Berezin 2018 Simulation Argument in The Context of Ultimate Reality and Meaning

METHODS AND SYSTEMATIC REFLECTIONS
https://www.utpjournals.press/doi/pdf/10.3138/uram.29.4.244 - Wednesday, January 31, 2024 12:38:39 PM - IP Address:176.33.110.56
SIMULATION ARGUMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF ULTIMATE

REALITY AND MEANING
Alexander A. Berezin, Department of Engineering Physics, McMaster University,

Hamilton. Ontario, Canada, LBS 4L7
I. INTRODUCTION
Rapid evolution of computers and the exponential growth of computer power (Moore's
Law) have triggered some interesting philosophical speculations that have a direct
impact on issues or the Ultimate Reality and Meaning (URAM). Recently. philosopher
Nick Bostrom. in an article with the provocative titk. 'Are You Living [n a Computer
Simulation?' (2003), presented a modern version or the earlier solipsist and su~jcctive
arguments (e.g., George Berkeley) according to which the outside world is indistin-
guishable from illusion. This •simulation Argument· resonates with several other
recent developments, such as the discourse on whether fuwre computers will be able
to emulate human consciousness (artilicial intelligence), whether the future human
beings will reach a biological symbiosis with computers (stages of 'Transhumanism'
or ·Posthumanism'. as defined below), or (in .a more radical futurology) whether
human beings will actual ly be replaced by artificial self-replicating life forms
(e.g.. 'silicon life').
These philosophical themes have even auained some notorious visibility in the
mass culture and entertainment (e.g., the recent blockbuster movies 'The Matrix' and
·The Matrix Reloaded'). Frank Tipler had already presented an earlier reflection
on these issues in his 1994 book, Physics ofl111111ortality, Modern Cosmology, Cod and
the Resurrection of rile Dead. His argument of ·omega Point' was akin to the earlier
ideas of the universal convergence, which had been developed by the French Jesuit and
paleontologist Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881 - 1955). Though the latter did not talk
explicitly about the simulation hypothesis. the extrapolation of his ideas potentially
points in this direction. The key question stemming from these ideas is to what extent
the simulated (virtual) world can be considered as actually 'rear, and, if so. in what
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sense it 'exists' and whether it can be transcended to the plane of Ultimate Reality and
Meaning, similarly to the URAM-transcendence of the usual human existence
(e.g., our existence ' in the mind of God').
Although the Simulation Argument (with variations) has a long history in both
science fiction and in 'serious' scientific studies. the 'simulat.ion' theme has become an
especially 'hot' issue in the last few years following the publication of Bostrom's
seminal paper (2003). It should be noted, however, that, so far, relatively few scholarly
published articles have been published on this issue. Much, if not most, of the present
discussion is going on in the form of internet postings in numerous discussion forums.
The worldwide web materials are noLOriously difficult to reference in a formal way.
particularly because many such postings are anonymous or have been signed with pen
names. and include comments from many people. While it is virtually impossible to
read all this ever-growing collection of on-line postings, this paper will review some
generic ideas and inferences taken from the variety of postings without, in certain
circumstances, attributing them to particular authors. 1 make no apology for these
unattributed quotes because, in my view, they do present an on-going shift from paper-
based scholarship to one which is based on the worldwide web, and which does,
indeed, reduce the efficacy of formal referencing in many cases. After all, ideas as such
do not depend on who specifically put them forward first. The long history of the
Simulation Argument shows that these ideas are indeed the collective product of a
large number of thinkers.
2. NICK BOSTROM' S SIMULATION ARGUMENT
Nick Bostrom, a lecturer in the Department of Philosophy of Oxford University, starts

a 2003 paper by noticing that the recent, rapid, and ongoing progress in information
Lechnology (IT) makes it highly likely that enormous amounts of computing power
will be available in the future. I n recent years the development of IT has followed the
so-called 'Moore's Law' - an empirically established trend according Lo which the
processing power of IT doubles about every eighteen months. Unlike Newton's laws,
Moore's Law is not a fundamental law of nature, however its unimerrupted reliability
over the course of the past fifty or so years indicates that it will most likely continue
its pace in the decades to come (Berezin and Ibrahim 2004). This may especially be so
if recently booming development in the area of quantum computing (the next stage 10
the 'parallel-processing' computing) translates itself into a new generation of
computer technology based on more advanced (quantum) principles than the present
'classical' computing.
So, can we legitimately ask what humankind will likely do with all this exponen-
tially increasing computer power? For example, will an area of Artificial lntelligence
(Al), which.is itself a significant development in computer science and engineering,
be further boos1ecl lb the level of genuinely simulating human consciousness?
(q.v., Kurzweil 1999, 2005; Moravec 1999). lf so, what will the next stage be? Will
simulated beings be conscious in the same way we are. or. in some other way?
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Will they, perhaps, be conscious in a higher way than we are? Can specific, individual
people (including those who are already dead) be 'simulated' in such a way that they
will nol know that they are, actually, computer simulations? And, finally, to ask the
most provocative question of all: Could it be (or what are the chances) that we are, in
fact, already computer simulations?
Undoubtedly, many people with common sense would tend to dismiss the Simulation
Argument, outright, as utter rubbish. Indeed, the seemingly weird assumption that we
may be computer simulations appears to be at odds .with our sense of personal reality,
free wil l, and personal freedom of action. And yet, it cannot be consistently refuted on
the basis of purely logical argumentation. Bostrom does not assert that we are neces-
sari ly simulated entities. but he, as well as many other i nternet discussants, does ann
the simulation hypothesis with a variety of physical and mathematical arguments.
Bostrom summarizes the simulation hypotheses in the following way:
AL our current stage of technological development. we have neither sufficiently powerful

