~-

~~ · ~l/6,09
'

UNCLASXII AIR FORCE ~

SERVICE COMMAND
IN
OPERATION 'DRAGOON'

),

---+- ...... - ,__ ____ - Va ___

Headquarters ft~

TWELFTH AIR FORCE I

 HEADO.U.ARI'ERS TWELFTH ..AIR FORCE
J.:PO 650, U. S. ,A;rmy

15 May 1945.

The .securing and supply of a beachhead is one of t:ae most dif-

ficult feats of warfare. '!'he Invasion of southern FRJ.NCE not only
presented the usual problems connected with a landir.g operation tmt,
in addition, pre~cnted the problem of supporting a rapidly advancing
front within a relatively short time after the landings h£.d been ac-
complished. The story of how the YJI Air Force Serv.ice comnand with-
in southern FBJ.NCE alone transported, supplied, and maintained tbe
Twelfth Air Force indicates that with proper planning and coordina-
tion an Ji.ir Force is ce.pable cf maintaining and supplying itself in
a rapidly changing situation.

Major General, u. s. ,A;rmy,

comnand i.og.

Classification chang.ed t.o : ·.

!DEC 19118
',)
.c~---------------
Aut~ity AGF Ltr 380.1 (14 Mar 47) GNGBI-4 .
.'I1.1l---~---t~ __ llf../J__________ ~
JQHN R. PUGH
Lt Col, Cav
Custodian

~-1 OCT 19~5

 XII Am FORCE SERVICE COJMAND

IN

OPERATICN 'DRAGOON 1

HF.ADQUARTERS TWELFTH AIR FORCE

 XII AIR FORCE STI·'.VICE CO!/TI\!AND
IN OPEl:.ATICN DRAGOON
Page Number

Background • • • • • • • • • • 1
Forces Involved • • • • • • • • • 1
com:nand Responsibilities • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 3
Air Operations Prior to D-Day •••••••• 4
Planning for Supply and I•.'.i3.intenance • • • • . • • • • • • • • 5
Flanning Phases • . • • • • • • • • • • • • 5
order cf Battle • • • • • • 5
Supply Responsibilities • • • • •• 7
Air corps Technical SUpY,Jlies • • • • • • • 7
Bombs and ,AmmUnition •••. 14
Gasoline . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Leng Range FU.el Tanks • • • • • • • • . 14
oxy6en ••• 14
common i terns of Supply • • • • 14
:-;~aintenance and supply of Troop Carrier Uni ts .. 14
St&ging Areas • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 15
Assessment and phasing of Supplies Required in FRANCE 16
Determining Factors ••• 16
~uarterillS.ster • • ••••• 16
Signal •••••••• 17
Air corps Technical Supplies ! • • • • , •. • • • • 17
Ordnance • , •••• 17
. .A,n::mun it ion • • •.• • • • • ... 17
Schedule of Fovement of comba,t Units
Rate of effort of combat Units
overall 1·has ing
.... 17
18
18
Bombs and ,ATLLmnition. . .. 19
Aviation Gasoline and Oil • • • 19
oxygen and Acetylene 20
Long Ranbe FU.el Tanks 21
summary 21
Unit :Phasing . . . .
General
Priority of 1,:ovement
.... . . .
· 21
21
21
service Tea.ms • • • • • • • • • • 21
Air Bcse J,.;rees ••••• 22
T:over;1ent of Service Group Teams
r.:ovement of Service Squadron Teams • .. .. 22
22
!.covenent of Air Force General Depot 22
I

D Day Convoy .. . 23
D plus 5 · convoy 23
D plus 8 convoy 23

UNCLASSl~IED
- i -
 Page Number ,

D plus 10 convoy • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 23
D :plus 12 Convoy • • . • • . • • • • • • • 23
D plus 15 convoy • • . • • . . • • • • • 24
J,.;ove:n.ent of Uni ts encl SUPiJlies into Southern FRANCE 24
sct.edule of r~:ovement • • • • . • • • • • • • 24
hny~~rol ■•• • •••• 24
Unladen Equipment . • • • • • . Z7
r.:ovemeuts from CORSICA • • • • • • . • • • • Z7
Movements from ITALY • • • • • • Z7
Beech Control • • . • • . • • Z7
Operations in FRANCE • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 28
The 332nd Service Group asswoos initial responsibility . • 28
Operations upon landing ••• 28
Initial shortages at beaches . • . • . • . • 28
Opening of SISI'ERON Airfield • . • • . • . . • . • 33
,Arrival of XII AFSC (.Aa.v) and 19th Service Group 33
Breakthrough to the RF.ONE Valley• • • • • • •• 33
The 332ncl Service Group moves to SALON, 25 August 1944 • • 33
Opening of FORT DE BOUC • • • • • • • • • • • • • 34
Movement of supplies from beach dumps. . • • • • • • • • • 34
Air Base J,J:.'eas revised, 1 September 1944 • • • • . • • . . 40
Advance North creates additional transportation problems • 40
TrUcking facilities pooled • • 40
Supply by air becomes necessary • • • . . • . • . • 42
332nd Group Operations at VA!E'JCE • • • • • .. • -47
4lst Service Group operations at SALON • 47
Air Force General Depot established. • • • . • • 50
Opening of fields in LYON area • . . • . 50
stocking of advanced fields • • • ••. 53
Reserve ration dump established • . . 56
Air Base ,Areas revised, 17 September 1944. • . : 56
The 19th service Group moves to DOLE • • • , ••• 56
The 332nd Service Group moves to LYON. • • • • • • • • 58
Service Groups were scattered over a large area. • 58
Winter clothing issued • • • • . • • . • • 58
XII .AFSC ordered to Tr.ALY • • • • • • • • 61
Vehicles are left in FRANCE • • • . • • ••••••• 61
Summary • • • • • . • . . • 61

.Annex •A" •
:SUild up and expenditure of anmunition stocks
on CORSICA. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 66
Annex "B' - Total ammunition require:imnts for DRAQOON • • • • 68
,Annex •c• -
Total overall aviation gasoline and oil require-
ments for period D to D plus. 46. • • • • • • • • 70
,Annex "D• -
Major supply. ~tenis turned: over to lX .AFSC • • • • 72
. -~~ f-i:· :~~
r- i I'

- ii -
 Page 1Tumber

Location of combat Uni ts in CORSICA • • • • • • • • • 8

Location of Servlce Units in CORSICA. • • • • • • • • • • 9
Location of combat Units in ITALY ••••••.•••• lC
Location of Service Units in lT.ALY • • • • • • • •• 11
Location cf combat units in SMIDD:r.A • • • • • • • • • • • 12
Lo cat ion of service Uni ts in SARDINIA • • • • • • • • • • 13
Invasion Beaches • • • . • • 25
Rr-:oNE Valley area • • • • • • • • • • • 57

- iii -
 XII AIR FOOCE SE?.VICE 'COt-ttnm IK OFERJ.TION DRAGCON

BlCKGRCUND.

l. The N;editerranean Allied .Air Force began the study of the

problems of' supporting an assault againzt the scuth of FR.Ju~CE, in Dec-
ember 1943. On 28 December 1943, Y~.AF issued preliminary directives_
to Norttwest ,African Tactical Air Force, Northwest African coastal Air
Fore~, Northwest ,African Troop Carrier corrina.nd, and Northwest African
Air Service corr.mend·, detailing the specific responsibilities of each
.Air Force or comnend in the total scheme. The reorganization of l
January 194-4 produced new headquarters and throughout January and Feb-
ruary various discussions were held with these units including XII Air
support comr£nd, XII Air Force Service command, and Army Air Force
Engineer command/Mediterranean Theater of Operations. These discus-
sions dealt mainly with:

a. The provision of airfields in CCRSICA.

o. The B?Jllinistrative problems of suprly, especially of
long range tanks.
c. The difficulties attendant upon splitting the ground
echelons to enable the·air echelons to operate from
CO~ICA while leaving behind sufficient personnel to
move to FRAI\CE, direct from Il'ALY, to service the air
echelons on arrival there.

2. Original planning called for the operation to take place in

I{ay 1944 which was a:lso the original date for the invasion of NCffi.lANDY.
Subsequent events necessitated the postponement of_ the operation, and
it was finally mounted on i5 August 1944. The operation was designed
to give the greatest possible assistance to the Normandy invasion
forces by forcing the enemy to employ a Ir.aximum number of his troops
in southern FRANCE.

3• During .the early planning stages the operation was termed

"A~"VIL". This name was later changed to "DRAGOON" for security rea-
sons.

FORCES INVCLVED.

4• The Ground Forces allotted for the operation were comprised

'
of American, British, and French under the command of ~~jor General
Alexander M• ~tch, Conunandi~ General of the United States Seventh
.AnnY• The Army plan called for.a three-division assault on three
beaches in the ST TROPEZ - ST R.AFHAEL area.. The beaches were ident-
ified for security reasons as AURA Beach at CAP ST. PIERRE - CAP
CJiJAARAT, DELT.A Beach at the southw~stern end of GOLFE DE TROPEZ, and
CM.1EL Beach at ST RAHI.AEL.

5. The Air Force allotted for the operation was the Mediterran-
ean All:ied Air Force under the command of Lt. General Ira. c. Eaker.
Units of MAA1' which participated in the operation were the Fifteenth
Air Force and the :Mediterraneari--.Allied Tactical Air Force under wfiI'ch
"1lfiitsof the TWelfth Air Force operated~ For Operation "Dragoon•,
11ATAF had available the following elements: -

a. XII Tactical Air command and 87th Fighter Wing, with

headquarters respectively in NAPLES and FURIANI, · CORSICA,
and their units on various Corsican airfields. rt con-
sisted of the following squadrons: -

P-47 18
Spits 11
A-20 4
Photo Recon 2
Spit T/R FR 1
Spit T/R 1
F6A T/R 1
Beau :NF 1

These were divided as follows as to hationality: -

U.S.A.A.F. 26
R .A .F. 12
F • .A .F. 1 '
b. 42nd Bombardment Wing, with its headquarters at EI.MAS,
SARDINIA, and its squadrons at two different fields in
SARDINIA, consisting of 16 Squadrons of B-26s, divided as
to nationality as follows: -

u.s.A.A.F. 12
F •.A .F. 4
c. 57th Bombardment Wing, with its headquarters at PRUNELLI,
CORSICA, and its squadrons at three fields in CORSICA,
consisting of 12 B-25 squadrons, all u.s.A•A•F·
d. Provisional Troop Carrier Air Division, with its head-
 quarters at LIDO DI RC:-.U., and its units at various air-
fields in the TICMC &.ree, consisting of 32 squadrons of
c-47's, all U·S•A•A•F·•

6. In addition, r,IJ.TJ.:F had .32 sc;_uadrons of the Desert Air Force

available. The situation never demanded the use of any of these
squaa.rons in tLe operation. Two fie;_;hter croups assicned to the Fif-
teenth ~ir Force (6 squ2drons of P-J8 1 s) were based in CCRSICA and
·were used during the initial phases of the-operation.

CC:-:!,•u'JJ) 1BSFCh6IBILI'l1IES.

7. Tactical .Air Force w~s broadly charged with the responsibil-

ity of neutralizing the enemy air forces, of preventing or effectively
retarding movement of enemy ground forces, of providing air cover over
the assault area and shipping within forty miles of it, and of provid-
ing close air support to the ground forces taking part in the opera-
tion.

8. I'he commanding General of XII Tactical ,Air command had opera-

tional control of all units allotted to that corr.n~nd together with
units ter,1porarily attached thereto and ;-;as given responsibility for the
provision and coordination of air forces in close support of the opera-
tion and also the provision of the air cover over the assault area and
shi}.Jping vii thin :'orty miles.

9. The Cor.-..rr.anding Generals of the 42nd and 57th BOCibardment Wings

exercised operational control nver tne units allotted to their comma.ids
and were to be prep&red .to pi.. 0Vide the mo.xinnun possible medium bomber
1

support during the operation.

10. under the direction of the cormna.nding General of IlATAF, the

co:nmanding General of the provisional Troop Carrier .Air Division exer-
cised operational control of all units allotted to that command and was
given the responsibility for the conduct of airborne operations during
the invasion.

11. ~~e co~;.manding Gen;ral of XII Air Force Service COr;rnand was
charged with the responsibility of the supply and maintenance of all·
air force units taking part in the operation vlith the exception of main-
tenance and supply of technical spares, bombs, and arrmunition for Royal
Air Force units, ,Air Fonnation Siaial units, and French units utilizing
British equip:nent. In addition, he was given tne responsibility of sup-
ply of all Quartermaster q1ass I and III items to units of tne Royal ,Air
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 0 ............................................ .

~ In order to fulfill troop ca1 rier :ceq_uirements for the operation, 8

1

Troop Carrier Groups of 24 Squ1::drons were brought from t::-le Ninth ,Air
Force in ENGLA?-0 and ::-tat ionect on va~ious airfields in ITJJ:..Y.

- 3 ..
Force and French Air Force for the first thirty days of the operation,
and for all aviation gasoline and oil for the entire operation.
I

AlR OPERATIONS PRIOR TO D DAY.

12. A carefully planned program of air operations preceded the

actual invasion and supported it on D Day and thereafter. The inva-
sion coast was divided into four distinct areas, namelya SETE, MAR-
SEILLES, TOULON, and GENOA. From 1 to 15 ,August the operation was
planned and executed so that the enemy would not be able to detennine
in advance which of these areas would be the actual assault area. The
schedule of attacks was divided into four phases each of which contri-
buted a distinct feature to the air preparation for th~ invasion.

13. Phase I covered that period to 10 August 1944 and was prim-
arily concerned with counter air force operations and the interdiction
of corru:nunications. Railroad bridges in the RHONE:·Valley and airfields
in the PO Valley were the principal targets during this period.

