective from receipt of this Decision, with a warning that a similar infraction
shall be dealt with more severely in the future.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1998/mar1998/ac_2040_1998.html

E. Conflict of interest
Questions:
• What is conflict of interest? Why are there proscriptions
against it?

• What are the kinds of conflict of interest?

• What are the tests for determining conflict of interest?

• How can conflicts of interest be avoided? Mitigated?

• What are the defenses against a charge of conflict of

interest?

1) ABA-ROLI, Code of Professional Responsibility

(Annotated), pp. 112-115.

2) Codal provisions:

• CPR Canon 15
CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND
LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

• CPR Rule 14.03 (b)

Rule 14.03 - A lawyer may not refuse to accept representation of an indigent
client unless:c
(b) he labors under a conflict of interest between him and the prospective client
or between a present client and the prospective client.

• CPR Rule 15.01

Rule 15.01. - A lawyer, in conferring with a prospective client, shall ascertain as
soon as practicable whether the matter would involve a conflict with another
client or his own interest, and if so, shall forthwith inform the prospective client.
• CPR Rule 15.03
Rule 15.03. - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

• CPR Rule 21.07

Rule 21.07 - A lawyer shall not reveal that he has been consulted about a
particular case except to avoid possible conflict of interest.

• CPR Rule 6.03

Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in said service.

• Canons 6, Canons of Professional Ethics (CPE)

6. Adverse influence and conflicting interests

It is a duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to the client all the
circumstances of his relations to the parties and any interest in or connection with
the controversy, which might influence the client in the selection of counsel.

It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent

of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of
this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client,
it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to
oppose.

The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge his
secrets or confidence forbids also subsequent acceptance of retainers or
employment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the client
with respect to which confidence has been reposed.
3) Cases:
• Hilado vs. David, 84 Phil. 569 (1949)
FACTS: Blandina Hilado filed a complaint to have some deeds of sale annulled
against Selim Assad. Attorney Delgado Dizon represented Hilado. Assad was
represented by a certain Atty. Ohnick. Atty. Vicente Francisco replaced Atty.
Ohnick as counsel for Assad . Four months later, Atty. Dizon filed a motion to
have Atty. Francisco be disqualified because Atty. Dizon found out that Hilado
approached Atty. Francisco to ask for additional legal opinion regarding her case
and for which Atty. Francisco sent Hilado a legal opinion letter. Atty. Francisco
opposed the motion for his disqualification. In his opposition, he said that no
material information was relayed to him by Hilado; that in fact, upon hearing
Hilado’s story, Atty. Francisco advised her that her case will not win in court; but
that later, Hilado returned with a copy of the Complaint prepared by Atty. Dizon;
that however, when Hilado returned, Atty. Francisco was not around but an
associate in his firm was there (a certain Atty. Federico Agrava); that Atty.
Agrava attended to Hilado; that after Hilado left, leaving behind the legal
documents, Atty. Agrava then prepared a legal opinion letter where it was stated
that Hilado has no cause of action to file suit; that Atty. Agrava had Atty.
Francisco sign the letter; that Atty. Francisco did not read the letter as Atty.
Agrava said that it was merely a letter explaining why the firm cannot take on
Hilado’s case. Atty. Francisco also pointed out that he was not paid for his
advice; that no confidential information was relayed because all Hilado brought
was a copy of the Complaint which was already filed in court; and that, if any,
Hilado already waived her right to disqualify Atty. Francisco because he was
already representing Assad in court for four months in the said case.

Judge Jose Gutierrez David ruled in favor of Atty. Francisco.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Francisco should be disqualified in the said civil
case.

HELD: Yes. There already existed an attorney-client relationship between Hilado

and Atty. Francisco. Hence, Atty. Francisco cannot act as counsel against Hilado
without the latter’s consent. As ruled by the Supreme Court, to constitute an
attorney-client relationship, it is not necessary that any retainer should have been
paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney consulted
did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had. If a
person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his
attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional
advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such
consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as established.
Section 19 (e) of Rule 127 imposes upon an attorney the duty “to maintain
inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of
his client.” Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number
of litigations, a complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant,
secret and well known facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of the
dealings between an attorney and a client, inquiry of the nature suggested would
lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that might only
further prejudice the complainant’s cause. We conclude therefore that the motion
for disqualification should be allowed.

DISPOSITION: We conclude therefore that the motion for disqualification should

be allowed. It is so ordered, without costs.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1949/sep1949/gr_l-961_1949.html

• Dee vs. CA, 176 SCRA 651 (1989)

FACTS: Petitioner and his father went to the residence of private respondent,
accompanied by the latter’s cousin, to seek his advice regarding the problem of
the alleged indebtedness of petitioner’s brother, Dewey Dee, to Caesar’s Palace,
a well-known gambling casino at Las Vegas, Nevada, U.S.A. Private respondent
personally talked with the president of Caesar’s Palace at Las Vegas, Nevada.
He advised the president that for the sake and in the interest of the casino it
would be better to make Ramon Sy answer for the indebtedness. The president
told him that if he could convince Ramon Sy to acknowledge the obligation,
Dewey Dee would be exculpated from liability for the account. Upon private
respondent’s return to Manila, he conferred with Ramon Sy and the latter was
convinced to acknowledge the indebtedness. In August, 1981, private
respondent brought to Caesar’s Palace the letter of Ramon Sy owning the debt
and asking for a discount. Thereafter, the account of Dewey Dee was cleared
and the casino never bothered him.
Having thus settled the account of petitioner’s brother, private respondent sent
several demand letters to petitioner demanding the balance of P50,000.00 as
attorney’s fees. Petitioner, however, ignored said letters.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is an attorney-client relationship between parties.

HELD: YES. Court affirmed the decision of the defendant Court of Appeals.
Costs against the petitioner.

RATIO: There is no question that professional services were actually rendered

by private respondent to petitioner and his family. Through his efforts, the
account of petitioner’s brother, Dewey Dee, with Caesar’s Palace was assumed
by Ramon Sy and petitioner and his family were further freed from the
apprehension that Dewey might be harmed or even killed by the so-called mafia.
For such services, respondent Mutuc is indubitably entitled to receive a
reasonable compensation and this right cannot be concluded by petitioner’s
pretension that at the time private respondent rendered such services to
petitioner and his family, the former was also the Philippine consultant of
Caesar’s Palace.

A lawyer is entitled to have and receive the just and reasonable compensation for
services rendered at the special instance and request of his client and as long as
he is honestly and in good faith trying to serve and represent the interests of his
client, the latter is bound to pay his just fees.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the resolution of respondent Court of Appeals,

dated February 12,1987, reinstating its original decision of May 9, 1986 is hereby
AFFIRMED, with costs against l petitioner.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/aug1989/gr_77439_1989.html

• Perez vs. De La Torre, 485 SCRA 547 (2006)

Facts and Complaint: In December 2001, several suspects for murder and
kidnapping for ransom, among them Sonny Boy Ilo and Diego Avila, were
apprehended and jailed by the police authorities. Respondent went to the
municipal building of Calabanga where Ilo and Avila were being detained and
made representations that he could secure their freedom if they sign the
prepared extrajudicial confessions. unknown to the two accused, respondent was
representing the heirs of the murder victim; that on the strength of the
extrajudicial confessions, cases were filed against them, including herein
complainant who was implicated in the extrajudicial confessions as the
mastermind in the criminal activities for which they were being charged.

Defense: Respondent denied the accusations against him. He explained that

while being detained at the Calabanga Municipal Police Jail, Avila sought his
assistance in drafting an extrajudicial confession regarding his involvement in the
crimes of kidnapping for ransom, murder and robbery. He advised Avila to inform
his parents about his decision to make an extrajudicial confession, apprised him
of his constitutional rights and of the possibility that he might be utilized as a
state-witness.

Respondent claimed that when Ilo sought his assistance in executing his
extrajudicial confession, he conferred with Ilo in the presence of his parents; and
only after he was convinced that Ilo was not under undue compulsion did he
assist the accused in executing the extrajudicial confession.

Ruling: Atty. Dela Torre is suspended for 3 years.

Under Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer

shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts. Respondent is therefore duty bound to
refrain from representing two parties having conflicting interests in a controversy.
By doing precisely the foregoing, and without any proof that he secured the
written consent of both parties after explaining to them the existing conflict of
interest, respondent should be sanctioned.

The prohibition against representing conflicting interest is founded on

principles of public policy and good taste. In the course of a lawyer-client
relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the client’s case,
including the weak and strong points of the case. The nature of that relationship
is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. It behooves
lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of impropriety and double-dealing for only then can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.

At the time respondent was representing Avila and Ilo, two of the accused
in the murder of the victim Resurreccion Barrios, he was representing the family
of the murder victim. Clearly, his representation of opposing clients in the murder
case invites suspicion of double-dealing and infidelity to his clients. Respondent
assisted in the execution by the two accused of their confessions whereby they
admitted their participation in various serious criminal offenses knowing fully well
that he was retained previously by the heirs of one of the victims. Respondent,
who presumably knows the intricacies of the law, should have exercised his
better judgment before conceding to accused’s choice of counsel. It did not cross
his mind to inhibit himself from acting as their counsel and instead, he even
assisted them in executing the extrajudicial confession.

DISPOSITION: Atty. Danilo de la Torre is found GUILTY of violation of Rule

15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting
interests. He is SUSPENDED for THREE YEARS from the practice of law,
effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/ac_6160_2006.html

• Samson vs. Era, A.C. No. 6664, July 16, 2013

Facts: The complainant and his relatives were among the investors who fell prey
to the pyramiding scam perpetrated by ICS Corporation led by Emilia Sison and
several others. They engaged the services of Atty. Era to represent and assist
him and his relatives in the prosecution of criminal case against Sison and her
group. Pursuant to the engagement, Atty. Era prepared the demand letter
demanding the return or refund of the money subject of their complaints. He also
prepared the complaint-affidavit that Samson signed and swore to and
subsequently presented to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
(OCPQC). After the preliminary investigation, the OCPQC formally charged
Sison and the others with several counts of estafa in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 96 (RTC), in Quezon City. In April 2003, Atty. Era called a meeting with
Samson and his relatives to discuss the possibility of an amicable settlement with
Sison and her cohorts. He told Samson and the others that undergoing a trial of
the cases would just be a waste of time, money and effort for them, and that they
could settle the cases with Sison and her group, with him guaranteeing the
turnover to them of a certain property located in Antipolo City belonging to ICS
Corporation in exchange for their desistance. They acceded and executed the
affidavit of desistance he prepared, and in turn they received a deed of
assignment covering land registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. R-
4475 executed by Sison in behalf of ICS Corporation. After an amicable
settlement and several negotiations with Sison and her cohorts, Atty. Era
expressed that he already accomplished his professional responsibility towards
Samson. They also later found out that they could not liquidate the property
subject to the amicable settlement. During the hearings in the RTC, Atty. Era did
not anymore appear for Samson and his group. They found out that Atty. Era had
already been entering his appearance as the counsel for Sison in her other
criminal cases involving the same pyramiding scam. On January 20, 2005,
Samson executed an affidavit alleging the foregoing antecedents and prayed for
Atty. Era’s disbarment on the ground of his violation of the trust, confidence and
respect reposed in him as their counsel.

Atty. Era was required to file his Comment. After several extensions, Atty. Era
finally filed his Comment on April 11, 2006 in the OBC. He alleged that the
lawyer-client relationship ended when Samson and his group entered into the
compromise settlement. The case was referred to IBP for investigation, report
and recommendation. IBP Recommendation: the Investigating Commissioner
found Atty. Era guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests, failing
to serve his client with competence and diligence and champion the latter’s
cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion – suspended from the
practice of law for 6 months IBP Board of Governors: adopted and approved the
IBP recommendation with modification that Atty. Era be suspended from the
practice of law for 2 years.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Era violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
on conflict of interests.

Ruling. YES. The Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the IBP. The lawyer-
client relationship did not terminate when the parties entered into a compromise
settlement, for the fact remained that he still needed to oversee the
implementation of the settlement as well as to proceed with the criminal cases
until they were dismissed or otherwise concluded by the trial court. It is also
relevant to indicate that the execution of a compromise settlement in the criminal
cases did not ipso facto cause the termination of the cases not only because the
approval of the compromise by the trial court was still required, but also because
the compromise would have applied only to the civil aspect, and excluded the
criminal aspect pursuant to Article 2034 of the Civil Code. Rule 15.03, Canon 15
of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that: "A lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts." Atty. Era thus owed to Samson and his group
entire devotion to their genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of their rights. He was expected to exert his best efforts and ability to
preserve the clients’ cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his clients
likewise served the ends of justice.

Contrary to Atty. Era’s ill-conceived attempt to explain his disloyalty to Samson

and his group, the termination of the attorney-client relationship does not justify a
lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former
client. The spirit behind this rule is that the client’s confidence once given should
not be stripped by the mere expiration of the professional employment. Even
after the severance of the relation, a lawyer should not do anything that will
injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which the lawyer previously
represented the client. Nor should the lawyer disclose or use any of the client’s
confidences acquired in the previous relation. In this regard, Canon 17 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility expressly declares that: "A lawyer owes
fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him." The lawyer’s highest and most unquestioned duty is
to protect the client at all hazards and costs even to himself. The protection given
to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation,
nor is it affected by the client’s ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining
another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the
death of the client. In the absence of the express consent from Samson and his
group after full disclosure to them of the conflict of interest, therefore, the most
ethical thing for Atty. Era to have done was either to outrightly decline
representing and entering his appearance as counsel for Sison, or to advice
Sison to engage another lawyer for herself. Unfortunately, he did neither, and
should now suffer the proper sanction.

NOTES: Prohibition against conflict of interest rests on 5 rationales, rendered as

follows:

1st : the law seeks to assure clients that their lawyers will represent them with
undivided loyalty
2nd : the prohibition against conflicts of interest seeks to enhance the
effectiveness of legal representation

3rd : a client has a legal right to have the lawyer safeguard the client’s
confidential information

4th : conflicts rules help ensure that lawyers will not exploit clients, such as by
inducing a client to make a gift to the lawyer

5th : some conflict-of-interest rules protect interests of the legal system in

obtaining adequate presentations to tribunals. Reason: the rule is grounded in
the fiduciary obligation of loyalty. The nature of their relationship is, therefore,
one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.

DISPOSITION: The Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES Atty. EDGARDO O. ERA

guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15, and Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two
years effective upon his receipt of this decision, with a warning that his
commission of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jul2013/ac_6664_2013.html

• Hornilla vs. Salunat, 405 SCRA 220 (2003) Page 18 of 20

Facts: Benedicto Hornilla is a member of the Philippine Public School Teachers
Association (PPSTA). Along with several other complainants, Hornilla filed intra-
corporate cases before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against
PPSTA board members for unlawful spending and the undervalued sale of real
property.

Atty. Ernesto Salunat on the other hand is a member of the ASSA Law and
Associates, and a retained legal counsel of PPSTA. As retained counsel, he
represented PPSTA in the cases against them by Hornilla and other members.

Hornilla alleged that Atty. Salunat is laboring under conflict of interests for
engaging with PPSTA, where his fees are derived from the corporate funds that
its members, including himself, contributed on.
Atty. Salunat refused to withdraw his representation despite being told by PPSTA
members about the conflict of interest. For his part, he contends that his
representation was in behalf of ASSA Law and Associates, being the retained
legal counsel of PPSTA, and not under his personal capacity.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Salunat is indeed representing conflicting interests

for representing members of the same corporation in a derivative suit?

Held: Atty. Salunat is found guilty of representing conflicting interests. Engaging

as counsel for a corporation and representing part of its members in a derivative
suit would normally give rise to a conflict of interests.

Since this is still his first offense, Atty. Salunat is admonished to observe a higher
degree of fidelity in his professional practice, and is further warned that a
repetition of such act will be dealt with severely.

DISPOSITION: Respondent Atty. Ernesto Salunat is found GUILTY of

representing conflicting interests and is ADMONISHED to observe a higher
degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession. He is further WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/jul2003/ac_5804_2003.html

• George Solatan vs. Inocentes, 466 SCRA 1 (2005)

FACTS: Atty. Jose A. Camano was an associate in the firm of Atty. Oscar
Inocentes. The Oscar Inocentes and Associates Law Office was retained by
spouses Genito, owners of an apartment complex when the Genito Apartments
were placed under sequestration by the PCGG. They represented the spouses
Genito before the PCGG and the Sandiganbayan and in ejectment cases against
non-paying tenants occupying the Genito Apartments.

Solatan's sister (Gliceria Solatan) was a tenant of the Genito Apartments. It

appears from the records that Gliceria Solatan left for the United States in 1986,
and since then, the apartment was either intermittently used by members of her
family or placed under the charge of caretakers. A complaint for ejectment for
non-payment of rentals was filed against her and the decision was rendered in a
judgment by default ordering her to vacate the premises.

