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Chapter 7–The Nature and Creation of Contracts
CHAPTER 7
THE NATURE AND CREATION OF CONTRACTS
CONTENTS
Teaching Approach
Additional Teaching Suggestions
1. Intention to Create Legal Relations
2. Battle of the Forms
3. The Postal Rule and Overtaking Communications
4. Acceptance by Performance
Discussion Boxes
1. You Be The Judge 7.1—Fobasco Ltd v Cogan
2. Ethical Perspective 7.1—Dickinson v Dodds
3. Business Decision 7.1—The Granting of Options
4. Business Decision 7.2—Battle of the Forms
5. Business Decision 7.3—The Postal Rule
Review Questions
Cases & Problems
Case Briefs
TEACHING APPROACH
We now move into the second substantive section of the text. The preceding chapters
discussed the law of tort in considerable detail. This chapter marks a turn from torts to
contracts. It consists of eight chapters. The first six chapters deal with issues that are
relevant to contracts generally:
 Chapter 7 explains The Nature and Creation of Contracts, by focusing on the core
issues of intention to create legal relations, offer and acceptance.
 Chapter 8 considers the role that Consideration and Privity play in the formation
and enforcement of contracts.
 Chapter 9 looks at the Terms and Representations that may be included in a
contract.
 Chapter 10 examines a number of Contractual Defects.
 Chapter 11 explains how a contract may be brought to an end through Breach and
Discharge.
 Chapter 12 canvasses the various Contractual Remedies that may be available in
the event of breach.
The final two chapters deal with special types of contracts that are especially important to
business:
 Chapter 13 considers Sale of Goods.
 Chapter 14 considers Bills of Exchange.
Throughout the chapters on contracts, a special emphasis is placed on the issue of risk
management. Students are encouraged to think about ways in which, as business people,
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Copyright © 2014 Pearson Canada Inc.
they may make the most of contractual arrangements, while also avoiding some of the
more common problems that arise in practice.
ADDITIONAL TEACHING SUGGESTIONS

Intention to Create Legal Relations
Drawing upon the ideas that are discussed in the case briefs of Balfour v Balfour and
Rose & Frank Co v JR Crompton & Rose Ltd that appear below, students could be asked
to consider the social and ethical implications of the applicable presumptions. Generally
speaking, there are rebuttable presumptions that an intention to create legal relations: (i)
does not exist in a family or social context, but (ii) does exist in a commercial context. It
occasionally is suggested that those rules serve the interests of men over women: S
Hedley “Keeping Contract in its Place – Balfour v Balfour and the Enforcement of
Informal Agreements” (1985) 5 Oxford J of Legal Studies 391. Promises within a
domestic context are more likely to be made by a husband to a wife – than by a wife to a
husband – for the simple reason that men historically had much more to give. Upon
marriage, the man and woman become one and that one was the man. Married women
were traditionally incapable of holding property on their own. That obviously is no longer
true. But it does remain true that wealth tends to be concentrated in men’s hands.
Consequently, the presumption against contractual relations in domestic contexts
generally prevents women from legally enforcing promises made by men. In contrast, the
presumption in favour of contractual relations in commercial contexts generally allows
men to accumulate greater wealth in their “natural” sphere of activity. The same basic
point can be expressed through the distinction between “private” and “public.” The courts
generally will not enforce agreements in a domestic context because they do not want to
interfere in “private” matters. In contrast, they generally are willing to intervene in the
“public” world of the marketplace. The dichotomy between “private” and “public” is,
however, somewhat artificial. The courts will not intervene in family matters because
they are “private.” To a large extent, however, they are “private” precisely because the
courts have refused to intervene.
Battle of the Forms

Drawing upon the ideas that are discussed in the case brief of Butler Machine Tool Co v
Ex-cell-O Corp that appears below, students could be asked to suggest other ways of
resolving the problems that arise through a battle of the forms. They should appreciate
both the need for conceptual purity (eg there cannot be a contract without consensus ad
idem) and the need for practical results (eg the recognition of a contract in a commercial
context, especially if the agreement has been executed). There are at least four
possibilities: (i) a strict “mirror” principle that requires agreement between the parties,
(ii) an approach that allows the last shot to win, (iii) an approach that allows the first shot
to win unless the details of a subsequent shot are specifically drawn to the initial party’s
attention, and (iv) an approach that allows the court to consider what is reasonable in
light of all of the shots that were fired.
The Postal Rule and Overtaking Communications

The rules regarding the communication of offers and acceptances give rise to interesting
policy issues. There are, unfortunately, few cases on point.
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Suppose, for instance, that Pam mailed a letter to Dave offering to sell a painting for $100
000. After receiving that offer, Dave sent a letter that rejected the offer. The next day,
however, before Pam received his rejection letter, Dave telephoned her and purported to
accept her offer. Allowing Dave to overtake his mailed rejection with a telephoned
acceptance might allow him to unfairly speculate at her expense. He could reject the offer
with a letter and, before it’s actual receipt, monitor the market. If the value of the painting
increased during the interim, he could hastily telephone his acceptance. He could, in
effect, blow both hot and cold. On the other hand, Pam is really none the worse for wear
even if Dave is entitled to overtake his earlier rejection with a subsequent and timely
acceptance. She had no contract at the outset. She similarly had no contract when Dave
mailed his acceptance. The subsequent creation of a contract would not obviously
prejudice her. (At most, she could argue that, unbeknownst to her, the initial rejection
brought an end to the possibility that she could be bound to a contract through an
effective acceptance.)
The situation would be different, however, if Dave initially mailed an acceptance letter
and then used a telephone call to try to revoke his acceptance before the letter’s receipt.
In that situation, the mailed acceptance presumably would, by virtue of the postal rule,
result in the creation of a contract as soon as the letter was sent. Pam therefore could
argue that, unbeknownst to her, she had contractual rights against Dave. It might be
improper to allow him to later overtake receipt of the letter by telephoning a rejection if,
for instance, the value of the painting dropped in the interim.
Acceptance by Performance
The offer of a unilateral contract is accepted through performance of the stipulated act.
As discussed in the case brief of R v Clarke that appears below, however, the mere
performance of that act does not necessarily constitute acceptance. The offeree must have
acted with knowledge of the offer. Otherwise, there is no consensus ad idem because, at
the relevant time, the parties did not have a meeting of minds – they were not
simultaneously thinking about the offer and the promise of a reward.
R v Clarke is often contrasted with Williams v Carwardine (which appears below in a

Case Brief). The plaintiff witnessed the murder of a “lusty man.” The deceased’s brother
offered a reward of £20 for information leading to the conviction of the murderer. The
plaintiff, who knew of that offer, was beaten nearly to death by the murderer, who wanted
her to keep quiet. The plaintiff subsequently provided the relevant information to the
authorities. She was motivated by a desire to make peace with God before she died. She
nevertheless was allowed to collect the reward. Although she had not been motivated by
the defendant’s promise, she did know about it when she implicated the murderer.
Students might be asked to consider the relevance of knowledge and motive. Should an
offeree be able to accept in ignorance of an offer? Aside from being contrary to orthodox
rules, an answer in the affirmative seems unnecessary on policy grounds. A reward
obviously was not necessary to motivate the offered. Furthermore, since the offeree acted
in ignorance, there is no need to fulfill expectations, as generally is true in contracts.
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Should an offeree be entitled to claim a reward that it knew about, but that was not a
motivating factor? That seems a more difficult question. The decision in Williams might
be defended on evidentiary grounds. It may simply be too difficult to isolate the basis
upon which the offeree acted. Was the reward a motivating factor? The primary
motivating factor? Likewise, even if the reward was one of several motivating factors,
there may be a need to protect the offeree’s expectations. Finally, motive is generally
considered to be irrelevant in private law.
DISCUSSION BOXES
You Be The Judge 7.1
Fobasco Ltd v Cogan (1990) 72 OR (2d) 254 (HCJ)
1. On the facts, the parties likely had a mere social arrangement. (That is the
conclusion reached by the trial judge in this case.) Even though there was a long-standing
arrangement, there is no proof that Eddie intended to relinquish ownership of the season’s
tickets (ie by transferring the tickets into David’s name.) Moreover, it is significant that
the parties, who were business people, did not clearly outline their rights and obligations.
Viewed objectively, if they had intended the arrangement to be something more than a
favour between friends, they probably would have made it clear that they had entered into
contractual relations.
2. This question asks students to consider the issue from a risk management
perspective. Just as business people should know the importance of outlining their
prospective rights and obligations, they should also know that, while not generally
necessary, it makes good commercial sense to put agreements in writing. Writing
probably would have indicated an intention to create legal relations and it would have
helped to settle the terms of the agreement.
3. Assuming that a contract is recognized, it does not appear on the facts that Eddie
and David agreed to this arrangement for more than one season at a time. As such, they
effectively would have renegotiated the terms of the agreement each year, including, for
example, the price and number of tickets involved. Since there was no mutual agreement
to enter a legal transaction forever, Eddie would not be forced to make tickets available to
Fobasco Ltd indefinitely.
Ethical Perspective 7.1

Dickinson v Dodds (1876) 2 Ch D 463 (CA)
1. This questions asks students to weigh, from a business perspective, the relative
significance of morality, profitability, flexibility and freedom. On the one had, it might be
suggested that all promises should be kept (unless, for instance, harm would occur – as
when I honour an undertaking to return a weapon to a friend who became insane after I
made my promise). On that view, a serious promise, by its very nature, places the
promisor under an obligation to act in a certain way. The strength of that obligation
intuitively varies with the circumstances. The purchase of land arguably lies toward the
more serious end of that continuum. The strength of the obligation is also heightened if
the promisee relies upon the promisor’s undertaking. (That might be the case, for
instance, if Dickinson incurred expenditures in the belief that the offer was open for his
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acceptance.) On the other hand, it might be suggested that the promisor should not be
required to give something for nothing. Following the bargain theory of contractual
liability, a person should not, exceptional circumstances aside (eg promissory estoppel,
seal), be forced to confer a benefit upon someone without receiving anything in
exchange.
2. There are a number of financial and non-financial reasons that might motivate
business people to honour firm offers.
Even if business people do not see any financial benefit to doing so, they may honour
firm offers and other gratuitous undertakings simply because they believe it is the right
thing to do. Although that factor may not be conclusive very often, there is also a danger
in being too cynical about the morality of those in the marketplace.
There are also reasons for honouring firm offers that are a combination of non-financial
and financial. Most business people want to develop goodwill in the marketplace. A
company’s reputation will suffer if it frequently engages in sharp practice or is thought to
be untrustworthy. Moreover, there are financial repercussions to a lack of goodwill and
an unfavourable reputation. All else being equal, a customer is more likely to do business
with a company that it trusts will not only honour legal obligations, but also its informal
promises. Returning to a theme introduced in Chapter 1, students should appreciate that
business is based on on-going human relations and that strict enforcement of legal rights
is not always desirable in the long-term.
Business Decision 7.1

The Granting of Options
1. The decision to grant or refuse an option should reflect a number of
considerations.
 The student should consider whether $100 000 is a reasonable price. The presence
of other interested buyers may suggest that the price should be increased to reflect
the emerging market position.
 The student should consider the possibility that other prospective purchasers may
disappear if the land is effectively taken off the market for 90 days. It may be that
the other potential buyers are interested immediately or not at all.
 The student should also consider the likelihood that ABC Corp will receive
zoning approval. If not, then the land will have been frozen for 90 days without
any real prospect for sale.
 Finally, the student should consider the price that ABC Corp is willing to pay for
the option. If that price is sufficiently high, it may off-set the possible negative
consequences of freezing the land for 90 days. That last point requires further
discussion.
The terms of a business agreement are limited only by one’s imagination and what the
parties are willing to agree upon. Under the circumstances, the offeror will want to insist
on a price that makes it worthwhile to keep the offer open, particularly in light of the
possibility that the other prospective purchasers may be lost. The offeror may also
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consider charging an additional fee in the event that zoning approval is not received, or
insisting on another term that requires ABC Corp to buy the land more quickly in the
event that an alternative offer is made that reaches a stipulated price.
Finally, as an alternative to an option, the parties might agree to a conditional sale of the
sort that is described in Chapter 16. Under that arrangement, a contract of purchase and
sale would be immediately created, but performance of the primary obligations would be
suspended pending the outcome of the zoning application. In that instance, ABC Corp
would, however, likely have an immediate obligation to use its best efforts to secure
zoning approval.
2. If there is a large number of potential buyers, the property could presumably be

sold fairly easily to another purchaser. If the interest level is sufficiently high, the offeror
may not want to be bound to a single buyer for a set price. Indeed, in such circumstances,
the possibility exists to increase the sale price through an auction where the land is sold to
the highest bidder. In contrast, where there are no other prospective buyers, the offeror
must weigh the benefits of showing goodwill on the one hand, and the possibility of
missing out on a deal that does not require approval on the other.
3. Where the future market value is expected to decline, an option guaranteeing

$100 000 makes sound business sense. On the other hand, limiting the price of the land in
an increasing market runs the risk of losing substantial profits.

Battle of the Forms
1. This exercise is aimed primarily at the issue of risk management. Students are not
so much expected to provide substantive answers, but rather demonstrate an appreciation
of the need for caution. In essence, they must realize that if they do not carefully read all
contractual documents, they may be caught by surprise and bound by terms of which they
were unaware. They must also realize that, in some circumstances at least, an apparent
contract may not actually exist if the parties were never ad idem on the terms. That issue
is further explored above under the heading of “Additional Teaching Suggestions: Battle
of the Forms.”
2. Business people can obviously avoid difficulties by carefully reading contractual

documents and ensuring that the terms are expressly settled before negotiations conclude.