14. Phase II co~red that period from 11 ,August 1944 to 0350 .

hours on D Day, 15 ,August 1944. This part of the operation was design-
ed to neutralize the main coast defense batteries in the assault area,
to lower the effectiveness of coast defense troops by deterioration in
morale resulting from concentrated bombing attacks, and to neutralize
the main coastal radar'stations covering the assault area and the ap-
proaches to it. To accomplish this without jeopardizing tactical sur-
prise, attacks were made on the area plan heretofore mentioned, and
reached from BEZIERS, FRANCE, on the western extreruity to VIAREGGIO,
TI.ALY, in the eest.

15. Phase III lasted from approximately 0600 to 0730 hours on D

Day and was designed to cause the maximum aestruction to the enemy
coastal and beach defenses • .A:11 available forces were used to pave
the way for the actual landing itself •.

16. Phase IV began with H hour, approximately 0800, and continued

throughout the day of 15 ,August 1944. A maximwn effort 1Vas placed
against gun positions, and armed recces were flown to attack troop con-
centrations and road bridges. Road and rail bridges in the RHONE Val-
ley were the targets for the medium bombers. This phase of the opera-
tion, in which the medium bombers attacked gun po~itions and road and
rail bridges in southern FRANCE and in which fighters and fighter-
bombers flew armed recces throughout the entire battle area, continued
for the rest of the month.

17. The actual invasion was preceded by an airborne diversion

which was designed to deceive the enemy as to the area in which the
actual assault w'ould take place. TO achieve this end, 5 C-47's of the
 Detachment 216 squadron took off from .AJACCIO, COF.SJ:CA at five minute
intervals from 0210 to 0230. They flew west to a point 90 miles south
of CIOTAT where they turned north and started dispensing ~indow" at
a regular rate so that the results on enemy radar would a1pec.r to be
a force of approximately 200 aircraft flying in normal troop carrier
formation. A durrnny drop zone was picked to the northwest of TOULON
where the aircraft dropped 500 miniature parachute dummies.

·18. on D Day the Provisional Troop Carrier Division landed and·

dropped 8,631 parachutists and glider troops plus equipment in three
landing and drop zones in the general area of IE 1/UY, LA !v:OTI'E, and
TR.Am-EN-FROVENCE. Supply missions were flown to the san:e area on the
follc:ming day.

✓-~JDiG FOR SUPP.LY ./ili"D !,:AThlTE.NANCE.

19. Planning Phases - The overall planning for the supply and
maintenance of Air Force units centered around the knowledge of what
units would be employed and the responsibility of these units. This
planning naturally fell into two distinct phases, namely:

Va. Planning covering the overall build-up of supplies.

✓£• Planning covering the movement of supplies from built-
up stocks ~o the invasion area.

20. Order of Battle - Early in 1944, when general planning for

the operation had commenced, it had been decided that the tactical
situation would necessitate the use of CORSICA as the main base of op-
erations. TfliS island was most strategically located with regard to
the current Italian Campaign e.nd the impending Southern FRANCE Cam-
paign. From here operatio~s not only could be caITied on over IT.ALY
but, at any given time, could easily be shifted to the new area of op-
erations in FRAfiCS. ,Accordingly, throughout the spring of 1944 a
gradual movement of combat uni ts to CORSICA took place, accompanied
by a corresponding r.iovenent of service uni ts. Old airfields. were re-
paired and improved end new airfields were .constructed by Air Force
Engineering Co.11'.mand/Mediterranean Theater of Operations. On 15
August 1944, the day of the invasion, the following combat units were
located on CORSICA and were being serviced by XII .AFSC:

GROUP TYPE LOCATION

!,.7th Boreb Group- (4 Sguc.drons )- .A-20 FORErl'.A
340th Bomb Group-(4 Squadrons)- B-25 .ALES.AN
- 310th Bomb Group (4 Squadrons) B-25 GEISONACCIA
321st Bomb Group-(4 SquLdrons)_ B-25 SOLENZARA

1st Fighter Group (3 squ~drons )-- P-38 AGHI0NE

14th Fighter Group (3 Squcdrons) ~38 AGHI0NE
27th Fighter Group (3 Squadrons) F-47 S~GIA

- 5 -
/

GROUP ~ LOCATION
57th Fighter Group (3 Sqdns) P-47 ALTO
79th Fighte~ Group (3 Sqdn.s) F-47 SERruGIA
86th Fighter Group (3 Sqdns) P-47 POREI'TA
324th Fighter Group (3 Sqdns) P-47 GHISONACCIA
5th Photo squadron BORGO
23rd photo Recon. Squadron P..38 BORGO
111th Tac Recon. squadron F-51 BORGO

415th Night Fighter Squadron Beau SOI.ENZ.ARA

417th Night Fighter Squadron Beau BORGO
21. In addition, the following French Air Force units were in
CORSICA and were being serviced by XII AFSC:

l/33 Squadron BCRGO

4th Group (2 Sqdns) P-47 ALTO
2/33 squadron P-51 CALVI
339 Wing (3 Sqdn.s) AJ.ACCIO
22. This tremendous shift of units had resulted in but a few
Twelfth Air Force uni ts remaining in IT.ALY. The problem for XII
AFSC bad not decreased correspondingly, however, because of·tbe Troop
carrier uni ts which had arrived from ENGLAfID. XII AFSC was servicing
the following combat units in IT.ALY on 15 August 1944:
GROUP .Tim LOCATION
62nd Troop Carrier Group (4 Sqdns) C-47 G.ALERA
64th Troop Carrier Group (4 Sqdns) C-47 CIAMPINO
60th Troop carrier Group (4 Sqdns) C-47 BRINDISI
435th Troop carrier Group (3 Sqdns) c-47 TARQ,UINIA
436th Troop carrier Group (3 Sqdns) c-47 VOLTONE
437th Troop Carrier Group (3 Sqdns) c-47 MONI'.ALTO
438th Troop Carrier Group (3 Sqdns) c-47 CANINO
439th Troop carrier Group (3 Sqdn.s) c-47 ORBErELLO
440th Troop carrier Group (3 Sqdns) C-47 OMBRONE
441st Troop carrier Group (3 Sqdns )' C-47 GROSSETO
442nd Troop Carrier Group (3 Sqdns) c-47 FOLLONIC.A
51st Troop carrier Wing Glider
TrF' ining center (3 Dets.) M.AliCIGLIANO
345th Fighter Squadron TARQ.UINIA
346th Fighter squadron PCMIGLIANO
4l6th Night Fighter Sq\U\dron FOMIGLIANO

- 6-
 23. on this same date, XII AFSC was also serving the following
units in SARDINIA.

GROUP TYFE LCCATION

17th Bomb Group (4 Sqdns) B-26 VILLACIDRO

319th Bo~b Group (4 Sqdns) B-26 DECIMON...ANNU
320th ·Bomb Group (4 Sqdns) B-26 DECilJOJUill1'U

347th Fighter squadron ALGHERO

414th Night Fighter squadron ALGHERO

I
I
I I
24. v{u"pply Responsibilities - Since CORSICA had been chosen as
the base from which tactical operations would be carried on, it natur-
ally followed that, so far as the Air Force was concerned, it should
be the principal location at which to build up supplies for the A~r -
Force •. The commanding General of Mediterranean Allied .Air Force, in
conjunction with the Commanding General of A.,.-my Air Force-Service com-
mand, Mediterranean Theater of Operations was to ensure the XII Air
Force service command that adequate supplies were available in CORSICA
and SARDTh"IA for the forces under the operational control of XII Tac-
tical Air C~nd, 57th Bombardment Wing, and 42nd Bombardment Wing.
The commanding Officer of the Northern Base section·was responsible
for the movements of the supplies from the docks to base dumps and
XII Air Force service conmand dumps for future destribution by the Ser-
. -vice COirJIJSnd to the airfields.

25. ~ommanders of sub:rdinate units submitted detailed require-

ments to the XII .AFSC. (!3ased upon this infonnation and upon certain
fixed premises ·that were received from M.AAF, the XII AFSC prepared a
detailed plan for support of air Force units) This plan indicated the
quantity of supplies required and when required, and was based upon
actual experience tables for the type of aircraft employed. These
tables were compiled from actual consumption data for the previous year
and were tempered by previous personal experience of personnel in the
Command who bad participated in the landings that took place in NORI'H
.AFRICA, SICILY, .And S.AIERNO. NUmerous changes in Army plans forced re-
vision of Air Force plans. The first estimate of requirements was sub-
mitted by XII .Ali'SC before the Seventh Army Staff had prepared its sup-
ply plan for support of the Anny.

26. Air corps Technical Supplies - Air Force General Depot #3 at

NAPLES, which was operated by A.AFSC/t'ffO, continued to be used as the
source of supply for.Air Corps technical supplies. Air courier ser-
_vice between NAPIES and COffiICA :proved invaluable as a means of bring-
ing in that which was required in addition to the normal flow of sup-
plies to the island • . CORSICA had become a real center for air opera-

- 7
 "Bo'("qo--
4-17'\\'\ N. F'\'f. 5q.
\ \ \ '\n \O.C. "R12con SC\-
5-th 'Photo SC\.
'2.'3-tcl -Photo ':>a,,
\j33'fd ~qdn. (F.A..r.)
locat,on of
Com'oai" Un,i's on Co-<s\ca
14 Augusi" lC\44
-8-
S~'C''('Og\O
'27'\h ft'f. Gp.
7"t\'\ ft-r. Gp.
A\to .
571h Ft>t. Gp.
4-\h Gp. (f.t\.f.)
F\ \e. SCH\
'340th Bomb Gp.CM)
Gh\sonacc ,a
3\0\h 'Bom'o Gp. CM\
:324\n Ft.-r. Gp ..
~gh·,one.
ht ft't".Gp.(\5tnA.f.)
14\h Ft-r.Gp.(15tn /\.f.)
So\12.n-z.o'('a
'32\-.-t 6om'c Gp. (M)
4\Sth N. F't'(". ':>q.
 Ca \v\ Co\v, Siaq;nq f'..'('ea
\C\ '5.~. \-\Q. Sadn. '3?>2S.G. 1-\Q.SQdn. \013 '5\~Y\a\ Co.
\\olo\ 0-<d. '5c!r-~ Co. \\ \O QM Co. '5~0 A. ~.u.
\00'5 s;qna\ Co. \OS<\ s,qno\ Co. Rttc.\"lad. \ '5\o ~ed.i),s~.1)1tt
\\ 20 QM Co. \'\\,;';) 'i:.n~.\).Co.('l)e.\;)(}.; t'IF>.f':>C/t\'to
485~.~.u. rU'('\Qt\\ \-\Q'<''-• C.f>...S.I\.
~'2.0S.G. '2'\'T0Q\"\i~\<...Co. "3'20 5.G. 11o1}a.9. '51.l~.SQ.
\°'
\'\ S.G. !)85 S11.-t-..i. Sq.(i;)Cl';.)
'\Sl:.n~.C:-~\. fl>.'tC:.('1)11.'1:-j
814 S\~.\)~fl.Co. :Bo'<'~o
\C\ '5.G. \'\C\8 En9.C, P\. H,f.c.
~'2.0 '5.G. 38'5 '5est'1. 5cidn.
\C\~S Qt'\ T'("K. Co.
'oa.'(''<'ag\o 51 0'(d."B."'O. SQ.
~io S.G. \o <312'C'V. '5Gidn. \'e\!,C\ " S~t\ Co.
\C\1\ Q\'\"T,t'f{.Co. , \C\C\S~n~.C.?\. f t>.fC
\1,o'?,l,0-to.':idtt\.Co. \'lie
cA1c:. a.~ ,-..\<..C..,.(~e.\~ :?o'<' 12tto
'"°''=- ~Yl~.C. ?\. fM'C.. ('v/l't.) 3 "!>'2 S.G. \'\'\\En~. C. ?\. ~f>..fC
'320 S.G. "30'5Sa.~".SQd'I"\.
~2\ ..
\'\10 Qt\ 'i-t\<..Cc.
\ toS \ O~d. Sc\-M Co.
F O \e \\ ·\ - - - - - - - - - - ■ ~ n c.~1t ...... c.... Coe.,:)(p.,\\.)
~Ob S.G. "!:I t-\(2~. ':>'-'~· ?\. A \-to
5 .. ~Ob S.G. '2.lo ':le~"- Sci.in.
\<\Slo QM\'<~. Co.
P'C' u. net'< 12 \/o.l\0 Otd.':>..,_~ Co,
'3Ob S.G. '20!15 QM "T-<\<.Co. \'\'\S \:t-,~ C. ~\. flWC (»~\.)
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\\o ~e'?. Su?-So(1)11.\-. ~ '3. G. ~ Q . S<:1dn.
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\b~~ O~d.Sc\-t\Co.
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Location of
SeYv,ce Unites on Co'<'s\ca
\0 Au9us1 1~44

-9-
 fo\\on,co
"\-t\-2 nd i. C.Gp.

C=-'\"OSS~"to

@ Om'o'<'on~
~ t\-"\O'lh i.C. Gp .
•

C \Off\ f>I T\O

64'1h i.C. Gp.

?om\~\,ono
'3"\c t'\''f. '5C\. (~50 f.G.)
4\b'\n W. Pl'<'. ':IC\·

Location of
\
Combo-\ Un\ts \ n I ta \y
14 August 1944

-10 -
 P.iom'oino
4- \ S.G. 68 <;Je-t'I.Sa. (O<i'\.)
\G.C\1 c"t'\1:1,-C. \'\. f Fo.fC.(\)et)

rol\onic~

I
4\ S.G. loS ':><2't"'l.SQ.(t:let)
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4 I S. G. \-\ci. 'SCilcin.
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j
Om'o'<'one \\?.1 Q.l-\.Co.
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Con·,no
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C.o.~od ,c.n W\O -----------------------
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17\-'n ~om'o Gf1.Cl1)

Lo cat ,on of
Com'oa-\" Un'rts on Soy-d\n ,a 14 Aug 1<\44

-12.-
J\\~'('\Q.'('O
"!>\0 <:;.G. ~"-.S ':>e.-c'I. S~. ('Oe.".)
\'\'\"?> \:.ni. c. ?\. \'P,~ C~e'I

Locot,on of
5e~v,ce \Jn,1s on So\"d.,n\o
 /

tions and the tremendous infltt."\: of planes had created additional pro-
blems. 'lhe need for replacement parts becaLJe acute. For example,
during August the Service Squadrons of the 32oth Service Group serv-
iced P-47s, A-20s, P-39s, P-51s, P-38s, B-25s, B-26s, B-24s and B-17s,
plus P-38s reconverted into ph~to planes and even a P-40.