hardware nor the requisite software lO create conscious minds in computers. But persuasive
arguments have been given lo the effect that if technological progress continues unabated
then these shortcomings will eventually be overcome. Some authors argue that this stage
may be only a few decades away. Yet present purposes require no assumptions about the
time-scale. The Simulation Argument works equally well for those who think that it will
take hundreds of thousands of years to reach a posthuman stage of civilization. where
humankind has acquired most of the technological capabilities that one can currently show
to be consistent with physical laws and with material and energy constraints. (2003, p. 245)
Even before Bostrom's articles. the simulation ideas were well reflected in science
fiction. Without going into a detailed discussion of much of this work (it could easily
take many pages) I will here mention two novels by Greg Egan: Perm.utarion City
( 1994) and Diaspora ( 1997). They address events that are expected to occur in the
middle of the 21 st century.
Computing power has increased enormously, to the extent that it is possible to run
very detailed simulation of human brains and human bodies. Also, scanning technol-
ogy has improved to the point at which it is possible to scan existing brains at the
atomic level. 'In Pemwta1io11 City', Egan describes a community of simulated human
beings (Copies) with multiple copies of the same individuals. All of this, however, is
not good news: many Copies cannot accept their existence and attempt to bail out into
reality. The Copies who do continue (as simulations) are wonied about their rights and
about maintaining access to sufficient computer power, on which their very existence
depends.
In Diaspora, humanity is divided into three types: the polis citizens (downloaded
minds running on software in virtual reality). the gleisner robots (software people
living embodied I ives in robot bodies), and fleshers, people still embod ied in good old
fashioned skin. The novels deal with many existential, philosophical and mathematical
issues 1hat would likely arise in the realm of grand computer simulations (such as, for
example, what would we experience if our brains were computer-upgraded to perceive
a 1welve-dimensional world?).
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Recently. and in part because of the success of the Matrix movie series, much of the
Simulation Argument has been discussed from a variety of philosophical positions.
In his 2005 work, The Matrix as Metaphysics, David Chalmers posits that the mau·ix
presents a version or an old philosophical fable: the brain in a vat. The brain is stimu-
lated with the same sort of inputs that a normal, embodied brain receives. To do this,
the brain is connected to a giant computer simulation of a world. The simulation