The Postal Rule
1. There is an enforceable contract. Based on the rules governing non-instantaneous
communications, the offer Maria made through the mail was effective when the offeree
received it on June 5th. The acceptance letter that the offeree mailed on the same day
would have been effective where and when it was mailed by the offeree. The contract
was already fully formed before the offeree received notice of the revocation.
REVIEW QUESTIONS
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1. The phrase “meeting of the minds” refers to a mutual agreement to enter into a
legal transaction on a particular basis. (Lawyers often use the phrase consensus ad idem.)
A meeting of the minds is significant to the formation of contracts because it shows that
the offeror and offeree agreed to enter a contract on certain terms and that they are
willing to be bound to those terms. Meeting of the minds occurs through the process of
offer and acceptance. Significantly, however, contract law, as usual, takes an objective
approach to the issue. Consequently, while rare, a person may be bound by an agreement,
even without intending to do so, as long as the reasonable person would have thought
they intended to be bound.
2. “Comfort letters” arise in connection with the requirement that the parties have an
intention to create legal obligations. Just as the parties have freedom to contract, so too
they have freedom not to contract. Consequently, even if the other elements of contract
formation (eg offer, acceptance, consideration) are in place, a court will first ask whether,
on an objective assessment, the parties intended to be legally bound by their promises. If
not, then although they could have created a contract, they have chosen not to do so. A
court will respect that choice.
There is a presumption that parties in a commercial setting do intend to create legal

relations. That presumption may be rebutted, however, by evidence to the contrary. Such
evidence may take the form of a comfort letter.
A comfort letter is only somewhat comforting in practice. It provides the writer’s promise
to perform in a certain way, but it also stipulates that that promise is not legally
enforceable. Notwithstanding its inability to create legally enforceable obligations, a
comfort letter is valuable to the extent that the writer cares about his or her reputation. A
business person who breaks a promise — even a promise that is not legally enforceable
— will be a less desirable trading partner in practice. Comfort letters therefore provide
some assurance that an undertaking will be honoured.
3. Since a contract comes into existence as soon as an offer is accepted, the offeror
must be careful to avoid offering more than he or she is willing or able to provide. Not
only is the offeror obligated to honour the promises contained in the agreement, he or she
will be unable to alter the contents of that agreement, or bring the contract to an end,
without the agreement of the other party.
The courts have developed two techniques to reduce these dangers. First, judges have
developed careful guidelines for deciding which statements qualify as offers. To qualify
as an offer, the person making the statement must have the intention to create legal
relations. This means that the offeror must have intended that the proposed agreement
would be enforceable in law. The test for deciding this issue is an objective one that asks
whether the reasonable person, viewing the circumstances as a whole, would believe that
the parties intended that the agreement would be legally binding. The court will not take
into account the subjective intentions of the parties because: (i) a person could easily lie
about the matter, and (ii) one of the primary aims of contract law is to protect reasonable
expectations. A court will try to protect the party who, on the basis of his reasonable
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expectations, may have made arrangements in anticipation of the contract being fulfilled.
The courts have also simplified matters by assuming that offers made in a commercial
context are generally enforceable, while offers made in a family or social context
generally are not. However, these presumptions may be disproved where there is
evidence to the contrary.
The second way judges reduce the risks of making an offer is by placing limits on how
statements can function as offers. The courts classify some statements about proposed
transactions not as offers, but rather as invitations to treat. An invitation to treat is an
invitation for others to make an offer and shows a willingness to receive an offer. The test
for deciding whether a statement is an offer or an invitation to treat is also an objective
one. The court will ask how a reasonable person would interpret a disputed statement in
light of all the circumstances.
4. “Quantum meruit” is a Latin phrase that means “as much as it is worth.” A

contract requires offer and acceptance, at least one of which usually involves the payment
of a price. Those elements are most easily established when the parties expressly provide
offer and acceptance. Nevertheless, a contract may be created even if offer and
acceptance are implied rather than express. That may happen if, for instance, a person
walks into a restaurant and says simply, “A cheeseburger and a milkshake.” That
statement is interpreted by the reasonable person as both a desire to receive the meal and
an offer to pay for it. By filling the order, the restaurant provides its acceptance.
(Acceptance may occur earlier if the server says something like, “I’ll bring it right up.”)
Furthermore, even though neither party mentioned a price, the initial demand implied a
willingness to pay a reasonable price. A court would consider all of the circumstances,
especially the price list on the restaurant’s menu, in settling on a dollar figure.
5. The objective “reasonable person” test allows the courts to create a fictional
person in order to determine what the parties should have done or thought in the
circumstances. The objective test provides the courts with considerable flexibility and
makes it possible for a judge to equally say what a reasonable person would or would not
have intended. In addition, a test based on subjective intentions would be difficult to
apply for two reasons. First, a person could easily lie at trial about what his or her
intentions were. Second, a primary aim of the law of contracts is to protect reasonable
expectations. Since the business world could not function properly unless people were
entitled to rely on outward appearances, the courts will protect the reasonable
expectations and interpretations of the parties.
6. An option is a contract in which the offeror is paid in exchange for a binding

promise to hold an offer open for acceptance for a specific period. The concept is
important because the offeror, as master of the offer, normally is entitled to revoke the
offer anytime prior to acceptance by the offeree. That is true even if the offeror issued the
offer as a “firm offer,” promising that the offeree would have a certain period of time
within which to accept.
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An option consequently provides a way in which the offeree of a large offer can compel
the offeror to hold that offer open as promised. The option is a separate contract. In
exchange for receiving a price (usually a small, but significant, sum of money), the
offeror of the large offer agrees to hold that large offer open. Because the promise to hold
the large offer open is now contained within its own contract, it is enforceable.
Suppose, for instance, that the defendant offered to sell Blackacre to the plaintiff for $1
000 000. The plaintiff needs a week to think about the possibility before accepting or
rejecting. The defendant, however, prima facie can revoke the sale offer at any time. To
preclude that possibility, and to compel the sale offer to remain open for a week, the
plaintiff may persuade the defendant to create a new contract: an option. In exchange for
the plaintiff’s payment of, say, $5000, the defendant enforceably agrees to hold the sale
offer open for one week.
7. An offer is an indication of a willingness to enter into a contract on certain terms,

whereas an invitation to treat is an indication of a willingness to receive an offer. The test
for deciding whether a statement is an offer or an invitation to treat is an objective one.
The court will ask how a reasonable person would interpret a disputed statement in light
of all the circumstances. In applying the test, the courts tend to apply certain
presumptions: (i) the display of an item on a store shelf, even if marked with a price tag,
is an invitation to treat, and (ii) a statement placed in a newspaper or catalogue is
generally an invitation to treat. However, an advertisement may be considered an offer if
a reasonable person would read it that way. For instance, an advertisement that states,
“Men’s 12 speed mountain bike. $400. First come, first served” is an offer, whereas
“Men’s 12-speed mountain bike. Seller will accept best offer” is an invitation to treat.
The distinction helps to promote commercial activity by eliminating the offeror’s danger
of being immediately bound to an unmanageable number of contracts.
8. Revocation occurs if the party who made the offer withdraws it. The offeror is
generally entitled to revoke the offer at anytime. But where the offeror promises to hold
an offer open for acceptance during a certain period, special attention is required. Strictly
speaking, since there is no exchange of value in return for the firm offer, the promise to
hold the offer open is not enforceable in law. From a commercial viewpoint, this
flexibility is important because it allows the offeror to negotiate with other potential
buyers. However, from an ethical perspective, it may be in the offeror’s best interest to
honour firm offers. In addition to maintaining good business relations, keeping one’s
promises generates goodwill for the business.
9. “Cross-offers” occur when two people offer each other a contract on the same
terms. That would be true, for example, if you wrote a letter to me saying “I will buy
your car for $5000” and I write a letter to you saying, “I will sell my car to your for
$5000.” It may appear that a contract is created because you and I share the same idea at
the same time. A contract, however, requires more than a coincidence of ideas. It requires
a consensus ad idem—a meeting of the minds. A contract is created only if one person
offers and another person accepts that offer.
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10. The tendering process limits the revocation of offers during the period in which
they are being considered and otherwise ensures a fair bidding process. The courts have
found that two contracts may be formed under the tendering process. Under Contract A,
the call for tenders is an offer to enter into a special contract to hold a fair tendering
process in exchange for an irrevocable bid. In that context, the bid constitutes acceptance
of the offer under Contract A. Under the second contract, the call for tenders serves as an
invitation to treat to receive offers to enter into the larger Contract B. In that context, the
bid constitutes an offer to enter into Contract B. There will be one Contract A for each
party that submits a tender, but there can be only one Contract B between the party
calling the tenders and the party that submits the winning bid.
11. An offer may come to an end in five different ways.

 Revocation If an offer has not been accepted, and if the offeror is not
compelled to hold the offer open for acceptance under the terms of an option, the
offeror is entitled to revoke the offer. Revocation is simply the termination of an
offer. Revocation normally can be made in the same manner as the original offer
(eg an offer that appeared in a newspaper may be communicated by a revocation
in the same paper).
 Lapse of Time Even if an offer has not been accepted or revoked, it will
lapse after the passage of a reasonable time. The calculation of that reasonable
period depends upon the circumstances, including the terms of the offer, the
nature of the goods, the volatility of the market, and industry practice.
 Death or Insanity An offer usually comes to an end if, prior to acceptance or
termination buy other means, either the offeror or the offeree dies or becomes
insane. At least in theory, a mind that no longer exists or that has become
defective cannot contribute to a consensus ad idem (a “meeting of the minds”)
and therefore cannot support the creation of a contract. In practice, however, an
offer may be accepted, notwithstanding death or insanity, if performance of the
proposed contract was not personal to the parties — eg if the offer was a simple
offer to sell land for a monetary price, rather than a proposal to exchange the
performance of a concert for the creation of a computer program. If the offeror’s
and offeree’s personalities are not crucial to performance, it may be open for their
estates to adopt the agreement.
 Rejection An offer is terminated if it is rejected by the offeree. Once it is
thereby terminated, it cannot unilaterally be revived by the offeree if that party
has a change of heart. The offeree must make a new offer or hope that the offeror
reiterates and recreates the original offer.
 Counter-Offer A counter-offer is an attempt to accept an offer but on
varied terms. Any variation of the original terms constitutes a counter-offer. And
that counter-offer constitutes a rejection of the original offer and the creation of
an entirely new one. The offeror and offeree thereby trade positions.
12. The statement is not true. As a general rule, the offeree is entitled to
communicate acceptance by any reasonable means. As a result, for example, a written
offer may be accepted orally, or vice versa. The choice does not always lie with the
offeree, however. Most importantly, the offeror is the master of the offer and therefore
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can stipulate that acceptance must be communicated in a particular manner. Furthermore,

even if the offeror has not expressly required a particular form of communication, the
circumstances may restrict the offeree’s options.
13. An offer is terminated once it is rejected. This means that it cannot later be
accepted if you, as the offeree, later changed your mind. The rule is set up this way to
ensure that there is only one “master of the offer.” In order to revive the transaction, you
could do one of two things. You could either ask the offeror to repeat the initial offer or
can make an offer yourself and hope that the original offeror accepts.
14. A counter offer occurs when an offeree responds to an offer by indicating a

willingness to enter into a contract, but on different terms. A counter offer has the effect
of rejecting an existing offer and creating a new one, thereby switching the parties’ roles.
Consequently, any attempt to modify the terms of the offer amounts to a counter offer.
But because the general rule regarding counter offers tends to inhibit commercial
transactions, the courts sometimes characterize an offeree’s statement not as a counter
offer, but rather an as inquiry (which does not kill the offer).
15. A battle of the forms arises when each party claims to have entered into a contract
on the basis of its own standard form document, but the parties’ documents incorporate
different terms. From a time and cost-saving perspective, it makes sense for a business to
use the same form for every transaction. A problem arises, however, where the offeree
responds to the offeror with its own standard form containing terms that do not exactly
match the terms of the offer. In that situation, the offeree is making a counter offer rather
than an acceptance. A further difficulty occurs if the agreement is executed rather than
executory. In that situation, the court must address the fact that the parties have already
performed. In order to determine which contractual form will govern the transaction, a
court will look at a number of factors, including: (i) the usual industry practice, (ii) past
dealings between the parties, (iii) the precise sequence of events, and (iv) the forms (if
any) that the parties actually signed. The battle of the forms was the subject of Additional
Teaching Suggestions in an earlier part of this chapter.
16. A bilateral contract is a contract in which a promise is exchanged for a promise. A

unilateral contract is a contract in which an act is exchanged for a promise. A bilateral
contract can be accepted by words or conduct, whereas a unilateral contract can only be
accepted by the performance of a stipulated act.
17. Silence, by itself, cannot amount to acceptance. The reason for this is to
discourage individuals and businesses from foisting obligations upon people. If, however,
the parties habitually create contracts on the basis of silence, or if the offeree does
something that the reasonable person would interpret as acceptance, silence can amount
to acceptance. That exception is especially important when a customer agrees to purchase
goods that are sent to her unless she returns them within a stated period (as under a book-
of-the-month club).
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18. Instantaneous communication is any form of communication in which there is

little or no delay in the interaction between the parties. Non-instantaneous
communication involves a substantial delay between transmission and receipt. The
difference in the form of communication is particularly relevant because it determines
when and where the contract was formed. Acceptance by instantaneous communication is
generally effective when and where received by the offeror. Acceptance by non-
instantaneous communication, on the other hand, is generally effective where and when
the offeree sends it.
19. The statement is not true. As a general rule, non-instantaneous communications

are governed by the postal rule. The postal rule states that a contract is formed when and
where an acceptance letter is put into a mailbox or delivery system. If that rule applies,
then it certainly is possible that the offeror will be bound to a contract, without knowing
it, if the letter becomes lost. Significantly, however, the postal rule is merely a default
rule. As master of the offer, an offeror can insist upon any form of acceptance.
Consequently, even if an offeror is willing to receive an acceptance letter by mail, it
remains possible to say that the postal rule is inapplicable. (That intention may be express
or implied.) If so, then the offeree is entitled to accept by post, but a contract will be
formed only if, when, and where the offeror actually receives the letter.
20. The first statement is correct; the second statement is incorrect.
A unilateral contract is an agreement under which, at the time of creation or formation,

only the offeror has outstanding primary obligations to perform. The contract is
“unilateral” precisely because only one party has duties to fulfill. The offeree also
performs, of course, but that performance also comprises the stipulated act of acceptance.
When acceptance is effective and the contract comes into existence, the offeree has
nothing left to do. Suppose, for example, that I say to you, “I will pay you $5000 if you
walk to Calgary.” There is no contract at the outset. Moreover, there will be no contract
unless and until you fully perform the stipulated act — ie walking to Calgary. A contract
will come into existence only if and when you take the final step into that city. At that
point, you have both accepted my offer and fully performed your part of the bargain.
Only I have an outstanding obligation to perform — ie payment of $5000 to you.
A bilateral contract is an agreement under which, at the time of creation, both parties
have at least some outstanding primary obligations. A bilateral contract, in other words,
involves the exchange of a promise for a promise. In the classic bilateral agreement, the
parties provide offer and acceptance through words. Orally or in writing, each says, in
effect, “I promise ….” The promise of performance, however, also may be
communicated in other ways, including the performance of some act. For example, by
walking into a restaurant and saying, “A cheeseburger and a milkshake,” I not only
evince a desire for the meal, but also offer to be bound to an enforceable agreement for
the provision of food. My offer is implicit in my act. Likewise, acceptance may be
communicated through actions If I walk into your hair salon and silently sit in a chair
while you cut my hair, I implicitly have accepted your offer to cut hair for a price. (If no
price is stipulated, a court will award quantum meruit or “as much as it is worth.”)
7-12
CASES AND PROBLEMS
1. In a business context, there is a general presumption that the parties had an

