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1
Part Three:
Contracts
CONTENTS
Chapter 9 ................................. Introduction to Contracts

Chapter 10 ............................... Mutual Assent
Chapter 11 ............................... Conduct Invalidating Assent
Chapter 12 ............................... Consideration
Chapter 13 ............................... Illegal Bargains
Chapter 14 ............................... Contractual Capacity
Chapter 15 ............................... Contracts in Writing
Chapter 16 ............................... Third Parties to Contracts
Chapter 17 ............................... Performance, Breach, and Discharge
Chapter 18 ............................... Contract Remedies
ETHICS QUESTIONS RAISED IN THIS PART

1. Historically, the common law of contracts placed a great deal of emphasis upon "caveat emptor" or let the buyer
beware. In the twentieth century much of this doctrine has been eroded by various consumer protection laws. Are
there ethical reasons why freedom of contract should not be upheld by the law?
2. What obligation should the producer of goods have to produce goods that are without defects? Should caveat
emptor be the rule of law in the area of contracts?
3. Should a party who enters into a contract by mistake be released from her contractual obligations? If yes, should
all mistakes be grounds for release or just certain types of mistakes?
4. Are certain types of contracts unethical or unconscionable? If so, what types of contracts are either unethical or
unconscionable? How should the law treat a situation where a contract is unethical or unconscionable?
5. If one party is harmed by the breach of another party, what remedies should be available to the non-breaching
party? Is specific performance always the best remedy from an ethical perspective? Why?
ACTIVITIES AND RESEARCH PROBLEMS

1. Have students bring copies of contracts they have signed to the class. Then carefully read these contracts and
have the class discuss the legal implications of the contracts, whether they were aware of all of the contractual
terms to which they had agreed, and how they might have negotiated a better deal for themselves.
2. Tell your students to assume they have just been offered a top level management position with a major
corporation. Then have them draft an employment contract that they believe would be fair to both them and to the
corporation.
3. Research the general statute of frauds in the state where you live. Compare it to the general statute of frauds
discussed in the text.
4. Some states have adopted "plain language contract statutes" for contracts involving consumer transactions.
Research to see whether your state has adopted such a statute and if so, discuss the implications of it.
© 2014 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly
accessible website, in whole or in part.
2 INTRODUCTION TO CONTRACTS CHAPTER 9
Chapter 9
INTRODUCTION TO CONTRACTS
A. Development of the Law of Contracts D. Classification of Contracts

1. Common Law 1. Express and Implied Contracts
2. The Uniform Commercial Code 2. Bilateral and Unilateral Contracts
3. Types of Contracts Outside the Code 3. Valid, Void, Voidable, & Unenforceable Contracts
B. Definition of Contract 4. Executed and Executory Contracts
C. Requirements of a Contract E. Promissory Estoppel
F. Quasi Contracts
Cases in This Chapter

Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School Skebba v. Kasch
Fox v. Mountain West Electric, Inc. Jasdip Properties SC, LLC v. Estate of Richardson
TEACHING NOTES
A contract is a binding agreement that the courts will enforce. The Restatement defines a contract as “a promise
or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in
some way recognizes a duty.”
A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS

Contract law has undergone enormous changes in the past century—changes which affect both the rules for
making a contract and the enforceability of contracts. The formalities of contract formation have been relaxed
to the point that the law now recognizes as a contract almost any agreement in which both parties intended to be
bound. In addition, it is also now much easier to get out of an obligation imposed by a contract, due to the
recognition of factors such as fraud, duress, undue influence, mistake, unconscionability or impossibility.
Common Law
Contracts are primarily governed by state common law, with a clear presentation found in the Restatements of
the Law of Contracts, first promulgated on May 6, 1932. A revised edition—the Restatement, Second,
Contracts—was adopted and promulgated on May 17, 1979.
*** Chapter Objective ***

Distinguish between contracts covered by the UCC and those covered by common law.
The Uniform Commercial Code

Article 2 of the UCC governs the sale of tangible personal property in all states except Louisiana. A sale is a
contract involving the transfer of title to goods from seller to buyer for a price. The Code essentially defines
goods as tangible personal property. Personal property is any property other than real property (land).
Types of Contracts Outside the Code
General contract law governs all contracts outside the Code. For example, the Code does not apply to
employment contracts, service contracts, insurance contracts, contracts involving real property (land and
CHAPTER 9 INTRODUCTION TO CONTRACTS 3
anything attached to it, including buildings), and contracts for the sale of intangibles such as patents and
copyrights. These transactions continue to be governed by general contract law.
NOTE: See Figure 9-1 for a summary of the law governing contracts.
B. DEFINITION OF CONTRACT
A contract is not a "thing," but a relationship between parties, which entails mutual rights and duties contained
in a set of promises that the courts will enforce. A contract, then, can be defined as:
"a promise or set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy or the
performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty."
A breach is the failure to perform contractual promises properly.
It is important to note that while all contracts are promises, not all promises are contracts. Some promises are
unenforceable and, therefore, are not contracts. For a promise to be enforced, it must include all essential
requirements of a legal, binding contract.
NOTE: See Figure 9-2.

List the essential elements of a contract.
C. REQUIREMENTS OF A CONTRACT
Mutual Assent — The parties must show by words or conduct that they have agreed to enter into a contract.
The usual method of showing mutual assent is by offer and acceptance.
Consideration — Each party to a contract must intentionally exchange a legal benefit or incur a legal detriment
as an inducement to the other party to make a return exchange.
Legality of Object — The purpose of a contract must not be criminal, tortious, or against public policy.
Capacity — The parties must have contractual capacity. Some persons, such as adjudicated incompetents
(persons placed under guardianship by a court order), have no legal capacity to contract, while others, such as
minors, nonadjudicated incompetent persons, and intoxicated persons, have limited capacity to contract.
In some instances a contract must be evidenced by a writing to be enforceable; but in most cases, an oral
contract is binding and enforceable.
NOTE: See Figure 9-3.
CASE
STEINBERG V. CHICAGO MEDICAL SCHOOL
ILLINOIS COURT OF APPEALS, 1976
41 ILL.APP.3D 804, 354 N.E.2D 586
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13765816040578352414&q=354+N.E.2d+586&hl=en&as_sdt=2,34
FACTS: Robert Steinberg applied for admission to the Chicago Medical School as a first-year
student and paid an application fee of $15. The school, a private educational institution, rejected
his application. Steinberg brought an action against the school, claiming that it did not evaluate
his and other applications according to the academic entrance criteria printed in the school’s
bulletin. Instead, he argues, the school based its decisions primarily on nonacademic
considerations, such as family connections between the applicant and the school’s faculty and
members of its board of trustees and the ability of the applicant or his family to donate large
sums of money to the school. Steinberg asserts that by evaluating his application according to
these unpublished criteria, the school breached the contract it had created when it accepted his
application fee. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, and Steinberg
appealed.
DECISION: Trial court’s dismissal reversed and case remanded.
OPINION: Dempsey, J. A contract is an agreement between competent parties, based upon a
consideration sufficient in law, to do or not do a particular thing. It is a promise or a set of
promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in
some way recognizes as a duty. [Citation.] A contract’s essential requirements are: competent
parties, valid subject matter, legal consideration, mutuality of obligation and mutuality of
agreement. Generally, parties may contract in any situation where there is no legal prohibition,
since the law acts by restraint and not by conferring rights. [Citation.] However, it is basic
contract law that in order for a contract to be binding the terms of the contract must be
reasonably certain and definite. [Citation.]
A contract, in order to be legally binding, must be based on consideration. [Citation.]
Consideration has been defined to consist of some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to
one party or some forbearance, disadvantage, detriment, loss or responsibility given, suffered,
or undertaken by the other. [Citation.] Money is a valuable consideration and its transfer or
payment or promises to pay it or the benefit from the right to its use, will support a contract.
In forming a contract, it is required that both parties assent to the same thing in the same
sense [citation] and that their minds meet on the essential terms and conditions. [Citation.]
Furthermore, the mutual consent essential to the formation of a contract must be gathered from
the language employed by the parties or manifested by their words or acts. The intention of the
parties gives character to the transaction, and if either party contracts in good faith he is entitled
to the benefit of his contract no matter what may have been the secret purpose or intention of
the other party. [Citation.]
Steinberg contends that the Chicago Medical School’s informational brochure constituted an
invitation to make an offer; that his subsequent application and the submission of his $15 fee to
the school amounted to an offer; that the school’s voluntary reception of his fee constituted an
acceptance and because of these events a contract was created between the school and
himself. He contends that the school was duty bound under the terms of the contract to evaluate
his application according to its stated standards and that the deviation from these standards not
only breached the contract, but amounted to an arbitrary selection which constituted a violation
of due process and equal protection. He concludes that such a breach did in fact take place
each and every time during the past ten years that the school evaluated applicants according to
their relationship to the school’s faculty members or members of its board of trustees, or in
accordance with their ability to make or pledge large sums of money to the school. Finally, he
asserts that he is a member and a proper representative of the class that has been damaged by
the school’s practice.
The school counters that no contract came into being because informational brochures,
such as its bulletin, do not constitute offers, but are construed by the courts to be general
proposals to consider, examine and negotiate. The school points out that this doctrine has been
specifically applied in Illinois to university informational publications.
***
We agree with Steinberg’s position. We believe that he and the school entered into an
enforceable contract; that the school’s obligation under the contract was stated in the school’s
bulletin in a definitive manner and that by accepting his application fee—a valuable
consideration—the school bound itself to fulfill its promises. Steinberg accepted the school’s
promises in good faith and he was entitled to have his application judged according to the
school’s stated criteria.
INTERPRETATION: An agreement meeting all of the requirements of a contract is binding and
legally enforceable.
ETHICAL QUESTION: Is it ethical for a school to consider any factors other than an applicant’s
merit? Explain.
CRITICAL THINKING QUESTION: Should the courts resolve this type of dispute on the basis
of contract law? Explain.
D. CLASSIFICATION OF CONTRACTS
Contracts can be classified according to various characteristics, such as their method of formation, their content,
and their legal effect. These classifications of contracts are not mutually exclusive.