'Z1. Bombs and Ammunition - Huge stocks of bombs and ammunition

were built u:p on CORZICA. This build-up involved not only prepara-
tions for the impending campaign in FRANCE but also had to fill the re-
quirements for the sustained campaign in ITALY which was currently in
progress. ' The peak of the build-up came well •in advance of D-Day. •

28. Gasoline - It did not become necessary to build up huge stocks

of gasoline on CORSICA because of the proximity'of large bulk storage
facilities at 1""1uIDALENA, S.ARDINIA and the excellent pipe lines which had
been construc·ted on CORSICA. Gasoline was shi:i:)ped tc either BASTIA or
PORTO VECCHIO from NADDAI.EN.A in small coasta,l vessels and the pipe line
running between the two ;ior·ts serviced all the airfields on the island
with the exception of the one at AJACCIO which was adjacent to the port
of .lw.ACCIO, and the fields at C.IJ.,VI miich were serviced from the ports
at C./il..VI and IlE ROUSSE.

29. Long Range Fuel Tanks - Long range belly tanks for pre-D Day
requirements and D day requirements were furnished by XII AFSC. 6000
P-47 115 gallon tanks and 1500 P-40 75 gallon tonks were made available
in CORSICA. 'lhe Director of Maintenance and Supply, N'AAf!, supplied
16000 Spitfire 90 gallon tanks as a minimuzn. 'lb.ese tanks were in add-
ition to the tanks being supplied to CORSICA for current operations
then in progress.

30. Oxygen - Oxygen requirements were filled from an o:xygen plant

op0rated by the 3loth Service Group in SARDINIA. 'lhis plant operated
on a 24 hour basis to meet the demands of units on CORSICA.

31. Common Items of Supply - Common i terns of supply were obtain-

ed in the· normal marmer through the Northern Base Section.· Requirements
for the .Air Force had been submitted to NORBS at an early date.

32. Ml.intenance and Supply of Troop Carrier Uni ts - Coincidental

with the final preparations being n::ade in CORSICA was the supply and
maintenance problem attendant upon the arrival from .ENGL.AND of the 8
Troop Carrier Groups which participated in the operation. The move-
ment of these Groups from the European Tb.eater of Operations to the
1Bditerranean 'lheater, although temporary, presented certain problems
of supply am maintenance. Prior to their arrival, uni ts of XII .AFSC
had been servicing 3 C-47 groups. The· addition of 24 Squadrons of
............................. ......................................... .
,

• See .Annex 'A' for table of build up of bombs and ammunition in COR-
SICA.
 C-47 aircraft almost tripled consumption, and air corps te~hnical
supplies for the increased number of aircraft did not exist in the
theater. The Troop carrier Groups were requested to bring suffic-
ient spare parts with them to cover the operation. soroo special
items were requisitioned from the Ul\:"TrED STATES, through .AA.FSC/MrO, ·
1
and were delivered by air. nu.ring the period of operation the
troop carrier groupe were maintained between 95% and 100% opera-
tional.

33. The principal supply problem presented by the troop carr-

ier groups other than Air Corps Technical Supplies was that of pet-
roleum, oil, and lubricants. The groups were based on 8 different·
fields, namely: MONI'.ALTO, C.ANlNC, T.ARQ.UINIA, GROS.SErO. FOU.ONICA,
ORBETELLO, 0!\1IlRONE, and VOLTONE. Facilities for keeping these
fields stocked were not readily available. The nearest bulk stor-
age of aviation gasoline was at NAPLES. The port ot CIVITAVECCHli
had been used to disembark some aviation 6asoline in drwns. Only a
S?JSll dump had been built up there. There were bulk storage facil-
ities at S.AN STEFANO but they had not yet been put into operation.
The railroad north from NAPLES had been repaired only as far as
CIVITAVECCHIA,

34. The XII AFSC foresaw the probable fuel req_uirements and '
Peninsular Base Section was induced to hasten the opening of the fac-
ilities at S.AN SrEFANO. Gasoline was tal~n directly there by tankers.
It was then put j_nto drums end trucked to the various fields. For 2
weeks prior to the invasion 2 truck companies of P,B,S, and 1 tr·uck
company of XII AFSC (the only XII AFSC t-ruck company available, all
others being on CORSICA or working on otrer phases of the invasion)
each worked ,30 trucks on a 24 hour bases. These trucks averaged 1½
turnarounds per day and handled a daily average of approximately
110,000 gallons with a peak day going as high as 150,000 gallons.
on 15 August 1944, the day of the invasion, all fields had been
stocked with reserves ranging from 106,000 gallons at T.ARQUINIA to
220,000 gallons at FOU.ONICA, It developed that the invasion opera-
tions of the c-47's lasted only ·2 days and the supply of gaooline on
hand was far in excess of actual needs, ,Ample preparations had been
~~d~, however, if the situation had demanded more extensive opera-
tions.

35. Staging Areas - In addition to the planning, supply build-

up problems, and the mainten8llce and supply of the Troop Carrier units,
pre-D Day activities of XII AFSC included the operation of a staging ·
area at SANT.A !,:ARIA. IT.ALY• A staging area at CIVJTAVECCHIA was op-
erated by P,B,S, and a similar area in CORSICA was operated by NORBS.

- 15.
,ASSF.SS},'IE!\J"T uill l'EASING CF SUFT1LES REC,,UIRED IN ?RAL'JCE.

36. Determining factors - computaticn of the amount o.f supplies

required end the movement of these supplies was dependent upon a nwn-
ber of factors, namely:

a. Types and numbers of aircraft to be ·employed and the

anticipated schedule for the movement of these air-
craft into FR.AfnE.
b. Rate of effort to be expended by combat units.
c. Nl..unber of personnel to be moved into FR.AKCE.
d. Limited shipping allocation for the initial convoys.

37. Quartermaster - XII AFSC had issued an Administrative Direc-

tive on~ July 1944* which directed, among other things, the prepara-
tion which should be made by units participating in the invasion and
the supplies to be taken with each unit.

38. All units were furnished reserve •C", "D", •K• and "B" rations
by the Service Group ~uertermaster in the staging area for those units
staging in ITALY. The Service Units which were staging in CORSIC~ drew
these rations from the Service Group ~uartermaster before departing
from their home stations. Each individual in each unit carried 1 type
"D' and 1 type "K" ration. Each unit, in addition to the above, carr-
ied a minimum of 10 days balanced "B" rations per individual. Units
from CORSICA had, in addition, a 4 day emergency ration. These rat-
ions included gratuitous FX rations for the same number of days and
were drawn at the Staging ,Area or from the Service Group Q.Uartermaster
prior to leaving the home station. Arrangements were also made where-
by units in JT.ALY were allowed to purcha~e an e_xtra 2 weer...s P.X: rations.
,Also, N£TOUSA Circular No. 14.directed that all units have on hand at
all times 2 "C" rations and 1 "D" ration per individual. These rat-
ions were carried by all uni ts in their unit supply. When the assault
area reached a normal supply status, all units were again directed
that 1 •c•
ration be carried by all individuals. Each ~uartermaster
Company service Group transported 15,000 balanced "B" rations, broken
down on the strength figure of 5,000 per meal. These rations were
held as a quartermester reserve and were issued to units in the inva-
sion after the unit 10 day reserve bad been consumed. This additional
ration was transported in an effort to maintain Air Force units on a
.continuous diet of •B• rations from Air Force stocks until such was
received on regularly scheduled convoys into southern FRANCE which
were due to arrive on D plus 25. The issue of Q,uartermaster Class I sup-
plies applied equally to French and British units which were attached to
........................................................................
• .Administrative Order No. 10, Hq. XII .AFSC, 25 July 1944.

• 16 ..
the Twelfth Air Force or the XII Tactical Air Co::.mand for the opera-
tion. Due to scarcity, perishables, including fresh meat, butter,
and vegetables, were reserved solely for American troops.

39. Service Group Q,uartennasters carried with them a 15 day re-

_ser~e of Class II and IV Quarterraaster supplies for 5,000 men.

40. Signal -'All Signal compGnies Service Group carried a 30 day

supply of peculiar and connnon items.

41. 4ir corps Technical Supplies - Eech combat group carried a

10 day level of spares and each service squadron carried a 30 day
leYel. one combat packup per combat ;:;roup was scheduled to arrive
in FPJINCE initially, and thereafter the flow W6S to be maintained at
a rate of one packup per group each 30 days. The first packup for
a-particular group was scheduled to arrive within 5 to 20 days after
the arrival of the unit concerned. It was estimated that 20 enzine_s
per combat group per month would be required and these were to be
s~ipped concurrently with each combat packup.

42. Ordnance - Ordnance s & LI companies carried a 10 day level

of vehicular spare parts and cleaning and preserving materials. In
addition,·ec.ch Ordnance S & !11 company carried a 30 day level of ord-
nance spare parts. -

43. ,AAir..:Unition - All 'l\,elfth Air Force units entered the Theater
of Operations with the authorized basic allowance of ammunition for
ground weapons as follows:-

Weapon Rds •. of }JmllUnition Type of Ammunition

CARBlJl1E, Cal• .30, Bl 60 Ball

· RIFLE, Cal• .30, Ml 56 Ball
RIFLE, U.s. cal., . .30, !-.U.903 60 Ball
FL°l'OL, Auto., cal• .45, Ml.911Al 2l Ball
GUN, Sub-n1achine, Cal •• 45 100 80;0 Ball - 20% Tr.
GUN, Ea chine, Cal. .50 265 API & T
LAUNCHER, Rocket, A•T., 2.36 11 6 E:.E.
LAU!\"'CHER, Grene.de 10 HeEo
·SECTGUN, 12 Gauge, Riot Type / 10 ffe½ Chilled Shot
EORI'AR, 60 MM 90 H•E•
RIFLE, Browning, Automatic · 200 Ball

44. Schedule of 1\Tovement of Combat Units - .Air echelons of com-

bat units were scheduled to arrive on the following days:

- 17 -
 Day Unit Type of Aircraft

D plus 6 225 Squadron Spit

2/33 Squadron P-51
111 Tac/R P-51
324 Wing Spit
D plus 7 322 Wing Spit
D plus 9 324th Fighter Group. P-47
27th Fighter Group P..47
D plus 12 23rd :PoRoU. , P-38
D plus 20 251 Wing Spit
57th.Fighter Group P-47
79th Fighter Group P-47
415th Night Fighter Squadron Beau
D plus 24 86th Fighter Group P-47
4th Fighter Group P-47
D plus 28 47th Bomb Group A-20

45. Rate of :Effort of Combat Units - For the first 3 days after
each unit's arrival in F?.ANCE they were to operate at G maximum rate
of etfort, the next 7 days at an intensive rate of effort, and at a sus-
tained rate of effort thereafter, Based on this premise and upon act-
ual combat experience, the following sortie rate per group per day was
used:

Type of Aircraft sustained Intensive rr.ax:i.mum .

Fighter Bombers 45 65 100
Light Bombers 27 39 60
:Medium BOmbers 18 25 39
46. The ovqrall amount of bombs, small anr~ ammunition, aviation
gasoline and oil, oxygen, and long range fuel tanks was determined from
the above figures.

47. overall Phasing - In an effort to establish a 21 day build-up

of supplies with the unloading of the D plus 25 convoy, the following
schedule was adopted:

D convoy to cover operations for period D to D plus 12.

D plus 5 convoy to cover operations for period D plus 13 to
D plus 17.
D plus 10 convoy to cover operations for period D plus 18 to
D plus 23.
D :plus 15 convoy to cover operations for period D plus 24 to
D plus 32.
D plus 20 convoy to cover operations for period D plus 33 to
D plus 40.
D plus 25 convoy to cover operations for period D plus 40 to
D plus 46.

- 18 -
 48. Bombs and ,Ammunition - Bombs shipped were restricted to 5
basic types which were lOOC pound general purpose, 5CO pound general
purpose, 250 pound general purpose, 100 pound frag cluster, and 100
pound smoke, white phosphorous • .AS a further simplification, all
bombs shipped were of the same type. The :percentage of types of
bombs planned to be expended by different types of aircraft was as
followsz

loo lb.
Type 1000 500 250 100 lb. frag. Smoke , White
of Ale lb. G.P. lb. o.p .. lb. G.P. clusters ;phosphorous

P-47
C

25% 70% 3%
.A-20 7<Y/4 28%
B--25 55% 15% 10% 20%
49. The basis for computation for small arms ar1mru.nition consump-
tion was calculated in a like manner with the additional feature of
figuring the percent of load expended per sortie since this figure
varies with rate of effort. The following basis was used:

Type of JJc sustained Intensive N.exirnum

Fighters 8.3;{ 12.0% 18.6%

::
Bombers 3.6~s 5-~~ 8.0%
50. Daily combat requirements of the various types of bombs and
small arms amnunition were figured from information then available.
This information combined with the schedule of arrival of combat units,
minus a loss factor which took into consideration losses due to enemy
action, unserviceability and daruage to materiel caused by rough handl- I j

ing across beaches, misdirection, etc •• produced the overall require- I

, I
ments in tonnage and phasing. This resulted as follows:

convoy Tow. of Bombs and Ammunition

D 522
D plus 5 .5o4
D plus 10 1489.5
D plus 15 2030
D plus 20 1721
D plus 25 1514
TOI'AL 7180.5
51. Aviation Gasoline, and Oil - Planning for shipment of avia-
tion gas and oil was arrived at in a similar manner to that of figuring

- 19 -
requirements for bombs and anmn.mition. · The order of :,attle, the type
of aircraft, and the rate of effort remained the same. Based on act-
ual combat experience the following amounts of gaeoline consumed per
combat group for effort employed was used as a basis: (rn·gallons)

sustained Intensive Maximum

P-47 Group 13000 20000 30000

Spit Wing 5500 9000 12000
A-20 Group 10000 15000 22000
B-25 Gr<>up 16000 21000 34000
B-26 Group 17500 24.0CO 38000
Beaufighter Squadron 2500 4000 6000
P-38 T/R Squadron 2500 4000 6000

52. Aviation oil requirements were figured on the b6sis of 3

percent of gasoline consumption for 1120 oil a,nd 5 percent of gasoline
comsumption for 1100 oil. Ten percent. of actual computed .needs was
added as a loss fcctor to rrovide for transient aircraft EJS well as
loss due to enemy action, wastage, misdirection., and field distri-
bution.