George Solatan was occupying said apartment when he learned of the judgment.
He informed Atty. Inocentes of his desire to arrange execution of a new lease
contract by virtue of which he would be the new lessee of the apartment.
Atty.Inocentes referred him to Atty. Camano, the attorney in charge of ejectment
cases against tenants of theGenito Apartments.

During the meeting with Atty. Camano, a verbal agreement was made in which
the complainant George Solatan agreed to pay the entire judgment debt of his
sister, including awarded attorney’s fees and costs of suit. Complainant George
Solatan issued a check in the name of Atty. Camano which is representing half of
the attorney’s fees.

Complainant George Solatan failed to make any other payment. The sheriff in
coordination with Atty. Camano enforced the writ of execution and levied the
properties found in the subject apartment. Complainant renegotiated and Atty.
Camano agreed to release the levied properties and allow the complainant to
remain at the apartment. Acting on Atty. Camano’s advice, the complainant
presented an affidavit of ownership to the sheriff who released the levied items.

However, a Northern Hill 3-burner gas stove was not returned to the complainant
but was kept by Atty. Camano in the unit of the Genito Apartments where he was
temporarily staying and, thereafter, turned over the same to a certain Recto
Esberto, caretaker of the Genito Apartments.

Complainant filed the instant administrative case for disbarment against Atty.
Camano and Atty.Inocentes. The IBP Board of Governors resolved to suspend
Atty. Camano from the practice of law for 1 year and to reprimand Atty. Inocentes
for exercising command responsibility.

ISSUES: 1)Whether or not Atty. Camano violated the Code of Professional

Responsibility
2)Whether or not Atty. Inocentes violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD: All lawyers must observe loyalty in all transactions and dealings with their
clients.An attorney has no right to act as counsel or legal representative for a
person without being retained. No employment relation was offered or accepted
in the instant case. Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires
all lawyers to observe loyalty in all transactions and dealings with their clients.
Unquestionably, an attorney giving legal advice to a party with an interest
conflicting with that of his client may be held guilty of disloyalty.

However, the advice given by Atty. Camano in the context where the
complainant was the rightful owner of the incorrectly levied properties was
in consonance with his duty as an officer of the court. It should not be
construed as being in conflict with the interest of the spouses Genito as
they have no interest over the properties. The act of informing complainant
that his properties would be returned upon showing proof of his ownership may
hint at infidelity to his clients but lacks the essence of double dealing and
betrayal.

Atty. Inocentes’ failure to exercise certain responsibilities over matters

under the charge of his law firm is a blameworthy shortcoming. As name
practitioner of the law office, Atty. Inocentes is tasked with the
responsibility to make reasonable efforts to ensure that all lawyers in the
firm should act in conformity to the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility.
Atty. Inocentes received periodic reports from Atty. Camano on the latter’s
dealings with the complainant. This is the linchpin of his supervisory capacity
over Atty. Camano and liability by virtue thereof. Partners and practitioners who
hold supervisory capacities are legally responsible to exert ordinary diligence in
apprising themselves of the comings and goings of the cases handled by
persons over which they are exercising supervisory authority and in exerting
necessary efforts to foreclose violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility by persons under their charge.

DISPOSITION:The Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolution dated 16 April

2004 is AFFIRMED in respect of the sanction meted out on Atty. Camano. Atty.
Inocentes is hereby ADMONISHED to monitor more closely the activities of his
associates to make sure that the same are in consonance with the Code of
Professional Responsibility with the WARNING that repetition of the same or
similar omission will be dealt with more severely.
FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/aug2005/ac_6504_2005.html

• Daging vs. Davis, A.C. No. 9395, November 12, 2014

Facts: This administrative complaint for disbarment arose from an Affidavit
Complaint filed by Daria O. Daging (complainant) before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), Benguet Chapter,2 against Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis
(respondent).

Complainant was the owner and operator of Nashville Country Music Lounge.
She leased it from Benjie Pinlac (Pinlac).

Meanwhile, complainant received a Retainer Proposal from Davis & Sabling Law
Office signed by respondent and his partner Atty. Amos Saganib Sabling (Atty.
Sabling) and eventually resulted in the signing by the complainant.

Complainant was delinquent in paying the monthly rentals, Pinlac terminated the
lease. Together with Novie Balageo (Balageo) and respondent, Pinlac went to
complainant's music bar, inventoried all the equipment therein, and informed her
that Balageo would take over the operation of the bar. Complainant averred that
subsequently respondent acted as business partner of Balageo in operating the
bar under her business name, which they later renamed Amarillo Music Bar.

Complainant alleged that she filed an ejectment case against Pinlac and Balageo
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Baguio City. At that
time, Davis & Sabling Law Office was still her counsel as their Retainer
Agreement remained subsisting and in force. However, respondent appeared as
counsel for Balageo in that ejectment case

In his Comment, respondent denied participation in the takeover or acting as a

business partner of Balageo in the operation of the bar. He asserted that Balageo
is the sole proprietress of the establishment. He insisted that it was Atty. Sabling,
his partner, who initiated the proposal and was in fact the one who was able to
convince complainant to accept the law office as her retainer. Respondent
maintained that he never obtained any knowledge or information regarding the
business of complainant who used to consult only Atty. Sabling. Respondent
admitted though having represented Balageo in the ejectment case, but denied
that he took advantage of the Retainer Agreement between complainant and
Davis and Sabling Law Office.

The Investigating Commissioner rendered a Report and Recommendation finding

respondent guilty of betrayal of his client's trust and for misuse of information
obtained from his client to the disadvantage of the latter and to the advantage of
another person. He recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of one year.

Issue: WON respondent violated the Canon upon appearing as lawyer in the
ejectment case?

Held: Based on the established facts, it is indubitable that respondent

transgressed Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. It provides:

Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

"A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as
counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or
former client." The prohibition against representing conflicting interests is
absolute and the rule applies even if the lawyer has acted in good faith and with
no intention to represent conflicting interests. In Quiambao v. Atty. Bamba, this
Court emphasized that lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the
client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-
dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.

Respondent argues that while complainant is a client of Davis & Sabling Law
office, her case is actually handled only by his partner Atty. Sabling. He was not
privy to any transaction between Atty. Sabling and complainant and has no
knowledge of any information or legal matter complainant entrusted or confided
to his law partner. He thus inveigles that he could not have taken advantage of
information obtained by his law firm by virtue of the Retainer Agreement. We are
not impressed.
In Hilado v. David, reiterated in Gonzales v. Atty. Cabucana, Jr.,this Court held
that a lawyer who takes up the cause of the adversary of the party who has
engaged the services of his law firm brings the law profession into public
disrepute and suspicion and undermines the integrity of justice. Thus,
respondent's argument that he never took advantage of any information acquired
by his law firm in the course of its professional dealings with the complainant,
even assuming it to be true, is of no moment. Undeniably aware of the fact that
complainant is a client of his law firm, respondent should have immediately
informed both the complainant and Balageo that he, as well as the other
members of his law firm, cannot represent any of them in their legal tussle;
otherwise, they would be representing conflicting interests and violate the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Indeed, respondent could have simply advised
both complainant and Balageo to instead engage the services of another lawyer.

DISPOSITION: The Court ADOPTS and AFFIRMS the January 15, 2012
Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors. Atty. Riz
Tingalon L. Davis is found GUILTY of violating Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of six (6) months effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is
warned that a commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result
in the imposition of a stiffer penalty.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/nov2014/ac_9395_2014.html

• Quiambao vs. Bamba, 468 SCRA 1 (2005)

Facts: Felicitas Quiambao was the president and managing director of Allied
Investigation Bureau, Inc (AIB). Quiambao procured the legal services of Atty.
Nestor Bamba for the corporate affairs of AIB. Atty. Bamba was also the official
legal counsel of an ejectment case filed by Quiambao against spouses Santiago
and Florito Torroba.

When Quiambao resigned from AIB, Atty. Bamba, without withdrawing as

counsel from the ejectment case, represented AIB in a complaint case for
replevin and damages against her. Quiambao filed charges against Atty. Bamba
for representing conflicting interests and violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
For his part, Atty. Bamba denies that he was a personal lawyer of Quiambao,
and he believes that it is part of his duty to pursue cases in behalf of employees
at the time Quiambao was working in AIB. Even then, Atty. Bamba contends that
the ejectment case and replevin case are completely unrelated.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Bamba is guilty of misconduct for representing

conflicting interests in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held: Yes, Atty. Bamba is representing conflicting interests. Despite Atty.

Bamba’s contention that his legals services extend to AIB’s employees, this
should not cover the personal cases filed by its officers.

Even though the replevin and ejectment case are unrelated, representing
opposing clients therein gives rise to suspicions of double-dealing, and would
thus result to a conflict of interest.

Furthermore, Atty. Bamba failed to show that he disclosed or procured the

approval of Quiambao before pursuing the replevin case against her. Atty.
Bamba was found guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and
was suspended from practicing for one (1) year.

DISPOSITION: Respondent Atty. Nestor A. Bamba is hereby held GUILTY of

violation of Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 and Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of ONE (1) YEAR effective from receipt of this Resolution, with a warning
that a similar infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely

FULL TEXT:
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/aug2005/ac_6708_2005.html#:~:text=Quiamb
ao%20charges%20respondent%20Atty.,of%20disloyalty%20and%20double
%2Ddealing.

• Alisbo vs. Jalandoon, 199 SCRA 321 (1991)

Facts:
• A verified complaint for disbarment was filed with then Secretary of
National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile on January 2, 1974, by Ramona L. Vda. de
Alisbo and Norberto S. Alisbo against their former counsel, Attorney Benito
Jalandoon, Sr., charging him with deceit, malpractice, and professional infidelity.

The facts of the case, as found by the Solicitor General, are the following:

• On March 16, 1970, Ramon Alisbo engaged respondent Attorney Benito

Jalandoon, Sr., as his counsel because Alisbo failed to file a motion for execution
of a judgment in his favor within the reglementary five-year period (Sec. 6, Rule,
39, Rules of Court). The judgment was for the recovery of his share on the estate
of the deceased spouses Catalina Sales and Restituto Gozuma which had been
adjudicated to him by Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental.

• On April 18, 1970, Atty. Jalandoon prepared a complaint for revival of the
judgment in Civil Case but

filed it only on September 12, 1970 on five (5) months later. The complaint was
signed by respondent alone.

• However, he withdrew it and filed a second complaint, with Ramon S.

Alisbo as the lone plaintiff, praying for the same relief.

• On December 8, 1971, an amended complaint was filed were: Ramon S.

Alisbo, assisted by his judicial guardian, Norberto S. Alisbo, and joined with eight
(8) others. The amended complaint was signed by Attorney Bernardo B. Pablo
alone as counsel of the plaintiffs.

• On August 21, 1973, defendant Carlito Sales filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the action for revival of judgment in Civil Case had
already prescribed.

• On October 3, 1973, the CFI of Negros Occidental dismissed the complaint

on the ground of prescription as the judgment in Civil Case No. 4963 became
final on May 30, 1961.
• On January 2, 1974, the complainants charged respondent Attorney Benito
Jalandoon, Sr. with having deliberately caused the dismissal of Civil Case with
having concealed from them the material fact that he had been the former legal
counsel of Carlito Sales, their adversary in the probate proceedings.

The respondent filed a general denial of the charges against him. According to
him to Attorney , it was only on October 6, 1972, when Civil Case No. 9559 was
called for pre-trial, that he discovered his previous professional relationship with
Sales. At that time, the ten-year prescriptive period for revival of the judgment in
favor of Alisbo had already expired. He thereupon asked Alisbo's permission to
allow him (Jalandoon) to withdraw from the case. He also informed the court
about his untenable position and requested that he be allowed to retire
therefrom. His request was granted.

The Solicitor General who investigated the matter made the following
observations:

Evident from the foregoing is the fact that in handling the case for Ramon S.
Alisbo which eventually led to its dismissal, respondent committed several errors,
among which are:

1. He did not verify the real status of Ramon Alisbo before filing the case.
Otherwise, his lack of capacity to sue would not have been at issue.

2. He postponed the motion to revive judgment and gave way instead to a

motion to resolve pending incidents in Civil Case 4963. In doing so, he frittered
away precious time.

3. He dropped Ramon Alisbo's co-plaintiffs and impleaded them as

defendants. Otherwise, the complaint would have been defective only in part.

Issue: Whether Atty. Jalandoon be held responsible for the dismissal of the case
and had betrayed his client’s trust. Yes.

Ruling: Attorney Jalandoon, betrayed his client Ramon Alisbo's trust and did not
champion his cause with that wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion that a
lawyer is obligated to give to every case that he accepts from a client. There is
more than simple negligence resulting in the extinguishment and loss of his
client's right of action; there is a hint of duplicity and lack of candor in his dealings
with his client, which call for the exercise of this Court's disciplinary power.

After filing the complaint, Attorney Jalandoon sat on the case. While he allegedly
found out about Ramon Alisbo's insanity on July 17, 1971 only, he amended the
complaint to implead Alisbo's legal guardian as plaintiff on December 8, 1971
only, or almost five (5) months later. By that time the prescriptive period had run
out.

In view of his former association with the Saleses, Attorney Jalandoon, as a

dutiful lawyer, should have declined the employment proffered by Alisbo on the
ground of conflict of interest. Had he done that soon enough, the Alisbos (herein
complainants) would have had enough time to engage the services of another
lawyer and they would not have lost their case through prescription of the action.

It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent

of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of
this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client,
it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to
oppose.

The Court, after due deliberation, decided to suspend him for a period of
two (2) years from the finality of this decision.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Attorney Jalandoon's pretense that he did not know before the pre-trial that
the Sales defendants had been his clients in the past, is unbelievable because:

1. Before he filed the complaint for revival of judgment, he had had several
interviews with Ramon S. Alisbo and Norberto Alisbo regarding Civil Case No.
4963.

2. He must have done some research on the court records of Civil Case No.
4963, so he could not have overlooked his own participation in that case as
counsel for Carlito Sales, et al.
3. To prepare the complaint for revival of judgment (Civil Case No. 9559), he
had to inform himself about the personal circumstances of the defendants-Carlito
Sales, et al. The fact that they had been his clients could not have eluded him.

DISPOSITION: The Honorable Solicitor General who conducted the investigation

of this case found respondent Attorney Benito Jalandoon, Sr. guilty of serious
misconduct and infidelity. Although the Solicitor General recommended the
suspension of respondent Attorney Benito Jalandoon Sr. from the practice of law
for a period of one (1) year, the Court, after due deliberation, decided to suspend
him for a period of two (2) years from the finality of this decision.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1991/jul1991/am_1311_1991.html

• Heirs of Falame vs. Baguio, 548 SCRA 1 (2008)

DISPOSITION:

FULL TEXT:

• Aninon vs. Sabitsana, Jr., A.R. No. 5098, April 11, 2012
Facts: In her complaint, Josefina M. Aniñon (complainant) related that she
previously engaged the legal services of Atty. Sabitsana in the preparation and
execution in her favor of a Deed of Sale over a parcel of land owned by her late
common-law husband Brigido Caneja, Jr.. Respondent allegedly violated her
confidence when he subsequently filed a civil case against her for the annulment
of the Deed of Sale in behalf of Zenaida L. Cañete, the legal wife of Brigido
Caneja, Jr. The complainant accused Respondent of using the confidential
information he obtained from her in filing the civil case.

Issue: Whether Respondent is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting

interests.

Held: Yes, the court agree with the findings and recommendations of the IBP
Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors. The relationship between a
lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust
and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must prevail to
promote a full disclosure of the client’s most confidential information to his/her
lawyer for an unhampered exchange of information between them. Needless to
state, a client can only entrust confidential information to his/her lawyer based on
an expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for
his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all dealings and
transactions with the client. Part of the lawyer’s duty in this regard is to avoid
representing conflicting interests, a matter covered by Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which a lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts. “The proscription against representation of conflicting
interests applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present clients in
the same action or in an unrelated action.” The prohibition also applies even if
the “lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the
lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to
use the confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the
other as the two actions are wholly unrelated.”

To be held accountable under this rule, it is “enough that the opposing parties in
one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or
conditions of the lawyer’s respective retainers with each of them would affect the
performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.” Jurisprudence has
provided three tests in determining whether a violation of the above rule is
present in a given case. One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for
an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that
claim for the other client. Thus, if a lawyer’s argument for one client has to be
opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a violation of
the rule. Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a
new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided
fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-
dealing in the performance of that duty. Still another test is whether the lawyer
would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any
confidential information acquired through their connection or previous
employment. On the basis of the attendant facts of the case, we find substantial
evidence to support Respondent’s violation of the above rule, as established by
the following circumstances on record:
One, his legal services were initially engaged by the complainant to protect her
interest over a certain property. The records show that upon the legal advice of
Respondent, the Deed of Sale over the property was prepared and executed in
the complainant’s favor.