Distinguish among (a) express and implied contract, (b) unilateral and bilateral contracts, and (c) valid, void,
voidable, and unenforceable contracts; and (d) executed and executory contracts.
Express and Implied Contracts

Parties may indicate their willingness to enter into a contract either in words (express) or by conduct implying
such willingness (implied in fact). Both are contracts, equally enforceable. The difference between them is
merely the manner in which the parties manifest their assent.
CASE
FOX V. MOUNTAIN WEST ELECTRIC, INC.
SUPREME COURT OF IDAHO, 2002
137 IDAHO 703, 52 P.3D 848; REHEARING DENIED, 2002
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=52+P.3D+848&hl=en&as_sdt=2,34&case=12020421688825080366&scilh
=0
FACTS: Lockheed Martin Idaho Technical Company (LMITCO) requested bids for a
comprehensive fire alarm system in its twelve buildings located in Idaho Falls. Mountain West
Electric (MWE) was in the business of installing electrical wiring, conduit and related hookups,
and attachments. Fox provided services in designing, drafting, testing, and assisting in the
installation of fire alarm systems. The parties decided that it would be better for them to work
together with MWE taking the lead on the project. The parties prepared a document defining
each of their roles and jointly prepared a bid. MWE was awarded the LMITCO fixed-price
contract. In May 1996, Fox began performing various services at the direction of MWE’s
manager.
During the course of the project, many changes and modifications to the LMITCO contract
were made. MWE and Fox disagreed on the procedure for the compensation of the change
orders. MWE proposed a flow-down procedure, whereby Fox would receive whatever
compensation LMITCO decided to pay MWE. Fox found this unacceptable and suggested a
bidding procedure to which MWE objected. Fox and MWE could not reach an agreement upon a
compensation arrangement with respect to change orders. Fox left the project on December 9,
1996, after delivering the remaining equipment and materials to MWE. MWE contracted with
Life Safety Systems to complete the LMITCO project.
Fox filed a complaint in July 1998 seeking money owed for materials and services provided
to MWE by Fox. MWE answered and counterclaimed seeking monetary damages resulting from
the alleged breach of the parties’ agreement by Fox. The district court found in favor of MWE
holding that an implied in fact contract existed. Fox appealed.
DECISION: The decision of the district court is affirmed.
OPINION: Walters, J.
IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT
This Court has recognized three types of contractual relationships:
First is the express contract wherein the parties expressly agree regarding a transaction.
Secondly, there is the implied in fact contract wherein there is no express agreement,
but the conduct of the parties implies an agreement from which an obligation in contract
exists. The third category is called an implied in law contract, or quasi contract.
However, a contract implied in law is not a contract at all, but an obligation imposed by
law for the purpose of bringing about justice and equity without reference to the intent or
the agreement of the parties and, in some cases, in spite of an agreement between the
parties. It is a non-contractual obligation that is to be treated procedurally as if it were a
contract, and is often refered (sic) to as quasi contract, unjust enrichment, implied in law
contract or restitution.
[Citation.]
“An implied in fact contract is defined as one where the terms and existence of the contract
are manifested by the conduct of the parties with the request of one party and the performance
by the other often being inferred from the circumstances attending the performance.” [Citation.]
The implied-in-fact contract is grounded in the parties’ agreement and tacit understanding.
[Citation.] * * *
[UCC §] 1-205(1) defines “course of dealing” as “a sequence of previous conduct between
the parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common
basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct.”
***
Although the procedure was the same for each change order, in that MWE would request a
pricing from Fox for the work, which was then presented to LMITCO, each party treated the
pricings submitted by Fox for the change orders in a different manner. This treatment is not
sufficient to establish a meeting of the minds or to establish a course of dealing when there was
no “common basis of understanding for interpreting [the parties’] expressions” under [UCC §] 1-
205(1).
* * * After a review of the record, it appears that the district court’s findings are supported by
substantial and competent, albeit conflicting, evidence. * * *
Using the district court’s finding that pricings submitted by Fox were used by MWE as
estimates for the change orders, the conclusion made by the district court that an implied-in-fact
contract allowed for the reasonable compensation of Fox logically follows and is grounded in the
law in Idaho. [Citation.]
This Court holds that the district court did not err in finding that there was an implied-in-fact
contract using the industry standard’s flow-down method of compensation for the change orders
rather than a series of fixed price contracts between MWE and Fox.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Fox contends that the district court erred by failing to consider previous drafts of the proposed
contract between the parties to determine the terms of the parties’ agreement. Fox argues the
predominant factor of this transaction was the fire alarm system, not the methodology of how
the system was installed, which would focus on the sale of goods and, therefore, the Uniform
Commercial Code (“UCC”) should govern. Fox argues that in using the UCC various terms were
agreed upon by the parties in the prior agreement drafts, including terms for the timing of
payments, payments to Fox’s suppliers and prerequisites to termination.
MWE contends that the UCC should not be used, despite the fact that goods comprised
one-half of the contract price, because the predominant factor at issue is services and not the
sale of goods. MWE points out that the primary issue is the value of Fox’s services under the
change orders and the cost of obtaining replacement services after Fox left the job. MWE
further argues that the disagreement between the parties over material terms should prevent the
court from using UCC gap fillers. Rather, MWE contends the intent and relationship of the
parties should be used to resolve the conflict.
This Court in [citation], pointed out “in determining whether the UCC applies in such cases,
a majority of courts look at the entire transaction to determine which aspect, the sale of goods or
the sale of services, predominates.” [Citation.] It is clear that if the underlying transaction to the
contract involved the sale of goods, the UCC would apply. [Citation.] However, if the contract
only involved services, the UCC would not apply. [Citation.] This Court has not directly
articulated the standard to be used in mixed sales of goods and services, otherwise known as
hybrid transactions.
The Court of Appeals in Pittsley v. Houser, [citation], focused on the applicability of the UCC
to hybrid transactions. The court held that the trial court must look at the predominant factor of
the transaction to determine if the UCC applies. [Citation.]
The test for inclusion or exclusion is not whether they are mixed, but, granting that they are
mixed, whether their predominant factor, their thrust, their purpose, reasonably stated, is the
rendition of service, with goods incidentally involved (e.g., contract with artist for painting) or is a
transaction of sale, with labor incidentally involved (e.g., installation of a water heater in a
bathroom). This test essentially involves consideration of the contract in its entirety, applying the
UCC to the entire contract or not at all.
[Citation.] This Court agrees with the Court of Appeals’ analysis and holds that the
predominant factor test should be used to determine whether the UCC applies to transactions
involving the sale of both goods and services.
One aspect that the Court of Appeals noted in its opinion in Pittsley, in its determination that
the predominant factor in that case was the sale of goods, was that the purchaser was more
concerned with the goods and less concerned with the installation, either who would provide it
or the nature of the work. MWE and Fox decided to work on this project together because of
their differing expertise. MWE was in the business of installing electrical wiring, while Fox
designed, tested and assisted in the installation of fire alarm systems, in addition to ordering
specialty equipment for fire alarm projects.
The district court found that the contract at issue in this case contained both goods and
services; however, the predominant factor was Fox’s services. The district court found that the
goods provided by Fox were merely incidental to the services he provided, and the UCC would
provide no assistance in interpreting the parties’ agreement.
This Court holds that the district court did not err in finding that the predominant factor of the
underlying transaction was services and that the UCC did not apply.
INTERPRETATION: An implied in fact contract is formed by the conduct of the parties; in

cases in which a contract provides for both goods and services, the common law applies if the
predominant factor of the contract is the provision of services.
CRITICAL THINKING QUESTION: Why should the legal rights of contracting parties depend
on whether a contract is or is not for the sale of goods?
Bilateral and Unilateral Contracts

When two promises are exchanged, a bilateral contract is established, and each party is both a promisor and a
promisee. A unilateral contract is where a promise is exchanged for an act.
Valid, Void, Voidable, and Unenforceable Contracts
By definition a valid contract is one that meets all of the requirements of a binding contract.
A void contract is an agreement that does not meet all of the requirements of a binding contract; it is not
actually a contract but merely a promise or agreement with no legal effect.
A voidable contract, on the other hand, is a contract, but because of the way it was formed, the law permits one
or more of the parties to avoid the legal duties the contract creates, making the contract unenforceable.
An unenforceable contract is a contract, but is unenforceable as there is no remedy for a breach.
Executed and Executory Contracts
Where performance has been fully completed by all parties, the contract is said to be executed. Executory
contracts are those where performance has only been partially completed or not begun. Thus, every contract
that is completely performed will have an executory and executed phase.

