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Dimensions of the self-concept: A source of further

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Journal of Youth and Adolescence, Vol. 13, No. 4, 1984

Dimensions of the Self-Concept: A Source of Further

Distinctions in the Nature of Self-Consciousness
Gregory C. Elliott,

Received September 1, 1983; accepted June 18, 1984

This study distinguished between forms o f self-consciousness (private self-

consciousness and social anxiety) and investigated the effect o f self-esteem,
vulnerability to criticism, and the tendency to fantasize on each. Utiliz-
ing a sample o f adolescents (age 12 to 19years), a structural equation analy-
sis using unobserved variables revealed that, as expected, vulnerability to
others" criticism heightened both private self-consciousness and social anxi-
ety. In contrast, the tendency to fantasize in everyday life increased only pri-
vate self-consciousness, and low self-esteem led directly only to increased
social anxiety. Further, results showed that self-esteem had an appreciable
indirect effect on both private self-consciousness and social anxiety, as medi-
ated by vulnerability and the tendency to fantasize, indicating that the effect
o f self-esteem (a primary motivator) was more complex than an analysis o f
direct effects would indicate. Implications for our understanding o f self-
consciousness and the self-concept are discussed.

My deepest thanks go to Morris Rosenberg, whose insights into the self-concept were indispens-
able, both in conceptualization and in analysis. I also thank John A. Fleishman and Edward
Z. Dager for their constructive comments on early drafts of this article. Any errors remaining
are my responsibility.
This study was supported by NIMH Grant R01 MH27747-06 awarded to Morris
Rosenberg. The data were analyzed using the facilities of the Computer Science Center, University
of Maryland, College Park.
~Department of Sociology, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island 02912. Professor
Elliott received his Ph.D. in sociology at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. His current major
interest is in the structure of the self-concept.
285

0047-2891/84/0800-0285S03.50/0 © 1984 Plenum Publishing Corporation

286 Ellioll

INTRODUCTION

Self-awareness is the condition in which the self is the focus o f a per-

son's own attention. All of us have, at one time or another, been acutely
aware o f ourselves. We can be embarrassed for having committed a social
gaffe, we can be preoccupied with the impression we are making on others,
or we can be examining our motives for particular behaviors. These are but
a few o f the many instances in which our attention is directed inward, toward
ourselves, rather than outward, toward the people and things in our environment.
The environment can be a powerful source o f self-awareness. Duval
and Wicklund (1972; Wicklund, 1975) have developed a theory delineating
the situational factors that lead to self-awareness and the consequences o f
that state. According to the theory, any stimulus that causes a person to take
him- or herself as an object of attention will lead to self-awareness. For ex-
ample, seeing oneself in a mirror or appearing before a camera causes peo-
ple to be self-aware. Argyle (1969) proposed a number of situational factors
that could lead to self-awareness, including mere presence, individuation,
evaluation, and self-confrontation.
However, the environment may not be the only stimulus to self-
awareness. Some people may be chronically aware o f themselves and their
behavior during an interaction, regardless of its nature; for others, it may
be extremely rare for them to focus their attention on themselves, even
when situational factors facilitate the process. Buss (1980) makes a distinc-
tion between the state o f self-awareness, which is situationally induced and
transient, and the trait o f self-consciousness, which is the person's reasona-
bly stable disposition to focus his or her attention on the self.
The purpose o f this study is to further our understanding o f disposi-
tional self-consciousness by exploring its relationship with certain aspects of
the self-concept, using a sample o f young people (ages 12-19 years). One
must distinguish the notion o f self from that of self-concept. Mead (1934)
saw the self as a process of interaction with oneself through the conversation
between the "I" and the "Me." [See also Blumer (1969).] However, sociolo-
gists also agree that there is a mental structure called the self-concept: "the
totality of the individual's thoughts and feelings with reference to himself
as an object" (Rosenberg, 1979, p. 7). Most of the research on the self-concept
has heretofore been focused on self-esteem (Wells and Marwell, 1976; Wylie,
1979), but Rosenberg (1979) has called for research in the self-concept that
goes "beyond self-esteem."
More is needed, however, than a simple expansion o f our analysis o f
the self-concept. Even when other aspects of the self-concept are considered,
most of the research has focused on the study of specific dimensions in iso-
lation. The result is an ever-lengthening list o f elements and dimensions com-
Dimensions of the Self-Concept 287

prising the self-concept. Elliott et al. (1984) have called for a change in the
focus in self-concept research. Specifically, they suggest that the task be-
fore us is to move to a study of the self-concept structure (i.e., how these
various bits and pieces are arranged with reference to one another) and to
formulate and test models that explore the causal nexus of these dimensions.
Some research has begun to address this issue. McGuire and Padawer-
Singer (1976) and Rosenberg (1965) have shown that various components
of the self-concept are differentially salient or important to the individual;
Stryker (1968) proposed that certain identity elements are preeminent in a
person's self-concept. Still, this is merely the beginning of a change in focus
from "lists" of loosely related self-concept elements to a structural approach,
in which dimensions are posited to be causally related in theoretically
meaningful ways. The present paper presents a model specifying theoreti-
cally plausible connections among several fundamental aspects of the self.
The notion of self-consciousness as a disposition may be new, but it
has its roots in our earliest understandings of the self. Cooley's (1902) no-
tion of the "looking-giass self" as a basis for self-observation and Mead's
(1934) delineation of the process of role-taking in order to understand one-
self from the others' vantage point indicate that sociologists have long been
aware of our ability to make ourselves the object of our own focused atten-
tion. Recently, Rosenberg has argued that the trait of self-consciousness is
an important aspect of the self; it is "recognized in experience, implicated
in behavior, and related to emotional disturbance" (Rosenberg, 1979, p. 283).
As such, self-consciousness is likely to be associated with dimensions of the
self-concept in theoretically meaningful ways. In particular, we focus on the
effects of self-esteem, vulnerability to criticism, and the tendency to fanta-
size on self-consciousness. Others have examined the zero-order relationships
between self-consciousness and various personality traits (e.g., Turner et
al., 1978). The major distinction to be made here is that the present effort
is more focused in its attempt to look within the self-concept and to locate
self-consciousness within a theoretically derived network of important dimen-
sions. This will simultaneously yield evidence about the structure of the self-
concept and provide an indication of the construct validity of the measures of
self-consciousness used herein.
The present study differs from earlier studies of self-consciousness in
several ways. First, there is a difference in focus. Many past studies involve
situational self-awareness, not dispositional self-consciousness (Duval and
Wicklund, 1972; Wicklund, 1975). Those that do involve self-consciousness
more often focus on its behavioral consequences (Buss and Scheier, 1976;
Scheier et al., 1978; Turner and Peterson, 1977). In contrast, the present study
investigates the relationship between self-consciousness and certain dimen-
sions of the self-concept. Second, whereas previous research has been based
288 Elliott