intention to create legal relations.1
That presumption, however, is rebuttable by evidence to the contrary. Just as the parties
have the freedom to contract, they also are free not to contract. Although there is no
magic in words, the use of a phrase like “This agreement is subject to formal contract”
normally indicates that, even if the other essential elements of an enforceable agreement
(eg offer, acceptance, certainty of terms, consideration) are present, the parties have
evinced an intention not to be legally bound. That proposition takes on additional strength
when it is used, as in this case, by sophisticated business entities who understand the
significance of legal enforceability.
In determining whether the parties have a created a contract, however, a court must look
at all of the circumstances. The wording of a document is important, but so too are the
parties’ actions. If neither party had yet performed, it is clear that Ziggy could not have
compelled DJI to fill its purchase order. The document alone would govern and it would
indicate that there was no intention to create legal relations. Notwithstanding the
document, however, DJI did create and deliver the requested component, and Ziggy did
accept the device and pay the price. Those actions require some legal explanation. The
likeliest explanation is that, despite the contentious phrase, the parties did subsequently
create and fulfill an enforceable agreement. Their contract arises not from their
paperwork, but rather from their behaviour. That possibility acquires support from the
fact that the two companies previously had done business many times on precisely the
same terms. In the absence of an overarching contract, they were not obliged to do so
again in the future. An objective reasonable person, however, most likely would consider
all of the facts and conclude that, as in the past, the parties chose to buy and sell computer
components on the usual terms.
Any hardship that that conclusion creates for DJI’s new owners must be placed at the
owners’ own feet. If they truly wished to re-draft their standard form document and
revise their contractual terms, they should have directed their own workers to await their
instructions before filling Ziggy’s orders.
Similarly, any windfall that Ziggy may appear to enjoy is explained by the actions of
CJI’s new owners. Although Ziggy initially was informed that the apparent agreement
was “subject to formal contract,” it ultimately was provided—in the usual way—with the
type of component that it traditionally obtained from DJI. DJI’s conduct therefore
engendered Ziggy’s reasonable expectation that there was a contract that contained on the
usual terms.
[Based on RTS Flexible Systems v Muller [2010] 1 WLR 753 (UK SC)]
1
Rose & Frank Co v JR Crompton & Rose Ltd [1923] 2 KB 261 (CA).
7-13
2. This exercise focuses on the fact that the elements of offer and acceptance are
reckoned objectively rather than subjectively. Regardless of what one or both of the
parties actually had in mind, a contract exists if a reasonable person would conclude so
after considering the circumstances.
The parties almost certainly had a contract under which Danuta would pay WETS to both
obtain a permit and remove the tree. The trial judge in the actual case upon which this
exercise is based held to the contrary. As the appeal judge explained, however, the trial
judge did so by erroneously focusing on the defendant’s actual state of mind. Properly
analyzed, however, it does not matter that Danuta genuinely and honestly believed that
WETS would only obtain the permit on her behalf. The recognition of an offer and
acceptance is determined on the basis of the reasonable person test. The trial judge
therefore should have asked whether a reasonable person in the parties’ position would
have believed that a contract was created.
Three factors point strongly in favour of a contract. (1) Danuta wanted not only a permit,
but also tree removal services. (2) Danuta was presented with a price estimate that
covered both the acquisition of a permit and the removal of the tree. (3) Companies like
WETS never contract merely to obtain permits on behalf of customers.
Although it occasionally may impose a contract against the wishes or beliefs of a person
life Danuta, our legal system uses an objective test of contract creation. That approach
protects reasonable expectations. Regardless of Danuta’s actual beliefs, she helped to
create a perception that she had contractually agreed to pay WETS to remove the tree.
WETS is entitled to enforce that reasonable expectation.
[Based on West End Tree Service Inc v Stabryla 2010 ONSC 68 (Ont SCJ)]
3. Ronaldo will not be permitted to revoke his bid. Generally speaking, the party
who makes an offer is entitled to revoke it any time before it is accepted. However
Ronaldo’s bid, as a response to a call for tenders, falls under a special exception to this
general rule. Since Darlington City must be able to rely on the fact that any offers it
receives will remain open while they are being considered, the tendering process ensures
that the offers do remain open. Under Contract A, Darlington City’s call for tenders
constitutes an offer to enter into a fair and irrevocable tendering process, while Ronaldo’s
bid constitutes acceptance of that offer. Having reached that agreement, the parties are
obliged to adhere to its terms. As a result, Ronaldo’s bid is irrevocable. Darlington City
therefore is entitled to accept Ronaldo’s bid as part of the process leading up to the
creation of Contract B. If Ronaldo refuses to actually create Contract B, he can be sued
for breach of contract and the City will be entitled to damages.
[Based on R v Ron Engineering & Construction (Eastern) Ltd (1981) 119 DLR (3d) 267
(SCC)—discussed below in a Case Brief]
7-14
4. On the facts of this case, it is important to consider four rules governing

acceptances of offers. First, a contract generally does not exist until the offeree has
communicated acceptance to the offeror. Second, however, the postal rule states that a
mailed acceptance may be effective when and where it is put into the mail, rather than
when and where it is received. Third, the offeror, as master of the offer, can dictate the
manner in which an acceptance must be given. And fourth, if the offeror is silent on the
issue of acceptance, the offeree is entitled to use whatever means are reasonable in the
circumstances.
The crucial question in this case is whether Parktown could accept Miranda’s offer by
either: (i) simply signing their acceptance to her offer to purchase, or (ii) placing their
acceptance into the mail system. At first glance, it would appear that the postal rule
would apply and that a contract was created on October 10 when Parktown mailed its
acceptance. In support of that view, Parktown could point to the fact that Miranda did not
expressly exercise her authority, as master of the offer, to insist upon actual receipt of the
acceptance within the time frame.
On further reflection, however, a court would likely find that, in the circumstances, there
could not be a contract until Parktown actually communicated its acceptance to Miranda.
In other words, it would prefer the general rule, rather than the postal rule. It would do so
because, given the highly volatile nature of the real estate market, no reasonable person
would be willing to be bound to a contract without receiving actual acceptance. That was
the decision reached in Beer v Townsgate I Ltd, upon which this question was based:
(1997) 152 DLR (4th) 671 (Ont CA).
5. This question requires a consideration of the rules governing the acceptance or

rejection of an offer. Birinder attempted to reject the offer by leaving a message on an
answering machine. As a general rule, however, a rejection is effective only when and
where it is received. Since the answering machine was broken, Singh’s Computer Shop
did not receive the rejection.
As a general rule, an offer may be accepted by any reasonable means. In this case,
Singh’s Computer Shop appears to have expected Birinder’s acceptance to be
communicated by word (presumably through a phone call). At least implicitly, however,
they also allowed acceptance to occur through conduct — ie Birinder’s use of the laptop.
The saleswoman specifically said that the unit could not be used until Birinder had
decided to purchase it. As a corollary of that statement, she also implicitly said that if he
used, he would be taken to have accepted her offer to sell.
If a court found that neither the rejection on the answering machine, nor Birinder’s
acceptance through the use of the laptop, were effective, then the offer would have been
killed when Birinder went to the shop and explained to the saleswoman that he did not
want the computer. However, even if that was true, he would be held liable in tort for
having used the computer without permission. Moreover, while the claim might lie in
trespass, it would likely amount to a conversion. If so, then the remedy is, in effect, a
7-15
forced sale. Birinder would have to pay the market value of the computer, and in
exchange, he would receive title to the unit. The end result would therefore be the same.
6. Ahmad’s promise was a firm offer, but not an option. A firm offer is a gratuitous
promise to hold open an offer. Since it is gratuitous, in the sense that it is not supported
by consideration, it is not enforceable. Ahmad therefore was entitled to revoke his firm
offer prior to acceptance. The situation would have been different if Ahmad had given his
promise in exchange for consideration. In that situation, Felicity would have effectively
purchased an option – that is, the right to accept the offer within the promised period of
time. Ahmad therefore would not have been entitled to revoke his offer to sell the land.
And since he sold the land to a third party, he would have breached his contractual
promise to hold the offer open for Felicity’s acceptance.
Felicity nevertheless could argue that while Ahmad was legally entitled to revoke his
offer, he did not do so in a timely manner. An offer is susceptible to acceptance (and
hence to the creation of a contract) as long as it has not been terminated. Ahmad did not
effectively terminate the offer by revocation prior to Felicity’s acceptance because he did
not reasonably draw that fact to her attention. She faxed her acceptance letter to him
before he informed her of the sale to the third party. In response, Ahmad would argue
that, regardless of revocation, his offer naturally terminated through the lapse of time. An
offeror can stipulate the length of time during which an offer is open. But even if he does
not do so, the law states that an offer is only open for a reasonable length of time. The
issue of reasonableness depends upon all of the circumstances, including: (i) the nature of
the contract, (ii) the stability of the market, and (iii) the usual industry practice. The
question probably does not contain enough information for students to arrive at a
conclusive answer. They would, nevertheless, be expected to identify the relevant factors.
To succeed in her claim, Felicity would have to overcome Dickinson v Dodds (which was
discussed in Ethical Perspective 7.1). The facts of this case may be distinguishable from
those in Dickinson because Felicity faxed her letter of acceptance to Ahmad before
learning that the property had been sold to a third party. In Dickinson, in contrast, the
offeree knew of the third party sale before actually providing the purported acceptance.
Finally, whether or not Felicity succeeds in her action against Ahmad, students should
appreciate that while firm offers are not legally enforceable, they generally should be
honoured. A business person’s reputation will be damaged to the extent that promises –
even gratuitous promises – are broken.
7. Following the case upon which this exercise is based, Mack Darin probably is not
guilty of any crime. Granted, any sensible lay person would say that Darin had offered a
switchblade for sale. As a general rule, however, an advertisement or a store display
constitutes not an offer, but rather an invitation to treat. The offer instead is made by the
customer, who offers to buy an item. The store is then free to accept or reject that offer.
The rule is designed to protect business from becoming over-exposed to liability. If every
advertisement and display constituted an offer, then a storekeeper might receive
7-16
acceptances than out-numbered existing stock and thereby become liable for breach of
contract.
[Based on Fisher v Bell [1961] 1 QB 394 (CA)]
8. Simone’s acceptance of Olaf’s offer on October 21st by mail formed a valid and
enforceable contract governed by the laws of British Columbia. Even though Simone
likely received Olaf’s revocation before he received her acceptance, the rules governing
non-instantaneous communication state that an offer and a revocation of an offer are only
effective when and where they are received. An acceptance, in contrast, generally is
effective when and where it is sent. Because Simone sent her acceptance prior to
receiving Olaf’s revocation, a contract was formed before Olaf purportedly (and
ineffectively) withdrew his offer.
[Based on Byrne v Van Tienhoven (1880) 5 CPD 344.]
9. The courts generally assume that an agreement reached in a commercial context is

legally enforceable, whereas one reached between family members is not. These
presumptions can be disproved with evidence to the contrary. Since Edgar offered to
transfer the clear title to Tina and Hussein, it appears that he intended for the agreement
to be legally binding.
Edgar’s offer may be interpreted as pertaining to a unilateral contract. In exchange for

Tina and Hussein’s payment of the monthly mortgage instalments, Edgar promised that
they could live in the house and that he would transfer the title into their name.
Acceptance of a unilateral contract is not effective until the stipulated act is complete.
Normally, the offeror is entitled to revoke his offer any time before acceptance. In this
type of case, however, the court would want to protect Tina and Hussein’s reasonable
expectations. It might do so by finding two unilateral contracts. The primary contract
would involve Edgar’s promise to transfer the title to Tina and Hussein if they fully paid
the mortgage. The secondary contract would involve Edgar’s promise to not revoke his
offer once Tina and Hussein began paying. As such, Edgar would not be entitled to
revoke his offer. Since an offeree does not have any obligations under a unilateral
contract, Tina and Hussein would not have to pay the full mortgage once they began
making instalment payments.
Because of the difficulties associated with the revocation of an offer to create a unilateral
contract, courts often prefer to find an offer of a bilateral contract instead. On that view,
at the outset, Edgar promised to eventually transfer title to the house, while Tina and
Hussein promised to pay the mortgage. Although the preference for a bilateral contract is
often appropriate, it would create its own difficulties in this situation. It would mean that
Tina and Hussein were contractually obliged to pay the mortgage. They might well prefer
a flexible approach to a unilateral contract that allowed them to pay the mortgage and
obtain the house, but that did not require them to do so. (Although the courts enjoy some
flexibility in interpreting the facts, the choice between a unilateral contract and a bilateral
contract technically turns upon the offeror’s intention.)
7-17
[Based on Errington v Errington [1952] 1 KB 290 (CA) and Dawson v Helicopter

Exploration Co [1955] 5 DLR 404 (SCC)—discussed below in Case Briefs]
10. For Arvid’s letter to qualify as an offer, he must have intended that the proposed
agreement would be enforceable in law. The test for determining whether there was an
intention to create legal relations is whether a reasonable person, viewing the
circumstances as a whole, would believe that the parties intended that the agreement
would be legally binding. In addition, the courts usually assume that an agreement
reached in a commercial context is legally enforceable, whereas one reached in a social
context is not. Despite their past intimacy and Arvid’s secret desires for a future romance,
viewed objectively, it is likely that a court would consider the offer to be a business
arrangement that was intended to be legally binding.
Even though both Dora and Arvid firmly believed that they had formed a valid and
enforceable agreement, coincidental beliefs are not enough to form a binding contract.
The offeree must actually communicate acceptance to the offeror. In this case, since Dora
never told Arvid of her intention to join his company, the parties did not form an
enforceable agreement. Moreover, the courts have developed the rule that silence, by
itself, is not acceptance. Arvid will not be able to show that he and Dora habitually did
business in this way, or that Dora did anything that the reasonable person would interpret
as acceptance. Arvid, then, is incorrect to insist that a contract had been created and that
Dora was his employee.
[Based on Felthouse v Bindley (1862) 142 ER 1037 (Exch)—discussed below in a Case