Explain the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
E. PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
As a general rule, promises are not enforceable if they do not meet all of the requirements of a contract. One
exception is promissory estoppel. Noncontractual promises are enforced under the doctrine of promissory
estoppel in order to avoid injustice, when the promise is made under circumstances that should lead the
promisor reasonably to expect that the promisee would take a definite and substantial action or forbearance in
reliance on the promise and the promisee takes such action or forbearance.
NOTE: See Concept Review: Contracts, Promissory Estoppel, and Quasi-Contracts
CASE
SKEBBA V. KASCH
COURT OF APPEALS OF WISCONSIN, 2006
2006 WI APP 232, 724 N.W.2D 408; REVIEW DENIED, 2007 WI 59
http://www.wicourts.gov/ca/opinion: /DisplayDocument.html?content=html&seqNo=26899
FACTS: Kasch and his brother owned M.W. Kasch Co. Kasch hired Skebba as a sales
representative, and over the years promoted him first to account manager, then to customer
service manager, field sales manager, vice president of sales, senior vice president of sales and
purchasing, and finally to vice president of sales. When M.W. Kasch Co. experienced serious
financial problems in 1993, Skebba was approached by another company to leave Kasch and
work for them. When Skebba told Kasch he was accepting the new opportunity, Kasch asked
what it would take to get him to stay. Skebba told Kasch that he needed security for his
retirement and family and would stay if Kasch agreed to pay Skebba $250,000 if one of these
three conditions occurred: (1) the company was sold; (2) Skebba was lawfully terminated; or (3)
Skebba retired. Kasch agreed to this proposal and promised to have the agreement drawn up.
Skebba turned down the job opportunity and stayed with Kasch from December 1993 through
1999 when the company assets were sold.
Over the years, Skebba repeatedly but unsuccessfully asked Kasch for a written summary of
this agreement. Eventually, Kasch sold the business receiving $5.1 million dollars for his 51
percent share of the business. Upon the sale of the business, Skebba asked Kasch for the
$250,000 Kasch had previously promised to him. Kasch refused and denied ever having made
such an agreement. Instead, Kasch gave Skebba a severance agreement, which had been
drafted by Kasch’s lawyers in 1993. This agreement promised two years of salary continuation
on the sale of the company, but only if Skebba was not hired by the successor company. The
severance agreement also required a set-off against the salary continuation of any sums
Skebba earned from any activity during the two years of the severance agreement. Skebba
sued, alleging breach of contract and promissory estoppel.
The jury found there was no contract, but that Kasch had made a promise upon which
Skebba relied to his detriment, that the reliance was foreseeable, and that Skebba was
damaged in the amount of $250,000. The trial court concluded that, based on its reading of
applicable case law, it could not specifically enforce the promise the jury found Kasch made to
Skebba because there were other ways to measure damages. The trial court held that since
Skebba could not establish what he had lost by relying on Kasch’s promise he had not proved
his damages.
DECISION: Order of trial court reversed and case remanded.
OPINION: Kessler, J. Kasch did not promise to pay Skebba more than Skebba would have
earned at the job Skebba turned down. Kasch did not promise that total income to Skebba
would be greater than in the turned-down job, no matter how long he remained with Kasch.
Kasch only promised that if Skebba stayed, Kasch would pay Skebba $ 250,000 (the sum
Skebba wanted for his retirement), at the earliest of (1) Kasch selling the business, (2) Skebba
retiring, or (3) Skebba being lawfully terminated. Skebba stayed. Kasch sold the business while
Skebba was still employed by Kasch. Kasch refused to pay as promised.
The purpose of promissory estoppel is to enforce promises where the failure to do so is
unjust. U.S. Oil Co., Inc. v. Midwest Auto Care Servs., [citation]. In this case, the trial court
specifically relied on parts of [the] Hoffman [case] in determining that specific performance of
the promise could not be awarded and in concluding that Skebba had not properly established
damages. Hoffman was the first case in Wisconsin to adopt promissory estoppel. * * * [T]he
Hoffman court explained its adoption of a cause of action based on promissory estoppel as
grounded in section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts which:
does not impose the requirement that the promise giving rise to the cause of action
must be so comprehensive in scope as to meet the requirements of an offer that
would ripen into a contract if accepted by the promisee. Rather the conditions
imposed are:
1. Was the promise one which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the
promisee?
2. Did the promise induce such action or forbearance?
3. Can injustice be avoided only by enforcement of the promise?
[Citation.]
The Hoffman court explains that the first two of these requirements are facts to be found by
a jury or other fact-finder, while the third is a policy decision to be made by the court. [Citations.]
In making this policy decision, a court must consider a number of factors in determining whether
injustice can only be avoided by enforcement of the promise. U.S. Oil, [citation]. The court in
U.S. Oil adopted those considerations set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts §
139(2), (1981):
a. the availability and adequacy of other remedies, particularly cancellation and
restitution;
b. the definite and substantial character of the action or forbearance in relation to
the remedy sought;
c. the extent to which the action or forbearance corroborates evidence of the
making and terms of the promise, or the making and terms are otherwise
established by clear and convincing evidence;
d. the reasonableness of the action or forbearance; [and]
e. the extent to which the action or forbearance was foreseeable by the promisor.
[Citation.]
The record does not indicate that the trial court here applied the considerations our supreme
court announced in U.S. Oil. Instead, the trial court apparently relied on the Hoffman court’s
discussion of various damage theories that the court explained might be appropriate once the
determination had been made to enforce the promise by application of promissory estoppel. * * *
***
A court, in fashioning a remedy, can consider any equitable or legal remedy which will
“prevent injustice.” * * *
As later commentators have noted, Wisconsin, with its landmark Hoffman decision, is one of
a small group of states which recognizes that to fulfill the purpose of promissory estoppel—i.e.,
prevent injustice—a court must be able to fashion a remedy that restores the promisee to where
he or she would be if the promisor had fulfilled the promise. [Citation.] In this case, Skebba
performed—he remained at M.W. Kasch—in reliance on Kasch’s promise to pay $250,000 to
him if one of three conditions occurred. Kasch enjoyed the fruits of Skebba’s reliance—he kept
on a top salesperson to help the company through tough financial times and he avoided the
damage that he believed Skebba’s leaving could have had on M.W. Kasch’s reputation in the
industry. Accordingly, to prevent injustice, the equitable remedy for Skebba to receive is Kasch’s
specific performance promised-payment of the $250,000.
The record in this case, considered in light of the U.S. Oil tests and the jury’s findings,
compels specific performance of the promise because otherwise Kasch will enjoy all of the
benefits of induced reliance while Skebba will be deprived of that which he was promised, with
no other available remedy to substitute fairly for the promised reward. * * * [In short, every factor
this court requires to be considered supports enforcement of the promise through promissory
estoppel. The trial court submitted the promissory estoppel cause of action to the jury. The jury
concluded that the promise had been made, that Skebba relied on the promise to his detriment,
and that such reliance was foreseeable by Kasch. The jury also found that Skebba’s damages
were the amount Skebba testified Kasch promised to pay Skebba if he was still employed when
the company was sold, that is, $250,000. * * *
* * * In this case, specific performance is the necessary enforcement mechanism to prevent
injustice for Skebba’s reliance on the promise the jury found Kasch had made to him.
INTERPRETATION: The courts will enforce a promise that the promisor should reasonably
expect to induce detrimental reliance by the promisee if the promisee takes such action and
justice requires enforcement.
ETHICAL QUESTION: Did Kasch act ethically? Explain.
CRITICAL THINKING QUESTION: What could Skebba have done to better protect his
interests? Explain.

Identify the three elements of an enforceable quasi contract and explain how it differs from a contract.
F. QUASI CONTRACTS
A quasi contract is not actually a contract because it is based neither on an express nor on an implied promise.
The law imposes a quasi-contractual obligation to avoid injustice when these elements are present: (1) a benefit
given to the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) an appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; and (3)
retention of the benefit by the defendant under circumstances which make it unfair for him to keep the benefit
without compensating the plaintiff.
NOTE: See Concept Review: Contracts, Promissory Estoppel, and Quasi-Contracts
CASE
JASDIP PROPERTIES SC, LLC V. ESTATE OF RICHARDSON
COURT OF APPEALS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 2011
395 S.C. 633, 720 S.E.2D 4
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3098899484583065486&q=JASDIP+PROPERTIES+SC,+LLC+v.+ES
TATE+OF+RICHARDSON&hl=en&as_sdt=4,232
FACTS: On May 5, 2006, Stewart Richardson (Seller) and JASDIP Properties SC, LLC (Buyer)
entered into an agreement for the purchase of certain property in Georgetown, South Carolina.
The purchase price for the property was to be $537,000. The buyer paid an initial earnest
money deposit of $10,000. The balance was due at the closing on or before July 28, 2006.
Thereafter the seller granted the buyer extensions to the closing date in return for additional
payments of $175,000 and $25,000, each to be applied to the purchase price. The buyer was
unable to close in a timely fashion, and the seller rescinded the contract.
Thereafter, the buyer brought suit against the seller (1) contending that the seller would be
unjustly enriched if allowed to keep the money paid despite the rescission of the agreement and
(2) requesting $210,000. The $210,000 consisted of the $10,000 earnest money deposit and
$200,000 in subsequent payments. The buyer later filed an amended complaint requesting
$205,000, stating that the agreement permitted the seller to retain half of the $10,000 earnest
money deposit.
A jury determined that neither party had breached the contract and awarded no damages on
that basis. The buyer then requested a ruling by the trial court on its action for unjust
enrichment. The trial court denied the buyer’s claim for unjust enrichment. The buyer appealed
arguing that all the evidence presented at trial, as well as the jury’s verdict, supports a finding
that the agreement was rescinded or abandoned and that this requires restitution of $205,000 to
the buyer.
DECISION: Judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded.
OPINION: Konduros, J. “Restitution is a remedy designed to prevent unjust enrichment.”