largely on experimental design, the present study explores the issue by

means of sample survey analysis. Third, the present study extends the scope
o f investigations o f self-consciousness by using a sample o f adolescents.

Varieties of Self-Consciousness

Our everyday use of the term "self-consciousness" makes us realize that

there is more than one way in which a person's attention can be self-focused.
In one form of self-consciousness, the individual tends to be especially aware
o f his or her own internal states. For example, some people seem to focus
more on their values or are in closer touch with their feelings than are others.
This preoccupation with one's own psychological attributes is called private
self-consciousness. In contrast, a second form of self-consciousness is charac-
terized by a general concern with the self as a social actor who is a stimulus
for others' behavior. For example, some people are very aware that others
will react to the impression they convey in an interaction, and so they or-
chestrate their performance accordingly. This realization of one's status as
the object of other people's attention is called public self-consciousness. Fenig-
stein et al. (1975) have found empirical support for a discrimination between
private and public self-consciousness. Conceptually, the distinction between
them is that, in private self-consciousness, the person's attention is on his
or her personal characteristics, whether or not others are aware of them,
whereas in public self-consciousness, the person is aware that others will react
to him or her as a social object, even though particular internal states are
not at issue. ~
Fenigstein et al. (1975) discovered that public self-consciousness must
be distinguished from social anxiety. Socially anxious people not only are
aware that others react to them as social stimuli; they also are apprehensive
about this reaction. Buss (1980) identified four types o f social a n x i e t y -
embarrassment, shame, shyness, and audience a n x i e t y - b u t they all involve
discomfort due to the scrutiny o f others. Note that public self-consciousness
is a necessary but not sufficient condition for social anxiety. Socially anx-
ious people are presumably always publicly self-conscious, but people
can be aware o f the fact that others are attending to them without being wor-
ried about it. The items comprising the measure we use might be viewed as
reflecting social anxiety, because they involve concern and discomfort as the
object o f someone's scrutiny (see the Appendix).

~This distinction is also made in the common parlance. The Random House Dictionary (1975,
p. 1193) lists two distinct definitions of self-conscious: (1) "excessively conscious of oneself as an
object o f observation by others," and (2) "conscious of oneself or one's own thoughts, well-being,
etc."
Dimensions of the Self-Concept 289

The Development of Self-Consciousness

A large body of evidence, presented by Rosenberg (1979, Chap. 9), in-

dicates that the onset of adolescence is a time of great disturbance in self-
concept development. At about age 12 years children show a distinct decrease
in self-esteem and self-concept stability and, similarly, sharp increases in
depression and self-consciousness. For some dimensions, this disturbance
abates in later adolescence, but not for self-consciousness. One explanation
for this phenomenon is found in Rosenberg's (1979, Chap. 8) discussion of
the development of exterior and interior components of the self-concept. Prior
to adolescence, children seem to conceive of the self almost wholly in terms
of exterior components, such as observable behaviors, abilities, and physi-
cal characteristics. In contrast, adolescents are more likely to refer to the
self in terms of a psychological interior and deal with such notions as
thoughts, feelings, and traits. Rosenberg (1979, pp. 217-222) explains this
difference by noting that it is in adolescence that people develop the ability
to introspect; the young child is a "radical empiricist," responding to exter-
nal stimuli, but the adolescent is a "psychological clinician," able to reflect
on and contemplate internal stimuli. In addition he argues that, although
both older and younger children can understand themselves in terms of a
social exterior, only the older children have the communicative skills, which
follow from cognitive development, to be able to understand the self as com-
posed of psychological dimensions. Finally, the ability to conceptualize is
a phenomenon emerging only in adolescence. Learning to synthesize and or-
ganize thoughts and feelings into appropriate concepts comes with adoles-
cence and means that people can view themselves qualitatively differently
than when they were younger. In terms of the distinctions made above, Rosen-
berg's presentation of the emergence of an interior component of the" self-
concept delineates the development of private self-consciousness.
To understand the development of public self-consciousness (and by
extension, social anxiety), we can make use of Mead's (1934) work on the
development of the self. According to Mead, there is a social development
of the self that parallels the psychological. In the egocentric stage, the young
child is self-centered but not self-conscious. Progressing to what Mead calls
the game stage, the child develops the ability to take the role of the other.
In such role-taking, a person views his or her own possible acts from the
other's vantage point. At first, this is limited to specific others in the child's
environment. Later, the child begins to take the role of the "generalized other"
by abstracting from particular referent others a composite perspective from
which to view the self. Just as the advent of interior components of the self-
concept leads to private self-consciousness, so the ability to take the role of
the other, to see oneself as others do, makes possible public self-consciousness.
By adolescence, children have developed a sociocentric view of the self
290 Ellioll

through role-taking. In seeing themselves from the others' perspective, they

can become aware o f themselves as the object of others' scrutiny; this new
awareness of themselves is the emergence of public self-consciousness. Fur-
ther, realizing that one is the focus o f others' attention can become threaten-
ing and generate a good deal of anxious concern. If so, the newly developed
public self-consciousness will evolve into social anxiety.
Self-consciousness (in any form) is one of the important consequences
of individual development. Adolescence marks a striking phase for this aspect
o f the self. Therefore, one might expect that analysis of the relationships
between self-consciousness and certain dimensions o f the self-concept dur-
ing this critical development phase would be especially fruitful. For this rea-
son, we focus our analysis on adolescents (age 12-19 years).