Two, Respondent met with Zenaida Cañete to discuss the latter’s legal interest
over the property subject of the Deed of Sale. At that point, Respondent already
had knowledge that Zenaida Cañete’s interest clashed with the complainant’s
interests.

Three, despite the knowledge of the clashing interests between his two clients,
Respondent accepted the engagement from Zenaida Cañete.

Four, Respondent’s actual knowledge of the conflicting interests between his two
clients was demonstrated by his own actions: first, he filed a case against the
complainant in behalf of Zenaida Cañete; second, he impleaded the complainant
as the defendant in the case; and third, the case he filed was for the annulment
of the Deed of Sale that he had previously prepared and executed for the
complainant.

DISPOSITION: The Court resolves to ADOPT the findings and recommendations

of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty.
Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. is found GUILTY of misconduct for representing
conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED for one (1) year from
the practice of law.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/ac_5098_2012.html

• Orola vs. Ramos, A.C. No. 9860, September 11, 2013

Facts: Complainants, except Karen Orola, are the heirs of the late Trinidad who
is married to Emilio. Meanwhile, complainant Karen Orola is the daughter of
Maricar and one of Antonio's heirs. In the settlement of Trinidads estate the
parties were represented by the following: (a) Atty. Villa as counsel for and in
behalf of the Heirs of Trinidad; (b) Atty. Azarraga as counsel for and in behalf of
Heirs of Antonio,with respondent as collaborating counsel; and (c) Atty. Aquiliana
Brotarlo as counsel for and in behalf of Emilio, the initially appointed
administrator of Trinidads estate. In the course of the proceedings, the Heirs of
Trinidad and the Heirs of Antonio moved for the removal of Emilio as
administrator and, in his stead, sought the appointment of the latters son, which
the RTC granted.

Subsequently, respondent filed an Entry of Appearance as collaborating counsel

for Emilio in the same case and moved for the reconsideration of the RTC Order.
Due to this, complainants filed the instant disbarment complaint before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), claiming that he violated: (a) Rule 15.03
of the Code, as he undertook to represent conflicting interests in the subject
case;and (b) Section 20(e), Rule 138 of the Rules, as he breached the trust and
confidence reposed upon him by his clients, the Heirs of Antonio.Complainants
further claimed that while Maricar consented to the withdrawal of respondents
appearance, the same was obtained only after he had already entered his
appearance for Emilio.In this accord, respondent failed to disclose such fact to all
the affected heirs and, as such, was not able to obtain their written consent as
required under the Rules.

Respondent refuted the charges contending that he never appeared as counsel

for the Heirs of Trinidad or for the Heirs of Antonio. He pointed out that the
records of the case readily show that the Heirs of Trinidad were represented by
Atty. Villa, while the Heirs of Antonio were exclusively represented by Atty.
Azarraga. He averred that he only accommodated Maricar's request to
temporarily appear on her behalf and that his appearances were free of
charge.He also obtained Maricars permission for him to withdraw from the case
and to represent Emilio. He added that he had no knowledge that the late
Antonio had other heirs and that no information was disclosed to him by Maricar
or their counsel of record at any instance. Finally, he clarified that his
representation for Emilio in the subject case was more of a mediator, rather than
a litigator,and that since no settlement was forged between the parties, he
formally withdrew his appearance.In support of his assertions, respondent
submitted the affidavits of Maricarand Atty. Azarraga.

In the Report and Recommendation of the IBP, respondent was found guilty of
representing conflicting interests but was held that there was no violation of
Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules as complainants themselves admitted that
respondent did not acquire confidential information from his former client nor did
he use against the latter any knowledge obtained in the course of his previous
employment. Considering that it was respondent's first offense, the imposition of
disbarment is too harsh thus recommended that he be severely reprimanded.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the
aforementioned report and imposed against respondent the penalty of six (6)
months suspension from the practice of law.

Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests in

violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code

Ruling: Yes. Respondent is guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code because a
lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose interests oppose those
of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same
action or on totally unrelated cases. Rule 15.03 of the Code reads: CANON 15 A
LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS. Rule 15.03 - A lawyer
shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two

or more opposing parties.The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is
the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the
other client. Respondent's justification that no confidential information was
relayed to him cannot fully exculpate him for the charges against him since the
rule on conflict of interests provides an absolute prohibition from representation
with respect to opposing parties in the same case. The Court concurs with the
IBPs finding that respondent violated Rule 15.03 of the Code, but finds the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months to
be more appropriate taking into consideration the following factors:
● first, respondent is a first time offender;
● second, it is undisputed that respondent merely accommodated Maricars
request out of gratis to temporarily represent her;
● third, it is likewise undisputed that respondent had no knowledge that the
late Antonio had any other heirs aside from Maricar whose consent he
actually acquired, hence, it can be said that he acted in good faith; and
● fourth, complainants admit that respondent did not acquire confidential
information from the Heirs of Antonio nor did he use against them any
 knowledge obtained in the course of his previous employment, hence, the
said heirs were not in any manner prejudiced by his subsequent
engagement with Emilio.

DISPOSITION: Respondent Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos is hereby held GUILTY of

representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03,Canon 15 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) months, with WARNING that a repetition
of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/sep2013/ac_9860_2013.html

• PCGG vs. Sandiganbayan, 455 SCRA 546 (2005) - DONE

FACTS: In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK)
encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable financial
support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily
overdrawings on its current account with Central Bank. Despite the mega loans
GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. The Central Bank issued a
resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with
safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its
liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held where Lucio Tan
group submitted the winning bid. Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a
petition with the CFI praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in
GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by RA 265. After EDSA Revolution I Pres
Aquino established the PCGG to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former
Pres Marcos, his family and cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG filed
with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution
against respondents Lucio Tan, at.al. PCGG issued several writs of
sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by them by taking advantage of
their close relationship and influence with former Pres. Marcos. The
abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are represented as their counsel, former
Solicitor General Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent
Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan et. al. with Sandiganbayan. It was
alleged that Mendoza as then Sol Gen and counsel to Central Bank actively
intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK which was subsequently acquired by
respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently became Allied Banking Corporation.
The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which prohibits former government lawyers from accepting
“engagement” or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in the said service. The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution
denyting PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. It failed to prove the
existence of an inconsistency between respondent Mendoza’s former function as
SolGen and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. PCGGs
recourse to this court assailing the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE: Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to

respondent Mendoza. The prohibition states: “A lawyer shall not, after leaving
government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in the said service.”

HELD:
The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03.
Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he
acted as SOlGen and later as counsel of respondents et.al. before the
Sandiganbayan. However there is still the issue of whether there exists a
“congruent-interest conflict” sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from
representing respondents et. al. The key is unlocking the meaning of “matter”
and the metes and bounds of “intervention” that he made on the matter. Beyond
doubt that the “matter” or the act of respondent Mendoza as SolGen involved in
the case at bar is “advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said
bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation in CFI of Manila.

The Court held that the advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure
to liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear in stressing
that “drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations and laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do not
fall within the scope of the term “matter” and cannot disqualify. Respondent
Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate
GENBANK. He also did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank.
The legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration
cases.
Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and
liquidation of banks. Thus, the Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged
intervention while SolGen is an intervention on a matter different from the
matter involved in the Civil case of sequestration. In the metes and bounds of
the “intervention”. The applicable meaning as the term is used in the Code of
Professional Ethics is that it is an act of a person who has the power to influence
the subject proceedings. The evil sought to be remedied by the Code do not exist
where the government lawyer does not act which can be considered as
innocuous such as “ drafting, enforcing, or interpreting government or agency
procedures, regulations or laws or briefing abstract principles of law.” The court
rules that the intervention of Mendoza is not significant and substantial. He
merely petitions that the court gives assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK.
The role of court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the
Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding the role
of the SolGen is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of
government.

Petition assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is denied.

Relevant Dissenting Opinion of Justice Callejo:

Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: “ A
lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ,
should not after his retirement accept employment in connection with any matter
which he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.”
Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position as a
vehicle to promote or advance his private interests extends beyond his tenure on
certain matters in which he intervened as a public official. Rule 6.03 makes this
restriction specifically applicable to lawyers who once held public office.” A plain
reading shows that the interdiction 1. applies to a lawyer who once served in the
government and 2. relates to his accepting “engagement or employment” in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the service.

DISPOSITION: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated

July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan
in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is denied.
FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/apr2005/gr_151809-
12_2005.html
F. Privileged communication: confidences and
secrets

Questions:
• What is the attorney-client privilege? What is its rationale?

• What is the extent of its scope? Limitations?

1) Codal provisions:

• Canon 21: Preserve client’s confidences and secrets

• CPR Rule 21.01

• CPR Rule 21.02

• CPR Rule 21.03

• CPR Rule 21.04

• CPR Rule 21.05

• CPR Rule 21.06

• CPR Rule 21.07, cf. CPR Rule 15.01, Rule 14.03

• CPR Rule 15.02

• ROC Rule 138, Sec. 20 (e)

• ROC Rule 130, Sec. 21 (b)

• Art. 208, Revised Penal Code

• CPE, Canon 37

2) Cases:
• Genato vs. Silapan, 406 SCRA 75 (2003)
FACTS: In July 1992, respondent asked if he could rent a small office
space in the complainant's building in Quezon City for his law
practice.Complainant acceded and introduced respondent to Atty. Benjamin
Dacanay, complainant’s retained lawyer, who accommodated respondent in
the building and made him handle some of complainant’s cases.Hence, the
start of the legal relationship between complainant and respondent.The conflict
between the parties started when respondent borrowed P200,000.00 from
complainant which he intended to use as down payment for the purchase of a
new car.In return, respondent issued to complainant a postdated check in the
amount ofP176,528.00 to answer for the six (6) months interest on the loan.He
likewise mortgaged to complainant his house and lot in Quezon City but did
not surrender its title claiming that it was the subject of reconstitution
proceedings before the Quezon City Register of Deeds.

With the money borrowed from complainant, respondent purchased a new

car.However, the document of sale of the car was issued in complainant’s
name and financed through City Trust Company. In January 1993,
respondent introduced to complainant a certain Emmanuel Romero.Romero
likewise wanted to borrow money from complainant.Complainant lent
Romero the money and, from this transaction, respondent earned
commission in the amount ofP52,289.90.Complainant used the commission
to pay respondent’s arrears with the car financing firm.Subsequently,
respondent failed to pay the amortization on the car and the financing firm sent
demand letters to complainant.Complainant tried to encash respondent’s
postdated check with the drawee bank but it was dishonored as respondent’s
account therein was already closed.Respondent failed to heed complainant’s
repeated demands for payment.

Complainant then filed a criminal case against respondent for violation of

Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and a civil case for judicial foreclosure of real
estate mortgage.
In the foreclosure case, respondent made the following allegation in his Answer:

xxx xxx xxx

4. That complainant is a businessman who is engaged in the real estate

business, trading and buy and sell of deficiency taxed imported cars, shark loans
and other shady deals and has many cases pending in court;

In a Resolution, dated October 27, 1993, the Court referred the administrative
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. On August 3, 2002, the Board of Governors of the
IBP approved the report of the investigating commissioner finding the
respondent guilty as charged and recommending his suspension from the
practice of law for one (1) year.

Respondent’s Answer:
When required by the Court to comment, respondent explained that it was
complainant who offered him an office space in his building and retained him as
counsel as the latter was impressed with the way he handled a B.P. 22 case filed
against complainant. Respondent insisted that there was nothing libelous in
his imputations of dishonest business practices to complainant and his
revelation of complainant's desire to bribe government officials in relation
to his pending criminal case. He claimed to have made these statements in
the course of judicial proceedings to defend his case and discredit
complainant's credibility by establishing his criminal propensity to commit
fraud, tell lies and violate laws. He argued that he is not guilty of breaking
his confidential lawyer-client relationship with complainant as he made the
disclosure in defense of his honor and reputation.

Secondly, respondent asserted that he executed the real estate mortgage in

favor of complainant without consideration and only as a "formal requirement" so
he could obtain the P200,000.00 loan and for this reason, he did not surrender
his title over the mortgaged property to complainant.
Thirdly, respondent claimed that he issued the postdated check, not for account
or for value, but only: (a) to serve as "some kind of acknowledgment" that he
already received in advance a portion of his attorney's fees from the complainant
for the legal services he rendered, and (b) as a form of assurance that he will not
abandon the cases he was handling for complainant.

Lastly, respondent denied that he received a P52,289.90 commission from

Romero's loan which he allegedly helped facilitate. He alleged that the amount
was paid to him by Romero as attorney's fees, the latter being his client. He used
this amount to pay his arrears with the car financing firm. On January 29, 1993,
before paying the next amortization on the car, he asked complainant to execute
a deed of sale transferring ownership of the car to him. Complainant refused
and insisted that he would transfer ownership of the car only after the
termination of his criminal case which respondent was handling as his
defense lawyer. Consequently, respondent stopped paying the amortization on
the car. Respondent also alleged that he filed a perjury case against complainant
who, in turn, filed a complaint for libel against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent committed a breach of trust and

confidence by imputing to complainant illegal practices and disclosing
complainant’s alleged intention to bribe government officials in connection with a
pending case.

RULING:The Supreme Court affirmed the findings and recommendation of the

IBP.
It must be stressed, however, that the privilege against disclosure of confidential
communications or information is limited only to communications which are
legitimately and properly within the scope of a lawful employment of a lawyer. It
does not extend to those made in contemplation of a crime or perpetration of a
fraud. If the unlawful purpose is avowed, as in this case, the complainant's
alleged intention to bribe government officials in relation to his case, the
communication is not covered by the privilege as the client does not consult the
lawyer professionally. It is not within the profession of a lawyer to advise a client
as to how he may commit a crime as a lawyer is not a gun for hire. Thus, the
attorney-client privilege does not attach, there being no professional employment
in the strict sense.
Be that as it may, respondent's explanation that it was necessary for him to make
the disclosures in his pleadings fails to satisfy the court.

The disclosures were not indispensable to protect his rights as they were not
pertinent to the foreclosure case.It was improper for the respondent to use
it against the complainant in the foreclosure case as it was not the subject matter
of litigation and respondent’s professional competence and legal advice were not
being attacked in said case.A lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his
dealings with his clients, with integrity in a manner that is beyond
reproach.His relationship with his clients should be characterized by the highest
degree of good faith and fairness.

Court agrees with the evaluation of the IBP and finds that respondent’s
allegations and disclosures in the foreclosure case amount to a breach of
fidelity sufficient to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against
him.However, the recommended penalty of one (1) year suspension of
respondent from the practice of law seems to be disproportionate to his
breach of duty considering that a review of the records of this Court reveals that
this is the first administrative complaint against him.Wherefore, Atty. Essex L.
Silapan is ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months

DISPOSITION: Respondent Atty. Essex L. Silapan is ordered suspended from

the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective upon receipt of this
Decision. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant
and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Court Administrator is directed to
circulate this order of suspension to all courts in the country.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/jul2003/ac_4078_2003.html

• Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, 262 SCRA 122 (1996)

FACTS OF THE CASE: The Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), raised a complaint before the Sandiganbayan(SB) against Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr. and Teodoro Regala and his partners in the ACCRA law firm, for
the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the
named corporations in PCGG Case No. 33 (Civil Case No. 0033), entitled
"Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo Cojuangco, et al."
During the course of the proceedings, PCGG filed a "Motion to Admit Third
Amended Complaint" which excluded private respondent Raul S. Roco from the
complaint on his undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for
whom he acted as nominee/stockholder.

In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint, ACCRA lawyers requested

that PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to them as accorded Roco. The
PCGG has offered to the ACCRA lawyers the same conditions availed of by
Roco but the ACCRA lawyers have refused to disclose the identities of their
clients.ACCRA lawyers filed the petition for certiorari, invoking that the Honorable
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion:
● In subjecting petitioners ACCRA lawyers who acted to the strict application
of the law of agency
● In not considering petitioners ACCRA lawyers and Mr. Roco as similarly
situated and,therefore, deserving of equal treatment.
● In not holding that, under the facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege
prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their
client(s) and other information requested by PCGG.
● In not requiring that the dropping of party-defendants by the PCGG must
be based on reasonable and just grounds and with due consideration to
equal protection of the law.

ISSUE: Whether or not client’s identity in a case involving and acquiring

companies allegedly sourced from ill-gotten wealth is privileged and disclosure of
such is unethical.