53. Tonnage was not available on the assault convoy to cover, as

in the case of bombs and ammunition, operations for the period D to D
plus 12. Sufficient supplies for D to D plus 10 were allowed and the
balance was made up in subsequent convoys. The following represents
the total overall @3.SOline and oil requirements for period D to D plus
46:

convoy Tons (315 gallons per ton)

D 1317
D plus 5 1692
·D plus 10 2347
D plus 15 4674
D plus 20 3393
D plus 25 2262

TOTAL 16386

54. Oxygen and Acetylene - Oxygen and acetylene requirements were

also figured on the basis of the rete of ~ffort of uni ts taking part
and the date of arrival of these units. These supplies were shipped
in es follows:

convoy· Oxygen (tons) Acetylene (tons)

D 5

.. 20 ..
 convoy Oxygen (tons) Ace.tylene (tons)

D plus 5 5 3
D plus 10 5 3
D plus 15 8
D plus 20 7 3
D plus 25 5 3
55. Longe Range Fuel Tanks ~ Long range fuel tanks viere not pr.:ased
in the shipment of other commodities of supply until D plus 20 as it was
believed that all tergets would be within a stort range of ini tia11y
occupied_ airdrcmes. The following requirements were planned:

· convo:z:: Ty~ Tank :t,.Turnber

D plus 20 P-38 165 gallons 25

F-47 - 100 gallons 150
D plus 25 F-J8 - 165 gallons 25
P-47 - 100 gallons - 150

56. Summa.ry - The planning for _the build-up and movement of sup-
plies hed prepared for the Air Force alone meeting its own requirement&,
not only for supplies _peculfar to the Air Force, but_ for common i terns
as well.

UNIT IB..ASDJG
j :

57. General - The problems of planning for movement of units onto

· the beaches is essential-ly a question of shipping. Not only is it a
~uestion of sufficient ships to move the un1ts but also the ~uestion of
sufficient_ ships to I!'l8ke and keep those units operational by bringing
in the hug'e quantities of supplies required. ··
' .. ' ._
58. F-riority of movement - In preparing plans for the rr:.ovement of
Air_ corps units into FRA1vCE, the limited shipping made it necessary to
establish a system of movement priority. Combat and service units were
set up for movement in such a manner as to insure at all times suffic-
ient service personnel in FP.Al':-CE to adequately service the combat units
as t!-cey arrived. For the first time, Service Command units were sched-
uled to arrive on the beaches ahead of or along with the canba t uni ts
being serviced. This policy wes adopted as a result of knowledge and
experience gained in the landings at SICILY and SAIERNO.

59. Service Teems • .Another very impo!'.tant factor that n;ade for the
success of the operation was the decision to keep service teams intact.
For many months the XII Air Force Service command bad. been operating
with 2 inter-related types of service teams.- The first tne was the
Service Sg_uaa·ron team consisting of a Service squadron, a Quartermaster

- 21 ..
 Truek can:rieny, 2nd. an Ordner ce S & I,; Con;pany. Ee ch Service Squ&dron
tecl!Il serviced a combat £TOUP and rerr2ined with tlu,t combat group
throuo;hcut •. '~hus, in the mcve into Southern FRM:CE, the Service
squadron teB.Ill either rreceded its co:Lbe.t group or accompanied the ad-
vance echelon of the combat group. The ,=;econd type of service team
was the Service Group teem consistin[" of a Eeadq_uarters ol:'.d Head-
quarters Squadron of a Service Group, a QuarterrrEster Company (ser~ice
group), a Sig71al company (service group), and an Engineer Fire Fight-
ing Flatcon.

60. .Air Base Areas - The com:r:ianding officer of a Service Group

team was charged with the control and coordination of sui;ply end ser-
vice to all .Air Force uni ts located within the boundaries of a desig-
nated erea. Such Lreas were established by the Service ca1:mand and
were kno..n as .Air Base Areas. To accomplish the supply and service
for wl:.ich charged, tre ccmr..anding officer of the Service Group team
utilized the units and p_ersonnel of tbe Service Sc;;_u6dron team or teamz,
loC<.:ted and operating within the designated area, as he deemed advis-
able. All .Air Force service units located within the boundaries of a
given Air Base ,Area were attached to the Service Group r~sponsible
for that area, regardless of previ~us a6signments and/or attechllients.
Such attachrnents became effective ir.:nnediately upon a unit entering a
given .Air Base Area or upon its inclusion within the area due to re-
vision of boundaries effected by the COED1and.

'.1 61. r·.:ovewent of service Grcup Tean:.s - •rhe importance of maintain-

ing close ccntrol and adeq_uate supplies necessitated the adoption of
the ;.olicy of keeping Service Group teams intact, and priorities were
established to enable these teams to move into FRANCE as r_equired.

62. Jfovement of Service squadron Teams - Planning was complicated

as all combat groups were to be operational during the entire change of
station. This necessitated the movement of Service Squadron teems
.Prior to the movement of the comb"" t units in order that tl-.:ey could be
at the new,station in Southern FRJu~CE prepared to receive and supply
the combat 1 mit upon its a:r-rival. Thus, it Wes necessary for a Service
Squadron teem scheduled for movement at a later date to assume the res-
ponsibilities for the service and su:pply of one additional combat group
wtose service Squudron tecilll had rreviously departed. :Fast experience
proved thet this procedure was practicable for short periods of time
i;roviding both combE.t groups were flying the same type aircraft.

63 • Movement of Air Force General Depots - Decis:i 0n was ::nade to

tte effect that Air Force General Depot units in sufficient strength
were to arrive 10 days befcre the anticipated arrival of large quent-
i ties of bulk supplies. This provided sufficient time for the loca-
tion of adequate storage facilities and prevented much confusion that
had arise~ on occasion in other operations.

- 22 -
64. "D" nay convoy - On the "D" Day convoy, the Service Squ2d-
ron team consisting of the 57th Service Squadron, the 1974th Quarter-
master Truck company and the 1683rd Ordnance S & M. Company, reinforc-
ed by a detachment of the 1110th ~uarterrnaster company (Service Group)
and a detachment of the 1059th Signal Company (Service Group), were
scheduled to depart IT.ALY. This was prior to D plus 5 and it was es-
sential tba~ this team arrive in advance of the 27th Fighter Group
"A" party which was scheduled to arrive on the D plus 5 convoy from
COR3ICA. Attaching the Q,uartermaster and sigrial detach.i-oonts to this
Service Squadron team was an exception to the general policy of main-
taining service Group teams intact and also the policy of not splitting
units. It was deemed necessary, however, as there were no other simi-
lar units in FRJu~CE, nor were any scheduled to arrive at that time.
The two detachments were to rejoin their units on D plus 5. A bomb
disposal squadron was included on the "D" day ~Convoy for obvious rea-
sons.

65. p plus 5 convoy - Plans for the D ·plus 5 convoy contained

a complete Service Group team (the quartermaster end signal detach-
ments that were to arrive on "D' day were a part of this team) consis-
ting of the Headquarters apd Headquarters Squadron, 332nd Service Group,
the 1110th Quartermaster Company (Service Group), the 1059th Signal
company (Service Group), and the 1991st Engineer Platoon F.AFC. The
Headquarters, 332nd Service Group was to be given the SUJ:!ply and main-
tenance responsibility for all Twelfth Air Force units in FRANCE at
that tilre and command responsibility for all service units of XII Air , I
Force Service coi:::mend. The 1955th Q,uartenr.aster Truck company s chedul-
ed to arrive from CORSICA and the 1722nd Ordnance S & M Company schedul-
ed to arrive from IT.ALY were to be sent in on D plus 5 in order to pro-
vide additional transportation P.I).d automotive maintenance. The sound-
ness of this decision was supported by the very great need for transport-
ation which·d~veloped throughout the entire operation. Al.so scheduled
from ll'.ALY on the D plus 5 convoy wes the 324th Fighter Group "A"
party.
: !
, l
66. D plus 8 convoy - The D plus 8 convoy from CORSICA was to bring i
the service Squadron team that serviced tl:i.e 324th Fighter Group. iI

67. D plus 10 convoy - The D plus 10 convoy from ll'ALY was to bring
the first elements of the units that would make up the Air Force Ordn-
ance Depot that was to be established~ Al.so, the 1108th Quartermaster
company (Service Group) was included in order to properly supply the
Royal Air Force and French Air Force units with Class I imd l I I supplies.
This was necessary as these units were scheduled to operate in an aree
r·emote from USAAF uni ts •

68. D plus 12 convoy - Plans called for the D plus 12 convoy to

- 23 -
bring the second complete Service Group team to arrive in FRAI~CE con-
sisting of the Eeaa~uarters and Headquarters Squadron, 19th Service
Group, the 112oth Quartern~3ter Company (Service Group), the 1005th
Signal company (Service Group), and the 1998th Engineer Fire Fighting
Platoon. Also included in this convoy was the service Squadron team
consisting of the 16th Service Squedron, the 2470th ~uartennaster
Truck company, and the 1661st Ordnances & M company. This Service
Squadron team serviced the 79th Fighter Group which was set up to
arrive on D plus 16.

69. cornbat units on the D plus 12 convoy were to be the "B"

party of 27th Fighter Group ard the .•B• party of 324th Fighter Group

70• D plus 15 convoy - The D plus 15 convoy from ITJ.LY was to

include the 34th Depot Supply Squadron, additional units for the Air
Force Ordnance Depot, a detachment of Headquarters, XII Air Force Ser-
vice comnand, end a detacrnoont of the 397th Signal Company (Avn.)
With the arrival of the latter two detachments it was planned that a
fixed Service command Headquarters could be established with adequate
corrrnunications.

71. Feints of disembarking - It should be noted that initially,

practically all units were scheduled to disembark at C.AirIEL Beach.
This was be.cause C.AMEL Beach was closest to the sites of the proposed
landing strips that were to be constructed. The 19th Service Group
team that was scheduled to arrive on D plus 12 was to disembark at
DELTA Beach. This was deemed necessary as according to plan there
would be a number of miscellaneous units in this sector, and also be-
cause other combat units scheduled to arrive after D plus 15 were to
disemberk at ALPHA Beach. It shpuld also be noted that the depot
~its were to disembark on DELTA Beach. This was decided upon for
two reasons: first, the depot units were to prepare for the reception
of incoming supplies at either TOULON or }f.A.tBEII.I.ES, depending on the
tactical situation, and DELTA Beach was closer to both of these two
towns; second, in order to cvoid congestion, units not needed on CAI;'EL
Beach were scheduled to disembark at DELTA or .AI.FHA Beach.

MOVEI::E:Nl' OF UNITS AND SUPPLIES INI'O sour HERN FRANCE.

72. Schedule of Movement - Combat Groups and Service Units of

the Twelfth Air Force up to and including D plus 15 were scheduled to
move into FRANCE as follows:
Unlad- Desti-
Unit . From Date Jers. Veh. en Eq. Nation
57th Service Sqdn.

.
ITALY D 222 36 148 Camel
1974th ~~ Truck co. • • 102 107 "
1683rd Ord. S & M co. • " 80 26 26 '

.. 24 -
 I I

@ Les Av-ces

~ \..e \..uc
Come\ Be2ocn

I\)
U)

@ Cogo\in

.
Lond,n~ 62ocne2s @
""f\amatue\\e
Cop Ccima't"ot

Note: ine '3'32 nc;:i Se'<"v\c~ G'('ou'f> SCl.'<"'1/\Ced

tn,s a'<'ea \Ant\\ 2'5 F\u~u•:,'t \C\44.
 Unlad- Desti-
unit From Date 1·ers. Veh. en Eq_. nation

net 1110th Q.:M CO Serv Gp ITALY D 15 2 Camel

Det 1059th Sig Co s.G. ITALY D 15 2 Camel
11th Bomb Disp Sqdn lTALY D 7 4 Camel

27th Ftr GP 11 .A" ]?arty CORSICA D plus 5 .340 71 50 Camel

Hq sq 33 2nd Se rv GP CORSICA D plus 5 165 26 5.3 Camel
lllCth O,M co serv Gp CORSICA D plus 5 92 4 50 camel
1059th Sig co serv Gp CCPuSICA D plus 5 100 18 30 Camel
1991st ~ngr Flt FJ.FC CORSICA D plus 5 38 12 Camel
net 874th Sig co f'eP CORSICA D plus 5 47 lC camel
1963rd Engr Dep Flt (net) CORSICA D plus 5 31 4 Camel
I)et 14o8th QMJ)ep Plt CCRSICA D plus 5 11 2 Camel
Class III
1955th QM Truck co CORSICA D plus 5 102 107 Camel

324th Ftr Gp "A" :Farty ITALY D plus 5 3.39 77 75 Camel

1722nd Ord S & M Co ITALY D plus 5 80 26 26 Camel
1st Service Squadron CORSICA D plus 8 222 86 148 Camel
1952nd Q;M Truck Co CORSICA D plus 8 102 107 Camel
1697th Ord S & M'Co CORSICA D plus 8 Bo 26 26 Camel
57th :somb Disp squadron CCFSICA D plua' 8 7 4 Camel

Det 1967th Trk Co (Ord) IT.ALY D plus 10 51 54 Camel

1901st Ord li]IJID.O Co ITJ-LY D plus 10 186 14 13 Camel
1108th QJf. Co Serv GP ITALY D plus 10 92 4 50 Crunel

27th Ftr Gp, 11 B" Party CORSICA D plus 12 528 131 50 Camel
_32l;.th Ftr Gp, 11 B" Party CCPSICA D plus 12 568 132 134 Camel
Hq sq 19th serv Gp CCRSICA D plus 12 165 26 53 Delta
16th service Squadron CORSICA D plus 12 222 86 148 Camel
2470th ClM Truck Co CORSICA D plus 12 102 107 Camel
1661st Ord S & M Co CORSICA D plus 12 80 26 26 Camel
1120th Q}l. Co Serv GP CORSICA D plus 12 92 4 50 Delta
1005th Sig Co Serv Gp CCFSICA D plus 12 100 18 30 Delta
1998th Engr Plt F.AFC CCRSIC.A D plus 12 .38 12 Delta
net. 874th Sig Co Dep CORSICA D plus 12 54 le 25 Delta
.3rd ?v~d sup Plat CORSICA D plus 12 21 3 30 Delta

34th Dep Sup Sq IT.ALY D plus 15 131 47 100 Delta

Det Hq, XII .A:FSC ITJLY D plua 15 150 35 Delta
:J?et 1967th Trk Co (OrQ) IT.ALY D plus 15 51 53 Camel
2011 Ord :Ma int Co, AF IT.ALY D plus 15 223 66 Delta
Hq 1st Ord Bn, 1st Ord lT.ALY D plus 15 39 8 8 Delta
Depot Regiment
1951st Ord Depot co, .Avn ITALY D plus 15 186 28 16 Delta
net 397th Sig co, Avn ITALY D plus 15 40 10 Delta
NOI'E: Figures, in the personnel, vehicle, and unladen equipment col-
umns were used in long renge planning and are not actual fig-
ures submitted by the various units,

73. Units were moved into Southern FRANCE from CORSICA by means
of an LST ferry service from CALVI and ILE ROUSSE on the northwest
coast of the island. BASTIA was designated es the elternate :port in ,
.CORSICA should C.ALVI and/or ILE RCUSSE be destroyed by enemy action.
Service units end "B" parties of certain tactical units sailed in fol-
low-up convoys from ITALY end SARDINIA.