Brief]
11. In this case, a judge must consider two broad issues to determine whether
Ekaterina’s counter offer was still open when Rasheed purported to accept it. First, a
judge must consider the effect of Naima’s involvement. Since Naima was not authorized
to act for Rasheed, her communications with Ekaterina are irrelevant. In any event,
Naima did not purport to accept or reject Ekaterina’s counter offer. Moreover, although
Naima suggested that the deal would not have to be closed immediately given Rasheed’s
planned use of the property, it is doubtful that that statement would constitute a counter
offer by introducing a new term of the agreement. Naima’s statement is not inconsistent
with Ekaterina’s desire to close the deal quickly. There could be a lag between closing of
the sale and commencement of farming.
The second broad issue that a judge must consider is whether Ekaterina left her counter
offer open for a reasonable period. An offeror is entitled to limit the life span of an offer,
for example by stipulating that acceptance must occur within a certain period. If no
specific time period is expressly stated, as is the case here, an offer is only open for a
reasonable period. In determining whether 10 days amounts to a reasonable period, a
judge will look at: (i) the nature of the proposed contract, (ii) the volatility of the market,
and (iii) the usual practice in the industry. On balance, the following factors will
outweigh the fact that the rural Saskatchewan farm market had not been particularly
7-18
active in recent years: (i) Ekaterina asked Rasheed to respond without delay, (ii) there
was another interested party, and (iii) Rasheed’s original offer asked that she quickly
reply by fax or telegram, which shows that, even though he did not require the land until
March, he too wanted to complete the transaction quickly. Since a reasonable period
would have lapsed, Ekaterina’s counter offer was no longer open when Rasheed
purported to accept it.
[Based on Barrick v Clark [1950] 4 DLR 529 (SCC)—discussed below in a Case Brief]
12. This case turns on the applicability of the postal rule. The postal rule states that
an offer (of a new contract or renewal of an old contract) occurs when and where an
acceptance is placed into a mailbox. If that is true in this instance, then the insurance
policy was renewed as soon as SRB placed its envelope into a mailbox. MLA is liable
even though it never received that letter.
The postal rule, however, is merely a default rule. It does not always apply to posted
acceptances. And in this case, the terms of the insurance indicate that acceptance, through
payment of the premium, is effective only if and when it actually reaches MLA’s Head
Office in Halifax. Since SRB’s letter was lost in the mail, there was no acceptance and
hence no renewal of the contract. MLA therefore is no required to pay a benefit to Connie
Fikowski upon her husband’s death.
[Based on Saskatchewan River Bungalows Ltd v Maritime Life Assurance Co (1994) 115
DLR (4th) 478 (SCC).]
CASE BRIEFS
Balfour v Balfour [1919] 2 KB 571 (CA)—note 5
The parties were a married couple. The husband was required to from England to Ceylon
for work. On medical advice, the wife decided to stay behind. Before leaving, the
husband promised to pay £30 per month to the wife. At the time of that agreement, the
relationship was in good order and both parties expected that she would join him in
Ceylon a short while later. After the husband went abroad, however, the marriage
deteriorated and the parties formally separated. The wife then tried to enforce the
husband’s promise. The Court of Appeal refused. It held that within a family context,
there is a presumption that the parties did not intend to create legal relations. In support
of that view, it suggested that the enforcement of promises within a domestic relationship
would both open the floodgates to litigation and improperly interfere with “private”
matters. Interestingly, the courts have held that the general presumption does not apply
with respect to an agreement that a married couple creates after separating: Merritt v
Merritt [1970] 2 All ER 760 (CA). In that situation, the parties are considered adverse to
each other’s interests. It is also interesting to note that Canadian courts have extended the
general presumption to same sex couples: Luoma v Anderson (1986) 50 RFL (2d) 127
(BC SC). The rule is based on the nature of the relationship, rather than the parties’
sexual orientation.
Rose & Frank Co v JR Crompton & Rose Ltd [1923] 2 KB 261 (CA)—note 6
7-19
The parties were sophisticated businesses. They entered into a series of contracts for the
purchase and sale of paper products. Their last agreement contained a clause that
expressly said: “This arrangement is not entered into, nor is this memorandum written, as
a formal or legal agreement, and shall not be subject to legal jurisdiction in the Law
Courts.” The defendant supplied some of the product that the plaintiff ordered, but
refused to deliver the rest. The plaintiff sued for breach of contract. The trial judge held
that the agreement was a contract and therefore was capable of supporting an action for
breach. He said that the quoted clause was repugnant to the rest of the document, which
clearly created an enforceable agreement. On appeal, Scrutton LJ held that there is a
general presumption in commercial matters that the parties did intend to create legal
relations. However, he also held, in light of the key clause, that that presumption was
rebutted on the evidence. Even commercial parties are entitled to enter into an agreement
that is binding only in conscience and that cannot be enforced in the courts.
Jones v Padavatton [1969] 2 All ER 616 (CA)—note 7

A woman persuaded her daughter to become a law student by promising to support her
during her studies. The daughter agreed. The mother then bought a house in the city
where the daughter was studying and promised the daughter that she could: (i) live rent-
free, and (ii) collect rent from other tenants in the building. Subsequently, however, the
mother tried to claim possession of the property while the daughter was still studying.
The issue was whether the parties had created an enforceable contract. If so, the daughter
was entitled to enforce it by remaining in occupation of the premises. The court held that
both parties had given consideration – the mother by promising to let the daughter use the
house and the daughter by promising to study for the bar. It also held that family
members can create enforceable agreements. The general rule in Balfour v Balfour is
rebuttable. On the facts, however, the court concluded that the parties intended that the
agreement would be binding in conscience only. The mother therefore was entitled to
assert possession of the building despite her (unenforceable) promise to the contrary.
Toronto-Dominion Bank v Leigh Instruments Ltd (Trustee of) (1999) 178 DLR (4th)
634 (Ont CA)—note 8
Plessey Company plc had a subsidiary company named Leigh Instruments Ltd. Leigh
wished to obtain a line of credit from the Toronto-Dominion Bank for $45 000 000.
Worried that Leigh may not be able to repay the loan, TD asked Plessey to provide a
guarantee. Plessey repeatedly refused to assume a legal obligation for Leigh’s debt. It did,
however, provide the bank with a series of documents that contained the disputed
sentence
It is our policy that our wholly owned subsidiaries, including [Leigh] be managed
in such a way as to be always in a position to meet their financial obligations….
Leigh subsequently ran into financial difficulties and defaulted on repayment of the line
of credit. TD then demanded repayment from Plessey. The dispute turned on the proper
interpretation of the quoted sentence. Plessey insisted that it merely provided comfort
letters and that the relevant sense meant that it was Plessey’s policy that Leigh be
managed by Leigh itself so as to be able to meet its own obligations. TD, in contrast,
argued that the letters constituted an enforceable agreement under which Plessey’s policy
7-20
was that Plessey would ensure that Leigh was managed in such a way as to repay its
debts. The bank buttressed that argument by saying that the letters would be pointless if
they did not create legal obligations, and that Plessey cannot be believed to have engaged
in a pointless exercise.
The Ontario Court of Appeal held in favour of Plessey. The circumstances amply
demonstrated that Plessey was not willing to assume legal liability for Leigh’s debt. All
of the parties were sophisticated commercial actors who knew the difference between
legal and moral obligations. Finally, to find in favour of Plessey was not to render the
letters pointless. Though not legally enforceable, comfort letters are practically
significant because they import moral obligations. A reputation for honesty and for
fulfilling undertakings—both legal and moral—is very important in the business world. A
comfort letter accordingly increases the likelihood that the drafter will act as promised.
Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Boots Cash Chemists (Southern) Ltd [1953]
1 QB 401 (CA)—note 9
Stores in England traditionally did not operate on a self-serve basis. A customer would
not pick up items from the shelves and bring them to the cashier. Instead, a sales
representative would provide requested items to the customer from behind a counter.
After the war, however, an increasing number of self-serve stores began to open. This
case demonstrates the occasional need for the law to take account of new ways of doing
business. It also demonstrates that changes in society, and changes in the way that
business is done, often create competing interests.
Under legislation, certain types of drugs could only be sold under a pharmacist’s
supervision. The defendant’s drug store operated on a self-serve basis. Customers were
allowed to wander the aisles, pick up items off the shelves, and proceed to the cashier.
The cashier’s station was within sight of the pharmacist, who supervised all drug sales.
The plaintiff was a national pharmaceutical organization that was opposed to the
proliferation of self-serve drug stores, primarily on the basis that such operations
detrimentally affected the commercial opportunities that were available to its members.
The seemingly simple question was: when is a contract of sale created? The plaintiff
argued that the display of an item on a shelf is an offer and that a customer accepts that
offer by placing the item in a shopping basket. If that was true, then the defendant was in
breach of the legislation because the contract was not created under a pharmacist’s
supervision, but rather in the store’s aisles. The defendant, on the contrary, argued that
the display of an item on a shelf is merely an invitation to treat. The customer makes an
offer to purchase by taking the item to the cashier, who then either accepts or rejects the
offer. If that was true, then the statute was not breached because the sale took place at the
cashier’s station, which was located next to the pharmacist.
The court adopted the defendant’s view and held that the statute had not been breached.
On policy grounds, the court was motivated by a desire to support the proliferation of
self-serve stores, which were much more convenient for customers. And on practical
grounds, the court said if the plaintiff’s view prevailed, such that a contract was created
7-21
as soon as a customer placed an item in a shopping basket, then the customer would later
be prevented from changing his or her mind by returning the item to the shelf. After all,
once a contract is created, it cannot be unilaterally terminated.
Blair v Western Mutual Benefit Association [1972] 4 WWR 284 (BC CA)—note 11
The essential facts are provided in the text accompanying note 11.
R v Ron Engineering & Construction (Eastern) Ltd (1981) 119 DLR (3d) 267 (SCC)—
note 16
The defendant wanted a building project completed. It therefore called for bids or tenders
from interested construction companies. That call carried certain stipulations: (i) it
required bids to be accompanied by a $150 000 “deposit” cheque, (ii) it said that all bids
were irrevocable after the close of tenders – ie after the deadline for receiving bids, (iii) it
said that a “deposit” cheque would be forfeited if a bidder withdrew its tender within 60
days after the close of tenders, and (iv) it said that the successful bidder would be
required to create a contract for the actual construction project within 7 days of being
notified that it submitted the winning bid.
The plaintiff submitted a bid and a deposit cheque. A short time later, after tenders had
closed, it realized that it had made a mistake when it calculated the expected costs of
completing the construction project. As a result, its bid was substantially lower than it
should have been. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant therefore could not accept the
erroneous bid. (The plaintiff did not purport to revoke or withdraw its offer, for fear of
forfeiting its deposit.) The defendant refused to disregard the bid and, in fact, later
announced that the plaintiff had submitted the winning bid. When the plaintiff refused to
create a contract for the building project within 7 days, the defendant relied on the terms
of the call for tenders and refused to return the plaintiff’s cheque for $150 000.
The question was whether the plaintiff company was bound by the stipulations and rules
that the defendant set out in its call for tenders. There were at least two possible views.
On the first view, the defendant’s call for bids was merely an invitation to treat. The
plaintiff’s submission of a bid was an offer. The defendant accepted that offer when it
announced that the plaintiff’s bid was the lowest one received. However, if that is correct,
then no contract came into existence until the defendant accepted the plaintiff’s bid. And
if that is true, then following the general rule, the plaintiff should have been entitled to
revoke its offer any time before acceptance. Hence, there would not actually have been
any contract.
That approach is unacceptable, however, because, depending upon the circumstances, it

could expose both parties to an unreasonable risk. Generally speaking, a company that
submits a bid wants some assurance that the selection process will be fair. It certainly
would not want to incur the substantial expense of preparing a bid, only to later learn that
the party that made the call for tenders did not even follow its own rules regarding the
acceptance of winning bids. At the same time, the party that calls for tenders wants some
assurance that it will have a proper opportunity to consider all of the bids. It does not
want to be exposed to the risk that bidders will withdraw part way through the process.
7-22
For those reasons, Estey J in the SCC formulated the rules regarding Contract A and
Contract B that are discussed in the text. That approach is not invariably applied. It does,
however, provide a mechanism through which all parties have some assurance that the
bids will be considered fairly and in accordance with the rules announced by the party
that called for tenders.
MJB Enterprises v Defence Construction (1999) 170 DLR (4th) 577 (SCC)—note 16
The defendant issued a call for tenders. The call documents stated that (1) each bidder
must state a single price, and (2) as a result of a privilege clause, the defendant was not
required to accept the lowest price.
The plaintiff submitted the lowest single price bid. The defendant, however, selected
another bid, in which the price was stated in terms of a formula, rather than a single price.
When the plaintiff sued for breach of Contract A, the defendant invoked the privilege
clause and argued that it was not required to accept the lowest bid.
The Supreme Court of Canada held in favour of the plaintiff. It reached that conclusion
on the basis of several propositions. First, just as Contract A may arise expressly or by
implication, so too it is possible for a court to imply certain terms into a Contract A that
does arise.
In this case, the Contact A contained an implied term that only compliant bids would be
accepted. No reasonable business would go the trouble and expense of creating a bid
without an assurance that everyone was playing by the same rules. In this case, that
meant that the defendant could accept only a bid that stated a single price.
The court reconciled that finding with the privilege clause that the defendant expressly
included in its call for tenders. The privilege clause stated that the defendant need not
select the lowest price. The objective purpose of that clause is to allow the defendant to
consider factors beyond a simple price (eg a bidder’s reputation for reliability, a bidder’s
experience). That clause is necessary because the defendant would no want to be locked
into a low bid if it had reasonable grounds to believe that the bidder might not be able to
complete the project at the promised price.
Turning to the facts, the court held that the defendant did breach Contract A by selecting
a non-compliant bid (ie a bid that was not stated as a single price). It further held that the
privilege clause was irrelevant to the dispute because that clause could not transform a
non-compliant bid into a compliant bid.
Butler Machine Tool Co v Ex-cell-O Corp [1979] 1 All ER 695 (CA)—note 19