RULING: The court held that the client identity in this case is privileged. As a
matter of public policy, a client's identity should not be shrouded in mystery. This
general rule is however qualified by some important exception:

1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing

the client's name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he
sought the lawyer's advice.

2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability

 3) Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client
unless, by revealing the client's name, the said name would furnish the
only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an
individual of a crime.

The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench,

therefore, clearly reveal that the instant case falls under the first and third
exception.

The attorney-client privilege, as currently worded in the Rules of Court provides

the disqualification by reason of privileged communication. Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court further emphasizes the importance of maintaining client confidence.
Furthermore, this duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code
ofProfessional Responsibility. Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
also demands a lawyer's fidelity to client.

The Resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan are hereby annulled and set

aside

DISPOSITION:

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1996/sep1996/gr_105938_1996.html

• People vs. Sandiganbayan, 275 SCRA 505 (1997)

People vs. Sandiganbayan
275 SCRA 505

FACTS: Paredes, was the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then Governor
of the same province and is at present a Congressman. Atty. Sansaet is a
practicing attorney who served as counsel for Paredes in several instances. In
1976, Paredes applied for a free patent over a piece of land and it was granted to
him. But later, the Director of Lands found out that Paredes obtained the same
through fraudulent misrepresentations in his application. A civil case was filed
and Sansaet served as counsel of Paredes. A criminal case for perjury was
subsequently filed against Paredes and Sansaet also served as counsel.
Later, TeofiloGelacio, a taxpayer, initiated perjury and graft charges against
Paredes and Sansaet, claiming that they acted in conspiracy, by not filing an
arraignment in the criminal case. To evade responsibility for his own
participation, he claimed that he did so upon the instigation and inducement of
Paredes, and to discharge himself as a government witness. The Sandiganbayan
claimed that there was an attorney-client privilege and resolved to deny the
discharge.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Atty. Sansaet is barred by the attorney-
client privilege

HELD : Statements and communications regarding the commission of a crime

already committed, made by a party who committed it, to an attorney, consulted
as such, are privileged communications. However, the communication between
an attorney and client having to do with the client's contemplated criminal acts, or
in aid or furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak of privilege ordinarily
existing in reference to communications between an attorney and a client. The
falsification not having been committed yet, these communications are outside
the pale of the attorney client privilege.
Moreover, Sansaet himself was a conspirator in the commission of the
falsification. For the communication to be privileged, it must be for a lawful
purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an unlawful purpose
prevents the privilege from attaching.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted

SETTING ASIDE the impugned resolutions and ORDERING that the present
reliefs sought in these cases by petitioner be allowed and given due course by
respondent Sandiganbayan

FULL TEXT:https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1997/jul1997/gr_115439_41_1997.html

• Castillo vs. Sandiganbayan, 377 SCRA 509 (2002)

FACTS: RP filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution and damages against several persons, one of
which is Gregorio Castillo. The latter was accused of having acted as dummy,
nominee and/or agent of the Marcoses, et al. in establishing Hotel Properties,
Inc., in order to acquire beneficial interest and control, and conceal ownership, of
Silahis International Hotel.
Castillo later died, therefore, a motion to dismiss was subsequently filed on the
ground that the action did not survive the death of petitioner. Sandiganbayan
denied the motion, stating that the case is not only one for recovery of money,
debt or interest thereon, but one for recovery of real and personal property and
that the cause of action being inclusive of claim for damages for tortuous
misconduct.

In another motion to dismiss, petitioner contended that the complaint filed against
Castillo is violative of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege (since Castillo is
attorney-in-fact). But Sandiganbayan ruled that Castillo is sued as principal
defendant for being in conspiracy with other defendants in the commission of the
acts complained of.

Hence this petition.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion

2. Whether or not the suit is violative of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:

The suit is violative of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and must be

dismissed pursuant to the Court’s decision in Regala vs. Sandiganbayan.

THEORY OF DEFENSE:

The ruling in Regala does not apply because in said case, there was a clear
finding that the ACCRA lawyers were impleaded by the PCGG as co-defendants
to force them to disclose the identity of their clients as shown by the PCGG’s
willingness to cut a deal with the ACCRA lawyers – the names of their clients in
exchange for exclusion from the complaint. In the present case, petitioner is
being sued as principal defendant for being in conspiracy with the other
defendants in the commission of the act complained of, and he is not being
required to name his clients.

The claim that petitioner merely acted in his professional capacity as counsel
with neither participation in nor knowledge is a mere allegation not yet proven.
HELD: SC found for the petitioner.

The Court adopted its own ruling in the Regala case, viz: “an argument is
advanced that the invocation by petitioner of the privilege of attorney-client
confidentiality at this state of the proceedings is premature and that they should
wait until they are called to testify and examine as witnesses as to matters
learned in confidence before they can raise their objection. But petitioners are not
mere witnesses. They are co-principals in the case for recovery of alleged ill-
gotten wealth. They have made their position clear from the very beginning that
they are not willing to testify and they cannot be compelled to testify in view of
their constitutional right against self-incrimination and of their fundamental legal
right to maintain inviolate the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality.”

The doctrine of adherence to judicial precedents or stare decisis, provided in Art.

8, C.C., enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It required courts in a country
to follow the rule established in a decision of the Supreme Court thereof. That
decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all
courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that
once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed
settled and closed to further argument.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated

November 24, 1998 and February 18, 1999 are hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent Sandiganbayan is further ordered to exclude petitioner
Gregorio R. Castillo as party-defendant in SB Civil Case NO. 0014 entitled
Republic of the Philippines vs. Modesto Enriquez, et al.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2002/feb2002/gr_138231_2002.html

• Dalisay vs. Mauricio, 479 SCRA 307 (2006)

DALISAY vs MAURICIO JR.

FACTS: The case stemmed from a letter-complaint by Valerina Dalisay against
Atty. Melanio Mauricio for demanding and receiving exorbitant attorney’s fees but
did not take any action on her case. Complainant further alleged that
notwithstanding her payments, respondent never rendered any legal service for
her in civil case 00-044. As a result she terminated their attorney-client
relationship and demanded the return of her money and documents. However,
he refused to do so.

Respondent on his part defended that what was collected as attorney’s fees is for
the legal services by way of legal advice and opinions that the respondent
rendered to her and her family. Thus, he had every right to collect such.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of malpractice and gross misconduct

for violating Canons 17, 18 Rule 18.03 and 20 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, we DENY respondent’s motion for

reconsideration. Our Decision dated April 22, 2005 is immediately executory.
Respondent is directed to report immediately to the Office of the Bar Confidant
his compliance with our Decision.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/jan2006/ac_5655_2006.html

• Lee vs. Simando, A.C. No. 9537, June 10, 2013 Page 19 of 20
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves to
ADOPT the findings and recommendation of the IBP in Resolution No. XIX-20
10-733 suspending respondent Atty. Amador L. Simando for six ( 6) months from
the practice of law, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will warrant a more severe penalty.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant
and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. The
Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to append a copy of this Decision to
respondent's record as member of the Bar.

Atty. Simando is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this
Decision so that we can determine the reckoning point when his suspension shall
take effect.

This Decision shall be immediately executory.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/ac_9537_2013.html

G. Duty to hold client’s moneys and properties in
trust

1) Codal provisions and cases:

• CANON 16: Hold client’s moneys and properties in trust

• Art. 1491, Civil Code

• Zalamea v. De Guzman, A.C. No. 7387, November 3, 2016

Facts: In 2000, petitioners Manuel Enrique Zalamea and Manuel Jose Zalamea
(the Zalamea brothers) sought respondent Atty. Rodolfo P. de Guzman, Jr.'s
advice on the properties of their ailing mother, Merlinda L. Zalamea, who had a
property situated at Scout Limbaga, Quezon City under her name. When
Merlinda passed away, De Guzman then prepared a letter for a possible tax-free
transfer of the Scout Limbaga property to the Merlinda Holding Corporation which
was sought to be incorporated to handle Merlinda's estate, and notarized the
incorporation papers of said corporation.

In September 2001, the Zalameas put up EMZEE FOODS INC., (EMZEE) a

corporation engaged in lechon business, with De Guzman providing the capital
and operational funds. Sometime in 2002, Manuel Enrique informed De Guzman
about the property located at Speaker Perez St. (Speaker Perez property) which
was then under the name of Elarfoods, Inc. (Elarfoods), a corporation owned and
run by the Zalamea brothers' aunts and uncles. Since said property had been
mortgaged to Banco de Oro (BDO), the bank foreclosed it when Elarfoods failed
to pay the loan. Elarfoods likewise failed to redeem the property, resulting in the
consolidation of the ownership over the property in BDO's name.

The Zalamea then seek the advice of Atty. De Guzman to reacquire the property.
The BDO, through Atty. De Guzman, agreed to sell the property for P20 Million,
and with a 10% downpayment. Due to lack of funds of the Zalameas, Atty. De
Guzman’s wife, Angel, agreed to shoulder the P2 Million downpayment.
Subsequently, Angel was forced to pay the monthly installments and all in all,
paid a total of P13 Million.
Not long after, the relationship, between the Zalamea brothers and the Spouses
De Guzman turned sour. The Spouses De Guzman wanted reimbursement of the
amounts which they had advanced, while the Zalamea brothers claimed sole
ownership over the property. Hence, the brothers filed a disbarment case against
De Guzman for allegedly buying a client's property which was subject of litigation
under Article 1491 of the Civil Code.

Issue: Whether the prohibition under Art. 1491 for lawyers apply in the case.

Ruling: No. The SC held that the prohibition does not apply in the case.

The Court dismissed the Petition for Disbarment against Atty. Rodolfo P. de
Guzman, Jr. for utter lack of merit.

Under Article 1491 of the Civil Code, lawyers are prohibited to acquire by
purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the
mediation of another, their client's property and rights in litigation.

Indeed, the purchase by a lawyer of his client's property or interest in litigation is

a breach of professional ethics and constitutes malpractice. A lawyer is
disqualified from acquiring by purchasing the property and rights in litigation
because of his fiduciary relationship with such property and rights, as well as with
the client. The very first Canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that "a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for law and legal process." Canon 17 states that a lawyer
owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him, while Canon 16 provides that "a lawyer shall hold in
trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession."
Further, Section 3, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court requires every lawyer
to take an oath to obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities. And for any violation of this oath, a lawyer may be suspended or
disbarred by the Court. All of these underscore the role of the lawyer as the
vanguard of our legal system.

According to the SC, the prohibition which the Zalameas invoke does not apply
where the property purchased was not involved in litigation. De Guzman clearly
never acquired any of his client's properties or interests involved in litigation in
which he may take part by virtue of his profession. There exists not even an iota
of proof indicating that said property has ever been involved in any litigation in
which De Guzman took part by virtue of his profession. True, they had previously
sought legal advice from De Guzman but only on how to handle their mother's
estate, which likewise did not involve the contested property. Neither was it
shown that De Guzman's law firm had taken part in any litigation involving the
Speaker Perez property.

The prohibition [in Article 1491] which rests on considerations of public policy and
interests is intended to curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client
on account of his fiduciary and confidential relationship with him.

Clearly, the relationship between the Spouses De Guzman and the Zalamea
brothers is actually one of business partners rather than that of a lawyer
and client. Atty. De Guzman's acquisition of the Speaker Perez property was a
valid consequence of a business deal, not by reason of a lawyer-client
relationship, for Which he could not be penalized by the Court. De Guzman and
his wife are very well allowed by law to enter into such a transaction and their
conduct in this regard was not borne out to have been attended by any undue
influence, deceit, or misrepresentation.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court

DISMISSES the Petition for Disbarment against Atty. Rodolfo P. de Guzman, Jr.
for utter lack of merit.

FULL TEXT: https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2016novemberdecisions.php?

id=912

• CPR Rule 16.01: To account

Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.

• Berbano vs. Barcelona, 410 SCRA 258 (2003)

FACTS: Felicitas Berbano, heir of Rufino Hilapo appointed Atty. Daen as their
atty-in-fact for their pending case with the Commission on the Settlement of Land
Problems (regarding their Ayala lot being claimed by Filinvest Dev. Corp.). Atty.
Daen was subsequently arrested by Muntinlupa police. The heirs of Hilapo
looked for a lawyer to secure the release of Atty. Daen. Berbano was
recommended to Atty. Barcelona (by a certain Naty Sibuya). After the first visit of
Atty. Barcelona in Muntinlupa City Jail, they learned that Atty. Daen had decided
to engage the services of Atty. Barcelona. Atty. Barcelona told Berbano that if
they could produce P50K, he will cause the release of Atty. Daen the next day.
Since it was already late in the evening, Berbano could only produce P15,700 by
asking from relatives who were with her.
There were several subsequent meetings between Berbano and Atty. Barcelona
regarding the “grease money” to be used to allegedly bribe an SC justice.
Berbano made another payment via a “pay-to-cash” check for P24,000; and, in
another occasion, went to the house of Atty. Barcelona to give him P10,000.
Another P15,000 was handed to Atty. Barcelona by Atty. Daen’s nephew while
Berbano gave him P1000 for gasoline expenses when Atty. Barcelona informed
them that he could not secure Atty. Daen’s because the check had not been
encashed. By this time, the total amount given to Atty. Barcelona reached
P64,000.
For failure to deliver on his promise and due to his sudden disappearance,
Berbano filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Barcelona with the IBP.
Commissioner Bautista found Atty. Barcelona guilty of malpractice and serious
breach of the Code of Professional Responsibility recommending him to be
disbarred and ordering him to return the P64,000 (For failure to file an answer
and to appear before the Commissioner, the decision was rendered ex parte.).
Board of Governors adopted the Commissioner’s findings but reduced the
penalty to suspension from the practice of law for 6 years.

ISSUE: W/N Atty. Barcelona should be disbarred

HELD: Atty. Barcelona should be disbarred.

Disbarment proceedings are meant to safeguard the administration of justice by
protecting the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court
and remove from the profession of law persons whose disregard for their oath of
office have proved them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them
as members of the bar.
Berbano’s Affidavit-Complaint and testimony was sufficient to support the finding
that respondent committed the acts complained of. The act of Atty. Barcelona in
not filing his answer and ignoring the hearings, despite due notice, emphasized
his contempt for legal proceedings. Hence, the Court finds no compelling reason
to overturn the Investigating Commissioner’s judgment.
Atty. Barcelona is guilty for violations of Canon 1, 7, 11, and 16 (Rule 16.01).
Instead of promoting respect for law and the legal processes, respondent
callously demeaned the legal profession by taking money from a client under the
pretext of having connections with a Member of the Court (to secure the release
of Atty. Daen). Also, this was not the first time Atty. Barcelona has been charged
and found guilty of conduct unbecoming a lawyer (The previous case also
involved misrepresentation and Atty. Barcelona also did not appear before the
IBP despite due notice.). Respondent has demonstrated a penchant for
misrepresenting to clients that he has the proper connections to secure the relief
they seek, and thereafter, ask for money, which will allegedly be given to such
connections (related to Canon 12).

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, for gross misconduct, respondent Wenceslao C.

Barcelona is DISBARRED from the practice of law. His name is ordered
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is further directed to return to
complainant Felicitas Berbano the amount of Sixty Four Thousand Pesos
(P64,000.00) within thirty (30) days from notice of this Decision.

This Decision shall take effect immediately.

FULL TEXT: https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2003septemberdecisions.php?

id=807

• Licuanan vs. Melo, 170 SCRA 100 (1989)

Facts: Licuanan filed a complaint against Atty. Melo for breach of professional
ethics. Atty. Melo was Licuanan’s counsel in an ejectment case filed against her
tenant. Atty. Melo failed to remit to her the rentals collected nor did the said
lawyer report to her the receipt of said amounts. It was only after a year from
actual receipt that Atty. Melo turned over his collections to Licuanan because a
demand made by the latter.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Melo should be penalized for failure to remit rentals
collected
Held:
Yes! Atty. Melo is disbarred.
Ratio: The actuations of Atty. Melo in retaining for his personal benefit over a 1
year period, the mount of P5,220 received by him on behalf of his client,
Licuanan is deprived of its use, and withholding information on the same despite
inquiries made by her, I a breach of the Lawyer’s Oath to which he swore
observance, and an evident transgression of the CPR. Due to Atty. Melo’s
professional misconduct, he has breached the trust reposed in him by his client.
Atty. Melo’s unprofessional actuations considered, the SC find him guilty of
deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in office. He has displayed lack of
honesty and good moral character.

DISPOSITION:WHEREFORE, consistent with the crying need to maintain the

high traditions and standards of the legal profession and to preserve
undiminished public faith in attorneys-at-law, the Court Resolved to DISBAR
respondent, Atty. Manuel L. Melo, from the practice of law. His name is hereby
ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/feb1989/am_2361_1989.html

• CPR Rule 16.02: To keep client’s fund separate

Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from
his own and those of others kept by him.