The Self-Concept and Self-Consciousness

Self-consciousness should be related to certain dimensions of the self-

concept. This paper does not attempt to explore the full range o f self-concept
dimensions; rather, it is limited to a consideration o f a small number o f the-
oretically meaningful self-concept components that might have a bearing on
self-consciousness.
We focus on three such dimensions: self-esteem, vulnerability to criti-
cism, and the tendency to fantasize. These self-concept dimensions were ex-
ogenous variables in an earlier structural analysis o f the self-concept (Elliott,
1982), which investigated their effects on the tendency to present an inauthen-
tic self to others. Results showed that, as predicted, each self-concept dimen-
sion except private self-consciousness significantly affected the tendency to
present a false front. The model presented herein is an elaboration o f the
structural model analyzed by Elliott (1982). In particular, we posit a struc-
tural model in which self-esteem is hypothesized to affect self-consciousness
in adolescents both directly and indirectly, through the intervening dimen-
sions of vulnerability and the tendency to fantasize.
At the outset, we spell out the theoretical reasons for expecting these
dimensions to influence self-consciousness. In advancing these arguments, we are
not oblivious to the possibility that in some cases the causal specification
might be different. In particular, we realize that these relationships might
often be reciprocally causal in nature. Here, we simply advance certain rea-
sons for expecting the dominant direction of causal influence to be as indi-
cated. The model presented is viewed as a theoretically sensible and plausible
causal ordering but not the only possible one. Whether the proffered model
is more appropriate than others awaits the analysis of a longitudinal study
or the advent o f clearly appropriate instrumental variables for a nonrecur-
sire model.
Dimensions of Ihe Self-Concep! 291

Further, we distinguish between private self-consciousness and social

anxiety in analyzing the impact o f the selected self-concept dimensions.
Research has generally revealed differences in kinds o f self-consciousness by
finding low correlations between measures o f each kind or by showing how
each kind differentially affects behavior (Buss, 1980). One further way of dis-
tinguishing kinds of self-consciousness is to examine the relationships posit-
ed by the model to see if the self-concept dimensions affect one kind of
self-consciousness and not another. We discuss the effects of each self-
concept dimension on private self-consciousness and social anxiety.
Vulnerability. One aspect of the self along which people can vary is
their vulnerability to criticism. Some are able to take criticism and even use
it as a spur to self-improvement. It is not that they expect none; it is that
they know how to deal with criticism. Others are more thin-skinned. They
are more prone to find criticism threatening and to react to it with with defen-
siveness and hostility.
We expect that vulnerability should have an impact on private self-
consciousness. Criticism directs attention to deficiencies in the self. People
who are bothered more by criticism are apt to concentrate on their inner
characteristics. In attending to their thoughts, feelings, and traits, they can
identify those that might cause them trouble and those that can help them
avoid it. Those less vulnerable, by contrast, need not focus their attention
on themselves so much. Feeling that they know how to deal with most
criticism, they do not have to preoccupy themselves with their own personal
qualities and can turn their attention elsewhere.
Vulnerability would also be expected to have a bearing on social anxie-
ty. Those who feel susceptible to criticism should worry greatly about the
scrutiny of others, since other people are the sources o f most criticism. Their
discomfort in most social situations should be quite high, because they have
difficulty coping with negative reactions. The more bothered they are by criti-
cism, the more anxious they should be in social situations, which potentially
are sources of it. On the other hand, those for whom vulnerability is low
should not be so anxious. Because they are not unduly disturbed by criti-
cism, they need not worry so much about whether other people find things
wrong with them.
Fantasy. All o f us have at one time or another operated in a world o f
fantasy, reveling in unconstrained imaginings of whom we would like to be,
free from normative and reality constraints. Some of us spend more time
in this imaginary world than do others. Especially during adolescence, when
the self is so much an object of concern, youngsters may be "trying out" rad-
ically different selves to see if they are viable, or they may simply be escap-
ing from a disappointing perceived self.
It is reasonable to expect the tendency to fantasize to be positively related
to private self-consciousness. In the world of imagination, the self is usually
292 Elliott