74. Ferry control - A ferry control was established et CALVI -

ILE ROUS.SEand liaison was maintained with the Northern Base Section
to ensure that the priorities of movement of units as directed by the
corir.anding General of xn Tactical Air _Command were carried out. The
ferry control consisted of representatives of XII TAC, XII Air Force
service cor:unand and R•.A•F• Movements.

75• Unladen Equipment - Northern Base Section was responsible for

supplying transportation for moving all Air Force equipment and sup-
plies that could not be carried in the unit•s vehicles. All Air Force
units were responsible for loading their loose unit TBA equipment into
IST's and wµoading it again on the invasion beaches.

76. 1:ovements from CORSICA - The movement of Air Force I uni ts was
primarily from CORSICA as indicated by the following statistics:

Total number ot :personnel shipped·••·••••••••·• 15.528

TOtal number of vehicles shipped ............. 4,819
Tons of unladen equipioont ............. 1,134
Ntunber of lifts required ......... I.ST 72
LOI' 2

77. :Movements f.ran ITALY - The movement of air force units from
ITALY was not on as large a scale as from CORSICA, but considerable
number of units were invol~ed. These air force units shipped from
ITALY were phesed in with ground force units and were loaded on all
types of craft ranging from LCT I s to HI' Boats.

Total number of personnel shipped ·····~········ 5,367

Total number of vehicles shipped •••••··••••••• 1,619
Tons of unlad~n equipment .............. 514
NUmber of craft involved .............. 61
78 Beach control - All beach activities were under the control
of the Beach Control Group Headquarters, 7th ,Army. There was a liaison·
section of the XII Air Fo::rce Service Command with the Beach Contro.1
Group Headquarters.

- '27 -
 79. The XII Air Force Service command bad a Planning Officer
during the planning stages of the invasion. This officer later be-
came the Air Force Liaison Officer at the Beach Gontrol Headquarters.
J.;rmy Engineer Shore Regiments ~ere located on all beaches and were
controlled by the centrel heedquarters. )Jl Air Force liaison officer
with the Beach control Headquarters and 3 Beach Sections with the En-
gineer Shore Regiments were provided. The R•A•F• components to the
Beach Sections were provided under arrangements made by Headquarters
of M3diterraneen Al.lied Tactical Air Force. The XII Air Force Service ,I

command, in conjunction with the Beach control, was also given the
further responsibility of preparing detailed information for issue· to
units prior to their embarkation and to be used for their guidance in
movement over the as.saul t .beaches.

OPERATIONS ll-J FRANCE.

80. The 332nd service Group asswnas initial responsibility - The

332nd ,service Group landed at c.AMEL Beach, 6 miles east of sr. R.AI--1L'.EL.
This. was the first service Group to arrive and all functions of the
XII AFSC regarding supply and administration were assumed by the Group.
The whole of the invasion erea was its responsibility. Headquarters
was set up in a grove on the FREJUS - LE LUC highway, 5 miles west of
FREros, the spot being most centrally located with regard to projected
airfields and beach.dumps.

81. Operations upon landing - The first phase of supply and

transportation began with the landing and units of the Service command
immediately set to work stocking airstrips at FREJUS, RM!ATEULLE, ST.
RAPHAEL and·LE LUC from where combat units began to operate.· .Along
with the stockage of the fields, there was the problem of transporta-
tion of Twelfth Air Force units from their :point of arrival at the
beach to their proper bivouac areas. Clearing the beaches of all per-
sonnel and equiprnent was absolutely obligatory and measures necessary
to accomplish this required careful planning and constant supervision.
Army transportation wa.s originally scheduled to cooperate in this act-
ivity but shortages had rcade this difficult and the situation was hand-
led entirely by air force transportation. Close contact was maintain-
ed with the Seventh Army Beach control group through the JJ2nd Serv-
ice Group S-3 who had landed on D Day as Air Liaison Officer for XII
Air Force Service command. Through this liaison it was :possible at
times to b;ave the "DUKWS" deliver some gasoline directly to ST. RAPHAEL
airfield, only a.mile from the beach rather than to the beach dumps,
thus somewhat easing the transportation problem.

82. Dlitial Shortages at Beaches - rt soon became evident that

· v-80 gasoline and cal. .50 ammunition were short at the beach dumps.
The rapid advance of the army had far exceeded expectation, and with
it the gasoline consumption had increased. Moreover, 95% of the AC

- 28 -
 •

XII Air Force Service CorJllBnd personnel and

equiµient sh0'7n lt:1ndiDe on beaches of tbe
RIVIERRA. The I.SI' (Lancing Ship Tank) at
the left wes loaded with JLBny heavy vehicles
used by the Aviation engineers .

• 29 -
A large Air corps Tech Trailer leaves an
LST as XII .Air Force Service conmand per-
sonnel reach French beaches.

30 -
 or01nization equipment beiDg Ullloaded and segregated in
.i?O e ~. beach dump. The unit colDIDe.n¼r was resp6nsible for the
-nr: .ID0ven~ent of personnel anp. _ynhden_, equipment from ships to
ro tlle~ bea-0,h dWl).ps anp assembly areas. ';Che Co.::lillSnders contac-
~l:q }eQ. -the '-ir }'Pree, :aeac~c,ontrol Ffint 1n 'the 13ir fot'ce cs-
In~n sembly ~rea for tra?1$portation to m9ve t~ unladen equip-
'Cll"I..i
re.nt to the as2embly area. 'bn11t com:nand.er,p were required
, .:ta .1 to· furnish wo:r:'k ael_ails for the movina-, 'iced.in~ and un-
e•Jl J.oadj,ng o'f equipment and .sujfIJ_lies. When _i1o~sible. the
.!WOl weightJ oJ. eaco.. box or ,crate: was kept J>el.fW :S::0 founds
..........1. ... ... ..

S - - .31 -
v-80 gasoline being unloaded from an Air Evacuation Air-
craft. These aircraft carried much needed supplies on
their forwerd tripe during the initial stages of the in-
vasion. From the beginning, the speed of the advance
exceeded all expectations and the necessity of keeping
supflies of rations, fuel, and anmunition moving forward
exceeded the capacity of all available carriers. Arrey
vehicle movement, made necessary by the fast moving front.
drained 80 octane gasoline and supplementary supplies
from the d\Dllps. Critically needed 80 octane wes flown
in on every available aircraft.

- 32 •
cal • •50 ammunition, because it wcs in similar boxes to ground force
ammunition, was lost in ground force dumps fer the first 5 days of
the OJ;-eretion. XII AFSC was advised of the shortage and air shi~
ments began immediately. I)Uring the next three days, 53,0CO gallons
of v-Bo gasoline was flown to FREJUS Airfield fro~ JT.ALY and CC~ICA.
A srr..all ordnance detacl:m1e,r:t W£S sent to RA].:ATEUI..LE to receive the
ammunition being flown in while a quarterrr..aster detachment received
and distributed the M•T. gas arriving et F:-lEJUS Airfield.

83. Opening of SISTERON Airfield - Word wes received on 24 August

1944 that TEE'""t..E Airfield (better known as SI&rERON No. l) would be used
by a Spit wing. A platoon of 24 trucks trans,i)orting rations, lCC oct-
ane and v-80 gasoline was irrmediately dispatched to the field. Three
round trips were made hauling these supplies. Also, C-47 aircraft op-
erating from Italian beses helped to stock the field initially. The
supply at SISTERCN was n:aintained by air as the long-over-mountain
haul made truck supply practically impossible. Critical items and
maintenance items of supply were flown to this field by air evacua-
tion aircraft on their forward trips. A detachment of the llc8th
Q,uartermas.ter company Service Group, Avn, , took over this field on 28
August 1944.

84. During the period 19 August 1944 to 7/ August 1944 the air-
fields at FREJUS, RJ..YJ.ATUEil.E, ST RJJ'F.J.EL and 1E LUC. were stocked with
over J00,000 gallons of 100 octene easoline plus 35,000 gallons at
SISI'ERCN and 36,000 gallons at a field at CEURS F':IERRE. During this
s~~~ period, 10,000 rations were issued in spite of the fact that all
Air corps troops had arrived with a 10 day stock. Close to 70,000
gallons of v-80 gasoline was handled, most of it being sent from COR-
SICA and ITALY by air.

85. Arrival of XII .AFSC (Adv) and 19th Service Group• The 19th
Service Group had arrived on 22 August 1944 and was stationed at IE
LUC. The .Adve.nce:, Headquarters of llI AFSC arrived shortly thereafter
and set up headquarters at AIX. ·

86. Breakthrough to the Rhone Valley - The swi.ft drive of Allied

forces ha~ not been stopped in the north and west and a breakthrough
into the southern RF.ONE Valley resulted in the capture.of the more im-
portant airdromes of the Luftwaffe. The fields located in the PROV-
ENCE Area were co111prised of the giant ISTRES US TUBE and the sa 1.ellite ·
fields of· LAV.All.ON, SALON, and LA J.ASSE. 4ccordingly, Air.Base Areas
were established effective 25 August 1944. The 19th Service Group was
given the FREJUS area and the 332nd Service Group the area around SALON
DE PROVENCE, 110 miles west of FREJUS.

87. • The 332nd service Group moves to SALON. 25 August 1944 .. The
332nd Service Greup inmediately began moving to its new area and with

.. 33 -
l1,
the advance party sent a JO truck convoy of 100 oct&ne gasoline to
begin the stocking of S.ALON .Airfield. The area of the JJ2nd Group
included 4 airfields; SALON, LA J1SSE·, LA VALLON and ISTRES. I-47
groups from LE LUC end COR:_,ICA were im:nediately moved into this area
and were later followed by .A-20 1 s of tl,e 47th Bomb Group. Head-
quarters of 3J2nd Group w2.s set up at SUFFHEN, 12 miles southwest of
SALON.
88. Opening of FORT DE BOUC - Initial stocking of fields in
this area necessitated a long haul from the invasion beaches but ar-
rangements were made by XII Air Force Service Con:::nand for the Novy
· to use }ORI' DE BOUC, northwest of MARSEILLES and less than JO miles
south of S.ALON. · The Navy rendered every available means of assis-
tance and the port was swept and cleared of mines to perrnit limited
tonnage to be unloaded. · The Seventh J,.rmy w=,s contacted, and ships
waiting to be unloaded at the invasion beaches, which carried Air
Force supplies, were directe~ to PORI' DE BOUC. The nWilber of ships
directed to this port was based upon the cargo carried and that
which could be unloaded and handled by the Air Force service com-
:imnd. This was an Air Force project in its entirety. The Army wes
cognizant of its responsibility in connection with the operation of
a ~ort with port troops, ·but it wos unable to render any assistance
or equipment, whatsoever. The 1408th QuarteI'Ill£1ster Depot Company
Class III, Avn,. took over the operation of a gasoline dwnp set up
near MlRA.Vi.AS and also directed· the unloading at 1-0RI' DE BOUC • Not
only were items peculiar to the Air Forces unloaded and stocked in
this area but also common usage items, including ration.9.

89. The JOBN HOFKINS was the firat ship to come into PORT DE
BOUC. It had approximately 6,coo tons of supplies which could not be
unloaded because the draft of the vessel Wc.·s too great and it could
not be brought along side the quay. The problem was solved by using
barges to cover the area between the quay and the ship.

90• LA VALLON ana ISl'TIES airfields .were each stocked with 100,
000 gallons of aviation €!J3.S and 75,000 rounds of cal • •50 ammunition.
332nd Operations in this area lasted only from 28 August to 1 Sept-
ember 1944 but in these 3 days it handled 40,000 rations and 12,000
gallons of v-80 gasoline, in addition to the stocking of the fields
already noted.

91. Movement of supplies from beach dwnps - The 19th service

Group operating in the FREJUS area serviced the 27th and 324th Fighter
Groups u:::itil they moved to SALON and JSTRES, and continued to handle
the supplies coming over the beachhead. Supplies were trucked out or
the beach dumps to rail heads and airfields and then were moved on by
rail and air. Truck convoys operating 24 hours a day were also used
to forward supplies• Rail comnunication.s to the S.ALON area had been

- 34 -
Thousand pound bom~s leaving e beach dump for del-
ivery to en airfield. This beech dump wes operated
by XII Air Force service COn:mand personnel arriving
in .P'RANCE on D-Day.