• Hernandez vs. Go, 450 SCRA 1 (2005)

FACTS
• Sometime in 1961, Hernandez’s husband abandoned her and her son
• Shortly thereafter, creditors of Hernandez ‘s husband demanded payment
of his loans
• Respondent instilled in complainant a feeling of helplessness, fear,
embarrassment, and social humiliation. He advised her to give him her land titles
covering Lots 848-A, 849-Q, and 849-P at Zamboanga City so he could sell them
to enable her to pay her creditors. He then persuaded her to execute deeds of
sale in his favor without any monetary or valuable consideration. Complainant
agreed on condition that he would sell the lots and from the proceeds pay her
creditors.
• Hernandez owns three more lots in Zamboanga City which were
mortgaged to creditors. When the mortgages fell due, Atty. Go redeemed the lots
and persuaded Hernandez to execute deeds of sale in his favor covering the said
lots
• Atty. Go became the registered owner of all the lots belonging to
Hernandez
• In 1974, Hernandez came to know that Atty. Go did not sell her lots as
agreed upon, but instead he paid her creditors with his own funds and had her
land titles registered in his name, depriving her of real property worth millions
• Hernandez filed a complaint with the IBP
• IBP: Atty. Go violated Canon 17 and should be suspended for 3 years

ISSUE: W/N Atty. GO SHOULD BE REPRIMANDED

HELD: YES, for violating Canons 16 and 17.

Atty. Go violated Canon 16
His acts acquiring for himself Hernandez’s lots entrusted to him are acts
constituting gross misconduct, a grievous wrong, a forbidden act, a dereliction of
duty, willful in character and implies a wrongful intent and not a mere error in
judgment
Such conduct on the part of Atty. Go not only degrades himself but also the
honor of the legal profession
Atty. Go violated Canon 17 which provides that “a lawyer owes fidelity to the
cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him.”
Records show that Hernandez reposed high degree of trust and confidence in
Atty. Go and when she engaged his services, she entrusted to him her land titles
and allowed him to sell the same
Atty. Go, however, abused this trust and confidence when he did not sell her
properties to others but to himself without giving any monetary consideration to
Hernandez, thus depriving Hernandez the real worth of her properties
Atty. Go is duty bound to render a detailed report to Hernandez on how much he
sold the lots and the amounts paid to her creditors but failed to do so
In previous cases, the Court disbarred and expelled lawyers from the practice of
law in similar circumstances, thus, the penalty recommended by the IBP is too
light
Atty. Go was ordered disbarred

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, respondent JOSE S. GO is found guilty of gross

misconduct and is DISBARRED from the practice of law. His name is ordered
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/ac_1526_2005.html

• CPR Rule 16.03: Delivery of funds, lawyer’s lien

Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due
or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so
much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements,
giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the
same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as
provided for in the Rules of Court.

• Businos vs. Ricafort, 283 SCRA 40 (1997)

Facts: Businos representing her co-heirs, executed a special power of attorney,
appointing Atty. Ricafort as attorney-in-fact to demand, collect and receive for
any and all rentals that may be deposited in court by the defendant in the civil
case (apparently a case involving the properties of the late Pedro Rodrigo, father
of herein complainant.) due and owing to her or said co heir.

Then rental of 30k was received by Atty. Ricafort. Instead, however, of depositing
the money, respondent converted the money to his own personal use. Also, 2k
was demanded from complainant supposedly for a bond in a Civil Case, when no
such bond was required.

On despite several demands, he failed to return the same to complainant. So,

Businos filed a criminal case for estafa and an administrative case for disbarment
against him.
On the hearing of the estafa, respondent paid complainant inside then courtroom.
This prompted Businos not to anymore pursue the estafa case against
respondent. She did not, however, withdrew the instant complaint.

Issue: Whether or not the return of the money unlawfully retained by a lawyer
relieves him from liability.

Ruling: No.His belated payment of the amount he illegally used and fraudulently
obtained do not relieve him from any liability since the relation between an
attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in its nature and of a very delicate,
exacting and confidential character, requiring high degree of fidelity and good
faith. In view of that special relationship, lawyers are bound to promptly account
for money or property received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do
so constitutes professional misconduct.

Atty. Ricafort violated Section 25 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Respondent's transgressions manifested dishonesty and amounted to grave

misconduct and grossly unethical behavior which caused dishonor, not merely to
respondent, but to the noble profession to which he belongs, for it cannot be
denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished
whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence.

Here, respondent chose to forget that by swearing the lawyer's oath, he became
a guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair
an impartial administration of justice — a vital function of democracy a failure of
which is disastrous to society.

He unlawfully retained his client’s funds, refused to deliver the same on despite
the duty to account for all money or property collected or received for the client.
Any departure from the path which a lawyer must follow as demanded by the
virtues of his profession shall not be tolerated by this Court as the disciplining
authority. This is specially so, as here, where respondent even deliberately
defied the lawful orders of the Court for him to file his comment on the complaint,
thereby transgressing Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
requires a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due the courts.

The bar confidant recommended one year suspension but the Supreme Court
has resolved to disbar Atty. Ricafort. The punishment was aggravated by his
deliberate defiance of the lawful orders of the SC to file a comment on the
complaint.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, for dishonesty, grave misconduct, grossly

unethical behavior in palpable disregard of Section 25 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, aggravated by a violation of Canon 11
thereof, and consistent with the urgent need to maintain the esteemed traditions
and high standards of the legal profession and to preserve undiminished public
faith in the members of the Philippine Bar, the Court Resolves to DISBAR
respondent ATTY. FRANCISCO RICAFORT from the practice of law. His name
is hereby stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1997/dec1997/ac_4349_1997.html

• Quilban vs. Robinol, 171 SCRA 768 (1989)

DISPOSITION: In so far as the complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Robinol

against Atty. Montemayor is concerned, therefore, we find the same absolutely
without merit.

ACCORDINGLY, 1) In Administrative Case No. 2144, Atty. Santiago R. Robinol

is hereby DISBARRED for having violated his lawyer's oath to delay no man for
money, broken the fiduciary relation between lawyer and client, and proven
himself unworthy to continue in the practice of law. By reason of his unethical
actuations, he is hereby declared to have forfeited his rights to attorney's fees
and is ordered to return the amount of P 75,000.00 to the plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. Q-16433 through the complainant in the aforementioned Administrative
Case.

2) Administrative Case No. 2180 against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor for

disbarment is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the respective personal records of

Attys. Santiago R. Robinol and Anacleto R. Montemayor.

This Resolution is immediately executory.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/apr1989/am_2144_1989.html

• Rayos vs. Hernandez, G.R. No. 169079, February 12, 2007

NATURE: Petition for Review of the Resolution of IBP dismissing Francisco
Rayos’ complaint for disbarment against Atty. Ponciano Hernandez.

FACTS: Atty Hernandez was the counsel of Rayos in a Civil Case for damages
against NAPOCOR. RTC dismissed the complaint. Upon appeal, CA reversed
the RTC decision and awarded damages in favor of Rayos. SC affirmed the CA
Decision which became final and executory.

NAPOCOR issued a Check in the amount of ₱1,060,800.00 payable to Rayos

which was turned over to Atty. Hernandez as counsel. When Rayos demanded
the turn over of the check, Atty. Hernandez refused and justified his retention as
a means to ensure payment of his attorney’s fees.

Rayos initiated this complaint for disbarment for Atty. Hernandez’ failure to return
the rest of the award in the amount of ₱557,961.21.

In his answer Atty. Hernandez alleged that they had a contract for attorney’s fees
on a contingent basis on 40%-60% sharing of the court award. Atty. Hernandez
was entitled to receive 60% of the award – 40% as attorney’s fees and 20% as
litigation expenses. He asseverated that he deposited Rayos’ share of the 40%
award in a bank under Rayos’ name.

ISSUE #1: Whether Atty. Hernandez is justified in retaining the amount awarded
to Rayos to assure payment of his attorney’s fees.

HELD: NO.
Moneys collected by an attorney on a judgment rendered in favor of his client
constitute trust funds and must be immediately paid over to the client. Canon 16
of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:

CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client
that may come into his possession.

Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.

When Atty. Hernandez withheld and refused to deliver the check, he breached
the trust reposed on him. The claim that Rayos failed to pay his attorney’s fees is
not an excuse for Atty. Hernandez’ failure to deliver the amount. A lawyer is not
entitled to unilaterally appropriate his client’s money for himself by the mere fact
alone that the client owes him attorney’s fees. The failure of an attorney to return
the client’s money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he has
misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice and violation of the general
morality, as well as of professional ethics; it also impairs public confidence in the
legal profession and deserves punishment.

It is true that under Canon 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, an

attorney has the following rights:

Rule 16.03- A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due
or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so
much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements,
giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the
same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as
provided for in the Rules of Court.

But the fact alone that a lawyer has a lien for fees on moneys in his hands
collected for his client, does not relieve him of his duty to promptly account for
the moneys received; his failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct.
Thus, what respondent should have properly done was to provide the petitioner
with an accounting before deducting his attorney’s fees and then to turn over the
remaining balance of the award collected.

The relationship of attorney and client has always been rightly regarded as one
of special trust and confidence. An attorney must exercise the utmost good faith
and fairness in all his relationship vis-à-vis his client. Respondent fell far short of
this standard when he failed to render an accounting for the amount actually
received by him on behalf of his client and when he refused to turn over any
portion of said amount to his client upon the pretext that his attorney’s fees had
not at all been paid. Respondent had, in fact, placed his private and personal
interest above that of his client.

Lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants. Law
advocacy, it has been stressed, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it
births are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that,
unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from
governmental interference, is impressed with a public interest, for which it is
subject to State regulation.

A lawyer’s compensation for professional services rendered is subject to the

supervision of the court, not just to guarantee that the fees he charges and
receives remain reasonable and commensurate with the services rendered, but
also to maintain the dignity and integrity of the legal profession to which he
belongs. Upon taking his attorney’s oath as an officer of the court, a lawyer
submits himself to the authority of the courts to regulate his right to charge
professional fees.

ISSUE #2: Whether a contingent fee comprising of 40% as attorney’s fees and
20% as litigation expenses is unreasonable and unconscionable.

HELD: YES.

A contingent fee arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction and is generally

recognized as valid and binding but must be laid down in an express contract.
The amount of contingent fee agreed upon by the parties is subject to the
stipulation that counsel will be paid for his legal services only if the suit or
litigation prospers. A much higher compensation is allowed as contingent fee in
consideration of the risk that the lawyer may get nothing if the suit fails. Contracts
of this nature are permitted because they redound to the benefit of the poor client
and the lawyer "especially in cases where the client has meritorious cause of
action, but no means with which to pay for legal services unless he can, with the
sanction of law, make a contract for a contingent fee to be paid out of the
proceeds of the litigation. Oftentimes, the contingent fee arrangement is the only
means by which the poor and helpless can seek redress for injuries sustained
and have their rights vindicated."

Contingent fee contracts are subject to the supervision and close scrutiny of the
court in order that clients may be protected from unjust charges. Section 13 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics states that "a contract for a contingent fee,
where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the circumstances of
the case including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should
always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness."
Likewise, Rule 138, Section 24, of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorney’s; agreement as to fees. - An attorney
shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable
compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter
of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional
standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as
expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such
testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written
contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by
the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.

The reduction of unreasonable attorney’s fees is within the regulatory powers of

the courts. When the courts find that the stipulated amount is excessive or the
contract is unreasonable, or found to have been marred by fraud, mistake, undue
influence or suppression of facts on the part of the attorney, public policy
demands that said contract be disregarded to protect the client from
unreasonable exaction.

Stipulated attorney’s fees are unconscionable whenever the amount is by far so

disproportionate compared to the value of the services rendered as to amount to
fraud perpetrated upon the client.

Generally, the amount of attorney’s fees due is that stipulated in the retainer
agreement which is conclusive as to the amount of the lawyer’s compensation. A
stipulation on a lawyer’s compensation in a written contract for professional
services ordinarily controls the amount of fees that the contracting lawyer may be
allowed, unless the court finds such stipulated amount unreasonable or
unconscionable. In the absence thereof, the amount of attorney’s fees is fixed on
the basis of quantum meruit, i.e., the reasonable worth of the attorney’s services.
Courts may ascertain also if the attorney’s fees are found to be excessive, what
is reasonable under the circumstances. In no case, however, must a lawyer be
allowed to recover more than what is reasonable, pursuant to Section 24, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court.

We have identified the circumstances to be considered in determining the

reasonableness of a claim for attorney’s fees as follows: (1) the amount and
character of the service rendered; (2) labor, time, and trouble involved; (3) the
nature and importance of the litigation or business in which the services were
rendered; (4) the responsibility imposed; (5) the amount of money or the value of
the property affected by the controversy or involved in the employment; (6) the
skill and experience called for in the performance of the services; (7) the
professional character and social standing of the attorney; (8) the results
secured; (9) whether the fee is absolute or contingent, it being recognized that an
attorney may properly charge a much larger fee when it is contingent than when
it is not; 35 and (10) the financial capacity and economic status of the client have
to be taken into account in fixing the reasonableness of the fee.

Rule 20.1, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enumerates

the following factors which should guide a lawyer in determining his fees:

(a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;

(b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;

(c) The importance of the subject matter;

(d) The skill demanded;

(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of

the proffered case;

(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of
the IBP Chapter to which he belongs;

(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the
client from the service;

(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;

(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established;

and

(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.

As adverted to, the court note that petitioner was unschooled and frustrated and
hopeless with the tragic loss of his loved ones caused by the inundation of the
town of Norzagaray, Bulacan, on 26-27 October 1978 because of the negligent
release by NAPOCOR of the water through the spillways of the Angat Dam.
Petitioner also had to face the loss and destruction of his family’s properties.
Under such circumstances and given his understandable desire to recover the
damages for the loss of his loved ones and properties, petitioner would easily
succumb and readily agree to the demands of respondent lawyer regarding his
attorney’s fees.

The court held that the contingent fee claimed was grossly excessive and
unconscionable. Such a fee structure, when considered in conjunction with the
circumstances of this case, also shows that an unfair advantage was taken of the
client and legal fraud and imposition perpetrated upon him. Lawyers should not
be permitted to get a lion’s share of the benefits due the poor and the helpless.
Contracts for legal services between the helpless and attorney should be
zealously scrutinized to the end that a fair share of the benefits be not denied to
the former. This Court has the power to guard a client, especially an aged and
necessitous client, against such a contract.

Since Atty. Hernandez, after all, succeeded in obtaining a favorable decision for
his client in his efforts in litigating the case for 15 years and he took risk in
representing petitioner on a contingent fee basis, a fee of 35% of the amount
awarded to petitioner would be a fair compensation for respondent’s legal
services.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE the Court Resolves that:

1. Respondent is guilty of violation of the attorney’s oath and of serious

professional misconduct and shall be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
six (6) months and WARNED that repetition of the same or similar offense will be
dealt with more severely;

2. Respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees in the amount equivalent to thirty-five

percent (35%) of the total amount awarded 51 to petitioner in Civil Case No. SM-
951; and

3. Respondent is to return the amount of Two Hundred Ninety Thousand One

Hundred Nine Pesos and Twenty-One Centavos (₱290,109.21), 52 which he
retained in excess of what we herein declared as fair and reasonable attorney’s
fees, plus legal interest from date of finality of this judgment until full payment
thereof.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/feb2007/gr_169079_2007.html

• CPR Rule 16.04: No borrowing, lending

Rule 16.04 - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client's
interest are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of
justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling
for the client.
• Barnachea vs. Quicho, 399 SCRA 1 (2003)
FACTS: Respondent had not been in the private practice of the law for quite
some time. However, in September 2001, he decided to revive his legal practice
with some associates. Complainant engaged the legal services of respondent for
the latter to cause the transfer under her name of the title over a property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 334411 previously owned by her
sister, Lutgarda Amor D. Barnachea. The latter sold said property to complainant
under an unnotarized deed of absolute sale.

Complainant drew and issued BPI Family Bank Check No. 0052304 in the
amount of P11,280.00 and BPI Family Bank Check No. 0052305 in the amount
of P30,000.00, for the expenses for said transfer and in payment for
respondent’s legal services.

Respondent encashed the checks. However, despite the lapse of almost two
months, respondent failed to secure title over the property in favor of
complainant. The latter demanded that respondent refund to her the amount of
P41,280.00 and return the documents which she earlier entrusted to him.
However, respondent failed to comply with said demands. On November 1,
2001, complainant received a letter from respondent informing her that he had
failed to cause the transfer of the property under her name and that he was
returning the documents and title she had entrusted to him and refunding to her
the amount of P41,280.00 through his personal check No. DIL 0317787. Said
check was drawn against his account with the Bank of Commerce in the amount
of P41,280.00 and was postdated December 1, 2001. Respondent told
complainant that he needed more time to fund the check. However, respondent
failed to fund the check despite the demands of complainant.