the central character. Fantasizing is likely to involve seeing the self in excit-
ing situations, with heroic or other desirable characteristics. Attention is
directed toward the self, usually as one wishes it to be. But the fantasy self
inevitably comes up against the perceived real self, to the characteristic dis-
advantage of the latter. As a result, fantasy focuses the individual's attention
on what he or she is like, rather than directing attention to external events.
In contrast, an active fantasy life may have little bearing on social anxi-
ety. It has no direct connection with worrying about what others think o f
us. Because fantasizing is an act of introspection that involves a self that
others are unlikely ever to see, it is reasonable to predict that social anxiety
will be neither enhanced nor inhibited by the tendency to fantasize.
Self-Esteem. Global self-esteem, as a dimensions o f the self-concept,
is the person's evaluation of his or her own self. People vary in the extent
to which they evaluate themselves positively, and so have high self-esteem,
or negatively, with resultant low self-esteem (James, 1890/1950).
When considering the general notion of self-consciousness (the tendency
to make oneself the focus of one's own attention), one might expect that
self-esteem would have a negative effect on self-consciousness. Some research-
ers (e.g., Murphy, 1947; Barron, in Jahoda, 1958, p. 28) have argued that
the self tends to come to the forefront o f attention when it is problematic;
so long as the self-fulfills its expectations, it is in the background of awareness.
Given the motivational status o f self-esteem, the self is obviously more
problematic for those with low self-esteem. Therefore, one might argue that
low-self esteem people, lacking secure confidence in their own self-worth,
are more likely to focus attention on themselves.
In applying this general argument to each particular form o f self-
consciousness, it is useful to distinguish the social and personal impacts o f
low self-esteem. We expect that self-esteem will have a negative impact on
social anxiety. Recall that the socially anxious person is concerned with the
reactions of others to his or her presented self. Those with high self-esteem
respect themselves and need not be worried about others' reactions to the
impressions they convey. They are convinced that others will respond favora-
bly to the self they are presenting, and as a result, they feel less social anxie-
ty. Those with low self-esteem, in contradistinction, envision themselves as
somehow seriously deficient; their assessment of their own personal quali-
ties is low. They may be more worried about what others would think of
them. Expecting social rejection, ridicule, or disapproval,~they are uncom-
fortable at the thought o f others' scrutiny.
In contrast, we suspect that self-esteem will have little or no effect on
private self-consciousness. Private self-consciousness deals with a person's
tendency to focus on his or her internal states. Although those undesirable
factors leading to a problematic self and low self-esteem may tend to focus
attention on one's internal states, there may be strong forces pulling in the
Dimensions of the Self-Concept 293

opposite direction. Indeed, Duval and Wicklund (1972) suggest that situa-
tional self-awareness is avoided to the extent that a problematic self is
revealed by such a focus. A parallel argument may hold for private self-
consciousness. Social anxiety may not be avoidable, because one can-
not control the discerning scrutiny of others; but it may be much easier defen-
sively to block out one's own focus on internal states, thereby avoiding the
development of private self-consciousness. According to this argument, high-
self-esteem individuals should be no more or less aware o f their internal
characteristics than those with low self-esteem, although their reactions to
a given level of awareness may differ greatly. The consequences of private
self-consciousness may be different for high- and low-self-esteem individu-
als, but not the tendency itself. If these expectations are correct, the differen-
tial impact of self-esteem would serve as a further source of discrimination
between private self-consciousness and social anxiety.
The effect of self-esteem on both forms o f self-consciousness may also
be indirect, in that the other dimensions o f the self-concept under consider-
ation here may mediate the self-esteem-self-consciousness relationship. There
is good reason to presume primacy for self-esteem. Researchers in the self
have long recognized that the need to think well of oneself is a powerful moti-
v a t o r f o r human conduct. Indeed, Rosenberg (1979) refers to self-esteem as
one o f the two primary motivators located within the self-concept (the other
being self-consistency), a view shared by Schwartz and Stryker (1971). Some
would even assert that self-esteem is the dominant force in a person's motiva-
tional system (Allport, 1961, pp. 155-156; Kaplan, 1975, p. 10). It is there-
fore reasonable to expect that self-esteem would be a source of influence on
other aspects of the self-concept in general and that it would be prior to other
determinants of self-consciousness in particular. Hence, our structural model
includes self-esteem as an exogenous variable, vulnerability and the tenden-
cy to fantasize as intervening variables, and private self-consciousness and
social anxiety as the ultimate dependent variables. In this manner, we will
be able to determine the extent to which the effect of self-esteem on either
form o f self-consciousness is mediated by the other self-concept variables.
We now turn to a justification for each o f the intervening links with self-
esteem.
We hypothesize that self-esteem should negatively influence vulnera-
bility. Those with high self-esteem are convinced of their own self-worth and
do not interpret every criticism as a personal attack. In contrast, those with
low self-esteem are painfully aware of their own shortcomings; criticism con-
firms their own worst fears about themselves. Therefore, low-self-esteem ac-
tors should experience a greater vulnerability to criticism than those with high
self-esteem. As a result, one reason that low-self-esteem people are self-
conscious is because they are more vulnerable to criticism, which in turn leads
to greater self-consciousness.
294 Ellion

Fantasy should also mediate the relationship between self-esteem and

private self-consciousness. People are more likely to need to escape into an
imaginary world when the world in which they live is unsatisfactory. High-
self-esteem people, being generally satisfied with themselves, do not need
to spend a great deal of time pretending or wishing they were someone else.
By contrast, those with low self-esteem can forget for a while that they are
not the person they would like to be by fantasizing. Hence, low self-esteem
may lead to a greater tendency to fantasize. Because we have hypothesized
no effect for fantasy on social anxiety, we are forced to conclude that the
tendency to fantasize will not mediate the self-esteem-social anxiety rela-
tionship.

METHOD

Sample

The data for this analysis were collected from public-school children
in grades 3 through 12 in Baltimore City in 1968. A random sample of 2625
pupils from 25 schools was drawn from the population of third-to twelfth-
grade students. After eliminating students who had withdrawn, 1917 were
interviewed (79.2% of the children still registered, or 73.0% of all children
originally drawn from the central records). The 1098 adolescent ranging in
age from 12 to 19 years served as the basis for the analysis. [For a more com-
plete description o f the sampling procedure, see Rosenberg and Simmons
(1972).]

Measures

To measure self-esteem, we used a global measure containing six items.