[Citation.] (“Unjust enrichment is an equitable doctrine, akin to restitution, which permits the
recovery of that amount the defendant has been unjustly enriched at the expense of the
plaintiff.”). “The terms ‘restitution’ and ‘unjust enrichment’ are modern designations for the older
doctrine of quasi-contract.” [Citation.] “[Q]uantum meruit, quasi-contract, and implied by law
contract are equivalent terms for an equitable remedy.” [Citation.]
“Implied in law or quasi-contract are not considered contracts at all, but are akin to
restitution which permits recovery of that amount the defendant has been benefitted at the
expense of the plaintiff in order to preclude unjust enrichment.” [Citation.] * * *
“To recover on a theory of restitution, the plaintiff must show (1) that he conferred a non-
gratuitous benefit on the defendant; (2) that the defendant realized some value from the benefit;
and (3) that it would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without paying the
plaintiff for its value.” [Citation.] “Unjust enrichment is usually a prerequisite for enforcement of
the doctrine of restitution; if there is no basis for unjust enrichment, there is no basis for
restitution.” [Citation.]
Buyer seeks the $175,000 and $25,000 payments as well as the $10,000 in earnest money
* * * Additionally, in its amended complaint, Buyer states that under the Agreement, Seller can
only keep half of the $10,000 in earnest money and only requests a total of $205,000. An issue
conceded in the trial court cannot be argued on appeal. [Citation.] Therefore, Buyer is bound by
that concession and entitled to $5,000 of the earnest money at most.
The $175,000 and $25,000 payments both explicitly stated that they were towards the
purchase price. Additionally, Buyer paid $10,000 in an earnest money deposit. The unappealed
finding of the jury was that neither party breached the Agreement. An unchallenged ruling, right
or wrong, is the law of the case. [Citation.] Based on the jury’s finding that Buyer did not breach,
we find Buyer is entitled to the money paid towards the purchase price as well as half of the
earnest money under the theory of restitution. Buyer met the requirements to recover under the
theory of restitution: (1) Buyer paid Seller $205,000 towards the purchase price and the sale did
not go through despite the fact that neither party breached; (2) Seller kept the $205,000
although he also retained the Property; and (3) Seller keeping the $205,000 is inequitable
because the Seller still has the Property, the jury found neither party breached, and the
evidence supports that Buyer intended to go forward with the purchase. Therefore, the trial court
erred in failing to find for Buyer for its claim of unjust enrichment. Accordingly, we reverse the
trial court’s determination that Buyer was not entitled to restitution and award Buyer $205,000.
INTERPRETATION: Implied in law or quasi contracts are not considered contracts at all, but
are akin to restitution which permits recovery of that amount the defendant has been benefited
at the expense of the plaintiff in order to prevent unjust enrichment.
CRITICAL THINKING QUESTION: Why does the law allow a recovery in quasi contract?
ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS AND CASE PROBLEMS
1. Owen telephones an order to Hillary's store for certain goods, which Hillary delivers to
Owen. Neither party says anything about the price or payment terms. What are the legal
obligations of Owen and Hillary?
Answer: Implied Contracts. Owen and Hillary’s agreement deals in goods, so the contract falls
within the UCC. Omission of a stated price would require payment of a “reasonable” price
with full payment being made when possession of the goods is obtained. Since Hillary has
fully performed by delivering the goods, Owen is obligated to pay a reasonable price for
them.
2. Minth is the owner of the Hiawatha Supper Club, which he leased for two years to Piekarski.
During the period of the lease, Piekarski contracted with Puttkammer for the resurfacing of
the access and service areas of the supper club. Puttkammer performed the work
satisfactorily. Minth knew about the contract and the performance of the work. The work,
including labor and materials, had a reasonable value of $2,540, but Puttkammer was never
paid because Piekarski went bankrupt. Puttkammer brought an action against Minth to
recover the amount owed to him by Piekarski. Will Puttkammer prevail? Explain.
Answer: Quasi-Contract. No. Judgment for Minth. In order to establish a cause of action for
unjust enrichment, Puttkammer must be able to demonstrate that (1) a benefit was conferred
on Minth by Puttkammer; (2) Minth knew of or appreciated the benefit; and (3) Minth
accepted or retained the benefit under circumstances making it inequitable for Minth to retain
the benefit without paying for its value. Here, the first and second elements have been
satisfied but not the third.
An action for unjust enrichment is based on the moral principle that one who has received a
benefit has the duty to reimburse the other when to retain that benefit would be unjust. But it
is not enough that the benefit was conferred and retained; the retention must also be unjust.
Here, Puttkammer does not claim or imply that Minth ordered or ratified the work, that he
performed the work expecting to be paid by Minth, that he was prejudiced by any misconduct
or fault on Minth's part, or that Minth's interests were so intertwined with those of Piekarski
that the contract could be said to have been executed on Minth's behalf. Rather, all that
Puttkammer has alleged is that Minth knowingly acquiesced in the performance of the work.
Puttkammer v. Minth, 83 Wis.2d 686, 266 N.W.2d 361 (1978).
3. Jonathan writes to Willa, stating “I'll pay you $150 if you reseed my lawn.” Willa reseeds
Jonathan's lawn as requested. Has a contract been formed? If so, what kind?
Answer: Unilateral Contracts. Yes, this is an example of a unilateral contract. Jonathan’s
writing to Willa is an offer which is accepted when Willa reseeds the lawn. Jonathan must
pay $150 to Willa.
4. Calvin uses fraud to induce Maria to promise to pay money in return for goods he has
delivered to her. Has a contract been formed? If so, what kind? What are the rights of Calvin
and Maria?
Answer: Valid, Void, Voidable and Uniforceable Contracts. This is a voidable contract. A
contract has been formed; however, Maria, at her option, may rescind the contract. Calvin
has no right to avoid the contract if Maria decides to not rescind.
5. Anna is about to buy a house on a hill. Prior to the purchase she obtains a promise from
Betty, the owner of the adjacent property, that Betty will not build any structure that would
block Anna's view. In reliance on this promise Anna buys the house. Is Betty's promise
binding? Why or why not?
Answer: Promissory Estoppel. Betty’s promise is not binding and there is no contract. The
essential elements of a contract (mutual assent, consideration, legality and legal capacity) are
not all present. However, the doctrine of promissory estoppel may be applicable. If a jury
finds that Anna acted reasonably in reliance on Betty’s promise, Betty’s promise will be
enforceable.
6. Mary Dobos was admitted to Boca Raton Community Hospital in serious condition with an
abdominal aneurysm. The hospital called upon Nursing Care Services, Inc., to provide
around-the-clock nursing services for Mrs. Dobos. She received two weeks of in-hospital
care, forty-eight hours of postrelease care, and two weeks of at-home care. The total bill was
$3,723.90. Mrs. Dobos refused to pay, and Nursing Care Services, Inc., brought an action to
recover. Mrs. Dobos maintained that she was not obligated to render payment in that she
never signed a written contract, nor did she orally agree to be liable for the services. The
necessity for the services, reasonableness of the fee, and competency of the nurses were
undisputed. After Mrs. Dobos admitted that she or her daughter authorized the forty-eight
hours of postrelease care, the trial court ordered compensation of $248 for that period. It did
not allow payment of the balance, and Nursing Care Services, Inc., appealed. Decision?
Answer: Quasi-Contract. These circumstances establish a contract implied in law or "quasi
contract," which is imposed by law to prevent the unjust enrichment of one party at the
expense of another. The principle of quasi contract is frequently applied in the area of work
performed or services rendered, although liability is generally imposed only when the person
for whose benefit the services were rendered requested them or knowingly and voluntarily
accepted their benefits. Emergency aid, however, is an exception. In the present case, the
services provided to Mrs. Dobos in the hospital were essential to her health and safety, and
she was unable to consent to receiving them. Nursing Care Services, Inc., acted with intent
to charge for the services and had no reason to know that Mrs. Dobos would not agree.
Given these circumstances, the in-hospital services clearly fall within the emergency aid
exception. As for the two weeks of at-home care, Mrs. Dobos knowingly and voluntarily
accepted the benefits conferred, and thus obligated herself to pay for the reasonable value of
the services. Nursing Care Services, Inc. v. Dobos, 380 So.2d 516, (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
7. St. Charles Drilling Co. contracted with Osterholt to install a well and water system that
would produce a specified quantity of water. The water system failed to meet its warranted
capacity, and Osterholt sued for breach of contract. Does the Uniform Commercial Code
apply to this contract?
Answer: Contracts Outside the Code. The UCC does not apply to contracts primarily for
services. The test for inclusion is whether the contract's predominant purpose is the rendition
of services with goods incidentally involved, or whether it is a sale of goods with labor
incidentally involved. In this case the contract to install a water system was a service
transaction and, therefore, not within the scope of the UCC for two reasons. First, the parties
had no agreement as to what specific component parts were to be installed, but rather the
contractor undertook to install a system of indefinite description and of warranted capacity.
Second, the language of the contract itself indicated that the arrangement was a service
contract rather than a sale of goods. Osterholt v. St. Charles Drilling Co., 500 F.Supp. 529
(1980).
8. Helvey brought suit against the Wabash County REMC (REMC) for breach of implied and
express warranties. He alleged that REMC furnished electricity in excess of 135 volts to
Helvey’s home, damaging his 110-volt household appliances. This incident occurred more
than four years before Helvey brought this suit. In defense, REMC pleads that the Uniform
Commercial Code’s (UCC’s) Article 2 statute of limitations of four years has passed, thereby
barring Helvey’s suit. Helvey argues that providing electrical energy is not a transaction in
goods under the UCC but rather a furnishing of services that would make applicable the
general contract six-year statute of limitations. Is the contract governed by the UCC? Why?
Answer: Uniform Commercial Code. There have been only a few cases addressing whether
electricity is considered goods. The courts are divided on the question. In the case upon
which this problem was based, the court held that, yes, this contract is governed by the UCC,
and therefore, REMC would prevail. The UCC essentially defines goods as tangible personal
property. To be within the UCC's definition of a good, electricity must be (1) a thing, (2)
existing, and (3) movable, with (2) and (3) occurring simultaneously. Electricity can be
measured in order to establish a purchase price by the amount of current which passes
through the meter, thus fulfilling the existing and movable requirements. Also, it is legally
considered personal property, subject to ownership, and may be bartered, sold, and, in fact,
stolen. Therefore, the sale of electricity is a sale of goods subject to UCC's Article 2's statute
of limitations. Helvey v. Wabash County REMC, Court of Appeals of Indiana, First District,
1972. 151 Ind.App. 176, 278 N.E.2d 608.
9. Jack Duran, president of Colorado Carpet Installation, Inc., began negotiations with Fred
and Zuma Palermo for the sale and installation of carpeting, carpet padding, tile, and vinyl
floor covering in their home. Duran drew up a written proposal that referred to Colorado
Carpet as “the seller” and to the Palermos as the “customer.” The proposal listed the
quantity, unit cost, and total price of each item to be installed. The total price of the job was
$4,777.75. Although labor was expressly included in this figure, Duran estimated the total
labor cost at $926. Mrs. Palermo in writing accepted Duran’s written proposal soon after he
submitted it to her. After Colorado Carpet delivered the tile to the Palermo home, however,
Mrs. Palermo had a disagreement with Colorado Carpet’s tile man and arranged for another
contractor to perform the job. Colorado Carpet brought an action against the Palermos for
breach of contract. Does the Uniform Commercial Code apply to this contract?
Answer: Uniform Commercial Code. The UCC defines "goods" as "all things . . . which are
movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale" and defines a "sale" as "the
passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price." In this case, the carpeting and other
materials were movable when Colorado Carpet procured them for installation, and the
agreement contemplated that title would pass to the Palermos. The contract included,
however, not only the sale of goods as defined by the UCC, but also the performance of labor
or service. Since goods and services are mixed, the primary purpose of the agreement is
crucial in determining the nature of the contract. A number of factors point to the conclusion
that the primary purpose of the contract was the sale of goods, with labor or service only
incidentally involved. The charge for labor was a small percentage of one overall contractual
price. Colorado Carpet's proposal referred to the parties as "seller" and "customer." Further,
as noted above, the carpeting and other materials meet the UCC definition of "goods." .
Colorado Carpet Installation, Inc. v. Palermo, 668 F.2d 1384 (Col. 1983).
10. On November 1, the Kansas City Post Office Employees Credit Union merged into the
Kansas City Telephone Credit Union to form the Communications Credit Union (Credit
Union). Systems Design and Management Information (SDMI) develops computer software
programs for credit unions, using Burroughs (now Unisys) hardware. SDMI and Burroughs
together offered to sell to Credit Union both a software package, called the Generic System,
and Burroughs hardware. Later in November, a demonstration of the software was held at
SDMI’s offices, and the Credit Union agreed to purchase the Generic System software. This
agreement was oral. After Credit Union was converted to the SDMI Generic System, major
problems with the system immediately became apparent so SDMI filed suit against Credit
Union to recover the outstanding contract price for the software. Credit Union
counterclaimed for damages based upon breach of contract and negligent and fraudulent
misrepresentation. Does the Uniform Commercial Code apply to this contract?
Answer: Uniform Commercial Code. Judgment for SDMI. We must determine whether the
oral agreement between SDMI and Credit Union was for goods or services. The test when
dealing with a mixed contract is "not whether they [goods or services] are mixed, but,
granting that they are mixed, whether their predominant factor, their thrust, their purpose,
reasonably stated, is the rendition of service, with goods incidentally involved . . . or is a
transaction of sale, with labor incidentally involved."
Prior to entering into an agreement for the Generic System software, Credit Union attended a
demonstration of the program at SDMI's place of business. Therefore, we conclude the
software was movable at the time of identification to the contract, satisfying that requirement
of the definition of goods. SDMI installed the Generic System software on Credit Union's
computer and was present to attempt modifications and corrections of the program so the
accounting system would run more efficiently. These services are incidental to the sale of
the software because, without Credit Union buying the Generic System program, the services
would not be necessary. Therefore, the sale of the software is predominant. We hold this
software to be goods and subject to the provisions of the UCC.
11. Insul-Mark is the marketing arm of Kor-It Sales, Inc. Kor-It manufactures roofing fasteners
and Insul-Mark distributes them nationwide. In late 1985, Kor-It contracted with Modern
Materials, Inc., to have large volumes of screws coated with a rust-proofing agent. The
contract specified that the coated screws must pass a standard industry test and that Kor-It
would pay according to the pound and length of the screws coated. Kor-It had received
numerous complaints from customers that the coated screws were rusting, and Modern
Materials unsuccessfully attempted to remedy the problem. Kor-It terminated its relationship
with Modern Materials and brought suit for the deficient coating. Modern Materials
counterclaimed for the labor and materials it had furnished to Kor-It. The trial court held
that the contract (a) was for performance of a service, (b) not governed by the Uniform
Commercial Code, (c) governed by the common law of contracts, and (d) therefore, barred
by a two-year statute of limitations. Insul-Mark appealed. Decision?
Answer: Contracts Outside the Code. The transaction is predominantly for the performance of a
service and, therefore, is not governed by the Sales article of the UCC. Where a transaction is
“mixed,” that is it involves both goods and services, the Sales article of the UCC will apply
only where the “predominant thrust” of the transaction is a sale of goods with labor only
incidentally involved. This court rejects the “bifurcation” approach, taken by some lower
courts, whereby a mixed transaction is viewed as two transactions: one for the sale of goods
governed by the UCC, and one for the performance of a service governed by the common
law. The bifurcation approach is less sensitive to the parties’ expectations than the
predominant thrust approach and would not work where an agreement is not readily divisible.
Whether the predominant thrust of a transaction is the sale of goods or the performance of a
service depends primarily on the language of the contract in light of the situation of the
parties and the surrounding circumstances. Also relevant are the final product the purchaser
bargained to receive and whether it may be described as a good or a service. Finally, the
courts examine the costs involved for the goods and services, and whether the purchaser was
charged only for a good or a price based on both goods and services.
The agreement between Kor-It and Modern Materials was predominantly for the
performance of a service. The performance Kor-It contracted to obtain was the
transformation of its screws from a non-coated form to a coated form with enhanced rust-
resistance. Modern Materials’ complex multi-step application process was the crucial
element completing this transformation. The transfer of the coating material, a good, in the
process was incidental to the larger service. This is evidenced by the fact that Kor-It did not
involve itself in deciding which coating material Modern Materials would apply to the
screws. Furthermore, the pricing method in this transaction reveals that its predominant
thrust was the performance of a service: Kor-It was charged by the pound of screws coated
rather than by the gallons of coating used.
12. Max E. Pass, Jr., and his wife, Martha N. Pass, departed in an aircraft owned and operated
by Mr. Pass from Plant City, Florida, bound for Clarksville, Tennessee. Somewhere over
Alabama the couple encountered turbulence, and Mr. Pass lost control of the aircraft. The
plane crashed killing both Mr. and Mrs. Pass. Approximately four and a half months prior to
the flight in which he was killed, Mr. Pass had taken his airplane to Shelby Aviation, an
aircraft service company, for inspection and service. In servicing the aircraft, Shelby
Aviation replaced both rear wing attach point brackets on the plane. Three and one half
years after the crash, Max E. Pass, Sr., father of Mr. Pass and administrator of his estate,
and Shirley Williams, mother of Mrs. Pass and administratrix of her estate, filed suit against
Shelby Aviation. The lawsuit alleged that the rear wing attach point brackets sold and
installed by Shelby Aviation were defective because they lacked the bolts necessary to secure
them properly to the airplane. The plaintiffs asserted claims against the defendant for breach
of express and implied warranties under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),
which governs the sale of goods. Shelby Aviation contended that the transaction with Mr.
Pass had been primarily for the sale of services, rather than of goods, and that consequently
Article 2 of the UCC did not cover the transaction. Does the UCC apply to this transaction?
Explain.
Answer: Uniform Commercial Code. No, plaintiffs’ warranty claim dismissed. The problem in
“mixed” transactions such as this one is to determine whether Article 2 governs the contract.
The test for inclusion or exclusion in the UCC is not whether the contracts are mixed, but
granting that they are mixed, whether their predominant factor, their thrust, their purpose,
reasonably stated, is the rendition of services with goods incidentally involved (e.g. contract
with artist for painting) or is a transaction of sale, with labor incidentally involved (e.g.,
installation of a water heater in a bathroom). In order to determine the predominant purpose
of a mixed transaction, courts examine the language of the parties’ contract, the nature of the
business of the supplier of the goods and services, the reason the parties entered into the
contract (i.e. what each bargained to receive), and the respective amounts charged under the
contract for goods and for services. In this case, the written document evidencing the
transaction is the invoice prepared by Shelby Aviation. In the top left hand corner is a
preprinted paragraph that states that the owner is authorizing “the following repair work to be
done along with the necessary material.” As a whole, the invoice clearly emphasizes the
repair and inspection aspect of the transaction, indicating that the predominant purpose was
the sale of service, with the sale of goods incidental to that service.
13. In March, William Tackaberry, a real estate agent for Weichert Co. Realtors, informed
Thomas Ryan, a local developer, that he knew of property Ryan might be interested in
purchasing. Ryan indicated he was interested in knowing more about the property.
Tackaberry disclosed the property’s identity and the seller’s proposed price. Tackaberry also
stated that the purchaser would have to pay Weichert a 10 percent commission. Tackaberry
met with the property owner and gathered information concerning the property’s current
leases, income, expenses, and development plans. Tackaberry also collected tax and zoning
documents relevant to the property. In a face-to-face meeting on April 4, Tackaberry gave
Ryan the data he had gathered and presented Ryan with a letter calling for a 10 percent
finder’s fee to be paid to Weichert by Ryan upon “successfully completing and closing of
title.” Ryan refused to agree to the 10 percent figure during this meeting. Tackaberry
arranged a meeting, held three days later, where Ryan contracted with the owner to buy the
land. Ryan refused, however, to pay the 10 percent finder’s fee to Weichert. What, if
anything, is Weichert entitled to recover from Ryan? Explain.
Answer: Quasi-contract. Weichert is entitled to compensation for services rendered to Ryan.