In his Answer to the complaint, respondent denied that complainant contracted

his legal services. Although respondent admitted having received the two checks
from complainant, he claimed that said checks were intended to cover actual and
incidental expenses for transportation, communication, representation, necessary
services, taxes and fees for the cancellation and transfer of TCT No. 334411
under the name of complainant and not for legal services. He asserted that he
acted in good faith as shown by the fact of his return of complainant’s documents
with an explanatory letter and his issuance of a personal check for P41,280.00
dated December 1, 2001. He insisted that he would not compromise for such
meager amount his personal standing as well as his membership in the legal
profession. His failure to transfer the title of the property under the name of
the complainant was caused by his difficulty in making good the claimed
amount, compounded by his affliction with diabetes and the consequent
loss of sight of his right eye.

Respondent further alleged that he was a licensed real estate and insurance
broker and had been a freelance business management consultant. At the same
time he engaged in real estate brokering, pre-need products marketing for
Prudential Life, and life insurance underwriting for Insular Life. In 1999, he gave
up the practice of his profession as a lawyer and subsequently managed to put
up a business center with fellow insurance underwriters for their common
insurance underwriting practice. He further claimed that sometime in August,
2001, an insurance client introduced complainant as an insurance prospect
to him. In the course of their dealing, complainant intimated to respondent
her willingness to consider respondent’s insurance proposal provided the
latter would help her facilitate the cancellation and eventual transfer to her
name the property covered by TCT No. 334411 in the name of
complainant’s sister, Lutgarda Amor D. Barnachea. Respondent agreed to
help complainant in the transfer of the title to her name, with the condition that no
diligent study or verification of complainant’s documents, nor preparation of any
additional document or any application or petition whatsoever, will be made by
respondent. He explained to complainant that his task was merely to go through
the regular process of presenting the available documents, paying the taxes and
fees, and following up the processing for the cancellation and issuance of the
certificate of title. In other words, respondent offered to complainant services
which a non-lawyer familiar with the procedure and the related offices can
perform and provide to the complainant with respect to the transfer of the
title of the property in her name.

Respondent asserted that in the latter part of September 2001, he discovered

and became aware for the first time that the original copy of TCT No. 334411
with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City was destroyed in a fire in Quezon City
Hall several years earlier and that complainant’s copy of the title needed to be
reconstituted before it can be cancelled and transferred. At about the same time,
the working relations of respondent in the business center with his non-lawyer
associates had become difficult and strained, impelling him to sever his business
relations with them and cease from to going to the business center.
Consequently, telephone communications between respondent and complainant
at the business center was cut. Communications became much more limited
when, apart from the fact that respondent did not have a landline at his
residence, respondent’s mobile phone was stolen sometime in October 2001.

ISSUE: Is respondent guilty of the said accusations?

RULING: The Court is led to believe that respondent’s failure to cause the
transfer of the title of the property under the name of complainant was due to a
financial problem that beset him shortly after he received the checks from
complainant. It can easily be inferred from respondent’s letter that he used
complainant’s money to alleviate if not solve his financial woes. What
compounded respondent’s unethical conduct was his drawing of a personal
check and delivering the same to complainant without sufficient funds in his bank
account to cover the check. Even as he promised to fund his account with the
drawee bank, respondent failed to do so when the check became due.

Respondent Atty. Edwin T. Quiocho is found guilty of violation of Canons 15 and

16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for One (1) Year with a stern warning that a repetition of the same
or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to restitute to
the complainant the full amount of P41,280.00 within ten (10) days from notice
hereof. Respondent is further DIRECTED to submit to the Court proof of payment
of said amount within ten (10) days from said payment. If Respondent fails to
restitute the said amount within the aforesaid period, he shall be meted an
additional suspension of three (3) months for every month or fraction thereof of
delay until he shall have paid the said amount in full. In case a subsidiary
penalty of suspension for his failure to restitute the said amount shall be
necessary, respondent shall serve successively the penalty of his one year
suspension and the subsidiary penalty. This is without prejudice to the right of
the complainant to institute the appropriate action for the collection of said
amount.

DISPOSITION:IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, Respondent Atty. Edwin T.

Quiocho is found guilty of violation of Canons 15 and 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for One
(1) Year with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be
dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to restitute to the complainant the full
amount of P41,280.00 within ten (10) days from notice hereof. Respondent is
further DIRECTED to submit to the Court proof of payment of said amount within
ten (10) days from said payment. If Respondent fails to restitute the said amount
within the aforesaid period, he shall be meted an additional suspension of three
(3) months for every month or fraction thereof of delay until he shall have paid
the said amount in full. In case a subsidiary penalty of suspension for his failure
to restitute the said amount shall be necessary, respondent shall serve
successively the penalty of his one year suspension and the subsidiary penalty.
This is without prejudice to the right of the complainant to institute the appropriate
action for the collection of said amount.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/mar2003/ac_5925_2003.html

• Navarro vs. Atty. Solidum, A.C. No. 9872, January 28, 2014
FACTS: Hilda S. Presbitero and Natividad P. Navarro filed a disbarment case against
Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr.

In May 2006, Presbitero’s daughter, Ma. Theresa P. Yulo (Yulo), also engaged
respondent’s services to handle the registration of her 18.85-hectare lot located in
Nasud-ong, Caradio-an, Himamaylan, Negros. Yulo convinced her sister, Navarro, to
finance the expenses for the registration of the property. Respondent undertook to
register the property in consideration of 30% of the value of the property once it is
registered. Respondent obtained ₱200,000 from Navarro for the registration expenses.
Navarro later learned that the registration decree over the property was already issued
in the name of one Teodoro Yulo. Navarro alleged that she would not have spent for the
registration of the property if respondent only apprised her of the real situation of the
property.

Meanwhile, Atty. Solidum obtained two loans of Php1,000,000.00 from Navarro

and one loan of Php1,000,000.00 from Presbitero to finance his sugar trading business,
securing them with postdated checks and drafting a MOA in each.

Respondent paid the loan interest for the first few months. He was able to pay
complainants a total of Php900,000.00. Thereafter, he failed to pay either the principal
amount or the interest thereon. The checks issued by Solidum to the complainants
could no longer be negotiated because the accounts against which they were drawn
were already closed. When complainants called Solidum’s attention, he promised to pay
the agreed interest for September and October 2006 but asked for a reduction of the
interest for the succeeding months.
Complainants alleged that Solidum induced them to grant him loans by offering
very high interest rates. He also prepared and signed the checks which turned
out to be drawn against his son’s accounts. Complainants further alleged that
respondent deceived them regarding the identity and value of the property he
mortgaged because he showed them a different property from that which he owned.
Presbitero further alleged that respondent mortgaged his 263-square-meter property to
her for Php1,000,000.00 but he later sold it for only Php150,000.00.

The IBP-CBD found that respondent was guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for committing the following acts:

(1) signing drawn checks against the account of his son as if they were from his
own account;

(2) misrepresenting to Navarro the identity of the lot he mortgaged to her;

(3) misrepresenting to Presbitero the true value of the 263-square-meter lot he

mortgaged to her;

(4) conspiring with Yulo to obtain the loans from complainants;

(5) agreeing or promising to pay 10% interest on his loans although he knew that
it was exorbitant; and

(6) failing to pay his loans because the checks he issued were dishonored as the
accounts were already closed.

ISSUE: Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD: Respondent violated at least four provisions: Rule 1.01, Canon 16, Rule
16.01, and Rule 16.04 of the CPR. Solidum was disbarred from the practice of law.

Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

Respondent agreed to pay a high interest rate on his loan from the complainants. He
drafted the MOA. Yet, when he could no longer pay his loan, he sought to nullify the
same MOA he drafted on the ground that the interest rate was unconscionable. It was
also established that respondent mortgaged a 263-square-meter property to Presbitero
for P1,000,000.00, but he later sold the property for only P150,000.00, showing that he
deceived his client as to the real value of the mortgaged property. Respondent’s
allegation that the sale was eventually rescinded did not distract from the fact
that he did not apprise Presbitero as to the real value of the property.
Respondent failed to refute that the checks he issued to his client Presbitero and to
Navarro belonged to his son, Ivan Garcia Solidum III whose name is similar to his
name. He only claimed that complainants knew that he could no longer open a current
bank account, and that they even suggested that his wife or son issue the checks for
him. However, we are inclined to agree with the IBP-CBD’s finding that he made
complainants believe that the account belonged to him. In fact, respondent signed in the
presence of Navarro the first batch of checks he issued to Navarro. Respondent sent
the second batch of checks to Navarro and the third batch of checks to Presbitero
through a messenger, and complainants believed that the checks belonged to accounts
in respondent’s name.

CANON 16. - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND

PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.

Respondent had been negligent in properly accounting for the money he received
from his client, Presbitero. Indeed, his failure to return the excess money in his
possession gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his
own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, the
client.

Rule 16.04. - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of
justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for
the client.

While respondent’s loan from Presbitero was secured by a MOA, postdated checks and
real estate mortgage, it turned out that respondent misrepresented the value of the
property he mortgaged and that the checks he issued were not drawn from his account
but from that of his son. Respondent eventually questioned the terms of the MOA that
he himself prepared on the ground that the interest rate imposed on his loan was
unconscionable. Finally, the checks issued by respondent to Presbitero were
dishonored because the accounts were already closed. The interest of his client,
Presbitero, as lender in this case, was not fully protected. Respondent violated Rule
16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which presumes that the client
is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to
renege on his obligation.6 In his dealings with his client Presbitero, respondent
took advantage of his knowledge of the law as well as the trust and confidence
reposed in him by his client.

Respondent failed to live up to the high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair
dealing required of him as a member of the legal profession. Instead, respondent
employed his knowledge and skill of the law and took advantage of his client to secure
undue gains for himself that warrants his removal from the practice of law.

Is conduct under Rule 1.01 confined to the performance of a lawyer’s professional

duties? No. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his
professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders
him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

Respondent failed to live up to the high standard of morality, honesty, integrity,

and fair dealing required of him as a member of the legal profession. Instead,
respondent employed his knowledge and skill of the law and took advantage of
his client to secure undue gains for himself that warrants his removal from the
practice of law.

DISPOSITION:WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr. GUILTY

of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 16, Rule 16.01, and Rule 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court DISBARS him from the
practice of law effective immediately upon his receipt of this Decision.

Atty. Solidum is ORDERED to return the advances he received from Hilda S.

Presbitero, amounting to ₱50,000, and to submit to the Office of the Bar
Confidant his compliance with this order within thirty days from finality of this
Decision.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/jan2014/ac_9872_2014.html

H. Attorney’s Fees

1) Codal provisions and cases:

• CANON 20: To charge only fair and reasonable fees

• Rep. Act No. 5185, Sec. 6

Section 6. Prohibition Against Practice. A member of the Provincial Board or City
or Municipal Council shall not appear as counsel before any court in any civil
case wherein the province, city or municipality, as the case may be, is the
adverse party: Provided, however, That no member of the Provincial Board shall
so appear except in behalf of his province in any civil case wherein any city in the
province is the adverse party whose voters are en-franchised to vote for
provincial officials, nor shall such member of the Provincial Board or City or
Municipal Council appear as counsel for the accused in any criminal case
wherein an officer or employee of said province, city or municipality is accused of
an offense committed in relation to the latter's office, nor shall he collect any fee
for his appearance in any administrative proceedings before provincial, city or
municipal agencies of the province, city or municipality, as the case may be, of
which he is an elected official.

The provisions of this Section shall likewise apply to provincial governors and city
and municipal mayors.

• ROC Rule 138, Sec. 24, 32

Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. — An
attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a
reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the
subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the
professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of
attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard
such testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A
written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless
found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.

Section 32. Compensation for attorneys de oficio. — Subject to availability of

funds as may be provided by the law the court may, in its discretion, order an
attorney employed as counsel de oficio to be compensates in such sum as the
court may fix in accordance with section 24 of this rule. Whenever such
compensation is allowed, it shall be not less than thirty pesos (P30) in any case,
nor more than the following amounts: (1) Fifty pesos (P50) in light felonies; (2)
One hundred pesos (P100) in less grave felonies; (3) Two hundred pesos (P200)
in grave felonies other than capital offenses; (4) Five Hundred pesos (P500) in
capital offenses.
• Quirante vs. IAC, 169 SCRA 769 (1989)
FACTS: In the case of Dr. Casasola’s claim against its erring building contractor,
the trial court ruled in favor of the former who eventually died.Here, petitioner
Atty. Quirante filed a motion in the trial court for the confirmation of his attorney’s
fees. According to him, there was an oral agreement between him and the late
Dr. Casasola with regard to his attorney’s fees, as confirmed in writing by the
latter’s surviving spouse and two daughters to be computed as follows:

In case of recovery of the P120,000.00 surety bond, the attorney’s fees of the
undersigned counsel (Atty. Quirante) shall be P30,000.00;
In case the Honorable Court awards damages in excess of the P120,000.00
bond, it shall be divided equally between the Heirs of Dr. Casasola, Atty. John C.
Quirante and Atty. Dante Cruz.
The trial court granted the motion for confirmation despite an opposition
thereto.In the petition for review on certiorari, the respondent court (IAC) ruled
that the confirmation of attorney’s fees is premature.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Quirante is entitled of the attorney’s fees.

HELD: NO. Ruling of respondent court affirmed.

RATIO: Since the main case from which the petitioner’s claims for their fees may
arise has not yet become final, the determination of the propriety of said fees and
the amount thereof should be held in abeyance.

The orderly administration of justice dictates that such issue be likewise

determined by the court a quo inasmuch as it also necessarily involves the same
contingencies in determining the propriety and assessing the extent of recovery
of attorney’s fees. The alleged confirmation to attorney’s fees should not
adversely affect the non-signatories in the petition, since it is also premised on
the eventual grant of damages to the Casasola family.

DISPOSITION: We, therefore, take exception to and reject that portion of the
decision of the respondent court which holds that the alleged confirmation to
attorney's fees should not adversely affect the non-signatories thereto, since it is
also premised on the eventual grant of damages to the Casasola family, hence
the same objection of prematurity obtains and such a holding may be pre-
emptive of factual and evidentiary matters that may be presented for
consideration by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, with the foregoing observation, the decision of the respondent

court subject of the present recourse is hereby AFFIRMED.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/jan1989/gr_73886_1989.html

• Tanhueco vs. de Dumo, 172 SCRA 760 (1989)

DISPOSITION:

FULL TEXT:

• Albano vs. Coloma, 21 SCRA 411 (1967)

DISPOSITION:

FULL TEXT:

• Metropolitan Bank vs. CA, 181 SCRA 367 (1990)

FACTS: This petition for review on certiorari impugns the decision of the COurt
of Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 08265-08268 affirming the order of Branch 168,
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, in Civil Cases Nos. 19123-
128, 19136, and 19144, fixing attorney’s fees and directing herein petitioner
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank), as defendant in said civil
cases, to pay its attorneys, herein private respondent Arturo Alafriz and
Asosciates, movant therein, the amount of P936,000.00 as attorney’s fees on a
quantum meruit basis.

ISSUES:

1. WON private respondent is entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien

for payment of its attorney’s fees.
2. WON private respondent is entitled to twenty-five percent (25%) of the
actual and current market value of the litigated properties on a quantum
meruit basis.
RULING:

1. No. A charging lien, to be enforceable as security for the payment of

attorney’s fees, requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money
and execution in pursuance of such judgment secured in the main action
by the attorney in favor of his client. In the case at bar, the civil cases were
dismissed upon the initiative of the plaintiffs “in view of the full satisfaction
of their claims.” This being so, private respondent’s supposed charging lien
is without any legal basis.

2. The Court refrains from resolving the same so as not to preempt or

interfere with the authority and adjudicative facility of the proper court to
hear and decide the controversy in a proper proceeding which may be
brought by private respondent. In filing a reasonable compensation for the
services rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit, the
elements to be considered are generally (1) the importance of the subject
matter in controversy, (2) the extent of the services rendered, and (3) the
professional standing of the lawyer. A determination of all these factors
would indispensably require nothing less than a full-blown trial where
private respondent can adduce to establish its right to lawful attorney’s
fees and for petitioner to oppose or refute the same.

Another Digest:

NATURE: Review on certiorari – annul the decision of Court of Appeals

ordering Metrobank to pay Arturo Alafriz and Associates P936,000.00 as
attorney’s fees on the basis of quantum meruit.

