Immigration Law 2023

MENDOZA, MARICAR A.
CASE DIGESTS
2018-2-03278 IMMIGRATION LAW 2023
G.R. No. L-10280 | September 30, 1963
QUA CHEE GAN, JAMES UY, DANIEL DY alias DEE PAC, CHAN TIONG YU, CUA
CHU TIAN, CHUA LIM PAO alias JOSE CHUA and BASILIO KING, petitioners-
appellants, vs. THE DEPORTATION BOARD, respondent-appellee.
FACTS:
QUA CHEE GAN, JAMES UY, DANIEL DY alias DEE PAC, CHAN TIONG YU, CUA CHU
TIAN, CHUA LIM PAO alias JOSE CHUA and BASILIO KING (Petitioners-Appellants) were
charged before the Deportation Board, with having purchased U.S. dollars in the total sum of
$130,000.00, without the necessary license from the Central Bank of the Philippines and with
having attempted to bribe officers of the Philippine and United States Governments in order to
evade prosecution for said unauthorized purchase of U.S. dollars.
Following the filing of said deportation charges, a warrant for the arrest of said aliens was issued
by the presiding member of the Deportation Board (DB). Petitioners-Appellants filed a joint
motion to dismiss the charges presented against them for the reason, among others, that the same
do not constitute legal ground for deportation of aliens from this country, and that said Board has
no jurisdiction to entertain such charges. Said motion having been denied, Petitioners-Appellants
filed a petition for habeas corpus and/or prohibition which was denied by the CFI. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the President has powers to deport aliens and, consequently; and (2) Whether
or not the delegation to the DB of the ancillary power to investigate, carries with it the power to
order the arrest of the aliens complained of.
RULING:
FIRST ISSUE: Yes. While Sec 69 of Act 2711 of the Revised Administrative Code does not
expressly confer on the President the authority to deport these aliens, the fact that such a
procedure was provided for before the President is a clear indication of such power. The
Supreme Court stated that the Petitioners-Appellants committed the act of profiteering¸ which is
a ground for deportation. The President may then order their deportation if after investigation
they are shown to have committed the act charged.
SECOND ISSUE: No. Executive Order No. 398, as it empowers the DB to issue warrant of
arrest and to fix bond and prescribe the conditions for his temporary release, and the Order of
arrest of DB upon Petitioners-Appellants were declared illegal and null and void.
The exercise of the power to order the arrest of an individual demands the exercise of discretion
by the one issuing the same, to determine whether under specific circumstances, the curtailment
of the liberty of such person is warranted. The fact that the Constitution and the statute relied
upon, prescribe the manner by which the warrant may be issued, conveys the intent to make the
issuance of such warrant dependent upon conditions the determination of the existence of which
requires the use of discretion by the person issuing the same. In other words, the discretion of
whether a warrant of arrest shall issue or not is personal to the one upon whom the
authority devolves. And authorities are to the effect that while ministerial duties may be
delegated, official functions requiring the exercise of discretion and judgment, may not be
so delegated. Indeed, an implied grant of power that would serve the curtailment or limitation on
the fundamental right of a person, such as his security to life and liberty, must be viewed with
caution, if we are to give meaning to the guarantee contained in the Constitution.
Page 1 of 119
MENDOZA, MARICAR A. CASE DIGESTS
G.R. No. L-83882 | January 24, 1989
IN RE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILLIE YU, petitioner, vs. MIRIAM

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, BIENVENIDO P. ALANO, JR., MAJOR PABALAN, DELEO
HERNANDEZ, BLODDY HERNANDEZ, BENNY REYES and JUN ESPIRITU SANTO,
respondent.
FACTS:
WILLIE YU was originally issued a Portuguese passport in 1971. Sometime in 1978, he was
naturalized as a Philippine citizen. Despite his naturalization, he applied for and was issued
Portuguese Passport by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo in 1981. Said
Consular Office certifies that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. He also declared
his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed, specifically, the Companies
registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.
The CID detained Yu pending his deportation case. YU, in turn, filed a petition for habeas
corpus. An internal resolution referred the case to the Court en banc. The Court en banc denied
the petition. When his Motion for Reconsideration was denied, YU filed a Motion for
Clarification.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not YU’s acts constituted renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
RULING:
Yes, to the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered together constitute an express
renunciation of YU's Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. Express
renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly
and not left to inference or implication. YU, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after
having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen, resumed or
reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese
passport and represented himself as such in official documents even after he had become a
naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is
grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship.
While normally the question of whether or not a person has renounced his Philippine citizenship
should be heard before a trial court of law in adversary proceedings, this has become
unnecessary as this Court, no less, upon the insistence of YU, had to look into the facts and
satisfy itself on whether or not his claim to continued Philippine citizenship is meritorious.
Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to be displayed when

required and suppressed when convenient.
Page 2 of 119
G.R. Nos. 95122-23 | May 31, 1991
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND

DEPORTATION), BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, COMMISSIONER ANDREA D.
DOMINGO, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JORGE V. SARMIENTO, ACTING
ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER REGINO R. SANTIAGO, MEMBERS OF THE BOARD
OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, ESTANISLAO CANTA, LEO MAGAHOM and BENJAMIN
KALAW, petitioners, vs. HON. JOSELITO DELA ROSA, Presiding Judge, RTC Manila,
Branch 29, WILLIAM T. GATCHALIAN, respondents.
FACTS:
On July 12, 1960, SANTIAGO GATCHALIAN, grandfather of WILLIAM GATCHALIAN,

was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native-born Filipino citizen following the
citizenship of natural mother Mariana Gatchalian. Sometime in 1961, WILLIAM, then twelve
years old, arrives in Manila from Hongkong together with a daughter and a son of Santiago.
They had with them certificate of registration and identity issued by the Philippine consulate in
Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature of the secretary of foreign affairs,
Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino citizens.
The board of special inquiry admitted the Gatchalians as Filipino citizens and issued an
identification certificate to William. The board of commissioners was then directed by the
Secretary of Justice to review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant
was a Filipino citizen, such as the case of WILLIAM. The Board of Commissioners reversed the
initial decision of the Board of Special Inquiry and ordered the exclusion of WILLIAM. Acting
NBI Commissioner recommended that William be charged with violation of the Immigration Act
of 1940. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation ordered the arrest of WILLIAM as a
matter of consequence the Warrant of Exclusion issued against him.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not WILLIAM GATCHALIAN is a Filipino citizen based on the validity of his
parents’ marriage abroad; and (2) Whether or not the warrant of arrest by the Board of
Commissioners and the Commission on Immigration and Deportation was valid.
RULING:
FIRST ISSUE: Yes. His grandfather, Santiago Gatchalian, was born of a Filipina mother, despite
being an illegitimate child. His father, Francisco Gatchalian, and he were certified as Filipinos by
the Philippine Consulate in Hong Kong. Thus, WILLIAM is a Filipino citizen.
SECOND ISSUE: No. Pursuant to Sec. 37 (a) of Commonwealth Act 613, a warrant of arrest
may only be issued by the Bureau of Immigration (then the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation) if the sole purpose of the arrest is to execute a final order of deportation.
Further, in the case at bar, BOC's alleged cause of action and deportation against WILLIAM
arose in 1962. However, the warrant of arrest of WILLIAM was issued by Commissioner
Domingo only on August 15, 1990 — 28 long years after. It is clear that the BOC's cause of
action has already prescribed and by their inaction could not now be validly enforced by it
against WILLIAM. Furthermore, the warrant of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 was already
recalled and the Identification certificate of respondent, among others, was revalidated on March
15, 1973. Hence, the warrant of arrest was invalid.
Page 3 of 119
G.R. No. L-21289 | October 4, 1971
MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM and LAU YUEN YEUNG,
petitioners-appellants, vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, respondent-
appellee.
FACTS:
LAU YUEN YEUNG applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant
sometime in 1961. During the interrogation made in connection with her application for a
temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing at
Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her
great grand uncle, Lau Ching Ping. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March
1961 for a period of one month.
On the date of her arrival, ASHER Y. CHENG filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to
undertake, among others, that said LAU YUEN YEUNG would actually depart from the
Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within
the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative
might properly allow.
After repeated extensions, LAU YUEN YEUNG was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13
February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with MOY YA LIM YAO alias
EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM an alleged Filipino citizen.
Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond
and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she
brought an action for injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her
arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write and speak either English or
Tagalog, except for a few words. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino
name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. As
a result, the CFI of Manila denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not LAU YUEN YEUNG ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a
Filipino citizen.
RULING:
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native
born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen
of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an
alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her
husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer
from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.
Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the
proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceeding, in order to be considered
as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied
the same privilege.
This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the legislature intended to
treat them differently. LAU YUEN YEUNG, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen
from and by virtue of her marriage to MOY YA LIM YAO as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a
Filipino citizen.
Page 4 of 119
G.R. No. 83820 | May 25, 1990
JOSE B. AZNAR (as Provincial Chairman of PDP Laban in Cebu), petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EMILIO MARIO RENNER OSMEÑA,
respondents.
FACTS:
On November 19, 1987, EMILIO "LITO" OSMEÑA filed his certificate of candidacy with the
COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988
local elections. JOSE B. AZNAR filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of
Osmeña on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United
States of America. Aznar presented the following exhibits as support to his allegation: (a)
Application for Alien Registration Form No. 1 of the Bureau of Immigration signed by Osmeña;
(b) Alien Certificate of Registration No. 015356 in the name of Osmeña; (c) Permit to Re-enter
the Philippines; and (d) Immigration Certificate of Clearance.
OSMEÑA, on the other hand, maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the
legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio
Osmeña, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport; that he has been
continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for more
than six months; and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965.
The COMELEC directed the Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winning candidates. Having
obtained the highest number of votes, OSMEÑA was proclaimed the Provincial Governor of
Cebu. The petition for disqualification filed by Aznar was thereafter dismissed. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not OSMEÑA has lost his Filipino Citizenship and thus was disqualified as a
candidate for the Provincial Governor of Cebu Province.
RULING:
Aznar failed to present direct proof that OSMEÑA had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the
modes provided for under C.A. No. 63, to wit: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by
express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
Constitution or laws of a foreign country, among others. From the evidence, it is clear that
OSMEÑA did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or
by any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship.
Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and who are not.
Whether or not a person is considered an American under the laws of the United States does not
concern us here.
By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that OSMEÑA is a Filipino
remains. Considering the fact that admittedly OSMEÑA was both a Filipino and an American,
the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still
a Filipino. In the case of OSMEÑA, the Certification that he is an American does not mean that
he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is
no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied
renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose
Philippine citizenship must be "express", it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of
Philippine 'citizenship when there is no renunciation either "'express" or "implied".
Page 5 of 119
G.R. No. 132244 | September 14, 1999
GERARDO ANGAT, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
FACTS:
GERARDO ANGAT was a natural born citizen of the Philippines until he lost his citizenship by
naturalization in the United States of America. Sometime in 1996, he filed before the RTC of
Marikina City a petition to regain his Status as a citizen of the Philippines under Commonwealth
Act No. 63, Republic Act No. 965 and Republic Act No. 2630. After being allowed and ordered
to take his oath of allegiance, the trial court issued an order repatriating ANGAT and declaring
him as citizen of the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171. The Bureau of Immigration
was ordered to cancel his alien certificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification
as Filipino citizen.
Sometime in 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion (virtually
a motion for reconsideration) asserting that the petition itself should have been dismissed by the
court a quo for lack of jurisdiction because the proper forum for it was the Special Committee on
Naturalization consistently with Administrative Order No. 285 issued by then President Ramos.
AO 285 had tasked the Special Committee on Naturalization to be the implementing agency of
R.A 8171. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the petition. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Court erred in dismissing ANGAT’s petition which in effect gave retroactive
effect to AO 285.
RULING:
No. The Office of the Solicitor General was right in maintaining that ANGAT's petition should
have been filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization and not with the RTC which had
no jurisdiction thereover. Under Section 1 of Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 725, amending
Commonwealth Act No. 63, an application for repatriation could be filed by Filipino women
who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens, as well as by natural born Filipinos
who lost their Philippine citizenship, with the Special Committee on Naturalization. The court's
order of 04 October 1996 was therefore null and void, and it did not acquire finality nor could be
a source of right on the part of petitioner.
It should also be noteworthy that the petition was one for repatriation, and it was thus incorrect
for ANGAT to initially invoke Republic Act No. 965 and R.A. No. 2630 since these laws could
only apply to persons who had lost their citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the armed forces of an allied foreign country or the armed forces of the United
States of America, a factual matter not alleged in the petition, Parenthetically, under these
statutes, the person desiring to re-acquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to
file a petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or
where he had last resided in the Philippines.
Page 6 of 119
G.R. No. 142840 | May 7, 2001
ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.
FACTS:
TEODORO C. CRUZ was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in
1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985, however, CRUZ enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without
the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a
Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 section 1(4), which provides
that a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, “rendering service to or
accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.” Whatever doubt that remained
regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in
1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
In 1994, CRUZ reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630. He ran
for and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections.
He won over petitioner ANTONIO BENGSON III who was then running for reelection.
Subsequently, BENGSON filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with the HRET claiming
that CRUZ was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a natural-born
citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution. The HRET rendered its
decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring CRUZ the duly elected
Representative in the said election. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not CRUZ, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
RULING:
Yes. Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the
manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship
may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization; (2) by repatriation; and (3) by direct
act of Congress.
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1)
desertion of the armed forces; (2) services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War
II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time; (4) marriage of a
Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political economic necessity.
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine
citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and having
registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the RA
2630, CRUZ was deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status
which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of
repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship.
Page 7 of 119
G.R. No. 138496 | February 23, 2004
HUBERT TAN CO and ARLENE TAN CO, petitioners, vs. THE CIVIL REGISTER OF
MANILA and any person having or claiming an interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought, respondent.
FACTS:
In the respective certificates of birth of HUBERT TAN CO and his sister ARLENE TAN CO, it
is stated that their parents CO BOON PENG and LOURDES VIHONG K. TAN are Chinese
citizens. CO BOON PENG filed an application for his naturalization as a citizen of the
Philippines with the Special Committee on Naturalization under Letter of Instruction (LOI) No.
270. His application was granted and he was conferred Philippine citizenship under Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1055. CO BOON PENG took his oath as a Philippine citizen February 15,
1977.
HUBERT and ARLENE, finished college in Philippines schools. They filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila a petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court for correction of entries in
their certificates of birth, praying that the trial court render judgment correcting and changing the
entries in their respective birth certificates as to the citizenship of their father CO BOON PENG,
from “Chinese” to “Filipino.”
The court a quo issued an order dismissing the petition outright on the ground that the petition
was insufficient, solely because the PETITIONERS’ father CO BOON PENG applied for
naturalization under LOI No. 270 and was conferred Philippine citizenship by naturalization
under PD No. 1055 and not under CA No. 473. Their Motion for Reconsideration was as well
denied, Hence this petition.
ISSUE/S:
Whether LOI 270 and CA 473 can be construed as statutes in pari materia so as to consider the
siblings CO as Filipino citizens following the naturalization of their father.
RULING:
Yes. LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are laws governing the naturalization of qualified aliens
residing in the Philippines. While they provide for different procedures, CA No. 473governs
naturalization by judicial decree while LOI No. 270 governs naturalization by presidential
decree. Both have the same purpose and objective. Therefore, LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are
statutes in pari materia.
Section 15 of CA No. 473, which extends the grant of Philippine citizenship to the minor
children of those naturalized thereunder, should be similarly applied to the minor children of
those naturalized under LOI No. 270, like the PETITIONERS in this case. It is not enough that
the PETITIONERS adduce in evidence the certificate of naturalization of their father, Co Boon
Peng, and of his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to entitle them to
Philippine citizenship.
The law does not provide for a specific procedure of law to be followed. But the Supreme Court
approved Rule 108 of the Rules of Court to provide for a procedure to implement the law.
Page 8 of 119
G.R. No. 210412 | July 29, 2015
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. KAMRAN F. KARBASI, Respondent.
FACTS:
KAMRAN F. KARBASI filed a petition for naturalization with the RTC. KARBASI and his
counsel appeared and presented proof of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements. The
RTC found KARBASI’s evidence sufficient to support his petition and found KARBASI as
possessing all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen.
Not in conformity, the Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, interposed an appeal to the
CA, based mainly on the ground that the RTC erred in granting KARBASI’s petition as he failed
to comply with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 473 (Naturalization Law) on character,
income and reciprocity.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the CA had correctly affirmed the RTC decision granting the application for
naturalization of KARBASI, an Iranian refugee, despite the opposition posed by the OSG.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court had noted and taken the following into consideration:
a. There was neither a showing that KARBASI was dependent on another person for
support nor proof that his family’s extraordinary expenses that would render his income
as inadequate. As in any other business venture, the risk of losses is a possibility for his
repair shop but, still, this risk was not clearly established to render his livelihood as
unstable and volatile. In fact, the OSG does not belie the fact that KARBASI has been
engaged by reputable companies for his services.
The findings of the RTC would even indicate that KARBASI had indeed exhibited
industry and hard work in putting up his repair shop business and that his wife considered
him as a good provider, not to mention a vocational and college degree holder.
Admittedly, testimonies in favor of an applicant for naturalization are expected to be self-
serving. Nevertheless, the Court found it difficult to agree with the OSG’s meager use of
government data to prove that KARBASI would become a burden to the Philippine
society in the future. Except for its own citation of government data, nothing else was
presented to establish that KARBASI had indeed no lucrative income or trade to support
himself and his family.
b. With respect to KARBASI’s alleged under declaration of income in his ITRs, the Court
ruled that KARBASI did not deny the charge of the OSG and instead admitted procedural
lapses on his part. There is no showing that the income earned by KARBASI was
undeclared in order to benefit from statutory tax exemptions. The Court did not consider
this as an outright reflection of one’s immoral inclinations. With due consideration to his
character as established by witnesses, and as observed by the RTC during the hearings,
KARBASI should be deemed to have sufficiently explained his mistake.
c. A perusal of KARBASI’s petition, both with the RTC and the CA, together with his
supplemental pleadings filed with the Court reveals that he has successfully established
his refugee status upon arrival in the Philippines. In effect, the country’s obligations
under its various international commitments come into operation.
Page 9 of 119
G.R. No. 47616 | September 16, 1947
JOSE TAN CHONG, Petitioner-Appellee, v. THE SECRETARY OF LABOR, Respondent-

Appellant.
FACTS:
JOSE TAN CHONG, was born in San Pablo, Laguna, in July 1915 of a Chinese father and a
Filipino mother, who were legally married. Sometime in 1925, when CHONG was about ten
years old, he was taken by his parents to China. On January 25, 1940, he arrived at the port of
Manila and sought entry as a native-born citizen. The Board of Special Inquiry assigned to hear
his case, denied him admission on the alleged ground that he is a Chinese citizen. On appeal, the
Secretary of Labor affirmed the decision of the Board and ordered the deportation of CHONG to
the port from whence he came. CHONG sued for a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First
Instance of Manila which was granted.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not CHONG was a Filipino citizen.
RULING:
No, the decision of the Court confirming the lower court’s Judgment was set aside, and CHONG
was recommitted to the custody of the Commissioner of Immigration to be dealt with in
accordance with law.
Considering that the law in force and applicable to the CHONG at the time of their birth was sec.
4 of the Philippine Bill (Act of 1 July 1902), as amended by Act of 23 March 1912, which
provides that only those "inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who
were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1899; and then resided in said Islands, and their
children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands," the Supreme Court held that the CHONG who was born of alien parentage, was not and
are not, under said section, citizens of the Philippine Islands.
Page 10 of 119
G.R. No. 128195 | October 3, 2001
ELIZABETH LEE and PACITA YU LEE, HON. JUDGE JOSE D. ALOVERA,* Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Roxas City, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
ROXAS CITY, petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by THE
DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND THE ADMINISTRATOR, LAND REGISTRATION
AUTHORITY and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,* respondents.
FACTS:
In March 1936 a family named DINGLASAN sold to LEE LIONG, a Chinese citizen a parcel of
land, Lot. No. 398. In 1948, the DINGLASANs filed with the CFI an action against the heir of
LEE LIONG for annulment of the sale and recovery of land. The assailed the validity of the sale
because of a constitutional prohibition against aliens acquiring ownership of land by virtue of the
1935 Constitution. In the following year, the same former owners filed with the CFI an action for
recovery of the same parcel of land on the same contention, that the sale was invalid due to the
same constitutional prohibition. When the case was elevated to it, the Supreme Court annulled
the order of the trial thereby dismissing the case on the ground of res judicata.
On September 7, 1993, the PETITIONERS filed with the RTC a petition for reconstitution of the
title of said Lot. No. 398. Because LEE LIONG died intestate on 1944, his wife and their
deceased husband executed an extrajudicial settlement of his estate. The PETITIONERS each
acquired shares of the land from their deceased husbands. The reconstitution was to recover the
lost or destroyed certificate of title over the property issued in the name of LEE LIONG. On
1994, the RTC ordered the reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title.
On January 1995, the Solicitor General filed with the CA a petition for the annulment of the
RTC’s
judgement alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case, contending that the
PETITIONERS were not the proper parties in the reconstitution titled since their predecessor-in-
interest, LEE LIONG, did not acquire the title since he was a Chinese Citizen and was
constitutionally not qualified to own land. The CA declared the judgement of reconstitution void.
The PETITIONERS filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not LEE LIONG has the qualification to won Philippine land.
RULING:
The sale of land was consummated during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and under that
Constitution aliens are prohibited from acquiring ownership of our lands, except in cases of
hereditary succession. Thus, LEE LIONG, being a Chinese citizen was disqualified.
However, the Court ruled that it cannot revert the land to the original sellers because of the
doctrine of pari delicto, where both parties were at fault. The Court added that the proper party
to initiate action against the lot was the Solicitor General. He may initiate for reversion or
escheat of land to the State. The Court ruled that even if the State took sixty years to take action
on the issue it is not barred from doing so because prescription never lies against the State.
In this case however, the land is now in the hands of Filipinos by virtue of inheritance from LEE
LIONG to their husband which subsequently became theirs. There would be no more public
policy violation since the land is acquired by qualified owners. “If land is invalidly transferred
to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the
original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid."
Thus, the subsequent transfer of the property to qualified Filipinos may no longer be impugned
on the basis of the invalidity of the initial transfer. The objective of the constitutional provision
to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.
Page 11 of 119
G.R. No. 183133 | July 26, 2010
BALGAMELO CABILING MA, FELIX CABILING MA, JR., AND VALERIANO

CABILING MA, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSIONER ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ, JR.,
ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER ARTHEL B. CARONOÑGAN, ASSOCIATE
COMMISSIONER JOSE DL. CABOCHAN, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER TEODORO
B. DELARMENTE AND ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER FRANKLIN Z. LITTAUA, in
their capacities as Chairman and Members of the Board of Commissioners (Bureau of
Immigration), and MAT G. CATRAL, Respondents.
FACTS:
BALGAMELO CABILING MA (Balgamelo), FELIX CABILING MA, JR. (Felix, Jr.),

VALERIANO CABILING MA (Valeriano), LECHI ANN MA (Lechi Ann), ARCELI MA
(Arceli), NICOLAS MA (Nicolas), and ISIDRO MA (Isidro) are the children of FELIX (Yao
Kong) MA, a Taiwanese, and DOLORES SILLONA CABILING, a Filipina.
Records reveal that petitioners FELIX, JR., BALGAMELO and VALERIANO (Petitioners)
were all born under aegis of the 1935 Philippine Constitution in the years 1948, 1951, and 1957,
respectively.
They were all raised in the Philippines and have resided in this country for almost sixty (60)
years; they spent their whole lives, studied and received their primary and secondary education
in the country; they do not speak nor understand the Chinese language, have not set foot in
Taiwan, and do not know any relative of their father; they have not even traveled abroad; and
they have already raised their respective families in the Philippines.
During their age of minority, they secured from the Bureau of Immigration their Alien
Certificates of Registration (ACRs).
Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens, PETITIONERS, however, failed to
have the necessary documents registered in the civil registry as required under Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 625. It was only more than thirty (30) years after they elected Philippine
citizenship that BALGAMELO and FELIX, JR. did so. On the other hand, there is no showing
that VALERIANO complied with the registration requirement.
Individual certifications issued by the Office of the City Election Officer, Commission on
Elections, Surigao City, show that all of them are registered voters of Barangay Washington,
Precinct No. 0015A since June 1997, and that records on previous registrations are no longer
available because of the mandatory general registration every ten (10) years. Moreover, aside
from exercising their right of suffrage, BALGAMELO is one of the incumbent Barangay
Kagawads in Barangay Washington, Surigao City.
In 2004, the Bureau of Immigration received the Complaint-Affidavit of a certain MAT G.

CATRAL (Mr. Catral), alleging that FELIX (Yao Kong) MA and his 7 CHILDREN are
undesirable and overstaying aliens. They were thereafter charged with violation of Sections 37(a)
(7) and 45(e) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, otherwise known as the Philippine Immigration
Act of 1940, as amended. The Board of Commissioners (Board) of the Bureau of Immigration
(BI) found that FELIX MA and HIS CHILDREN to have violated Commonwealth Act No. 613,
Sections 37(a)(7) and 45(e) in relation to BI Memorandum Order Nos. ADD-01-031 and ADD-
01-035, respectively.
In 2005, BALGAMELO, FELIX, JR., and VALERIANO filed the Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure before the Court of Appeals. The CA dismissed the
petition after finding that the PETITIONERS failed to comply with the exacting standards of the
law providing for the procedure and conditions for their continued stay in the Philippines either
as aliens or as its nationals. The PAETITIONERS’S Motion for Reconsideration was as well
denied.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the herein Petitioners are Filipino citizens.
Page 12 of 119
RULING:
The 1935 Constitution declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose mothers are citizens of
the Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. The mandate
states:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

xxxx
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority,
elect Philippine citizenship.
In 1941, Commonwealth Act No. 625 was enacted. It laid down the manner of electing
Philippine citizenship, to wit:
Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with subsection (4), Section 1,
Article IV, of the Constitution shall be expressed in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the
party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths and shall be filed with the
nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.
The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under
oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3)
registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry.
The instant case presents a different factual setting. Petitioners complied with the first and
second requirements upon reaching the age of majority. It was only the registration of the
documents of election with the civil registry that was belatedly done. The Court ruled that under
the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to elect Philippine citizenship has not been lost and
they should be allowed to complete the statutory requirements for such election.
Notably, the petitioners timely took their oath of allegiance to the Philippines. This was a
serious undertaking. It was commitment and fidelity to the state coupled with a pledge to
renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance to any other state. This was unqualified
acceptance of their identity as a Filipino and the complete disavowal of any other nationality.
Petitioners have passed decades of their lives in the Philippines as Filipinos. Their present status
having been formed by their past, petitioners can no longer have any national identity except that
which they chose upon reaching the age of reason.
Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of the right of the petitioners to elect
Philippine citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship in form and substance. The
failure to register the election in the civil registry should not defeat the election and
resultingly negate the permanent fact that they have a Filipino mother. The lacking
requirements may still be complied with subject to the imposition of appropriate administrative
penalties, if any.
Page 13 of 119
G.R. No. 202809 | July 2, 2014
DENNIS L. GO, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS:
DENNIS L. GO filed for a Petition for Naturalization under Commonwealth Act No. 473, the
Revised Naturalization Law. Aside from his presentation of all other requirements, GO presented
as witnesses Dr. Tordesillas, Silvino Ong, Teresita Go, and Juan Go.
Dr. Anlacan testified that as per the psychiatric examination conducted, GO has no psychiatric
abnormality at the time of the test. Dr. Tordesillas, on the other hand, testified that GO’s medical
examination results were normal. Ong testified that he had known GO since childhood through
his association with the family during celebrations. Teresita described GO as peace-loving
person who participated in activities sponsored by his school and the barangay. Juan likewise
claimed that he know GO personally.
The trial court granted GO’s petition for naturalization ruling that he possessed all the
qualifications therefor. However, on appeal, the CA set aside and reversed the trial court’s
decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not GO’s petition for naturalization should have been granted.
RULING:
Jurisprudence dictates that in judicial naturalization, the application must show substantial and
formal compliance with C.A. No. 473. In other words, an applicant must comply with the
jurisdictional requirements, establish his or her possession of the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications enumerated under the law, and present at least two (2) character witnesses to
support his allegations. Specifically, said requirements are as follows:
1. That they are citizens of the Philippines;

2. That they are "credible persons";
3. That they personally know the petitioner;
4. That they personally know him to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time
required by law;
5. That they personally know him to be a person of good repute;
6. That they personally know him to be morally irreproachable;
7. That he has, in their opinion, all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the
Philippines; and
8. That he "is not in any way disqualified under the provisions" of the Naturalization Law.
In vouching for the good moral character of the applicant for citizenship, a witness, for purposes
of naturalization, must be a "credible" person as he becomes an insurer of the character of the
candidate. The records of the case show, however, that the joint affidavits executed by
petitioner’s witnesses did not establish their own qualification to stand as such in a naturalization
proceeding. In turn, petitioner did not present evidence proving that the persons he presented
were credible. While there is no showing that petitioner’s witnesses were of doubtful moral
inclinations, there was likewise no indication that they were persons whose qualifications were at
par with the requirements of the law on naturalization.
Further, petitioner’s witnesses only averred general statements without specifying acts or events
that would exhibit petitioner’s traits worthy of the grant of Philippine citizenship. Filipino
citizenship is predicated upon oneness with the Filipino people. It is indispensable that an
applicant for naturalization shows his identification with the Philippines as a country deserving
of his wholehearted allegiance.
Page 14 of 119
G.R. Nos. 178831-32 | April 1, 2009
JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

NAPOLEON N. CAMERO and RENALD F. VILLANDO, Respondents.
FACTS:
The core issue in the consolidated petitions is the qualification of JOCELYN SY

LIMKAICHONG to run for, be elected to, and assume and discharge, the position of
Representative for the First District of Negros Oriental. The contention of the parties who sought
her disqualification is that she is not a natural-born citizen because her parents were Chinese
citizens at the time of her birth. They went on to claim that the proceedings for the naturalization
of her father, JULIO ONG SY, never attained finality due to procedural and substantial defects.
In the election that ensued, LIMKAICHONG was voted for by the constituents of Negros
Oriental and garnered the highest votes. She was eventually proclaimed as the winner and has
since performed her duties and responsibilities as Member of the House of Representatives.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not HRET has jurisdiction over the disqualification cases; and (2) Whether or not
the irregularity of the LIMKAICHONG’s proclamation will prevent HRET from acquiring
jurisdiction.
RULING:
FIRST ISSUE: Yes. HRET has jurisdiction over the disqualification cases.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members.
In this case, LIMKAICHONG was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, she had
taken her oath of office, and she was allowed to officially assume the office on July 23, 2007.She
took all the necessary elements to become a Member of the House of Representatives. As such,
HRET will be the sole judge of the qualification complaints against her.
SECOND ISSUE: No. Jurisprudence teaches that in an electoral contest where the validity of
the proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken his oath of office and assumed his post as
congressman is raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET. The reason for this ruling is self-
evident, for it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional
bodies, with due regard to the people's mandate.
In the case at bar, LIMKAICHONG was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, she
had taken her oath of office, and she was allowed to officially assume the office on July 23,
2007. Even if there is an alleged irregularity in her proclamation, she still has validly assumed
office. As such HRET will have jurisdiction over any qualification complaints.
Hence, the irregularity of the LIMKAICHONG’s proclamation will not prevent HRET from
acquiring jurisdiction.
Page 15 of 119
G.R. No. 177721 | July 3, 2007
KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION AND BANTAY KATARUNGAN FOUNDATION,

petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA; SANDIGANBAYAN
JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG, respondents.
FACTS:
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ERMITA announced an appointment in favor of GREGORY S.

