FW On the Habermas cards.

First, no link, it is impossible for all affected beings to express their opinions and consent on every moral claim. Not all humans discuss moral claims we deem to be true. No one consents or disusses every moral claim. Following this logic, moral claims could not exist. Second, turn it. This means it would not be moral to incarcerate any criminal because they never consented to the agreement. Third, turn. This means it would be immoral to provide a benefit to any group without every single person or animal in that group discussing it and agreeing to it. If this was true we wouldnt have humanitarian aid groups or government benefits. Fourth, no link. There are certain things that, for example, affect all humans. Like the morals to killing, yet we do not all discuss these things, meaning under his FW natural intuitions are disregarded. On Habermas 2. Turn it. If my army is alone in a foreign country where we cannot communicate with the natives then there would be no moral code to stop us from massacring eachother because we cannot discuss morals On Benhabib, Cross apply my turn to habermas to. The absence of rights due to lack of discourse would still eliminate any moral code. Contention level I meet Animals can communicate rights claims to us through cries. Korsgaard 5
(Christine M., Arthur Kingsley Porter Professor of Philosophy at Harvard, The Sources of Normativity, 1996) From here the argument proceeds as it did in the case of other people. I wont spell out the details here. Roughly it will look like this: I first point out to you that your animal nature is a fundamental form of identity on which your human identity depends. A further stretch of reflection requires a further stretch of endorsement. If you dont value your animal nature, you can value nothing. So you must endorse its value. Perhaps that by itself doesnt show us that we have obligations to the other animals, since the value could still be private. To show us that we

animals must have a way of impressing their value upon us, the way we impress our value on each other when we ask,
have obligations, consciousness and make us think. But that isnt a problem, is it ?

How would you like it if someone did that to you? They must be able to intrude into our

The cries of an animal are no more mere noise than the words of a person. An animals cries express pain, and they mean that there is a reason to change its condition. Another animal can obligate you in exactly the same way another person can. It is a way of being someone that you share. So of course we have obligations to animals. This is sufficient to prove communication because animals are aware within themselves that suffering is bad and thus implicitly agree to relief from it. Also, I meet

Even non rational animals have a sense of self and value themselves Korsgaard [Fellow Creatures: Kantian Ethics and our Duties to Animals, delivered in the
Tanner Lectures by Christine M. Korsgaard, 2004] Of course

some people will be tempted to say that only an animal with a self conception can be said to matter to itself. The difficulty with using that idea to
draw any hard moral lines is that the idea of self-conception is not univocal. I have identified, as

the form of self-consciousness characteristic of rational beings, a conception of ones inner states and activities as ones inner states and activities, an ability to say this is how I am now disposed to act, or to think.

That is a form of self-consciousness because one can situate oneself within ones inner world, identify oneself as the subject of ones own representations. Mirror recognition might be said to be the external analog to that: a conception of ones outer states and activities as such, an ability to think something like this is how I look. An animal who can recognize itself in the

But some animals who lack the capacity for mirror recognition may be successfully named and called, and that might be thought to imply a certain sense of self. Animals who know their place in a social order or hierarchy also seem to have a certain sense of self, in the sense that they can situate themselves in that social hierarchy. Even animals who seem to know when a threat or offer is directed at or to them must have some sort of primitive self-conception. The description may be more appropriate to animals with a more highly developed consciousness and sense of self. But any animal who experiences its own good and pursues it as the end of its actions to that extent matters to itself. This is a still deeper sense of good for than we can apply to the plant. When we say that something is naturally good for an animal, we mean that it is good from its point of view.
mirror can situate itself in the outer, public world, in the gaze of others.

Any animal knows that it must protect itself and thus inherently agrees to action that would protect itself. Animals do this naturally.