The defendant wanted to buy equipment from the plaintiff. The plaintiff sent a document
that quoted a price of £75 000. Writing on the back of that document said that the sale
was subject to the plaintiff’s own standard terms. Those terms included a price escalation
clause (ie although the price was stated to be £75 000, it would be increased if, before
delivery, the plaintiff’s own costs increased). The defendant received that document and
7-23
replied with its own document. The defendant’s document said that the sale was subject
to its own standard terms. Those standard terms did not include a price escalation clause.
The defendant’s document also contained a tear-away slip that the plaintiff was asked to
sign and return to the defendant. The plaintiff signed and returned the slip. At the same
time, it sent a letter that reiterated its original price of £75 000, but that did not refer to
the escalation clause. The plaintiff later delivered the equipment and then claimed an
additional payment under the price escalation clause. The defendant, in response, said
that that clause was not part of the contract.
The question was whether a contract was completed on the plaintiff’s terms, the
defendant’s terms, or neither. The majority of the Court of Appeal adopted a traditional
approach and held that a contract is created only if one party’s acceptance mirrors the
other party’s offer. On that view, the plaintiff made an offer that contained a price and an
escalation clause. The defendant replied with a counter offer that included a price, but not
an escalation clause. The plaintiff accepted that offer by returning the signed strip and by
referring to the price, but not the escalation clause. The parties were therefore ad idem on
the issue of price.
Lord Denning MR concurred, but on more flexible grounds. He said that the courts have
a strong desire to find a valid contract, especially if an agreement has already been
performed. He also said that the proper approach depends upon all of the circumstances.
In some situations, the party who fires the last shot wins. In other words, the contractual
terms are the last ones that are proposed. In other situations, the party who fires the first
shot wins. That might be true if the subsequent shots contain terms that are unusual or
substantially different. In such circumstances, the subsequent party’s terms do not prevail
unless they are specifically drawn to the initial party’s attention. And finally, it is
sometimes appropriate to formulate the terms on the basis of all of the shots taken
together. And if that fails to produce an answer, the court may be entitled to simply
impose reasonable terms.
Tekdata Interconnection Ltd v Amphenol Ltd [2010] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 357 (CA)—note 19
Rolls-Royce required a certain widget for the manufacture of jet engines. It acquired
those widgets through a supply chain. Rolls-Royce purchased from Goodrich, Goodrich
purchased from the plaintiff, and the plaintiff purchased from the defendant. Although the
various parties could have done so, they did not create an overarching, multi-party
agreement. Instead, the supply chain consisted of a series of individual contracts between
each set of parties. That system worked well enough for many years. It eventually broke
down, however, when the plaintiff became dissatisfied with a widget that it obtained from
the defendant.
Rolls-Royce informed Goodrich that it required another widget. Goodrich contacted the
plaintiff. The plaintiff contacted the defendant by, as usual, sending a “Purchase Order.”
That document stated (1) certain terms, favourable to the plaintiff, regarding delivery date
and quality of goods, and (2) that the terms of the Purchase Order governed the contract.
After receiving the Purchase Order, the defendant responded with its own standard form
document, entitled an “Acknowledgement.” The defendant’s document did not reflect the
7-24
plaintiff’s terms. Instead, it stated that (1) the defendant was entitled to the protection of a
broad exclusion clause, and (2) the defendant’s terms governed the contract.
Some time later, the defendant shipped the widget to the plaintiff. The plaintiff accepted
the goods, but later complained that delivery was late and that the widget was defective.
A dispute then arose between the parties. Neither party argued that there was no contract.
Each instead argued for a contract on its own terms. There was a “battle of the forms.”
The trial judge recognized that the orthodox approach states that there is no contract
unless the parties to agree to the same terms. However, the judge also said that, in
appropriate circumstances, it was possible to adopt Lord Denning’s view in Butler and to
simply formulate the best conclusion after considering all of the facts. The trial judge
then decided, for two primary reasons, that the parties ought to be treated as having
created a contract on the plaintiff’s terms. First, the plaintiff’s terms were preferable
because they required the widget to meet certain high standards. Because the widget was
to be used in a jet engine, public safety favoured the terms that offered protection.
Second, the trial judge was substantially influenced by the fact that the defendant did not
immediately argue that its own terms should prevail. It instead made that argument only
when it served its Statement of Defence upon the plaintiff. The trial judge accordingly
held that the parties could not be treated as having agreed to the defendant’s terms.
The Court of Appeal strongly disagreed. Most importantly, it rejected Lord Denning’s
broad and flexible approach to the creation of a contract in the context of a battle of the
forms. Almost without exception, the orthodox rules of offer and acceptance govern,
even in a battle of the forms. Some other, more flexible approach is possible only if the
parties — by means of their documents and conduct — demonstrate that they are willing
to depart from the orthodox rules. There was no such evidence on the facts.
The Court of Appeal accordingly held that a contract had been created on the defendant’s
terms. The trial judge erred in creating the contract that would have been desirable,
rather than recognizing the contract that the parties actually created. It was irrelevant that
the public would be better protected under the plaintiff’s terms. The parties themselves,
by words and conduct, showed that they were agreed upon the defendant’s terms.
Finally, the Court of Appeal was unimpressed with the fact that the defendant did not
make the technical legal argument (that its own terms prevailed) until its lawyers drafted
the pleadings. Very often, Longmore LJ explained, business people respond to a dispute
by trying to find a business solution. The search for a legal solution arises only if,
business negotiations having failed, lawyers become involved.
Prior to Tekdata, Canadian courts not infrequently relied upon Lord Denning’s analysis
in Butler in order to find a contract. Of course, Butler was not binding precedent. Neither
is Tekdata. It therefore remains open to Canadian judges to follow Lord Denning
notwithstanding the English Court of Appeal’s criticisms of the holistic approach to the
recognition of a consensus ad idem. A Supreme Court of Canada judgment is needed on
7-25
point, either to re-affirm the orthodox approach (along the lines of Tekdata) or to
authoritatively allow recourse to Lord Denning’s looser model.
Felthouse v Bindley (1862) 142 ER 1037 (Ex Ch)—note 21

A misunderstanding arose during negotiations for the sale of a horse. The plaintiff, who
wished to buy the animal, thought that the price was £30. The defendant, who wished to
sell the animal, though that the price was 30 guineas. (Prior to the decimalization of the
pound sterling in 1970, a guinea was equal to one pound plus one shilling. Today, it
would be equal to £1.05.) The plaintiff offered to split the difference. He wrote a letter to
the defendant saying, “If I hear no more about him, I’ll consider the horse mine at £30
15s.” The defendant did not respond to that offer, and it later sold the horse to another
person. The plaintiff then sued the defendant in conversion claiming that he had already
bought the horse. The court disagreed. It held that a contract cannot be foisted upon an
offeree and that mere silence does not constitute acceptance.
Rolling v Willann Investments Ltd (1989) 63 DLR (4th) 760 (Ont CA)—note 23
An agreement created in 1974 stated that Willann enjoyed “the first right to meet any
offer to purchase that [Rolling] may receive” on a certain property. It further said that
Willann “shall have 72 hours from the date such offer is delivered to it by [Rolling]
within which to exercise this option by submitting ... an offer on terms identical to those
contained in the first mentioned offer. Failing which this option shall terminate and
[Rolling] may accept such first mentioned offer.”
In 1989, Rolling sent a fax to Willann that contained an offer received form a third party.
More than 100 hours later, Willann submitted an identical offer to Rolling. An issue arose
as to whether Rolling was obliged to sell the property to Willann. Willann admitted that
while its offer was not received within 72 hours, as required by the agreement. It argued,
however, that Rolling had not complied with the terms of the agreement either because he
had delivered the third party’s offer by way of fax — a form of communication that the
parties had not contemplated in 1974.
The Ontario Court of Appeal held that Rolling was entitled to rely on a faxed
communication. Consequently, since Rolling had complied with the option agreement, he
was entitled to insist upon a timely reply by Willann. And since Willann did not respond
within 72 hours, Rolling was not obliged to sell the property to him. Robins JA
explained:
While it is true that the parties to the option agreement could not have anticipated
delivery of a facsimile of the offer by means of a telephone transmission at the
time the agreement was executed, they did not limit or restrict or, indeed, specify
the way in which delivery was to be made for the purposes of their agreement.
The purport of the agreement is that Willann is to be placed in receipt of a copy of
the offer and is to exercise his option within a specified time following receipt.
The manner in which delivery is to be made in order to place Willann in receipt of
the document is of no real importance. What is important is whether and when
7-26
Willann was in fact put in receipt of the offer or, put another way, whether and
when the document was in fact delivered to him.
Where technological advances have been made which facilitate communications

and expedite the transmission of documents we see no reason why they should not
be utilized. Indeed, they should be encouraged and approved. Nothing is to be
gained in the circumstances of this case in requiring an attendance at Willann’s
offices to deliver the documents, and Willann suffered no prejudice by reason of
the procedure followed. In our opinion, the transmission of a facsimile of the offer
for the purpose of effecting delivery is not in violation of the option agreement. It
follows that Willann properly received delivery of the offer. For whatever reason,
the company failed to exercise its option within the strict time period granted by
the option agreement and, consequently, has no existing rights under that
agreement.
Nova Scotia v Weymouth Sea Products Ltd (1983) 149 DLR (3d) 637, aff’d 4 DLR (4th)
314 (NS CA)—note 24
Under the Instalment Payment Contracts Act RSNS 1967, c 147, a seller had to be
licenced in order to enter into contracts made “within the province” of Nova Scotia. An
offer for the sale of property in Nova Scotia was sent by courier to an offeree outside of
the province. The offeree sent an acceptance back by way of courier. The question was
whether the contract was made “within the province” and therefore was caught by the
statute. The court said that the postal rule for acceptance applies equally to regular mail
and to letters sent by courier. Consequently, the contract was formed when and where the
offeree sent an acceptance by courier – outside of Nova Scotia. The legislation did not
apply.
Saskatchewan River Bungalows Ltd v Maritime Life Assurance Co (1994) 115 DLR
(4th) 478 (SCC)—note 26
The plaintiff company was owned by Mr and Mrs Fikowski. That company obtained an
insurance policy of Mr Fikowski’s life. The terms of the policy stated that annual renewal
could be achieved by payment to the defendant insurance company’s head office in
Halifax by July 26. An envelope, containing a cheque and a request for renewal, was
placed into a mailbox in a timely manner. Unfortunately, that letter never reached its
destination. The insurance company sent several “late payment due” notices, but because
the Fikowskis did not check their mailbox on a regular basis, they were ignorant of the
problem for many months. When the Fikowskis finally appreciated the circumstances,
they attempted to tender payment, a year late, in order to renew their policy. By that time,
however, Mr Fikowski had been diagnosed with a terminal disease. He died a short time
later. Mrs Fikowski and the plaintiff company then sued the insurer, demanding payment
of a benefit under the policy.
The dispute largely turned on the doctrine of waiver or promissory estoppel. (Mrs
Fikowski unsuccessfully argued that the insurance company was barred from
complaining about the late payment of the premium.) The root of the dispute, however,
turned on the fact that the postal rule did not apply in the circumstances. Although the
7-27
insurance company was willing to receive acceptance by post, it was not willing to bear
the risk of lost acceptances. It therefore displaced the presumptive postal rule by
stipulating that acceptance was effective only if and when it arrived at its head office in
Halifax.
R v Clarke (1927) 40 CLR 227 (HCA)—note 27

Two police officers were murdered. The state of Western Australia offered a reward of
£1000 for information leading to the arrest and conviction of the culprits. Clarke heard of
the offer. However, by the time that he later provided information to the police, he had
forgotten about the reward. He had been motivated to contact the police not by the
promise of money, but rather by a desire to clear his own name. When the actual culprits
were subsequently apprehended, Clarke tried to claim the reward. The court refused
because, inter alia, there was no consensus ad idem at the relevant time. Clarke had not
acted with the intention of accepting the offer, about which he had forgotten.
Dawson v Helicopter Exploration Co [1955] 5 DLR 404 (SCC)—note 28

The plaintiff was a prospector who had information regarding a potential claim in
northern BC. He disclosed that information to the defendant, an exploration company.
The defendant replied with a letter that offered to pay the plaintiff a 10 percent interest in
any claim that he helped the defendant to find. The plaintiff agreed to that arrangement.
Some time later, the defendant said that it could not go through with the plan. At an even
later date, however, the defendant explored the area in question and staked a claim
exclusively for itself. The plaintiff then claimed damages for breach of contract. In
response, the defendant argued that its offer was for a unilateral contract, rather than a
bilateral contract. And on that view, no contract was ever created because the plaintiff
never actually performed the requisite act of acceptance by helping the defendant to find
a claim.
The SCC held in favour of the plaintiff. The court said that there is a presumption in
favour of bilateral contracts, rather than unilateral contracts. It based that decision on
policy grounds. Technically speaking, a unilateral offer can be revoked any time before
the offeree fully accepts. Consequently, while the offeror’s position is protected, the
offeree is vulnerable to being frustrated after partially completing an act of acceptance. In
contrast, a bilateral contract equally protects both parties. Since the contract is created
immediately upon the exchange of promises, neither party can unilaterally withdraw from
the arrangement. On the facts, the court said that the presumption applied and that the
defendant’s offer was for a bilateral contract. Moreover, the plaintiff had accepted that
offer. Although the plaintiff had not expressly said words to that effect, the situation was
“instinct with obligation.” The plaintiff effectively promised to try to guide the defendant
to a claim and the defendant effectively promised to pay a 10 percent interest in any
claims that were found. The defendant breached that contract by refusing to cooperate in
the performance of the agreement.
Errington v Errington [1952] 1 KB 290 (CA)—note 29

A man bought a house on credit. He paid £250 and promised to pay the remainder of the
price over time under a mortgage. He then promised the plaintiff, his daughter-in-law,
7-28
that she would be entitled to the house if she met the mortgage payments. The plaintiff
regularly made the payments. However, after the man died, the defendant, his widow,
purported to revoke her husband’s offer and evict the plaintiff. The widow argued that a
unilateral contract is not created until the stipulated act of acceptance has been fully
performed. And since the plaintiff had not yet paid the entire mortgage, she had not yet
fully accepted the deceased’s offer. The court disagreed with that approach. It held that
the plaintiff was not required under the unilateral contract to actually make the payments.
However, it also said that the deceased’s offer could not be revoked while the plaintiff
was in the process of accepting. An offeree of a unilateral contract must allow the offeree
the opportunity to fully perform.
Ayerswood Development Corp v Hydro One Networks Inc (2004) 39 CLR (3d) 288 (Ont
SCJ)—note 30
The defendant announced a program that was designed to conserve energy. It offered to
pay a certain amount of money to contractors who constructed new buildings that
contained certain energy-saving features. The offer was said to expire on 31 March 1993.
As the defendant realized, a contractor would not be in a position to apply for the
program until it had completed its design plans for a building. And as the defendant also
knew, the drafting of such plans is an expensive exercise.
The plaintiff intended to apply to the program and therefore incurred the cost of drafting
building plans that met the defendant’s specifications. Before the plaintiff could actually
file its application, however, the defendant purportedly cancelled the program. The
plaintiff ignored that purported cancellation and filed its application before 31 March
1993. It then demanded payment.
The court held that the defendant had offered a unilateral contract. The defendant argued
that, as offeror, it was entitled to revoke its offer anytime before complete acceptance —
ie anytime before a contractor actually submitted an application. The court rejected that
argument. It held that the offeror of a unilateral offer cannot frustrate an attempt at
acceptance by withdrawing the offer while an offeree was in the process of accepting.
The court did not, however, specifically explain how or why that obligation arose.
7-29
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
Le 10. — Oh ! le beau rayon de lune qui vient de tomber sur
l’évangile que je lisais !
Le 11. — Aujourd’hui, à cinq heures du matin, il y a eu cinquante-

sept ans que notre père vint au monde. Nous sommes allés, lui,
Mimi et moi, à l’église en nous levant, célébrer cet anniversaire et
entendre la messe. Prier Dieu, c’est la seule façon de célébrer toute
chose en ce monde. Aussi ai-je beaucoup prié en ce jour où vint au
monde le plus tendre, le plus aimant, le meilleur des pères. Que
Dieu nous le conserve et ajoute à ses années tant d’années que je
ne les voie pas finir ! Mon Dieu, non, je ne voudrais pas mourir la
dernière ; aller au ciel avant tous serait mon bonheur. Pourquoi
parler de mort un jour de naissance ? C’est que la vie et la mort sont
sœurs et naissent ensemble comme deux jumelles.
Demain je ne serai pas ici. Je t’aurai quittée, ma chère
chambrette, papa m’emmène à Caylus. Ce voyage m’amuse peu ; je
n’aime pas de m’en aller, de changer de lieu ni de ciel, ni de vie, et
tout cela change en voyage. Adieu, mon confident, tu vas m’attendre
dans mon bureau. Qui sait quand nous nous reverrons ? Je dis dans
huit jours, mais qui compte au sûr en ce monde ? Il y a neuf ans que
je demeurai un mois à Caylus. Ce n’est pas sans quelque plaisir que
je reverrai cet endroit, ma cousine, sa fille, et le bon chevalier qui
m’aimait tant ! On prétend qu’il m’aime encore. Je vais le savoir.
C’est possible qu’il soit le même ; lui me trouvera bien changée
depuis dix ans. Dix ans, c’est un siècle pour une femme. Alors nous
aurons même âge, car le brave homme a ses quatre-vingts ans
passés.
Le 12. — C’était pour moi une véritable peine de m’en aller ;

papa l’a su et m’a laissée. Il me dit hier au soir : « Fais comme tu
voudras. » Je voulais demeurer et me sentais toute triste en pensant
que ce soir je serais loin d’ici, loin de Mimi, loin de mon feu, loin de
ma chambrette, loin de mes livres, loin de Trilby, loin de mon
oiseau : tout, jusqu’aux moindres choses, se présente quand on s’en
va, et vous entoure si bien qu’on n’en peut sortir. Voilà ce qui
m’arrive chaque fois qu’il est question de voyage : j’appelle voyage
une sortie de huit jours. Comme la colombe, j’aime chaque soir de
revenir à mon nid. Nul endroit ne me fait envie.
Je n’aime que les fleurs que nos ruisseaux arrosent,