determines which inputs the brain receives. When the brain produces outputs, these
are fed back into the simulation. The internal state of the brain is just like that of a
normal brain, despite the fact that it lacks a body. From the brain's point of view, things
seem very much as they seem to all of us. The brain is massively deluded, it seems.
It has all sorts of false beliefs about the world. It believes that it has a body, but it has
no body. It believes that it is walking outside in the sunlight, but in fact it is inside a
dark lab.
Furthermore, even the existence of the 'real' (biological) brain is not essential - the
entire simulation can proceed as a chain of bits ('0' and 'I') in some super-computer.
As Bostrom has suggested, it is not out of the question that in the history of the
universe, technology will evolve in such a way that beings will be able co create
computer simulations of entire worlds (2003). There may well be vast numbers of such
computer simulations, compared to just one real world. If so, there may well be many
more beings who are in a matrix than beings who are not. Given all this, one might
even infer that it is more likely that we are in a matrix than that we are not. Whether
this is right or not. it certainly seems that we cannot be certain that we are not in a
matrix.
Chalmers points out that the question of 'reality' is a u·icky one (2005). We should
not necessarily see a simulated world as 'unreal' - it just exists on the basis of a
different metaphysical substrate (computer 'bits'), instead of atoms and molecules.
Therefore, accordin g Chalmers, the situation (even if we live in a matrix) may not be
Lhat worrisome; the simulated world simply has a more fundamental metaphysical
substrate (bits and information) than ordinary physical matter (electrons, atoms, and
molecules). In shon, whereas the ordinary physical world is based on the dynamics of
the material particles, the simulated world has its foundation in an unending play of
computer digits. In a metaphoric way one can say that such a simulated world will be
a direct projection of the ideal Platonic world of numbers.
Recently the idea that the universe is a huge computer became popular in a main-
stream physics (Lloyd 2006). This view entails that all physical processes (atomic
dynamics. biology, cosmological events, etc.) are the elements of a singular computa-
tional process. In this vein, the Simulation Argument, whether it uses the image of the
Marrix or another relevant metaphor, becomes an organic pan of an underlying meta-
physics rather than an odd addi1ion to it. In a theological interpretation, one might
view physical reality as being represented in the mind of God, and our own thoughts
and perceptions as depending on God's mind. In such a view, the simulation of the
world is implemented in the mind of God. If this is right, we should say that physical
processes really exist, but just at the most fundamental level. where they are consti-
tuted by processes in the mind of God.
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3. THREE ALTERNATIVE PROPOSITIONS
In splitting his arguments into several alternative scenarios, Bostrom posits that with
a very high likelihood at least one of the followi ng three propositions is true: (1) the
human species is very likely to go extinct berore reaching the 'posthuman stage';
(2) any posthuman civilization is extremely unlikely to run a sign ificant number of
simulations of their evolutionary history (or varia1ions thereat); and. (3) we are al most
certainly living i n a computer simulation. The tirst or these propositions is another
rorm or a Doomsday argument, according to which there is a very high probability that
human civilization, and humanity itself, will be destroyed within a historically short
timeframe. Whi le the Doomsday argument implicitly (sometimes, explicitly) finds its
presence in most key religions (e.g., in the Book of Revelation), in recent years it has
also become a visible and powerful component of a broad public discussion. Published
literature and numerous internet discussions show an exponential growth and intensi-
fication of 1his subject in recent years. Present pol itical instability, nuclear proliferation,
growth of terrorism and intolerance, as well as demographic, economic, and environ-
mental uncertainties and tensions are grossly contributing to these gloomy predictions.
Adding to these woes are possible technological threats, such as self-replicating nano-
scale systems, which may quicky consume ordinary biology (a 'gray goo' scenario), or
the possibility of an uncontrollable. genetically-engineered pandemic. The overall pic-
ture gets very scary, indeed.
In fact, in recent years the Doomsday argument has evol ved from a somewhat fringe
subject into a vocal issue of the mainstream philosophical and f uturological discourse.
Academic authors such as the Canadian philosopher John Leslie ( I 996) and renowned
British cosmologist and astrophysicist Martin Rees (2003) have summarized numer-
ous arguments as to why, more l ikely than not, our luck may soon be running out.
Without going into detailed review of all the possible (competing and/or concurrent)
scenarios or our possible extinction, it suffices to mention one as, perhaps, the most
serious threat. There are a number of small but dedicated groups of people and
individuals who have an unstoppable and ever-growing ability to inflict large-scale
damage. Ominous testimonies to these abilities are the events of the Oklahoma City
bombing of 1995 and the horrors of September 11, 200 I. Due to unstoppable advance-
ments in nuclear physics and technology, the sheer amount of physically destructive
power that is potential ly available to small, clandestine groups has become more and
more frightening.
While some may downplay the above as conspiracy theories, the unfortunate reality
is that a possible destruction of Ii re on Earth through the explosion of a super-powerful
nuclear device (a 'Doomsday machine' ) is not at all unthinkable. On the contrary, it
is fully within the techn.ological means existing today to construct such a device.
Apart from nuclear threats there are on-going discussions about bio-terrorism, cyber-
terrorism, and other sinister means of mass destruction. Even such wild scenarios as an·
attempt to dellect a large asteroid with a deliberate purpose of hilling the Earth are not
impossible (e.g., recent blockbuster movics 'Deep Impact' and 'Armageddon' depict
technologically plausible means for dellccting asteroids).
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Beyond all of this, it is becoming increasingly clear that no functionally sensible
social system can fully control all fringe individuals who may be nursing such
megalomaniacal and suicidal plans for the whole of humankind. If it is not uncommon
for single individuals to commit suicide (numerous statistics suggest that, on average,
as much as I % of all people die by suicide, recognizing, of course, that it is most likely
that not all suicides are reported as such), why might one not chose 10 destroy everyone
else as well?
lL is, of course, impossible lo predict with full certainty whether the Doomsday
scenario, in whatever fashion, will indeed come LO pass or if humanity will find a safe
rou te lO avoid it and will keep progressing indefinitely. The most optimistic scenario
foresees the future prol iferation of humankind beyond the planet Earth, perhaps even
to the galactic and cosmic level, as some scientists are proposing (e.g., Dyson 1979,
I 988). This does not necessarily limit future cosmic humanity to our present biological
form; in fact, some authors propose human-computer symbiosis ('cyber-humans'). or
even complete transfer of consciousness to robotics (Kurzweil 1999, 2005; Moravec
1999). Marvin Minsky, one of the pioneers of Artificial Intelligence, expresses an
ullerly optimistic view: 'Yes, we will engineer replacement bodies and brains using
nanotechnology. We will then live longer, possess greater w isdom and enjoy capabili-
ties as yet unimagined' ( 1994, p. 119).
Computer scientist and futurologist Ray Kurzweil, discerns six epochs in the cosmic
evolution of consciousness: (I) Physics and Chemistry - Information in atoms and
structures; (2) Biology - Information in DNA; (3) Brain - i nformation in neural
patterns; (4) Technology - I nformation in hardware and software designs; (5) Merger
of technology and human intelligence (technology masters methods of biology, i nclud-
ing human intelligence); and, (6) the universe wakes up - pallerns and energy in the
universe become saturated with intell igent processes and kn<;>wledge and vastly-
expanded human intelligence (predominantly non-biological) spreads through the uni-
verse (2005, p. 15). Restating the last point Kurzweil says:
The Universe is 1101 conscious - yet. But it will be. StricLly speaking, we should say that
very little of it is conscious today. But that will change soon. I expect that Lhe universe
will become sublimely intelligent and will wake up in Epoch Six. The only belief I am
posting here is that the universe exists. If we make that leap of faith. the expec1a1ion chat
it will wake up is not so much a belief as an informed understanding, based on the same
science that says there is a universe. (Kurzweil 2005, p. 390)
There is, however, a strong counter argument to such an optimistic idea: if cosmic
proliferation of humankind (in whatever form) is indeed a possibility, then it already
should have happened in countless other civilizations - our predecessors in the
universe. After all, self-replicating space probes traveling at one percent of the speed
of light (technically, quite possible) could colonize the entire galaxy ( I 00,000 light
years in diameter) in just I0 million years - a small fraction of the presumed duration
of life on Eanh (3 or 4 billion years).
But leaving aside claims of UFO enthusiasts, there is no delectable and commonly
acceptable evidence that this is happening or ever happened before, at least not in a
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shape and Corm we can recognize as such. AsserLions such as that, 'the Pyramids were
built by extraterrestrials' (e.g., von Dliniken 1968) remain on the fringe, at best. As an
alternative, there is a 'Zoo Hypothesis', (see below) which seems to be a way to circum-
vent this counter argument. We, however, are bound to be locked into a vicious, circu-
lar loop if we want to apply logic con~istently, either to refute or conlirm the validity
of the Zoo Hypothesis. The conclusion to the first of Bostrom's propositions, then, i s
that the probability_that an advanced civilization will, in time, willingly or accidentally
destroy itself (whether we like it or 1101) shou ld be considered as quite high.
The second of Bostrom's propositions- that any posthuman civilization is extremely
unlikely lo run a significant number of simulations - makes us even more puzzled as
to why the simulations wou ld not do this. Ir, by definition. enormous computer power
will be avail able at that time, then it is almost certain that it will be tried in every
conceivable way. As compu ter games are popular mass entertainment for scores of
youths nowadays, it will just be lOO tempting to try a ' real' simulation (in Bostrom's
sense), even if it should only be an open, technical possibility. Somebody, somewhere,
sometime will give it a try. And even one such super-simulation will be enough, in its
all-encompassing scope, 10 simulate all prior human history and all human beings who
ever existed (Tipler 1994). If such super-simulation has never happened, not even once
in 1hc entire history of 1hc universe, then we might conclude rhat there is some
fundamental (perhaps metaphysical) prohibition from doing it, a prohibition whose
nature (apart from the religious context) we have not yet discovered.
And finally, if the first and second propositions are put aside, Lhc only remaining
option is to accept the simulation hypothesis at face value.
4. TRANSI-IUMAN I SM AND POSTI-IUMANISM
The related terms 'transhumanism' and ' posthumanism ' arc neologisms that were
introduced recently (in the last decade) into scholarly discourse at the interface between
the biological sciences, computer science, nanotechnology, and futurological fore-
casts. In this interdisciplinary context, ·transhumanism ' broadly means a way of think-
ing about the future that is based on the premise that the human species in its current
form docs not represent the end of our development but is, rather, in a comparatively
early phase. Generally, transhumanism is delincd as the philosophical concept that
humanity can. and should. strive to auain higher levels of development - physical,
mental and social. It encourages research into areas such as life extension, nanotech-
nology, physical and mental enhancements, uploading human consciousness inlo
computers, and megascale engineering. The l atter may include space colonization and
even spacetime manipulation at the galactic and cosm ic levels. All such possibilities
tind support in scientific literature (e.g.. biotechnology, quantum and particle physics,
and the mathematics of the intinite, such as sets).
Transhumanism can be further defined as an intellectual and cultural movement
that anirms 1he possibility and desirability or fundamentally improving the human
condition by developing and making widely available technologies that can eliminate
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aging and greatly enhance human intellec1ual, physical, and psychological capacities.
lt includes the study of the ramifications, promises, and potential dangers of technologies
that will enable us to overcome fundamental human limi1ations, as well as 1he related
study of the ethical mauers involved in developing and using such technologies.
A co-term, 'posthumanism', can be seen as a potential extension of transhumanism,
and may be used to talk about possible future beings whose basic capacities so
radically exceed those of present human beings as to no longer be unambiguously
human by our current standards. Many transhumanists wish to follow life paths which
would, sooner or later. require growing into posthuman persons: they yearn Lo' reach
intellectual heights as far above any current human genius as human beings arc above
other primates, to be resistant to disease and impervious to aging, to have unlimited
youth and vigor. to exercise comrol over their own desires, moods, and mental states,
to be able to avoid feelings of tiredness, hatefulness, or irritation about petty things, to
have an increased capacity for pleasure, love, artistic appreciation, and serenity, and lO
experience novel states of consciousness that current human brains cannot access. ll
seems likely that the simple fact of living an indefinitely long, healthy, and active life
would take anyone to posthumanity, if he or she went on accumulat ing memories,
skills, and intelligence.
Posthumans could be completely synthetic artificial intelligences, enhanced
computer uploads. or the result of what is made from many smaller but cumulatively
profound augmentations to a biological human ('uploading', sometimes also called
'downloading' or 'mind uploading' or 'brain reconstruction', means in this context the
process of transferring an intellect from a biological brain to a computer).
The ideas of posthumanism and transhumanism are certainly unorthodox and
con troversial. Some critics fiercely oppose the very idea that human nature can or
should be changed or tampered with in any way. The popular social philosopher and
best selling writer Fraricis Fukuyama went so far as to include lranshumanism in
his list of the most dangerous ideas facing the world at present. He dismisses
transhumanism as:
... a strange liberation movement whose crusaders aim much higher than civil rights
campaigners. feminists, or gay-rights activists ... This movement wants nothing less than
to liberate the human race from its biological constrains. (2004. p. 237)
Such an argument may look like a version of the present counter-cultural Luddism.
While it is undeniable that the transition to the transhuman stage wi ll most likely bring
some extremel y serious challenges to humanity (and may even evoke the real danger
of our extinction), Fukuyama's off-handed dismissal of it does not provide a
constructive alternative. Technological and social forces that are currently driving us
towards a post/transhuman stage may simply be too powerful to be stopped or reversed
by an appeal to some vague fears. As has often happened in the past, numerous social
changes that were unthinkable to previous generations have actually come to pass and
have often brought more benefits than troubles. In this vein, the fate of the transhuman
'phase transition' remains an open challenge for a social philosophy and an eschato-
logical discourse.
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5. SUPERINTELLIGENCE
A related Lerm, ·superintelligcnce· (sometimes called ' ultraintelligence' ), can be defined