This case presents two issues: whether Ryan and Tackaberry entered into an enforceable
agreement and, if not, whether Weichert is entitled to recover the reasonable value of
Tackaberry’s services on a theory of quantum meruit. The facts are insufficient to conclude
that Tackaberry and Ryan mutually manifested assent to the essential terms of the contract.
First, Ryan never expressly assented to the terms of Tackaberry’s offer. Although Ryan
expressed interest in learning more about the property, neither his expression of interest nor
his agreement to meet with Tackaberry to learn more about the transaction was sufficient to
establish the “unqualified acceptance” necessary to manifest express assent. Moreover, Ryan
refused to agree to the 10 percent figure during the April meeting and thereafter consistently
rejected that term. Thus, the parties never formed an express contract.
In some circumstances, courts will allow recovery even though the parties’ words and actions
are insufficient to manifest an intention to agree to the proffered terms. Recovery based on a
quasi contract, sometimes referred to as a contract implied in law, is wholly unlike recovery
based on an express or implied in fact contract in that the law imposes it for the purpose of
bringing about justice without reference to the parties’ intentions. Applying that principle,
courts have allowed quasi-contractual recovery for services rendered when a party confers a
benefit with a reasonable expectation of payment. That type of quasi-contractual recovery,
known as quantum meruit, entitles the performing party to recoup the reasonable value of the
services he has rendered. In this case, Tackaberry furnished Ryan with information about the
property with an expectation that Ryan would pay a brokerage fee, and Ryan himself
admitted at trial that he had always intended to compensate Tackaberry for his services. To
deny Tackaberry compensation for services rendered would unjustly enrich Ryan. The
commission amount should be determined on the basis of proofs showing the reasonable
value of Tackaberry’s services, including evidence of customary brokers’ fees for similar
transactions. Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan, Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1992, 128 N.J.
427, 608 A.2d 280.]]
ANSWERS TO “TAKING SIDES” PROBLEMS
Richardson hired J. C. Flood Company, a plumbing contractor, to correct a stoppage in the

sewer line of her house. The plumbing company’s “snake” device, used to clear the line leading
to the main sewer, became caught in the underground line. To release it, the company excavated
a portion of the sewer line in Richardson’s backyard. In the process, the company discovered
numerous leaks in a rusty, defective water pipe that ran parallel with the sewer line. To meet
public regulations, the water pipe, of a type no longer approved for such service, had to be
replaced either then or later, when the yard would have to be excavated again. The plumbing
company proceeded to repair the water pipe. Though Richardson inspected the company’s work
daily and did not express any objection to the extra work involved in replacing the water pipe,
she refused to pay any part of the total bill after the company completed the entire operation. J.
C. Flood Company then sued Richardson for the costs of labor and material it had furnished.
a. What arguments would support J. C. Flood’s claim for the costs of labor and material it
had furnished?
b. What arguments would support Richardson’s refusal to pay the bill?

c. For what, if anything, should Richardson be liable? Explain.
ANSWER:
a. J.C. Flood could argue that (i) Richardson had agreed expressly to the replacement of the
water pipe; (ii) Richardson had agreed impliedly to the replacement of the water pipe;
(iii) the work was necessary, completed and satisfactorily performed; and (iv) the bill was
reasonable in its amount.
b. Richardson could argue that (i) she had never agreed expressly to the replacement of the
water pipe; (ii) she had never been informed of the need to replace the water pipe; (iii)
the work was unnecessary; and (iv) the bill was not reasonable in its amount.
c. Decision for J.C. Flood. Richardson v. J. C. Flood Company, District of Columbia Court
of Appeals, 1963, 190 A.2d 259.
Contracts are either expressed or implied: expressed when their terms are stated by the parties,
implied when arising from a mutual agreement not set forth in words. An implied contract “may
be presumed from the acts and conduct of the parties as a reasonable man would view them
under all the circumstances.” Here, Richardson made daily inspections yet failed to object to the
replacement of the water pipe until after the work was completed. Although she did not
expressly agree to this extra work, her acts and conduct indicate her consent to it. Therefore, she
created an implied (in fact) contract obligating her to pay for the reasonable value of the
company's services.
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„Goed, en dan gaan we meteen thuis het pakje aanhalen.”
„Maar wacht es,” zegt Ambro. „Hoe laat komen we terug?”
„Om half vier ongeveer.”
„Waar moeten we dan brood eten?”
„Da’s al lang in orde. Moeder heeft voor alles gezorgd. Voor ieder een stapel
kadetjes met ham en kaas.”
„Gommenikkie, da’s fijn!”
„En we mogen in een kattekroeg wat gaan drinken.”
„Dat wordt een reuzen-dag!” zegt Ambro verheugd.
Dan gaan de beide jongens op stap. Ambro koopt een pond goudreinetten.
„Wat een kanjers,” zegt Paul. „Me broekzakken puilen er van uit.”
„Nou, ik zal er niet lang last van hebben,” lacht Ambro.
Intusschen hebben ze Paul’s huis bereikt, waar [162]ze het pakje afhalen.
Boven aan de trap roept mevrouw: „Ambro, zul je goed op Paul passen?”
„Ja mevrouw,” is het antwoord. „U krijgt hem heelhuids terug.”
En nu begeven de jongens zich naar het bootje.
„We gaan eerste klas, hoor!” zegt Paul. „Dan zitten we fijn vooraan. En anders
krijg je al de rook in je facie.”
„Chique!” zegt Ambro. „Kijk het bankje bij de bel is vrij, laten we daar gaan
zitten, dan mogen we bellen als ie vertrekt.”
Ze zijn echter veel te vroeg en er is nog geen sprake van vertrekken.
„Ik ga een appel schillen,” zegt Ambro en hij haalt zijn mes te voorschijn; het
mes, dat alle jongens hem benijden, want het is groot, en gevuld met alle
soorten van mesjes en priempjes en het is overal voor te gebruiken.
De machinist van de boot, die vlak bij de jongens z’n pijpje staat te rooken,
kijkt er met welgevallen naar.
„Dat messie mag er wezen, jongeheer.”
Ambro, zeer gevleid, geeft hem het mes om ’t van dichtbij te laten bekijken.
„’n Effetief messie, best staal, zal nog heel wat gekost hebben.”
„Niks heeft ’t me gekost. Zoo maar voor noppes weggehaald.”
„’t Zal niet waar zijn,” zegt de machinist.
„Nee, niet weggekaapt! Eerlijk verdiend, hoor!”
„En je zeit weggehaald!” [163]
„Op de zomer-kermis, boven in een mast, die met groene zeep was
ingesmeerd. Ik had een heele sjouw voor ik er was en toen ik eenmaal boven
was, wist ik niet wat ik pakken zon, een ham of het mes.
„Maar ik koos toch ’t mes en nou ben ik er maar blij om, want ’t heeft me al
heel wat diensten bewezen.”
„Dat heb je ’m kranig gelapt,” zegt de machinist goedkeurend. „Die paaltjes

valle anders nog niks niet mee, ik ben tenminste es halleverwege blijve steke.”
„Mot je een stukkie,” vraagt Ambro, hem de helft van zijn appel voorhoudend.
„As ik je niet ontrijf. Maar, ’t is zoo’n groot brok, je houdt temet zelf niks over.”
„O, we hebben plenty, man.”
„Nou, dan op je santé.”
Vóór de machinist vertrekt, heeft ook Paul hem zijn aandeel geofferd.
Nu nadert de schipper, om met de bel het sein tot vertrek te geven.
„Mogen wij het doen?” vraagt Ambro.
„Ga je gang, jongeheer. Ik doe ’t elken dag.”