Each item ascertained the respondents' general evaluation of themselves. (Ex-
ample: "Another kid said, 'I am no good.' Do you ever feel like this?" If
yes, ask: "Do you feel like this a lot or a little?") Vulnerability is based on
a three-item scale in which respondents indicated how sensitive they were
to criticism. (Example: "Do your feelings get hurt very easily, pretty easily,
or not very easily?") Six items comprised the fantasy scale and reflected the
respondents' tendency to spend time in an imaginary world. (Example:
"Would you say you daydream a good deal o f the time? Yes or no.") The
private self-consciousness scale consisted of six items which tapped the respon-
dents' preoccupation with their own personal characteristics (Example: "How
much time do you spend thinking about who you are, what you are, or what you
are like?. A lot of time, some time, or not very much time."). Finally, social anxie-
ty was assessed by six items, each of which measured the respondents' con-
cern with the thought of others' scrutiny. (Example: "If the teacher asked
Dimensions of the Self-Concept 295

you to get up in front of the class and talk a little bit about your summer,
would you be very, a little, or not at all nervous?") A complete list of items
used in the final model is available in the Appendix.
A few words about the measures used in this study are in order. First,
most of the indices evinced acceptable levels of reliability. The following are
the internal consistency scores for each of the scales, as measured by Cron-
bach's alpha: self-esteem, 0.687; vulnerability, 0.659; fantasy, 0.492; pri-
vate self-consciousness, 0.603; and social anxiety, 0.650. One would normally
expect a somewhat lower level of internal consistency among adolescents than
adults; hence, the alpha coefficients for all the scales except fantasy appear
reasonable. However, none of the scales is a perfectly valid measure of its
associated underlying component. This provided us with the major impetus
for using an unobserved variable structural equations model as a way of
examining the hypothesized relationships corrected for the less than perfect-
ly reliable measures.
Second, the measures of private self-consciousness and social anxiety
in the present study are similar but not identical to those measures developed
by Fenigstein e t al. (1975) in their initial investigation of self-consciousness.
The data used in this analysis were collected in 1968 as part of an intensive
study of the self-concept of young people. Unfortunately, because this study
predates the work of Fenigstein et al. (1975), the self-consciousness scales
they developed were not available. However, the items comprising the pri-
vate self-consciousness and social anxiety scales used in the present study
bear a striking resemblance to the comparable scales developed by Fenig-
stein et al. (1975), and they appear reasonably face valid. 3 It is also interest-
3For example, compare the following items taken from the scales of Fenigstein et aL (1975) with
their counterparts in the Appendix.
Private Self-Consciousness
I'm always trying to figure myself out.
Generally, I'm not very aware of myself.
I reflect about myself a lot.
I'm often the subject of my own fantasies.
1 never scrutinize myself.
I'm generally attentive to my inner feelings.
l'm constantly examining my motives.
1 sometimes have the feeling that I'm off somewhere watching myself.
l'm alert to changes in my mood.
I'm aware o f the way my mind works when I work through a problem.
(Note: The two items dealing with fantasy, which one might feel more properly reflect our
proposed tendency to fantasize, showed the lowest factor loadings on the private self-conscious-
ness scale in Fenigstein's analysis.)
Social Anxiety
It takes time to overcome my shyness in new situations.
1 have trouble working when someone is watching me.
1 get embarrassed very easily.
I don't find it hard to talk to strangers.
t feel anxious when I speak in front o f a group.
Large groups make me nervous.
296 Elliott

ing to note that Fenigstein et al. (1975) report a correlation between their
scales of 0.11 in their major sample of subjects; this is precisely the correla-
tion we found between our scale of social anxiety and that of private self-
consciousness (0.112). The fact that the scales share the same relationship
in both studies is consistent with the view that they are parallel in nature.

Selecting the Model

Each of the constructs mentioned above is a latent property of the per-

son, inherently unobservable directly but revealed in one's responses to the
items in the aforementioned scales. However, as the internal analyses of each
scale reveal, these measures are somewhat flawed. Rather than analyze the
relationships among the scales, it would be better to investigate the relation-
ships among the latent traits they imperfectly tap. Such a procedure is provid-
ed by the analysis of covariance structures developed by Joreskog and his
colleagues (Joreskog, 1978, 1979).
We began by specifying the model to be analyzed. This model includes
both unobservable and observable variables. The unobservable variables con-
sist of the latent dimensions of the self-concept (self-esteem, vulnerability,
the tendency to fantasize, private self-consciousness, and social anxiety), and
the observable variables consist of the items designed to reflect one's stand-
ing on these dimensions (see the Appendix).
The model is actually composed of two parts. The measurement model
specifies the relationships between the observed and the unobserved varia-
bles by designating which of the dimensions of the self-concept is tapped
by each item. The structural model specifies the relationships among the un-
observed variables, as specified by the theory. One further constraint ap-
plies. The model must be identified (Wiley, 1973); that is, there must be a
sufficient number of observed relationships to estimate the parameters of
the model.
Figure 1 presents the structural model under analysis. Self-esteem is
an exogenous variable, vulnerability and the tendency to fantasize are inter-
vening variables, and private self-consciousness and social anxiety are the
ultimate dependent variables. In addition, we estimated the correlations be-
tween the disturbances of the intervening variables and those of the ultimate
dependent variables, respectively. These disturbance correlations are precisely
the partial correlations between the variables in question, controlling for those
variables that are causally prior to them. They indicate the extent to which
the relationship between these variables is spurious, due to their common
antecedents.
The analysis of. covariance structures allow the researcher to test how
well a given model reproduces the correlations between the observed varia-
Dimensions of the Self-Concept 297

.9 .024

Fantasy.~ .169

-~19 ~ ~ Private .963

',,,,,___ I/ <.o5,>
Vulnerability / - .