as a capacity to outperform radically the best human brains in practically every field,
including scientific creativity, general wisdom, and social skills. Sometimes a distinc-
tion is made between weak and strong superintelligence. Weak superintell igence is
what one would get if he or she could run a human intellect at an accelerated clock
speed. such as by uploading it to a fast computer. If the upload's clock-rate were a
thousand times that of a biological brain. it would perceive reality as being sl owed
down by a factor of a thousand. It would think a thousand times more thoughts in a
given 1imc interval than its biological counterpart.
Many recent developments indicate that we are along the path of eventually creat-
ing superintelligence. Of course. the chess programs that currently exist, and which
have already beatc:,n even the best human chess-masters, cannot yet be classified as
superintelligenc·e. Yet the very existence (and advancement) of such programs is a
strong indication that further developments may soon lead to the inclusion of other
human mental capacities in computer programs.
Another pertinent c laim is the so-called 'Flynn effect', according to which the aver-
age human IQ (Intelligence Quot ient) gradually increases over the years. While the
whole notion of [Q is not w ithout controversy, the said effect (if real) can be auributed
to several factors. Among them are better nutrition, beller education, and advance-
ments in global information technology. Thus·, if the growth of IQ scores can be taken
at race value, it can, in principle, generate a 'blissful circle', in which more and more
'smart' humans can bu ild smarter and smarter information systems, which, in turn, can
foster f"urther growth of smartness in humans.
Indications of the potentially self-enhancing human-technology loop can be traced
to earlier literature. As early as 1793, French philosopher and mathematician A ntoi ne-
Nicolas Marquis De Condorcet ( 1743- 1794) discussed growth of human capacities as
a result of the progress of science:
AL the present time a young ma11 on leaving school may know more of Lhe principles of
mathematics than Newton ever learnt in years of study or discovered by dint of genius.
and he may use Lhe calculus with a faci lity then unknown. (Condorcet 1955. p. 196)
At any rate, it appears that more and more human features (such as object recognition
and guessi ng) can be imitated by technology, often with a performance superi or to that
of actual human beings. Where do we stop, or should we be stopping at al I?
Some go as far as predicting that the arrival of superintelligence will deal a heavy
blow to anthropocentric worldvicws. Much more important than its philosophical
implications, however, would be its practical effects. Creating superintelligence may
be the last invention that human beings will ever need to make, since superintelli-
genccs could thcmsel ves take care of further scient i fie and techno logical development.
They would do so more effectively than human beings. Biological humanity would no
longer be the smartest life form on the block.
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6. THE S IN GULAR I TY NOTION
Although long known in mathematics and theoretical physics, the term 'singularity'
has recently acquired another, specifically futurological and eschatological meaning.
Some thinkers conjecture that there will be a point in the future when the rate of tech-
nological development becomes so rapid that the progress-curve becomes nearly verti -
cal. Within a very brief time (months, days, or even just hours), the world might
be transformed almost beyond recognition. This hypothetical point is referred to as
'singularity'. The most likely cause of singularity would be the creation of some form
of rapidly self-enhancing greater-than- human-intelligence.
The development of the notion of singularity in the above sense is, again, a joint
effort of many people. The often-quoted author Verner Vinge regards singularity as
one of the more prohable scenarios for the future (Vi nge 1993), although many further
discussions are, at present, confined to the internet. Earlier, one of the key founders of
computer science, John von Neumann (1903-1957), expressed similar ideas, which
are here paraphrased by von Neumann's friend, mathematician Stanislav Ulam:
One conversation cemcred on the ever accelerating progress of technology and changes
in the mode of human life. which gives the appearance of approaching some essential
singularity in the history of the race beyond which human affairs, as we know them. could
not continue. (Ulam 1958. p. 86).
Provided that we manage to avoid destroying civilization, Vinge thinks that singularity
is likely to happen as a consequence of advances in artificial intelligence, large sys-
tems of networked computers, or computer-human integration, or of some other form
of intelligence amplification. Enhancing intelligence will, in this scenario, at some
point lead to a positive feedback loop: smarter systems can design systems that are
even more intelligent, and can do so more swiftly than the original human designers.
This positive feedback effect would be powerful enough to drive an intelligence explo-
sion that could quickly lead to the emergence of a superintelligent system of surpass-
ing abilities. According to Vinge's (rather optimistic) estimates, humankind will likely
produce super-intelligence some time before 2030 (Webb 2002, p. 135). lt makes lillle
difference, however, if such an event (singularity) were to happen in one, two, or five
hundred years (etc.); what is central, is that the arguments supporting that singularity
may happen are growing stronger and stronger.
7. OMEGA POINT
The idea of the ·omega Point', while close (almost identical) to the singularity notion,
extends it somewhat further from the 'technological to a metaphysical and eschatologi-
cal realm. Omega Point is a term used by Pierre Teilhard de Chardin to describe the
aim towards which consciousness evolves: evolution is a process converging toward a
final unity. Similar ideas were proposed by the Russian scholar and biologist Vladimir
253
Vcrnaclsky ( 1861- 1945). who is credited with introducing the notion of the •biosphere'
as a wholistic entity which encompasses lhe totality of I iving organisms on Earth
(the laucr notion or 'Gaia' - a living planet - which was coined by the British biologist
James Lovelock, is an expansion of this idea).
Both Vernadsky and Teilhard de Chardin held the vision of the planet Earth as
coming through a transformative process, and metamorphosing from the biosphere