En Ambro belt alsof zijn leven er van af hangt. De bewoners van de Schie
hadden nog nooit zoo luid en lang het vertrek van het bootje hooren
aankondigen.
„Nou is ’t genoeg,” roept lachend de schipper. „Anders komen we nog zonder

bel in Delft aan.”
En Paul, die op zijn beurt gehoopt had de bel [164]te mogen luiden, werd
beloofd bij de aankomst aan de eerste aanlegplaats zijn schade te mogen
inhalen.
Juist zou de loopplank naar binnen gehaald worden, als van de kade hevig
met een parapluie wuivend, een oude juffrouw aan komt loopen, zoo hard, als
haar onderdanen het toelieten.
„Wacht even, schipper, die juffrouw moet nog mee,” roept Ambro.
„Ja, ik zie ’t” zegt de schipper en terwijl hij de juffrouw, die intusschen de
loopplank bereikt heeft, ridderlijk de hand toesteekt, zegt hij goedig: „Kalm an
maar, moeder, me hebbe de tijd.”
De juffrouw wordt hijgend en puffend naar binnen gehaald en de jongens

krijgen nu een mede-passagier.
De juffrouw is nog niet in staat een woord uit te brengen en zit amechtig naar
lucht happend op een bank, terwijl ze het bezweete welgedane gezicht met
een netjes opgevouwen, hagelwitten zakdoek afveegt.
„Hè, hè … hè, hè … is dat loope!… mense, mense,… hè, hè!”
„Blij dat u zit, juffrouw,” toetert Ambro haar in de ooren, zoo hard, alsof ’t
vanzelf sprak dat de juffrouw doof was, hetgeen ze wederom beantwoordde
met de noodige „hè hè’s” en „mense mense”.
„Dat scheelde maar een haartje,” schreeuwt Ambro, nòg harder dan den
vorigen keer, in de meening, dat zijn eerste gebrul niet verstaan was door de
juffrouw. [165]
Dit blijkt tè kras voor haar trommelvlies en ze keert zich verwoed naar Ambro
om, terwijl ze nijdig zegt:
„Ik bin niet doof! je hoef niet zoo te schreeuwe!”
Na dezen uitval kijkt Ambro haar even beteuterd aan en wijdt dan weer zijn
volle aandacht aan een worm, dien hij in een van zijn mooie goudreinetten
ontdekte.
„Ik bin anders altoos op tijd,” opent de juffrouw eensklaps het gesprek. „Me
klokkie gong sekers na.”
„Wat zegt u, juffrouw?” zegt Ambro, z’n oor vlak bij haar gezicht houdend.
Als ze hem verbaasd aankijkt, zegt de deugniet, terwijl hij veiligheidshalve een
eindje van haar af gaat zitten:
„Ik ben ook niet doof!”
En onmiddellijk laat hij er op volgen: „Moet u een stukkie?” en houdt haar een
stuk appel voor.
Dit verteedert de juffrouw en met een vriendelijk: „Dank Uwes wel, jongeheer,”
neemt ze het partje aan, dat ze luid smakkend verorbert.
„Is dat uw zoontje?” vraagt eensklaps Ambro, op Paul wijzend.
Paul, die zich al dien tijd stil hield en zich kostelijk vermaakte met het gesprek
tusschen het tweetal, proest het op eenmaal uit.
„Wou je ’n oud mensch nemen?” zegt de juffrouw lachend tegen Ambro. „Me
jongste soontje is al vijf en dertig. En die heit er krek zoo eentje als deuze.”
„Nou, dan kon ’t uw kleinzoontje zijn. Paul, daar zit je opoe. Lach es tegen d’r.”
[166]
„Je bent me d’r eentje,” zegt de juffrouw, maar ze heeft toch schik in hem.
„Moet u ook naar Delft?” vraagt Paul.
„Nee, ikke gaan na de Zwet, na me dochter, die heit daar ’n cefé.”
„Met een schommel?” vraagt Ambro vol belangstelling.

„Ja, achter ’t beffet,” lacht de juffrouw.
De schipper komt de kaartjes ophalen.
„Opoe betaalt voor ons,” zegt Ambro.
„’t Is toch … wat e rakker, hè? Sal me ’n lekker dier thuis sijn …! Soo twalef!!”
Dan licht ze zorgvuldig haar japonrok op en haalt uit een grooten witten zak,
een knipbeurs van enormen omvang en grut er met beverige vingers het geld
voor een „karetje” uit.
„Tot de Zwet,” zegt ze.
„De gewone reis, moeder,” zegt de schipper die haar reeds van lange jaren
kent. [167]
„Wij moeten naar Delft,” zegt Paul.
„Verkoopt u retourtjes?”
„Nee, jongeheer, alleenig enkelde reissie’s.”

„Dan twee stuks,” zegt Paul waardig.
„Ja, ja,” lacht Ambro. „Ik mag vandaag met oome uit.”
„Gane jullie soo same na Delleft?” informeert de juffrouw.
„Ja, juffrouw,” zegt Ambro. „Opkomen voor ons nummer, we zijn d’r allebei
ingeloot.”
„Hoor nou zoo’n broekeman,” zegt de schipper onder het weggaan.
„Dat zal nog wel een paar jaartjes anhouwe.”
„Sou je graag soldaat sijn?” vraagt de juffrouw aan Ambro.
„Nee,” zegt Ambro. „Ik hou van commandeeren en niet van gecommandeerd
te worden.”
„Toe maar, toe maar, wat een baassie!” lacht de juffrouw.
„Maar hij,” zegt Ambro, op Paul wijzend. „Hij is er gek op. Hij kan een heelen
dag met een houten geweertje en een kurk spelen.”
„Nee, hoor juffrouw,” valt Paul hem vlug in de rede. „Hij jokt maar wat, ik moet
er ook niets van hebben, me broer zegt ook dat ’t een nare zooi is en zonde
van je goeie tijd.”
„O, is uwes broer in dienst?” zegt de juffrouw, bij voorbaat ja knikkend met ’t
hoofd.
„Al zeven maanden zit ie d’r in,” zegt Paul. „En nou heeft ie straf; daarom gaan
we naar Delft om ’m wat lekkers te brengen.” [168]
„Heit ie straf?” zegt meewarig de juffrouw. „En mag ie nou niet naar huis?”
„Hij heeft veertien dagen, hoe heet ’t ook weer, o ja, kwartier-arrest.”
„Sa-je gebeure,” zegt de juffrouw, ofschoon ze volstrekt niet weet wat kwartier-
arrest wil zeggen.
„Sit ie nou in ’n hok?” informeert ze op fluisterenden toon.

„Ja,” lacht Ambro. „Aan een ketting.”
„O, daar hei je die pejas ook weer. Van jou geloof ik toch nooit niks meer.”
„Nee juffrouw,” licht Paul haar beleefd in. „Dat is het cachot wat u bedoelt, dat
is voor erge feiten, zegt me broer.”
„Wat heit ie dan wel gedaan, zonder nieuwsgierig te zijn,” zegt de juffrouw.
„Hij heeft aan den luitenant z’n sik getrokken,” zegt Ambro. „’t Was een
aangeplakte, want hij hield ’m in zijn hand.”
„Och malle,” lacht Paul. „Niks van aan, hoor juffrouw. Hij was niet geschoren
op een inspectie en toen heeft een sergeant hem er bij gelapt.”
„Wat een stuk sjagrijn! Ja, se kenne die jonges soo koejeneere,” zegt de
juffrouw vol medegevoel.
„Ja,” zegt Ambro. „Ik wist dat ’t iets met den baard te maken had.”
„Jongeheer, belle!” onderbreekt de schipper hun gekeuvel en Paul vliegt op de

bel af en haalt z’n schade van straks terdege in.
„Nou, ik bin d’r,” zegt de juffrouw, terwijl ze haar parapluie en mandje ter hand
neemt. [169]
„Goeie reis verdere, jongeheere.”
„Dag juffrouw,” zeggen de jongens beleefd.
Het bootje zet zijn reis voort.
Onderweg moeten zij onder twee bruggen doorvaren. De pijp wordt omlaag
gehaald en ook de ijzeren hekken van het bovendek moeten plat liggen opdat
de boot zonder stooten onder de brug door kan.
De schipper, die rustig zijn pijpje zat te rooken, verlaat nu ook het dek, want de
brug is in aantocht.
Maar Ambro heeft schik in het geval en stelt Paul voor boven op het dek te
klimmen.
„Je zal heusch je kop niet stooten! kom Paul, we gaan plat op onzen buik
liggen, net als de stoompijp.”
Meteen is Ambro al naar boven en Paul, hoewel een beetje angstig voor zijn
hoofd, volgt hem.
„Wat een rare knullen,” zegt de schipper lachend. „Als een verstandig mensch
voor zijn gemak naar beneje gaat, motte hullie juist naar bove.”
„’t Kan immers geen kwaad?” informeert Paul.
„Nee hoor,” stelt de schipper hem gerust. „Als je maar plat blijft liggen en niet
je neus in den wind steekt.”
Intusschen is de boot bij de brug gekomen en glijdt op eigen vaart er onder

door.
„Hè fijn,” juicht Ambro. „Hij schuift net langs mijn pet.”
„Tòch gevaarlijk,” zegt Paul. „Hij moet maar eens ’n beetje hooger liggen, de
brug zal heusch [170]niet uit den weg gaan en dan zouden we toch netjes
gekraakt worden.”
„Bê-je nou!” is de verontwaardigde uitroep van Ambro. „De pijp ligt immers nog
hooger dan wij.”
Maar ze zijn er al veilig onder door en Paul herademt. Hij vond het een
benauwde bedoening.
„Straks nog een brug,” zegt Ambro. „Jammer, dat er geen twintig onderweg
zijn. Ik vind het wàt emmes, ’t is weer eens wat anders.”
[Inhoud]
AMBRO REDT EEN SECTIE SOLDATEN.
Delft nadert.—Het weêr is heerlijk, het lijkt wel een zomersche dag. De
jongens zitten weer in de laagte bij den voorsteven van het bootje.
„Kijk es, Paul,” roept Ambro triomfantelijk. „Ben ik niet handig?… ik pak
me daar zoo maar een visch uit het water,” en hij houdt Paul een klein
witvischje onder den neus.
„Kijk-t-ie spartelen,” zegt Paul in bewondering voor Ambro’s vlugheid.
„Maar niet heusch,” zegt deze. „Hij is zoo dood als een pier. Kijk, er
dobberen er nog veel meer. Tsjonge,… kijk es wat een zooi! En allemaal
dood.”
De schipper, die hun gesprek gevolgd had, geeft hun uitleg.
„Da’s van de fabrieke … die vergiftige hier het water met d’rlui
uitwaseminge en dan mot, al wat leeft, sterreve.”
„Kan je ze nog eten?” vraagt Ambro vol belangstelling. [171]
„Nee jonge, da’s niet goed voor je maag, maar de poes, die zou d’r an
smulle.”
Voor de laatste maal luidt Ambro nu de bel—de boot is aan.
Ze nemen afscheid van den schipper en roepen hem een tot-straks toe,
want over vier uur gaan ze weer terug naar Rotterdam.
„Heb je je pakkie, Paul?” vraagt Ambro met een dood-onschuldig gezicht