- 35 -
Aviation gasoline being delivered to beach dumps by "DUKWS•.
This dump was operated by personnel of XII Air Force Ser-
vice Command group who arrived on D-Day. Civilian l aborers
followed up this unloading and properly stacked the drums
into piles. EVery effort was made to avoid large concentra-
tions and where space was available drums were stacked on
their sides in piles of not more then 5 , 000 gallons, with
piles 75 yards apart. Piles were stacked so that markings
on the end of each drum were visible without moving other
drums.

- 36 -
First loaves of G•l• bread being taken fran the oven
of a French bakery operated by a XII Air Force Ser-
vice Camnand group quarter=:aster comJ)8ny. The bakery
was issuing bread made of American flour less than
tive days after initial laDGings, h.evi.ng taken over a
French bakery in ST RAr-'liAEL

- 37 -
 one of the hundreds of 1 D1JKWS" used to unload
i.!"'VO .:rl i;M L.ibe~ty ships is shQ'll'.D leaving the bea-0h
-· 9~ I: tt> take oo a load of aviation gascline to be
\':;'l.5:.;a!:, delive.-ced to a Xll Air Foree servic~ command
usrl;t bea:ch dump. 10 e
"l VO a ., i::,.. i L.,.t;t 'I
J .,\H IAfI ':'Z a r
Thousand pound bombs being unloaded
from en LCT (I.a.Ddillg craft Tank) to
be trucked to e XII Air Force Ser-
vice command 11 emno• dump near the
beeches.

- 39 -
opened Etnd by 4 September the .Air CorpL in the .SALON area was re-
ceiving one trainload every other day. This train carried 425 tons
of supplies or approximately 212 tons each day. This was necessary
to augment those supplies now being received from the vessels un-
loading at FCRT DE BCUC.

92. It had become quite obvious at this point that planning

for the operation had been -sound, and supi,lies to support the com-
bat operations were ample and properly phesed. The rapid e<lvence,
however, bad created a transportation problem far beyond expectation.
The majority of Air corps supplies had been bid in and shipped to ·he
beaches in the vicinity of ST. RAPF.AEL as it had been anticipated
that only airfields in this erea would be used until D plus 20 to D
plus 25 The advance to fields in the SALON area had created a pro-
blem which was largely solved by the opening of PORT DE BOUC, and
later MA::SEILLES .Also trucking on a 24 hour bas is f rem t}'i"l beeches,
plus air transport, plus the railroad which was opened .• and operating
'by D :plus 20, hed kept the situation under control.

93. Air Base Areas revised 1 September 1944 - The period prior
to the end of August was marked by a rapid advance by the ,Army ·1p
the RHONE Valley opening up airfields et VALENCE and }.!0:NI'ELIMAR. The
41st Service Group had landed in FRANCE on 29 August 1944 and on 1
September 1944 Air Base ;.re&s were again defined. The 19th Service
Group continued in the FREJUS Area and the_4lst Service Group took
over that a1~a formerly designated as the 332nd Air Base ,Area. The
332nd .service Group was sent forward to work in the V.ALE:r-;"CE Area.

94. Advance North creates additional transportation problems -

The advance north created yet another problem. The high degree of
success attributed to the Twelfth Air.Force in the destruction of en•
emy lines of corr.munication·and supply in southern FR.Al:CE also made
it impossible for the service units to use these srure facilities to
support the rapidly advancing combat utits. It was necessary to
keep fighter bombers moving to the most advanced fields as quickly
as they were captured in order to continue successfully the destruc-
tion of the fleeing Gennans. This involved two problems of transpor-
tation. First crune the actual movements of the units into the advanc-
ed airfields and second, the stockage of the fields to necessary sup-
ply levels. The f!rst problem was solved by the fullest utilization
of all vehicles, end the second by the use of air transportation aug-
mented by such vehicle transportation as was available.

95. Trucking facilities pooled - .At this tme all available

trucks of the XII ,Air Force service Commend and R•A•F• units, with the
exception of a limited number of trucks which were attached to each

- 40 -
C•47's end A-20 1 S flew in
f!llS, rations, and ammun-
itions to this forward French field for the fight-
er bombers, Shown above, supplies are being unlo6d-
ed end trucked to XII Air Force Service Caimand
dumps near the field.
service Group for use by those organizations in the further distribu-
tion of Supplies, were placed in one pool cilld operated from the Bi,se
supply .Area, Mm.ely tbat area immediately south of SALON. All trucks
J.ocated in the &se Supply JJ:ea w.ere controlled and dispatched by a
central office of the service com."8.nd and they transported supplies
from both POnT DE BCUC and from Air Force dumps in the Base Supply
Area to the forward airdromes of Vlu..:ElWE and :.:ONI'ELIMA...'R, a road dis-
tance of over 150 miles.
96. supply by air becomes necessa·ry - It soon became apparent, 0
however, that the truer.a at the disposal of the Service Cowi~nd could
not meet the supply levels required by the combat units. Therefore,
it was necessary either to fly supplies directly from ITALY to the air-
fields, or from th~ Base supply ~ea in southern FP.A.\'CE +.o the forward
fields. The latter was more desirable in view of the fact that a.~ple
supplies v:ere available in FRANCE. The Headquarters, Tv1elfth Air Force
was contacted and ·requested to allocate one'group of C-47 aircraft to
IBJ.J,JCE to. be 'placed under the OJ;erat ional control of XII JJ.ir Force- Ser--
vice command. This was accomplished a:pproxirriately D plus 20 when the
64th Troop Carrier Group was ~:oved to FRANCE and stationed at ISTRE:3.

97. I Later, with the advent of r::ore and more Air Force units and
consequent spreading out to new airfields, it became increasingly evi-
dent that additional air transport would be required. Since all avail-
able transport aircraft were already in use, it was necessary to divert
heavy bom'uers fro!!! their regular r:iissions and use them instead. for tran-
sporting supplies into advanced fields in southern FR.AI;CE. Accordingly
the 451st, 461st, and 484th Bomb Groups of the 49th Bomb Wing, Fifteenth
Air Force, were used to transport supplies from their FOGGIA, ITALY
bases to BHON Airfield, LYON.

98. The lnst date that the heavy bombers moved supplies fromJTALY
was 22 Se~tember 1944. However, at this juncture the 484th,Group was
moved to JSTRES Airfield and oper£ted from this base for tne next 10
days. The GroUIJ hung up an admirable record during this time, and trans-
ported almost as much as the entire 3 groups during the previous 12 day
period.

99• Also, beginning about 10 September 1944, another tc.ctical unit,

the 47th Bomb Group, which was based at LA JJ..SS"E and flew A-20 type
aircraft, ~as diverted from its nonnal duties and utilized for trans~
porting supplies to advanced fields.

loo. Air transportation, although used primarily for Air Corps sup-
plies, on sever61 occasions lent assistance to the Seventh Army and
continental Base Section by the rapid movement to for.ward areas of crit-
ically needed supplies such as cal • •30 ammunition and mortar shells.

- 42 -
B-24's of the Fifteenth Air Force lined up like
a truck convoy at a forward field in FRANCE.
These bombers, along with c-47's and A-20's of
the Twelfth Air Force, made daily supply runs
bringing in 100 octane gas, bombs, and rations
making XII .Air Force Service command's project
of •supply by air• a reality.

- 4-3 -
Pilots am crew help unload ammunition from one of
the many B-24's used to fly supplies from ITALY to
forward French fields. The B-24's were used main-
l y in the ffi.Ovement of ammUJ1ition, bombs, and 100
octane gasoline·, which the bombers were built to
carry in their norm&l rr,issions. The planes also
carried empty drums and through the use of a small
kicker type pump, which was placed in each aircraft,
the r;as was pumped from the fuel tanks into the
empty containers.

- 44 -
From reserve tanks of B-24's to tank-truck to fighter
bombers. Gas wi::s brought to this forward French field
daily by B-24 1 s during the period of the Seventh ArlllY'S
rapid advance and when it became necessary for the XII
Air Force Service comm end to fly in supplies.

- 45 -
-- - -- -- - . - -

Gasoline for fighter bombers operating at this

forward field in .FRMCE is being pumped from
reserve tank.a of e B-24 leaving just enough
fuel in the Liberator to make its return trip.

- 46 -
This w2s accomplished by the 64th Troop Carrier's C-47 1 s.

101. supply of the airfields by air may be said to, hB.ve ended
by 4 October since it w1=1s about this time that reliable rail service
was established.

102. 332nd Group Operations at VALENCE - The movement of the

332nd Service Group into the Vi.LEIJCE area placed under it fields at
M01.'TELIM.A.~, VJ.I.ENCE, and CDERS. These areas were cleared of mines
and c-47 aircraft were landing supplies within 18 hours after the
fields came into Allied possession. A detachment from the 1110th
Q.uartermaster company, Service Group (.Avn) tock charge of the rations
a~~d V-80 g3-soline !:it the 1:C:t-.TELIMAR Airfield where the 322 Wing RAF
was stationed with Spitso 332nd Service Group Headquarters was set
up in VALENCE from where service functions at VJ.I.ENCE and GUERS fields
could be directed. The 16th Air Service Squadron moved to Vi.I.ENCE
airfield where it serviced the 79th Fighter Group and the 23rd Photo
Re con Squadron. ·rhe airfields were stocked with 18c, 000 gallons of
aviation gasoline and 260,000 rounds of cal • •50 arrmiunition while
40, COO gallons of v--80 gasoline and 90, OOC rat ions were handled by the
~uartermaster section. Truck convoys continued to bring up supplies
from the beach dumps but a large portion of the supplies in the area
were brought in by c-47's landing at VALENCE Airfield.

103. 41st Service Group operations at S.ALON - The 41st Service

Group oper6ting in the Si.LON area continued to supply fields in the
vicinity and open the supply channels to the newly captured and constr-
ucted fields. The coordination of all air freight traffic at the huge
ISTSES Airfield was controlled by the Group in pursuance of supplying
forward areas.
I
104. Airfields under the jurisdiction of the 41st Service Group
during•September included SALON, LA V.Ail..ONE, LA J.ASSE and ISTRF..S as
well as the emergency fields which had been established at the time
of the beachhead along.the RIVIERA 0oast.

105. combat uni ts in the 41st Air B1:.se Area at this time were the
~

47th Bomb Group at LA J.ASSE, serviced by the 303rd Service Squadron;

the 27th Fighter Bomber Group at SALON, serviced by the 57th Service
Squadron; the 324th Fighter Group and the 4th Fighter Group, F.AF, at
ISTRES, both serviced by the 1st Service Squadron. The 339 Fighter
Wing FAF and the 415th Night Fighter Squadron were at LA VALLON. By
10 September the 324th Fighter Group and 4th Fighter Group, F.AF, had
moved out of ISTRES and the 64th Troop Carrier Group had moved in.
The 339 Fighter Wing, F.AF, had left LAV.ALLON and the 417th Night
Fighter Squadron had joined the 415th Night Fighter Squadron at that
location.

- 47 -
Crew members of this TWelfth Air Force A-20 pitch in
to help unload rations they have just flown to a for-
we:rd field in Southern FRA!':CE. XII Air Force Service
COlI!lll8nd personnel trucked these rations to a quarter-
master 6Upply point for distribution. The 47th Light
bombardment GToup, flying .A-20 type aircraft, was used
to transpcrt supplies during the critical period, 1 6 -
16 September.

- 48 ..
A C-4'7 transport load of gasoline is transferred
to a truck at a forward French field. B-2.4 1 s
were used to build up supplies at BRON Airfield.
C-47's were used for more inaccessible fields,
i.e., those fields which were non-operational
and inaccessible tc the heavier B-2.4 1 s.

- 49 -
106. The Group also operated a transient mess at ISTRES and a
st&.ging area near PO~T D3 BOUC. .An ordm:.nce dump was established.
at EER!B, and a POL dump at ISI'IIES.

107. Ordnance ana. POL sup:plies wiloaded at either I.:JiRS'EII.LES or

FC''l'.l.T DE BOUC were trucked to the dumps or to tbe airfield at IS'l.1:RES
from where they were trans-shipped north by air. It was a matter of
convenience to truck direct to the airfield since C-47's were making
regular flights north from lSI'RES.

108. Five truck compenies came under the jurisdiction of the 4lst
service Group for supply, quarters, and maintenance, and Headquarters
XII Air Force Service cormnand for operations. In pursuance of their
missions they traveled 700, o89 miles and carried 27,585 tons of sup-
plies.

109. Air Force General.Depot established - Following the capture

of 1.lAP.SEllLES in the last week of August, an Air Force General Depot
was established there and operated by the SUpply,Squadron of the J8th
Air Depot Group. M.ARSEILI.ES was chosen as the location for the Air
Depot because of the port facilities, large warehouses and storage
yards, and excellent rail facilities. The depot did not'start to func-
tion until 19 September, the time between l September and 19 September
being used for stocking. previous to 19 September all requisitions
for Air corps supplies went back to Air Force General #J at NAB.ES
and the supplies thus requisitioned were flown direct to the service
units that had made the requisition.

110. All the service units had landed with JO day p~ckups. This
put them in a position to. supply the combat units for JO days without
excessive recourse to depots. props end wings became critical items
but by 24 September 1944 this situation was eased with the arrival of
such items.

111. Opening of fields in LYON area - The JJ2nd Group stationed

at V.ALENCE received word on J September 1944 that airdrornes in the
LYON area were to be used immediately/by the combat groups. These
fields were to be supplied by air.

112. .An advance section of JJ2nd Service Group Headquarters was

sent forward and set up at LA V.ALBOl':NE, midway between LYONS and ALJ3ER-
lEU on the highway connecting these towns. However, after 2 days, the
Headquarters personnel and a signal detachment moved to A!,IBERIEU leav-
ing a Quarter.u:.aster detachment at LA VALBOI\NE where good werehouse
space was available~ This• move was made to place the Group Headquarters
closer to XII Tactical Air Cor.1IIJS.nd, ,J\.dvance, which had set up in .AI·,IBER!EIT.