Que les prés dont mes pas ont foulé le gazon ;
Je n’aime que les bois où nos oiseaux se posent,
Mon ciel de tous les jours et son même horizon.
Neuf heures. — C’est l’heure que l’âme pieuse écoute avec le

plus de recueillement, à cause des pieux souvenirs qu’elle réveille. A
la neuvième heure, nous dit l’Évangile, les ténèbres couvrirent la
terre pendant que Jésus était en croix. Ce fut aussi à la neuvième
heure que le Saint-Esprit descendit sur les apôtres. Aussi cette
heure est-elle bénie et consacrée par l’Église à la prière. C’est alors
que les chanoines commencent leur office.
Le 14. — C’est un de mes beaux jours, de ces jours qui

commencent doux et finissent doux comme une coupe de lait. Dieu
soit béni de ce jour passé sans tristesse ! Ils sont si rares dans la
vie ! et mon âme plus qu’une autre s’afflige de la moindre chose. Un
mot, un souvenir, un son de voix, un visage triste, un rien, je ne sais
quoi, souvent troublent la sérénité de mon âme, petit ciel que les
plus légers nuages ternissent. Ce matin, j’ai reçu une lettre de
Gabrielle, de cette cousine que j’aime à cause de sa douceur et de
sa belle âme. J’étais en peine sur sa santé si frêle, ne sachant rien
d’elle depuis plus d’un mois. Sa lettre aussi m’a fait tant de plaisir
que je l’ai lue avant la prière, tant j’étais pressée de la lire. Voir une
lettre, et ne pas l’ouvrir, chose impossible ! Je l’ai lue. Entre autres
choses, j’ai vu que Gabrielle n’approuve pas mes goûts de retraite et
de renoncement au monde. C’est qu’elle ne me connaît pas, qu’elle
est plus jeune et qu’elle ne sait pas qu’il est un âge où le cœur se
déprend de tout ce qui ne le fait pas vivre. Le monde l’enchante,
l’enivre, mais ce n’est pas la vie. On ne la trouve qu’en Dieu et en
soi. Être seul avec Dieu seul, ô bonheur suprême !
On m’a remis à Cahuzac encore une lettre. Celle-ci est de Lili,
autre douce amie, mais tout à fait à l’écart du monde ; âme pure,
âme de neige par sa candeur, si blanche que j’en suis éblouie quand
je la regarde, âme faite pour les yeux de Dieu. Elle me dit de l’aller
voir, mais je ne veux pas sortir avant Pâques. Après j’irai à Rayssac,
et au retour je demeurerai tant que je pourrai avec Lili. Je m’en allais
de Cahuzac toute contente avec ma lettre, lorsque j’ai vu près de la
fontaine un petit garçon qui se désolait à fendre l’âme. C’est qu’il
avait cassé son cruchon, et le pauvre enfant avait peur d’être battu
par son père. Ce n’est pas lui qui me l’a dit, tant il pleurait, mais des
femmes qui avaient vu tomber la cruche. Ce pauvre petit, j’ai vu
qu’avec dix sous je le consolerais ; et le prenant par la main, je l’ai
mené chez un terrassier où il a retrouvé sa cruche. Charles X ne
serait pas plus heureux s’il reprenait sa couronne. N’est-ce pas que
c’est un beau jour ?
Le 15. — Boue, pluie, ciel d’hiver, temps incommode pour un

dimanche ; mais ça m’est égal, tout comme si je voyais le soleil. Non
par indifférence, j’aime mieux le beau temps ; mais tous les temps
sont bons : quand le dedans est serein, que fait le reste ? J’étais à
Lentin, où j’ai entendu bien mal prêcher, ce me semble. Cette parole
de Dieu, si belle, comme elle se défigure en passant par certaines
bouches ! On a besoin de savoir qu’elle vient du ciel. Je vais à
vêpres, malgré le temps. J’ai rapporté d’Andillac une fleur, la
première que j’aie vue cette année. Les pareilles étaient sur l’autel
de la Vierge, dont elles embaumaient les pieds. C’est la coutume de
nos paysannes de lui offrir les premières fleurs de leur jardin ;
coutume pieuse et charmante : rien ne pare mieux un autel de
campagne. Je laisse ici ma fleur comme un souvenir du dimanche le
plus voisin du printemps.
Le 16. — Encore une lettre de G…, une lettre pour m’annoncer
son mariage. Que j’étais loin d’y penser ! Elle est si jeune, si
délicate, si frêle. On ne voit qu’un peu de vie dans ce petit corps
d’enfant. Mon Dieu, que je la souhaite heureuse ! mais je ne sais
pas… je ne vois rien de riant dans son mariage. Il faut pourtant que
je lui fasse mes félicitations, c’est l’usage. J’ai passé tout le jour à
penser à elle, à me figurer son avenir et à penser à ces mots de sa
lettre : Je n’ai de calme qu’à genoux.
Le 17. — C’est un cœur tout neuf que celui de G… Voilà

pourquoi elle pourra être heureuse, si son mari est aimable, parce
qu’elle l’aimera avec tout le charme d’une première affection.
J’écoute le berger qui siffle dans le vallon. C’est l’expression la
plus gaie qui puisse passer sur les lèvres de l’homme. Ce sifflement
marque un sans-souci, un bien-être, un je suis content qui fait plaisir.
Ces pauvres gens, il leur faut bien quelque chose, ils ont la gaieté.
Deux petits enfants font aussi en chantant leur fagot de branches
parmi les moutons. Ils s’interrompent de temps en temps pour rire ou
pour jouer, car tout cela leur échappe. J’aimerais de les voir faire et
d’écouter le merle qui chante dans la haie du ruisseau ; mais je veux
lire. C’est Massillon que je lis depuis que nous sommes en carême.
J’admire son discours de vendredi sur la Prière, qui est vraiment un
cantique.
Le 18. — Le berger m’a annoncé ce matin l’arrivée des

bergeronnettes. Une a suivi le troupeau toute la journée : c’est de
bon augure, nous aurons bientôt des fleurs. On croit aussi que ces
oiseaux portent bonheur aux troupeaux. Les bergers les vénèrent
comme une sorte de génies et se gardent d’en tuer aucune. Si ce
malheur arrivait, le plus beau mouton du troupeau périrait. Je
voudrais que cette naïve crédulité préservât de même tant d’autres
petits oiseaux que nos paysans font périr inhumainement, et qui
m’ont donné bien du chagrin autrefois. Le malheur des nids était un
de mes chagrins d’enfance. Je pensais aux mères, aux petits, et
cela me désolait de ne pouvoir les protéger, ces innocentes
créatures ! Je les recommandais à Dieu.
Je disais : O mon Dieu, ne les faites pas naître

Ou préservez-les de malheur ;
Préservez ces petits, vous êtes bien le maître,
Des griffes du vautour, des mains de l’oiseleur.
J’en ai vu qu’on prenait de leur nid sous le lierre,

D’autres sur le grand chêne ou cachés sous la terre,
Et, tristes comme moi quand je n’ai pas ma cour,
Tous mouraient dans un jour.
Et tous auraient chanté, et tous, mettant des ailes,

Se seraient envolés dans les bois, sur les mers ;
Et quand naîtront les fleurs, ces pauvres hirondelles
Renaîtraient dans les airs.
Vous les verriez, enfants, passer sous les nuages,

Et puis chaque matin gazouiller tout l’été.
Oh ! que c’est bien plus doux que de les voir en cages
Sans chants ni liberté !
Le 19. — Je ne sais jusqu’où ces oiseaux m’auraient menée, tant

ils me donnent de souvenirs et tant je leur portais de tendresse. Me
voici dans une joyeuse attente ; papa revient ce soir. Il me tarde :
huit jours d’absence sont longs quand on a l’habitude de ne jamais
se quitter. C’est de plus Saint-Joseph aujourd’hui, la fête de papa.
Ce ne peut être qu’un beau jour. J’ai entendu la messe pour le fêter,
voilà mon bouquet : les prières sont des fleurs divines.
Le 20. — Papa est arrivé frais, bien portant et charmé de l’accueil

qu’on lui a fait chez ma cousine de La Gardelle. La soirée s’est
passée à parler de cette bonne famille qui nous aime, des voisins
qu’ils ont, de leur curé. La vie des curés de campagne est
intéressante, et j’aime à me la faire dire. Enfin, des uns ou des
autres, nous avons eu de quoi causer jusqu’après dix heures où
chacun de nous va dormir pour l’ordinaire, sans avoir tout appris.
Je n’ai aucune envie d’écrire aujourd’hui, j’aime mieux coudre.
L’aiguille me sied mieux que la plume, je la reprends. Nous avons eu
au lever ce matin une lettre de Marie et un cahier de la Propagation
de la foi, voilà pour le cœur et pour l’âme. Marie nous mande des
amitiés ; les missionnaires, des conversions. Que ces hommes sont
admirables, et que de grand cœur je leur donne mon sou par
semaine ! Je voudrais te voir de cette association.
Le 21. — Je crois que c’est aujourd’hui le premier jour du

printemps. Je ne m’en doutais pas ; au froid qu’il fait, à la bise qui
siffle, on se croirait en janvier. Encore un peu de temps et la froidure
s’en ira : patience, pauvre impatiente que je suis de voir des fleurs,
un beau ciel, de respirer l’air tout embaumé du printemps ! Quand
j’en serai là, j’aurai quelques jours de plus, quelques soucis peut-
être, et voilà comme les jouissances arrivent. J’ai fait pourtant un
beau réveil. Comme j’ouvrais l’œil, une lune charmante passait sur
ma fenêtre et rayonnait dans mon lit, et rayonnait si bien que tout à
coup j’ai cru que c’était une lampe suspendue à mon contrevent.
C’était joli à voir et bien doux, cette blanche lumière. Aussi l’ai-je
contemplée, admirée, regardée jusqu’à ce qu’elle se fût cachée
derrière le contrevent, pour reparaître ensuite et se cacher comme
un enfant qui joue à clignette.
J’ai été me confesser ; j’ai longtemps réfléchi sur la douce et
belle morale de M. Bories, puis j’ai écrit à Louise, ici à présent : que
de douces choses j’ai faites ! J’écrirais tout à présent que j’écrirais
trop ; je ne pourrais pas dormir, et il faut que je dorme, et que je
puisse penser à Dieu et le prier demain qui est dimanche. Ce frêle
corps qui tient l’âme, il le faut ménager. C’est ennuyeux, mais qu’y
faire ? Les anges n’ont pas ce souci : heureux anges !
Le 24. — Je vois un beau soleil qui du dehors vient resplendir
dans ma chambrette. Cette clarté l’embellit et m’y retient, quoique
j’aie envie de descendre. J’aime tant ce qui vient du ciel ! J’admire
d’ailleurs ma muraille toute tapissée de rayons, et une chaise sur
laquelle ils retombent comme des draperies. Jamais je n’eus plus
belle chambre. C’est plaisir de s’y trouver et d’en jouir comme de
chose à soi. O le beau temps ! il me tarde d’en jouir, de respirer à
plein gosier l’air de dehors si suave aujourd’hui ; ce sera pour
l’après-midi : ce matin, il faut que j’écrive. Hier il nous arriva trois
personnes et des livres, toutes visites d’amis. L’après-dîner se passa
à causer, à écouter mille choses que Mme Roquiers sait raconter
comme nouvelles intéressantes, ou amuser sa petite fille, enfant de
quatre ans, fraîche comme une première rose. C’était plaisir de
baiser ses joues rondelettes et de lui voir croquer des gimblettes.
Nous sommes invitées Mimi et moi à aller assister demain chez M.
Roquiers à la bénédiction d’une cloche. Cette course ne me déplaît
pas.
Le 26. — C’est une jolie chose qu’une cloche entourée de

cierges, habillée de blanc comme un enfant qu’on va baptiser. On lui
fait des onctions, on chante, on l’interroge, et elle répond par un petit
tintement qu’elle est chrétienne et veut sonner pour Dieu. Pour qui
encore ? car elle répond deux fois. Pour toutes les choses saintes de
la terre, pour la naissance, pour la mort, pour la prière, pour le
sacrifice, pour les justes, pour les pécheurs. Le matin, j’annoncerai
l’aurore ; le soir, le déclin du jour. Céleste horloge, je sonnerai
l’Angelus et les heures saintes où Dieu veut être loué. A mes
tintements, les âmes pieuses prononceront le nom de Jésus, de
Marie ou de quelque saint bien-aimé ; leurs regards monteront au
ciel, ou, dans une église, leur cœur se distillera en amour.
Je pensais cela et d’autres choses devant cette petite cloche
d’Itzac, que je voyais bénir au milieu d’une foule qui regardait sans
penser à rien, ce me semblait, et qui regardait également nous et la
cloche. Deux demoiselles étaient en effet choses curieuses et toutes
nouvelles pour les Itzagois. Les pauvres gens !
Le 27. — A deux heures papa est parti pour Alby où Lili le

réclame pour ses affaires. Nous voilà encore seules pour je ne sais
combien de jours, car il est possible que papa aille à Rayssac. A son
retour j’aurai des nouvelles de Louise. Il me tarde. Voilà longtemps
que je ne sais rien de cette chère amie. Ce n’est pas qu’elle
m’oublie, je ne puis le croire. Si je le croyais… Non, non, Louise
m’aime et sera toujours mon amie. C’est dit, c’est fait, nous n’en
sommes plus aux commencements pour avoir des doutes sur notre
amitié. C’est qu’elle ne peut m’écrire ou que les charbonniers
perdent les lettres. Les ennuyeux, s’ils savaient ce qu’ils perdent !
Le 28. — J’ai failli avoir un chagrin : mon petit linot était sous la
griffe de la chatte, comme j’entrai dans ma chambre. Je l’ai sauvé en
donnant un grand coup de poing à la chatte, qui a lâché prise.
L’oiseau n’a eu que peur, puis il s’est trouvé si content qu’il s’est mis
à chanter de toutes ses forces comme pour me remercier et
m’assurer que la frayeur ne lui avait pas ôté la voix. Un bouvier qui
passe au chemin de Cordes chante aussi menant sa charrette, mais
un air si insouciant, si mou, que j’aime mieux le gazouillement du
linot. Quand je suis seule ici, je me plais à écouter ce qui remue au
dehors, j’ouvre l’oreille à tout bruit : un chant de poule, les branches
tombant, un bourdonnement de mouche, quoi que ce soit
m’intéresse et me donne à penser. Que de fois je me prends à
considérer, à suivre des yeux de tout petits insectes que j’aperçois
dans les feuillets d’un livre ou sur les briques ou sur la table ! Je ne
sais pas leur nom, mais nous sommes en connaissances comme
des passants qui se considèrent le long du chemin. Nous nous
perdons de vue, puis nous nous rencontrons par hasard, et la
rencontre me fait plaisir ; mais les petites bêtes me fuient, car elles
ont peur de moi, quoique je ne leur aie jamais fait mal. C’est
qu’apparemment je suis bien effrayante pour elles. En serait-il de
même au paradis ? Il n’est pas dit qu’Ève y fit jamais peur à rien. Ce
n’est qu’après le péché que la frayeur s’est mise entre les créatures.
Il faut que j’écrive à Philibert.
Le 29. — J’ai commencé hier au soir ma lettre d’outre-mer que

j’écris avec un inexprimable intérêt par les souvenirs qu’elle fait
naître, par les dangers qu’elle va courir. Est-il possible qu’une feuille
de papier lancée sur l’Océan arrive à son adresse, tombe juste sous
les yeux de mon cousin dans son île ? Ce n’est pas croyable, à
moins que quelque ange navigateur ne prenne ce papier sous son
aile. Cette île de France est en effet au bout du monde. Pauvre
Philibert, comme il est loin d’ici et qu’il est à plaindre, lui qui aime
tant son pays, ses parents, son beau ciel d’Europe ! Je me souviens
du dernier soir que nous avons passé ensemble, et comme il
contemplait avec extase ces étoiles de son pays qui bientôt
disparaîtraient pour lui ! Il regrettait surtout l’étoile polaire qu’on
cesse de voir sous la ligne. Alors paraît la croix du Sud. La croix du
Sud est bien belle, mais jamais, me disait-il, je ne l’ai tant regardée,
ni toutes nos constellations d’Afrique, que cette petite étoile du Nord.
Étoiles du beau ciel de France,