into the noosphere (the laner is meant to indicate the totality of beings exhibiting
mentality and conscious activity).
The term ·Omega Point.' was also used by Tulane University professor of mathe-
matics Frank J. Tipler to describe a hypothetical cosmological scenario in the distant
ruwre of the universe (Tipler 1989; 1994). According to his version or the Omega
Point Theory. as the universe comes to an end in a Big Crunch, the compu tational
capacity of the Universe is capable of increasing at a sufficient rate and accelerating
exponentia lly faster towards the 'time end' point. In principle, a simulation run on this
Universe-computer can thus continue forever in its own (subjective) terms, even though
the external Universe lasts on ly a finite rime. This theory assumes that certain cosmo-
logical variables indicate, in all likelihood, that the universe will evenlllally contract,
and thill there will be intelligent civilizations in existence at the appropriate time to
exploit the computational capacity of such an environment. Tipler identifies thi s
asymptotic srate of infinite information capacity w ith God.
The impl ication of Tipler's theory for present-day human beings is that thi s
ultimate cosmic computer will essentially be able to resurrect everyone who has ever
lived, by recreating all possible quantum brain states within the master simulation.
This would be a Matrix-like simulated reality, except without the necessity for physi-
cal bodies in ·reality'. From the perspective or the inhabitant, the Omega Point repre-
sents an aherlife of infinite duration, which could take any imaginable form due to
its virtual nature.
Jn fact, Tipler's discussion of simulated reality raises questions of the same genre
as posed by Bostrom. As Tipler states:
Suppose we try to simulate a city full of people ... In p,inciple. we can imagine a simula-
tion being so good that every atom in each person and each o~ject in the city and the
properties of each atom having an analogue in the simulation. Let us imagine, in the limit.
a simulation that is absolutely perfect: each and every property of the real city, and each
and every property of each real person in the real city is represented precisely in the
simulation ... The key question is this: do the simulated people exist? As far as the simu-
lated people can tell. they do ... There is simply no way for the simulated people to tell
that they are 'really' inside the computer. that they are merely simulated and not real. ..
There is no way for the people inside this simulated universe to tell that they are only a
sequence of numbers being tossed around inside a computer and are in fact not real. How
do we know we ourselves arc not merely a simulation inside a gigantic computer?
Obviously. we cannot know. ( I 989. pp. 241-242).
It may look like the Simulation Argumenl can be dismissed simply because the required
computer power is beyond any imagination or the inlinite. This. however, is not so.
254
The required processing power Lo simulate the whole of humankind is, of course.
enormous, but it is still tinite and can, in principle, be reached. There are even some
estimates of how many bits are required for such a simulation. One of the numbers
proposed is of the order of l 0" l 23 ( I 0 to the power of 123), as this is calculated by
Seth Lloyd, one of the leading physicists in the area of quantum computing (Lloyd
2002). Extrapolating Moore's Law exponentially (i.e., the doubling of computer power
every 18 months), such a power might possibly be achieved within several hundred,
especially if promising advancements in quantum computi ng were LO become a reality
(or, for that mailer, a 'simulated reality'!).
8. FERM I'S PARADOX, THE ZOO HYPOTHESIS, AND THE SIMULATION