PROCEDURAL FACTS:
• Arturo A. Alafriz and Associates (AAA) handled the civil cases of
Metrobank from March 1974 to September 1983.
o All the cases were declaration of nullity of certain deeds of sale, with
damages.
ANTECEDENT FACTS:
• Celedonio Javier bought 7 parcels of land owned by Eustaquio Alejandro,
et al., with a total area of about 10 hectares.
 o Properties were mortgaged by Javier with Metrobank to secure a
loan obligation of one Felix Angelo Bautista and/or International Hotel
Corporation.
o Javier defaulted. Metrobank foreclosed the properties.
o Alejandro, on the other hand, alleging deceit, fraud and
misrepresentation committed against him by Javier in the sale of the
parcels of land, brought suits against Javier et al., and included Metrobank
as defendant therein.
o AAA’s services were already acquired here.
• While the case was pending, Metrobank sold the properties to its sister
company, Service Leasing Corporation on March 23, 1983 for the purported price
of P600,000.00. SLC, on the other hand, sold the property to another company
and the cycle went on.
o Metrobank, no longer the possessor of the properties, moved for
substitution of party on July 28, 1983.
o AAA had no knowledge about this. AAA only knew when Metrobank
filed its motion. Thus, they filed on August 16, 1983 a verified motion to
enter in the records of the aforesaid civil cases its charging lien, pursuant
to Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, equivalent to twenty-five
percent (25%) of the actual and current market values of the litigated
properties as its attorney's fees.
o This was granted by the TC because of Metrobank’s failure to
appear.
o The Alejandro case was subsequently dismissed as well.
• On May 28,1984, AAA filed a motion to fix its attorney's fees, based on
quantum meruit, which motion precipitated an exchange of arguments between
the parties. (dismissal of the Alejandro case, etc.)
o Metrobank: paid in full.
o AAA: P50,000.00 given by Metrobank could not be considered as
full payment but merely a cash advance
o Negotiations up to P600,000.00 were even made to evade court
litigation but to no avail.
• CA: Affirmed RTC (sub bullet 3, bullet 2 of AF)

ISSUE: Whether or not the legal fees charged by AAA are reasonable.

HELD: NO.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
• On the matter of attorney's liens Section 37, Rule 138 provides:
. . . He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the
payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments,
which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he
shall have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the
records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and
shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the
adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power over such judgments
and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the
payment of his just fees and disbursements.

Consequent to such provision, a charging lien, to be enforceable as security for

the payment of attorney's fees, requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment
for money and execution in pursuance of such judgment secured in the main
action by the attorney in favor of his client. A lawyer may enforce his right to fees
by filing the necessary petition as an incident in the main action in which his
services were rendered when something is due his client in the action from which
the fee is to be paid. .

• In the case at bar, the civil cases below were dismissed upon the initiative
of the plaintiffs "in view of the frill satisfaction of their claims." 8 The dismissal
order neither provided for any money judgment nor made any monetary award to
any litigant, much less in favor of petitioner who was a defendant therein. This
being so, private respondent's supposed charging lien is, under our rule, without
any legal basis. It is flawed by the fact that there is nothing to generate it and to
which it can attach in the same manner as an ordinary lien arises and attaches to
real or personal property.

RULING: CA Ruling is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

DISPOSITION: ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition for review is hereby

GRANTED and the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of February 11,
1988 affirming the order of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
without prejudice to such appropriate proceedings as may be brought by private
respondent to establish its right to attorney's fees and the amount thereof.
FULL TEXT:
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1990/jan1990/gr_86100_03_1990.html

• CPR Rule 20.01: Fee guide

Rule 20.01 - A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his
fees:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) the time spent and the extent of the service rendered or required;
(b) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;

(c) The importance of the subject matter;

(d) The skill demanded;

(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the

proffered case;

(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the
IBP chapter to which he belongs;

(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client
from the service;

(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;

(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and

(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.

• Roxas vs. de Zuzuarregui, 481 SCRA 250 (2006)

Facts: The Zuzuarreguis engaged the legal services of Attys. Romeo G. Roxas
and Santiago N. Pastor, to represent them in the case. This was sealed by a
Letter-Agreement, wherein it was contained that the attorneys would endeavor to
secure just compensation with the NHA and other government agencies at a
price of 11pesos or more per square meter, and that any lower amount shall not
entitle them to any atty’s fees. They also stipulated that in the event they get it for
11pesos per square meter, their contingent fee shall be 30% of the just
compensation. They also stipulated that their lawyer’s fees shall be in proportion
to the cash/bonds ratio of the just compensation.
[…]
A Compromise Agreement was executed between the Zuzuarreguis and the
NHA. The Compromise Agreement, stipulated among other things, that the just
compensation of the Zuzuarregui properties would be at P19.50 per square
meter payable in NHA Bonds. In a Decision dated 20 December 1985, the RTC,
approved the Compromise Agreement submitted by the parties.

The total amount in NHA bonds released to Atty. Romeo G. Roxas in behalf of
the Zuzuarreguis amounted to P54,500,000.00. Out of this amount, the records
show that the amount turned over to the Zuzuarreguis by Atty. Roxas amounted
to P30,520,000.00 (representing the actual just compensation, although this
amount is bigger) in NHA bonds.

Computed at P19.50 per square meter, the 1,790,570.36 square meters property
of the Zuzuarreguis was expropriated at a total price of P34,916,122.00. The total
amount released by the NHA was P54,500,000.00. The difference of
P19,583,878.00 is, undoubtedly, the yield on the bonds.

On 25 August 1987, a letter was sent by the Zuzuarreguis’ new counsel, Jose F.
Gonzalez, to Attys. Roxas and Pastor, demanding that the latter deliver to the
Zuzuarreguis the yield corresponding to bonds paid by the NHA within a period of
10 days from receipt, under pain of administrative, civil and/or criminal action.

Issue: The honorable court of appeals gravely erred on a question of law in

holding that the letter-agreement re: contingent fees cannot be allowed to stand
as the law between the parties

Held: A contract is a meeting of the minds between two persons whereby one
binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some
service. Contracts shall be obligatory, in whatever form they may have been
entered into, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present.

The Zuzuarreguis, in entering into the Letter-Agreement, fully gave their consent
thereto. In fact, it was them (the Zuzuarreguis) who sent the said letter to Attys.
Roxas and Pastor, for the purpose of confirming all the matters which they had
agreed upon previously. There is absolutely no evidence to show that anybody
was forced into entering into the Letter-Agreement. Verily, its existence, due
execution and contents were admitted by the Zuzuarreguis themselves.
In the presence of a contract for professional services duly executed by the
parties thereto, the same becomes the law between the said parties is not
absolute but admits an exception – that the stipulations therein are not contrary
to law, good morals, good customs, public policy or public order.

Under the contract in question, Attys. Roxas and Pastor are to receive contingent
fees for their professional services. It is a deeply-rooted rule that contingent
fees are not per se prohibited by law. They are sanctioned by Canon 13 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics.

A contract for contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable

under all the circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the
compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to
its reasonableness.

Indubitably entwined with the lawyer’s duty to charge only reasonable fees is the
power of this Court to reduce the amount of attorney’s fees if the same is
excessive and unconscionable.

Attorney’s fees are unconscionable if they affront one’s sense of justice, decency
or reasonableness. It becomes axiomatic therefore, that power to determine the
reasonableness or the, unconscionable character of attorney's fees stipulated by
the parties is a matter falling within the regulatory prerogative of the courts.

In the instant case, Attys. Roxas and Pastor received an amount which was
equal to forty-four percent (44%) of the just compensation paid (including the
yield on the bonds) by the NHA to the Zuzuarreguis, or an amount equivalent to
P23,980,000.00 of the P54,500,000.00. Considering that there was no full blown
hearing in the expropriation case, ending as it did in a Compromise Agreement,
the 44% is, undeniably, unconscionable and excessive under the circumstances.
Its reduction is, therefore, in order.
It is imperative that the contingent fees received by Attys. Roxas and
Pastor must be equitably reduced. In the opinion of this Court, the yield that
corresponds to the percentage share of the Zuzuarreguis in the P19.50 per
square meter just compensation paid by the NHA must be returned by Attys.
Roxas and Pastor.
The yield on the NHA bonds amounted to P19,583,878.00. This amount must
therefore be divided between the Zuzuarreguis, on the one hand, and Attys.
Roxas and Pastor, on the other. The division must be pro rata. Attys. Roxas and
Pastor, in the opinion of this Court, were not shortchanged for their efforts for
they would still be earning or actually earned attorney’s fees in the amount of
P6,987,078.75

On the issue of moral and exemplary damages, we cannot award the same for
there was no direct showing of bad faith on the part of Attys. Roxas and Pastor,
for as we said earlier, contingency fees are not per se prohibited by law. It is only
necessary that it be reduced when excessive and unconscionable, which we
have already done.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the

Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 25 June 2001 and 06
February 2002, respectively, are AFFIRMED but with the MODIFICATION that
Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor are hereby ordered to return to
the Zuzuarreguis the amount of P17,073,224.84. No costs.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/jan2006/gr_152072_2006.html

• Masmud vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 183385, February 13, 2009

FACTS: The late Alexander J. Masmud (Alexander), the husband of Evangelina
Masmud (Evangelina) filed a complaint against First Victory Shipping Services
and Angelakos (Hellas) S.A. on July 9, 2003 for non-payment of permanent
disability benefits, medical expenses, sickness allowance, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees. Alexander engaged the services of Atty. Rolando
B. Go, Jr. (Atty. Go) as his counsel. In consideration of Atty. Go's legal services,
Alexander agreed to pay attorney's fees on a contingent basis, as follows: twenty
percent (20%) of total monetary claims as settled or paid and an additional ten
percent (10%) in case of appeal. On November 21, 2003, the Labor Arbiter (LA)
rendered a Decision granting the monetary claims of Alexander. Alexander's
employer filed an appeal before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC). During the pendency of the proceedings before the NLRC, Alexander
died. After explaining the terms of the lawyer's fees to Evangelina, Atty. Go
caused her substitution as complainant. On April 30, 2004, the NLRC rendered a
Decision dismissing the appeal of Alexander's employer. On appeal before the
CA, the decision of the LA was affirmed with modification. Thereafter,
Alexander’s employer appealed to the Supreme Court. On February 6, 2006, the
Court issued a Resolution dismissing the case for lack of merit.

On January 10, 2005, the LA directed the NLRC Cashier to release the amount
of P3,454,079.20 to Evangelina. Out of the said amount, Evangelina paid Atty.
Go the sum of P680,000.00. Dissatisfied, Atty. Go filed a motion to record
and enforce the attorney's lien alleging that Evangelina reneged on their
contingent fee agreement. Evangelina paid only the amount of P680,000.00,
equivalent to 20% of the award as attorney's fees, thus, leaving a balance
of 10%, plus the award pertaining to the counsel as attorney's fees. In her
comment, Evangelina manifested that Atty. Go's claim for attorney's fees of
40% of the total monetary award was null and void based on Article 111 of
the Labor Code.

The Labor Arbiter issued an Order granting Atty. Go's motion. Then, Evangelina
questioned the decision of the Labor Arbiter before the NLRC. However, the
NLRC dismissed her appeal. Then, she elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals. The CA partially granted the petition with some modification declaring
that Atty. Go is fully compensated by the amount of P1,347,950.11 that he has
already received. Dissatisfied, Angelina filed this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the legal compensation of a lawyer in a labor proceeding

should be based on Article 111 of the Labor Code.

SC RULING:
There are two concepts of attorney's fees. In the ordinary sense, attorney's
fees represent the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client
for the legal services rendered to the latter. On the other hand, in its
extraordinary concept, attorney's fees may be awarded by the court as
indemnity for damages to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing
party, such that, in any of the cases provided by law where such award can
be made, e.g., those authorized in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, the amount is
payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have agreed that the
award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof.
Here, we apply the ordinary concept of attorney's fees, or the compensation that
Atty. Go is entitled to receive for representing Evangelina, in substitution of her
husband, before the labor tribunals and before the court. The retainer contract
between Atty. Go and Evangelina provides for a contingent fee. The contract
shall control in the determination of the amount to be paid, unless found by the
court to be unconscionable or unreasonable. Attorney's fees are unconscionable
if they affront one's sense of justice, decency or reasonableness. The decree of
unconscionability or unreasonableness of a stipulated amount in a contingent fee
contract will not preclude recovery. It merely justifies the fixing by the court of a
reasonable compensation for the lawyer's services.

Contingent fee contracts are subject to the supervision and close scrutiny of the
court in order that clients may be protected from unjust charges. The amount of
contingent fees agreed upon by the parties is subject to the stipulation that
counsel will be paid for his legal services only if the suit or litigation prospers. A
much higher compensation is allowed as contingent fees because of the risk that
the lawyer may get nothing if the suit fails. The Court finds nothing illegal in the
contingent fee contract between Atty. Go and Evangelina's husband. The CA
committed no error of law when it awarded the attorney's fees of Atty. Go and
allowed him to receive an equivalent of 39% of the monetary award.

Considering that Atty. Go successfully represented his client, it is only proper that
he should receive adequate compensation for his efforts. With his capital
consisting of his brains and with his skill acquired at tremendous cost not only in
money but in expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to the protection of
any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of his client to escape
payment of his just compensation. It would be ironic if after putting forth the best
in him to secure justice for his client, he himself would not get his due.

DISPOSITION: In view of the foregoing, the Decision and Resolution of the

Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/feb2009/gr_183385_2009.html

• CPR Rule 20.02: Client’s consent of fees for referral
Rule 20.02 - A lawyer shall, in case of referral, with the consent of the client, be
entitled to a division of fees in proportion to the work performed and responsibility
assumed.

• Urban Bank vs. Pena, 364 SCRA 597 (2001)

FACTS: It was in 1994 that Isabel Company,Inc. (ISCI) sold the land to Urban
Bank Inc. (UBI). One of the conditions of the sale was for ISC to cause the
eviction of all the occupants found in said property. To fully implement this
condition, ISC engaged the services of herein Respondent Atty. Magdaleno M.
Peña.

During the eviction process, Complainant was informed by ISC and Respondent
about the necessity of a letter of authority in favor of the latter, granting him the
authority to represent Complainant in maintaining possession of the aforesaid
property and to represent Complainant in any court action that may be instituted
in connection with the exercise of said duty.

Complainant acceded to the request and issued a letter-authority, but only after
making it very clear to the Respondent that it was ISC which contracted his
services and not Complainant.

Subsequently however, Respondent requested for a modification of said letter of

authority by furnishing Complainant with a draft containing the desired wordings
(including the date, i.e., 19 December 1994) and asking Complainant to modify
the previous letter by issuing a new one similarly worded as his draft.

If only to expedite and facilitate matters, Complainant willingly obliged and re-
issued a new letter of authority to Respondent, this time incorporating some of
Respondent’s suggestions. Thus it came to pass that the actual letter of authority
was dated 19 December 1994, while Complainant’s clarificatory letter was dated
15 December 1994.

Eventually, the eviction of the occupants of the property in question was

successfully carried out. After the lapse of more than thirteen (13) months,
Respondent filed a collection suit against herein Complainant and its senior
officers "for recovery of agent’s compensation and expenses, damages and
attorney’s fees", on the strength of the letter of authority.

Petitioner then alleged that the act of Respondent in securing the letter of
authority from Complainant, ostensibly for the purpose of convincing the
occupants sought to be evicted that he was duly authorized to take possession of
the property and then using the same letter as basis for claiming agent’s
compensation, expenses and attorney’s fees from Complainant, knowing fully
well the circumstances surrounding the issuance of said letter of authority,
constitutes deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct under Section 27, Rule 138
of the Revised Rules of Court.

Respondent then disputed that he was guilty of deceit, malpractice or gross

misconduct. He declared that complainant, through its duly authorized officers,
engaged his services to rid the property of tenants and intruders in the course of
a telephone conversation. He added that there was no reason for him to deceive
complainant into writing a letter of authority because he knew very well that the
verbal agreement was sufficient to constitute an attorney-client relationship. The
request for a letter of authority, according to him, was "merely to formalize the
engagement."2 Lastly, he argued that the complainant accepted the benefits of
his service, just as it never disclaimed that he was acting in its behalf during the
period of engagement.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be disbarred on the ground of deceit,

malpractice and gross misconduct

HELD: No. Respondent cannot be found guilty of the charges against him. Apart
from the allegations it made in various pleadings, complainant has not proferred
any proof tending to show that respondent really induced it, through machination
or other deceitful means, to issue the December 19 letter of authority ostensibly
for the purpose of evicting illegal occupants, then using the very same letter for
demanding agent’s compensation. During the scheduled hearing, it did not
introduce a single witness to testify apropos the circumstance under which the
letter was dispatched. Those who signed and issued the letter, Corazon M.
Bejasa and Arturo E. Manuel Jr., were never presented before the investigating
commissioner to substantiate its assertion that the letter it gave to the respondent
was only "for show," and for a purpose which is limited in scope. Similarly, not
even the sworn statements from these or other vital witnesses were attached to
the memorandum or the other pleadings it submitted. It is one thing to allege
deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct, and another to demonstrate by
evidence the specific acts constituting the same.