Du beau pays de ma naissance,
Vous ne luirez plus à mes yeux
Par delà l’Océan immense,
Où je vais vivre malheureux,
Et, sans vous voir, voir d’autres cieux,
Étoiles du beau ciel de France !
Ce pauvre cousin me disait cela, ce me semble, et j’en avais le

cœur gros. Que les exilés sont à plaindre ! Rien ne leur plaît dans
cet éloignement du pays. Avec sa femme et ses enfants, Philibert est
triste en Afrique ; en France, il serait heureux.
Le 30. — Deux lettres nous sont venues : l’une de joie, pour
annoncer le mariage de Sophie Decazes, l’autre de deuil, pour nous
parler de mort. C’est ce pauvre M. de La Morvonnais qui m’écrit tout
pleurant, tout plein de sa chère Marie. Comme il l’aimait et comme il
l’aime encore ! C’étaient deux âmes qui ne pouvaient se quitter :
aussi demeureront-elles unies malgré la mort, et à part le corps où
n’est pas la vie. C’est là l’union chrétienne, union spirituelle,
immortelle, nœud divin formant l’amour, la charité qui jamais ne
meurt. Dans son veuvage, Hippolyte n’est pas seul : il voit Marie,
partout Marie, toujours Marie. « Parlez-moi d’elle, toujours d’elle »,
me dit-il. Puis : « Écrivez-moi souvent, vous avez des tours de
langage qui me la rappellent au vif. » Je ne m’en doutais pas ; c’est
Dieu qui le fait et m’a mis dans l’âme quelques traits de
ressemblance avec cette âme. Voilà pourquoi elle m’aimait et je
l’aimais : la sympathie naît des rapports de l’âme. Je trouvais de plus
en Marie quelque chose d’infiniment doux que j’aime tant, qui
n’émane que d’une âme pure. « La vraie marque de l’innocence,
c’est la douceur », dit Bossuet. Que de charmes, que de bien j’aurais
goûté dans cette amitié céleste ! Dieu en a jugé autrement et me l’a
ôtée après un an que j’en ai joui. Pourquoi si tôt ? Point de plaintes,
Dieu n’en veut pas pour ce qu’il nous ôte et pour quelques jours de
séparation. Ceux qui meurent ne vont pas si loin, car le ciel est tout
près de nous. Nous n’avons qu’à lever les yeux et nous voyons leur
demeure. Consolons-nous par cette douce vue en nous résignant
sur la terre, qui n’est qu’une marche à la porte du paradis.
1er avril. — Voilà donc un mois de passé, moitié triste, moitié

beau, comme à peu près toute la vie. Ce mois de mars a quelques
lueurs de printemps qui sont bien douces ; c’est le premier qui voit
des fleurs, quelques pimprenelles qui s’ouvrent un peu au soleil, des
violettes dans les bois sous les feuilles mortes, qui les préservent de
la gelée blanche. Les petits enfants s’en amusent et les appellent
fleurs de mars. Ce nom est très-bien donné. On en fait sécher pour
faire de la tisane. Cette fleur est douce et bonne pour les rhumes, et,
comme la vertu cachée, son parfum la décèle. On a vu aujourd’hui
des hirondelles, joyeuse annonce du printemps.
Le 2. — Mon âme s’en va tout aujourd’hui du ciel sur une tombe,

car il y a seize ans que ma mère mourut à minuit. Ce triste
anniversaire est consacré au deuil et à la prière. Je l’ai passé devant
Dieu en regrets et en espérances ; tout en pleurant, je lève les yeux
et vois le ciel où ma mère est heureuse sans doute, car elle a tant
souffert ! Sa maladie fut longue et son âme patiente. Je ne me
souviens pas qu’il lui soit échappé une plainte, qu’elle ait crié tant
soit peu sous la douleur qui la déchirait : nulle chrétienne n’a mieux
souffert. On voyait qu’elle l’avait appris devant la croix. Il lui serait
venu de sourire sur son lit de mort comme un martyr sur son
chevalet. Son visage ne perdit jamais sa sérénité, et jusque dans
son agonie elle semblait penser à une fête. Cela m’étonnait, moi qui
la voyais tant souffrir, moi qui pleurais au moindre mal, et qui ne
savais pas ce que c’est que la résignation dans les peines. Aussi,
quand on me disait qu’elle s’en allait mourir, je la regardais, et son
air content me faisait croire qu’elle ne mourrait pas. Elle mourut
cependant le 2 avril à minuit, à l’heure où je m’étais endormie au
pied de son lit. Sa douce mort ne m’éveilla pas, jamais âme ne sortit
plus tranquillement de ce monde. Ce fut mon père… Mon Dieu !
j’entends le prêtre, je vois des cierges allumés, une figure pâle, en
pleurs : je fus emmenée dans une autre chambre.
Le 3. — A neuf heures du matin ma mère fut mise au tombeau.
Le 4. — Je vais à Cahuzac avec le soleil sur la tête. Si cela

m’ennuie, je penserai au saint du jour, saint Macaire cheminant sous
une corbeille de sable dans le désert pour se défaire d’une tentation.
Il tourmentait le corps pour sauver l’âme.
Le 8. — Je ne sais pourquoi je n’ai rien mis ici depuis quatre
jours ; j’y reviens à présent que je me trouve seule dans ma
chambre. La solitude fait écrire parce qu’elle fait penser. On prend
son âme avec qui l’on entre en conversation. Je demande à la
mienne ce qu’elle a vu aujourd’hui, ce qu’elle a appris, ce qu’elle a
aimé, car chaque jour elle aime quelque chose. Ce matin j’ai vu un
beau ciel, le marronnier verdoyant, et entendu chanter les petits
oiseaux. Je les écoutais sous le grand chêne, près du Téoulé dont
on nettoyait le bassin. Ces jolis chants et ce lavage de fontaine me
donnaient à penser diversement : les oiseaux me faisaient plaisir, et,
en voyant s’en aller toute bourbeuse cette eau si pure auparavant, je
regrettais qu’on l’eût troublée, et me figurais notre âme quand
quelque chose la remue ; la plus belle même se décharme quand on
en touche le fond, car au fond de toute âme humaine il y a un peu de
limon. Voilà bien la peine de prendre de l’encre pour écrire de ces
inutilités ! Mieux vaut parler du pauvre Tamisier, qui me racontait,
assis près du portail, quelque aventure de ses courses. Je l’en ai
remercié par un coup de vin, qui lui donnera d’autres paroles et des
jambes pour aller au gîte ce soir. J’ai lu un sermon ; ne pouvant pas
aller en entendre, je me fais de ma chambrette une église où je
trouve Dieu, ce me semble, et sans distractions. Quand j’ai prié, je
réfléchis ; quand j’ai médité, je lis, puis quelquefois j’écris, et tout
cela se fait devant une petite croix sur la table, comme un autel ;
dessous est le tiroir où sont mes lettres, mes reliques.
Le 9. — J’ai médité ce matin sur les larmes de Madeleine. Les

douces larmes et la belle histoire que celle de cette femme qui a tant
aimé ! Voici papa, je quitte tout.
Le 13. — Depuis le retour de papa j’ai laissé mon Journal, mes

livres et bien des choses. Il y a de ces jours de défaillance où l’âme
se retire de toutes ses affections et se replie sur elle-même comme
bien fatiguée. Cette fatigue sans travail, qu’est-ce autre chose que
faiblesse ? Il la faut surmonter comme tant d’autres qui vous
prennent cette pauvre âme. Si on ne les tuait une à une, toutes ces
misères finiraient par vous dévorer comme ces étoffes rongées par
les vers. Je passe trop subitement de la tristesse à la joie ; quand je
dis joie, je veux dire ces bonheurs de l’âme calmes et doux, et qui
n’éclatent au dehors que par la sérénité. Une lettre, un souvenir de
Dieu ou de ceux que j’aime, me feront cet effet, et d’autres fois tout
le contraire. C’est quand je prends les choses mal qu’elles
m’attristent. Dieu sait les craintes et les ravissements qu’il me
donne ; mes amis, vous ne savez pas combien vous m’êtes doux et
amers ! Te souviens-tu, Maurice, de cette petite courte lettre qui m’a
tourmentée quinze jours ? que tu me semblais froid, indifférent, peu
aimable !
Je viens de suspendre à mon bénitier le rameau bénit. C’était
hier les Rameaux, la fête des enfants, si heureux avec leurs
rameaux bénits, garnis de gâteaux dans l’église. Cette joyeuse
entrée leur est donnée sans doute en mémoire de l’hosanna que les
enfants chantèrent à Jésus dans le temple. Dieu ne laisse rien sans
récompense. Voilà mon cahier fini. En recommencerai-je un autre ?
Je ne sais. Adieu à celui-ci et à toi !
II
Le 14 avril 1835. — Pourquoi ne continuerais-je pas de t’écrire,

mon cher Maurice ? Ce cahier te fera autant de plaisir que les deux
autres, je continue. Ne seras-tu pas bien aise de savoir que je viens
de passer un joli quart d’heure sur le perron de la terrasse, assise à
côté d’une pauvre vieille qui me chantait une lamentable complainte
sur un événement arrivé jadis à Cahuzac ? C’est venu à propos
d’une croix d’or qu’on a volée au cou de la sainte Vierge. La vieille
s’est souvenue que sa grand’mère lui disait qu’autrefois on lui avait
dit que, dans la même église, il avait été fait un vol plus sacrilége
encore, puisque ce fut le Saint-Sacrement qu’on enleva un jour qu’il
était seul exposé dans l’église. Ce fut une fille qui, pendant que tout
le monde était aux moissons, s’en vint à l’autel et, montant dessus,
mit l’ostensoir dans son tablier, et s’en alla le poser sous un rosier
dans un bois. Les bergers qui le découvrirent l’allèrent dénoncer, et
neuf prêtres vinrent en procession adorer le Saint-Sacrement du
rosier et le reportèrent à l’église. Cependant la pauvre bergère fut
prise, jugée et condamnée au feu. Au moment de mourir, elle
demanda à se confesser et fit au prêtre l’aveu du larcin, mais ce
n’était pas qu’elle fût voleuse, c’était, dit-elle, pour avoir le Saint-
Sacrement dans la forêt. « J’avais pensé que sous un rosier le bon
Dieu se plairait aussi bien que sur un autel. » A ces paroles, un ange
descendit du ciel pour lui annoncer son pardon et consoler la sainte
criminelle, qui fut brûlée sur un bûcher dont le rosier fut le premier
fagot. Voilà ce que m’a chanté la mendiante que j’écoutais comme
un rossignol. Je l’ai bien remerciée, puis lui ai offert quelque chose
pour la payer de sa complainte ; elle n’a voulu que des fleurs :
« Donnez-moi quelque brin de ce beau lilas. » Je lui en ai donné
quatre, grands comme des panaches, et la pauvre vieille s’en est
allée, son bâton d’une main et son bouquet de l’autre, et moi dedans
avec sa complainte.
Le 15. — A mon réveil, j’ai entendu le rossignol, mais rien qu’un

soupir, un signe de voix. J’ai écouté longtemps sans jamais entendre
autre chose. Le charmant musicien arrivait à peine et n’a fait que
s’annoncer. C’était comme le premier coup d’archet d’un grand
concert. Tout chante ou va chanter.
Je n’ai pas lu la vie du saint aujourd’hui, je vais la lire : c’est mon
habitude avant dîner. Je trouve que, tandis qu’on mange, qu’on est à
la crèche, il est bon d’avoir dans l’âme quelque chose de spirituel
comme une vie de saint.
Elle est charmante, la vie de saint Macédone, de celui qui, par
ses prières, obtint la naissance de Théodoret, et qui dit à un
chasseur étonné de rencontrer le saint sur la montagne : « Vous
courez après les bêtes, et moi je cours après Dieu. » Dans ces mots
est toute la vie des saints et celle des hommes du monde.
Nous avons un hôte de plus dans la cuisine, un grillon, qu’on a
rapporté parmi des herbes ce soir. Le voilà établi dans le foyer, où la
petite bête chantera quand elle sera joyeuse…
Le jeudi saint. — J’arrive tout embaumée de la chapelle de

mousse où repose le saint ciboire à l’église. C’est un beau jour que
celui où Dieu veut reposer parmi les fleurs et les parfums du
printemps. Nous avons mis tous nos soins, Mimi, moi et Rose la
marguillière, à faire ce reposoir, aidées que nous étions de M. le
curé. Je pensais, en le faisant, au cénacle, à cette salle bien ornée
où Jésus voulut faire la Pâque avec ses disciples, se donnant lui-
même pour agneau. Oh ! quel don ! que dire de l’Eucharistie ? Je
n’en sais rien : on adore, on possède, on vit, on aime, l’âme sans
parole se perd dans un abîme de bonheur. J’ai pensé à toi parmi ces
extases, et t’aurais bien désiré à mon côté à la sainte table, comme
il y a trois ans.
Le mardi de Pâques. — Voici plusieurs jours que je n’ai écrit ni à