ARGUMENT
Enrico Fermi ( I 901-1954), one of the greatest physicists of the 20th cemury, is credited
with putti ng foiward a query that later became known as ' Ferm i's Paradox'. A popular
article gives the following summary of it:
How common are other civilizations in the universe? This question has fascinated
humanity for centuries, and although we still have no definitive answer. a number of
recent developments have brought it once again to the fore. Chief among these is the
confirmation, after a long wait and several false starts. that planets exist outside our solar
system ... [But]. does it fol low that technological civilizations are abundanc as well?
Many people have argued that once primitive life has evolved. natural selection will inev-
itably cause it to advance toward intelligence and technology. But is this-necessarily so?
There might be something wrong with this argument, which was famously articulated by
nuclear physicist Enrico Fermi in 1950. If extraterrestrials are commonplace, he asked.
where are rhey? Should their presence not be obvious? This question has become known
as the 'Fermi Paradox'. (Crawford 2000. p. 164)
So f'ar, all massive SETI (Search for Extraterrestrial Intell igence) programs have failed
to bring any posit ive results. There is no trace of ·1hem' anywhere (Webb 2002). Of
course. absence of evidence is not necessari ly evidence of absence, and yet the nega-
tive SETI result puts the followi ng problem before us. The lirst technological civi liza-
tion with the ability and the inclination to colonize the galaxy could have done so
before any competitors even had a chance to evolve. In principle, this could have hap-
pened billions of years ago, when Earth was inhabited solely by microorganisms and
was wide open to interference from outside. YeL no physical artifact. no chemical
traces, no obvious biological inlluence indicates that it has ever been intruded upon.
Even if the Eanh was deliberately seeded with life, as some scientists have speculated,
it has been left alone since then.
It follows that any attempt 10 resolve the Fermi Paradox must rely on assumptions
about the behavior of' othflr ci vilizations (Webb 2002). For example, they might destroy
themselves lirst, they might have no interest in colonizing the galaxy, or they might
have strong ethical codes against interfering wi th primitive l ife forms. These auempted
255
explanations are plausible only if the number of extraterrestrial civilizations is small.
If the galaxy has contained millions or billions of technological civilizations, it seems
very unlikely that they would all destroy themselves, be content with a sedentary exist-
ence, or agree on the same set of ethical rules for the treatment of less developed forms
of life. l.t would Lake only one technological civilization LO embark, for whatever
reason. on a program of galactic colonization to make evidence of that civilization's