To be sure, no evidence in respect of the supposed deceit, malpractice or gross

misconduct was adduced by the complainant. It is axiomatic that he who alleges
the same has the onus of validating it. In disbarment proceedings, the burden
of proof is upon the complainant and this Court will exercise its
disciplinary power only if the former establishes its case by clear,
convincing, and satisfactory evidence. In this regard, we find that
complainant failed to meet the required standard.

Lastly, complainant seems to belabor under the mistaken assumption that the
basis of the respondent in instituting the civil case against it was the December
19 letter of authority. Well to point out, the suit was grounded on an oral contract
of agency purportedly entered into between him and the complainant,
represented by its duly authorized officers.

What respondent was trying to enforce were the terms and conditions of the
contract. The letter, from the his own admission, just served to officially confirm a
done deal. It was, hence, utilized solely as documentary evidence to buttress
respondent’s assertion regarding the existence of the agency agreement. In fact,
the amount of compensation (to the tune of 10% of the market value of the
property) he was recovering in the action was never mentioned in the letter, but
apparently settled in the course of an oral conversation. Indeed, respondent, with
or without the letter, could have instituted a suit against the complainant. There is
no gainsaying that a verbal engagement is sufficient to create an attorney-client
relationship.

DISPOSITION: In sum, we find that, under the premises, respondent can hardly
be faulted and accused of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct for invoking
the aid of the court in recovering recompense for legal services which he claims
he undertook for the complainant, and which the latter does not deny to have
benefited from. Indeed, what he did was a lawful exercise of a right.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the disbarment complaint against respondent Atty.
Magdaleno M. Peña is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2001/sep2001/ac_4863_2001.html

• CPR Rule 20.03: Client’s consent of acceptance of fee

• ROC Rule 138, Sec. 20 (e)

• CPR Rule 20.04: Avoid compensation controversy with

client

• ROC Rule 138, Sec. 24, 32

• Corpus vs. CA, 98 SCRA 424 (1980)

• Malvar v. Kraft Foods, G.R. No. 183952, September 9, 2013

FACTS: Malvar filed a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal
against KFPI and Bautista in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
The Labor Arbiter found and declared her suspension and dismissal illegal, and
ordered her reinstatement, and the payment of her full backwages, inclusive of
allowances and other benefits, plus attorney’s fees. NLRC and CA affirmed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. After the judgment in her favor became final and
executory, Malvar moved for the issuance of a writ of execution but the execution
failed due to questionable computation of the award. Malvar requested for the
2nd issuance of the writ of execution and was partially complied with but with
protest on the part of Kraft by filing a TRO for further execution since the
computation is incorrect. CA ruled in favor of Kraft. Thus, Malvar appealed. While
her appeal was pending in this Court, Malvar and the respondents entered into a
compromise agreement.

Thereafter, Malvar filed an undated Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw Case praying

that the appeal be immediately dismissed/withdrawn in view of the compromise
agreement, and that the case be considered closed and terminated.Before the
Court could act on Malvar’s Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw Case, the Court
received a Motion for Intervention to Protect Attorney’s Rights from The Law Firm
of Dasal, Llasos and Associates, through its Of Counsel Retired Supreme Court
Associate Justice Josue N. Bellosillo (Intervenor), whereby the Intervenor sought,
among others, that both Malvar and KFPI be held and ordered to pay jointly and
severally the Intervenor’s contingent fees.

The Intervenor indicated that Malvar’s precipitate action had baffled, shocked
and even embarrassed the Intervenor, because it had done everything legally
possible to serve and protect her interest. It added that it could not recall any
instance of conflict or misunderstanding with her, for, on the contrary, she had
even commended it for its dedication and devotion to her case. According to the
Intervenor, it was certain that the compromise agreement was authored by the
respondents to evade a possible loss as a result of the labor litigation and , they
saw the Intervenor as a major stumbling block to the compromise agreement that
it was then brewing with her. Obviously, the only way to remove the Intervenor
was to have her terminate its services as her legal counsel. This prompted the
Intervenor to bring the matter to the attention of the Court to enable it to recover
in full its compensation based on its written agreement with her.

Opposing the Motion for Intervention,Malvar stresses that there was no truth to
the Intervenor’s claim to defraud it of its professional fees; that the Intervenor
lacked the legal capacity to intervene because it had ceased to exist. Malvar
adds that even assuming, arguendo, that the Intervenor still existed as a law firm,
it was still not entitled to intervene for the following reasons, namely: firstly, it
failed to attend to her multiple pleas and inquiries regarding the case: secondly,
maintaining that this was a justifiable cause to dismiss its services, the Intervenor
only heeded her repeated demands to withdraw from the case when Atty. Dasal
was confronted about his appointment to the government subsidiary; thirdly, it
was misleading and grossly erroneous for the Intervenor to claim that it had
rendered to her full and satisfactory services when the truth was that its
participation was strictly limited to the preparation, finalization and submission of
the petition for review with the Supreme Court; and finally, while the Intervenor
withdrew its services on October 5, 2009, the compromise agreement was
executed with the respondents on December 9, 2010 and notarized on
December 14, 2010, after more than a year and two months, dispelling any
badge of bad faith on their end.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Motion for Intervention to protect attorney’s rights can
prosper, and, if so, how much could it recover as attorney’s fees.

RULING: Yes. A compromise agreement is a contract, whereby the parties

undertake reciprocal obligations to avoid litigation, or put an end to one already
commenced. The client may enter into a compromise agreement with the
adverse party to terminate the litigation before a judgment is rendered therein. If
the compromise agreement is found to be in order and not contrary to law,
morals, good customs and public policy, its judicial approval is in order. A
compromise agreement, once approved by final order of the court, has the force
of res judicata between the parties and will not be disturbed except for vices of
consent or forgery. A client has an undoubted right to settle her litigation without
the intervention of the attorney, for the former is generally conceded to have
exclusive control over the subject matter of the litigation and may at any time, if
acting in good faith, settle and adjust the cause of action out of court before
judgment, even without the attorney’s intervention. It is important for the client to
show, however, that the compromise agreement does not adversely affect third
persons who are not parties to the agreement.

By the same token, a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client
relationship at any time with or without cause. But this right of the client is not
unlimited because good faith is required in terminating the relationship. The
limitation is based on Article 19 of the Civil Code, which mandates that “[e]very
person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” The
right is also subject to the right of the attorney to be compensated. This is clear
from Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 26. Change of attorneys. - An attorney may retire at any time from
any action or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in
court. He may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding,
without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client
and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to
retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed
shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the former one, and
written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse party.
A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his
place, but if the contract between client and attorney has been reduced to
 writing and the dismissal of the attorney was without justifiable cause, he
shall be entitled to recover from the client the full compensation stipulated
in the contract. However, the attorney may, in the discretion of the court,
intervene in the case to protect his rights. For the payment of his
compensation the attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the
payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgment,
rendered in the case wherein his services had been retained by the client.
(Bold emphasis supplied).

In fine, it is basic that an attorney is entitled to have and to receive a just and
reasonable compensation for services performed at the special instance and
request of his client. The attorney who has acted in good faith and honesty in
representing and serving the interests of the client should be reasonably
compensated for his service.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the Court APPROVES the compromise

agreement; GRANTS the Motion for Intervention to Protect Attorney's Rights; and
ORDERS Czarina T. Malvar and respondents Kraft Food Philippines Inc. and
Kraft Foods International to jointly and severally pay to Intervenor Law Firm,
represented by Retired Associate Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, its stipulated
contingent fees of 10% of ₱41,627,593.75, and the further sum equivalent to
10% of the value of the stock option. No pronouncement on costs of suit.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/sep2013/gr_183952_2013.html

• Balingit v. Cervantes & Delarmente, A.C. No. 11059,
November 9, 2016 Page 20 of 20
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, Atty. Teodoro B. Delarmente and Atty. Renato M.
Cervantes are hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.
Both are STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall
be dealt with more severely. They are also DIRECTED to return to complainant
the amount of P45,000.00. Finally, respondents are DIRECTED to report to this
Court the date of their receipt of this Decision to enable this Court to determine
when their suspension shall take effect.

FULL TEXT: https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2016novemberdecisions.php?

id=916

I. Withdrawal of Services

• Canon 22
CANON 22 - A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR
GOOD CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE
CIRCUMSTANCES.

• CPR Rule 22.01

Rule 22.01 - A lawyer may withdraw his services in any of the following
case:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in connection
with the matter he is handling;
(b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these
canons and rules;

(c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best interest of
the client;

(d) When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him
to carry out the employment effectively;

(e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or fails to
comply with the retainer agreement;

(f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; and

(g) Other similar cases.
• Domingo vs. Aquino, 38 SCRA 472 (1971)
DISPOSITION:

FULL TEXT:

• Montano vs. IBP, 358 SCRA 1 (2001)

FACTS: The complainant hired the services of Atty. Juan S. Dealca as his
counsel in collaboration with Atty. Ronando L. Gerona in a case pending before
the Court of Appeals docketed wherein the complainant was the plaintiff-
appellant.

The parties agreed upon attorney’s fees in the amount of P15,000.00 fifty percent
(50%) of which was payable upon acceptance of the case and the remaining
balance upon the termination of the case. Accordingly, complainant paid
respondent the amount of P7,500.00 representing 50% of the attorney’s fee.

Thereafter, even before respondent counsel had prepared the appellant’s brief
and contrary to their agreement that the remaining balance be payable after the
termination of the case, Atty. Dealca demanded an additional payment from
complainant obliged by paying the amount of P4,000.00.

Prior to the filing of the appellant’s brief, respondent counsel again demanded
payment of the remaining balance of P3,500.00. When complainant was unable
to do so, respondent lawyer withdraw his appearance as complainant’s counsel
without his prior knowledge and/or conformity.

Thus this complaint charging respondent with misconduct and praying that he be
“sternly dealt with administratively.”

ISSUE: W/N respondent committed misconduct and violated provisions of the

CPR?

HELD: Yes. The Court finds respondent’s conduct unbecoming of a member of

the legal profession. Under Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
a lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice
appropriate in the circumstances. Although he may withdraw his services
when the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services, under the
circumstances of the present case, Atty. Dealca’s withdrawal was
unjustified as complainant did not deliberately fail to pay him the attorney’s
fees. In fact, complainant exerted honest efforts to fulfill his obligation.
Respondent’s contemptuous conduct does not speak well of a member of the bar
considering that the amount owing to him was only P3,500.00. rule 20.4 of
Canon 20, mandates that a lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients
concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent
imposition, injustice or fraud. Sadly, for not so large a sum owed to him by
complainant, respondent lawyer failed to act in accordance with the demands of
the Code.

The Court, however, does not agree with complainant’s contention that the
maximum penalty of disbarment should be imposed on respondent lawyer. In the
present case, reprimand is deemed sufficient.

Respondent was REPRIMANDED.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Juan S.

Dealca is REPRIMANDED with a warning that repetition of the same act will be
dealt with more severely.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2001/may2001/ac_4215_2001.html

• CPR Rule 22.02

Rule 22.02 - A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a retainer
lien, immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled,
and shall cooperative with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter,
including all information necessary for the proper handling of the matter.

• Obando vs. Figueras, 322 SCRA 148

DISPOSITION:

FULL TEXT:
• Caoile vs. Macaraeg, A.C. No. 720, June 17,
2015
FACTS: Francisco, and four others, engaged the services of Atty. Macaraeg to
represent them in Civil Case No. 11119, an action for recovery of ownership filed
before the CFI of Lingayen, Pangasinan. After the CFI rendered judgment
against them, Francisco and his codefendants decided to appeal their case
before the CA. Accordingly, Atty. Macaraeg filed a notice of appeal. Thrice he
moved for extension of time to file appellants' brief. In his last motion for
extension, he alleged that he was already in the process of doing the finishing
touches on the brief and just needed to have it printed. Yet, the extended period
expired without Atty. Macaraeg filing any brief. Hence, upon motion of the
opposing party, the CA dismissed the appeal. The dismissal became final and
executory on December 13, 1963.

Francisco averred that they were unaware of the dismissal of their appeal until
they were served with the CFI's writ of execution and a notice of sale at public
auction of their property in 1965. After confirming with the CA that they indeed
lost the case, Francisco confronted Atty. Macaraeg who informed him that they
lost the case because they failed to pay him in full.

Hence, this administrative complaint against Atty. Macaraeg for neglect and
dereliction of duty.

In his Answer, Atty. Macaraeg averred that Francisco and his codefendants did
not pay in full for his services in filing the appeal. Anent the pacto de retro sale
which Francisco and his wife executed in his favor supposedly to cover the
balance of his professional fees, Atty. Macaraeg claimed that it was Francisco
who insisted on its execution, and that, contrary to Francisco's claim, it was
intended as payment for his services while representing Francisco before the
CFI, and not as payment for his services in filing the appeal. Atty. Macaraeg also
claimed that, in any case, Francisco did not honor the said pacto de retro sale as
the possession of the lot was never turned over to him.Atty. Macaraeg denied
Francisco's accusation that he neglected their case. He pointed out that to push
through with the appeal he even advanced some of the appeal expenses. While
he admitted that he failed to submit an appellants' brief, he averred that the same
was actually the fault of his clients who failed to provide the necessary funds to
file said brief.

On September 22, 1966, this Court referred the Complaint to the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation. From March to November
1967, the Solicitor General conducted several hearings.

In November 1972, the Office of the Solicitor General again summoned the
parties to appear before it. Notably, the return of the subpoena served upon Atty.
Macaraeg contained a notation that Atty. Marcelino Macaraeg is now deceased.
Subsequently, this case was transferred to the IBP.

On October 19, 2011, Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero of the Commission on

Bar Discipline of the IBP came up with a Report and Recommendation. The
commissioner noted the long period of time that the Complaint has been
pending. Anent the merits of the Complaint, Commissioner Cachapero ruled that
Atty. Macaraeg neglected the cause of his clients when he thrice moved for
extension of time within which to file his brief. However, he did not file any,
reasoning out that the non-filing was due to his clients' failure to give him the
necessary funds.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated the Code of Professional

Responsibility for failing to file the appellant’s brief on behalf of his client.

RULING: YES. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides

that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him liable.

A considerable length of time had elapsed from the time Atty. Macaraeg' filed the
notice of appeal on August 30, 1962 up to the time he filed the third motion for
extension of time to file brief on October 5, 1963. Despite the passage of such
time, however, Atty. Macaraeg still failed to file the brief, which resulted in the
dismissal of his clients' appeal. Suffice it to state that a motion for extension to
file an appellant's brief carries with it the presumption that the applicant lawyer
will file the pleading within the requested extended period. Failure to do so
without any reasonable excuse violates the Code of Professional Responsibility.
While Atty. Macaraeg attributed the non-filing of the brief to his clients' failure to
give the amount necessary for filing the same, he should have, as aptly stated by
Commissioner Cachapero, shown a more mindful and caring attitude towards the
cause of his clients by advancing the payment. Besides, the facts of this case
show that his clients were making partial payments in their efforts to comply with
their obligation to him and were not deliberately refusing to pay him. In fact, as
claimed by Atty. Macaraeg himself, Francisco even insisted that they enter into a
pacto de retro sale in order for them to fully pay him for the services he rendered
in connection with their civil case in the CFI. In fact, if Atty. Macaraeg truly
believed that the necessary funds from his clients were not forthcoming, he could
have excused himself from the case. The Code of Professional Responsibility
allows a counsel to withdraw his services for a good cause, including the client's
failure to comply with the retainer agreement. Indeed, Atty. Macaraeg violated
Rule 12.03.

Nevertheless, while the actuation of Atty. Macaraeg warrants the imposition of a

penalty, supervening circumstances call for the dismissal of this administrative
case. Records reveal that he was already 60 years old when the hearings in this
disbarment case were held in 1967. Hence, he would have been 108 years old
by this time.

It is also noteworthy that the subpoena issued by the Solicitor General in 1972
contains a handwritten note that Atty. Macaraeg had already died. Thereafter,
nothing more was heard from either party despite notice. Under these
circumstances, it is safe to assume that the complainant had already lost interest
in pursuing this disbarment case against Atty. Macaraeg and that there is truth in
the handwritten notation in the return of the subpoena that Atty. Macaraeg had
already passed away. WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Complaint for
Disbarment against Atty. Marcelino Macaraeg is hereby DISMISSED.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Complaint for

Disbarment against Atty. Marcelino Macaraeg is hereby DISMISSED.

FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/jun2015/ac_720_2015.html