ONG as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court to fill up the vacancy because of the retirement
of Associate Justice Romeo Callejo Sr. Invoking Section 7 of Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution
which states that no person shall be appointed as Member of the Supreme Court unless he is a
natural born citizen, KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION AND BANTAY KATARUNGAN
FOUNDATION (Petitioners) contend that the appointment is unconstitutional, arbitrary,
whimsical and issued with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners claim that ONG is a Chinese
citizen as indicated in his birth certificate, which revealed that his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng
and mother, Dy Guiok Santos, were Chinese citizens. The birth certificate the petitioners assert,
prevails over ONG’s new Identification certificate issued by the Bureau of Immigration stating
that he is a natural born Filipino. They also assert that the DOJ does not have the power to alter
entries in a birth certificate.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not ONG was in truth and in fact a natural-born Filipino citizen considering that
having been born before January 17, 1973, of a Filipino mother and who elected Filipino
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, ONG met the requirements under Article IV,
Sections 1 and 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
RULING:
No, ONG is not a natural-born Filipino citizen. The court took notice of ONG’s records when he
was admitted to the bar. In his petition, he alleged that he is qualified to enter the bar because he
is a Filipino citizen, and his parents are naturalized Filipino citizens. As part of his evidence, in
support of his petition, he submitted his birth certificate and the naturalization papers of his
father. His birth certificate states that he was a Chinese citizen at birth and his father, Eugenio
Ong Han Seng was also a Chinese citizen.
It was based on the evidence that was submitted by ONG that the court allowed him to be part of
the bar and take oath as a lawyer. Hence, it is clear that in the records of the court, ONG is a
naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the
Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that
ONG and his mother were naturalized along with his father.
Furthermore, as the petitioners correctly submit, no substantial change or correction in an entry

in a civil register can be made without a judicial order, and, under the law, a change in
citizenship status is a substantial change.
Page 16 of 119
G.R. No. 198742 | August 10, 2012
TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

LUIS M. BAUTISTA, ROBELITO V. PICAR and WILMA P. PAGADUAN, Respondents.
FACTS:
TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of

Filipino parents. In 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a
certain Kevin Thomas Condon. In 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine
citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A.
No. 9225. The application was approved and SOBEJANA-CONDON thereafter took her oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. In 2006, SOBEJANA-CONDON filed an unsworn
Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and
Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order certifying that she has
ceased to be an Australian citizen.
SOBEJANA-CONDON sought elective office during the 2010 elections for the position of Vice-
Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning candidate.
She took her oath of office on May 13, 2010.
Soon thereafter, private respondents ROBELITO V. PICAR, WILMA P. PAGADUAN and

LUIS M. BAUTISTA, (private respondents) all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed
separate petitions for quo warranto questioning SOBEJANA-CONDON’s eligibility, as well as
her disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and
that she failed to execute a “personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath” as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A.
No. 9225. For her part, SOBEJANA-CONDON claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of
Australian Citizenship she executed in Australia sufficiently complied with Section 5(2), R.A.
No. 9225 and that her act of running for public office is a clear abandonment of her Australian
citizenship.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not SOBEJANA-CONDON sufficiently complied with the requirements under

Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
RULING:
No. SOBEJANA-CONDON’s act of running for public office did not suffice to serve as an
effective renunciation of her Australian citizenship. While the Court has previously declared that
the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of candidacy is already considered a
renunciation of foreign citizenship, such ruling was already adjudged superseded by the
enactment of R.A. No. 9225, which provides for the additional condition of a personal and sworn
renunciation of foreign citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-born Filipinos who re-acquire their citizenship and
seek elective office, to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenships before an authorized public officer prior to or simultaneous to the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections. The rule applies to all
those who have re-acquired their Filipino citizenship, like SOBEJANA-CONDON, without
regard as to whether they are still dual citizens or not. It is a pre-requisite imposed for the
exercise of the right to run for public office. SOBEJANA-CONDON’s failure to comply
therewith in accordance with the exact tenor of the law, rendered ineffectual the Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed. As such, she is yet to regain her political
right to seek elective office. Unless she executes a sworn renunciation of her Australian
citizenship, she is ineligible to run for and hold any elective office in the Philippines.
Page 17 of 119
G.R. No. 195649 | April 16, 2013
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, Respondents.
FACTS:
This Resolution resolves the Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration filed by ROMMEL ARNADO.
While ARNADO has successfully finished his term of office, and that the relief sought in the
instant case can no longer be granted, ruling on the said motion and supplemental motion for
reconsideration was deemed important by the Court as it will either affirm the validity of
ARNADOs election or affirm that ARNADO never qualified to run for public office.
ARNADO failed to advance any argument to support his plea for the reversal of the Court’s
Decision dated April 16, 2013. Instead, he presented his accomplishments as the Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and reiterated that he has taken the Oath of Allegiance not only
twice but six times. It must be stressed, however, that the relevant question was the efficacy of
his renunciation of his foreign citizenship and not the taking of the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. Neither do his accomplishments as mayor affect the question before
the Court.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not a dual citizen can run for a local elective position.
RULING:
There is no doubt that Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code disqualifies those with dual
citizenship from running for local elective positions. Also, the use of a passport is a positive
declaration that one is a citizen of the country which issued the passport, or that a passport
proves that the country which issued it recognizes the person named therein as its national.
It was established that ARNADO is a natural born Filipino citizen, and that he acquired
American citizenship by naturalization. He reacquired his Filipino citizenship by taking his Oath
of Allegiance to the Philippines and he renounced his American citizenship. After renouncing his
American citizenship, however, ARNADO used his U.S. passport at least six times.
The Court ruled that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be complete and unequivocal.
The requirement that the renunciation must be made through an oath emphasizes the solemn duty
of the one making the oath of renunciation to remain true to what he has sworn to. Allowing the
subsequent use of a foreign passport because it is convenient for the person to do so is rendering
the oath a hollow act. It devalues the act of taking of an oath, reducing it to a mere ceremonial
formality.
The Court stressed that what is at stake here is the principle that only those who are exclusively
Filipinos are qualified to run for public office. If we allow dual citizens who wish to run for
public office to renounce their foreign citizenship and afterwards continue using their foreign
passports, we are creating a special privilege for these dual citizens, thereby effectively junking
the prohibition in Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.
Page 18 of 119
G.R. No. L-1812 | August 27, 1948
EREMES KOOKOORITCHKIN, petitioner, vs. THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, oppositor.
FACTS:
In August 1941, EREMES KOOKOORITCHKIN filed with the CFI of Camarines Sur a petition
for naturalization, presenting as evidence: (a) the affidavits of ex-Judge Jaime M. Reyes and Dr.
Salvador Mariano, residents of Camarines Sur, (b) his declaration of intention which was sworn
in July 1940, and (c) notice of hearing. The petition was not heard until August 28 and Sept. 30,
1947 when KOOKOORITCHKIN presented his evidence, since the province was invaded by the
Japanese forces during WWI and the case records had to be reconstituted after being destroyed
during the war. SOLGEN cross-examined KOOKOORITCHKIN’s witnesses but did not file any
opposition and did not present any evidence to controvert the petition. The CFI granted the
petition for naturalization, finding that KOOKOORITCHKIN was a native-born Russian who
grew up as a citizen of and was part of the military of the defunct Imperial Russian Government
under the Czars. He had several stints while in military service before he joined the White
Russian Army at Vladivostok and fought against the Bolsheviks until 1922 when the latter force
defeated the former. Refusing to join the Bolshevik regime, he fled by sea to Shanghai, and
eventually went to Manila as part of the group of White Russians under Admiral Stark in March
1923. He finally permanently resided in Iriga, Camarines Sur except during his stint in the
guerrilla force in Caramoan from 1942 to July 1945. The lower court also made findings of the
establishment of his family, employment, social life, his ability to speak and write English and
Bicol, his good moral character, adherence to the underlying principles of the Philippine
Constitution, and being a stateless refugee belonging to no State.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not: (1) KOOKOORITCHKIN’s declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen

was valid and sufficient basis for his petition for naturalization, and (2) KOOKOORITCHKIN
sufficiently established legal residence in the Philippines and could speak and write any of the
principal Philippine languages.
RULING:
FIRST ISSUE: Yes. Section 5 of the Revised Naturalization Law applies and provides that “no
declaration shall be valid until entry for permanent residence has been established and a
certificate showing the date, place and manner of his arrival has been issued.”
KOOKOORITCHKIN’s declaration was reconstituted, the attached certificate referred to in the
declaration was not reconstituted. The SC, however, ruled that the law does not state that the
certificate is essential to the validity of the declaration as the only requirement is for the
said certificate to be issued. There is the uncontroverted fact of KOOKOORITCHKIN’s
peaceful and continuous residence in the Philippines for 25 years and statement in his declaration
that a certificate had been attached to the said declaration. Hence, KOOKOORITCHKIN’s
declaration was valid under law in view of other competent evidence showing the facts sought to
be established under the certificate that was not reconstituted.
SECOND ISSUE: KOOKOORITCHKIN has sufficiently shown legal residence in the

Philippines for a continuous period of not less than 10 years as required by Section 2 of the
Revised Naturalization Law. In addition, KOOKOORITCHKIN had good command of both
English and Bicol. While there may be many standards out there, none was set in the law on the
required ability to speak and write any of the principal Philippine languages. He got along well
with his comrades during his hazardous days in the guerrilla movement, thus, showing that he
satisfied the requirement of the law. There was also circumstantial evidence that he also ought to
know how to write Bicol, which uses the same alphabet used in English and so widely used in
the Philippines. Given his good command of English as shown in his testimony, he could easily
make use of the same alphabet in the place where he had been residing for 25 years.
Page 19 of 119
G.R. No. L-3323 | July 18, 1951
In the matter of the petition for naturalization of JACK J. BERMONT; JACK J.

BERMONT, petitioner-appellee, vs. THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-
appellant.
FACTS:
JACK J. BERMONT was born in Nikolavesk, Amur, Siberia, on March 1, 1912. During the
Russian revolution, his parents, who were both White Russians, fled from Russia, taking him
along with them, and settled in Japan where they resided for more than 10 years. In 1930 they
moved to Shanghai and there he completed his studies. His father died in Shanghai in July, 1948,
but his mother was still living and was in Japan. BERMONT came to the Philippines in January,
1935, with the intention of proceeding to Australia, but finding this country to his liking he
obtained permission to remain and had since then resided here continuously. He never took oath
of allegiance to the Soviet Government and considered himself stateless. He mingled with the
Filipinos and married a Filipina and had a child by her. He could speak and write English and
possessed a working knowledge of Tagalog, Spanish, and Cuyonon, a dialect spoken in Palawan.
He believed in the principles underlying the Philippine constitution and was opposed to
communistic government. He was of good repute and morally irreproachable, as certified to by
Attys. Jesus T. Paredes and Arsenio S. Lacson. He was not opposed to organized government,
nor was he affiliated to any subversive organization. During the last war he was an active
member of the guerrilla forces in Palawan under Major Pablo Muyco and was later attached to
the Allied Intelligence Bureau in Palawan, and as a result of his activities in the underground
movement, he became entitled to two medals of honor and two-unit citations, as certified to by
General Macario Peralta. He had not been convicted of any crime and was not suffering from
any contagious disease. He filed a petition for Philippine citizenship before the CFI of Manila,
which was granted. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the CFI erred in finding that BERMONT is a stateless person and not a Russian
citizen and in not finding that he has failed to establish that in his country Filipinos are permitted
to acquire Russian citizenship.
RULING:
No. The Court ruled that there was no denying the fact that, like Kookooritchken, BERMONT is
a White Russian refugee, who has permanently abandoned the land of his birth and adopted the
Philippines as his home and identified himself with its people. His alien certificate of registration
describes him as a stateless Russian. If Kookooritchken was held entitled to Philippine
citizenship, it does not seem fair that the same consideration should not be extended to the
BERMONT, who has presented an even stronger case because he has by deeds shown his loyalty
to this country and its ideals and his fitness to become one of its citizens.
Page 20 of 119
G.R. No. 221697 | March 8, 2016
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners, vs. COMELEC AND

ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO Respondents.
G.R. No. 221698-700 | March 8, 2016
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners, vs. COMELEC,

FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND AMADO D. VALDEZ
Respondents.
FACTS:
This case resolved two consolidated petitions under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with extremely urgent application for an ex parte issuance of temporary restraining
order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction assailing the decision of the
COMELEC: granting Estrella Elamparo’s petition to deny due course or cancel GRACE POE-
LLAMANZARES’ Certificate of Candidacy; and granting the three separate petitions for her
disqualification for the presidential election.
GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES wishes to run for the Office of the President of the Republic of
the Philippines. However, she was a foundling. Her parents are unknown. Mr. and Mrs. Militar
who found the infant Grace in a church gave her to Mr. and Mrs. Poe, her adoptive parents.
Under the Constitution, no person who is not a natural-born citizen shall serve as President of the
Philippines.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES is a natural-born citizen or a naturalized citizen.
RULING:
GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES is a natural-born citizen. Adopting these legal principles from

the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention on Statelessness is rational and reasonable
and consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The presumption of natural-
born citizenship of foundlings stems from the presumption that their parents are nationals of the
Philippines. As the empirical data provided by the PSA show, that presumption is at more than
99% and is a virtual certainty.
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there
are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized
in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, ie., did not have to undergo
the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born
Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who,
after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to
such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the
loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition
thereof.
Lastly, under the international law, foundlings are presumed to have been born of citizens of the
place where they are found. Consequently, GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES is considered as a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
Page 21 of 119
G.R. No. 221538 | September 20, 2016
RIZALITO Y. DAVID, petitioner, vs. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND MARY

GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES, respondents.
FACTS:
Senator MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES is a foundling whose biological parents are

unknown. As an infant, she was abandoned at the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo. She was lawfully
adopted by Spouses Ronald Allan Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe. In 1988, the Department of
Foreign Affairs issued her a Philippine passport. Having become Senator, she was also issued a
Philippine diplomatic passport in 2013. POE was naturalized and granted American citizenship
on October 18, 2001, and was subsequently given a United States passport. In 2006, POE took
the Oath of Allegiance to Republic of the Philippines. In the same year, POE filed a Petition for
Retention and or Re-acquisition of Philippine Citizenship through Republic Act No. 9225. The
Petition was granted by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. She executed an
Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States in 2011. POE decided to
run as Senator in the 2013 Elections. She won and was declared as Senator-elect on May 16,
2013.
RIZALITO Y. DAVID, a losing candidate in the 2013 Senatorial Elections, filed before the
Senate Electoral Tribunal a Petition for Quo Warranto on August 6, 2015. He contested the
election of and sought to unseat Senator POE for allegedly not being a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and, therefore, not being qualified to hold such office under Article VI, Section 3 of
the 1987 Constitution.
The Senate Electoral Tribunal promulgated its assailed Decision finding POE to be a natural-
born citizen and, therefore, qualified to hold office as Senator. Hence, this case.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not POE is a natural-born Filipino citizen, thus, qualified to hold office as a Senator.
RULING:
Yes. Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution spells out the requirement that "no person
shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines."
Though her parents are unknown, POE is a Philippine citizen without the need for an express
statement in the Constitution making her so. The pieces of evidence before the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, admitted facts, and uncontroverted circumstances adequately justify the conclusion of
her Filipino parentage. Also, the assumption should be that foundlings are natural-born unless
there is substantial evidence to the contrary. This is necessarily engendered by a complete
consideration of the whole Constitution, not just its provisions on citizenship. This includes its
mandate of defending the well-being of children, guaranteeing equal protection of the law, equal
access to opportunities for public service, and respecting human rights, as well as its reasons for
requiring natural-born status for select public offices.
Further, today, there are only two (2) categories of Filipino citizens: natural-born and
naturalized. A natural-born citizen is defined as one who is a citizen of the Philippines "from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship." A
naturalized citizen is one who underwent the naturalization process to become a Filipino. POE
did not.
The jurisprudential treatment of naturalization vis-a-vis natural-born status is clear. It should be

with the actual process of naturalization that natural-born status is to be contrasted, not against
other procedures relating to citizenship. Otherwise, the door may be thrown open for the
unbridled diminution of the status of citizens.
Page 22 of 119
G.R. No. 135083 | May 26, 1999
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
FACTS:
ERNESTO MAMARIL filed a disqualification case against vice-mayoralty candidate

MANZANO on the ground that he is not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. In
its resolution, the second division of the COMELEC granted the petition of MAMARIL and
ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of MANZANO on the ground that he is a
dual citizen and, under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code and the Makati charter,
persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. The
Commission found out that MANZANO was born in 1955, of a Filipino father and a Filipino
mother, in San Francisco, California, in the United States. Hence, he is an American citizen,
following the jus soli rule, and at the same time, a Filipino citizen for being born of Filipino
parents.
During the pendency of MANZANO’s motion for reconsideration, the 1998 elections was held
and MANZANO garnered the highest number of votes for vice-mayor in the city of Makati. His
proclamation was suspended, pending resolution of the case. Without resolving MANZANO's
motion, the COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of the COMELEC second division and
declared MANZANO qualified to run for vice-mayor. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification to hold or run office in the local
position.
RULING:
No. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person
whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a
state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary
act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship
clause of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to
possess dual citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any
act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the
constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes,
by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.
The concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Hence, the phrase “dual citizenship” in R.A. No. 7160, Section 40(d) and in
R.A. No. 7854, Section 20 must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance.”
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.
Page 23 of 119
G.R. No. 182701 | July 23, 2008
EUSEBIO EUGENIO K. LOPEZ, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

TESSIE P. VILLANUEVA, Respondents.
FACTS:
EUSEBIO EUGENIO K. LOPEZ, a dual citizen, was a candidate for the position of Chairman of
Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo City held on October 29, 2007. He was eventually
declared the winner. TESSIE P. VILLANUEVA filed a petition before the Provincial Election
Supervisor of the Province of Iloilo, praying for the disqualification of LOPEZ because he was
ineligible from running for any public office.
LOPEZ argued that he is a Filipino-American, by virtue of the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003. He said, he possessed all the qualifications to run for Barangay
Chairman.
COMELEC issued the Resolution granting the petition for disqualification of LOPEZ from
running as Barangay Chairman. COMELEC said, to be able to qualify as a candidate in the
elections, LOPEZ should have made a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship. LOPEZ’ motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC for
disqualifying LOPEZ.
RULING:
No. LOPEZ was born a Filipino, but he deliberately sought American citizenship and renounced
his Filipino citizenship. He later on became a dual citizen by re-acquiring Filipino citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino
citizenship may run for a public office in the Philippines.
Section 5 of the said law states:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding
such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing
of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
LOPEZ was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of the Dual Citizenship Law when
he took his oath of allegiance before the Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General’s
Office in Los Angeles, California, however, the same was not enough to allow him to run for a
public office.
LOPEZ’s failure to renounce his American citizenship as proven by the absence of an affidavit
that will prove the contrary leads this Commission to believe that he failed to comply with the
positive mandate of law.
Page 24 of 119
B.M. No. 1678 | December 17, 2007
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M.

DACANAY, petitioner.
FACTS:
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced
law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He
subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His
application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to RA No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and
Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, DACANAY reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he
took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in
Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law
practice.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not petitioner DACANAY lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave
up his Philippine citizenship.
RULING:
Yes. The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be
limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. Since Filipino citizenship is a
requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar
and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of
Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The
practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of

another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because “all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of RA 9225.” Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who
becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he
reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated
his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he
reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions “he shall apply with the proper
authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice.
Page 25 of 119
G.R. No. 179848 | November 27, 2008
NESTOR A. JACOT, petitioner, vs. ROGEN T. DAL and COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, respondents.
FACTS:
NESTOR A. JACOT assails his disqualification from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of
Catarman, Camiguin in the 2007 National and Local Elections, on the ground that he failed to
make a personal renouncement of his US citizenship. JACOT was a natural born citizen of the
Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the US in 1989. He sought to reacquire his
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act.
JACOT filed a request for the administration of his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines with the Philippine Consulate General of Los Angeles, California. The Los Angeles
PCG issued an Order of Approval of JACOT’s request, and on the same day, JACOT took his
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo. On
27 September 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued and Identification Certificate, recognizing
petitioner as a citizen of the Philippines.
Six months after, JACOT filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position of Vice-Mayor of the
Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin. The 2007 National and Local Elections were held. JACOT
garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Vice Mayor.
Thereafter, the COMELEC Second Division finally issued its Resolution disqualifying the
petitioner from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, for failure to
make the requisite renunciation of his US citizenship.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not JACOT has validly complied the citizenship requirement as required by law for
persons seeking public office.
RULING:
Contrary to JACOT’s assertions, his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made
before the Los Angeles PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with
the requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship, because these are
distinct requirements to be complied with for different purposes.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who
are already naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must take the following oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or retain their Philippine citizenship. By such oath,
the Filipino swears allegiance to the Philippines, but there is nothing in his oath as to his
renunciation of foreign citizenship.
The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their
Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer an oath
simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been
naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine
citizenship to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.
Page 26 of 119
G.R. No. 180088 | January 19, 2009
MANUEL B. JAPZON, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JAIME S.

TY, Respondents.
FACTS:
MANUEL B. JAPZON and JAIME S. TY were candidates for the Office of Mayor of the
Municipality of General MacArthur, Eastern Samar, in the 2007 local elections. JAPZON
instituted a Petition to disqualify and/or cancel TY’s Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of
material misrepresentation. JAPZON alleged that TY filed his Certificate of Candidacy, where
he falsely indicated therein that he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General MacArthur,
Eastern Samar, for one year before 14 May 2007, not being a permanent resident or immigrant of
any foreign country. JAPZON also alleged that though TY may have applied for the
reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he never actually resided in Barangay 6, Poblacion,
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for a period of one year immediately preceding the date of
election as required under Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991. Despite of reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, TY continued
travelling to the USA, the most recent of which was on October 2006 lasting until January 2007.
The COMELEC First Division found that TY complied with the requirements of Sections 3 and
5 of Republic Act No. 9225 and reacquired his Philippine citizenship. The Court of Appeals set
aside the orders of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals and annulled the election of the TY
as Municipal Mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the ground that TY’s immigration to the United
States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not TY has complied with the residency requirement for elective positions.
RULING:
Yes, TY solely complied the residency requirements for elective position.
It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which a natural-born
Filipino may reacquire or retain his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a foreign citizenship,
and provides for his rights and liabilities under such circumstances.
A close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does not at all touch on the matter of
residence of the natural-born Filipino taking advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225
imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor
does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the
current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats
citizenship independently of residence. This is only logical and consistent with the general intent
of the law to allow for dual citizenship.
There is no basis for this Court to require TY to stay in and never leave at all the Municipality of
General MacArthur, Eastern Samar, for the full one-year period prior to the 14 May 2007 local
elections so that he could be considered a resident thereof. To the contrary, the Court has
previously ruled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or
registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of
residence. The Court also noted, that even with his trips to other countries, TY was actually
present in the Municipality of General MacArthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, for at least nine
of the 12 months preceding the 14 May 2007 local elections. Even if length of actual stay in a
place is not necessarily determinative of the fact of residence therein, it does strongly support
and is only consistent with TY’s avowed intent in the instant case to establish residence/domicile
in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
Page 27 of 119
G.R. No. 176947 | February 19, 2009
GAUDENCIO M. CORDORA, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

GUSTAVO S. TAMBUNTING, Respondents.
FACTS:
In his complaint affidavit filed before the COMELEC Law Department, CORDORA asserted
that TAMBUNTING made false assertions. CORDORA stated that TAMBUNTING was not
eligible to run for local public office because TAMBUNTING lacked the required citizenship
and residency requirements.
To disprove TAMBUNTING’s claim of being a natural-born Filipino citizen, CORDORA

presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration which stated that, in two instances,
TAMBUNTING claimed that he is an American upon arrival in the Philippines in December
2000 and upon departure from the Philippines in June 2001. According to CORDORA, these
travel dates confirmed that TAMBUNTING acquired American citizenship through
naturalization in Honolulu, Hawaii in December 2000.
The COMELEC Law Department recommended the dismissal of CORDORA’s complaint

against TAMBUNTING because CORDORA failed to substantiate his charges against
TAMBUNTING. CORDORA’s reliance on the certification of the Bureau of Immigration that
TAMBUNTING traveled on an American passport is not sufficient to prove that
TAMBUNTING is an American citizen.
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and the resolution of the COMELEC Law
Department. The COMELEC En Banc was convinced that CORDORA failed to support his
accusation against TAMBUNTING by sufficient and convincing evidence. CORDORA filed a
motion for reconsideration which raised the same grounds and the same arguments in his
complaint. In its Resolution, the COMELEC En Banc dismissed CORDORA’s motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not TAMBUNTING was eligible to run for local public office in view of his lack of
required citizenship and residency requirements.
RULING:
TAMBUNTING did not deny that he is born of a Filipino mother and an American father.
Neither did he deny that he underwent the process involved in INS Form I-130 (Petition for
Relative) because of his father’s citizenship. He claims that because of his parents’ differing
citizenships, he is both Filipino and American by birth. CORDORA, on the other hand, insists
that TAMBUNTING is a naturalized American citizen.
The Court agreed with Commissioner Sarmiento’s observation that TAMBUNTING possesses
dual citizenship. Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for
TAMBUNTING to undergo the naturalization process to acquire American citizenship. The
process involved in INS Form I-130 only served to confirm the American citizenship which he
acquired at birth. The certification from the Bureau of Immigration which CORDORA presented
contained two trips where TAMBUNTING claimed that he is an American. However, the same
certification showed nine other trips where TAMBUNTING claimed that he is Filipino. Clearly,
TAMBUNTING possessed dual citizenship prior to the filing of his certificate of candidacy
before the 2001 elections. The fact that he had dual citizenship did not disqualify him from
running for public office.
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person
whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a
state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary
act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Page 28 of 119
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes,
by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.
In Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per
se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of
origin even after their naturalization. Section 5(3) of R.A. No. 9225 states that naturalized
citizens who reacquire Filipino citizenship and desire to run for elective public office in the
Philippines shall "meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath" aside from the oath of allegiance prescribed in Section 3 of
R.A. No. 9225. In the present case, TAMBUNTING, a natural-born Filipino, did not
subsequently become a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin requirements in
R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to him.
CORDORA concluded that TAMBUNTING failed to meet the residency requirement because of
TAMBUNTING’s naturalization as an American. CORDORA’s reasoning fails because
TAMBUNTING is not a naturalized American. Moreover, residency, for the purpose of election
laws, includes the twin elements of the fact of residing in a fixed place and the intention to return
there permanently, and is not dependent upon citizenship.
Page 29 of 119
G.R. No. 210164 | August 18, 2015
ROMMEL C. ARNADO, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

FLORANTE CAPITAN, Respondents.
FACTS:
ROMMEL ARNADO was a natural-born Filipino citizen, however, he became an American

citizen through naturalization. In 2008, ARNADO applied for repatriation under RA No. 9225
and took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines twice. His Citizenship Retention
and Re-acquisition was approved. He later filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao Del Norte.
LINOG BALUA, another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition seeking to disqualify ARNADO
and/or cancel his Certificate of Candidacy. BALUA presented as evidence a travel record stating
that ARNADO had been using his US passport. The record revealed that ARNADO, after
renouncing his foreign citizenship, continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the
country before the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to
undoing the renunciation made.
RULING:
Yes. The records and pieces of evidence presented before the Court revealed that between April
03, 2009 (the date when ARNADO renounced his foreign citizenship) and November 30, 2009
(the date when he filed his Certificate of Candidacy), ARNADO used his US passport four times,
actions which run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his
foreign passport, ARNADO positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American
citizen, in effect declaring before the immigration authorities of both countries that he is an
American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the United States of
America.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the
same and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which
granted the citizenship renounced.
Further, the citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be
possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any
act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.
Page 30 of 119
G.R. No. 216607 | April 5, 2016
ARLENE LLENA EMPAYNADO CHUA, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, IMELDA E. FRAGATA, and KRYSTLE MARIE C. BACANI, Respondents.
FACTS:
ARLENE LLENA EMPAYNADO CHUA filed her Certificate of Candidacy for Councilor for
the Fourth District of Manila during the 2013 National and Local Elections. The Fourth District
of Manila is entitled to 6 seats in the Sangguniang Panlungsod. She was proclaimed as a winner,
garnering the 6th highest number of votes. On the same day, IMELDA E. FRAGATA filed a
petition to deny due course/cancel CHUA’s CoC alleging that CHUA was not a Filipino Citizen
and was a permanent resident of the United States. In this petition, FRAGATA specifically
alleged that CHUA has been living in the U.S. for 33 years, she was validly issued a Green Card,
she continues to reside in Georgia, USA. FRAGATA prayed that CHUA be disqualified as a
candidate.
KRYSTLE MARIE C. BACANI filed a Motion to Intervene, alleging that since CHUA should
be disqualified, and that BACANI be the proclaimed Councilor as she was ranked 7th among all
candidates. BACANI argued that CHUA was a dual citizen, rendering her unqualified to run for
Councilor. Based on the Bureau of Immigration, CHUA was allegedly naturalized as an
American citizen in 1997 and was issued an American passport in 2006. She took an Oath of
Allegiance to the Philippines in 2011 but still continued to use her American passport twice in
2012 and once in 2013. More importantly, she did not execute an oath of renunciation of her
American Citizenship.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not CHUA should be disqualified to run as Councilor.
RULING:
Yes. CHUA failed to execute a sworn and personal renunciation of her foreign citizenship
particularly required of those seeking elective public office. Section 5(2) of the Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003 provides:
“2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and
all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;”
CHUA cannot claim that she has renounced her American citizenship by taking the Oath of
Allegiance. The oath of allegiance and the sworn and personal renunciation of foreign
citizenship are separate requirements, the latter being an additional requirement for
qualification to run for public office. With CHUA’s failure to execute a personal and sworn
renunciation of her American citizenship, she was a dual citizen at the time she filed her
Certificate of Candidacy on October 3, 2012. Under Section 40 of the Local Government Code,
she was disqualified to run for Councilor in the Fourth District of Manila during the 2013
National and Local Elections.
With her dual citizenship existing prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy, her
Certificate of Candidacy was void ab initio. She was correctly considered a non-candidate. All
votes casted for her were stray, and the person legally entitled to the position is private
respondent Krystle Marie C. Bacani, the candidate with the next highest number of votes among
the eligible candidates.
Page 31 of 119
G.R. No. 161434 | March 3, 2004
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs. The
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO
POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents.
FACTS:
RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE, also known as FERNANDO POE, JR. filed his certificate of
candidacy on 31 December 2003 for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines
in the forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, POE, representing himself
to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald
Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
The petitioners filed before the COMELEC a petition to disqualify POE and cancel his certificate
of candidacy by claiming that he is not a natural-born Filipino citizen, his parents were
foreigners: his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a
Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
The COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Hence, this case.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not POE is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
RULING:
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
“No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and
a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.”
Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
Based on the evidence presented which the Court considered as viable is the fact that the death
certificate of LORENZO POE, father of ALLAN POE, who in turn was the father of private
respondent FERNANDO POE, JR. indicates that he died on September 11, 1954 at the age of 84
years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. Evidently, in such death certificate, the residence of
LORENZO POE was stated to be San Carlos, Pangansinan. In the absence of any evidence to the
contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a
person at the time of his death was also his residence before death. Considering that the
allegations of petitioners are not substantiated with proof and since LORENZO POE may have
been benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902,
there is no doubt that ALLAN POE, father of private respondent FERNANDO POE, JR. was a
Filipino citizen. And, since the latter was born on August 20, 1939, governed under 1935
Constitution, which constitution considers as citizens of the Philippines those whose fathers are
citizens of the Philippines, FERNANDO POE, JR. was in fact a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines regardless of whether or not he is legitimate or illegitimate.
Page 32 of 119
G.R. No. 137000 | August 9, 2000
CIRILO R. VALLES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROSALIND

YBASCO LOPEZ, respondents.
FACTS:
The citizenship of ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ was once again raised as an issue by CIRILO
VALLES, when LOPEZ ran for re-election for the third time as Governor of Davao Oriental in
the 1998 elections.
The COMELEC, however, dismissed the petition, ruling that LOPEZ is a Filipino citizen and
therefore, qualified to run for a public office for the following reasons: (1) that her father,
Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis she was a
Filipino citizen under the 1987 Philippine Constitution; (2) that she was married to a Filipino,
thereby making her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473;
(3) that she renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her Australian passport was accordingly
cancelled as certified to by the Australian Embassy in Manila; and (4) that furthermore, there are
the COMELEC Resolutions in EPC No. 92-54 and SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring her a
Filipino citizen duly qualified to run for the elective position of Davao Oriental governor.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not LOPES is a Filipino; and (2) Whether or not LOPEZ is disqualified to run for
governor of Davao Oriental under Section 40 of RA No. 7160.
RULING:
FIRST ISSUE: Yes. The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis.
Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of
his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on
the basis of place of birth.
LOPEZ was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the
spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa
Marquez, an Australian. LOPEZ’ father, TELESFORO YBASCO, was born on January 5, 1879
in Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the
Registry of Births. Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, TELESFORO was
deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at
the time of her birth, TELESFORO’s daughter, ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ, is likewise a
citizen of the Philippines.
SECOND ISSUE: No. In previous cases, the Court clarified “dual citizenship” as used in the
Local Government Code and reconciled the same with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987
Constitution on dual allegiance. Recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen may, without
performing any act, and as an involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of different
countries, be also a citizen of another state, the Court explained that dual citizenship as a
disqualification must refer to citizens with dual allegiance.
Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not automatically disqualify
her from running for a public office. Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates with dual
citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of
candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship.
Page 33 of 119
G.R. No. 187567 | February 15, 2012
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. NORA FE SAGUN, Respondent.
FACTS:
NORA FE SAGUN is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta
Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City and did not elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at the age of 33 and after
getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. Said document was notarized by Atty. Cristeta Leungon but was not recorded and
registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.
In September 2005, SAGUN applied for a Philippine passport. Her application was denied due to
the citizenship of her father and there being no annotation on her birth certificate that she has
elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of her election of
Philippine citizenship averring that she was raised as a Filipino and she is a registered voter of
Baguio City as shown in the Voter Certification. She asserted that by virtue of her positive acts,
she has effectively elected Philippine citizenship and such fact should be annotated on her record
of birth so as to entitle her to the issuance of a Philippine passport. The trial court granted such
petition and ordered the local civil registry to annotate on SAGUN’s birth certificate the said
judicial declaration of her Filipino citizenship. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not an action or proceeding for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship
procedurally and jurisdictionally permissible; and (2) Whether or not an election of Philippine
citizenship, made 12 years after reaching the age of majority, considered to have been made
within a reasonable time as interpreted by jurisprudence.
RULING:
FIRST ISSUE: No. Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial
declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for settlement of
justiciable controversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act
or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of
right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy, the
court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to their status. Otherwise, such a
pronouncement is beyond judicial power.
SECOND ISSUE: No. SAGUN clearly failed to comply with the procedural requirements for a
valid and effective election of Philippine citizenship. She cannot assert that the exercise of
suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitutes a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship since the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of
citizenship by election. The mere exercise of suffrage, continuous and uninterrupted stay in
the Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot
take the place of election of Philippine citizenship. Hence, SAGUN cannot now be allowed to
seek the intervention of the court to confer upon her Philippine citizenship when clearly, she has
failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship.
As previously held in jurisprudence, the prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is

certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an
affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil
registry. Having failed to comply with the foregoing requirements, SAGUN’s petition before the
trial court must be denied.
Page 34 of 119
G.R. No. L-27281 | June 30, 1970
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL, as

Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VI and JUANITO SY, respondents.
FACTS:
Finding that JUANITO SY had satisfactorily shown that he had complied with all the
requirements specified in Republic Act No. 530, HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL, as Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordered that SY be allowed to take his oath of allegiance as
a Filipino citizen after which the corresponding certificate of naturalization should be issued in
his favor. The basis of such order was "that since the promulgation of the decision granting the
application of Juanito Sy for naturalization on December 11, 1961, up to the present, said
petitioner has not left the Philippines; that he has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful and
lucrative occupation, being an employee of the Liong Hong Trading with a net income of
P5,400.00 for 1964; that he has not committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or
contrary to any government-announced policies."
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its opposition
to the motion for the approval of the record on appeal, on the ground of the appeal being
frivolous and intended for the purposes of harassment and revenge in view of a criminal case
filed against the relative of the then occupant of the Solicitor General's chair. Said opposition
was, however, overruled by HON. CLORIBEL. Hence, this petition for certiorari and
mandamus.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not HON. CLORIBEL erred in overruling the opposition filed by the Republic to the
motion for the approval of the record on appeal in relation to SY’s petition to take his oath of
allegiance as a Filipino citizen.
RULING:
Yes. The Court has settled in jurisprudence that the firm and unwavering adherence, so manifest
in the decisions of the Court, to the concept that Filipino citizenship being an inestimable boon
and a priceless acquisition, one who seeks to enjoy its rights and privileges must not shirk
the most exacting scrutiny as to his fulfilling the qualifications required by law, which must
be fully met and could be inquired into at any stage of the proceeding, whether it be in the
course of the original petition or during the stage leading to his oath-taking pursuant to Republic
Act No. 530. Thus, “it was not the duty of the Government to specify the grounds of its
opposition. It is not bound in naturalization proceedings by the pleadings relative to the
presence or absence of qualifications. Without objection by the Government, it is the duty of
an applicant for citizenship affirmatively to establish all the legal requirements, and the court
motu proprio may and should deny his application if from his evidence he is found lacking in
any of those requirements." This is so in all stages of the proceeding. For the government, it is
almost never too late.
The Court reiterated that "It is thus undeniable that the right of the government to appeal is
deemed of such importance and is impressed with such significance that the "attempt to
render [it] nugatory" has invariably met with the condemnation that it so richly deserves. So
this Court has consistently and invariably ruled. We do so again."
Page 35 of 119
G.R. No. L-32287 | February 28, 1974
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF JUANITO SY TO BE ADMITTED A

CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES. JUANITO SY, petitioner-appellee, vs. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
FACTS:
In 1961, JUANITO SY filed in the CFI of Manila a petition for naturalization, which does not
expressly state that he is of good moral character as required by Section 7 of Commonwealth Act
No. 473, as amended; although said petition expressly includes the general averment that he has
all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications, with the latter specifically enumerated
including his not having been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. The CFI granted
the petition "subject to the provisions of Republic Act 530".
In 1965, the Government filed an opposition to the SY's oath-taking as a naturalized Filipino
citizen as well as a motion to dismiss the petition for naturalization on the ground that: (1) his
annual income of P3,000.00 at the time of the filing of the application is not lucrative even
though petitioner is a bachelor; (2) SY has not conducted himself in an irreproachable manner as
he has failed to notify the Bureau of Immigration of his change of address; and (3) SY finished
his elementary education at the Westminster High School, a Chinese school run and operated by
Chinese subjects and populated mainly by Chinese students, showing that petitioner has not
evinced a sincere desire to acquire Filipino citizenship, among others.
The CFI, however, issued an order finding that SY satisfactorily established his compliance with
the requirements of Republic Act No. 530. Hence, this case.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the CFI erred in the issuance of the assailed order; and (2) Whether or not SY
satisfactorily complied with the requirements of Republic Act No. 530.
RULING:
FIRST ISSUE: Yes. The Court reiterated its ruling "that a naturalization proceeding is not simply
a private contest between the applicant and the Solicitor General but a matter impressed with the
highest public interest, involving as it does an inquiry as to when an alien should be allowed to
enjoy the coveted boon of Filipino citizenship. It is for this reason that the burden of proof is
upon the applicant to show full and complete compliance with requirements of the law. The
government can at all stages of the proceeding raise the issue of such non-compliance even
without filing a formal opposition to the petition. For the government, it is never too late.”
SECOND ISSUE: No. The consistent doctrine is that the lucrative level of an applicant's annual
income is determined as of the time of the filing of the application. The Court also restated the
accepted definition of a gainful employment to the effect that it is not enough that his income is
sufficient for the ordinary necessities and that such an income to be lucrative must leave him an
appreciable margin over his expenses to be able to provide for his adequate support in the event
of unemployment, sickness or disability to work and thus avoid his becoming the object of
charity or a public charge. SY’s income was found by the Court to be not lucrative, and an
increase in the thereon subsequent to the filing of the petition cannot be taken into consideration.
The Court has also repeatedly ruled that failure to aver in the petition that the applicant is of
good moral character as required by Section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended,
being a jurisdictional requirement, is fatal to the petition. Finally, SY failed to submit a duly
authenticated copy of the intention to renounce Chinese nationality issued by the Ministry of
Interior of the Republic of China. This fact justifies likewise the denial of his petition.
Page 36 of 119
G.R. No. L-17137 | June 29, 1962
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF MO YUEN TSI TO BE ADMITTED A

CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES. MO YUEN TSI, petitioner-appellee, vs. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
FACTS:
MO YUEN TSI was born in Amoy, China on March 11, 1914; that he emigrated to the
Philippines, arriving at Manila on November 28, 1941; that he resides at No. 940 Juan Luna St.,
Manila; that he was married to Yiu Hou Deh in Amoy, China on July 24, 1948 with whom he
has two children born in Manila on June 5, 1949 and December 19, 1951, both being enrolled at
the Hope Christian High School in Manila; that he is a citizen of the Republic of Free China; that
one year prior to the filing of this petition, he has submitted a declaration of intention to become
a citizen of the Philippines with the Office of the Solicitor General; that he is a merchant by
occupation and his average annual income is P8,571.00, more or less; that he speaks and writes
in English but in Tagalog, not so much; that he believes in the principles underlying the
Philippine Constitution; that he conducts himself while staying in the Philippines in a good
manner; that he adopts Filipino customs, traditions, and ideals; that he is not opposed to
organized government; that he is not a member of any association or group of persons who
uphold and teach doctrines against government; that he does not teach or believe in the principle
advocating the use of force, violence, personal assault or assassination for the success and
predominance of men's ideas; that he is not a polygamist and neither does he believe in
polygamy; and that he has presented clearances from the National Bureau of Investigation,
Manila Police Department, City Fiscal of Manila, Bureau of Immigration, Deportation Board,
Clerk of Court of the Manila Court of First Instance, Bureau of Internal Revenue, Bureau of
Prisons, and Land Registration Commission.
This is an appeal interposed by the Solicitor General from the decision of the CFI of Manila in
granting the petition for naturalization of MO YUEN TSI.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the CFI erred in granting MO YUEN TSI’s petition.
RULING:
Yes. The Court ruled that MO YUEN TSI has not satisfactorily proven that he has all the
necessary qualifications and none of the disqualifications to be admitted a citizen of the
Philippines. The respective declarations of the vouching witnesses as to their qualifications are
purely self-serving, coming as they do from their own lips, and not therefore be deemed
sufficient to establish their credibility. There is also no competent evidence showing that the
petitioner is "morally irreproachable" which is a strict requirement of the law to be established.
As well pointed out by the Solicitor General, the phrase "morally irreproachable" is not satisfied
by mere "good" or even "good conduct", because the law requires a moral character of the
highest order, an excellent one. It is a well-settled rule in naturalization cases that vouching
witnesses, apart from their allegations in their affidavit, must prove at the trial that applicant is
"morally irreproachable".
The Court noted that to uphold the granting of the petition for naturalization of MO YUEN TSI
in this instant case, would be to place a premium on failure to conform diligently with the
requirements of the Revised Naturalization Law.
Page 37 of 119
G.R. No. 175430 | June 18, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. KERRY LAO ONG, Respondent.
FACTS:
KERRY LAO ONG, then 38 years old, filed a Petition for Naturalization. ONG alleged in his
petition that he has been a "businessman/business manager" since 1989, earning an average
annual income of P150,000.00. As proof of his income, he presented four tax returns for the
years 1994 to 1997. Based on these returns, the trial court granted ONGs petition.
The REPUBLIC, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the CA, arguing that contrary to the
trial courts finding, ONG did not prove his allegation that he is a businessman/business manager
earning an average income of P150,000.00 since 1989. His income tax returns belie the value of
his income. Moreover, he failed to present evidence on the nature of his profession or trade,
which is the source of his income. Considering that he has 4 minor children – all attending
exclusive private schools, he has declared no other property and/or bank deposits, and he has not
declared owning a family home, his alleged income cannot be considered lucrative. Under the
circumstances, the REPUBLIC maintained that ONG is not qualified as he does not possess a
definite and existing business or trade.
The CA dismissed the REPUBLIC's appeal and denied its motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not ONG has proved that he has some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful
occupation in accordance with Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court stressed that courts must always be mindful that naturalization
proceedings are imbued with the highest public interest. Naturalization laws should be rigidly
enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. The burden
of proof rests upon the applicant to show full and complete compliance with the requirements of
law.
Jurisprudence has settled that the qualification of "some known lucrative trade, profession, or
lawful occupation" means "not only that the person having the employment gets enough for his
ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an income such that
there is an appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to be able to provide for
an adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus
avoid ones becoming the object of charity or a public charge." His income should permit
"him and the members of his family to live with reasonable comfort, in accordance with the
prevailing standard of living, and consistently with the demands of human dignity, at this stage
of our civilization." It has been also held that in determining the existence of a lucrative income,
the courts should consider only the applicant's income; his or her spouse’s income should not be
included in the assessment. The spouses’ additional income is immaterial "for under the law the
petitioner should be the one to possess some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful
occupation to qualify him to become a Filipino citizen." Lastly, the Court has consistently held
that the applicant's qualifications must be determined as of the time of the filing of his petition.
In the case at bar, a careful review of the extant records suffices to hold that ONG has not proven
his possession of a "known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation" to qualify for
naturalization.
Page 38 of 119
G.R. No. L-19829 | July 30, 1966
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF FRANCISCO CO KENG TO BE

ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, movant-appellant, vs. FRANCISCO CO KENG, respondent-appellee.
FACTS:
FRANCISCO CO KENG is a merchant with an annual income of P18,000.00, residing at No.

428 Sto. Cristo, Manila; that he was born in Amoy, China, on August 26, 1920; married to Yao
Sok Ti alias Dolores Yao, with whom he has two children; and he speaks and writes English and
Tagalog. Alleging that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for
Philippine citizenship, he filed a petition for naturalization in the CFI of Manila. After due trial,
the court granted his petition. Two years later, upon CO KENG’s proper motion and there being
no objection from the Solicitor General, he was allowed to and did take the oath of allegiance as
a Filipino citizen.
Some three years thereafter, the Solicitor General filed in the same CFI a verified motion for
cancellation of CO KENG's certificate of naturalization, on the ground, among others, that the
same was obtained fraudulently. After hearing, said motion was denied. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not CO KENG has sufficiently complied with the requirements for naturalization.
RULING:
No. Under Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law, an applicant is required to state in his
petition all his present and former places of residences. Under this requirement, what is being
called for to be stated is not the legal residence or domicile, but the actual places of residences,
non-compliance with which is fatal to the petition. CO KENG, however, stated in his petition
that his only residence was that of his address in Manila, when in fact, he was residing at No. 28,
12th Street, Broadway, Quezon City.
Further, it appears from the records that CO KENG's tax returns from 1948 to 1957 were verified
by 3 sets of revenue examiners. While there were variations in their findings as to the exact
amount of tax deficiency payable by CO KENG, they were nevertheless unanimous in finding
that there were underdeclarations of income committed. This conduct of CO KENG, in
underdeclaring his income and underpayment of income tax, does not satisfy that proper and
irreproachable behavior required of applicants to Philippine citizenship. Failure of an applicant
to enter his true income in his tax return has also been declared as conclusive evidence of
dishonesty, making him devoid of that good moral character required by Section 2(3) of the
Revised Naturalization Law.
As the foregoing reasons should have justified the denial of the petition for naturalization in this
case, the favorable decision of the lower court and the certificate of citizenship issued pursuant
thereto were null and void.
Page 39 of 119
G.R. No. L-24252 | January 30, 1967
ZITA NGO BURCA, petitioner and appellee, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES, oppositor and appellant.
FACTS:
This case is in relation to a petition to declare ZITA NGO BURCA "as possessing all
qualifications and none of the qualifications for naturalization under Commonwealth Act 473 for
the purpose of cancelling her Alien Registry with the Bureau of Immigration". She avers that she
is of legal age, married to Florencio Burca, a Filipino citizen, and a resident of Real St., Ormoc
City; that before her marriage, she was a Chinese citizen, subject of Nationalist China; that she
was born on March 30, 1933, in Gigaquit, Surigao.
By constitutional and legal precepts, an alien woman who marries a Filipino citizen, does not –
by the mere fact of marriage – automatically become a Filipino citizen. On the specific legal
status of an alien woman married to a citizen of the Philippines, paragraph 1, Section 15 of the
Revised Naturalization Law states that any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a
citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not ZITA NGO BURCA is deemed a Filipino citizen in accordance with the
provisions in the Revised Naturalization Law vis-à-vis the Constitution of the Philippines.
RULING:
No. BURCA did not meet the requirements specified in the Revised Naturalization Law. The
petition is fatally defective for failure to contain or mention the essential allegations required
under Section 7 of the Naturalization Law, such as BURCA's former places of residence, and the
absence of the affidavits of at least two supporting witnesses.
BURCA’s petition avers that she was born in Gigaquit, Surigao, that her former residence was
Surigao, Surigao, and that presently she is residing at Regal St., Ormoc City. In court, however,
she testified that she also resided in Junquera St., Cebu, where she took up a course in home
economics, for one year. The law requires that a petition for naturalization should state
petitioner's "present and former places of residence". Residence encompasses all places where
petitioner actually and physically resided. Cebu, where BURCA studied for one year, and which
she did not state in her petition, perforce comes within the term residence.
Another defect in BURCA’s petition is that the same was not supported by the affidavit of at
least two credible persons. The necessity for the affidavit of two witnesses cannot be overlooked.
It is important to know who those witnesses are. The State should not be denied the opportunity
to check on their background to ascertain whether they are of good standing in the community,
whose word may be taken on its face value, and who could serve as "good warranty of the
worthiness of the petitioner". These witnesses should indeed prove in court that they are reliable
insurers of the character of petitioner. Short of this, the petition must fail.
Summarily, the Court had ruled that: (1) An alien woman married to a Filipino who desires to be
a citizen of this country must apply therefor by filing a petition for citizenship reciting that she
possesses all the qualifications set forth in Section 2, and none of the disqualifications under
Section 4, both of the Revised Naturalization Law; (2) Said petition must be filed in the CFI
where the petitioner has resided at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition;
and (3) Any action by any other office, agency, board or official, administrative or otherwise –
other than the judgment of a competent court of justice – certifying or declaring that an alien
wife of the Filipino citizen is also a Filipino citizen, is null and void.
Page 40 of 119
G.R. No. 183110 | October 7, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. AZUCENA SAAVEDRA

BATUGAS, Respondent.
FACTS:
In 2002, AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUGAS filed a Petition for Naturalization before the
RTC of Zamboanga del Sur. BATUGAS was born in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur on
September 28, 1941 to Chinese parents, BATUGAS has never departed the Philippines since
birth. BATUGAS can speak English, Tagalog, Visayan, and Chavacano. Her primary, secondary,
and tertiary education were taken in Philippine schools. After earning a degree in education, she
then practiced her teaching profession in several different schools in Mindanao. In 1968, married
a natural-born Filipino citizen and they had five children, all of whom studied in Philippine
public and private schools and are all professionals. After her stint as a teacher, BATUGAS and
her husband, as conjugal partners, engaged in the retail business of and later on in
milling/distributing rice, corn, and copra.
After all the jurisdictional requirements had been complied with, the Office of the Solicitor
General filed its Motion to Dismiss on the ground that BATUGAS failed to allege that she is
engaged in a lawful occupation or in some known lucrative trade. The OSG maintained that
BATUGAS is not allowed under the Retail Trade to engage directly or indirectly in the retail
trade. The RTC, however, denied such motion. The OSG appealed to the CA, but the CA
affirmed the RTC’s decision. Hence, this case.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not BATUGAS has validly complied the citizenship requirement as required by law
to become a naturalized citizen of the Philippines.
RULING:
Yes. Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either judicial
naturalization under CA 473 or administrative naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139.
Another option is called the derivative naturalization found under Section 15 of CA 473.
Under this provision, foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens may be deemed ipso
facto Philippine citizens and it is neither necessary for them to prove that they possess other
qualifications for naturalization at the time of their marriage nor do they have to submit
themselves to judicial naturalization.
The Court acknowledged that the main objective of extending the citizenship privilege to an
alien wife is to maintain a unity of allegiance among family members. It is, therefore, not
congruent with our cherished traditions of family unity and identity that a husband should be a
citizen and the wife an alien, and that the national treatment of one should be different from that
of the other.
BATUGAS has clearly proven, under strict judicial scrutiny, that she is qualified for the grant of
that privilege, and this Court will not stand in the way of making her a part of a truly Filipino
family.
Page 41 of 119
G.R. No. 205218 | February 10, 2020
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the Special Committee on

Naturalization (SCN), Petitioners, v. WINSTON BRIAN CHIA LAO AND
CHRISTOPHER TROY CHIA LAO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 207075 | February 10, 2020
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the Special Committee on

Naturalization (SCN), Petitioners, v. JON NICHOLAS CHIA LAO, Respondent.
FACTS:
This resolves two consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari: the Republic questioning the
RTC allowing the change in the nationality of WINSTON BRIAN CHIA LAO and
CHRISTOPHER TROY CHIA LAO's parents as entered in their respective Certificates of Live
Birth.; and the RTC allowing the same change in the nationality of the parents of JON
NICHOLAS CHIA LAO as entered in his Certificate of Live Birth.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the nationality of the parents of Winston Brian, Christopher Troy, and Jon
Nicholas Chia Lao, as entered in their respective Certificates of Live Birth, may be changed to
"Filipino" considering that, at the time of their birth, their parents were still Chinese nationals;
and (2) Whether or not an appropriate proceeding before the Special Committee on
Naturalization to determine whether an individual is qualified to acquire Filipino citizenship is
required before the nationality of a person's parents, as entered in the birth certificate, may be
changed.
RULING:
FIRST ISSUE: Yes. Generally, the entries recorded in the birth certificate: (1) the date and hour
of birth; (2) the sex and nationality of the infant; (3) the names, citizens, and religion of parents;
(4) the civil status of parents; and (5) the place where the infant was born, all correspond to facts
existing at the time of birth as argued by the Republic. However, reading Article 407 of the Civil
Code in conjunction with Article 412 of the Civil Code, even acts or events that occurred after
birth may be recorded in the certificate of live birth. The reason is that Article 412 of the Civil
Code uses the word "changed," which implies the occurrence of an event subsequent to birth
may be recorded in the civil register.
The naturalization of their father in 1977 was an act or event affecting and concerning their civil
status that must be recorded in the Civil Register. To prohibit the annotation of events
subsequent to birth in the certificate of live birth is to deny a person the right to form his or her
own identity. More than a "historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth," the
birth certificate is an instrument of individuation. It contains entries that separates a person from
others. We cannot fault Winston Brian, Christopher Troy, and Jon Nicholas for wanting to
change the nationality of their parents as entered in their certificates of live birth. They only want
a vital marker of their identity to align with a legal truth.
SECOND ISSUE: No. Naturalization may be either administrative, judicial, or legislative. As the
name implies, legislative naturalization bestows Filipino citizenship through a statute enacted by
Congress.
Clear from Presidential Decree Nos. 836 and 923 is that the naturalization extends to the alien
wife and minor children of the person naturalized upon the wife's showing that she does not
suffer from any of the disqualifications under Letter of Instructions No. 270, and that she and her
minor children reside permanently in the Philippines at the time of her husband's naturalization.
In other words, the only persons to undergo the proceeding before the Special Committee on
Naturalization will only be the person naturalized and his wife. The minor children, in the words
of Letter of Presidential Decree No. 836 "follow the acquired Filipino citizenship of their
mother."
Page 42 of 119
G.R. No. 138496 | February 23, 2004
HUBERT TAN CO and ARLENE TAN CO, petitioners, vs. THE CIVIL REGISTER OF
MANILA and any person having or claiming an interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought, respondent.
FACTS:
HUBERT TAN CO was born on March 23, 1974. His sister, ARLENE TAN CO, was born on
May 19, 1975. In their respective certificates of birth, it is stated that their parents CO BOON
PENG and LOURDES VIHONG K. TAN are Chinese citizens.
Thereafter, CO BOON PENG filed an application for his naturalization as a citizen of the
Philippines with the Special Committee on Naturalization under Letter of Instruction (LOI) No.
270. His application was granted, and he was conferred Philippine citizenship under P.D. No.
1055. CO BOON PENG took his oath as a Philippine citizen. In the meantime, HUBERT and
ARLENE CO finished college and earned their respective degrees in architecture and
accountancy in Philippine schools.
HUBERT and ARLENE CO filed with the RTC of Manila a petition under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court for correction of entries in their certificates of birth. The court a quo dismissed the
petition outright on the ground that the petition was insufficient, solely because the petitioners’
father Co Boon Peng applied for naturalization under LOI No. 270 and was conferred Philippine
citizenship by naturalization under PD No. 1055 and not under CA No. 473. The petitioners
sought reconsideration, but the same was denied. Hence, this case.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not HUBERT and ARLENE CO were qualified to claim the benefit of Section 15 of
CA No. 473, which provides that minor children of persons naturalized thereunder who were
born in the Philippines shall likewise be considered citizens thereof.
RULING:
Yes. LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are laws governing the naturalization of qualified aliens
residing in the Philippines. While they provide for different procedures, CA No. 473 governs
naturalization by judicial decree while LOI No. 270 governs naturalization by presidential
decree; both statutes have the same purpose and objective: to enable aliens permanently residing
in the Philippines, who, having demonstrated and developed love for and loyalty to the
Philippines, as well as affinity to the culture, tradition and ideals of the Filipino people, and
contributed to the economic, social and cultural development of our country, to be integrated into
the national fabric by being granted Filipino citizenship. Under the LOI, the procedure for the
acquisition of citizenship by naturalization is more expeditious, less cumbersome and less
expensive.
Clearly, LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are, as the petitioners correctly posit, statutes in pari
materia. Absent any express repeal of Section 15 of CA No. 473 in LOI No. 270, the said
provision should be read into the latter law as an integral part thereof, not being inconsistent with
its purpose. Thus, Section 15 of CA No. 473, which extends the grant of Philippine citizenship to
the minor children of those naturalized thereunder, should be similarly applied to the minor
children of those naturalized under LOI No. 270, like the petitioners in this case.
The petitioners’ recourse to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is appropriate. Under
Article 412 of the New Civil Code, no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order. The law does not provide for a specific procedure of law to be followed.
But the Court approved Rule 108 of the Rules of Court to provide for a procedure to implement
the law.
Page 43 of 119
G.R. No. 170603 | January 29, 2007
EDISON SO, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
FACTS:
EDISON SO filed before the RTC a Petition for Naturalization under Commonwealth Act No.
473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. He alleged in his petition
that he has all the qualifications under the said law and none of the disqualifications.
The RTC granted his petition, but the CA set aside the ruling of the RTC and dismissed his
petition for naturalization.
CA set aside the ruling of the RTC and dismissed the petition for naturalization without
prejudice. According to the CA, petitioner’s two (2) witnesses were not credible because they
failed to mention specific details of petitioner’s life or character to show how well they knew
him; they merely "parroted" the provisions of the Naturalization Act without clearly explaining
their applicability to petitioner’s case. The appellate court likewise ruled that petitioner failed to
comply with the requirement of the law that the applicant must not be less than 21 years of age
on the day of the hearing of the petition; during the first hearing on December 12, 2002,
petitioner was only twenty (20) years, nine (9) months, and twenty-five days old, falling short of
the requirement. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not SO sufficiently established his qualification under C.A. No. 473.
RULING:
No, hence the petition was denied for lack of merit. SO’s witnesses clearly did not personally
know him well enough; their testimonies do not satisfactorily establish that SO has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications prescribed by law.
Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a nation
by clothing him or her with the privileges of a citizen. Under current and existing laws, there are
three ways by which an alien may become a citizen by naturalization: (a) administrative
naturalization pursuant to R.A. No. 9139; (b) judicial naturalization pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as
amended; and (c) legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing
Philippine citizenship to an alien.
C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate and distinct laws – the former covers all aliens
regardless of class while the latter covers native-born aliens who lived here in the Philippines all
their lives, who never saw any other country and all along thought that they were Filipinos; who
have demonstrated love and loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to the customs and traditions.
While R.A. No. 9139 was intended to make the process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less
tedious, less technical and more encouraging which is administrative rather than judicial in
nature. Thus, although the legislature believes that there is a need to liberalize the naturalization
law of the Philippines, there is nothing from which it can be inferred that C.A. No. 473 was
intended to be amended or repealed by R.A. No. 9139.
If the qualifications prescribed in R.A. No. 9139 would be made applicable even to judicial
naturalization, the coverage of the law would be broadened since it would then apply even to
aliens who are not native born. It must be stressed that R.A. No. 9139 applies only to aliens who
were born in the Philippines and have been residing here.
Applying the provisions of R.A. No. 9139 to judicial naturalization is contrary to the intention of
the legislature to liberalize the naturalization procedure in the country. One of the qualifications
set forth in R.A. No. 9139 is that the applicant was born in the Philippines and should have been
residing herein since birth. Thus, one who was born here but left the country, though resided for
more than ten years from the filing of the application is also disqualified. On the other hand, if
we maintain the distinct qualifications under each of the two laws, an alien who is not qualified
under R.A. No. 9139 may still be naturalized under C.A. No. 473.
Page 44 of 119
G.R. No. 212785 | April 4, 2018
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner vs. GO PEI HUNG, Respondent.
FACTS:
On December 3, 2007, respondent GO PEI HUNG, a British subject and Hong Kong resident,
filed a Petition for Naturalization seeking Philippine citizenship. He was granted the Filipino
citizenship after the RTC found that he has all the qualification and none of the disqualifications
set forth in C.A. No. 473.
The Republic through the OSG opposed the decision thru an appeal to the CA but the same
dismissed the appeal.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not HEUNG has sufficiently submitted all requirements and proved his qualification
for his petition for naturalization.
RULING:
No, he has failed to prove full and complete compliance with the requirements of the
Naturalization Law. As such, his petition for naturalization must be denied without prejudice to
his right to re-file his application.
The Certificate of Arrival to the Philippines that is attached to the Petition for Naturalization is
mandatory as respondent must prove that he entered the country legally and not by unlawful
means or any other manner that is not sanctioned by law. Because if he entered the country
illegally, this would render his stay in the country unwarranted from the start, and no number of
years' stay here will validate his unlawful entry, The spring cannot rise higher than its source, so
to speak.
The Certificate of Arrival should prove that applicant’s entry to the country is lawful. Without it,
his Petition for Naturalization is incomplete and must be denied outright.
Even if the applicant acquired permanent resident status, this does not do away with the
requirement of said certificate of arrival. An application to become a naturalized Philippine
citizen involves requirements different and separate from that for permanent residency here.
The Declaration of intention is entirely different from the Certificate of Arrival; the latter is just
as important because it proves that the applicant's entry to the country was not illegal - that he
was a documented alien whose arrival and presence in the country is in good faith and with
evident intention to submit to and abide by the laws of the Republic. Certainly, an illegal and
surreptitious entry into the country by aliens whose undocumented arrival constitutes a threat to
national security and the safety of its citizens may not be rewarded later on with citizenship by
naturalization or otherwise; to repeat, a spring will not rise higher than its Source.
To repeat, strict compliance with all statutory requirements is necessary before an applicant may
acquire Philippine citizenship by naturalization. The absence of even a single requirement is fatal
to an application for naturalization. In naturalization proceedings, the burden of proof is upon the
applicant to show full and complete compliance with the requirements of the law. The
opportunity of a foreigner to become a citizen by naturalization is a mere matter of grace, favor
or privilege extended to him by the State; the applicant does not possess any natural, inherent,
existing or vested right to be admitted to Philippine citizenship. The only right that a foreigner
has, to be given the chance to become a Filipino citizen, is that which the statute confers upon
him, and to acquire such right, he must strictly comply with all the statutory conditions and
requirements. The absence of one jurisdictional requirement is fatal to the petition as this
necessarily results in the dismissal or severance of the naturalization process.
Page 45 of 119
G.R. No. 167569 | September 4, 2009
CARLOS T. GO, SR., Petitioner, vs. LUIS T. RAMOS, Respondent.
FACTS:
LUIS T. RAMOS filed before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of
Immigration) against JIMMY T. GO alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien.
RAMOS alleged that while GO represents himself as a Filipino citizen, GO’s personal
circumstances and other records indicate that he is not so. He presented the birth certificate of
GO, issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City, which indicated GO’s citizenship
as "Chinese." He alleges that it appears from GO’s birth certificate that his parents, Carlos and
Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered, because only the citizenship of
Carlos appears to be handwritten while all the other entries were typewritten. He also averred
that in September 1989 or thereabout, GO, through stealth, machination and scheming managed
to cover up his true citizenship, and with the use of falsified documents and untruthful
declarations, was able to procure a Philippine passport from the Department of Foreign Affairs.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not res judicata applies to citizenship cases.
RULING:
Citizenship proceedings, as afore-stated, are a class of its own, in that, unlike other cases, res
judicata does not obtain as a matter of course. In a long line of decisions, this Court said that
every time the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative
case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such
citizenship is generally not considered as res judicata; hence, it has to be threshed out again and
again as the occasion may demand. Res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship only if
the following concur:
1. a person’s citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said

person is a party;
2. the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution
thereof; and
3. the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
Deportation proceedings are administrative in character, summary in nature, and need not be
conducted strictly in accordance with the rules of ordinary court proceedings. The essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is
rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met. Although Jimmy was not furnished
with a copy of the subject Resolution and Charge Sheet as alleged by him, the trial court found
that he was given ample opportunity to explain his side and present controverting evidence.
Page 46 of 119
G.R. Nos. 95122-23 | May 31, 1991
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND

DEPORTATION), BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, COMMISSIONER ANDREA D.
DOMINGO, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JORGE V. SARMIENTO, ACTING
ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER REGINO R. SANTIAGO, MEMBERS OF THE BOARD
OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, ESTANISLAO CANTA, LEO MAGAHOM and BENJAMIN
KALAW, petitioners, vs. HON. JOSELITO DELA ROSA, Presiding Judge, RTC Manila,
Branch 29, WILLIAM T. GATCHALIAN, respondents.
FACTS:
In 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of WILLIAM GATCHALIAN, was recognized by the

Bureau of Immigration as a native-born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of his natural
mother, Marciana Gatchalian. Santiago has a wife, Chu Gim Tee, and 5 children: Jose, Gloria,
Francisco, Elena and Benjamin.
In 1961, WILLIAM arrived in Manila from Hong Kong together with Gloria, Francisco and
Johnson. WILLIAM and Johnson are Francisco’s sons. After investigation, the Board of Special
Inquiry No.1 rendered a decision admitting WILLIAM and his companions as Filipino citizens.
WILLIAM was issued Identification Certificate No. 16135.
In 1962, then Secretary of Justice issued Memorandum No. 9 setting aside all decisions rendered
by the Board of Commissioners on appeal or on review motu proprio by the Board of Special
Inquiry. The Memo also directed the Board of Commissioners to review prior cases decision,
including WILLIAM’s case. Consequently, the Board reviewed and eventually reversed the
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry. A warrant of exclusion was thereafter issued. The
Commission of Immigration sought to deport William, but he opposed the same resulting in so
many procedural appeals and processes.
In 1970, the acting director of the NBI wrote the Secretary of Justice recommending that
WILLIAM be charged with violation of Sec. 37 (a), pars. 1 and 2, in relation to Secs. 45 (c), and
(d) and (e) of CA No. 613, as amended, also known as the Immigration Act of 1940. The
Secretary of Justice indorsed said recommendation to the Commissioner for Immigration for
investigation and immediate action. In 1990, the Commission on Immigration ordered the arrest
of William who was released upon postingP200,000 cash bond. He filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition before the RTC of Manila. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss which was
denied.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not WILLIAM GATCHALIAN may be declared a Filipino by virtue of the validity
of his grandfather’s marriage.
RULING:
Yes, the Supreme Court held that in the absence of the evidence to the contrary foreign laws on a
particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. This is known as
Processual Presumption. In this case, there being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage,
there arises a presumption that it is the same of that of Philippine law the said marriage then is
declared valid. Therefore, WILLIAM following the citizenship of his father is a Filipino citizen.
WILLIAM does not need to prove the Chinese Law as said law is considered the same as
Philippine Law.
The doctrine of res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship.

In order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following
must be present:
1. a person's citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said

person is a party;
2. the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution
thereof, and
Page 47 of 119
3. the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
G.R. No. 191810 | June 22, 2015
JIMMY T. GO a.k.a. JAIME T. GAISANO, Petitioner, vs. BUREEAU OF

IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION and its COMMISIONERS and LUIS T. RAMOS,
Respondents.
FACTS:
In June 1999, the Concerned Employee’s of Noah’s Arc Group of Companies filed a letter-
complaint against JIMMY T. GO a.k.a. Jaime T. Gaisano and his father, CARLOS GO, Sr. a.k.a.
Go Kian Lu It was claimed that GO, SR. was an undocumented alien who later adopted the
Filipino name ‘Carlos Go, Sr." Allegedly, GO. SR. obtained for himself some basic education
and married a Chinese woman name Rosario Tan. Their union produced ten children, one of
whom is GO. On the premise that GO, SR. was an undocumented alien, GO is also an alien,
being a child of a Chinese citizen.
Finding the evidence and report of the NBA as conclusive of the citizenship of GO and GO, SR.,
BI subsequently rendered a Resolution dismissing the complaint for deportation filed against
petitioner GO. However, the BI Board of Commissioners reversed the case dismissal, holding
that the election of Philippine citizenship of GO, SR. was made out of time.
The Go’s filed a petition with the RTC of Pasig seeking to annul the order of the Board to which
it granted. The Board made a subsequent order that the certified true copy of the Oath of
Allegiance of GO, SR. appears to have been subscribed and sworn to before the Deputy Clerk of
Court of Iloilo City, while his Affidavit of Election was subscribed and sworn to before the same
public officer a day after. The Board considered this a irregular since GO, SR. filed his Oath of
Allegiance prior to his actual election of the Philippine citizenship contrary to Section 1 of C.A.
625. The Go’s opposed the subsequent order with a petition for review on certiorari but the same
was dismissed by the CA on the ground that the decision of the Board has attained finality.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the order of the Board is already final and executory.
RULING:
Yes, the CA is correct in ruling that the April 17, 2002 Decision of the Board may no longer be
reviewed as it already attained finality and should remain so. Based on the principle of
immutability of judgment, a decision must become final and executor at some point in time; all
litigations must necessarily come to an end.
A definitive final judgment, however erroneous, is no longer subject to change or revision.
A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. This quality of
immutability precludes the modification of a final judgment, even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law. And this postulate holds true whether the
modification is made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land. The orderly
administration of justice requires that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgments/resolutions
of a court much reach a point of finality set by the law. The noble purpose is to write finis to
dispute once and for all. This is a fundamental principle our justice system, without which there
would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must always be
maintained by those who exercise the power adjudication. Any act, which violates such
principle, must immediately be struck down. Indeed, the principle of conclusiveness of prior
adjudications is not confined in its operation to the judgments of what are ordinarily known as
courts but extends to all bodies upon which judicial powers had been conferred.
Subject to certain recognized exceptions such a (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-
called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4)
whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust
Page 48 of 119
and inequitable, which are not present in this case, the principle of immutability leaves the
judgment undisturbed as nothing further can be done except to execute it.
G.R. No. 151914 | July 31, 2002
TEODULO M. COQUILLA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

and MR. NEIL M. ALVAREZ, respondents.
FACTS:
TEODULO M. COQUILLA was born on February 17, 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern
Samar. He grew up and resided there until 1965, when he joined the United States Navy. He was
subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen. From 1970 to 1973, COQUILLA thrice visited the
Philippines while on leave from the U.S. Navy. Otherwise, even after his retirement from the
U.S. Navy in 1985, he remained in the United States.
On October 15, 1998, COQUILLA came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate,
although he continued making several trips to the United States, the last of which took place on
July 6, 2000 and lasted until August 5, 2000. Subsequently, COQUILLA applied for repatriation
under R.A. No. 81715 to the Special Committee on Naturalization. His application was
approved, and he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.
On November 21, 2000, COQUILLA applied for registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern
Samar and on February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating therein that he had
been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for "two years.”
On March 5, 2001, NEIL M. ALVAREZ, who was the incumbent mayor of Oras and who was
running for reelection, sought the cancellation of COQUILLA’s certificate of candidacy on the
ground that the latter had made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
stating that he had been a resident of Oras for two years when in truth he had resided therein for
only about six months since November 10, 2000, when he took his oath as a citizen of the
Philippines.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not COQUILLA was disqualified from running for office for failing to qualify on the
residency requirements.
RULING:
Yes, he had not completed the one year residency as required under the LGC. In the case at bar,
COQUILLA lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the
U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine
citizenship, COQUILLA was an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines save as our
immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a resident alien.
The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to

"dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal residence, that is, "the place where a
party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be
found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi)." A domicile
of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the child’s parents
reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of
choice).
In Caasi v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that immigration to the United States by virtue of a
"greencard," which entitles one to reside permanently in that country, constitutes abandonment
of domicile in the Philippines. With more reason then does naturalization in a foreign country
result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.
Page 49 of 119
G.R. No. 142840 | May 7, 2001
ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.
FACTS:
TEODORO C. CRUZ was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San
Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable
was the 1935 Constitution. In 1985, however, CRUZ enlisted in the United States Marine Corps
and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the
United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act
No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering
service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country."
In 1994, CRUZ reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act
No. 2630.3 He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of
Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over
ANTONIO BENGSON III, who was then running for reelection.
BENGSON III filed a Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with HRET assailing CRUZ’ citizenship. The
HRET dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not CRUZ may be considered as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
RULING. Yes. Cruz lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces
of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No.
2630. Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the
same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited
provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born
citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that
the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his
Philippine citizenship.
RATIO. Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for
reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63. Under this law, a
former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain
qualifications and none of the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their
citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces of the allied
forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
(4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political economic necessity.
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
Page 50 of 119
G.R. No. 86564 | August 1, 1989
RAMON L. LABO, JR., petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

(COMELEC) EN BANC AND LUIS L. LARDIZABAL, respondents.
FACTS:
RAMON LABO asked the Court to restrain the Commission on Elections from looking into the
question of his citizenship as a qualification for his office as Mayor of Baguio City. The
allegation that he is a foreigner, he says, is not the issue. The issue is whether or not the
COMELEC has jurisdiction to conduct any inquiry into this matter, considering that the petition
for quo warranto against him was not filed on time on account of the requirement for filing fees.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not RAMON LABO was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on 18
January 1988, as mayor of Baguio City.
RULING:
The Court ruled that the RAMON LABO is not now, nor was he on the day of the local elections
on January 18, 1988, a citizen of the Philippines. In fact, he was not even a qualified voter under
the Constitution itself because of his alienage. He was therefore ineligible as a candidate for
mayor of Baguio City, under Section 42 of the Local Government Code.
Marriage per se to a foreigner does not automatically divest a Filipino of his citizenship. It was
through a formal and positive process that a Filipino is naturalized such as marriage with a
foreign citizen coupled with the formal taking of the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the
Affirmation of Allegiance. Especially when in this case, the wordings of the Oath are to wit:
“Renouncing all other allegiance, he swore "to be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her
Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia ..." and to fulfill his duties "as an Australian
citizen."
In taking the Oath of Allegiance of a foreign country, he, in effect, voluntarily and freely rejected
Philippine citizenship and willingly and knowingly embraced the citizenship of a foreign
country.
Page 51 of 119
G.R. No. 104654 | June 6, 1994
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. ROSALIO G. DE LA ROSA,

PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 28, MANILA and
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.
FACTS:
September 20, 1991 - JUAN G. FRIVALDO filed a petition for naturalization under the
Commonwealth Act No. 63 before the RTC Manila.
October 7, 1991 - JUDGE DELA ROSA set the petition for hearing on March 16, 1992, and
directed the publication of the said order and petition in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of
general circulation, for 3 consecutive weeks, the last publication of which should be at least 6
months before the date of the said hearing.
January 14, 1992 - FRIVALDO asked the Judge to cancel the March 16 hearing and move it to
January 24, 1992, citing his intention to run for public office in the May 1992 elections. Judge
granted the motion and the hearing was moved to February 21. No publication or copy was
issued about the order.
February 21, 1992 - the hearing proceeded.
February 27, 1992 - Judge rendered the assailed Decision and held that FRIVALDO is
readmitted as a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by naturalization.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court in relation to R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25 of the Interim Rules, to annul the
decision made on February 27, 1992 and to nullify the oath of allegiance taken by FRIVALDO
on same date.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not FRIVALDO was duly re-admitted to his citizenship as a Filipino.
RULING:
No. The supreme court ruled that Private respondent is declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines
and therefore disqualified from continuing to serve as governor of the Province of Sorsogon. He
is ordered to vacate his office and to surrender the same to the Vice-Governor of the Province of
Sorsogon once this decision becomes final and executory.
The proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken therein, are
null and void for failure to comply with the publication and posting requirements under the
Revised Naturalization Law. The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following
irregularities:
1. the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a
publication of the order advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself;
2. the petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition;
3. petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the judgment;
and
4. petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting period.
Page 52 of 119
BAR MATTER No. 914 | October 1, 1999
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR, VICENTE D.

CHING, applicant.
FACTS:
VICENTE D. CHING, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and
Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was horn in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964.
Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines.
In 1998, CHING, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis University
in Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of the
Court, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit
to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship. In 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar
Examinations were released and CHING was one of the successful Bar examinees. The oath-
taking of the successful Bar examinees was scheduled in 1999. However, because of the
questionable status of CHING's citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath. Pursuant to the
resolution of the Court, he was required to submit further proof of his citizenship.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not CHING may be considered as a Filipino and consequently be admitted to the
Philippine Bar.
RULING:
No. The Court held that CHING failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of
fourteen years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally expressed
his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the
requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of majority." Moreover, CHING has offered no
reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in
electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is
required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and,
thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. CHING's unreasonable and unexplained
delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.
The 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the
election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the
election should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then
commenced upon reaching twenty-one years. In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases
involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing
the time period on the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In
these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the
pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that
the election should be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority. The
phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within
three years from reaching the age of majority.
The election of citizenship after the lapse of fourteen years upon reaching the age of majority is
deemed beyond the contemplation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority." The
allegation that his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified
public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him
Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by election.
Page 53 of 119
G.R. Nos. 92191-92 | July 30, 1991
ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.
G.R. Nos. 92202-03 | July 30, 1991
SIXTO T. BALANQUIT, JR., petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE

OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.
FACTS:
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative
district of Northern Samar are SIXTO BALINQUIT and ANTONIO CO (Petitioners), and JOSE
ONG, JR.
ONG was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against ONG premised on the following grounds:
1) JOSE ONG, JR. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2) JOSE ONG, JR. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
The HRET declared him natural born Filipino. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not ONG JR. is considered a natural born Filipino.
RULING:
Yes. When ONG’s father was naturalized, Sec 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely
applies its benefit to him for he was then a minor residing in this country. Thus, it was the law
itself which elected Philippine citizenship to him when he was only 9.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 of Article IV of the 1987 Philippine Consitution as
applying not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987, but also to
those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date.
The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a
Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen
while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine
citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-
born.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers
with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural-born
citizens. Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannot be made to depend on the
fleeting accident of time or result in two kinds of citizens made up of essentially the same
similarly situated members. It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that is, in
order to remedy this accidental anomaly, and, therefore, treat equally all those born before the
1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship either before or after the effectivity of
that Constitution.
Page 54 of 119
G.R. No. 125793 | August 29, 2006
JOEVANIE ARELLANO TABASA, Petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION and DEPORTATION and WILSON SOLUREN,
Respondents.
FACTS:
When he was 7 years old, JOEVANIE A. TABASA acquired American citizenship when his
father became a naturalized citizen of the US. In 1995, he arrived in the Philippines and was
admitted as "balikbayan"; thereafter, he was arrested and detained by the agent of BIR. The
Consul General of the United States’ embassy of Manila filed a request with the BID that his
passport has been revoked and that TABASA had a standing warrant for several federal charges
against him.
TABASA alleged that he acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation in accordance with the RA
No. 8171, and that because he is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be deported or detained by the
BID.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not TABASA has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171 and
therefore, is not an undocumented alien subject to deportation.
RULING:
No. TABASA is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8171. The only person
entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 is either a Filipino woman who lost her Philippine
citizenship by marriage to an alien, or a natural-born Filipino, including his minor children who
lost Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.
TABASA was already 35 years old when he filed for repatriation. The act cannot be applied in
his case because he is no longer a minor at the time of his repatriation in 1996. The privilege
under RA 8171 only belongs to children who are of minor age at the time of filing of the petition
for repatriation.
An applicant has to file his petition for repatriation with the Special Committee on Naturalization
(SCN), which was designated to process petitions for repatriation pursuant to A.O. No. 285.
In the Amended Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 8171 issued by the SCN on August 5,
1999, applicants for repatriation are required to submit documents in support of their petition
such as their birth certificate and other evidence proving their claim to Filipino citizenship. 19
These requirements were imposed to enable the SCN to verify the qualifications of the applicant
particularly in light of the reasons for the renunciation of Philippine citizenship.
TABASA must also prove that his parents relinquished their Philippine citizenship on account of
political or economic necessity as provided for in the law. It is notable that under the Amended
Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 8171, the SCN requires a petitioner for repatriation to
set forth, among others, "the reason/s why petitioner lost his/her Filipino citizenship, whether by
marriage in case of Filipino woman, or whether by political or economic necessity in case of a
natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his/her Filipino citizenship. In case of the latter, such
political or economic necessity should be specified."
Page 55 of 119
G.R. No. 163256 | November 10, 2004
CICERON P. ALTAREJOS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JOSE

ALMIÑE and VERNON VERSOZA, respondents.
FACTS:
JOSE ALMIÑE and VERNON VERSOZA filed with the COMELEC a petition to disqualify and
deny due course or cancel the certificate of candidacy of CICERON P. ALTAREJOS, on the
ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he made a false representation in his COC that he
was not a permanent resident of the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate, the town he's running
for as mayor in the May 10, 2004 elections.
ALTAREJOS answered that he was already issued a Certificate of Repatriation by the Special
Committee on Naturalization on December 17, 1997.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the registration of ALTAREJOS’s repatriation with the proper civil registry and
with the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting repatriation.
RULING:
Yes. The registration of certificate of repatriation with the proper local civil registry and
with the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting repatriation. ALTAREJOS
completed all the requirements of repatriation only after he filed his certificate of candidacy for a
mayoralty position but before the elections. ALTAREJOS’s repatriation retroacted to the date he
filed his application and was, therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty position in the
government in the May 10, 2004 elections.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 8171 is clear that repatriation is effected "by taking the oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau
of Immigration." Hence, in addition to taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, the registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civil registry and the
Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the repatriation of a citizen.
Republic Act No. 817118 has impliedly repealed Presidential `Decree No. 725. They cover the
same subject matter: Providing for the repatriation of Filipino women who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and of natural-born Filipinos. The Court's ruling in
Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections that repatriation retroacts to the date of filing of one's
application for repatriation subsists for the same reasons quoted above.
Page 56 of 119
G.R. No. 162759 | August 4, 2006
LOIDA NICOLAS-LEWIS, GREGORIO B. MACABENTA, ALEJANDRO A.

ESCLAMADO, ARMANDO B. HEREDIA, REUBEN S. SEGURITAN, ERIC LACHICA
FURBEYRE, TERESITA A. CRUZ, JOSEFINA OPENA DISTERHOFT, MERCEDES V.
OPENA, CORNELIO R. NATIVIDAD, EVELYN D. NATIVIDAD, Petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
FACTS:
This case resolves petitions for certiorari and mandamus for exercising their rights to suffrage
under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act or RA No. 9189. Petitioners are dual citizens who
retained or reacquired Philippine Citizenship under RA No. 9225, or Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003. COMELEC denied their petitions on the ground that they fail to meet
the qualification of 1-year residency required by the Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not dual citizens may exercise their right to suffrage as absentee voters even short of
1-year residency requirement.
RULING:
Yes. The Court ruled and so holds that those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship
under Republic Act No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003 may
exercise the right to vote under the system of absentee voting in Republic Act No. 9189, the
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.
There is no provision in the RA 9225 requiring duals to actually establish residence and
physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. Congress
enacted RA 9189 pursuant to Sections 1 and 2 of Article V of the Constitution, identifying in its
Section 4 of the said Act who can vote under it, among others, are Filipino immigrants and
permanent residents in another country opens an exception and qualifies the disqualification rule
under the Section 5(d) of the same Act.
By applying the doctrine of necessary implication, Constitutional Commission provided for an

exception to actual residency requirement of Section 1, Article 5 of 1987 Constitution, with
respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. Filipino immigrants and permanent residents in another
country may be allowed to vote even though they do not fulfill the residency requirement of said
Sec 1 Art V of the Constitution.
Page 57 of 119
G.R. No. 160869 | May 11, 2007
AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR SCHOOL

TEACHERS AND ALLIED WORKERS) MEMBER - HECTOR GUMANGAN
CALILUNG, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, in his official
capacity as the Secretary of Justice, Respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner prayed for a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing RA
9225, or Act Making the Citizenship of the Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship
Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, as Amended, and for Other
Purposes. Petitioner averred that said Act is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV
of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law."
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not RA 9225 is unconstitutional by recognizing and allowing dual allegiance.
RULING:
No. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a state policy and it is not a self-
executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2
and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but
with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin
even after their naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set
specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be
premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual
allegiance.
What RA No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its
face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic,
the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, RA No. 9225
stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue
of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the
other citizenship was not made a concern of RA No. 9225.
Page 58 of 119
G.R. No. 199113 | March 18, 2015
RENATO M. DAVID, Petitioner, vs. EDITHA A. AGBAY and PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
FACTS:
RENATO M. DAVID migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by

naturalization. Upon retirement, DAVID and his wife returned to the Philippines and purchased a
lot along the beach in Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a residential house. However, the
portion where they built their house is public land and part of the salvage zone. DAVID filed a
Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land with the DENR. In the said
application, DAVID indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.
EDITHA AGBAY opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is
disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public
documents under Article 172 of the RPC against DAVID. Meanwhile, DAVID re-acquired his
Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225.
The CENRO rejected DAVID’s MLA, ruling that DAVID’s subsequent re-acquisition of
Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab initio.
An information for Falsification of Public Document was filed before the MTC and a warrant of
arrest was issued against DAVID. Since the crime for which DAVID was charged was alleged
and admitted to have been committed before he had re-acquired his Philippine citizenship, the
MTC concluded that DAVID was at that time still a Canadian citizen.
DAVID elevated the case to the RTC via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC. The petition was denied.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not DAVID may be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in
his Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under
the provisions of R.A. 9225.
RULING:
Yes. DAVID made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino
citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian
citizen. Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen,
naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses
his Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six
months later, the falsification was already a consummated act, the said law having no retroactive
effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in
finding probable cause for falsification of public document under Article 172, paragraph 1.
The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign
citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225. Although the heading of Section 3 is
"Retention of Philippine Citizenship", the authors of the law intentionally employed the terms
"re-acquire" and "retain" to describe the legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. This is also evident from the title of the law using both re-
acquisition and retention.
In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be deemed to have re-
acquired their Philippine citizenship, which was lost pursuant to CA 63, under which
naturalization in a foreign country is one of the ways by which Philippine citizenship may be
lost. As its title declares, R.A. 9225 amends CA 63 by doing away with the provision in the old
law which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized
citizens of other countries and allowing dual citizenship,21 and also provides for the procedure
for re-acquiring and retaining Philippine citizenship. In the case of those who became foreign
Page 59 of 119
citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having
acquired foreign citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance under the new law.
Page 60 of 119
G.R. No. 209835 | September 22, 2015
ROGELIO BATIN CABALLERO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND

JONATHAN ENRIQUE V. NANUD, JR., Respondents.
FACTS:
ROGELIO BATIN CABALLERO and JONATHAN ENRIQUE NANUD, JR. were both
candidates for the mayoralty position of the Municipality of Uyugan, Province of Batanes.
NANUD filed a Petition to the COMELEC to deny due course to or cancellation of
CABALLERO’s certificate of candidacy (COC) that he was eligible to run for Mayor of
Uyugan, Batanes despite being a Canadian citizen and a non-resident thereof. During the
conference, CABALLERO, through counsel, manifested that he was not properly served with a
copy of the petition and the petition was served by registered mail not in his address in Barangay
Imnajbu, Uyugan, Batanes. He, however, received a copy of the petition during the conference.
CABALLERO did not file an Answer but filed a Memorandum controverting private
respondent’s substantial allegations in his petition.
The COMELEC First Division found that CABALLERO made a material misrepresentation in
his COC when he declared that he is a resident of Barangay Imnajbu, Uyugan, Batanes within
one year prior to the election.
Without the COMELEC Resolution becoming final and executory, elections were subsequently
held, and CABALLERO won. He then filed for a motion for reconsideration with the
COMELEC En Banc, which denied the aforesaid motion.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not CABALLERO had been a resident of Uyugan, Batanes at least one year before
the elections held on May 13, 2013.
RULING:
No. CABALLERO was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan, Batanes.
Thus, it could be said that he had his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes. However, he later
worked in Canada and became a Canadian citizen. In Coquilla v. COMELEC, the court ruled that
naturalization in a foreign country may result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.
This holds true in CABALLERO 's case as permanent resident status in Canada is required for
the acquisition of Canadian citizenship. Hence, CABALLERO had effectively abandoned his
domicile in the Philippines and transferred his domicile of choice in Canada. His frequent visits
to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacation from work in Canada cannot be considered as waiver of
such abandonment.
RA No. 9225, which is known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003,
declares that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who have lost their Philippine citizenship
by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country, can re-acquire or retain his
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of the law. The law does not provide for residency
requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any
effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the
concerned natural-born Filipino.
RA No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. This is only logical and consistent
with the general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may
hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may establish residence either
in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a citizen. However, when a
natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship seeks for an elective public office, residency in the
Philippines becomes material.
Republic Act No. 7160, which is known as the Local Government Code of 1991, provides,
among others, for the qualifications of an elective local official.
Page 61 of 119
G.R. No. 193993 | November 8, 2017
VIVENNE K. TAN, Petitioner vs. VINCENT "BINGBONG" CRISOLOGO, Respondent.
FACTS:
On 19 January 1993, VIVENNE K. TAN, born to Filipino parents, became a naturalized citizen
of the US. TAN applied to be registered as a voter in Quezon City. She indicated that she was a
Filipino Citizen by birth. TAN took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
before a notary public in Makati City.
TAN filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the 2010 National Elections to run as congresswoman
for the First District of Quezon City.
VINCENT "BINGBONG" CRISOLOGO filed a petition before the MeTC seeking the exclusion
of TAN from the voter's list on the following grounds:
1. she was not a Filipino citizen when she registered as a voter; and
2. she failed to meet the residency requirement of the law.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not TAN can be considered a Philippine citizen at the time she registered as a voter.
RULING:
No. Since the foregoing law was still effective when TAN became an American citizen, the loss
of her Philippine citizenship is but a necessary consequence. As the applicable law at that time,
TAN was presumed to know the legal effects of her choice to become a naturalized U.S. citizen.
The loss of Tan's Philippine citizenship is reinforced by the fact that she voluntarily renounced
her Philippine citizenship as a requirement to acquire U.S. citizenship. All said, absent any legal
basis for the retroactive application of R.A. No. 9225, we agree with the CA that TAN was not a
Filipino citizen at the time she registered as a voter and her inclusion to the permanent voter's list
is highly irregular.
Based on this provision alone, it would seem that the law makes a distinction between Filipino
citizens who lost their Philippine citizenship prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 9225 and
reacquired their citizenship under the same law from those who lost their Philippine citizenship
after R.A. No. 9225 was enacted and retained their citizenship. On this point, TAN contends that
this distinction does not substantially affect her citizenship status because reacquiring or
retaining Filipino citizenship has the same effect. Moreover, she points out that the framers of
the law did not distinguish the difference; hence, using the words "reacquire" and "retain"
interchangeably.
Renunciation or the relinquishment of one's citizenship requires a voluntary act for it to produce
any legal effect. This willingness to disassociate from a political community is manifested by
swearing to an oath. If we were to consider the words in the Oath of Allegiance as meaningless,
the process laid out under the law to effect naturalization would be irrelevant and useless. Thus,
to give effect to the legal implications of taking an Oath of Allegiance, we must honor the
meaning of the words which the person declaring the oath has sworn to freely, without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion.
To harmonize, given the distinction between citizens who have "reacquired" from those who
"retained" Philippine citizenship, coupled with the legal effects of renunciation of citizenship,
Section 2 of R.A. No. 9225 cannot be used as basis for giving a retroactive application of the
law. R.A. No. 9225 contains no provision stating that it may be applied retroactively as regards
natural-born citizens who became naturalized citizens of a foreign country prior to the effectivity
of the said law. In fact, correlating Sections 2 and 3 of the law would readily reveal that only
those falling under the second paragraph of R.A. No. 9225, i.e., natural-born citizens who
became naturalized citizens of a foreign country after the effectivity of the said law, shall be
considered as not to have lost their Philippine citizenship.
Page 62 of 119
G.R. No. 216637 | March 7, 2017
AGAPITO J. CARDINO, Petitioner vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC and

ROSALINA G. JALOSJOS a.k.a. ROSALINA JALOSJOS JOHNSON, Respondents.
FACTS:
During the May 13, 2013 Elections, AGAPITO J. CARDINO and ROSALINA G. JALOSJOS
both ran for the position of Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte. On May 15, 2013,
JALOSJOS was proclaimed the winner after garnering 18,414 votes, compared to CARDINO's
16,346 votes. CARDINO immediately filed a petition for quo warranto before the COMELEC,
which sought to nullify the candidacy of JALOSJOS on the ground of ineligibility.
CARDINO alleged that JALOSJOS was a former natural-born Filipino citizen who subsequently
became a naturalized citizen of the USA. JALOSJOS later applied for the reacquisition of her
Filipino citizenship under Republic Act No. 92255 before the Consulate General of the
Philippines in Los Angeles, California, USA. In 2009, JALOSJOS took her Oath of Allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines and an Order of Approval of citizenship retention and
reacquisition was issued in her favor. However, when JALOSJOS filed her Certificate of
Candidacy for Mayor of Dapitan City in 2012, she attached therein an Affidavit of Renunciation
of her American citizenship that was subscribed and sworn to on July 16, 2012 before Judge
Veronica C. De Guzman-Laput of the MTC of Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte.
CARDINO alleged that JALOSJOS' Affidavit of Renunciation was a falsified document that had
no legal effect.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the COMELEC acted proper when it declared the eligibility of JALOSJOS to run for
office after complying with the requirement of Republic Act No. 9225.
RULING:
Yes. The Court affirmed the findings of the COMELEC that JALOSJOS' Affidavit of
Renunciation is not a falsified document. As such, JALOSJOS complied with the provisions of
Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. By virtue thereof, JALOSJOS was able to fully divest
herself of her American citizenship, thus making her eligible to run for the mayorship of Dapitan
City, Zamboanga del Norte.
RA No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born
citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic.
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of
a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. The oath
is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores one's Filipino citizenship and all civil and
political rights and obligations concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in
Section 5.
The language of Section 5(2) is free from any ambiguity. In Lopez v. COMELEC, we declared its
categorical and single meaning: a Filipino American or any dual citizen cannot run for any
elective public position in the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of
all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy. We also expounded on the
form of the renunciation and held that to be valid, the renunciation must be contained in an
affidavit duly executed before an officer of the law who is authorized to administer an oath
stating in clear and unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing all foreign citizenship.
Page 63 of 119
G.R. No. 155635 | November 7, 2008
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT

OF APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondents.
G.R. No. 163979 | November 7, 2008
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner, vs. VICENTE MADRIGAL

BAYOT, respondent.
FACTS:
On April 20, 1979, VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, a Filipino, and MARIA REBECCA
MAKAPUGAY, an American, were married in Muntinlupa. They had a child name Alix, born in
November 27, 1982 in California. In 1996, REBECCA initiated divorce proceedings in
Dominican Republic, and it was granted. The same court also settled the issue on the couple's
conjugal property in Muntinlupa in 1997. REBECCA then filed a declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage on the ground of VICENTE's alleged psychological incapacity. She sought
dissolution of the conjugal partnerships of gains with application for support pendente lite for her
and Alix. She also prayed that VICENTE be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support for
their daughter Alix in the amount of P 220,000.00.
In 2001, VICENTE filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and that
the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. The RTC denied VICENTE's motion to
dismiss. CA dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094 and set aside RTC's incidental orders. According
to the CA, RTC ought to have granted VICENTE's motion to dismiss, since the marriage
between the spouses is already dissolved when the divorce decree was granted since REBECCA
was an American citizen when she applied for the decree.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not REBECCA obtained a Filipino citizenship by virtue of recognition.
RULING:
Yes. From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following material facts and dates may be
deduced: (1) Bureau Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez issued the Order of Recognition on
October 6, 1995; (2) the 1st Indorsement of Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero affirming
Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen was issued on June 8, 2000 or almost five years from
the date of the order of recognition; and (3) ID Certificate No. RC 9778 was purportedly issued
on October 11, 1995 after the payment of the PhP 2,000 fee on October 10, 1995 per OR No.
5939988.
Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of Filipino citizenship require the
affirmation by the DOJ of the Order of Recognition issued by the Bureau. Under Executive
Order No. 292, also known as the 1987 Administrative Code, specifically in its Title III, Chapter
1, Sec. 3(6), it is the DOJ which is tasked to "provide immigration and naturalization regulatory
services and implement the laws governing citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens."
Thus, the confirmation by the DOJ of any Order of Recognition for Filipino citizenship issued by
the Bureau is required.
Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-00235 on Recognition as a Filipino Citizen

clearly provides:
The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section shall automatically furnish the
Department of Justice an official copy of its Order of Recognition within 72 days from its date of
approval by the way of indorsement for confirmation of the Order by the Secretary of Justice
pursuant to Executive Order No. 292. No Identification Certificate shall be issued before the
date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice and any Identification Certificate issued by the
Bureau pursuant to an Order of Recognition shall prominently indicate thereon the date of
confirmation by the Secretary of Justice.
Page 64 of 119
G.R. No. 169958 | March 5, 2010
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL M. GONZALEZ, BUREAU OF

IMMIGRATION COMMISSIONER and BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS CHAIRMAN
ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ, JR., IMMIGRATION ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONERS and
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS MEMBERS ARTHEL B. CARONONGAN, TEODORO
B. DELARMENTE, JOSE D.L. CABOCHAN, and FRANKLIN Z. LITTUA, Petitioners,
vs. MICHAEL ALFIO PENNISI, Respondent.
FACTS:
MICHAEL ALFIO PENNISI was born on 13 March 1975 in Queensland, Australia to Alfio
Pennisi, an Australian national, and Anita T. Quintos, allegedly a Filipino citizen. In March
1999, PENNISI filed a petition for recognition as Filipino citizen before the Bureau of
Immigration. After submitting all the requirements necessary to prove that he is a Filipino, the BI
and DOJ granted his petition to be a Filipino citizen.
In 2003, the Senate Committees on Games, Amusement and Sports and on Constitutional
Amendments jointly submitted Committee Report No. 256, recommending, among other things,
that: (1) the BI conduct summary deportation proceedings against several Filipino-foreign PBA
players, including respondent; and (2) the DOJ Secretary conduct an immediate review of all
orders of recognition. PENNISI was included in the said list. On the said list the inclusion of his
name is anchored on the ground that the authenticity of the document presented by him are
suspicious.
In 2004, the DOJ issued a resolution revoking PENNISI’s certificate of recognition and directing
the BI to begin summary deportation proceedings against respondent and other Filipino-foreign
PBA players. An appeal was filed before the CA. After hearing CA affirmed the first decision of
the BI and DOJ retaining the PENNISI’s status as a Filipino. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PENNISI is a Filipino citizen.
RULING:
No. The Court ruled that they agree with the CA that while the affidavits of Soliman and Peralta
might have cast doubt on the validity of Quintos’ certificate of live birth, such certificate remains
valid unless declared invalid by competent authority. The rule stands that "documents consisting
of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein.
The issuance of certificate of recognition to an alien has not attained finality and therefore may
be subjected to judicial review.
In Go v. Ramos, the Court ruled that citizenship proceedings are a class of its own and can be
threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Res judicata may be applied in cases
of citizenship only if the following concur:
1. a person’s citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is
a party; the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution
thereof; and the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
However, the courts are not precluded from reviewing the findings of the BI. Judicial review is
permitted if the courts believe that there is substantial evidence supporting the claim of
citizenship, so substantial that there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim is
correct. When the evidence submitted by a deportee is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to
immediate review should be recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin the deportation
proceedings. Courts may review the actions of the administrative offices authorized to deport
aliens and reverse their rulings when there is no evidence to sustain the rulings.
Page 65 of 119
G.R. No. 188829 | June 13, 2016
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. RAUL S. GONZALEZ, IN HIS CAPACITY

AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, HON. ALIPIO F.
FERNANDEZ, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION, HON. ARTHEL B. CAROï¿½ONGAN, HON. TEODORO B.
DELARMENTE, HON. JOSE D. CABOCHAN, AND HON. FRANKLIN Z. LITTAUA, IN
THEIR CAPACITY AS MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, Petitioners, v. DAVONN MAURICE C. HARP,
Respondent.
FACTS:
DAVONN MAURICE HARP was born and raised in the United States of America to Toiya
Harp and Manuel Arce Gonzalez on 21 January 1977. While on a visit to the Philippines, he was
discovered by basketball talent scouts. He was invited to play in the Philippine Basketball
League and was eventually drafted to play in the Philippine Basketball Association (PBA).
Sometime in 2002, HARP was among those invited to participate in a Senate investigation
jointly conducted by the Committee on Games, Amusement, and Sports; and the Committee on
Constitutional Amendments, Revision of Codes and Laws. In the course of the inquiry, it was
established that HARP had previously obtained recognition as a citizen of the Philippines from
the BI and the DOJ upon submission of certain documents.
The Senate committees, however, found reason to doubt the Philippine citizenship of HARP.
After a scrutiny of the documents he had submitted and its own field investigation of his
purported background, they concluded that he had used spurious documents in support of his
Petition for Recognition.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not HARP was a natural born Filipino and his recognition was valid.
RULING:
Yes. The evidence relied upon by the DOJ and the BI is simply not enough to negate the
probative value of the documentary evidence submitted by HARP to prove his Philippine
citizenship. Without more, the Court finds no reason to set aside the rule that public documents,
particularly those related to the civil register, are "prima facie evidence of the facts therein
contained." Hence, the court relied on these documents to declare that HARP is a citizen of the
Philippines.
As in any administrative proceeding, the exercise of the power to revoke a certificate of

recognition already issued requires the observance of the basic tenets of due process. At the very
least, it is imperative that the ruling be supported by substantial evidence in view of the gravity
of the consequences that would arise from a revocation.
The Court found these pieces of evidence inadequate to warrant a revocation of the recognition
accorded to HARP. The Court noted that HARP was earlier recognized as a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines on the strength of the documentary evidence he presented.
When the evidence submitted by a HARP is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate
review should also be recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin the deportation
proceedings. A citizen is entitled to live in peace, without molestation from any official or
authority, and if he is disturbed by a deportation proceeding, he has the unquestionable right to
resort to the courts for his protection, either by a writ of habeas corpus or of prohibition, on the
legal ground that the Board lacks jurisdiction. If he is a citizen and evidence thereof is
satisfactory, there is no sense nor justice in allowing the deportation proceedings to continue,
granting him the remedy only after the Board has finished its investigation of his undesirability.
Page 66 of 119
G.R. No. 7318 | January 24, 1913
UY KAI HU, petitioner-appellee, vs. H.B McCOY, respondent-appellant.
FACTS:
The case involves a Chinese laborer named UY KAI HU who attempted to reenter the
Philippines without the necessary return certificate. UY KAI HU had previously obtained a
certificate of residence in 1903 but left the country in 1905 without obtaining the required return
certificate. In 1911, he returned to the Philippines as a stowaway and was apprehended by
immigration authorities.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the immigration authorities had jurisdiction over UY KAI HU; and (2)
Whether he could be deported for not having the required return certificate.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the trial court, stating that the immigration
authorities had jurisdiction over UY KAI HU and that he could be deported for not having the
necessary return certificate.
The court based its decision on the provisions of the Act of Congress of August 18, 1894, which
states that the decision of immigration or customs officers on the admission of an alien is final
unless reversed on appeal to the Secretary of the Treasury. The court also relied on the
requirement for a return certificate for registered Chinese laborers and the definition of “entry” in
immigration laws.
An "entry" in the sense of the immigration statutes means something more than merely stepping
upon dry land within the jurisdiction of the state. The mere fact that an alien has so far eluded the
vigilance of the immigration authorities as to pass the boundary line does not constitute an entry
in the sense of these laws when he is apprehended to soon thereafter that he is prevented from
performing any of those acts of business, pleasure, or travel for which alien enters the state; and
his right to enter is still subject to the administrative proceedings of the immigration authorities.
Page 67 of 119
G.R. No. L-7995 | May 31, 1957
LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations
and partnerships adversely affected by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner, vs. JAIME
HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of
Manila, respondent.
FACTS:
EDUARDO L. ICHONG, a Chinese-Filipino businessman, filed a petition before the Supreme

Court, arguing that Republic Act No. 1180 violated the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. He contended that the law singled out Chinese nationals for discriminatory
treatment by restricting their right to engage in retail trade while allowing other foreigners to do
so freely.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 1180, which imposed restrictions on the retail trade by Chinese
nationals, violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court, in its decision, declared Republic Act No. 1180 as unconstitutional.
The Court ruled that the law violated the equal protection clause enshrined in the Constitution,
which ensures that all individuals are treated equally under the law without discrimination.
The Court held that while it is within the government's prerogative to regulate immigration and
impose restrictions on foreign nationals, such regulations must be based on substantial
distinctions that are germane to the purpose of the law. In this case, the law's restriction on
Chinese nationals' right to engage in retail trade was deemed to be based solely on their race or
nationality, which is an arbitrary and unreasonable classification.
The Court emphasized that equal protection of the law is a fundamental right and a cornerstone
of a just and democratic society. Discriminatory laws that treat individuals differently based on
race or nationality are repugnant to the Constitution and cannot be upheld.
Page 68 of 119
G.R. No. 99358 | January 30, 1995
DJUMANTAN, petitioner, vs. HON. ANDREA D. DOMINGO, COMMISSIONER OF

THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION, HON. REGINO R. SANTIAGO and HON. JORGE
V. SARMIENTO, COMMISSIONERS BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND
DEPORTATION, respondents.
FACTS:
Bernard Banez, the husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a contract worker. In 1974,
he embraced and was converted to Islam. In the same year, he married DJUMANTAN in
accordance with Islamic rites. He returned to the Philippines in January 1979.
In 1979, DJUMANTAN and her two children with Banez – two-year old Marina and nine-month
old Nikulas – arrived in Manila as the "guests" of Banez. The latter made it appear that he was
just a friend of the family of petitioner and was merely repaying the hospitability extended to
him during his stay in Indonesia.
In 1981, Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her husband and DJUMANTAN. She
filed a complaint for "concubinage" with the Municipal Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan
against the two. This case was, however, dismissed for lack of merit.
In 1982, the immigration status of DJUMANTAN was changed from temporary visitor to that of
permanent resident under Section 13(a) of the same law. In the same year, DJUMANTAN was
issued an alien certificate of registration. Not accepting the set-back, Banez' eldest son,
Leonardo, opposed the granting of the alien certificate. Hence, this case.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the power of Congress to regulate immigration includes the authority to deport
aliens who violate immigration laws and regulations.
RULING:
Yes. Under clause 1 of Section 37(a), an "alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date
of this Act by means of false and misleading statements or without inspection and admission by
the immigration authorities at a designated port of entry or at any place other than at a designated
port of entry" is subject to deportation.
The deportation of an alien under said clause of Section 37(a) has a prescriptive period and "shall
not be effected ... unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five years after
the cause for deportation arises" (Immigration Act of 1940, Sec. 37[b]).
Congress may impose a limitation of time for the deportation of alien from the country.
The Court held that the right of the President to expel or deport aliens is absolute and
unqualified, based on the fact that aliens are not part of the nation and their admission into the
country is a matter of permission and tolerance. The fact of marriage to a Filipino citizen does
not exempt an alien from the immigration laws governing admission and exclusion. The court
also noted that there is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be
admitted or given permanent residency in the Philippines.
Regarding the issue of prescription, the court agreed with the Solicitor General that the right to
deport DJUMANTAN had prescribed under Section 37(b) of the Immigration Act of 1940. The
cause for deportation arose when it was discovered that DJUMANTAN entered the country
through false and misleading statements, which was reported to the CID in 1980. More than five
years had elapsed from that date to the issuance of the deportation order in 1990.
Page 69 of 119
G.R. No. L-9621 | January 30, 1957
ANG BENG, ET AL., Petitioners-Appellants, v. THE COMMISSIONER OF

IMMIGRATION, Respondent-Appellee.
FACTS:
The petitioners, ANG BENG, ET AL., both Chinese nationals, were prosecuted in and convicted
by the Court of First Instance of Manila for violation of the Import Control Law (Republic Act
No. 650) in Criminal Case No. 21317. They were also charged before the Deportation Board.
Pending appeal of the criminal case in the Court of Appeals, the Import Control Law expired, in
view of which and with the conformity of the Solicitor General, petitioners’ motion for dismissal
was granted and they were ordered discharged.
The Deportation Board, however, submitted to the President of the Philippines its findings in the
Deportation Case and recommended ANG BENG, ET AL.’s deportation. In 1954, the President
issued the corresponding order of deportation. In 1955, ANG BENG, ET AL. filed with the
Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for prohibition and certiorari, praying that the
President’s order of deportation be declared illegal and that they be released.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the order deporting ANG BENG, ET AL. should be set aside, because the law
defining the crime of which they were convicted had already expired, the order of deportation
being based on said conviction.
RULING:
No. The CFI’s ruling was upheld by the Court in this case.
The expiration of the Import Control Law cannot be considered favorable to them in the sense
that it erases the stigma of their conviction. There is no law upholding such proposition. The
benefit of retroactivity and liberal construction provided in Article 266 and 22 of the Revised
Penal Code accrues when penal laws are repealed.
In the case at bar, there is no subsequent repealing law that petitioners could mention. The law
violated by them expired in virtue of its own force. What is more, the President, in the exercise
of his executive prerogative and as an act of State, is vested with full power and discretion to
issue orders of deportation. Such orders do not depend on a prior judicial conviction in a criminal
case.
Page 70 of 119
G.R. No. L-6784 | March 12, 1954
NATIVIDAD MIRANDA, LUIS MIRANDA, PEDRO MIRANDA, RAMON MIRANDA

and FAUSTINO MIRANDA, petitioners, vs. DEPORTATION BOARD, respondent.
FACTS:
NATIVIDAD MIRANDA and her siblings (Petitioners) filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus against the Deportation Board. The petitioners were charged with entering the Philippines
through fraud and misrepresentation and were subsequently arrested and detained by the Bureau
of Immigration. The petitioners claimed that they are Filipino citizens and argued that the
Deportation Board has no jurisdiction over them.
The petitioners argue that the jurisdiction of the Deportation Board is limited to persons who are
admitted aliens and are found to be undesirable. They contend that since they are Filipino
citizens, the Deportation Board has no authority to hear their case.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Deportation Board has jurisdiction over the petitioners, who claim to be
Filipino citizens.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that while the jurisdiction of the Deportation Board is indeed
limited to aliens, the mere plea of citizenship does not divest the Board of its jurisdiction. The
petitioners have the burden of proving by sufficient evidence that they are Filipino citizens. The
Court ruled that the Deportation Board has the power to pass upon the evidence presented and
determine in the first instance if the petitioners are Filipino citizens or not. This is essential to the
efficient exercise of the Board’s power. The Court emphasized that the question of citizenship
should not be determined exclusively by the courts.
The Court’s decision is based on the principle that the jurisdiction of the Deportation Board is
limited to aliens, but the mere claim of citizenship does not automatically remove the Board’s
jurisdiction. The petitioners have the burden of proving their Filipino citizenship through
sufficient evidence. The Court also emphasized that the determination of citizenship should not
be solely within the jurisdiction of the courts, as the Deportation Board has the power to pass
upon the evidence and make a determination in the first instance.
Page 71 of 119
G.R. No. 153454 | July 7, 2004
AGUS DWIKARNA, petitioner, vs. HON. ANDREA D. DOMINGO, Commissioner,

Bureau of Immigration, GEN. LEANDRO MENDOZA,* Chief, Philippine National Police,
GEN. JAIME G. CARINGAL, Chief, Intelligence Group, Philippine National Police,
RONALDO P. LEDESMA, Chief, Bureau of Special Inquiry, and the Board of
Commissioners, Bureau of Immigration, respondents.
FACTS:
This case involves a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus filed by AGUS
DWIKARNA, an Indonesian national, against various government officials and agencies.
DWIKARNA and two other Indonesian nationals were apprehended at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport for illegal possession of explosives. They were charged with violation of
PD 1866 (illegal possession of firearms and ammunition) and the Philippine Immigration Act of
1940.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the DWIKARNA’s continued detention is legally justified and if he is entitled to the
extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court denied the petition and the prayer for a temporary mandatory injunction
for DWIKARNA’s release. DWIKARNA’s continued detention was deemed legally justified as
he had been convicted of illegal possession of explosive materials and sentenced to
imprisonment.
The Court held that the extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are only
available when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. In this case, DWIKARNA should have first appealed his conviction to the Court
of Appeals. The Court also stated that the deportation case against DWIKARNA should be
resolved by the Bureau of Immigration, and if DWIKARNA is dissatisfied with the decision, he
can move for reconsideration and then elevate his case to the Court of Appeals.
Page 72 of 119
[A.M. No. RTJ-06-2018. October 15, 2007.]
[Formerly Adm. Matter OCA-IPI No. 05-2360-RTJ]
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, complainant, vs. JUDGE ANTONIO I. DE

CASTRO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Manila, respondent.
FACTS:
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a complaint against Judge ANTONIO I. DE CASTRO,
the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Manila, alleging that he committed
gross ignorance of the law. The Court previously found Judge DE CASTRO guilty and imposed
a penalty of suspension for three months and one day without pay. Judge DE CASTRO filed a
motion for reconsideration and judicial clemency, seeking the modification of the penalty to a
fine.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the penalty of suspension imposed on Judge DE CASTRO should be modified to a fine.
RULING:
Yes. The Court ruled in favor of Judge DE CASTRO and modified the penalty from suspension
to a fine.
The Court considered the lack of malice or bad faith in Judge DE CASTRO’s actions and the
fact that this is his first administrative offense. The Court also took into account Judge DE
CASTRO’s reliance on his judicial compensation as his only means of livelihood.
Page 73 of 119
G.R. No. 180364 | December 3, 2014
TZE SUN WONG, Petitioner, vs. KENNY WONG, Respondent.
FACTS:
The petitioner, TZE SUN WONG, is a Chinese citizen who immigrated to the Philippines in
1975 and acquired permanent resident status in 1982. The respondent, KENNY WONG, filed a
complaint against TZE SUN WONG, alleging that he misrepresented himself as a Filipino
citizen in his driver’s license application and issued bounced checks. The Bureau of Immigration
(BOI) conducted an investigation and found probable cause, ordering the TZE SUN WONG’s
deportation on the grounds of illegal use of an alias and misrepresentation. The BOI’s decision
was affirmed by the Secretary of Justice and the CA.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the CA correctly denied TZE SUN WONG’s petition for certiorari.
RULING:
Yes. The court ruled that the CA’s dismissal of the petition was correct.
The court discussed the proper recourse for appealing decisions of the BOI Board of
Commissioners, stating that it can be appealed to the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
However, the court noted that the availability of a Rule 43 appeal presupposes the presence of
exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
In this case, the court found that TZE SUN WONG’s direct resort to certiorari was justified due
to the imminent deportation. The court ultimately denied the petition on substantive grounds,
stating that the acts of misrepresentation had already been established during the proceedings
before the BOI Board of Commissioners.
Page 74 of 119
G.R. No. L-1673 | October 22, 1948
LAO TANG BUN (alias VICENTE UY), NG BUN HO (alias ONG CHI BEN) LU BON
KING (alias LEE), YAP LIM SUN (alias PIA UY), and GAN PING (alias TANG ENG
TIAN) Petitioners, vs. ENGRACIO FABRE, JESUS BAUTISTA, and OSCAR ARANETA,
Commissioners of Immigration, and THE CHIEF OF POLICE, City of Manila,
Philippines, Respondents.
FACTS:
This case involves five Chinese citizens: LAO TANG BUN, NG BUN HO, LU BON KING,
YAP LIM SUN, and GAN PING (Petitioners-Detainees), who were detained by the immigration
authorities in the Philippines for the purpose of deportation. The Petitioners-Detainees filed a
petition to test the legality of their confinement and proposed expulsion from the country. The
use of habeas corpus to challenge the legality of aliens’ confinement and deportation is an
established practice.
The immigration authorities had received information that the Petitioners-Detainees were
engaged in communist activities, disseminating red propaganda, and trafficking firearms for
subversive elements. Based on this information, warrants for their arrest were issued, clearly
stating the reasons for their apprehension. The investigation commenced and the Petitioners-
Detainees were given a fair hearing, represented by attorneys, and allowed to cross-examine
witnesses and present evidence in their defense.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deportation of the Petitioners-Detainees was lawful and supported by
sufficient evidence.
RULING:
The court held that the deportation was lawful and supported by sufficient evidence.
The court stated that deportation proceedings are administrative in nature and do not require the
same strict rules of evidence as criminal proceedings. The court also noted that it is not its role to
weigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses in deportation cases. As long as
there is some evidence to support the deportation order and the proceedings were fair, the court
will not interfere with the decision of the immigration authorities.
Page 75 of 119
G.R. No. 166199 | April 24, 2009
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY and THE

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, Petitioners,
vs. CHRISTOPHER KORUGA, Respondent.
FACTS:
August 2001 – BI Commissioner Domingo received an anonymous letter requesting the

deportation of CHRISTOPHER KORUGA, American national, as an undesirable alien for
having been found guilty of Violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act in the State
of Washington, United States of America (USA) for attempted possession of cocaine
sometime in 1983. KORUGA was arrested and charged before the Board of Special Inquiry
(BSI) for violation of Section 37 (a) (4) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended.
BOC rendered a judgment ordering the deportation of KORUGA. A motion for

reconsideration was filed by KORUGA but was denied in a Resolution. Unaware of the
Resolution, KORUGA filed a Manifestation and Notice of Appeal Ex Abundanti
Cautelam with the Office of the President, which referred the appeal to the DOJ. DOJ
Secretary Datumanong dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved, KORUGA filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA. The CA dismissed the deportation case filed against
KORUGA.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether the exclusive authority of the BOC over deportation proceedings bars judicial
review. (2) Whether there is a valid and legal ground for the deportation of KORUGA.
RULING:
FIRST ISSUE: No. While it is true that BI has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try
and hear cases against an alleged alien, and that the BOC has jurisdiction over deportation
proceedings, Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution has vested power of judicial review in
the Supreme Court and the lower courts such as the CA, as established by law. Although the
courts are without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government and are not
empowered to execute absolutely their own judgment from that of Congress or of the
President, the Court may look into and resolve questions of whether or not such judgment has
been made with grave abuse of discretion, when the act of the legislative or executive
department is contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or when executed
whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias. In this case,
KORUGA correctly filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA to assail the
order of deportation on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
SECOND ISSUE: Yes. The settled rule is that the entry or stay of aliens in the Philippines is
merely a privilege and a matter of grace; such privilege is not absolute or permanent and may
be revoked. However, aliens may be expelled or deported from the Philippines only on
grounds and in the manner provided for by the Constitution, the Philippine Immigration Act
of 1940, as amended, and administrative issuances pursuant thereto. In the case, KORUGA
was charged with violation of Section 37 (a)(4) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended. Section 37 (a)(4) makes no distinction between a foreign prohibited drugs law and
the Philippine drugs law, thus, should apply to those convicted of all prohibited drugs laws,
whether local or foreign. There is no dispute that KORUGA was convicted of Volation of the
Uniform Controlled Substances Act in the State of Washington, USA for attempted
possession of cocaine. Although he pleaded guilty to a lesser offense and was not imprisoned
but underwent a one-year probation, he was still convicted under a prohibited drugs law. The
BOC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in ordering the deportation of KORUGA.
Page 76 of 119
G.R. No. 198780 | October 16, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
FACTS:
October 22, 2004 – FRINGER, an American citizen, and ALBIOS were married before the
MeTC.
December 6, 2006 – ALBIOS filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with FRINGER. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and
never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a
married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their
marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio.
April 25, 2008 – RTC declared the marriage between FRINGER and ALBIOS as void because
the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be
legally bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in
consideration of $2,000.00.
September 29, 2011 – CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential requisite of
consent was lacking.
ISSUE/S:
Whether a marriage contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in
consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent.
RULING:
No.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration: The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant

benefits. In the United States, marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular
purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as "limited purpose" marriages. A
common limited purpose marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a child.
Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law
is usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the time of their marriage, and it
attempts to filter out those who use marriage solely to achieve immigration status.
ALBIOS’ marriage is not void. CA’s decision was based on Article 2 of the Family Code,
which provides that consent is an essential requisite of marriage. For consent to be valid, 1)
freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. Absence of any of the
essential requisites shall render a marriage void ab initio. In view thereof, consent was not
lacking between ALBIOS and FRINGER. There was a real consent because it was not vitiated
nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. That their consent was freely given with the
clear intention of entering into a real and valid marriage to allow the ALBIOS to acquire
American citizenship. ALBIOS’ marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest. There is
no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the
Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long
as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or
voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid. Although ALBIOS’
marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not
void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.
Page 77 of 119
G.R. No. L-11511 | November 28, 1958
TAN SIN, petitioner, vs. THE DEPORTATION BOARD, respondent.
FACTS:
TAN SIN is a Chinese citizen residing at Pasay City allowed to reside in the Philippines as a
permanent resident. He was charged and convicted of the crime of estafa in the CFI. The Court
did not recommend to the President his deportation after service of the sentence. TAN SIN
served his sentence in the national penitentiary but before his release from confinement,
charges against him were filed by a special prosecutor in the Deportation Board alleging the
fact of his conviction by final judgment of the crime of estafa and service of sentence therefor
and praying that after hearing the Board recommended to the President his deportation as an
undesirable alien. The Deportation Board ordered that he be detained upon release from
confinement pending the termination of the deportation proceedings instituted against him.
TAN SIN filed a motion to dismiss which the Board denied. Aggrieved, TAN SIN filed a
petition before the CFI. The court rendered its judgment denying the petition. Hence, this
petition.
TAN SIN contends that it is Congress and not the President of the Republic that has absolute
and inherent power to deport aliens; that the power to deport aliens may be exercised by the
President of the Republic only for reasons provided by law, namely, section
37, Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 144 and 503, and after
hearing as provided for in section 69, Revised Administrative Code; and that although he was
convicted by final judgment of the crime of estafa, still section 37(a), clause 3, Commonwealth
Act No. 613, as amended, does not apply to him, because he was convicted only once of the
crime of estafa, which conviction happened on the thirtieth year after his entry to the
Philippines, and the sentence imposed upon him was only for 4 months and 1 day of arresto
mayor.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not TAN SIN’s contention is correct.
RATIO:
No. In the case of Tan Tong vs. Deportation Board, the Court held that the power to deport
aliens is lodged in the President of the Republic of the Philippines. As an act of state, it is
vested in the Executive by virtue of his office, subject only to the regulations prescribed in
Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code or other applicable laws. Section 37 of C.A.
No. 613, as amended, merely enumerates the grounds for which an alien may be arrested upon
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any officer designated by him for the
purpose. The fact that the ground upon which TAN SIN is sought to be deported is not among
those mentioned in the law cited by him, does not mean that the power to deport an alien
whose stay in the Philippines has become undesirable for causes not mentioned therein, has
been withdrawn from the President by the enactment of C.A. No. 613, as amended. Section 52
of the last-mentioned Act expressly provides that section 69 of the Revised Administrative
Code shall continue to remain in force and effect.
The Deportation Board has been legally constituted by the President of the Philippines and
vested with the power to issue warrants of arrest to apprehend undesirable aliens, and after
investigation conducted in the manner prescribed in section 69 of the Revised Administrative
Code, to recommend their deportation if found undesirable. TAN SIN has been taken into
custody for the purpose of determining whether he is an undesirable alien. The order of the
Deportation Board to hold TAN SIN in custody pending determination of the deportation
proceedings instituted against him is legal. Temporary detention is a necessary step in the
process of exclusion or expulsion of an undesirable alien and pending arrangements for his
deportation, the Government has the right to hold him under confinement for a reasonable
length of time.
Page 78 of 119
G.R. No. 81798 December 29, 1989
LAO GI alias FILOMENO CHIA, SR., his wife, ONG UE, and his children FILOMENO,
JR., MANUEL, ROSITA VICENTA and DOMINGA, all surnamed CHIA, petitioners vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND
DEPORTATION, respondents.
FACTS:
Secretary of Justice rendered Opinion No. 191, series of 1958, finding FILOMENA CHIA, Jr.,
alias Sia Pieng Hui to be a Filipino citizen as it appears that his father Filomeno Chia, Sr. is a
Filipino citizen and the legitimate son of Inocencio Chia and Maria Layug of Guagua,
Pampanga. Thereafter, Minister of Justice rendered Opinion No. 147, series of 1980, cancelling
Opinion No. 191 and setting aside the citizenship of FILOMENA CHIA, Sr. on the ground that
it was founded on fraud and misrepresentation. A charge for deportation was filed with the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) against Lao Gi alias Filomeno Chia, Sr.,
his wife, and children. Petitioners were required to register as aliens but refused. Petitioners
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the CID has no authority to reopen a matter long
settled under Opinion No. 191, series of 1958. The motion to dismiss was denied by the CID.
On appeal, CA affirmed the decision of the CID. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Petitioners are entitled to the right to due process even if they are aliens.
RULING:
CID has the authority and jurisdiction to hear and determine the deportation case against
petitioners and in the process also determine the question of citizenship raised by the
petitioners. Section 37(a) (1) of the Immigration Act clearly provides that before any alien may
be deported upon a warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration, there should be a prior
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground as charged
against the alien.
In this case, petitioners are charged with having entered the Philippines by means of false and
misleading statements or without inspection or admission by the immigration authorities at a
designated port of entry. After appropriate charges are filed in the CID the specific
grounds of which he should be duly informed of, a hearing should be conducted, and it is only
after such a hearing by the CID that the alien may be ordered deported. In such
hearing, Opinion No. 191, Series of 1958 of the Secretary of Justice and Opinion No. 147,
Series of 1980 of the Minister of Justice will bear much weight in the determination by the
CID of the citizenship of said petitioners.
The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It is an act by or under the authority of the
sovereign power. It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose presence in the
country is found to be injurious to the public good and domestic tranquility of the people.
Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action,
however, considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting
the freedom and liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such person to due process
should not be denied. Thus, the provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines particularly
on criminal procedure are applicable to deportation proceedings. Hence, the charge against an
alien must specify the acts or omissions complained of which must be stated in ordinary and
concise language to enable a person of common understanding to know on what ground he is
intended to be deported and enable the CID to pronounce a proper judgment.
Page 79 of 119
G.R. No. 159835 | January 21, 2010
THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND

DEPORTATION, Petitioner, vs. JUNG KEUN PARK @ JUNG GEUN PARK @ CHUNG
KEUN PARK, Respondent.
FACTS:
PARK is a South Korean national who came to the Philippines with his family to invest in
various businesses in the country. Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) received a letter
requesting for their assistance in deporting PARK as he was purportedly facing charges of fraud
in Korea for which a warrant for his arrest had been issued by the Korean Police. The letter also
stated the cancellation of Park’s Korean passport. In compliance, BID officials arrested PARK
and deported him to Korea. PARK returned to the Philippines, entering via Zamboanga City
from Malaysia. Believing that he had no valid passport, he was arrested again and through a
Charge Sheet, indicted him for violating Section 37 (a) (7) of C.A. No. 613, as amended. On the
very same date that PARK was indicted, the BID issued a Summary Deportation
Order (SDO) against PARK after finding that he had indeed violated the Immigration Act. Six
months after BID issued the SDO, PARK moved to set it aside. BID denied his motion on the
ground that the SDO had already become final and executory for being filed beyond the 30-day
period. On appeal, CA found PARK’s petition meritorious.
PARK’s contented the following: 1) The charge sheet failed to sufficiently inform him of the
specific grounds for his deportation; and 2) his case should have been heard under the regular
deportation proceedings, not the summary deportation proceedings.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the two issuances by the BID: SDO and Resolution denying PARK’s motion to
set aside SDO are valid.
RULING:
The SC granted the petition. A review of the records show that BID had sufficient factual and
legal basis for the SDO and its Resolution. Non-immigrants are required by law to present
valid passports and visas upon entry into the Philippines. In the case, PARK was indicted for
violating this requirement because when he returned to the Philippines, he used his cancelled
Passport. At the time PARK was indicted, there was no official document repudiating the
Letter. PARK did not present other competent proofs that his Passport had not been cancelled.
In deportation proceedings, the alien bears the burden of proving that he entered the
Philippines lawfully. The SC believed that PARK failed to discharge this burden. The SC also
held that there is no violation of due process when the summary deportation proceedings were
held and when the SDO was issued. The charge sheet contained not just a citation of the
provision of law allegedly violated by PARK, but a statement of the act constituting the
offense. The actual designation of the offense is not material so long as the act constituting the
offense was clearly alleged in the Charge Sheet and sufficient to inform PARK of the specific
ground for his deportation.
The SC disagree with PARK’s claim that his case should be heard under the regular
deportation proceedings where a full hearing is required before the BID's Board of Special
Inquiry. PARK was charged for having a cancelled passport, which theoretically is equivalent
to an expired passport — in either case, the alien does not possess the valid passport required
under Section 10 of the Immigration Act. The BID Office Memorandum Order No. 19 on
Summary Deportation lists aliens with cancelled passports to be covered under Summary
Deportation Proceedings. Thus, PARK's case was properly heard as one for summary
deportation, and a full-blown deportation hearing was not necessary.
The SC noted that deported aliens are generally barred from re-entering the territory of the
deporting state. However, States may, upon proper application, waive previous deportation
orders and allow an alien to re-enter, provided, the re-entry and readmission of the alien do not
pose a risk to the general welfare. In the case, PARK failed to obtain the consent of the
Page 80 of 119
Commissioner of Immigration prior to his re-entry, which allows the latter to charge him with
violation of the provision of the Immigration Act.
Page 81 of 119
G.R. No. 191810 | June 22, 2015
JIMMY T. GO a.k.a. JAIME T. GAISANO, Petitioner, vs.

BUREEAU OF IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION and its COMMISIONERS and
LUIS T. RAMOS, Respondents.
FACTS:
RAMOS initiated a complaint for deportation against GO before the BI claiming that GO
represents himself as a Filipino citizen, but his personal circumstances and relevant records
indicate that he is an alien, being a child of Chinese parents, which is in violation of
Immigration Act. GO countered that he was the son of a Chinese father and Filipina mother,
elected Philippine citizenship, as evidenced by his having taken the Oath of Allegiance and
having executed an Affidavit of Election of Philippine Citizenship. He was also a registered
voter. The Commissioner dismissed the complaint for deportation, but was reversed by the
Board, holding that the election of Philippine citizenship of GO, Sr. was made out of time. A
corresponding Charge Sheet was filed against GO for violation of Section 37 (a)(9), in relation
to Section 45(e) of C.A. No. 613, as amended. GO filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with application for injunctive reliefs before the RTC, seeking to set aside the Resolution of the
Board and the Charge Sheet. He also challenged the jurisdiction of the Board to continue with
the deportation proceedings. In the interim, the Board issued a Decision ordering the
apprehension and deportation of GO. GO filed a supplemental petition to declare the nullity of
the Board’s decision before the RTC. RTC dismissed the petition. Aggrieved, GO questioned
the RTC decision before the CA. CA dismissed the petition.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the evidence presented by GO and his father to prove their claim of Philippine
citizenship is substantial and sufficient to oust the BI of its jurisdiction from continuing with
the deportation proceedings, and resort to judicial action to pass upon the issue of alienage.
RULING:
No. The Bureau of Immigration is the agency that can best determine whether GO violated
certain provisions of C.A. No. 613, as amended. Courts will not interfere in matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of
activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies. By
reason of the special knowledge and expertise of administrative departments over matters
falling within their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon and their
findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded respect, if not finality, by the courts.
It is worthy to note that a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court generally bars
questions of fact. None of the exceptions was present in this case. GO’s Philippine citizenship
claim cannot be settled before the SC. There are factual issues that make his citizenship
controversial; hence, must first be resolved before the BI and not before the Supreme Court,
which is not a trier of facts.
Page 82 of 119
G.R. No. 204105 | October 14, 2015
GERONIMO S. ROSAS, Petitioner vs. DILAUSAN MONTOR and IMRA-ALI M.

SABDULLAH, Respondents.
FACTS:
TAROMSARI and ZIVEH, both Iranian nationals, arrived in the Philippines at the Mactan-
Cebu International Airport (MCIA). Few days after, they left for Japan. Japanese immigration
authorities discovered that TAROMSARI and ZIVEH had counterfeit or tampered Mexican
and Italian passports and used falsified names. An Exclusion Order was issued against
TAROMSARI and ZIVEH on grounds of "Not Properly Documented" and "No Entry Visa."
They were detained and thereafter, brought to MCIA for deportation. Respondents Imra-Ali
Sabdullah and Dilausan S. Montor, employees of the Bureau of Immigration (BI), Cebu, filed a
complaint before the Ombudsman (OMB) against Petitioner Rosas, who was then the Senor
Immigration Officer and Alien Control Officer of Cebu Immigration District Office and
designated as Regional Director, for grave misconduct, violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019, and
conduct prejudicial to the interest of public service. They alleged that Rosas irregularly
handled and disposed of the case involving the two Iranian nationals by allowing them to leave
the country without initiating any proceeding for violation of immigration laws considering
that said aliens were potential threats to the country's national interest and security. It was
further contended that the Iranian nationals should have been charged for deportation because
they violated Section 37 (a) (9), in relation to Sections 45 and 46 of Immigration Act. OMB
ruled against Rosas. Aggrieved, Rosas assailed the OMB’s ruling in the CA, arguing that he
should not be held administratively liable for the release of the 2 Iranian nationals pursuant to a
validly issued exclusion order. CA affirmed the OMB’s ruling.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Rosa’s act of releasing the two Iranian nationals without initiating any case for
violation of immigration laws despite the results of the investigation undertaken constitute
gross misconduct.
RULING:
The SC ruled in the affirmative. In the Philippines, aliens may be expelled or deported from the
Philippines on grounds and in the manner provided for by the Constitution, the Immigration
Act, as amended, and administrative issuances pursuant thereto. The examining immigration
officer determines whether the non-immigrant is qualified to enter the country, and if,
however, an alien possesses any of the disqualifications under Section 29, the immigration
officer is authorized to issue an exclusion order. Having admitted that they knowingly entered
the country with the use of fraudulent passports and false representations, TAROMSARI and
ZIVEH should have been ordered arrested and formally charged with violation of Section 37
(a) (9) in relation to Section 45 (c) and (d). Deportation proceedings should have been initiated
forthwith against these aliens. Petitioner Rosas had the duty under the law to oversee the filing
of criminal actions and deportation proceedings against TAROMSARI and ZIVEH and not
merely excluding them. When he recommended their exclusion, he was already aware that said
Iranian nationals used falsified Mexican and Italian passports in entering and leaving the
Philippines. In failing to initiate the proper proceedings against the Iranian nationals and
allowing them to escape criminal charges and thorough investigation for possible terrorist
activities or human trafficking, petitioner displayed a blatant disregard of established
immigration rules making him liable for grave misconduct that warrants his removal from the
service.
Page 83 of 119
G.R. No. 188829 | June 13, 2016
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. RAUL S. GONZALEZ, IN HIS CAPACITY

AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, HON. ALIPIO F.
FERNANDEZ, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION, HON. ARTHEL B. CAROÑONGAN, HON. TEODORO B.
DELARMENTE, HON. JOSE D. CABOCHAN, AND HON. FRANKLIN Z. LITTAUA, IN
THEIR CAPACITY AS MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, Petitioners, v. DAVONN MAURICE C. HARP,
Respondent.
FACTS:
DAVONN MAURICE HARP was born and raised in the U.S.A to Toiya Harp and Manuel Arce
Gonzalez. While on a visit to the Philippines, he was discovered by basketball talent scouts, and
was eventually drafted to play in the Philippine Basketball Association (PBA). He was invited in
a Senate inquiry which sought to review the processes and requirements involved in the
acquisition and determination of Philippine citizenship in connection with the "influx of bogus
Filipino-American (Fil-Am) or Filipino-foreign (Fil-foreign) basketball players into the PBA and
other basketball associations in the Philippines.” The Senate committees found reason to doubt
the Philippine citizenship of HARP. Acting on the findings of the special committee, the DOJ
Secretary issued a Resolution revoking the recognition accorded to HARP and directed the BI to
undertake summary deportation proceedings against him. Upon receipt of the SDO, HARP filed
a Petition for Review with an application for injunction before the CA to seek the reversal of the
DOJ Resolution and BI SDO. CA granted the petition and set aside the deportation order, stating
that HARP, who was a recognized citizen of the Philippines, could not be summarily
deported; and that his citizenship may only be attacked through a direct action in a proceeding
that would respect his rights as a citizen.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the DOJ is correct in revoking the citizenship recognition accorded to HARP;
and (2) Whether or not the SDO is valid.
RULING:
The SC denied the petition. The DOJ erroneously revoked the recognition accorded to HARP.
The DOJ relied on certain pieces of documentary and testimonial evidence to support its
conclusion that HARP is not a true citizen of the Philippines: (a) the findings of the Senate
committees and the NBI that alterations were made in the Certificate of Live Birth of Manuel;
(b) the discrepancy between the middle initial found in Manuel's birth certificate and that which
appears in HARP’s affidavit of citizenship; (c) the results of the Senate's field investigations of
HARP’s relatives; and (d) a Certification from the Secretary of Barangay Alicia, Bago Bantay,
Quezon City, stating that "Manuel Arce Gonzalez" was not included in the 2002 list of voters in
that barangay. The SC finds these pieces of evidence inadequate to warrant a revocation of the
recognition accorded to HARP. The SC noted that HARP was earlier recognized as a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines on the strength of the documentary evidence he presented. The
evidence relied by the DOJ and the BI is not enough to negate the documentary evidence HARP
presented.
As to the validity of the SDO, it is settled rule that summary deportation proceedings cannot be
instituted by the BI against citizens of the Philippines. Citizens may resort to courts for
protection if their right to live in peace, without molestation from any official or authority, is
disturbed in a deportation proceeding. Since HARP has already been declared and recognized as
a Philippine citizen by the BI and the DOJ, he must be protected from summary deportation
proceedings.
Page 84 of 119
G.R. No. L-22196 | June 30, 1967
ESTEBAN MORANO, CHAN SAU WAH and FU YAN FUN, petitioners-appellants, vs.
HON. MARTINIANO VIVO in his capacity as Acting Commissioner of Immigration,
respondent-appellant.
FACTS:
CHAN SAU WAH, a Chinese citizen born in Fukien, China, arrived in the Philippines in 1961 to
visit her cousin, Samuel Lee Malaps. She left in mainland China two of her children by a first
marriage: Fu Tse Haw and Fu Yan Kai. With her was FU YAN FUN, her minor son also by the
first marriage. CHAN SAU WAH and her minor son FU YAN FUN were permitted entry into
the Philippines under a temporary visitor's visa for two (2) months and after they posted a cash
bond. On 1962, CHAN SAU WAH married ESTEBAN MORANO, a native-born Filipino
citizen, and had child named ESTEBAN MORANO, JR. To prolong their stay in the Philippines,
CHAN SAU WAH and FU YAN FUN obtained several extensions. The Commissioner of
Immigration ordered CHAN SAU WAH and her son, FU YAN FUN, to leave the country with a
warning that upon failure to do so, he will issue a warrant for their arrest and will cause the
confiscation of their bond. Instead of leaving the country, CHAN SAU WAH (with her husband
Esteban Morano) and FU YAN FUN petitioned the CFI for mandamus to compel the
Commissioner of Immigration to cancel her Alien Certificates of Registration; prohibition to stop
the Commissioner from issuing warrants of arrest pending resolution of this case. The trial court
granted the petition. Petitioners and respondent Commissioner both appealed.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Section 37 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1940 is constitutional.
RULING:
Yes. Petitioners argue that Section 37 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1940 came from the
constitutional mandate in Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution, which limits to judges the
authority to issue warrants of arrest and that the legislative delegation of such power to the
Commissioner of Immigration is thus violative of the Bill of Rights. The SC disagrees. Section 1
(3), Article III of the Constitution does not require judicial intervention in the execution of a final
order of deportation issued in accordance with law. The constitutional limitation contemplates an
order of arrest in the exercise of judicial power as a step preliminary or incidental to prosecution
or proceedings for a given offense or administrative action, not as a measure indispensable to
carry out a valid decision by a competent official, such as a legal order of deportation, issued by
the Commissioner of Immigration, in pursuance of a valid legislation. The constitutional
guarantee set forth in Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution, requiring that the issue of
probable cause be determined by a judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings.
Indeed, the power to deport or expel aliens is an attribute of sovereignty. The SC noted that
where aliens are admitted as temporary visitors, "the law is to the effect that temporary visitors
who do not depart upon the expiration of the period of stay granted them are subject to
deportation by the Commissioner of Immigration, for having violated the limitation or
condition under which they were admitted as non-immigrants. In this case, Chan Sau Wah
entered the Philippines on a tourist temporary visitor's visa. She is a non-immigrant.
Page 85 of 119
G.R. No. L-10009 | December 22, 1958
TIU CHUN HAI and GO TAM, Petitioners-Appellees, v. THE COMMISSIONER OF

IMMIGRATION and THE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
Respondents-Appellants.
FACTS:
TIU CHUN HAI and GO TAM (Petitioners) are Chinese citizens who have overstayed their
temporary visitor's permit in the Philippines. In 1955, Commissioner of Immigration issued
warrants for their arrest. The warrants of arrest expressly order that they be brought before the
Commissioner for them to show cause why they should not be deported under the provisions of
the Immigration Act. Petitioners claimed that their continued detention in the Bureau of
Immigration was illegal; that as regards TIU CHUN HAI, no deportation proceedings have yet
been instituted against him, nor any investigation ever conducted to show why he should be
deported. With respect to GO TAM, it was claimed that his temporary permit to stay has not
expired and there is no justification for the denial of the extension of his stay.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the deportation of TIU CHUN HAI and GO TAM on the ground of overstaying
is valid.
RATIO: YES.
Proceedings for the deportation of aliens are not criminal proceedings, and neither do they
follow the rules established in criminal proceedings. Deportation proceedings are summary in
nature and the proceedings prescribed in criminal cases for the protection of an accused are not
present or followed in deportation proceedings. The presence in the Philippines of an
overstaying Chinese is a matter of privilege, and they are not entitled to the same rights and
privileges as resident aliens. The holding of the trial court that the arrest of petitioners is illegal
because no court proceedings have been instituted is, therefore, incorrect. Mejoff and Chirskoff
cases may not, therefore, be cited as precedents binding the decision in this case. In those
cases, there was impossibility of carrying out the deportation because the deportees were not
recognized as citizens of the country to which deportation was attempted. In the case at bar, no
such impossibility occurs; the country of the deportees is not unknown and the existence of the
means of carrying out the deportation is not denied or disputed. There has been a delay in the
deportation because the petitioners had come as temporary visitors in 1947 and 1949.
The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued presence is detrimental
to public welfare is absolute and unqualified. In case of temporary visitors such detriment is
not necessary; it is enough that they have overstayed the period of their permits. The SC
believes neglect or complacency of the government cannot operate as a waiver of this
country’s right or power to effect the deportation. Neither may the loathsomeness of the
country of the deportees under the guise of peaceful negotiation impair such right and power.
Mere courtesy cannot create a right or privilege. Neither can inaction on the part of the host
create such right or privilege, however long such courtesy may have continued.
Page 86 of 119
G.R. No. 536 | January 23, 1902
In the matter of the application of THOMAS TOYE PATTERSON for a writ of habeas
corpus.
FACTS:
In 1091, Act 265 of the Legislative Commission of the Philippines was promulgated. THOMAS
TOYE PATTERSON, a justice of the peace under the Austrian Government had not lost his
official character despite his residence of 10 months in the United States, arrived at the port of
Manila from abroad. He was arrested by the Collector of Customs of the Philippine Archipelago
24 hours after landing, which prompted him to file a petition for the issuance of writ of habeas
corpus. Collector of Customs argued that they arrested PATTERSON on the belief that he was
guilty of some, or all of the offenses specified in Act 265.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the issuance of writ of habeas corpus is proper.
RATIO:
The State, to preserve its integrity and sovereignty, may restrict the admission of foreigners into
its territory, and this right is not affected by existing treaties of commerce and intercourse
between nations. The exercise of this right belongs to the executive branch of the Government
free from interference on the part of the judicial power. Where a statute authorizes an executive
officer to exclude foreigners whom he has reasonable grounds to believe guilty of certain
unlawful acts or purposes, he is the sole and final judge of these facts and cannot be required to
show reasonable grounds for his belief to a court of justice. Moreover, where the foreigner
whose landing is prohibited by statute has actually landed, he remains under the jurisdiction of
the officer charged with the duty of excluding him and he may be reembarked and deported. To
hold that because THOMAS TOYE PATTERSON succeeded in landing when the law forbids
his landing the State thereby lost its right to reembark him and deport him from the territory
would be similar to saying that in case a quarantine law has prohibited the landing of a person
suffering from a contagious disease should such person succeed in landing the State has lost all
right of deporting him and freeing itself from the danger of contagion.
The Court denies the application of THOMAS TOYE PATTERSON for discharge, and he will
be remanded to the custody of the Collector of Customs of the Philippine Archipelago.
Page 87 of 119
G.R. No. L-6157 | July 30, 19101
W. CAMERON FORBES, J. E. HARDING, and C. R. TROWBRIDGE, plaintiffs, vs.

CHUOCO TIACO (alias CHOA TEA) and A. S. CROSSFIELD, defendants.
FACTS:
W. CAMERON FORBES is the Governor-General of the Philippines, while J. E. HARDING

and C. R. TROWBRIDGE are chief of police and chief of the secret service, respectively.
CHUOCO TIACO, on the other hand, is a Chinese citizen. In 1910, TIACO filed a suit in the
CFI against the Plaintiffs alleging that under the orders of FORBES, he was deported from the
Philippines and sent to Amoy, China. Upon returning to the Philippines, he feared that the
Plaintiffs would deport him again, hence, the petition for the issuance of preliminary injunction.
CFI granted the petition and prohibited the Plaintiffs from deporting TIACO. This prompted the
Plaintiffs to file a demurrer and a motion to dissolve the injunction, which the CFI overruled.
The Plaintiffs contended that CFI lacks jurisdiction in the matter since the power to deport
foreign subjects of the Chinese Empire is a primitive one of the Governor-General of the
Philippines.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the courts can take jurisdiction in any case relating to the exercise of the inherent
power of deporting alien, for the purpose of controlling this power vested in the political
department of the government.
RULING:
The government of the United States in the Philippines is a government possessed with "all the
military, civil, and judicial powers necessary to govern the Philippine Islands" and as such has
the power, through its political department, to deport aliens whose presence in the territory is
found to
be injurious to the public good and the domestic tranquility of the people. Deportation or
expulsion is a police measure having for its object the purging of the State of obnoxious
foreigners. It is a sort of national disinfect. The Governor-General, acting in his political and
executive capacity, is invested with plenary power to deport obnoxious aliens whose continued
presence in the territory is found by him to be injurious to the public interest, and in the absence
of express and prescribed rules as to the method of deporting or expelling them, he may use such
methods as his official judgment and good conscience may indicate.
The courts cannot take jurisdiction of cases pertaining to the political and discretionary duties of
the chief executive head of the government, for the purpose of controlling or attempting to
control the latter. In the exercise of those duties the chief executive is alone accountable to his
country in his political character and to his own conscience. For the judiciary to interfere for the
purpose of questioning the manner of exercising the legal, political, inherent duties of the chief
executive head of the government would, in effect, destroy the independence of the departments
of the government and would make all the departments subject to the judicial.
Therefore, the lower court was without jurisdiction to consider the questions presented in this
case. The Court orders the issuance of writ of prohibition directed to Hon. A. S. Crossfield.
Page 88 of 119
G.R. No. 82544 | June 28, 1988
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF: ANDREW

HARVEY, JOHN SHERMAN and ADRIAAN VAN DEL ELSHOUT, petitioners, vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSIONER MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, COMMISSION
ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION, respondent.
FACTS:
ANDREW HARVEY and JOHN SHERMAN are both American nationals, while ADRIAAN
VAN DEL ELSHOUT is a Dutch citizen. They were all residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna. The
case stems from the apprehension of petitioners by agents of the Commission on Immigration
and Deportation (CID) by virtue of Mission Orders issued by Commissioner
Miriam Defensor Santiago. They were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles. Deportation
proceedings were instituted against Petitioners and warrants of arrest were issued for violation
of Sections 37, 45, and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code. HARVEY filed a motion stating that he finally agreed to a self-
deportation and prayed for provisional release before he voluntary departs the country. The
BSI allowed the provisional release but under certain conditions. On the same date that the
motion was filed, petitioners filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Philippine Immigration Act clothed the Commissioner with authority to
arrest and detain petitioners pending determination of the existence of a probable cause leading
to an administrative investigation.
RULING:
Yes. The SC uphold the Commissioner’s official acts and rejected the petitioners’ contentions.
There can be no question that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed
by Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, is available to all persons, including aliens,
whether accused of crime or not. One of the constitutional requirements of a valid search
warrant or warrant of arrest is that it must be based upon probable cause. In this case, the arrest
of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close surveillance for three (3)
months during which period their activities were monitored. The deportation charges instituted
by the Commissioner are in accordance with Section 37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act
of 1940, in relation to Section 69 of the RAC. This provision should be construed in its entirety
in view of the summary and indivisible nature of a deportation proceeding, otherwise, the very
purpose of deportation proceedings would be defeated. Section 37(a) is not constitutionally
proscribed. Deportation proceedings, on the other hand, are administrative in character. An
order of deportation is never construed as a punishment. It is preventive, not a penal process. It
need not be conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Court proceedings.
What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be
arrested and deported, that a fair hearing be conducted with the assistance of counsel, if
desired, and that the charge be substantiated by competent evidence.
Lastly, the denial of the Commissioner of petitioners’ release on bail was in order because in
deportation proceedings, the right to bail is not a matter of right but a matter of discretion on
the part of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation.
Page 89 of 119
G.R. No. 154745 | January 29, 2004
COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, Petitioner,

vs. HERBERT MARKUS EMIL SCHEER, Respondent.
FACTS:
HERBERT MARKUS EMIL SCHEER, a native of Ochsenfurt, Germany, was a frequent visitor
of the Philippines. Later, his application for permanent resident status was granted. Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID) issued in favor of Scheer Alien Certificate of Registration
and Immigration Certificate of Residence. DFA was informed by the German Embassy that
SCHEER was wanted by the German Federal Police and a warrant of arrest had been issued
against him. The Board of Commissioners thereafter issued SDO. Scheer filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the SDO. BOC did not resolve the motion. SCHEER was neither arrested nor
deported. In the meantime, Petitioner Commissioner assumed office. Marine operatives and BID
agents apprehended SCHEER in his residence on orders of the Commissioner. He was held in
custody while awaiting his deportation. Scheer filed with the CA a petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus with a prayer for TRO and writ of preliminary injunction, to enjoin
the Commissioner from proceeding with the SCHEER’s deportation, alleging that his arrest was
premature, unwarranted, and arbitrary. The CA ruled in favor of SCHEER.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not SCHEER’s arrest and detention was premature, unwarranted and arbitrary.
RULING:
The SC agreed that the Immigration Commissioner is mandated to implement a legal and valid
SDO within a reasonable time. But in this case, the arrest of SCHEER in his house, at near
midnight, and his subsequent detention was premature, unwarranted, and arbitrary. Like a
thunderbolt in the sky, the BID agents and marines arrested SCHEER, on orders of the
Commissioner based on the SDO. Under the basic rudiments of fair play and due process, the
Commissioner was required to first resolve SCHEER’s Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the
said Order, which was filed more than six years before the arrest. It may be argued that
SCHEER’s filing of an Urgent MR did not ipso facto suspend the efficacy of the BOC's
deportation order. However, such an argument cannot be sustained in this case. It bears stressing
that more than six years had elapsed, from the time the SDO was issued, until SCHEER was
finally arrested. The BOC should have set SCHEER’s motion for hearing to afford him a chance
to be heard and adduce evidence in support thereon. It was bad enough that the BOC issued its
SDO without a hearing; but BOC also refused to resolve Scheer’s motion before causing his
arrest.
The deportation of an alien is not intended as a punishment or penalty. But in a real sense, it is.
Deportation is a punishment because it requires first, an arrest, a deprivation of liberty and
second, a removal from home, from family, from business, from property. To be forcibly taken
away from home, family, business, and property and sent across the ocean to a distant land is
punishment; and that oftentimes is most severe and cruel. Considering the peculiar backdrop and
the equities in this case, deportation, and the cancellation permanent resident visa as a
precondition to his re-entry into the country is severe and cruel; it is a form of punishment.
Page 90 of 119
G.R. No. L-9621 | January 30, 1957
ANG BENG, ET AL., petitioners-appellants, vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF

IMMIGRATION, respondent-appellee.
FACTS:
Petitioners are both Chinese nationals. They were prosecuted in and convicted by the CFI for
violation of the Import Control Law. They were also charged before the Deportation Board.
While the criminal case is pending in the CA, the Import Control Law expired. The Solicitor
General filed a motion to dismiss which was granted by the appellate court and petitioners were
ordered discharged. However, upon the recommendation of the Deportation Board, the President
issued a corresponding order of deportation. This prompted the petitioners to file a petition for
prohibition and certiorari with the CFI, praying that the President’s order of deportation be
declared illegal and that they be released. CFI dismissed the petition.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the order deporting the petitioners should be set aside, because the law defining
the crime of which they were convicted had already expired, the order of deportation being based
on said conviction.
RULING:
The SC disagreed with the contention of the petitioners that the expiration of the Import Control
Law would erase the stigma of their conviction. The benefit of retroactivity and liberal
construction accrues when penal laws are repealed. There is no subsequent repealing law that
petitioners could mention. The law violated by them expired in virtue of its own force.
Moreover, the order of deportation emanated from a branch of the government which exercises
jurisdiction independent from the judiciary. The President, in the exercise of his executive
prerogative and as an act of State, is vested with full power and discretion to issue orders of
deportation. Such orders do not depend on a prior judicial conviction in a criminal case.
Page 91 of 119
G.R. No. L-21426 | October 22, 1975
ANG NGO CHIONG, SZE SOOK YUEN alias SY SIOK GAN, ANG UN BON and ANG
CHO SIT, the last two herein represented by ANG NGO CHIONG, petitioners-appellees,
vs. EMILIO GALANG, in his capacity as Commissioner of Immigration, respondent-
appellant.
FACTS:
ANG NGO CHIONG, a native of Sin Koe, Chinkiang, China emigrated to the Philippines.
ANG NGO CHIONG's wife and two children visited Philippines as nonimmigrant aliens for a
period of thirty days. Their original period of stay was repeatedly extended. Meanwhile ANG
NGO CHIONG filed a petition for naturalization in the CFI. When the last extension for the
temporary stay of ANG NGO CHIONG 's wife and children expired, the Commissioner
ordered them to leave the Philippines. A petition for prohibition was filed with the CFI to
restrain the Commissioner from arresting ANG NGO CHIONG 's wife and children. The Court
issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining said arrest. Later, ANG NGO CHIONG 's
petition for naturalization was granted and became final, no appeal having been made from the
decision. CFI granted the petition, holding that ANG NGO CHIONG 's wife and children
acquired Philippine citizenship by reason of his naturalization: that Section 37(a) authorizing
the Commissioner to arrest aliens who should be deported is unconstitutional; that the form for
the bond used by ANG NGO CHIONG 's wife and children is illegal, not having been
approved by the Secretary.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Section 37 (a) authorizing the Commissioner to arrest aliens who should be
deported is unconstitutional.
RATIO:
The SC disagreed with the ruling of the lower court on the constitutionality of Section 37(a) of
the Immigration Law. The SC upheld the constitutionality of section 37(a) of the Immigration
Law, which authorizes the Commissioner of Immigration to order the arrest of aliens who
should be deported. Section 1(3), Article III of the 1935 Constitution (now section 3, Article
IV of the new Constitution) does not mean that only judges can issue warrants of arrest. What
it means is that it is the judge who should issue the warrant of arrest where the proceeding is
for the determination of a probable cause in a given case. On the other hand, the Commissioner
of Immigration can issue a warrant of arrest for the execution of a final deportation order. He
cannot issue a warrant of arrest solely for purposes of investigation and before a final order of
deportation is issued.
The lower court’s decision was affirmed insofar as it granted the writ of prohibition on the
ground that SZE SOOK YUEN and her children could be regarded as Philippine citizens if
they had satisfied the conditions laid down in section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law.
Page 92 of 119
G.R. No. L-26969 | December 19, 1984
CARPIO PHUA, TAN SIN TEE, PUA CHING TOO and PUA SHING SHING, the last
two represented by CARPIO PHUA, petitioners-appellees, vs. BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS of the Bureau of Immigration, respondent-appellant.
FACTS:
TAN SIN TEE, wife of CARPIO PHUA (supposed Filipino), and her two minor children, PUA
CHING TOO and PUA SHING SHING, arrived in the Philippines from Hongkong
documented as Filipino citizens and holders of certificates of registration and identity issued by
the Philippine Consulate. Upon their arrival, their admission was referred to a board of special
inquiry of the Bureau of Immigration. After due investigation, the board rendered a decision
admitting TAN SIN TEE and her children as Filipino citizens. The decision of the board of
special inquiry was referred to the Board of Immigration Commissioners. The Commissioners
did not meet as a body and did not deliberate on the said decision. As a result, TAN SIN TEE
and her children were issued identification certificates as Filipino citizens. The Secretary of
Justice directed the Board of Commissioners to review all decisions of the board of special
inquiry. The Commissioners rendered a decision excluding TAN SIN TEE and her children
pursuant to section 29(a)(17) of the Immigration Law. Before the warrant of exclusion could be
carried out, Carpio Phua and his alleged wife and children filed an action for prohibition with
preliminary injunction. The CFI declared the decision of Immigration Commissioners as void.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the CFI erred in declaring the decision of Immigration Commissioners as void.
RULING:
The SC ruled that the trial court erred in holding that the petitioners were denied due process of
law. The Immigration Law does not require notice and hearing for the review by the Board of
Commissioners of the decision of the board of special inquiry. The petitioners were already
heard before the board of special inquiry. That hearing was a sufficient compliance with the
requirements of due process.
The lower court’s decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition is DISMISSED. The
Preliminary Injunction is DISSOLVED.
Page 93 of 119
G.R. No. 113213 | August 15, 1994
PAUL JOSEPH WRIGHT, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE
JOSE DE LA RAMA, RTC, BRANCH 139, MAKATI, M.M. and HON. FRANK DRILON,
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, respondents.
FACTS:
To suppress crimes, Philippines and Australia entered an Extradition Treaty in 1988. The treaty
adopts the “non-list, double criminality approach,” and allows extradition for crimes committed
prior to the treaty's date of effectivity, provided that these crimes were in the statute books of the
requesting State at the time of their commission. Under the Treaty, each contracting State agrees
to extradite "persons wanted for prosecution of the imposition or enforcement of a sentence in
the Requesting State for an extraditable offense.”
PAUL JOSEPH WRIGHT, an Australian Citizen, was sought by Australian authorities for
indictable crimes in his country. Extradition proceedings were filed before the RTC, which
rendered a decision ordering the deportation of WRIGHT. Said decision was sustained by the
Court of Appeals; hence, WRIGHT came to the SC by way of review on certiorari, to set aside
the order of deportation. WRIGHT contends that the provision of the Treaty between Philippines
and Australia, giving retroactive effect to the extradition treaty amounts to an ex post facto law
which violates Section 21 of Article VII of the Constitution. He assails the trial court's decision
ordering his extradition, arguing the evidence adduced in the court below failed to show that he
is wanted for prosecution in his country.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the extradition proceedings instituted by the government against WRIGHT is
valid.
RULING:
Yes. A paramount principle of the law of extradition provides that a State may not surrender any
individual for any offense not included in a treaty of extradition. This principle arises from the
reality of extradition as a derogation of sovereignty. Extradition is an intrusion into the territorial
integrity of the host State and a delimitation of the sovereign power of the State within its own
territory. The act of extraditing amounts to a "delivery by the State of a person accused or
convicted of a crime, to another State within whose territorial jurisdiction, actual or constructive,
it was committed, and which asks for his surrender with a view to execute justice."
Conformably with Article 2, Section 2 of the Treaty, the crimes for which WRIGHT was
charged and for which warrants for his arrest were issued in Australia were undeniably offenses
in the Requesting State at the time they were alleged to have been committed. The trial court
correctly determined that the corresponding offenses under our penal laws are Articles 315(2)
and 183 of the Revised Penal Code on swindling/estafa and false testimony/perjury, respectively.
Thus, the offenses for which WRIGHT is sought by his government are clearly extraditable
under Article 2 of the Treaty. They were offenses in the Requesting State at the time they were
committed, and, irrespective of the time they were committed, they fall under the Extradition
Treaty's provisions, specifically, Article 2, paragraph 4. Moreover, the Treaty’s retroactive
application does not violate the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto law. The concept
of ex post facto law was limited only to penal and criminal statutes. As the CA correctly
concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute.
It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a crime
which offense or crime was already committed or consummated at the time the treaty was
ratified.
Page 94 of 119
G.R. No. 140520 | December 18, 2000
JUSTICE SERAFIN R. CUEVAS, substituted by ARTEMIO G. TUQUERO in his

capacity as Secretary of Justice, Petitioner, vs. JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ, Respondent.
FACTS:
The Philippine Department of Justice (RP-DOJ) received from the HongKong Department of
Justice (HK-DOJ) a request for the provisional arrest of fugitive JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ for
7 counts of accepting an advantage as an agent and 7 counts of conspiracy to defraud, pursuant to
their Extradition Agreement. An Order of Arrest was then issued by the RTC. Upon petition of
MUÑOZ, the CA rendered a decision declaring the Order of Arrest null and void. Thus,
JUSTICE CUEVAS, in his capacity as the Secretary of the DOJ, filed the instant petition.
MUÑOZ, on the other hand, filed an Urgent Motion for Release Pending Appeal, contending
that since Section 20(d) of P.D. No. 1069 sets the maximum period of provisional arrest at
twenty-days, and he has been detained beyond the said period, without both a request for
extradition having been received by the Philippine DOJ and the corresponding petition for
extradition having been filed in the proper RTC, he should be released from detention.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the rule of double criminality applies; and (2) Whether or not the provisional
warrant of arrest issued by the RTC was valid.
RULING:
The issue of whether or not the rule of double criminality applies was not for the CA to decide in
the first place but the trial court in which the petition for extradition is filed. It has the
jurisdiction to determine whether or not the offenses mentioned in the petition are extraditable
based on the application of the dual criminality rule and other conditions mentioned in the
applicable treaty. In this case, the RTC has yet to rule on the extraditability of the offenses for
which MUÑOZ is wanted in Hong Kong. Therefore, MUÑOZ has prematurely raised this issue
before the CA and now, before the SC.
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Order of Arrest. The Court ruled that there was
urgency for the provisional arrest of MUÑOZ considering the possibility of his escape because
of the gravity of the imposable penalty for the crime he committed and the sufficient resources
he has. Also, the fact that the HK-DOJ requested for the extradition of MUÑOZ 12 days after he
was provisionally arrested, the same is well within the custody periods allowed by extradition
laws in provisional arrests. The Court further held that the request for provisional arrest of
MUÑOZ and its accompanying documents are valid despite lack of authentication as the same is
not required. And based on said documents, the issuing judge determined the probable cause for
the Order of Arrest. Too, the extraditee is bereft of right to notice and hearing during the
extradition process to accommodate the more compelling interest of the State to prevent escape.
There is no denial of due process as long as the fundamental fairness is assured a party.
Page 95 of 119
G.R. No. 153675 | April 19, 2007
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION,

represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner, vs. HON. FELIXBERTO
T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ, Respondents.
FACTS:
Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the
Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons," which took effect on June 1997. Thereafter,
Hong Kong reverted back to China. JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ was charged before the Hong
Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of accepting an advantage as agent, and seven
(7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud. Warrant of arrest were issued against him. The
DOJ received from the HK-DOJ a request for the provisional arrest of MUÑOZ. When the DOJ
forwarded the request to the NBI, the latter filed with the RTC an application for the provisional
arrest of MUÑOZ. RTC issued an Order of Arrest. MUÑOZ filed a petition with the CA
questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest. CA declared the Order of Arrest void. In view of
this decision, the DOJ filed a petition for review on certiorari before the SC. The SC granted the
petition and sustained the validity of the Order of Arrest against MUÑOZ. Meanwhile, petitioner
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC a petition for the extradition of
MUÑOZ. Judge FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. granted the application for bail of MUÑOZ.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not a potential extraditee has a right to post bail.
RULING:
Yes. The SC noted the following: 1) that the exercise of the State's power to deprive an
individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in
administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine, have likewise been detained; 2)
to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history.
Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings
only. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the
pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines
under international conventions to uphold human rights. If bail can be granted in deportation
cases, there is no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise,
considering that the UDHR applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be
invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence
or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
Records show that MUÑOZ had been detained for over two years without having been convicted
of any crime. Such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental
right to liberty. In fact, it was the reason why the extradition court granted MUÑOZ to post bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there
is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under
the Constitution. However, there is no showing that Muñoz presented evidence to show that he is
a flight risk.
Page 96 of 119
G.R. No. 207342 | November 7, 2017
GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION,

represented by the PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Petitioner vs. JUAN
ANTONIO MUÑOZ, Respondent.
FACTS:
This case is the third in the trilogy of cases that started with the 2000 case of Cuevas v. Muñoz,
which dealt with JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ' provisional arrest as an extraditee, and the 2007
case of Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia, Jr., which resolved
the question of MUÑOZ' right to bail as a potential extraditee. The DOJ, representing HKSAR,
filed a petition in the RTC for the surrender of MUÑOZ to the HKSAR to face the criminal
charges against him in Hong Kong. RTC granted the request for the extradition of MUÑOZ,
holding that the extradition request sufficiently complied with the RP-HK
Agreement and Presidential Decree No. 1069. In due course, MUÑOZ elevated the adverse
decision to the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC’s conclusion that the crimes of conspiracy to
defraud and accepting an advantage as an agent were extraditable offenses; that not only
was conspiracy to defraud explicitly included in the offenses covered by the RP-HK Agreement,
but also that both crimes satisfied the double criminality rule. MUÑOZ filed a MR. CA amended
its decision by partially granting MUÑOZ’ MR. It concluded that the crime of accepting an
advantage as an agent should be excluded from the charges under which Muñoz would be tried
due to non-compliance with the double criminality rule.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the CA's conclusion that the crime of accepting an advantage as an agent did not
comply with the double criminality rule.
RULING:
Under the double criminality rule, the extraditable offense must be criminal under the laws of
both the requesting and the requested states. This simply means that the requested state comes
under no obligation to surrender the person if its laws do not regard the conduct covered by the
request for extradition as criminal. A perusal of the decision of the RTC and the original decision
of the CA show that said courts determined that the crime of accepting an advantage as an
agent was analogous to the crime of corrupt practices of public officers as defined under
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019. In its assailed amended decision, however, the CA reversed
itself. CA ultimately concluded that the crime of accepting an advantage as an agent did not have
an equivalent in this jurisdiction considering that when the unauthorized giving and receiving of
benefits happened in the private sector, the same was not a crime because there was no law that
defined and punished such act as criminal in this jurisdiction. The SC upheld this conclusion.
Since the offense of accepting an advantage as an agent charged against him in the HKSAR is
one that deals with private sector bribery, the conditions for the application of the double
criminality rule are obviously not met. Accordingly, the crime of accepting an advantage as an
agent must be dropped from the request for extradition. Conformably with the principle of
specialty embodied in Article 17 of the RP-HK Agreement, Muñoz should be proceeded against
only for the seven counts of conspiracy to defraud.
Page 97 of 119
G.R. No. 139465 | January 18, 2000
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge,

Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents.
FACTS:
President Marcos issued PD 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who
Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country." In 1994, Philippines entered an Extradition
Treaty with the US. The US government, through DFA, requested the Philippine Government for
the extradition of MARK B. JIMENEZ to the US. The request was forwarded the following day
by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Department of Justice (DOJ). Pending evaluation of
the extradition documents by the DOJ, JIMENEZ requested for copies of the official extradition
request and all pertinent documents and the holding in abeyance of the proceedings. When his
request was denied for being premature, JIMENEZ resorted to an action
for mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition. The trial court issued an order maintaining and
enjoining the DOJ from conducting further proceedings, hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not notice and hearing are essential during the evaluation of the proceedings, and
JIMENEZ’s entitlement to such, constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippines under
the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
RULING:
Although the Extradition Law does not specifically indicate whether the extradition proceeding
is criminal, civil, or a special proceeding, it nevertheless provides the applicability of the Rules
of Court in the hearing of the petition insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with the
summary nature of the proceedings.
The prospective extraditee under Section 2(c) of PD 1069, faces the threat of arrest, not only
after the extradition petition is filed in court, but even during the evaluation proceeding itself by
virtue of the provisional arrest allowed under the treaty and the implementing law. Thus, the
evaluation process, in essence, partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation making
available certain constitutional rights to the prospective extraditee. The Court noted that there is
a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty regarding the basic due process rights
available to a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of the proceedings. The Court was
constrained to apply the rules of fair play, the due process rights of notice and hearing. Hence,
the Secretary of Justice was ordered to furnish Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its
supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable time within which to file his comment with
supporting evidence.
Page 98 of 119
G.R. No. 139465 | January 18, 2000
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge,

Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents.
FACTS:
When the SC dismissed the petition filed by the Secretary of Justice and order the latter to
furnish MARK B. JIMENEZ copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to
grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence, the
Secretary of Justice filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not MARK B. JIMENEZ is entitled to the due process right to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
RULING:
The SC held that JIMENEZ is not entitled to the right of notice and hearing during the evaluation
stage of the extradition process; that there is no provision in the RP-US Extradition Treaty and
in P.D. No. 1069 giving an extraditee such right; that a court cannot alter, amend or add to a
treaty any clause, upon any motion of equity, or general convenience, or substantial justice; that
the terms of the treaty should be interpreted in the light of their intent; that other countries with
similar extradition treaties with the Philippines have expressed the same interpretation adopted
by the Philippine and US governments; and that an extradition proceeding is sui generis, not a
criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by
the Bill of Rights.
Page 99 of 119
G.R. No. 148571 | September 24, 2002
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Represented by the

Philippine Department of Justice, petitioner, vs. HON. GUILLERMO PURGANAN,
Presiding Judge Regional Trial Court of Manila and MARC JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARCIO
BATACAN CRESPO, respondent.
FACTS:
This Petition is a sequel to the case, Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion. The Secretary was ordered
to furnish MARC JIMENEZ copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to
grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. But,
on motion for reconsideration by the Secretary of Justice, it reversed its decision but held that the
JIMENEZ was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process. The US government, represented by Philippine-DOJ, filed with the RTC a
Petition for Extradition against JIMENEZ. In order to prevent the flight of JIMENEZ, the
Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his "immediate arrest" pursuant to Section 6
of PD 1069. The RTC rendered its decision directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and
fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. After he had surrendered his
passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty. The US
government filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to set aside the order of the lower court.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not JIMENEZ is entitled to Notice and Hearing before the issuance of a Warrant
of Arrest; (2) Whether or not Jimenez is entitled to bail.
RULING:
The SC find the petition meritorious. The SC stated the five postulates of extradition, to wit: 1)
extradition is a major instrument for the suppression of crime; 2) the requesting state will accord
due process to the accused; 3) the proceedings are sui generis; 4) compliance shall be in good
faith; and 5) there is an underlying risk of flight. Moreover, extradition is essentially an
executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising out of the presidential power to conduct foreign
relations and to implement treaties. Thus, the Executive Department of government has broad
discretion in its duty and power of implementation.
As to the first issue, the SC ruled in the negative. Section 6 of PD 1069 uses the word
“immediate” to qualify the arrest of the accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory
by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant. Even Section 2 of Article III of the
Constitution, which is invoked by JIMENEZ, does not require a notice of hearing before the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. The SC agrees with the US government when it argues that
sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for their arrest and setting it for
hearing at some future date would give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute an
escape.
With regard to the second issue, the SC agrees with the US. The constitutional provision on bail
applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal
laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render
judgments of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. However, this presumption is not an issue in
extradition.
Page 100 of 119

G.R. No. 157977 | February 27, 2006
EDUARDO TOLENTINO RODRIGUEZ and IMELDA GENER RODRIGUEZ,

Petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF MANILA – BRANCH 17, GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, and DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Respondents.
FACTS:
US government, through the DOJ, filed a petition for extradition against EDUARDO
TOLENTINO RODRIGUEZ and IMELDA GENER RODRIGUEZ (Petitioners). After their
arrest, petitioners applied for bail which the trial court granted. The US government moved for
reconsideration of the grant of bail, but the motion was denied by the trial court. Unsatisfied, the
US government filed a petition for certiorari with the SC. The SC directed the trial court to
resolve the matter of bail, which shall be subject to whatever ruling that the SC may have in the
similar case of Mark Jimenez entitled Government of the United States of America v. Purganan.
In compliance with the SC directive, the trial court, without prior notice and hearing, cancelled
the cash bond of the petitioners and ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioners filed a
very urgent motion for reconsideration of the cancellation of their bail but the same was denied.
Hence, this present petition.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not prior notice and hearing are required before bail is cancelled.
RULING:
The issue has become moot and academic insofar as Eduardo Rodriguez is concerned. He is
now in the USA facing the charges against him. With regard to his wife, Imelda Rodriguez, the
SC agrees that her bail should be restored. It emphasizes that bail may be granted to a possible
extraditee only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that he will not be a flight risk or a
danger to the community, and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian, and compelling
circumstances. The trial court's immediate cancellation of the bail of petitioners is contrary to
the ruling in Purganan. In Purganan, The SC held also that the grounds used by the highest
court in the requesting state for the grant of bail may be considered, under the principle of
reciprocity. Considering that she has not been shown to be a flight risk nor a danger to the
community, she is entitled to notice and hearing before her bail could be cancelled. Based on
the record, the SC found that absent prior notice and hearing, the bail's cancellation was in
violation of her right to due process.
Page 101 of 119

G.R. No. 163108 | February 23, 2005
GLENN CABALLES y CHUA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. EMMANUEL

D. LAUREA, HON. BENJAMIN T. ANTONIO, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
FACTS:
GLENN CABALLES was charged with rape of a minor in the RTC. CABALLES was detained
because he was charged with a non-bailable offense. Subsequently, CABALLES filed a petition
for bail, which the trial court denied. Then, he filed with the CA a petition for habeas corpus
and/or certiorari and prohibition. The CA issued a Resolution requiring CABALLES to inform
the court of his choice of remedy. He asked the court that his petition be treated as a petition for
habeas corpus without prejudice to the application of certiorari. The CA dismissed his petition
for habeas corpus, stating that it is not the proper remedy.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not CABALLES is entitled to the issuance of the writ.
RULING:
Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for the trial court's
function. It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari, or writ of error. The writ cannot be used
to investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised relating to procedure or on the
merits. The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to the question of whether the
proceedings and the assailed order are, for any reason, null and void. The writ is not ordinarily
granted where the law provides for other remedies in the regular course, and in the
absence of exceptional circumstances. Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted in
advance of trial. The orderly course of trial must be pursued, and the usual remedies exhausted
before resorting to the writ where exceptional circumstances are extant. Habeas corpus is a
summary remedy. It is analogous to a proceeding in rem when instituted for the sole
purpose of having the person of restraint presented before the judge in order that the cause of his
detention may be inquired into and his statements final. A writ of habeas corpus cannot be joined
with the special civil action for certiorari because the two remedies are governed by a different
set of rules.
Records show that CABALLES was charged with rape punishable by reclusion perpetua and was
detained based on the said charge; hence, if the evidence of his guilt is strong, he shall not be
admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. There is no question that the
trial court had jurisdiction over the offense charged and over CABALLES. The jail warden has
the authority and, in fact, is mandated to detain CABALLES until granted bail by the court, or
the case against him dismissed, or until he is acquitted after trial. CABALLES failed to establish
that his incarceration pendente lite was illegal, and likewise failed to establish exceptional
circumstances warranting the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus by the appellate court.
Page 102 of 119

G.R. No. 160922 | February 27, 2006
JEANY-VI G. KIANI, Petitioner, vs. THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION and

DEPORTATION (BID); EDGARDO CABRERA, ELISEO EXCONDE and JOSE VALE,
JR., Respondents.
FACTS:
JAVED KIANI, a British national but a Pakistani by birth, reported to the police that his friends,
Igbal and Balbir Singh, had been forcibly taken by 4 armed men. A couple days later, the
Commissioner of BID issued a Mission Order directing the officers of the Bureau to conduct
verification of the admission status and activities of JAVED KIANI, and, if found to have
violated the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, to immediately place him under
arrest. JAVED KIANI was arrested for presenting a fake Alien Certificate Registration (ACR)
and Immigration Certificate Registration (ICR). A Charge Sheet was filed against him before the
BSI. On the same day, the Board of Commissioners (BOC) conducted a summary proceeding
and issued a SDO revoking the visa issued to him. JEANY-VI G. KIANI, wife of JAVED
KIANI, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of her husband before the RTC. The
RTC issued an Order denying the petition. On appeal, CA dismissed the same.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus before the RC was the proper
remedy of Kiani; (2) Whether or not RTC had no jurisdiction over Kiani’s plea to set aside the
SDO issued by BOC.
RULING:
The SC ruled that the CA acted in accord with jurisprudence when it affirmed the assailed
Order of the RTC dismissing the Petition for Habeas Corpus. As the Court held in Caballes vs.
CA, habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for the trial
court's function. It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari, or writ of error. The writ cannot be
used to investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised relating to procedure or
on the merits. The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to the question of whether
the proceedings and the assailed order are, for any reason, null and void. The writ is not
ordinarily granted where the law provides for other remedies in the regular course, and in the
absence of exceptional circumstances. In this case, when KIANI filed her Petition for Habeas
Corpus with the RTC in behalf of her husband, a Charge Sheet had already been filed against
him for violation of Section 37(a)(7) and Section 45 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940,
as amended. The filing of the Charge Sheet before the BSI cured whatever irregularities or
infirmities were attendant to his arrest. The remedy of KIANI was to file a motion for the
dismissal of the Charge Sheet and the Mission Order of the Immigration Commissioner, not a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus before the RTC.
The RTC had no jurisdiction over petitioner’s plea to set aside the SDO issued by BOC against
her husband, JAVED KIANI since the Immigration Commissioner is vested with authority to
deport aliens. Thus, an aggrieved party by a Deportation Order is proscribed from assailing said
Order in the RTC even via a petition for habeas corpus. The party may a Motion for
Reconsideration thereof before the BOC. In case of denial, the aggrieved party may appeal to the
Secretary of Justice, and if the latter denies the appeal, to the Office of the President.
Page 103 of 119

A.M. No. RTJ-99-1510 | November 6, 2000
COMMISSIONER RUFUS B. RODRIGUEZ, complainant, vs. JUDGE RODOLFO R.

BONIFACIO, RTC, Branch 151, Pasig City, respondent.
FACTS:
Ma Jing was one of the 20 Chinese nationals with no valid employment documents, who were
apprehended. Confined at the Bureau of Immigration (BI) Detention Center, she filed a petition
for habeas corpus with the RTC. The same was granted by the respondent JUDGE RODOLFO
R. BONIFACIO. The BI submitted a Return of the Writ alleging that a Charge Sheet was filed
against Ma Jing for violation of Sec. 37(a)[7] of the Phil. Immigration Act No. 1940, as
amended. However, JUDGE BONIFACIO issued an Order for the immediate release of Ma Jing
to which the BI filed a motion for reconsideration the very next day. As the BI did not release
Ma Jing pursuant to the Order, Ma Jing filed a Motion to Declare BI COMMISSIONER
RUFUS RODRIGUEZ and his co-respondents guilty of contempt. JUDGE BONIFACIO denied
the MR filed by the BI and reiterated its Order to immediately release Ma Jing. On the same day,
however, the BI also issued a SDO to Ma Jing. The BI filed a Notice of Appeal to the CA. In the
meantime, COMMISSIONER RODRIGUEZ and his co-respondents were found guilty of
indirect contempt for non-compliance of the Court Order, they were arrested and detained.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not a Petition for Habeas Corpus may lie despite the pending of a deportation case.
RULING:
No. The return of the Writ of Habeas Corpus stated that there was already a Charge Sheet filed
against Ma Jing. Hence, it was grievous error for respondent judge to give due course to the
petition for habeas corpus despite the pending deportation case against Ma Jing. Where the BID
had not yet completed its hearing and investigation proceedings with respect to an alien and there
is no showing that it is unduly delaying its decision, habeas corpus proceedings are premature
and should be dismissed.
Judge Rodolfo R. Bonifacio was suspended from the service for three (3) months, without pay,
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar infraction shall be dealt with more
severely.
Page 104 of 119

G.R. No. 139255 | November 24, 2003
RAYMOND MICHAEL JACKSON, petitioner, vs. HON. FLORITO S. MACALINO,

RUFUS B. RODRIGUEZ, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, JOHN DOE and JANE DOE,
respondents.
FACTS:
SPO3 Rodolfo M. Villaceran of the PNP, filed two applications for the issuance of a search
warrant with the RTC against petitioner Raymond M. Jackson, an American citizen, a.k.a. Allen
Miller, and Jaime C. Bueta for violation of Article 176 of the RPC. The RTC granted the
application and issued the Search Warrants. The search was conducted on the said date; articles
were seized and the petitioner and Bueta were apprehended and detained. The US Embassy
advised the DOJ that the passports seized had been cancelled. Summary deportation proceedings
were initiated against Jackson. Subsequently, BOC issued an Order ordering for Jackson’s
summary deportation to his country of origin. Thereafter, Jackson filed a petition for habeas
corpus, which the RTC denied.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the writ of habeas corpus should be granted.
RULING:
No. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the ultimate purpose of the writ
of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint. It is essentially a writ of inquiry
and is granted to test the right under which he is detained. Section 4, Rule 102 of the said Rules
provides when the writ of habeas corpus is not allowed or discharged authorized if it appears
that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process
issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the
court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment; or make the order, the
writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall
not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor
shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or
convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment. The term "court" includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the
Bureau of Immigration.
Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release or discharge from
custody. What is to be inquired into is the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing
of the application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal,
it may, by reason of same supervening events such as the instances mentioned in Section 4, Rule
102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Any such supervening events
are the issuance of a judicial process preventing the discharge of the detained person.
Page 105 of 119

A.M. NO. RTJ-06-2018 | August 3, 2007
(Formerly Adm. Matter OCA-IPI No. 05-2360-RTJ)
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, complainant, vs. JUDGE ANTONIO I. DE

CASTRO Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Manila, respondent.
FACTS:
Gao Yuan is a Chinese national and holder of a special non-immigrant visa to the Philippines and
an immigrant visa to Canada. She was arrested by virtue of an order issued by the BI, which, in
turn, was a response to a letter from the Consul General of China which alleged that Gao Yuan
was a fugitive from justice and charged with embezzlement by Chinese police and requested her
arrest and deportation to China. James Mahshi, her husband, filed before the RTC a petition for
the writ of habeas corpus. Meanwhile, Gao Yuan’s passport was cancelled, and her summary
deportation was already ordered for being an undocumented and undesirable alien. JUDGE DE
CASTRO issued an order temporarily restraining the deportation of Gao Yuan for 17 days. The
OSG alleges that the order was in blatant disregard of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court on habeas corpus, and prevailing
jurisprudence thereon. The OSG filed an administrative complaint against DE CASTRO for (a)
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment; (b) grossly disregarding the law and prevailing
jurisprudence; and (c) dishonesty and abuse of authority.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus proper.
RULING:
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule
102 of the Revised Rules of Court. The objective of the writ is to determine
whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is
to be inquired into is the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application
for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by
reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Sec. 4 of Rule 102, be no
longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Thus, once a person detained is duly
charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through a petition for issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest
duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released
had been charged before any court. The term "court" includes quasi-judicial bodies or
governmental agencies authorized to order the person's confinement, like the Deportation Board
of the Bureau of Immigration. When the petition was filed by James Mahshi, a charge sheet and
deportation order had already been filed against Gao Yuan. By then, the restraint of Gao Yuan's
liberty was already by virtue of a lawful process. Clearly, the RTC no longer had jurisdiction
over the petition for habeas corpus and it was error for Judge De Castro to order Gao Yuan's
release upon the filing of a cash bond and take full responsibility for the release and
custody of Gao Yuan. The Judge’s acts also disregarded the rule on burden of proof after the writ
has been returned. If the detention is by reason of or in pursuance of law, the return is
considered prima facie evidence of the validity of the restraint and the petitioner therein
has the burden of proof to show that the restraint is illegal. The provisional or temporary
release of Gao Yuan also effectively granted the petition for habeas corpus insofar
as the discharge of the detainee is concerned, since the main prayer in a petition for habeas
corpus relates to the release or discharge of the detainee.
Page 106 of 119

G.R. No. 182161 | December 3, 2009
Reverend Father ROBERT P. REYES, Petitioner, vs. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his

capacity as the secretary of the COURT OF APPEALS, secretary DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, AND COMMISSIONER MARCELINO C. LIBANAN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, Respondents.
FACTS:
ROBERT P. REYES was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege. Upon the
request of the DILG, the DOJ issued Hold Departure Order against REYES in the interest of
national security and public safety. REYES was charged with the crime of Rebellion under
Article 134 of the RPC. The RTC dismissed the charge for lack of probable cause. In view
thereof, REYES requested for the lifting of the HDO, which remain unheeded. REYES filed a
Petition for the Writ of Amparo, arguing that he was held by BID officials at the NAIA as his
name is included in the Hold Departure List; that it had been for the timely intervention of his
counsel, he would not have been able to take his flight to Hong Kong; that when fly back to the
Philippines, he was detained and interrogated by the BID officers; and that immediate recourse
to the SC for the availment of the writ is exigent as the continued restraint on REYES’ right to
travel is illegal. The CA dismissed the petition and denying the privilege of the writ of amparo.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not REYES’ right to liberty has been violated or threatened with violation by the
issuance of the HDO, which would entitle him to the privilege of the writ of amparo.
RULING:
The petition must fail. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides that petition for a
writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
Here, REYES invokes this extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo for the protection of his
right to travel. He insists that he is entitled to the protection covered by the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo because the HDO is a continuing actual restraint on his right to travel. However, the SC
did not agree. Writ of Amparo only covers the right to life, liberty, and security. The restriction
on REYES’ right tot travel is not unlawful. He also failed to establish that his right to travel was
impaired in the manner that it amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty, and
security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy. The SC found the
direct recourse to them inappropriate. REYES should have filed with the RTC a motion to lift
HDO.
Page 107 of 119

G.R. No. 210759 | June 23, 2015
CHAIRPERSON SIEGFRED B. MISON, in his capacity as Chairperson1 of Bureau of

Immigration and Deportation, Petitioner, vs. HON. PAULINO Q. GALLEGOS, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court-Manila, Branch 47 and JA
HOON KU, Respondents.
G.R. No. 211403
CHAIRPERSON SIEGFRED B. MISON, as the Chairperson of Bureau of Immigration

and Deportation, Petitioner, vs. HON. PAULINO Q. GALLEGOS, as Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court-Manila, Branch 47 and JAHOONKU, Respondents.
G.R. No. 211590
CHAIRPERSON SIEGFRED B. MISON, in his capacity as the Chairperson of Bureau of

Immigration and Deportation, Petitioner, vs. JA HOON KU, Respondent.
FACTS:
This case consisted of three consolidated petitions assailing the Orders as well as the
Resolution issued by respondent Judge PAULINO Q. GALLEGOS. Interpol of Seoul,
Republic of Korea sent a notice to Interpol Manila requesting assistance in the location and
deportation of respondent JA HOON KU for arbitrarily spending money allotted as reserve
fund of Phildip Korea Co., Ltd. Consequently, the Korean Embassy wrote a Letter-Request to
petitioner Mison, Chairperson of the Bureau of Immigration (BI), for the immediate arrest and
deportation of KU to Korea for being an undesirable alien. Meanwhile, KU’s visa expired. BI-
BOC issued SDO and KU was detained. Korea voided KU’s passport. KU filed a Petition for
the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo. Judge GALLEGOS granted the privilege of the writ of
amparo.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the privilege of the writ of amparo was properly granted in the case at bar.
RULING:
The SC ruled in the negative. Amparo Rule was promulgated "in light of the prevalence of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances." "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed
without due process of law.” On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by
the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government
official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect
acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of
the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such
persons outside the protection of law." In view thereof, the SC ruled that KU's circumstance
does not come under the statutory definition of an enforced or involuntary disappearance.
Indeed, KU was arrested by agents of the BI, but there was no refusal on the part of the BI to
acknowledge such arrest nor was there any refusal to give information on the whereabouts of
KU. Neither can it be said that the BI had any intention to remove KU from the protection of
the law for a prolonged time.
Amparo Rule requires the parties to establish their claims by substantial evidence. Other than
making unfounded claims, however, KU was not able to present evidence that he was exposed
to "life-threatening situations" while confined at the BI Detention Center. On the contrary, the
records show that he is afforded visitorial rights and that he has access to his counsel.
Moreover, his primary fear, which prompted him to file the amparo petition, was that the BI
would trump up charges against him to justify his detention. The fact remains, however, that
even before his arrest, deportation charges against him were already duly filed and ruled upon
by the BI. RTC's grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo was improper in this case as KU
and his whereabouts were never concealed, and as the alleged threats to his life, liberty and
security were unfounded and unsubstantiated.
Page 108 of 119

G.R. No. 230324 | September 19, 2017
LORIE MARIE TOMAS CALLO, Petitioner vs. COMMISSIONER JAIME H.