presence apparent.
9. SIMULATION ARGUMENT AS A 'HIGH-TEC H' SOLIPSISM
Many commentators poim to some logical similarity and conceptual overlap between
the Simulation Argument and the philosophical position of solipsism. 'Solipsism'
(from the Latin ' ipse', 'self'. and ·solus·, 'alone') is the metaphysical belief that only
one's self exists. and that 'existence' simply means being a part of one's own mental
states. A consisten t solipsistic position takes it that all the objects, people, etc., that one
experiences are merely parts of one's own mind. This view is first recorded w ith the
pre-Socratic sophist Gorgias (c. 483- 375 B.C.), who is said to have stated that 'Nothing
exists. Even if something exists, nothing can be known about it, and even if something
could be known about it. knowledge about it can ' t be communicated to others'.
A thought-experiment related to sol ipsism is the so-called 'Brain-in-a-Vat' metaphor,
i.e., the view that 'l' may be trapped within some utterly unknowable reality, such that
everything I think is to be 'real ' is in fact an illusion.
Thoughts similar to solipsism are pres_enl in much of eastern philosophy. Taoism
and several interpretations of Buddhism, especially Zen, teach that drawing a distinc-
tion between the self and the universe is nonsensical and arbitrary, and merely an
artifact of language rather than an inherent reality. Another variation is a sort of mate-
rialistic agnosticism, stating simply that nothing outside of one's own thoughts can be
absolutely proven to exist; it may all simply be the illusion or imagination or the
thinker. The lauer position is mostly associated with the British philosopher and
Anglican bishop, George Berkeley ( 1685- 1753).
Berkeley is commonly seen as one of a triad of famous eighteenth-century British
Empiricists (the other 1wo arc John Locke and David Hume). He is best known for his
1110110, 'esse est percipi', 'to be is to be perceived·. As a consistent idealist, he pro-
pounded that everything that exists is either a mind or something that depends upon a
mind for its existence, ye t as an immaterialist he also believed that matter did not exist.
Berkeley accepted the seemingly outrageous position that ordinary physical objects
are composed solely of ideas. which are inherently mental. and also held that ordinary
obj ects are only collections of ideas, which are mind-dependent. He taught that there
are no material substances, but only finite mental substances and an infinite mental
substance (God).
As the above suinmary of Berkeley's views shows, his ideas concur with the
Simulation Argument. The only difference is that, in Bostrom's formulation, the
Simulation Argument still presupposes the existence of some primordial 'real' hardware
256
(super-computer) on which the grand simulation is run. This difference, however.
becomes somewhat blurred if one takes into consideration the idea of the possibility of
the nested Lower of simulations (simulation-within-simulation-wi1hin-simulation ...
ad infinitum). Like the proverbial argument of the Earth resting on a turtle (this
turtle is on an another turtle which, in turn, is on yet another turtle, etc: ... ' there
are lllrtles all the way down'), it is impossible to pinpoint logically where the chain
of nested simulations should end and where the 'real' simulator (computer) is
located. Furthermore, like the idea of the possibility of closed time loops in general
relativity (Berezin 2004), one can conceptualize the possibility of a closed loop of
simulations. which removes the logical need for the existence of the ultimate ·real'
hardware.
l 0. DREAMS AS SIMULATED REALITY
IL is interesting to note that, notwithstanding the speculative nature of Lhe Simulation

Argument, we do have some obvious (and ·real'!) analogy to it in our everyday life.
Most, if not all, people have dreams during sleep that are sometimes very vivid.
Assuming that we can envision our brain as a (biological) computer, can we say that it
acwal ly creates a simulated reality during our dreams? In our dreams do we remain
our real selves or do we emanate our simulated twins? Amazingly, analysis of the
nature of our dreams leads to almost the same questions as those that are raised by the
Simu lation Argument. Physicist Paul Davies puts it in this way:
We are fascinated by dreams. Those people who. like myself. dream very vividly often
have the experience of being "trapped" in a dream that we believe is real. (...) Can we be
absolutely sure that the "dream world.. is illusory and the "awake world.' real? Could it
be the other way about, or that both are real. or neither? ( 1993. p. I 17).
Similar dream-or-reality ideas have a plentiful presence in science fiction literature.

While not auempting to review this u·uly impressive body of literature, I will mention
here the. novel Solaris ( 196 I) by the renowned Polish writer Stanislaw L em (English
translation: Lem, 1981) which also gave rise to several screen versions (the most well-
known being clone by the Russian movie director Andrei Tarkovsky).
The novel describes the discovery of a gigantic sentient colloidal ocean of the planet
Solaris. The planet-scale brain is capable of incredible self-regulation. governing its
macroprocesses by colllroll ing its orbit around two suns, and its microprocesses by the
manipulation of neutrino-fields to create phantasmic simulacra of human beings.
When the novel's protagonist, psychologist Kris Kelvin, arrives at the Solaris Research
Station orbiting the planet, he, to his amazement and horror, encounters a Visitor -
Rheya, a simu lacrum of Kelvin's dead young wife, for whose suicide back on Earth
he has blamed himself for several years. The scientists on the Solaris Station come
10 realize that the sentient ocean is capable of producing materialized forms or
the scientists' own unconscious thoughts. Thus. . the simulated Rheya is actually a
257
materialized projection of what Kelvin's memory has contained about the actual Rhcya
back on Earth. Yel physically, the new Rheya is different. As Kelvin discovers through
the atomic analysis of her blood, Rheya does not consist of regular atoms but is
actually made of a system of stabilized neutrinos organized by a quantum lield that
is apparently under the planet"s control. Nonetheless. her behavioral autonomy i s
isomorphic with human behavior.