Fig. 1. Structural model for self-consciousness. Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
All coefficients are standardized path (regression) coefficients.

bles, according to the rules of path analysis (Hauser and Goldberger, 1971).
Joreskog's algorithm yields maximum-likelihood estimates of the parameters
for the model, which are then used to reproduce the interitem correlations.
The aim is to minimize the difference between the matrix of observed corre-
lations (S) and the matrix of correlations reproduced by the parameters (E).
For a detailed explanation of the minimization method, see Joreskog (1978,
1979).
Comparing S and E, one can make a goodness-of-fit test, using a likeli-
hood ratio chi-square statistic, to test the null hypothesis that the given model
is appropriate to represent the relationships underlying the observed data
against the null hypothesis that the model is not so appropriate. A signifi-
cant chi-square suggests that the model does not fit and must be augmented
by adding additional parameters, subject to the constraints of identifiablity.
The improvement in goodness of fit can be tested. The difference in chi-square
values between the original and the augmented model is itself distributed as
chi-square, with degrees of freedom equal to the difference between their
respective degrees of freedom.
Our approach to deriving a final model was as follows. Using Lisrel
V (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1981), we began by estimating the full model that
included all 27 items from all the scales. The fit was unacceptable (x 2 =
827.41, df = 314, p < 0.0005). Indications of where the model failed can
be gleaned by examining the modification indices; the modification index es-
timates the minimum improvement in goodness of fit (i.e., decrement to chi-
square) possible by adding a particular parameter to the model. Our exami-
 Table 1, Zero-Order Correlations Among the Observed Variables
Self-Esteem Vulnerability
v225 v248 v250 v253 v215 v216 v232
SE a
v225 1.000
v248 0.552 1.000
v250 0.420 0.462 1.000
v253 0.349 0.402 0.402 1.000

VU
v215 -0.161 -0.194 -0.190 -0.160 1.000
v216 -0.142 -0.163 -0.136 -0.142 0.390 1.000
v232 -0.168 -0.209 -0.177 -0.149 0.490 0.360 1.000
FA
v230 -0.090 -0.086 --0.065 -0.114 0.059 0.023 0.039
v233 -0.049 -0.064 --0.046 --0.056 0.047 --0.006 0.041
PR
v169 -0.067 -0.057 -0.004 --0.120 0.116 0.I08 0.075
v 172 - 0.096 -- 0.099 - 0.050 -- 0.131 0.095 O. t 09 0.061
v209 -0.036 -0.048 0.015 -0.133 0.103 0.132 0.090
v211 -0.048 -0.036 -0.029 -0.108 0.I11 0.101 0.103
SA
v354 -0.107 -0.116 -0.141 -0.091 0.138 0.153 0.207
v355 -0.125 -0.166 -0.162 -0.099 0.201 0.181 0.247
o
Fantasy Private Self-Consciousness Social Anxiety
O
v230 v233 v169 v 172 v209 v211 v354 v355
FA
v230 1.000
v233 0.465 1.000
¢3
PR O
v169 0.139 0.053 1.000
v172 0.101 0.110 0.369 1.000
v209 0.091 0.066 0.510 0.519 1.000
v211 0.124 0.074 0.422 0.457 0.537 1.000
SA
v354 0.058 -0.040 -0.014 --0.005 -0.022 --0.014 1.000
v355 0.050 0.017 0.017 0.012 0.009 -0.007 0.505 1.000
Note. Correlations are based on 1025 observations. Calculations are based on more significant digits
than presented here. The complete items are found in the Appendix.
"SE, Self-Esteem; VU, Vulnerability; FA, Fantasy; PR, Private Self-Consciousness; SA, Social Anxiety.

to
300 Elliott

nation revealed that the poor fit was due to the inadequacy of some of the
items used as observable variables. This inadequacy emerged in one of two
ways: (1) the item in question appeared to tap more than one unobservable vari-
able, suggesting a lack of discriminant validity; and (2) the disturbance of
the item in question was correlated with that of another item, indicating the
presence of an unanticipated factor that would account for some of the as-
sociation between the items.
We eliminated contaminated items according to the following criteria:
(1) items showing poor discriminant validity were deemed most threatening
to the analysis and were eliminated first; (2) items from one scale whose dis-
turbances were correlated with those of items from a different scale were
eliminated if there were more than one or two such correlations; (3) items
whose disturbances were correlated with those o f items from the s a m e scale
were considered least threatening and remained in the model, unless their
removal resulted in an appreciably better fit; and (4) items whose coefficients
in the measurement model were less than 0.400 were eliminated.

RESULTS

The final model made use of 15 observed variables, utilizing 1025

respondents. Table I presents the zero-order correlations among the observed
variables.
Turning to the analysis of covariance structures, Table II gives the
parameter estimates for the measurement model, while Fig. 1 presents esti-
mates for the structure model coefficients. All coefficients are standardized
path (regression) coefficients. Measuring the goodness of fit of the model,
the likelihood ratio chi-square value was 91.52, with 78 degrees of freedom
6o = 0.140). These results indicate that we should not reject the null hypothesis
that the model fits the data. The goodness o f fit index calculated by Lisrel
V was 0.982 (maximum value, 1.0; adjusted value, 0.972). Examining the
modification indices revealed that the highest index was 5.97 (for a potential
correlated disturbance involving measures of private self-consciousness and
fantasy), indicating that very little improvement would be gained in adding
more parameters.
Consider first the measurement model (Table II). Most of the items
included in the final model are reasonably good reflectors o f their designat-
ed unobserved variable. The minimum validity coefficient was 0.506, for a
measure of vulnerability; the median validity coefficient was 0.646. It is im-
portant to recall that the pruning process described above left us with items
displaying a high degree o f discriminant validity.
Turning to the coefficients in the structural model (Fig. 1), the results
offer strong support for the hypothesized relationships. Beginning with vul-
Dimensions of the Self-Concept 301