toi ni à personne. Les offices m’ont pris le temps, et j’ai vécu, pour
ainsi dire, à l’église. Douce et belle vie que je regrette de voir finir,
mais je la retrouve ici quand je veux : j’ouvre ma chambrette, et là
j’entre au calme, au recueillement, à la solitude ; je ne sais pourquoi
j’en sors.
Voilà sur ma fenêtre un oiseau qui vient visiter le mien. Il a peur, il
s’en va, et le pauvre encagé s’attriste, s’agite comme pour
s’échapper. Je ferais comme lui si j’étais à sa place, et cependant je
le retiens. Vais-je lui ouvrir ? Il irait voler, chanter, faire son nid, il
serait heureux ; mais je ne l’aurais plus, et je l’aime, et je veux l’avoir.
Je le garde. Pauvre petit linot, tu seras toujours prisonnier : je jouis
de toi aux dépens de ta liberté, je te plains et je te garde. Voilà
comme le plaisir l’emporte sur la justice. Mais que ferais-tu si je te
donnais les champs ? Sais-tu que tes ailes, qui ne se sont jamais
dépliées, n’iraient pas loin dans le grand espace que tu vois à
travers les barreaux de ta cage ? Ta pâture, tu ne saurais la trouver,
tu n’as pas goûté de ce que mangent tes frères, et même peut-être
te banniraient-ils, comme un inconnu, de leur festin de famille. Reste
avec moi qui te nourris. La nuit, la rosée mouillerait tes plumes, et le
froid du matin t’empêcherait de chanter.
En travaillant le champ, on a soulevé une pierre qui recouvrait un
grand trou. Je vais la voir. Jeannot, muni d’un câble, est descendu
dans le souterrain et l’a exploré de tous côtés. Ce n’est autre chose
qu’une excavation incrustée de jolies petites pierres relevées en
bosses de pralines. J’en ai pris pour monument de notre découverte.
Un autre jour, je descendrai dans la grotte, et peut-être y verrai-je
autre chose que Jeannot.
Le 24. — J’attendis tout hier le facteur, espérant que j’aurais de
tes lettres. Ce sera demain sans doute. Voilà comme je me console
à chaque courrier, depuis quinze jours que je suis en attente. C’est
bien long, et je commence à m’inquiéter de ton silence. Serais-tu
malade ? Cette idée me vient cent fois le jour, et la nuit quand je me
réveille. « Va-t’en, lui dis-je, je ne te crois pas. » Mais c’est possible :
le fils de M. de Fénelous vient bien de mourir à Paris. Mon Dieu, que
c’est triste, mourir loin des siens, loin de chez soi ! Demain je t’écris.
Parlons d’autres choses à présent. D’après la lettre de M.
Hippolyte, papa espère que nous le verrons ici. Ce nous serait un
grand bonheur de le posséder et de lui rendre un peu de ce que
nous lui devons pour son amitié pour toi. Qui sait ce que lui
semblerait notre Cayla, notre ciel et nous-mêmes ? On se fait sur
l’inconnu des idées que souvent la réalité désenchante. Au reste, je
ne voudrais pas qu’il vînt sans toi. Que serait pour lui le Cayla sans
Maurice ? Un désert où il s’ennuierait bientôt d’être seul. S’il
m’amenait sa fille, comme il me l’a dit, alors ce serait bien différent
pour lui : sa fille lui charmerait tout, et le Cayla pourrait lui sembler le
Val. Je serais aussi bien contente de voir cette enfant, de la tenir sur
mes genoux, de la caresser, de l’embrasser, de l’avoir en ma
possession pour quelques jours. Je ne saurais dire combien cette
petite créature m’intéresse, m’attache à elle, sans doute par le
souvenir de sa mère ; et puis, cette pauvre enfant est si intéressante
par son malheur ! N’avoir pas de mère, hélas ! c’est si triste, et
surtout à son âge, à deux ans ! Quoique si jeune, elle sent déjà sa
perte et la sentira tous les jours davantage. Le cœur apprend à
s’affliger comme il apprend à aimer. En grandissant, Marie aimera
toujours mieux sa mère et la pleurera davantage. Son avenir
m’occupe beaucoup ; je voudrais savoir si elle vivra, si Dieu ne la
retirera pas à lui avant l’âge où elle pourrait connaître le mal. Ce
serait un malheur pour son père, mais pour elle, oh non ! Peut-on
regretter qu’une âme s’en retourne au ciel avec toute son
innocence ? La belle mort qu’une mort d’enfant, et comme on bénit
ces petits cercueils que l’Église accompagne avec allégresse !
J’aime ceux-là, je les contemple, je m’en approche comme d’un
berceau ; je ne plains que les mères, je prie Dieu de les consoler, et
Dieu les console, si elles sont chrétiennes.
Je n’ai écrit qu’ici d’aujourd’hui. Je ne sais pourquoi cela m’est
devenu nécessaire d’écrire, quand ce ne serait que deux mots. C’est
mon signe de vie que d’écrire, comme à la fontaine de couler. Je ne
le dirais pas à d’autres, cela paraîtrait folie. Qui sait ce que c’est que
cet épanchement de mon âme au dehors, ce besoin de se répandre
devant Dieu et devant quelqu’un ? Je dis quelqu’un parce qu’il me
semble que tu es là, que ce papier c’est toi. Dieu, ce me semble,
m’écoute ; il me répond même de ces choses que l’âme entend et
qu’on ne peut dire. Quand je suis seule, assise ici ou à genoux
devant mon crucifix, je me figure être Marie écoutant tranquille les
paroles de Jésus. Pendant ce grand silence où Dieu seul lui parle,
mon âme est heureuse et comme morte à tout ce qui se fait là-bas,
là-haut, dedans, dehors ; mais cela ne dure guère. « Allons, ma
pauvre âme, lui dis-je, reviens aux choses de ce monde. » Et je
prends ma quenouille, ou un livre, ou une casserole, ou je caresse
Wolf ou Trilby. Voilà la vie du ciel en terre. Je trayais une brebis tout
à l’heure. Oh ! le bon lait, et que j’aurais voulu te le faire goûter, ce
bon lait de brebis du Cayla ! Mon ami, que de douceurs tu perds à
n’être pas ici !
A huit heures. — Il faut que je note en passant un excellent

souper que nous venons de faire, papa, Mimi et moi, au coin du feu
de la cuisine, avec de la soupe des domestiques, des pommes de
terre bouillies et un gâteau que je fis hier au four du pain. Nous
n’avions pour serviteurs que nos chiens, Lion, Wolf et Trilby, qui
léchaient aussi les miettes. Tous nos gens sont à l’église, à
l’instruction qui se fait chaque soir pour la confirmation. Ce repas au
coin du feu, parmi chiens et chats, ce couvert mis sur les bûches, est
chose charmante. Il n’y manquait que le chant du grillon et toi, pour
compléter le charme. Est-ce assez bavardé aujourd’hui ?
Maintenant, je vais écouter la Vialarette, qui revient de Cordes :
encore un plaisir.
Le 25. — Me voici devant un charmant bouquet de lilas que je
viens de prendre sur la terrasse. Ma chambrette en est embaumée ;
j’y suis comme dans un bouquetier, tant je respire de parfums !
Le 26. — Je ne sais quoi m’ôta de sur les fleurs hier matin ;

depuis j’en ai vu d’autres dans le chemin de Cahuzac, tout bordé
d’aubépines. C’est plaisir de trotter dans ces parfums, et d’entendre
les petits oiseaux qui chantent par-ci par-là dans les haies. Rien
n’est charmant comme ces courses du matin au printemps, et je ne
regrette pas de me lever de bonne heure pour me donner ce plaisir.
Bientôt je me lèverai à cinq heures. Je me règle sur le soleil, et nous
nous levons ensemble. L’hiver, il est paresseux : je le suis et ne sors
du lit qu’à sept heures. Encore parfois le jour me semble long. Cela
m’arrive lorsque le ciel est nébuleux, que je suis triste et que
j’attends un peu de soleil ou quelque chose de rayonnant dans mon
âme ; alors le temps est long. Mon Dieu, trouver un jour long, tandis
que la vie tout entière n’est rien ! C’est que l’ennui s’est posé sur
moi, qu’il y demeure, et que tout ce qui prend de la durée met de
l’éternité dans le temps. Oh ! que je plains une âme en purgatoire,
où l’attente fait tant souffrir, et quelle attente ! Peut-on mettre en
comparaison celles d’ici-bas, soit de la fortune, de la gloire, de tout
ce qui fait haleter le cœur humain ? Une seule peut-être en est
l’ombre, c’est celle de l’amour quand il attend ce qu’il aime. Aussi
Fénelon compare-t-il la félicité céleste à celle d’une mère au moment
où elle revoit son fils qu’elle avait cru mort. Midi sonne. Ce n’est plus
le temps d’écrire.
Quand je vois passer devant la croix un homme qui se signe ou
ôte son chapeau, je me dis : « Voilà un chrétien qui passe ; » et je
me sens de la vénération pour lui, et je ne ferme pas à verroux, si je
suis seule à la maison ; au contraire, je me tiens à la fenêtre, et
regarde tant que je puis cette bonne figure de chrétien, comme je l’ai
fait tout à l’heure. On n’a rien à craindre de ceux qui craignent Dieu.
J’aurais volontiers ouvert la porte à l’inconnu que j’ai vu chevauchant
du côté de la croix. Que Dieu l’accompagne où qu’il aille ! Je vais
courir aussi, mais pas bien loin, jusqu’à l’église pour vêpres. Il est
dimanche, jour de sortie pour le corps et de recueillement pour
l’âme. Elle rentre donc en soi et te quitte. Encore jour de courrier
aujourd’hui, et je n’ai pas de lettre. A quoi penses-tu, mon ami ?
Le 27. — J’ai rencontré le petit du Cruchon. Le pauvre enfant a

perdu son père ; sa mère est morte aussi, et depuis, l’orphelin a une
coutume touchante. Il prend à côté de lui, dans son lit, un mouchoir
à la place où était sa mère et s’endort en le tetant. Douce illusion qui
le console et l’attache si fort à son bout de mouchoir qu’il pleure et
crie s’il se réveille sans l’avoir aux lèvres ! Il appelle sa mère alors,
lui dit de revenir, et ne se calme qu’avec sa poupée : naïf besoin que
cette poupée, bien digne d’une âme d’enfant, et même de tout
homme fait, car tout affligé a la sienne, et se plaît à la moindre
image du bonheur perdu !
Le 28. — Quand tout le monde est occupé et que je ne suis pas

nécessaire, je fais retraite et viens ici à toute heure pour écrire, lire
ou prier. J’y mets aussi ce qui se passe dans l’âme et dans la
maison, et de la sorte nous retrouverons jour par jour tout le passé.
Pour moi ce n’est rien ce qui passe, et je ne l’écrirais pas, mais je
me dis : « Maurice sera bien aise de voir ce que nous faisions
pendant qu’il était loin et de rentrer ainsi dans la vie de famille », et
je le marque pour toi.
Mais je m’aperçois que je ne parle guère de qui que ce soit, et
que mon égoïsme se met toujours en scène ; je dis : « J’ai fait ceci,
j’ai vu cela, j’ai pensé telle chose », laissant derrière le public à la
façon de l’amour-propre, mais le mien est celui du cœur qui ne sait
parler que de lui. Le petit peintre ne sait donner que son portrait à
son ami, le grand peintre offre des tableaux. Je continue donc le
portrait. Sans la pluie qu’il a fait ce matin, je serais à Gaillac
maintenant. Grâce à la pluie, j’aime bien mieux être ici. Quel salon
peut me valoir ma chambrette ? avec qui serais-je à présent, qui me
valût ceux qui m’entourent ? Bossuet, saint Augustin et d’autres

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Managing the Law The Legal Aspects of

Doing Business 4th Edition McInnes

ADDITIONAL TEACHING SUGGESTIONS

Battle of the Forms

The Postal Rule and Overtaking Communications

R v Clarke is often contrasted with Williams v Carwardine (which appears below in a

Ethical Perspective 7.1

Business Decision 7.1

2. If there is a large number of potential buyers, the property could presumably be

3. Where the future market value is expected to decline, an option guaranteeing

Business Decision 7.2

2. Business people can obviously avoid difficulties by carefully reading contractual

Business Decision 7.3

There is a presumption that parties in a commercial setting do intend to create legal

4. “Quantum meruit” is a Latin phrase that means “as much as it is worth.” A

6. An option is a contract in which the offeror is paid in exchange for a binding

7. An offer is an indication of a willingness to enter into a contract on certain terms,

11. An offer may come to an end in five different ways.

can stipulate that acceptance must be communicated in a particular manner. Furthermore,

14. A counter offer occurs when an offeree responds to an offer by indicating a

16. A bilateral contract is a contract in which a promise is exchanged for a promise. A

18. Instantaneous communication is any form of communication in which there is

19. The statement is not true. As a general rule, non-instantaneous communications

20. The first statement is correct; the second statement is incorrect.

A unilateral contract is an agreement under which, at the time of creation or formation,

CASES AND PROBLEMS

1. In a business context, there is a general presumption that the parties had an

4. On the facts of this case, it is important to consider four rules governing

5. This question requires a consideration of the rules governing the acceptance or

[Based on Fisher v Bell [1961] 1 QB 394 (CA)]

[Based on Byrne v Van Tienhoven (1880) 5 CPD 344.]

9. The courts generally assume that an agreement reached in a commercial context is

Edgar’s offer may be interpreted as pertaining to a unilateral contract. In exchange for

[Based on Errington v Errington [1952] 1 KB 290 (CA) and Dawson v Helicopter

[Based on Felthouse v Bindley (1862) 142 ER 1037 (Exch)—discussed below in a Case

Jones v Padavatton [1969] 2 All ER 616 (CA)—note 7

That approach is unacceptable, however, because, depending upon the circumstances, it

Butler Machine Tool Co v Ex-cell-O Corp [1979] 1 All ER 695 (CA)—note 19

Felthouse v Bindley (1862) 142 ER 1037 (Ex Ch)—note 21

Where technological advances have been made which facilitate communications

R v Clarke (1927) 40 CLR 227 (HCA)—note 27

Dawson v Helicopter Exploration Co [1955] 5 DLR 404 (SCC)—note 28

Errington v Errington [1952] 1 KB 290 (CA)—note 29

Le 11. — Aujourd’hui, à cinq heures du matin, il y a eu cinquante-

Le 12. — C’était pour moi une véritable peine de m’en aller ;

Je n’aime que les fleurs que nos ruisseaux arrosent,

Neuf heures. — C’est l’heure que l’âme pieuse écoute avec le

Le 14. — C’est un de mes beaux jours, de ces jours qui

Le 15. — Boue, pluie, ciel d’hiver, temps incommode pour un

Le 17. — C’est un cœur tout neuf que celui de G… Voilà

Le 18. — Le berger m’a annoncé ce matin l’arrivée des

Je disais : O mon Dieu, ne les faites pas naître

J’en ai vu qu’on prenait de leur nid sous le lierre,

Et tous auraient chanté, et tous, mettant des ailes,

Vous les verriez, enfants, passer sous les nuages,

Le 19. — Je ne sais jusqu’où ces oiseaux m’auraient menée, tant

Le 20. — Papa est arrivé frais, bien portant et charmé de l’accueil

Le 21. — Je crois que c’est aujourd’hui le premier jour du

Le 26. — C’est une jolie chose qu’une cloche entourée de

Le 27. — A deux heures papa est parti pour Alby où Lili le

Le 29. — J’ai commencé hier au soir ma lettre d’outre-mer que

Étoiles du beau ciel de France,

Ce pauvre cousin me disait cela, ce me semble, et j’en avais le