Neutrino beings created by the ocean Solaris can be seen as being intermediate
between ' real· people (made of atoms and molecules) and true computer simulations
which exist in the form of electronic bits in the running computer program. And this
brings us LO the follnwing question: How can we say that beings made of atoms are
'real" whi le beings in the form of electronic bits are fictional? Not pretending to give a
dclinitc answer to this question (perhaps, there is not one), 1 believe that this opens a
fnscinating new area 10 pnnder with regard to ultimate issues of human and universal
existence.
There are many other examples of items of mass entertainment that deal with the
interface between what is real and what is simulated. Popular television series such as
'The Outer Limits· and 'The Twilight Zone', as well as the impressive success of such
books as Harry Potter and the Lo,d of the Ring give strong evidence of the timeliness
and importance or the theme or 'reality versus the dream world" for people in general.
In fact, many fictional books and movies directly address questions of ultimate reality
and meaning. A few typical areas of inquest include: (I) Does it really mailer if we arc
simulated reality or nor?; (2) Do simulated beings (if there are any) belong to the same
moral universe as we (presumably real) beings?; (3) To what extent can our dreams
and our imaginary worlds be considered simulated reality?; (4) Do quality aspects of
simulation affect the ethical values we assign Lo them?; (5) l s it morally prohibitive to
simulate ·ami-reality" - ultimately evil universes of discourse? (It is almost certain that
if positive reality can be simulated, so can negative reality); (6) If a strong ethical
component can be identified in the simulation acts, what are the criteria or guiding
principles behind that ethical component?: and, (7) By whose moral authority are these
presumed criteria and principles to be imposed?
By their very nawre. most of these questions are open-ended. It is very difficult,
if not impossible, to provide an unambiguously singular answer to most of them,
unless we are willing to conline ourselves to a stringent and limited philosophical
framework. Al the same time, there are some areas where the interface between the
real and the simulated can be (lo a degree, of course) explored at the experiential
level. Numerous observations (and even some in-depth studies) on drug-induced
hallucinations, enlightenment and meditation practices, Eastern and Western mysti-
cism and spiritu al awareness, although diverse in quality, intentions, and results - all
point to the expectation that our understanding of the interface between real and
imaginary (or simulated) is likely to attain new and higher levels. Perhaps a useful
connection to explore in the context of these questions is the notion of the co-existence
of parallel universes and multiple realities - an idea that is currently gaining strength
at the advanced frontier of quantum physics and cosmology (Berezin 2004; Randall
2005).
258
I I. CONCLUSIONS: THE SIMULATION ARGUMENT RELOADED
AILhough al first glance the Simulation Argument appears to be in opposition to such

cherished ideas as the inherenL value of the human life, human responsibility, and
human free will (how can computer simulations be responsible for anything?), when
viewed more closely, one finds that that opposition may be muted. qr, perhaps, even
eliminated al!ogether. In a traditional Judeo-Christian view if the world, when the
Bible says that.human beings are created 'from nothing' , would it not be an adequate
modern translation to say that we are simulation emanating from the mind of God? In
fact, the idea of our existence 'in the mind of God' has a long history within the frame-
work of traditional religious thinking (Davies 1993). Yet the notion that we, and the
world, are, in fact, simulations in the mind of God can be traced to a number of sources.
Some authors even assign mathematical (algorithmic) features to such a simulation.
For example, long before the advent of any technological computing, Gottfried
Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716), a philosopher who dwelled a great deal on the origins
of everything, described simulation in words that were similar to modern-day compu-
ter terms: 'Leibniz came to believe that the universe was binary, that God created the
world out of units of O (nothing) and I (God). He called the process "the secret of
creation"' (Teresi 2002, p. 70).
Simulated reality describes a hypothetical environment that, although experienced
as real, is actually a highly detailed simulation of reality. Unl ike the currently techno-
logically achievable concept of virtual reality, which is easily distinguished from the
experience of ·real ' reality, a simulated reality would be impossible to tell apart from
'real ' reality.
The modern version of this involves a thought experiment along the lines of imagin-
ing that the person experiencing the simulated reality is somehow plugged into a com-
puter of i mmense power that is programmed with all the rules of the simulation, and
provides them with all of U1eir sensory inpµt. A deeper thought experiment may even
assume that the person experiencing the simulation is him or herself simulated within
the simulation. and may have no physical existence beyond the simulation. Two philo-
sophical questions. and one ethical question, arise immediately: (I) fs i1, even in prin-
ciple, possible to tell whether we are in a sim.ulated real ity or a real one?; and, (2) Js
there any difference between the two? Does it mauer? How should we behave if we
knew that we were living in a simulated reality?
Addressing the Simulation Argument in the context of the Ultimate Reality and
Meaning requires a dichotomous approach from the physical and metaphysical (or
trans-physical) sides. Our present understanding of the essence of the Simulation
Argument is strongly li nked to the notion of information. Information as a concept has
both physical and metaphysical aspects. If, after all, information is just a coded digital
string (as in computer programs), then it reveals itsel f as (an integer) number - a clearly
metaphysical (Platonic) notion. On the other hand, any functional actualization of
information requires a physical substrate, be it computer hardware or a human brain.
Therefore, the whole simulation issue lies at the borderline between physical reality
(material world) and the numerically coded 'pure' information, which in turn has
259
connections LO the notion of spirituality (understood in a broad sense) and the ideal
Platonic world of numbers and forms.
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261

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METHODS AND SYSTEMATIC REFLECTIONS

https://www.utpjournals.press/doi/pdf/10.3138/uram.29.4.244 - Wednesday, January 31, 2024 12:38:39 PM - IP Address:176.33.110.56

SIMULATION ARGUMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF ULTIMATE

Alexander A. Berezin, Department of Engineering Physics, McMaster University,

2. NICK BOSTROM' S SIMULATION ARGUMENT

Nick Bostrom, a lecturer in the Department of Philosophy of Oxford University, starts

AL our current stage of technological development. we have neither sufficiently powerful

the brain is connected to a giant computer simulation of a world. The simulation

4. TRANSI-IUMAN I SM AND POSTI-IUMANISM

A related Lerm, ·superintelligcnce· (sometimes called ' ultraintelligence' ), can be defined

coming through a transformative process, and metamorphosing from the biosphere

8. FERM I'S PARADOX, THE ZOO HYPOTHESIS, AND THE SIMULATION

reason. on a program of galactic colonization to make evidence of that civilization's

9. SIMULATION ARGUMENT AS A 'HIGH-TEC H' SOLIPSISM

l 0. DREAMS AS SIMULATED REALITY

IL is interesting to note that, notwithstanding the speculative nature of Lhe Simulation

Similar dream-or-reality ideas have a plentiful presence in science fiction literature.

isomorphic with human behavior.

AILhough al first glance the Simulation Argument appears to be in opposition to such

Berezin, A. A. 2004. Ideas of Multidimensional Time, Parallel Universes and Eternity in

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