als ze al een heel eind op weg naar de kazerne zijn.
„Allemachies!” Paul verbleekt. „Nee, gauw terug!” En hij wil terughollen

naar de boot.
„Ik heb het,” roept Ambro en houdt het bewuste voorwerp omhoog.
„Hè, is dàt schrikken,” hijgt Paul.
„Hij is alwéér reusachtig!” lacht Ambro. „Zeg, weet jij den weg?” vraagt hij
dan.
„Ik wel,” zegt Paul. „We moeten naar de paardenmarkt.”
„Mag je d’r in, ik bedoel in de kazerne?”
„Dat zal niet gaan, ze laten geen burgers toe.”
„Laat naar je kijken, ben jij een burger!” schatert Ambro.
„Ja zeker zijn wij burgers, we dragen toch geen uniform.”
„Goed, burger Paul, alweer gelijk. Ik had anders wàt graag eens een
kijkie genomen in zoo’n soldatenhuis. Ik vraag het ijskoud aan den
generaal.”
„Jôh! de generaal! Die is er niet altijd, een hoogst enkele keer,” zegt Dirk,
„en dan moeten ze poetsen tot ze groen zien en een pluimpje [172]krijgen
ze nooit, alleen straf als er wat aan mankeert.”
„Nou, ik wil en zal de kazerne in,” zegt Ambro. „Wedde, dat we d’r in
komme?”
„Hier heen,” roept Paul. „Dit straatje in, dan zijn we er.”
„Ja, ik zie al een vlakte, dat is zeker de paardenmarkt.”
Om den hoek gekomen zien ze een menigte soldaten in werkcostuum.
„Wat zien ze d’r raar uit,” roept Ambro. „Dat is zeker hun daagsche
pakkie, ’t lijken wel clowns met die malle mutsie’s.”
„Dat zijn kwartiermutsen,” verklaart Paul, die nu alle geleerdheid

betreffende den dienst, opgedaan bij Dirk, Ambro opdischt.
„Je moet ’t maar weten! Hoort die kerel een muil opzetten! Die denkt
zeker, dat ze allemaal doof zijn! Begrijp jij, wat ie van ze wil?”
„Ja zeker,” zegt Paul. „Aan den schouder, geweer!” schreeuwt ie. Hoor,
nou roept ie weer „zet af.”
„En ze doen niks,” lacht Ambro.
„Wacht maar even,” zegt Paul.
Meteen klinkt weer een harde schreeuw, dat „geweer” moet verbeelden,
waarop alle geweren netjes, tegelijk weer op den grond worden geplaatst.
„Wat een poppenkast,” roept Ambro. „Dan vind ik gedresseerde honden

nog aardiger.”
„Kom mee,” dringt Paul aan. „Laten we nou niet aldoor hier blijven kijken.”
[173]
„Nou, misschien is Dirk er wel bij,” zegt Ambro, die pret heeft in al dat
gedoe. Hij had nog nooit zooiets gezien. Eenmaal in Den Haag, maar dat
was parade, toen waren ze allemaal netjes aangekleed en moesten
wachten op den generaal, die op een paard kwam aanhollen en al de
mannetjes monsterde.
„Kom je nou, of niet,” zegt Paul ongeduldig. „Anders zal ik wel alleen
gaan.”
„Hier ben ik al, burger, houd je kalm,” plaagt Ambro.
Ze stappen op de poort van de kazerne af en passeeren een paar

soldaten, die lui uitgestrekt in het zonnetje liggen te braden.
„Tabak, jongens?” vraagt er een. „Geef maar hier. Of is ’t misschien een

hammetje? Dat blieven we ook wel.”
„Fopspeentjes,” roept Ambro terug. „Vóór jullie naar bed gaan krijg je ze.”
Vóór de poort zit een sergeant op een kapotten stoel een krantje te lezen.
Hij kijkt bij het naderen van het tweetal van zijn lectuur op.
„Zoo, jong vee, wat motte jullie gedaan weze?”
Paul is zoowaar geschrokken van den harden toon waarop hij wordt
toegesproken, maar al gauw merkt hij, dat het niet zoo kwaad gemeend
is.
Ambro doet nu maar het woord.
„Meneer, we zouden graag dit pakje aan Dirk brengen. Dat is zijn broer,
ziet u. Mag dat?”
„Dirk kenne we hier niet,” luidt het antwoord. [174]
„D’r zijn hier misschien wel honderd Dirken. Maar waar leit ie? Welke
compie, welke sectie, welke kamer?”
„Dirk Vermeeren, 3de compagnie, 2de sectie, kamer 17,” antwoordt Paul
vlug.
Hij heeft nu weer allen moed teruggekregen nu hij merkte dat de bullebak
geen „kwaje” was.
„Dan gaan jullie ’t zellef maar brenge, hij zal d’r wel zijn, alles is
vanmorrege thuis. Hier de gang in, één trap op en dan de eerste deur
rechts. Ingerukt, marsch!”
Weg zijn de jongens.
„Zie je nou wel,” zegt Ambro zegevierend. „Ik wist het wel, dat we naar
binnen mochten, die kerel was immers veel te lui om dat pakkie zelf te
brengen. Hier Paul, kamer 17.”
„Moet je kloppen?” vraagt Paul een beetje bevreesd in dat nare, donkere,
groote gebouw.
„Bê-je wel wijs?” zegt Ambro. „Van nette manieren weten ze hier niks,” en
meteen doet hij de deur open.
„In orde, staat!” klinkt het op luiden toon en de beide jongens zien
plotseling overal kerels opduiken, die op stroozakken lagen te rooken, te
lezen en te luibakken.
Ieder staat nu als een standbeeld voor zijn bed.
De jongens begrijpen er niets van, tot de kerels in de gaten krijgen, dat ze

voor den mal zijn gehouden en loom hun bed weer opzoeken.
„Hallo,” roept Dirk, die hun die poets gebakken heeft. „Daar zijn de twee
hooge oome’s, heeren, [175]mag ik u voorstellen, mijn geachte broeder,
kolonel Paul en Overste Ambro, het grootste beest van Rotterdam en
omstreken.”
Paul, blij, dat hij eindelijk een bekend gezicht ziet en een bekende stem
hoort, komt met Ambro op Dirk af en reikt hem het pakje over.
„Dat moet ik je van moeder brengen en verder veel groeten van

allemaal.”
„Nou, maar jullie zijn beste kereltjes, hoor!” zegt Dirk die het pakje begint
te openen. „Hoe vinden jullie ’t hier? Gezellig, hè? Ambro, is dat geen
lekker bedje, je komt maar es logeeren, plaats en eten genoeg.”
De jongens kijken hun oogen uit; zoo’n rare boel hebben ze nog nooit
gezien.
IJzeren kribben met een stroozak en de wollen dekens op een hoopje

aan het eind en daar weer boven een kastje met een rommel waar je niet
meer uit wijs kan worden.
„Ha!” roept Dirk blij. „Sigaartjes en Kwatta’s! da’s toch maar alles. Ambro,
moet je een stukje?”
Ambro kijkt met glundere blikken naar het verleidelijke stukje chocolade,
maar hij weigert het en vindt, dat je een gevangene zijn lekkernij niet
moet ontnemen.
Dirk heeft, zooals we reeds zeiden, veertien dagen kwartier-arrest, omdat

hij bij een inspectie niet schoon geschoren was.
„Heb je nou heusch straf omdat je niet geschoren was,” vraagt Ambro
ongeloovig. „En als je nu je baard laat staan; hij kan toch niet in één nacht
lang zijn?” [176]
„Daar houden ze hier geen rekening mee,” antwoordt Dirk. „Of een glad
gezicht òf een flinke baard.”
Ambro voelt eens over zijn wang en kan slechts constateeren, dat er nog
geen spoor van haar te bespeuren is. „Bij mij is gelukkig alles in orde,”
zegt hij. „Laat de hooge-oome maar komen, hij mag me over mijn koonen
aaien.”
„Wat een lefschoppertje,” roept hem een landweerman toe, die evenals
alle anderen, lui op zijn krib ligt uitgestrekt.
„Had ik maar een beetje rook in mijn mond!” Deze verzuchting was voor
Dirk bedoeld en deze gooit hem een van zijn pas ontvangen sigaren toe.
„Hier, ouwe dief, jij ook wat,” lacht Dirk, en dan tot de jongens: „Dat is nou
onze Manus, de grootste lijntrekker van de heele compie.”
„Lijntrekken?” vraagt Paul.
En Dirk legt uit: „Lijntrekken is net doen of je druk aan ’t werk bent en een
heeleboel te doen hebt, maar in werkelijkheid voer je niks-niemendal uit
en als ze mannetjes zoeken om het een of andere karweitje op te
knappen … kamers zwabberen, stroozakken vullen of zoo iets lekkers,
dan ben je in geen hoeken of gaten te vinden.”
De jongens snappen het wel, maar zien niet in, dat kamers-zwabberen en
stroozakken vullen zulke nare bezigheden zijn.
„Ja,” zegt Manus. „Eventjes is aardig, vooral voor zulke jonge snuiters als
jullie, maar een heelen middag zou zoo’n grappie je gauw de keel uit
hangen.” [177]
„Zijn jullie nou allemaal lijntrekkers?” vraagt Ambro. „En kan niemand je
vinden?” en meteen wijst hij naar buiten, waar, op de binnenplaats een
sectie recruten een looppasje in ’t rond maakt.
„Kijk die es hollen in de warmte,… hun tongen hangen op hun vessie,…