Table !i. Measurement Model for Self-Consciousness

Parameter
Item estimate SE
SelgEsteem
v225 0.697 0.032
v248 0.781 0.032
v250 0.600 0.033
v253 0.517 0.034
Fantasy
v230 0.841 0.109
v233 0.543 0.072
Vulnerability
v215 0.646 0.034
v216 0.506 0.033
v232 0.640 0.034
Private Self-Consciousness
v169 0.599 0.031
v172 0.621 0.031
v209 0.768 0.030
v211 0.658 0.030
Social Anxiety
v354 0.573 0.040
v355 0.722 0.053
Note. The complete items are found in the Appendix.

nerability, we find that p e o p l e w h o are especially sensitive to o t h e r s ' criti-

cisms are also likely to find themselves p r e o c c u p i e d with their o w n
characteristics a n d a n x i o u s a b o u t the o t h e r s ' scrutiny. T h e results f o r f a n t a -
sy are, as expected, mixed. Those who spend m o r e time in an i m a g i n a r y world
are likely to experience greater private self-consciousness; in contrast (but also
a c c o r d i n g to p r e d i c t i o n ) , f a n t a s y h a d no effect o n social anxiety. F o r self-
esteem, the results reveal that, a l t h o u g h there is a slight t e n d e n c y for low
self-esteem t o lead to g r e a t e r p r i v a t e self-consciousness, as expected, this ef-
fect was far f r o m significant. O n the o t h e r h a n d , self-esteem h a d the predicted
effect o n social anxiety: t h o s e with low self-esteem a r e m o r e likely to be ner-
vous a b o u t the r e a c t i o n s o f o t h e r s to their b e h a v i o r , 4
It w o u l d be a m i s t a k e to c o n c l u d e f r o m these results t h a t self-esteem
a f f e c t e d social a n x i e t y b u t not p r i v a t e self-consciousness. T h e coefficients
given in Fig. 1 r e p r e s e n t o n l y the direct effects o f t h e c a u s a l l y p r i o r v a r i a -

4We examined the statistically significant structural coefficients to determine whether the apparent
differences in magnitude were themselves statistically significant. Tests for equality of coefficients
revealed that the effect of vulnerability on social anxiety was greater than any other effect;
none of the other significant effects differed from each other in absolute magnitude.
302 Elliott

bles. But the posited model also allows for the i n d i r e c t effects of self-esteem
on each form of self-consciousness, as mediated by vulnerability and the ten-
dency to fantasize. [See Alwin and Hauser (1975).] Beginning with private
self-consciousness, the total effect of self-esteem, as generated by the analy-
sis o f covariance structures, was - 0 . 1 2 1 ; as Fig. 1 reveals, when the inter-
vening variables are taken into account, this relationship is reduced to
- 0 . 0 1 9 . In other words, almost all (84.3%) of the relationship between self-
esteem and private self-consciousness is indirect, mediated by vulnerability
and the tendency to fantasize. The lion's share of the indirect effect is trans-
mitted through vulnerability (indirect coefficient = 0.076; 74.5O/o of the in-
direct relationship); the tendency to fantasize was a much weaker mediator
(indirect coefficient = - 0 . 0 2 6 ; 25.5% o f the indirect relationship).
Turning to social anxiety, we find that the total effect o f self-esteem
is - 0 . 2 9 0 . This amount is more equally split between direct and indirect ef-
fects, for when the other variables are taken into account, the direct effect
(shown in Fig. I) is - 0 . 1 3 6 . Once again, this means that a substantial (but
lesser) part (53.1 o70)of the total relationship is mediated by vulnerability and
the tendency to fantasize. By far, most of the mediation is through vulnera-
bility (indirect coefficient = - 0 . 1 4 9 ; 96.80/o of the indirect relationship).
The indirect effect through fantasy is negligible (indirect coefficient =
- 0 . 0 0 5 ; 3.2°7o o f the indirect relationship).
Our posited model also permitted disturbance correlations between the
intervening variables of vulnerability and fantasy on the one hand, and the
two self-consciousness variables, on the other. As mentioned above, these
disturbance correlations are precisely the partial correlations between the la-
tent variables involved, controlling for all causally prior variables. Begin-
ning with the intervening variables, inspection of Fig. 1 reveals that the partial
correlation between vulnerability and fantasy is not significantly different
from zero. In other words, the relationship between vulnerability and fanta-
sy is largely spurious, due to their common cause of self-esteem. In contrast,
there is a significant correlation between private self-consciousness and so-
cial anxiety, even when controlling for the other variables in the model. This
means that there are additional sources for the covariation between the two
forms of self-consciousness. 5
Finally, we note that there are only two instances in which the error
terms for the observed variables were significantly correlated with each other.
Such a correlation indicates a source of relationship for the observed varia-

~This does not imply that we have explained as much variance as we can in each dependent
variable separately.Other determinants of each kind of self-consciousnessexist, as the modest
amounts of explained variance indicate. Explaining a correlation between two variables is very
different from explaining variance in one variable.
Dimensions of the Self-Concept 303

bles in question that is unaccounted for by the model. In one case, the dis-
turbances for a measure of private self-consciousness and fantasy were
correlated; in the second case, two items measuring self-esteem shared a dis-
turbance correlation. Because two is only a small fraction of the total num-
ber of possible disturbance correlations between the observed variables, and
because the magnitude of these correlations is relatively small (-0.107 and
0.091, respectively), we believe that they do not pose a serious threat to the
results obtained in our analysis.