- 50 -
Air corps mechanics of a XII Air Force Service
com:nand squadron are shown removing a usable
wing from e damaged P-47 at a French airdrome
a few miles behind the seventh Army line.

• 51 -
uecbanics of a XII Air Force Service command squad-
are shown removing the dan:eged tail section of a
P..47 in a ban~r at a forw&rd French airfield.

- 52 -
It hed been found that daily liaison between the Service Group Com-
mander and the commanding General of XII Tactical Air command was
absolutely necessary and, since the service Group was dependent on
the Tactical Signal personnel for telephone lines of any length, it
was determined that the 2 advance headquarters should not be more
than 5 miles apart. Rear Headquarters of the Group remained at VAL-
ENCE, 75 miles south of LYONS, as both V.AI.ENCE and· MONI'ELTif.AR fields
continued to be used. The Group area extended, at this time, from
,AMBERIEU to MONTELIMAR over 150 miles to the south. Uany men and
·officers of the Group who had landed on D Day were still working at
the beaches approximately 250 road miles to the south.

113. stocking of Advanced Fields - Supply by air reached its

maximum in this new area. Four airdromes, LYON-BRON, AMBERlEO, LOY-
ETTES and SATALOS were being stocked simultaneously when weather
permitted. However, the concrete runway at LYON-BRON brought many
pl~nes into that field originally dispatched to ot~2rs. The three
B-24 groups which were being used to fly in supplies used the BRON
airfield. This field thus became the hub of the supply set-up.

114. The Group Engineering Officer was placed in charge of the

field. TWO hundred civilians were employed and trucks of the RAF,
Twelfth Air Force combat GrOlU)S, as well as all available Service
command vehicles, were pressed into use. French gu~rds were obtained
to prevent the theft of gasoline by civilians. Bands of FFI fre-
quently made attempts to truck away the badly needed fuel. Ordnance
personnel, quartermaster personnel, as well as service squadron per-
sonnel were used to receive and operate the supply dumps set up
around the field. B-24•s landed with an average load of 1,600 gal-
lons of gasoline, two 500 pound bombs, approximately 2,000 rounds
of cal • •50 ammunition and 18 empty gasoline drums making an average
load of 5.15 tons. Most of the planes were equipped with indivi-
dual kicker pumps which were used to pump gasoline out of the wing
tanks into gasoline drums. Everything had to function with clock-
like precision in order that the planes would be delayed the least
possible time for unloading. E)npty gasoline barrels bad to be ready
and properly placed at each hardstand where the B-24 1 s were scheduled
to park. It took an average of 20 to 25 minutes to unload gasoline,
bombs, and 8lllillunition from these aircraft. They flew in increments
of 50 at 30 minute intervals. A hundred heavy bombers frequently
landed at the field in less than 3 hours time. A day when a pre-
viously arranged schedule was maintained was the exception rather than
the rule, for due to weather conditions A-20 1 s and C-47's sent to
.AMBERIEU or LOYE!'I']S with supplies often had to be diverted to BRON.

115. The stocking of .A1iBERIEU Airfield, while on a somewhat ~11-

er scale, had its problems and is typical of much of the wcrk in

- 53 -
Bombs taken from en A-20 banb bey ere being
hauled to -p..47 1 s for their next mission.
~bile the XII Air Force service Corr.rr.and was
supplying the forward French eirdranes by
air , .A- 20 1 s u.ade daily shuttle runs to · bring
in ammunition.

- 54 -
A •Wagon Special pour Vina" solved the 100 octane sto-
rage problem at t bis forward French field. The gas
was pumped from .A-20 wing tanks into a tank truck,
then into the Wing Wagon until needed by the fighter-
bombers .

- 55 -
FRANCE, General Saville, commanding General of XII Tactical Air Com-
mand, the con::mand the group was servicing,_ called the Greup Com:nander
about nine o•clock one night in early September and stated that .AJi/IEER•
IEU Airfield would be usable the afternoon of the following day and
that he had ordered a tactical group to move the~e within 48 hours.
"mBERIEU .Airfield was 150 miles northwest of the Grcup Headquarters
at this time. Thirty six hours after the phone call, C-4,7 1 s.were be-
ing unloaded on the field. An officer who had been sent ahead to the
field had arranged for the help of more than a hundred FFI men to do
the uru.oadi~g until personnel to the south could be relieved. Rations,
v-80 gasoline end 100 octane gasoline and ammunition were all brought
in by air.

116. Reserve ration dump established - By using all transporta-

tion available, including A-2o•s, a small stock of rations was built
up near .AMBERIEU. This was held as a reserve for the forward area'
and was drawn upon when it was impossible to transport rations from
the beaches. Whenever weather or transportation would permit, the
stock at .AI·,::m:RIEU was replenished.

117. Air :sase ,Area revised, 17 September 1944 - Continued advances

· had necessitated a revision of Air Base ,Areas and on 17 September XII
Air Force Service Command designated new areas. The 4lst Air Base
.A;rea was designated as that area south of an east-west line through
l\.iENDE, MONrELDWl and G.AP. The 332nd .Area was north of the 41st Area
and south of an east-west line through V,ARENNES, MACON, and VOLTAIRE.
The 19th ,A;rea was north of the 332nd Area, and included Airfields at
DIJON, DOIE/T.AVAUX, and LUXEVll..

118. The 19th Service Group moves to DOLE - The 19th Service
Group 1noved from the eastern beach area to the DOLE section north of
.AMBERIEU. . This area was,. stocked from the beach fields by air and
this was augmented by truck shipments from the 332nd Service Group
stocl;.s in the LYON area. Sixty five thousand rations and class II
winter clothing for 7,000 men were shipped into the 19th area by truck
from the 332nd area. convoys with 100 octane gas arriving from the
SALON A,rea to the 332nd area were diverted to the 19th area for initial ,
stockage, as bad weather prevented planes from landing at DOIE for
several days after the field was opened. Fortunately, on 2 days, 30
September and 1 October, all aircraft of the 484th Bombardment Group
were able to land at the DOLE/T.AVJJJX Airfield. This was especially
opportune since the supply of 500 pound bombs, cal • •50 ammunition,
and ~00 octane gasoline was critically low at this time.

119. Units serviced by the 19th service Group during the month
of September included the 324 Wing, RAF, 339 Wing GAG, 415th Night.
Fighter Squadron, 23rd Photo. Recon. Unit, 111 Tactical Recon. Unit,
762nd Tac. Recon. (Ninth Air Force) and the 371st Fighter-Bomber
Group (Ninth Air Force). These units were stationed at airfields ~ear
BESANCON, DOLE, and DIJON, FRANCE.

- 56 -
 ,·
-~--
AmblZ.'('\IZ.1..1.

\Jo.
o:i, IZ. !;!S

'·!

'~- '-.
I
<
<"~.__;
:,
.r-•....;

-- --- ---
41s"t A\'f 'Bea se. A't'eo
---
l.o
\
3"o.'5Si.!-\_--~
':,1..1,~f'('C:H\ \.

A,,-'B01sci A'C'eos in So. F"("ance

17 Scz. ptcz.m \o e"° 1. C\44

-57-
120. The 332nd Service Group moves to LYON - The Rear Headquart-
ers of the 332nd Service Group was brought up to LYON-B~ON on 24 Sept-
ember 1944 as all fields in the VM.ID:CE area had by that time been ab.-
andoned by the tactical groups. SAT.ALOS end LOYEI'TES-fields were
stocked with 100 octane gasoline and ammunition by air. Q.uartermaster
supplies received at BROP and .Al:BERlEU were trucked to LA VALBONNE for
use of the uni ts at S.A.T.ALOS and LOYE'ITES.

121. The majority of supplies were shipped into this area by

plane but truck convoys continued to bring up supplies from the Base
Area 150 miles to the south. Operations here marked the peak supply
load of the 332nd Service Group in FRAHCE. .From 7 September to 1
October 1944 nearly 2,000,000 gallons of 100 octane gasoline, 250,000
gallons of v-80 gasoline, nearly 500,000 rations, 3,600 bombs, plus
4,000,000 rounds of cal • •50 ammunition were handled.

122. Service Groups wer·e scattered over a large area - The con-
stant movement of Service Groups resulted in a situation where they
had nobile units scattered over several hundred miles of territory.
The service units were often compelled to move and leave several air-
craft that needed repairs. In such cases a mobile unit was lefj; on
the spot to complete repairs or salvage. In one cese, the Service
Group had moved twice end the mobile unit was still et the same place.
BY 24 September, however, all mobile units belonging to Service
Groups stationed farther north were out of the MARSEII.LE Area. M:Cbile
units of the 16th, 1st and 57th service Squadrons had been in thif
area until 23 September 1944 but on that date the area was taken over
by the JO.3rd and 46th Service Squadrons and the J4th Depot Repair
Squadron. 1,iost of the repairable aircrsft had been taI:en care of and
practically all of the salvage had been cleaned up. The aircraft on ,
which repairs had not been completed were awaiting wirigs or props.
Requisitions had been submitted. and shipment by air from Depot #3 at
N.APLF..S was in pro 6-Tess.

123. Winter Clothing Issued - QJJ.artermaster planning fer the in-

vasion had not included an evacuation program and s.o.s. had been re-
quested to ship all woolen clothing requirements to FR,AKCE; When i,t
was decided that the TWelfth Air Force was to evacuate to ll'.ALY a
check with s.o.s. showed that there would be no woolen clothing in
IT.ALY and the issue would have to be made in FRANCE before departure.
It was found that the woolen clothing in FRANCE was scattered through-
out the beach dwnps. With the cooperation of the Base Section and
the use of air transport, an issue to 18,000 a~r corps troops was com-
pleted in 4 days.

- 58 -
A C-47 load of ammo is being loaded on a truck at a
forward French airdrome for delivery to a XII Air
Force Service command dump. Weather permitting, the
c-47's usually made two sorties each day to the for-
ward area. The first trip each day W£ S made from
ISTru!J . The second load was ordinarily picked up
from the beachhead airfields of RA!iiATEULLE and ST
RAPHAEL, these fields being approximately equi-dis-
tant with ISI'RE.S from the advanced fields to which
the supplies were being delivered.

- 59 -
Gasoline is being pumped from the A-20 (Hevoc)
into the tank truck at the extreme right while
a P-47 (Thunderbolt) on the left is being re-
fuelled by the truck at the same time.
124. .XII AJ.lSC ordered to Ir.ALY - A radio message was sent on
the night of JO September 1944 to all Twelfth Air Force units in
FRANCE directing that they proceed to the staging area at t~RS:SIL-
LES, reporting not later thar. 3 October 1944, for shipment back to
IT.ALY. .All uni ts, same of which were stationed as rr..uch as 400
miles to the north, met this J October deadltne.

125. Vehicles are left in FRANCE - At the same time a decision

was rendered that units would turn in all general purpose vehicles
.before embarkation and a reissue of vehicles was to be made upon ar-
rival in· ITALY. Steps were taken to prevent any such action takin~
place since past experience had taught that, where two base sect-
ions were involved in a trading program, the Air Force usually was
the loser in the deal, both in quality, and qu6ntity. However,
s.o.s. insisted that the vehicles were needed in FR.ANGE and that
there were replacement vehicles available in IT.ALY. consequently,
general purpose vehicles were turned in at the lt.ARSElll..E Staging
):!'ea. Units arrived at the staging area but were reluctant, however,
to release their vehicles until their last man stepped on an I.ST.
The result was chaos. Vehicles were turned in individually ond en-
masse by units at all hours of tbe day or night. ,Approximately
1,000 vehicles were turned in during the period 25 September to 12
October. The majority of these were handled during the period l Oct-
ober to 6 October.

126. The loss of vehicles in FRANCE greatly magnified the amount

of unladen equipment ordinarily involved in such moves and created a
problem at the port of debarkation at LEGFORN, i.e., the problem of
reception of the units et LEGHORN and the dlstribution of the personnel
and unladen equipment to their new bases. TO meet this circU!!lStance,
a procedure was evolved whereby drivers of vehicles turned in at MAR-
SEll.l..ES were flown to LEGHORN where they were issued new trucks and
were ready to receive the balance of the units upon arrival at the
port.

127. For the 1,000 vehicles turned in, many of which were in a
condition requiring excessive maintenance, new or rebuilt vehicles
were drawn. For example, 75% of the trucks, 2½ ton 6 x 6 cargo, were
new and the balance were trucks that had been rebuilt in the UNITED
STATES. The fears that the Air Force would not be properly cared for
proved to be unfounded.

SUMMARY

128. The principal probiem of XII Air Force Service coo.:mand dur- ,
ing the entire campaign of Southern FRANCE was that of transportation.
Proper planning had insured that supplies in proper amount were avail-
able but the delivery of these supplies to combat units was a con- I
stant stru&;le. The coordinating of movement of service units to for-

- 61 -
A staging area i~t?.ANCE from where XII
Air Force service Colllitland units left.
FRANCE to return to rrALY for duty.

- 62
wurd locations, the planning of stockage requirements in these for-
ward areas, the priority of movement of supplies, the decisions in"".
volving which supplies were to be moved by air and which w~re to be
moved by truck, the directives concerning the loads to be carried
by airplates and trucks and how they were to be loaded, all involved . I
a mass of detail. The coordination of these details wos handled by
XII Air Force Service Comnand Headquarters, Advance, from its head-
q_uerters at AJX. The net result was that DURJNG THE ENTIRE FERIOD
OF OFERJ..TIOJ\E NOT ONE OR J.lN P.ARI' OF A ?:~ISSION W.AS CANCELLED DUE TO
:UCK OF SUTILIBS.
129. Early in-the campaign it became quite obvious that the
Seventh .A:r!my would not be able to supply the. Air corps with common
usage items or transportation as originally planned. FROMD DAY UN-
TlL n II.US 4.5. J,.T WRICH TTI.1E XII AIR FORCE SERVICE COM!:Sf.AND CE.ASED or·-
ERATIClB, EVERY ITEM OF SUP.PLY, INCLUDING AU, C01iivTN USAGE ITEMS RE-
QUIP.ED AND USED BY THE Am FORCES, WAS RECEIVED, STCRED 1 AND DISTRI-
BUTED BY THE CO!-.'MAND WJTH THE UTILIZATION OF AIR FORCE EG:UIT-'.Mfil:T AND
FERSONNEL ONLY. (The only exception was the procurenent of a limited
amount of v-80 ~soline from the .Army dump at .AI,IBEIUEU). With m.inor
exceptions, all units were on a continuous diet of "B" rations during
the entire period. ·rhe Air Force, in addition to supplying itself,
also delivered some critical items of supply to the forwerd army units.