MORENTE, BUREAUS OF IMMIGRATION, OIC ASSOCIATES COMMISSIONERS
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION and BRIAN ALAS, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION,
Respondents.
FACTS:
Danielle Tan Parker, also known as Danielle Nopuente, is a holder of Philippine Passport. Parker
was charged for deportation for being an undesirable, undocumented, and overstaying alien, in
violation of Section 37 (a) (7) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. It was
alleged that Danielle was a fugitive from justice in the USA with an outstanding arrest warrant
issued against her. A SDO was issued against Danielle, and she was arrested by the BI. Danielle
filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus before the RTC. The BI was able to produce the body of
Danielle before the RTC. RTC dismissed the petition. Danielle then appealed to the CA. The CA
affirmed the RTC decision. LORIE MARIE TOMAS CALLO filed a petition for a writ of
amparo arguing that Danielle is a natural-born Filipino citizen and thus, there is no reason for her
to be detained by the BI.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the right to life, liberty, and security of Parker is threatened by the respondents to
warrant the issuance of the writ of amparo.
RULING:
The petition has no merit. The SC disagree with CALLO’s arguments. The protective writ
of amparo is a judicial remedy to expeditiously provide relief to violations of a person's
constitutional right to life, liberty, and security, and more specifically, to address the problem of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. RA 9851 provides for the
elements constituting enforced disappearances, to wit: (a) that there be an arrest, detention,
abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty; (b) that it be carried out by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization; (c) that it be
followed by the State or political organization's refusal to acknowledge or give information on
the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and, (d) that the intention
for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period
of time.
The elements of enforced disappearance are not attendant in this case. There is also no threat of
such enforced disappearance. While there is indeed a detention carried out by the State through
the BI, the third and fourth elements are not present. There is no refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of freedom or refusal to give information on the whereabouts of Danielle because as
CALLO admits, Danielle is detained in the Immigration Detention Facility of the BI. The BI also
does not deny this. In fact, the BI had produced the body of Parker before the RTC in the
proceedings for the writ of habeas corpus previously initiated by Danielle herself. Similarly,
there is no intention to remove Danielle from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of
time. As the BI explained, Parker has a pending criminal case against her in Davao City, which
prevents the BI from deporting her from the country. The SC see no forced or involuntary
disappearance, or any threats thereof, that would warrant the issuance of the writ of amparo.
Page 109 of 119

G.R. No. L-4254 | September 26, 1951
BORIS MEJOFF, petitioner, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.
FACTS:
This is a second petition for habeas corpus by BORIS MEJOFF, the first having been denied by
the SC. MEJOFF is an alien of Russian descent who was brought to this country from Shanghai
as a secret operative by the Japanese forces during the latter's regime in the Philippines. He was
arrested by the American army and handed to the Commonwealth government. He was later
release but was found to have no travel documents by the Deportation Board. Immigration
authority declared him as illegal and ordered for his deportation, but they failed to ship him since
no vessel wanted to take him for lack of authority. Since then, MEJOFF was under detention
while the Immigration arranged for his departure. MEJOFF filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not MEJOFF should be release from detention pending deportation.
RULING:
The SC held the MEJOFF’s temporary is a necessary step in the process of exclusion or
expulsion of undesirable aliens and that pending arrangements for his deportation. However, two
years had elapsed since the first decision was promulgated, and the government has not found
ways and means of removing MEJOFF out of the country.
A foreign national, not enemy, against whom no criminal charges have been formally made ore
judicial order issued, may not indefinitely be kept in detention. He also has the right to life and
liberty and all other fundamental rights as applied to human beings, as proclaimed in the
"Universal Declaration of Human Rights" approved by the General Assembly of the United
Nations, which the Philippines is a member. The theory on which the court is given power to act
is that the warrant for his deportation, which was not executed, is functus officio and the alien is
being held without any authority of law. The possibility that he might join or aid disloyal
elements if turned out at large does not justify prolonged detention, the remedy in that case being
to impose conditions in the order of release and exact bail in a reasonable amount with sufficient
sureties.
A writ should be issued commanding the BI to release MEJOFF from custody, provided that
MEJOFF shall be place under surveillance of the BI or its agent in a manner as may be deemed
adequate, to ensure that he keeps peace and be available when the government is ready to deport
him. He shall also put up a bond for the above purpose with sufficient surety or sureties, which
bond the Commissioner of Immigration is authorized to exact by section 40 of Commonwealth
Act No. 613.
Page 110 of 119

G.R. No. L-3802 | October 26, 1951
VADIM N. CHIRSKOFF, petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION and

DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondents.
FACTS:
VADIM N. CHIRSKOFF entered the Philippines with a passport duly visaed by the United
States Consul in Shanghai, for the purpose of making repairs on and taking delivery of certain
vessels purchased by or on behalf of the Java China Trading Co., Ltd. After repairing the vessel,
CHIRSKOFF remained in the Philippines. He was arrested by order of the Commissioner of
Immigration, charged with aiding, helping, and promoting "the final objective of the
Hukbalahaps to overthrow the Government." The Deportation Board ordered for CHIRSKOFF’s
deportation to Russia, for failing to depart from the Philippines upon the expiration of his
temporary stay. No formal charges for giving aid to Hukbalahaps have ever been filed. However,
immigration authorities were unable to carry out the deportation order. This is a second petition
for habeas corpus by VADIM N. CHIRSKOFF, the first petition having been dismissed.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not CHIRSKOFF should be release from detention pending deportation.
RATIO:
Similar to the case of Mejoff, the SC granted CHIRSKOFF’s petition since the denial of the first
petition, a period of over two years had elapsed without CHIRSKOFF having been deported and
the prospects of removing them were not in sight. The SC reiterated its decision in Mejoff that
foreign nationals, not enemy, against whom no criminal charges have been formally made or
judicial order issued, may not indefinitely be kept in detention; that in the "Universal Declaration
of Human Rights" approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations of which the
Philippines is a member, the right to life and liberty and all other fundamental rights as applied to
human beings were proclaimed; that the theory on which the court is given power to act is that
the warrant of deportation, not having been able to be executed, is functus officio and the alien is
being held without any authority of law; that the possibility that the petitioners might join or aid
disloyal elements if turned out at large does not justify prolonged detention, the remedy in that
case being to impose conditions in the order of release and exact bail in reasonable amount with
sufficient sureties.
The SC ordered that the writ issue commanding the BI to release CHIRSKOFF from custody
upon these terms: CHIRSKOFF shall be placed under the surveillance of the immigration
authorities or their agents in such form and manner as may be deemed adequate to insure that he
keep peace and be available when the Government is ready to deport him. The surveillance shall
be reasonable. CHIRSKOFF shall also put up a bond for the above purpose with sufficient surety
or sureties, which bond the Commissioner of Immigration is authorized to exact by section 40
of Commonwealth Act No. 613.
Page 111 of 119

A.C. No. 11043 | March 8, 2017
LIANG FUJI, Complainant vs ATTY. GEMMA ARMI M. DELA CRUZ, Respondent.
FACTS:
LIANG FUJI, a Chinese national, was ordered deported for overstaying. Special Prosecutor
GEMMA ARMI M. DELA CRUZ found that FUJI had overstayed for one (1) year and six (6)
months in violation of Commonwealth Act No. 613, Section 37 (a) (7). FUJI was arrested and
detained at the BI Detention Facility. The Board of Commissioners dismissed the deportation
charge against FUJI on the ground that he had a valid working visa. FUJI was directed to be
released. FUJI and his family filed an administrative complaint against Special Prosecutor
DELA CRUZ for gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law in relation to her issuance of
a Charge Sheet against FUJI for overstaying. FUJI alleged that his rights to due process were
violated since he was not afforded any hearing or summary deportation proceedings before the
deportation order was issued against him. FUJI further alleged that Special Prosecutor
DELA CRUZ failed miserably in discharging her duties because a simple initial review of the BI
records would have revealed that he was not overstaying because his work visa was valid.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Special Prosecutor DELA CRUZ is administratively liable for gross misconduct
and gross ignorance of the law in relation to her issuance of a Charge Sheet against FUJI for
overstaying.
RULING:
Yes. The Court find Special Prosecutor DELA CRUZ administratively liable for her negligence
in her failure to ascertain the facts before levying the formal charge against FUJI for overstaying.
In this case, Special Prosecutor DELA CRUZ issued the formal charge against FUJI for
overstaying. However, nowhere in the Memorandum was it stated that Fuji “overstayed” or that
“Liang’s working vis expired.” Atty. DELA CRUZ failed in the performance of her basic duties.
Special prosecutors in the Bureau of Immigration should exercise such degree of vigilance and
attention in reviewing the immigration records, whenever the legal status and documentation of
an alien are at issue. For while a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a
criminal action, it is however, a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the
freedom and liberty of a person. Atty. DELA CRUZ was expected to be reasonably thorough in
her review of the documents transmitted to her by the BI-MIS, especially as it may ultimately
result in the deprivation of liberty of the prospective deportee. She should not have simply relied
on the handwritten note by personnel from the BI-MIS at the bottom portion of the receipt for 9A
visa extension. Had she inquired further, she would have discovered that FUJI's application for
conversion from temporary visitor visa (9A) to work visa (9G) was approved by the Board of
Commissioners, one (1) year and seven (7) months earlier. Thus, even if FUJI's temporary visitor
(9A) visa had expired, his stay in the country was still valid under the 9G work visa. Generally, a
lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for
misconduct in the discharge of her duties as a government official. However, if said misconduct
as a government official also constitutes a violation of her oath as a lawyer and the Code of
Professional Responsibility, then she may be subject to disciplinary sanction by this Court.
Page 112 of 119

G.R. No. 199034
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Petitioner, v. Hon. LEILA M. DE LIMA, in her

capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice and RICARDO A. DAVID, JR., in
his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration, Respondents.
G.R. No. 199046
JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO, Petitioner, v. Hon. LEILA M. DE LIMA, in her capacity

as Secretary, Department of Justice, RICARDO V. PARAS III, in his capacity as Chief
State Counsel, Department of Justice and RICARDO A. DAVID, JR., in his capacity as
Commissioner, Bureau of Immigration, Respondents.
FACTS:
The DOJ issued a circular prescribing rules and regulations governing the issuance of Hold
Departure Orders. After the expiration of GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO’s term as
President of the Philippines and her subsequent election as Pampanga representative,
criminal complaints were filed against her before the DOJ. In view of the complaints,
LEILA M. DE LIMA issued DOJ Watchlist Orders (WLO) against ARROYO. She also
ordered for the inclusion of ARROYO’s name in the BI watchlist. ARROYO requested for
the issuance of ADO so that she may be able to seek medical attention from medical
specialists abroad for her hypoparathyroidism and metabolic bone mineral disorder. She
likewise undertook to return to the Philippines, once her treatment abroad is completed, and
participate in the proceedings before the DOJ. Before the resolution of the application for
ADO, ARROYO filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of
a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction to annul and set aside DOJ Circular No. 41 and
WLOs issued against her for allegedly being unconstitutional. Meanwhile, DE LIMA denied
the application for ADO. Thereafter, the SC issued a TRO. However, DE LIMA failed to
comply with it.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the DOJ Circular No. 41 and the WLOs are constitutional.
RULING:
The issuance of DOJ Circular No. 41 has no legal basis. To begin with, there is no law
particularly providing for the authority of the secretary of justice to curtail the exercise of the
right to travel, in the interest of national security, public safety or public health. As it is, the
only ground of the De Lima in restraining Arroyo, at that time, was the pendency of the
preliminary investigation of the Joint DOJ-COMELEC Preliminary Investigation Committee
on the complaint for electoral sabotage against her. DOJ Circular No. 41 is not a law. It is
not a legislative enactment which underwent the scrutiny and concurrence of lawmakers and
submitted to the President for approval. It is a mere administrative issuance apparently
designed to carry out the provisions of an enabling law which the former DOJ Secretary
believed to be Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292, otherwise known as the "Administrative
Code of 1987." Upon examination of the provisions of the said Code, it did not particularly
vest the DOJ the authority to issue DOJ Circular No. 41 which effectively restricts the right
to travel through the issuance of WLOs and HDOs. The questioned circular does not come
under the inherent power of the executive department to adopt rules and regulations as
clearly the issuance of HDO and WLO is not the DOJ's business.
Page 113 of 119

A.M. No. P-11-2927 | December 13, 2011
[Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 10-3532-P]
LEAVE DIVISION, OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES-Office of the Court

Administrator (OCA), Complainant, vs. WILMA SALVACION P. HEUSDENS, Clerk IV
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Tagum City, Respondent.
FACTS:
The Employees Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services, Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), received WILMA SALVACION P. HEUSDENS’ leave application for
foreign travel. HEUSDENS left for abroad without waiting for the result of her application. It
turned out that no travel authority was issued in her favor because she was not cleared of all her
accountabilities. HEUSDENS reported back to work. OCA recommended the disapproval of
HEUSDENS’ leave application, which Chief Justice Puno approved. HEUSDENS, in a letter,
explained that she emailed her leave application which was approved by her superior. OCA
found HEUSDENS to have violated OCA Circular No. 49-2003 for failing to secure the approval
of her application for travel authority. OCA recommended that an administrative complaint be
filed against HEUSDENS.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not OCA Circular No. 49-2003 (B) is constitutional.
RULING:
Yes. It has been argued that OCA Circular No. 49-2003 (B) on vacation leave to be spent abroad
unduly restricts a citizen’s right to travel guaranteed by Section 6, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. However, it is not the issue in this case. The only issue in this case is the non-
compliance with the Court’s rules and regulations. It should be noted that HEUSDENS did not
raise any constitutional concerns. In fact, she was apologetic and openly admitted that she went
abroad without the required travel authority. Nonetheless, granting that it is an issue, the exercise
of one’s right to travel or the freedom to move from one place to another, as assured by the
Constitution, is not absolute. There are constitutional, statutory, and inherent limitations
regulating the right to travel.
The fact that the Supreme Court has administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel
thereof, it has the authority to promulgate its own rules and regulations on foreign travels. Thus,
the Court came out with OCA Circular No. 49-2003 (B). A court employee who plans to travel
abroad must file his leave application prior to his intended date of travel with sufficient time
allotted for his application to be processed and approved first by the Court. He cannot leave the
country without his application being approved, much less assume that his leave application
would be favorably acted upon. In the case at bench, HEUSDENS should have exercised
prudence and asked for the status of her leave application before leaving for abroad.
HEUSDENS was admonished for traveling abroad without any travel authority in violation of
OCA Circular No. 49-2003, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense would
be dealt with more severely.
Page 114 of 119

A.M. No. MTJ-10-1770 | July 18, 2012
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 10-2255-MTJ)
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES-OFFICE OF THE COURT

ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, vs. JUDGE IGNACIO B. MACARINE, Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Gen. Luna, Surigao del Norte, Respondent.
FACTS:
Judge IGNACIO B. MACARINE wrote to the Court Administrator requesting for authority to
travel to Hongkong with his family where he would celebrate his 65th birthday. He stated that
his travel abroad shall be charged to his annual forced leave. However, he did not submit the
corresponding application for leave. For his failure to submit the complete requirements, his
request for authority to travel remained unacted upon. Judge MACARINE proceeded with his
travel abroad without the required travel authority from the OCA. OCA filed an administrative
case against Judge MACARINE for violation of OCA Circular No. 49-2003. OCA found Judge
MACARINE guilty of violation of OCA Circular No. 49-2003.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not of OCA Circular No. 49-2003 is violative of the constitutional right to travel.
RULING:
The right to travel is guaranteed by the Constitution. However, the exercise of such right is not
absolute. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution allows restrictions on one’s right to
travel provided that such restriction is in the interest of national security, public safety or public
health as may be provided by law. This, however, should by no means be construed as limiting
the Court’s inherent power of administrative supervision over lower courts. OCA Circular No.
49-2003 does not restrict but merely regulates, by providing guidelines to be complied by judges
and court personnel before they can go on leave to travel abroad. To "restrict" is to restrain or
prohibit a person from doing something; to "regulate" is to govern or direct according to rule.
Judge IGNACIO B. MACARINE is given the admonition that he acted irresponsibly when he
opted not to immediately secure a travel authority and is saved only from the full force that his
violation carries by the attendant mitigating circumstances. He is also warned that the
commission of a similar violation in the future will merit a more severe penalty. The
recommendation of the Office of the Court Administration that his absences, which were
unauthorized, shall not be deducted from his leave credits but from his salary is approved.
Page 115 of 119

G.R. No. L-6038 | March 19, 1955
FEDERICO M. CHUA HIONG, petitioner, vs. THE DEPORTATION BOARD,

respondent.
FACTS:
Proceedings were instituted before the Deportation Board against the petitioner, FEDERICO
M. CHUA HIONG, who is alleged to have secured the cancellation of his alien certificate of
registration with the BI, through fraud and misrepresentation, and to have maliciously and
illegally exercised privileges and rights belonging to citizens of the Philippines, such as the
right of suffrage, the acquisition of real estate and lumber concessions, knowing that he is a
Chinese national. Upon the institution of the proceedings, a warrant for his arrest was issued,
and a deportation proceeding was initiated. He filed a bond for his release and thereafter
petitioned said Deportation Board for the dismissal of the proceedings against him. The motion
to quash was denied by the Deportation Board.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the deportation proceeding shall proceed.
RULING:
There is no question that as the power to deport is limited to aliens only, the alienage of the
Federico in deportation proceedings is a basic and fundamental fact upon which the jurisdiction
of the Deportation Board depends. If the alienage of Federico is not denied, the Board's
jurisdiction and its proceedings are unassailable; if Federico is admittedly a citizen; or
conclusively shown to be such, the Board lacks jurisdiction and its proceedings are null and
void ab initio and may be summarily enjoined in the courts. Naturally the Board must have the
power, in the first instance, to determine the respondent's nationality. And Federico must
present evidence of his claim of citizenship before the Board and may not reserve it before the
courts alone in a subsequent action of habeas corpus. It must quash the proceedings if it is
satisfied that respondent is a citizen and continue it if it finds that he is not, even if Federico
claims citizenship and denies alienage. Its jurisdiction is not divested by the mere claim of
citizenship.
There is also no question that a respondent who claims to be a citizen and not therefore subject
to deportation has the right to have his citizenship reviewed by the courts, after
the deportation proceedings. When the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his
citizenship, the right to immediate review should also be recognized and the courts should
promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings. A citizen is entitled to live in peace, without
molestation from any official or authority, and if he is disturbed by a deportation proceeding,
he has the unquestionable right to resort to the courts for his protection, either by a writ of
habeas corpus or of prohibition, on the legal ground that the Board lacks jurisdiction. If he is a
citizen and evidence thereof is satisfactory, there is no sense nor justice in allowing
the deportation proceedings to continue, granting him the remedy only after the Board has
finished its investigation of his undesirability. The legal basis of the prohibition is the absence
of the jurisdictional fact, alienage.
In the case at bar, the SC held that it is proper that the issue of Federico’s citizenship be
determined in a judicial proceeding, a criminal action for violation of the Alien Registration
Act.
Page 116 of 119

G.R. No. L-24576 | July 29, 1968
MARTINIANO P. VIVO, as Acting Commissioner of Immigration, BOARD OF

COMMISSIONERS, Bureau of Immigration and DEPORTATION OFFICER, Bureau of
Immigration, petitioners, vs. HON. AGUSTIN P. MONTESA, as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch XIX, JOSE CALACDAY, ET AL., respondents.
FACTS:
JOSE CALACDAY, ET AL., all surnamed CALACDAY, arrived in the Philippines from
Hongkong. Upon their arrival, they sought admission as Filipino citizens. After investigation, the
BSI find them to be the legitimate sons of a Filipino citizen, one ISAAC CALACDAY, and thus
admitted them into this country. The BI then issued to each of them an identification certificate
as a Filipino citizen. However, ISAAC CALACDAY confessed before an immigration official
that the seven respondents were not his sons. Commissioner Vivo issued warrants of arrest
against the CALACDAYs, stating in said warrants their deportability for having entered the
Philippines "by means of false and misleading statements and that they were not lawfully
admissible at the time of entry, not being properly documented for admission". The
CALACDAYs filed before the respondent court a petition for prohibition. Vivo questioned the
propriety of the remedy of prohibition, and insisted that habeas corpus is the proper one, but the
respondent court invoked its general jurisdiction, which includes certiorari and prohibition, on
the ground that habeas corpus would be proper only to the one already arrested but not to those
not yet arrested. The trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining the BI from
arresting and detaining the CALACDAYs.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Commissioner Vivo can summarily order the arrest and deportation of the
CALACDAYs.
RULING:
The SC agrees with the Commissioner that the trial court is without jurisdiction to restrain the
deportation proceedings of the CALACDAYs. These proceedings are within the jurisdiction of
the Immigration authorities under Sections 29 and 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act (C.A.
No. 613). That jurisdiction is not tolled by a claim of Filipino citizenship, where the
Commissioner or Commissioners have reliable evidence to the contrary; and said officers should
be given opportunity to determine the issue of citizenship before the courts interfere in the
exercise of the power of judicial review of administrative decisions. The SC noted that when the
petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed, deportation proceedings had been started against
the respondents but had not been completed. In view of the non-completion of the proceedings,
the Board of Commissioners has not rendered yet any decision. The CALACDAYs, therefore,
are not being deported. Before the Board reaches a decision, it must conduct a hearing where the
main issue will be the citizenship or alienage of the respondents. Therefore, there is nothing so
far for the courts to review.
Page 117 of 119

G.R. No. L-32398 | January 27, 1992
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF PO YO BI TO BE ADMITTED AS CITIZEN

OF THE PHILIPPINES: PO YO BI, petitioner-appellee, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent-appellant.
FACTS:
PO YO BI, a Chinese national, filed a petition for naturalization. He moved to amend the petition
twice, which move the hearing as well. The trial court issued an Amended Notice of Petition for
Philippine Citizenship. The second amended petition itself was not published in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the province and city of Iloilo. There is, as
well, no evidence of its posting in a public and conspicuous place in the Office of the Clerk of
Court or in the building where such office is located. After trial, the trial court granted the
petition and declared PO YO BI as Filipino citizen. In his amended application, it failed to file a
statement of intent to be naturalized as a Filipino citizen by birth. The Solicitor General, through
the Assistant City Fiscal, filed a motion to reconsider the said decision, contending that PO YO
BI is not exempt from filing his declaration of intention, and has not complied with Section 4 of
the Revised Naturalization Law and that his witnesses are not competent and credible persons
within the contemplation of law. PO YO BI filed a motion alleging therein that more than two
years had elapsed since the rendition of the decision and that he has complied with all the
conditions and requisites imposed by Republic Act No. 530.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not PO YO BI can be admitted as citizen of the Philippines through naturalization.
RULING:
The SC noted the following reasons why PO YO BI’s petition for naturalization should fail:
1. Section 9 of the Revised Naturalization Law requires that the petition itself must be
published. The section amended petition was not published. Neither were the original
and the amended petitions. The Court ruled that the publication is a jurisdictional
requirement. Non-compliance therewith nullifies the proceedings in the case, including
the decision rendered in favor of the applicant;
2. PO YO BI failed to allege that he is of good character, which is the third of the six (6)
qualifications to become a citizen of the Philippines, as provided for in Section 2 of the
Revised Naturalization Law;
3. He failed to allege his present and former places of residence;
4. contrary to the argument of PO YO BI, he was not exempt from filing a declaration of
intention;
5. It has been held that to establish the qualifications that the applicant must be of good
moral character and must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner
during the entire period of his residence, the character witnesses must be in a position to
testify on the character and good moral conduct of the applicant during the entire period
of the latter's stay in the Philippines as provided by law. The witness in the case failed to
do that;
6. It is settled that a Chinese national cannot be naturalized as a citizen of the Philippines
unless he has complied with the laws of Nationalist China requiring previous permission
of its Minister of Interior for the renunciation of his nationality. In the instant case, PO
YO BI did not offer any evidence to prove that he obtained such permission.
Page 118 of 119

G.R. No. 197930 | APRIL 17, 2018
EFRAIM C. GENUINO, ERWIN F. GENUINO and SHERYL G. SEE, Petitioners vs

HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA, in her capacity as Secretary of Justice, and RICARDO V.
PARAS III, in his capacity as Chief State Counsel, CRISTINO L. NAGUIAT, JR. and
the BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, Respondents.
FACTS:
The DOJ issued a circular prescribing rules and regulations governing the issuance of Hold
Departure Orders. HDO was issued against GENUINOs, after criminal complaints of
Malversation and Violation of R.A. No. 3019 filed against them by the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) with the DOJ for the supposed diversion
of funds for the film "Baler." This was followed by the filing of another complaint for
Plunder, Malversation and Violation of Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019, for allegedly siphoning
off PAGCOR funds into the coffers of BIDA entities. Another complaint was thereafter filed
against EFRAIM and ERWIN GENUINO before the Office of the Ombudsman for violation
of R.A. No. 3019 for allegedly releasing PAGCOR funds intended for the Philippine Sports
Commission directly to the Philippine Amateur Swimming Association, Inc. The
GENUINOs, through counsel, requested that the HDO against them be lifted. This plea was
however denied, which prompted the institution of the present petition by the GENUINOs.
This case was consolidated with the case entitled Arroyo vs. De Lima.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Watchlist Order restraint on the right to travel, therefore, null and void.
RATIO: YES.
The language used in the WLOs does not contain an explicit restraint on the right to travel.
The issuances seemed to be a mere directive from to the BI officials to include the named
individuals in the watchlist of the agency. However, all of the WLOs contained a common
reference to DOJ Circular No. 41, where the authority to issue the same emanates, and from
which the restriction on the right to travel can be traced. The subject of a HDO or WLO
suffers restriction in the right to travel is implied in the fact that under Sections 5(a)(2) and
5(b)(2), the concerned individual had to seek permission to leave the country from the court
during the pendency of the case against him. Further, in 5(b)(3), he may not leave unless the
preliminary investigation of the case in which he is involved has been terminated. In the
same manner, it is apparent in Section 7 of the same circular that the subject of a HDO or
WLO cannot leave the country unless he obtains an ADO. By requiring an ADO before the
subject of a HDO or WLO is allowed to leave the country, and its mere issuance operates as
a restraint on the right to travel. The WLO also does not bear a significant distinction from
HDO, thereby giving the impression that they are one and the same or, at the very least,
complementary such that whatever is not covered in Section 1, which pertains to the
issuance of HDO, can conveniently fall under Section 2, which calls for the issuance of
WLO. In any case, there is an identical provision in DOJ Circular No. 41 which authorizes
the Secretary of Justice to issue a HDO or WLO against anyone, motu proprio, in the
interest of national security, public safety or public health. With this all-encompassing
provision, there is nothing that can prevent the Secretary of Justice to prevent anyone from
leaving the country under the guise of national security, public safety, or public health.
DOJ Circular No. 41 is declared unconstitutional. All issuances which were released
pursuant thereto are declared null and void.
Page 119 of 119

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Immigration Law 2023

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MENDOZA, MARICAR A.

IN RE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILLIE YU, petitioner, vs. MIRIAM

Whether or not YU’s acts constituted renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to be displayed when

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND

On July 12, 1960, SANTIAGO GATCHALIAN, grandfather of WILLIAM GATCHALIAN,

GERARDO ANGAT, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. KAMRAN F. KARBASI, Respondent.

JOSE TAN CHONG, Petitioner-Appellee, v. THE SECRETARY OF LABOR, Respondent-

Whether or not CHONG was a Filipino citizen.

BALGAMELO CABILING MA, FELIX CABILING MA, JR., AND VALERIANO

BALGAMELO CABILING MA (Balgamelo), FELIX CABILING MA, JR. (Felix, Jr.),

In 2004, the Bureau of Immigration received the Complaint-Affidavit of a certain MAT G.

Whether or not the herein Petitioners are Filipino citizens.

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

DENNIS L. GO, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

1. That they are citizens of the Philippines;

JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

The core issue in the consolidated petitions is the qualification of JOCELYN SY

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:

KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION AND BANTAY KATARUNGAN FOUNDATION,

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ERMITA announced an appointment in favor of GREGORY S.

Furthermore, as the petitioners correctly submit, no substantial change or correction in an entry

TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of

Soon thereafter, private respondents ROBELITO V. PICAR, WILMA P. PAGADUAN and

Whether or not SOBEJANA-CONDON sufficiently complied with the requirements under

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

EREMES KOOKOORITCHKIN, petitioner, vs. THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, oppositor.

Whether or not: (1) KOOKOORITCHKIN’s declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen

SECOND ISSUE: KOOKOORITCHKIN has sufficiently shown legal residence in the

In the matter of the petition for naturalization of JACK J. BERMONT; JACK J.

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners, vs. COMELEC AND

G.R. No. 221698-700 | March 8, 2016

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners, vs. COMELEC,

Whether or not GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES is a natural-born citizen or a naturalized citizen.

GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES is a natural-born citizen. Adopting these legal principles from

RIZALITO Y. DAVID, petitioner, vs. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND MARY

Senator MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES is a foundling whose biological parents are

The jurisprudential treatment of naturalization vis-a-vis natural-born status is clear. It should be

ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the

ERNESTO MAMARIL filed a disqualification case against vice-mayoralty candidate

EUSEBIO EUGENIO K. LOPEZ, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

Section 5 of the said law states:

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M.

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of

NESTOR A. JACOT, petitioner, vs. ROGEN T. DAL and COMMISSION ON

MANUEL B. JAPZON, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JAIME S.

Yes, TY solely complied the residency requirements for elective position.

GAUDENCIO M. CORDORA, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

To disprove TAMBUNTING’s claim of being a natural-born Filipino citizen, CORDORA

The COMELEC Law Department recommended the dismissal of CORDORA’s complaint

ROMMEL C. ARNADO, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

ROMMEL ARNADO was a natural-born Filipino citizen, however, he became an American

ARLENE LLENA EMPAYNADO CHUA, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

Whether or not CHUA should be disqualified to run as Councilor.

Whether or not POE is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:

CIRILO R. VALLES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROSALIND

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. NORA FE SAGUN, Respondent.

As previously held in jurisprudence, the prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is