DISCUSSION

Much of the previous research on self-consciousness has focused on

verifying empirically the existence of and distinctions among the various forms
of self-consciousness identified in theoretical developments. This has been
done either by examining correlations involving measures of each form or
by demonstrating their different effects on behavior. Although these are in-
deed important, evidence from one further source has been lacking. Progress
in the study of the self-concept has demonstrated the necessity of simultane-
ously considering its various aspects, in order to understand the relationships
that exist among them and their joint effects on the individual. The present
study investigated the relationship of several dimensions of the self-concept
with two forms of self-consciousness: private self-consciousness (in which
one's attention is chronically focused on one's own internal states) and so-
cial anxiety (in which one experiences discomfort because others' attention
is focused on the self). Results from a structural equations analysis showed
that the data supported the hypotheses. Further, the support came from
different measures of self-consciousness from those developed by Fenigstein
et al. (1975), thereby affording theoretical replication (La Sorte, 1972) for
the constructs of private self-consciousness and social anxiety.
Analysis of the data gathered from adolescents (ages 12-19 years) re-
vealed that, as expected, self-esteem, vulnerability to criticism, and the ten-
dency to fantasize had a significant impact on self-consciousness. More
important, however, the analysis demonstrated that, although some dimen-
sions of the self-concept would significantly affect both kinds of self-
consciousness, other dimensions would significantly affect only one. In par-
ticular, we found that vulnerability to criticism was a common cause for pri-
vate self-consciousness and social anxiety. The more vulnerable one is to
criticism, the greater the tendency to be aware of one's personal characteris-
tics and uncomfortable under the scrutiny of others. In contrast, self-esteem
 304 Elliott

and fantasy each significantly affect only one form of self-consciousness

directly. Although low self-esteem leads to more social anxiety, it apparent-
ly does not increase private self-consciousness. Conversely, the tendency to
fantasize does make one more aware of one's own personal characteristics
but does not make one more concerned about the attention of others.
Although self-esteem had no direct effect on private self-consciousness,
an indirect effect, mediated largely by vulnerability to criticism, did emerge.
Apparently, low-self-esteem individuals feel a greater vulnerability to other's
criticism, and this heightened vulnerability in turn leads to a greater focus
on one's own internal states. In a lesser vein, those with low self-esteem also
tend to fantasize more, which leads to greater private self-consciousness.
Similarly, self-esteem had an indirect self on social anxiety, mediated
almost entirely by vulnerability. The greater vulnerability experienced by low-
self-esteem people works to make them more worried about how others will
react to them. In contrast to private self-consciousness, there is still an ap-
preciable direct effect of self-esteem on social anxiety.
A major purpose of the present paper is to contribute to a change of
focus in self-concept research. Instead of dealing with dimensions of the self-
concept in terms o f "lists," we believe that greater theoretical advances can
be made if we begin to treat the various dimensions o f the self-concept in
terms of the possible structures that underlie them. We have suggested that
it is theoretically meaningful to view self-consciousness as subject to the in-
fluences of certain self-concept dimensions. In particular, we have considered
self-esteem as a "core" or "master" dimension that operates on self-
consciousness both directly and through mediating properties o f vulnerabil-
ity to criticism and the tendency to fantasize. Further, we have shown that
distinguishing between private self-consciousness and social anxiety is war-
ranted, not only on the basis of their conceptual definitions, but also be-
cause they are differentially affected by certain dimensions of the self-concept.
The results of our analysis have revealed a new and important theoretical
source for distinguishing between the two forms o f self-consciousness.
Much more research on the relationship between dimensions of the self-
concept and self-consciousness is needed. For example, one might consider
such aspects as self-concept stability across time and situations, clarity (how
well defined the components are), or salience (how atypical the components
are) as determinants or consequences of self-consciousness. Further, we need
to understand better the influence o f socialization processes on the develop-
ment of self-consciousness. Increased research in the structure of the self-
concept can lead to a fuller understanding of the complexities of individual
growth and development.
Dimensions of the Self-Concept 305

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 Dimensions of the Self-Concept 307

APPENDIX: ITEMS COMPRISING THE SELF-CONCEPT

DIMENSION SCALES

Self-Esteem

A n o t h e r kid said, "I a m no good." Do you ever feel like this? (If yes, ask): Do you feel
like this a tot or a little? (v225)
A n o t h e r kid said, "I think I am no good at all." Do you ever feel like this? (If yes, ask):
Do you feel like this a lot or a little? (v248)
Another kid said, "I'm not much good at anything." Do you ever feel like this? (If yes, ask):
Do you feel like this a lot or a little? (v250)
A kid told me, "There's a lot wrong with me," Do you ever feel like this? (If yes, ask):
Do you feel like this a lot or a little? (v253)

Vulnerability

When someone gets angry at you, do you get very upset, pretty upset, or not upset? (v215)
W h e n someone laughs at you, do your feelings get hurt very easily, pretty easily, or not
very easily? (v216)
Do your feelings get hurt very easily, pretty easily, or not very easily? (v232)

Fantasy

Would you say you daydream a good deal o f time? Yes or no. (v230)
A kid told me, "I don't daydream very m u c h . " Is this true or not true for you? (v233)

Private Self-Consciousness

How m u c h time do you spend thinking about what you are like? Do you spend a lot
of time, some time, not m u c h time, or not any time? (v169)
Do you ever think to yourself: "What kind of person am I? What am I like?" (If yes,
ask): How often do you think, " W h a t kind of laerson a m I? W h a t a m I like?" Often, some-
times, or hardly ever. (v172)
How m u c h time do you spend thinking about the kind of person you are? A lot o f time,
some time, not very m u c h time, or not any time. (v209)
How m u c h time do you spend thinking about who you are, what you are, and what you
are like? A lot of time, some time, or not very m u c h time. (v21 I)

Social Anxiety

If the teacher asked you to get up in front of the class and talk a little bit about your
summer, would you he very nervous, a little nervous, or not at all nervous? (v 354)
If you did get up in front of the class and tell them about your s u m m e r , would you think
a lot, a little bit, or not at all about how all the kids were looking at you? (v355)

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