130. Air Transport was the medium that had made delivery of sup-
plies in sufficient quantities and on time possible. The rapid advance
of the Army with the consequent placing of Air Force combat units on
forward fields had entirely excluded the possibility of entirely solv-
ing the problem by use of truck transportation. Destruction of brid-
ges by air power had not only harassed the enemy but had likewise work-.
ed. to our own disadvantage when it became necessary to use the highway
systems. Thi~ had also applied to the railroads and it was not until
the last day of XII Air. Force Service Connand operations that the rail-
way was open to the DIJON area from the south. (The first trains had
departed from the FROVEKCE Base Supply Area on 20 September 1944 and
arrived et destination on l October 1944 where they were unloaded by
service units of XII Air Force Service command). The use of air tr.?.:as-
port solved the supply problem.

131. Tnere follows a schedule showing types and quantities, in

tens,. of supplies shipped by air:

- 63 -
 From rr.ALY and CORSICA to Southern FRANCE

Type v-80 100 Oct. Bc:mba &

Aircre.ft Rations Gasoline Gasoline ,AJIImo Misc. TOtal
,· B-24 1270.5 579.5 269 2119
C-47 53 92.5 347.5 98.5 157 748.5

Totals 53 92.5 1818 678 426 2867.5

From Base Supply Area in Southern FRANCE to advance air

base areas:

Type v-80 100 Oct. Bombs & ~cl.II

Aircraft Rations Gasoline Gasoline .Ammo (Clothitlg) :Misc. TOtal

A--20 35 55.5 240.5 150 481

B-24 1246.8 1017.5 114-.2 2378.5
c--47 824 497 3o87 419.5 186.6 420.5 5434.6

.Totals 859 552.5 4574.3 1437 186.6 684.7 8294.1

Total tonnage of supplies transported by air:

Rations 912
v-80 gasoline 645
QM Class II (clothing) 186.6
100 octane gaso~ine 6192.3
Bombs and ,Am!nUnition 21·15
:Miscellaneous 1110.7
Total tonnage 11161.6

C-47 Aircraft operated from 6 Septerrber to 10 October 1944.

B-24 Aircraft operated from 10 Septenilier to 22 September 1944.
A-20 Aircraft operated from 10 September to 16 September 1944.
484th ro Aircraft operated from 22 September to 2 October 1944.

132. -Truck ~ransportation carried a large share of the load and

its contribution was as follows:

From the beachhead dumps, FORI' DE BOUC and Base Supply .Area
to the ·advanced airdron:es.
 Item cf supply Tonnage

Rations 1,874
v-80 gasoline 1,804
QJ:1 Class II (clothing) 30
lOC octane gasoline 5,520
Bombs and ,Ammunition 450
11:iscellaneous (Signal, .Medical, 8,448
Engineer, Air corps Technical
Supplies)

Total tonnage 18,126

133.. Railroad transportation was never a large factor in solving
the trans::;;ortation problem of XII .Air Force Service Command. Limited
use had been :r.iade of the railroad from the beachhead area to the SALON
aree, but rail transportation to the fields to the north was not avail-
able. Representatives of Xll .AFSC, however, did bid for tonnage on
behalf of the IX Air Force Service comr:iand, when, with representatives
of that co::i::-:and, they attended the first rsil tonnage meeting of the
sixth Anny Group. TWclve hundred tons per day were accepted for ship-
ment to the most northern Air Force units, and upon acceptance of this
bid the critical period of transportation in southern FR»JCE ::nay be
said to have ended,

134. The termination of the struggle for transportation and sup-

ply was coincident with the withdrawal of units of the Twelfth Air
Force from southern FRA..~CE. The Ninth Air Force which took over the
duties of T",1elfth Air Force on 1 October 1944 found a net-work of well
stocked airfields and was assured of an adequate future supply by railO.

.l

............... '• ...............................................• ....... .

• see ,Annex "D• for table of supplies left in F~~CE by XII AFSC.
 BUilD UP .AND EXPENDITlRE OF

15 Feb 1 Mn• 15 Mu- 1 Apr 15 Apr 1 !lay

Bomb, 1000 lb GP 12 53 395 1408 1940 2421

Boob, 1000 lb SAP 0 0 0 0 0 0

Bomb, 500 lb GP 3482 5898 11227 19185 24-266 23308

Bomb, 250 lb & 300 lb GP 241+5 14730 14653 17670 28545 34009

Bomb, 100 lb GP 0 4320 4320 3524 4655 4160

Cluster F.rag ML & Al 0 1577 1577 6554 18466 20072

Bomb, 260 lb Frag. , 0 0 0 0 0 0

Cluster Incd. 500 lb Ml.7 0 0 0 0 0 0

Bomb, Smoke W 100 lb 0 1314 3468 5766 5766 5164

cart. ca1. .50 451:M 2098M 3862M 5032M 4647M 4961M

Cart. Cal. .30 73M 381M 665r,r 1346M 1475M 1300M

-

- 66 -
 .AM.DNITION SWCKS ON CORSICA

15 1ey 1 J:UDe 15 :rune 1 July 15 J:uly 1 Aug 15 Aug 1 Sept

3832 5687 11398 15377 8907 4657 5731 7485

95 1017 2025 1655 1311 1265 935 645

28031 'Z'/587 19466 16959 13334 9079 11128 9949

3_0421 29408 28504 21714 30210 26724 32557 '219'Zl

13326 19633 22929 2'2429 .19486 16395 19347 15157

,II 24253 26667 19409 26865 'Z'/416 24986 24030 17643

0 0 0 439 111 133 75, 382

0 25 25 821 1133 496 774 2497

5736 12413 5400 6574 4467 4570 4175 3662

i]
11;
,,

4961M 5256M 4748M 4000:M 3678M · 6998:M 4820M I'

4552M l,t
l·j
11,

i:
11;;
1349M 1018M lJllM lJ.45M 1075M 123ljJ:, 1228:M 1186.M
[!
(i
p
ti
!j
i
i
i'i'
!1
;,1

J
!J'I·
ij
i
:1

- 67 - ~
i1l

I:
I;,,
I
,.;I
11
i'
ii•
 Al:l'JEX. "B"

TC1l'.AL JJ,MJNITION RF,Q.U!REi'.miTS FOR 11 :IllliGOON 1

CorNc,y D D ./, 5 D ./, 10

'

Period D to D .j 12 D,113 to Dll7 D,tl8 to DI 'Z"j r

Q,ty 'Ibns Q,ty Tons. Q,ty Tons

1000 lb GP 375 176 374 176 1255 589 ,'

500 lb GP 1050 256 1047 255 2821 691 i

250 lb GP 0 0 0 0 0 0 i

Clusters Frag Bomb 45 4 180 13 355 27

'

Smoke, W.P. 30 2 94 6 187 13

'
Oal • •50 498M 81 312M 51 984M 161

Cal • •30 0 0 0 0 32M 1.5

Pyrotechnics - 1 - 1 - 3.J,1.

M.sc. Fuze Components - 2 - 2 - 3.6

-
Totals 522 504 J.489.5

- 68 -
i ,
'
D-, 15 D -, 20· D ./ 25 Totals
I
I

lI
D,l24 to D,132 . D,133 to D,140 D,141 to D,146 D to D ./ 46

I . Q,ty Tons Q.ty Tons Q,ty Tons Q.ty Tons

II
I

1251 587 1188 558 1080 507 5523 2593

.II
'
I 4186 1019 3326 811 2598 634 15028 3666
I
I

lai+ 87 705 90 605 7l 1984 254

I
I

1428 106 J.450 108 2061 154 5519 412

I
'
I 445 31 4.59 32 618 43 1833 127
I

.
;
1183M 194 692M 113 525M 86 4194M 686

I 0 0 0 0 35M 1 67M 3

- 2.6 - 4 - 6 - 18

- 2-4 J. 5 - 6 !""' 22

2030. 1721 -1514 · 7781

 TOT.AL ovm ALL AVIATION GASOLINE AND
D Co!!Y'oy D,15 Convoy 10 Convoy
asoline Gasoline soline
Arrival Unit Required Required quired
D tbru D/11 thru 16 thru
!Bto o 10 1
'Ol6 324 Wing 54,000 45,000 44,000
i~
'Ol6 111 T/R Sq 26,000 20,000 20,000
'Ol6 2/33 T/R Sq 26,000 20.000 20.000
D,17 322 Wing 45,000 1t5,ooo 47,500
Trans Actt 40,000
'Dl9 'Zl Ftr Gp 60.000 110,000 125,000
'Dl9 324 :rrtr Gp 60,000 110,000 125,000
'Oll2 23 .P/R Sq 22,000 29,000
n120· 251 Wing 45,000
D,120 57 Ftr Gp 110,000
Dj20 414 NF Sq 22,000
D,120 415 NF Sq 22,000
'D124 86 Ftr Gp
'D124 4 F.G.(Fr)
D,128 47 Bomb Gp
'Dl45 340 Bomb Gp
1 G
Total Computed Requirements
10% less factor plus 3,35 tona
271,000 372,000 649,500
·-
:f lie. D& 1 0 000 000 6 000
Totals by Convoys 401,000 515,000 714,500
Totals in Tons per Convoy
(315 gals :r,er ton) l.'Zl3 1,635 2,268

AVIATION OIL TONNAGE

1120 Aviation oil (tons) 38 49 68

1100 Jw" t n 6 8 11
Totals by corrvoy 44 57 79 -

- 70 -
i
i
ANNEX "C"

· OIL REQ,umE}@Nl'S FOR PERIOD D. TO D,'46

D,115 Com'oy D/20 Convoy D,12.5 Convoy

Gasoline . Gasoline Ge.soline
Hsquired .Required Required
D,124 thru . ~33 1hru D,141 thru

49,500 44,000 33,000

22,500 20,000 15,000
22,500 20,000 15,000
49,500 . 44,000 33,000
85,000 . 80,000 60,000
117,000 104,000 78,000
117,000 104,000 78,ooo
22,500 . 20,000 15,000
10,500 44,000 33,000
159,000 104.,000 78,ooo
31,500 20.000 15,000
31,500 20,000 15,000
· 210,000 110,000 78,000
210,000 110,000 78,ooo
96,000 · 95,000 60,c.,oo
68,000
68 o
1,294,000 939,000 820,000 4,345,500
, -------=1~--=o.:-oo____.___1&0;:. :o=o......_ - - - 4_ _ _a-:,a_oo_o~-----------.....o_o=o......__
1,42.3,000 · 1,033,000 902,000 4,988,500

4..517 . 3,279 2,863

AVIATION uIL TONNAGE

135 98 86 474

22 16 14 77
157 114 100 551

- 71 -
 .ANNEX 11D 11

SUPPLIES

Shown below is an itemized listing of' the major supply items

which were turned over to the IX .Air l!'orce Service Command upon the

100 oct. Empty

Ga§Q;Y.~ _ll20 011 1100 Qi! Drums
(gals.) (gals.) (gals.). (each)

St. Raphael 70,000 1..522 500 705

Sisteron
•••Ouers
24,400
31,000
477
1,424
-
Istres 88,635 1,040 735 14,~5
Salon 56,250 1,485 1,053
•Ia J'asae 46,200 2,100 975
la Vallon 19,300 515 890 1,070
.-Valence 11,600 3,045 1,562
M:>ntelimar 600 200
Lyon/Bron 634,620 22,735 485 4,424
•.Amberieu 345,100 3,950 1,210
loyettes 71,175 2,090 1,563
Dijon 78,450 1,320 2,230 412
I..uxeuil 39,590 4,943 800 550
*Dole 48,650 1,800 10 513
••Besancon 24,900 370
'lbtal 1,589,870 47,392 7,674 23.492
•
Dunmg1
Dump No. 1
Dump No. 2
979,410
6,890
10..565
56,364
6,029
6,960
-
12,000
'lbtal 986,300 66,929 12,989 12,000

GRAND TOTAL1 2,576,170 114,321 20,663 40,492

• Air Force Quartermaster Air Base .krea Supply Points •

•• Decision was rendered by Tactical .Air Command to abandon Bes-
anaon just as initial stockage was begun •
••• .Airfield used by RAF Spitfire Wing of the Coastal .Air Force •

'lhe above does not include supplies in transit or those which

were being discharged i'rom cargo vessels or awaiting discharge.

- 72 -
 .A!·JJEX "D"

SOFPLIES

departure of this command :trom France, indicating not only the quan-
ti ties of such supplies, but also the location.

I.ong &mse Tanks 500 lb.

100 gal, 110 gal, 150 gal. 50 Caliber Bombs Gasoline Rations
(each) . (each) (each) (each) (each) (gals.) (each)

-
47 18 647,000 114 . -
1,870 14-,505
24,979
-
48,665
~
:
107
1,233,000
183 ,ooo
1,842
282
-.
52,000 83,000
5
198 2.51,000 .375
8

55
6
48 8 358,000 -78 29,000
-
22,000

319 173 1,064 2,672,000 107,849 168,170.

30 .36,000 121

30 .36,000 121

349 17.3 1,064 2,708,000 2,812 107,849 168,170

73
 1·

,.
,,
··~ ·\"' ~ ,;

REPRODUCED BY 941 ST ENGR. BN. MAY 1945

COMBINED ARMS
I~

11111;111i FORT~imll I
3 1695 0
I
 7

'

'

_,