dan is die daar, met die lange sabel verstandiger, die blijft tenminste
rustig op zijn plaats en laat de anderen rennen.”
„Oh, dat is de ooievaar,” lacht Dirk. „Ik hoor het aan zijn commando, hij
kraait net als een oude juffrouw, zie je wel, jongens, wat een lange nek
die kerel heeft, dat is „de ooievaar”.”
„Mogen jullie hier nou zoo niks doen en luieren?” vraagt Paul, die bang is,
dat er wel eens ’n hooge oome kon binnen komen.
Maar Dirk stelt hem gerust.
„Ja, hoor Paul, dat màg, we hebben nachtdienst gehad in de duinen bij
Den Haag en daarom hebben we nu rust, ja, ze zijn wàt bezorgd voor
ons, als het regent mogen we ook thuis blijven, kijk maar …” en hij wijst
op een broek, die stijf is van natte modder.
„Dat is mijn feestbroek, die deelt met me in lief en leed.”
„Ik heb de jicht in m’n rug van dat nachtelijke tochie,” klaagt Manus. „En
de volgende keer vertik ik ’t, dan piep ik ’m en kruip onder de wol … ze
lijken wel gek,… als een fesoenlijk mensch maft, gaan hullie met beeste-
weer door de duine renne.”
„Ik het toch moar twie kenijntjes te groaze hàad,” [178]klinkt van de
overzijde de stem van een boerenzoon.
„Zundàag zaamme smulle,” lacht hij en de jongens zien een glimmend

gezicht met glunderende oogen die bij het grinniken geheel verdwijnen,
terwijl een breeden spleet te zien komt, zijn mond met gele tanden.
„Hei ’j nog tebàak?” roept hij tot Dirk, maar deze, wel goed, doch niet gek,
antwoordt hem: „Een ander keertje, broer, anders hou ik zelf niks en ik
moet nog negen dagen brommen.”
De jongens zijn bij elkaar op de leege krib naast Dirk gaan liggen en
voelen zich langzamerhand thuis in de vreemde omgeving.
„Ik vind ’t toch wel aardig hier,” zegt Ambro. „Alleen een beetje saai op
den duur.”
„Saai!” roept Manus. „Hoe kan je ’t zeggen, we vervelen ons nooit, we

worden altijd bezig gehouden, een eerste klas hotel is er niks bij.”
Plotseling worden zware stappen gehoord en vliegt de deur open.
„In orde, staat!” wordt er geroepen en ditmaal is het geen grap.
„Toe, maak geen spas, hou op met die flauwe kul, leelijke kevers!”
schreeuwt Manus, die den kapitein niet in de gaten krijgt
Maar nu hij de anderen doodstil voor de bedden ziet staan kijkt hij op en
ontdekt dat inderdaad ditmaal de kapitein op de kamer is.
„Kop dicht,” roept de sergeant die hem begeleidt en Manus glijdt van zijn
krib en neemt „de houding” aan. [179]
De jongens hebben van schrik hetzelfde gedaan, en begrijpen weer niets

van die rij standbeelden die onbewegelijk blijven staan.
De grinnekende kop van den boerenzoon is veranderd in een dom

gezicht met vragend verwonderde oogen.
„Wat moet dat hier? Niks te doen? Dan maar aantreden in veldtenue; een
looppasje maken. Dat niks doen werkt verkeerd op jullie; binnen vijf
minuten op de binnenplaats, veldtenue met rol.”
„Kap’tein,” vraagt Manus.
„Kop dicht,” is ’t antwoord en Manus kijkt bedremmeld naar den grond,

terwijl hij zijn pruim van zijn rechter- naar z’n linkerwang laat gaan.
„Kap’tein,” roept een heldere jongensstem.
De kapitein kijkt op en ontdekt aan ’t eind van de kamer de twee jongens,

die half verscholen waren achter den dikken buik van een anderen
landweerman.
„Wat moet dat,” vraagt de kapitein verbaasd. „Wat doen jullie hier? er
mogen geen burgers in de kazerne.”
„Zie je wel,” fluistert Paul in doodsangst. „We zijn burgers, ik heb je wel
gewaarschuwd.”
Bij deze woorden moet de kapitein even glimlachen.
„Hoe komen jullie hier?” vraagt hij, terwijl hij naar de jongens toe gaat
Paul weet geen antwoord te vinden, hij is bang geworden door die
doodelijke stilte in een kamer waar een dertigtal mannen als beelden
staan te staren. [180]
„Net het panopticum,” denkt hij.
„Hij moest een pakje voor z’n broer brengen en we mochten van dien
mijnheer beneden aan de deur het zelf gaan brengen,” antwoordt Ambro
op helderen toon.
„Zoo—en waarom riep jij daar straks „kaptein”, had je me wat te zeggen?”
„Ja kaptein,” luidt het antwoord van Ambro. „Nu Manus,” en hij wijst op
den landweerman naast Dirk, „nu Manus z’n kop moest houden, wou ik u
maar even vertellen, dat ze allemaal vannacht gerend hebben in de
duinen met dat beestenweêr en dat ze daarom, zooals u zei, niks doen
en luieren.”
Hij zucht, nu eindelijk er uit is wat hij op ’t hart heeft.
„Zoo, nou maar dat is wat anders,” zegt de kapitein op zachten toon. „Dus
jullie hebt nachtdienst gehad,… nou, blijf dan maar hier … je kunt je gang
gaan.” [181]
Meteen ligt alles weer op de geliefkoosde krib, als werden ze door een
electrischen schok getroffen, en de kapitein, die de jongens toeknikte,
verlaat even dreunend de kamer als hij binnengekomen was.
„Mooi gedaan,” klinkt ’t hartelijk van Dirk.
„Je hebt ’t ’m kranig gezeid,” zegt Manus.
„Heere, Heere, kan dàat jong proate,” is de lof van den boerenzoon en
Ambro, die hen allemaal redde van den gevreesden looppas in de zon,
stond als held van het oogenblik midden in de kamer, blij, dat alles goed
afgeloopen was, want Paul had gelijk gehad, ze waren tòch burgers.
„Ja,” zegt Manus. „Had ik de burgerpet op gehad, dàn had-ie naar mijn
ook wel geluisterd, maar as-t-ie je in je werkpakkie ziet, wordt-ie
dienstklopper en dan is ’t „kophouwen en doen”!”
Paul heeft er genoeg van, en vindt, dat ze nu maar eens moeten

opstappen. Ze nemen hartelijk afscheid van Dirk en al de anderen en
begroet met arm-gezwaai van alle kribben verlaten ze de kamer.
„’t Was tòch fijn,” zegt Ambro, als ze weer op straat staan.
„Ik vind ’t een nare boel, ik zou niet graag zoo behandeld worden,” is
Paul’s antwoord.
„Hoorde je niet hoe ze allemaal het land er aan hebben? Dirk kan
gelukkig weer op zijn kantoor terug komen na den dienst, maar er zijn er
veel die hun plaats bezet vinden.”
„Ja,” zegt Ambro. „Van dien kant bekeken heb je gelijk, maar zoo’n
nachtelijke tocht door de duinen zou ik toch wàt graag meemaken.” [182]
„Nou, dat kan best eens gebeuren. Karel z’n vader gaat van den zomer
kampeeren, je zult zien, dat we dan mee mogen.”
„’t Zou tijd worden,” zucht Ambro. „Onze nachtelijke tocht is toen mooi in
de war geloopen. Maar, over wat anders gesproken, me maag jeukt.”
„Ik weet een kattekroeg,” zegt Paul. „Ga maar mee.”
De jongens stevenen nu direct op het doel af, om als ze hun twaalf-uurtje

hebben gebruikt, de terugreis te aanvaarden.
Het was een fijn dagje geweest en met voldoening kon Ambro terugzien
op zijn heldendaad in de kazerne, waar hij het waagde een „hooge oome”
te trotseeren en de soldaten te redden van den gehaten „looppas in de
zon”.

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Business Law and the Regulation of

Business 11th Edition Mann Solutions

Chapter 9 ................................. Introduction to Contracts

ETHICS QUESTIONS RAISED IN THIS PART

ACTIVITIES AND RESEARCH PROBLEMS

A. Development of the Law of Contracts D. Classification of Contracts

Cases in This Chapter

A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS

*** Chapter Objective ***

The Uniform Commercial Code

*** Chapter Objective ***

*** Chapter Objective ***

Express and Implied Contracts

INTERPRETATION: An implied in fact contract is formed by the conduct of the parties; in

Bilateral and Unilateral Contracts

*** Chapter Objective ***

*** Chapter Objective ***

OPINION: Konduros, J. “Restitution is a remedy designed to prevent unjust enrichment.”

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS AND CASE PROBLEMS

Answer: Quasi-contract. Weichert is entitled to compensation for services rendered to Ryan.

ANSWERS TO “TAKING SIDES” PROBLEMS

Richardson hired J. C. Flood Company, a plumbing contractor, to correct a stoppage in the

b. What arguments would support Richardson’s refusal to pay the bill?

„Maar wacht es,” zegt Ambro. „Hoe laat komen we terug?”

„Om half vier ongeveer.”

„Waar moeten we dan brood eten?”

„Gommenikkie, da’s fijn!”

„En we mogen in een kattekroeg wat gaan drinken.”

„Dat wordt een reuzen-dag!” zegt Ambro verheugd.

„Nou, ik zal er niet lang last van hebben,” lacht Ambro.

„Ja mevrouw,” is het antwoord. „U krijgt hem heelhuids terug.”

En nu begeven de jongens zich naar het bootje.

Ze zijn echter veel te vroeg en er is nog geen sprake van vertrekken.

„Dat messie mag er wezen, jongeheer.”

„Niks heeft ’t me gekost. Zoo maar voor noppes weggehaald.”

„’t Zal niet waar zijn,” zegt de machinist.

„Nee, niet weggekaapt! Eerlijk verdiend, hoor!”

„En je zeit weggehaald!” [163]

„Dat heb je ’m kranig gelapt,” zegt de machinist goedkeurend. „Die paaltjes

„O, we hebben plenty, man.”

„Nou, dan op je santé.”

Nu nadert de schipper, om met de bel het sein tot vertrek te geven.

„Mogen wij het doen?” vraagt Ambro.

„Ga je gang, jongeheer. Ik doe ’t elken dag.”

„Nou is ’t genoeg,” roept lachend de schipper. „Anders komen we nog zonder

De juffrouw wordt hijgend en puffend naar binnen gehaald en de jongens

„Hè, hè … hè, hè … is dat loope!… mense, mense,… hè, hè!”

„Ik ben ook niet doof!”

„Is dat uw zoontje?” vraagt eensklaps Ambro, op Paul wijzend.

„Moet u ook naar Delft?” vraagt Paul.

„Nee, ikke gaan na de Zwet, na me dochter, die heit daar ’n cefé.”

„Met een schommel?” vraagt Ambro vol belangstelling.

De schipper komt de kaartjes ophalen.

„Opoe betaalt voor ons,” zegt Ambro.

„Tot de Zwet,” zegt ze.

„Wij moeten naar Delft,” zegt Paul.

„Nee, jongeheer, alleenig enkelde reissie’s.”

„Gane jullie soo same na Delleft?” informeert de juffrouw.

„Hoor nou zoo’n broekeman,” zegt de schipper onder het weggaan.

„Dat zal nog wel een paar jaartjes anhouwe.”

„Sou je graag soldaat sijn?” vraagt de juffrouw aan Ambro.

„Toe maar, toe maar, wat een baassie!” lacht de juffrouw.

* Chapter Objective *

* Chapter Objective *

* Chapter Objective *

* Chapter Objective *

* Chapter Objective *