1

PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 183591 October 14 2008

Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic of the Philippines

FACTS:

On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to
sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia.

Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them
the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation
thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the
same.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;

2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy
of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local
Government Code of 1991)

3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be binding itself

a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not
recognized by law;

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371
(THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),

particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,

RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)

RULINGS:

1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult the local government units or communities
affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents exceeded their
authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of
government is a proper matter for judicial review.

As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance, the Court grants
the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance
adopted in David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.

In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:

x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a
judicial controversy even without any other overt act . Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to
awaken judicial duty.x x x x

By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.

That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.

2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters of public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a
state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160
(Local Government Code of 1991).

(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Sec 28 recognizes the duty of
officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates
 2

that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or
limitations as may be provided by law.

The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the highest order. In declaring that the
right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction
as to the executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.

E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and for a principal forum for
consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant
information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.

3.

a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not
recognized by law;

Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state
or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.

The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an “associative” relationship with the
national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or
regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate
any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any
part of Philippine territory for independence.

The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution. It is not merely an expanded version
of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed,
BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent
population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.

Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it – which
has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association – runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Republic.

The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being itself contrary to the present
Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in
conflict with the Constitution and the laws. The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered
by the term “autonomous region” in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it.

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:

The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force
upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework,” implying an
amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the
Constitution .

It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such
presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed
amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for
constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.

The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards.

Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third party that
the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these
proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371
(THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),

particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,

 3

RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)

This strand begins with the statement that it is “the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves
and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines “Bangsamoro people” as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent
islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of
full blood, including their spouses.

Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only “Moros” as traditionally understood even
by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of
indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined. The MOA-AD
proceeds to refer to the “Bangsamoro homeland,” the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of
their prior rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the public domain.

Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and
delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the
Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any
government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.

Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct consultations beforeany
project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of
people residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests
ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement
of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.

CONCLUSION:

In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent
consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the
MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious,
oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept
underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept
presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.
 4

Prof. Magallona, Hontiveros, Prof. Roque and 38 UP College of Law Students

-vs-

Ermita Exec.Sec., Romulo Sec DFA, Andaya Sec DBM, Ventura Administrator National Mapping & Resource Information
Authority and Davide Jr.

-writ of certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of RA 9522

Facts:

RA 3046 was passed in 1961 which provides among others the demarcation lines of the baselines of the Philippines as an archipelago.
This is in consonance with UNCLOS I.

RA 5446 amended RA 3046 in terms of typographical errors and included Section 2 in which the government reserved the drawing of
baselines in Sabah in North Borneo.

RA 9522 took effect on March 2009 amending RA 5446. The amendments, which are in compliance with UNCLOS III in which the
Philippines is one of the signatory, shortening one baseline while optimizing the other and classifying Kalayaan Group of Island and
Scarborough Shoal as Regimes of Island.

Petitioners in their capacity as taxpayer, citizen and legislator assailed the constitutionality of RA 9522:- it reduces the territory of the
Philippines in violation to the Constitution and it opens the country to maritime passage of vessels and aircrafts of other states to the
detriment of the economy, sovereignty, national security and of the Constitution as well. They added that the classification of Regime of
Islands would be prejudicial to the lives of the fishermen.

Issues:

1. WON the petitioners have locus standi to bring the suit; and
2. WON RA 9522 is unconstitutional

Ruling:

Petition is dismissed.

1st Issue:
The SC ruled the suit is not a taxpayer or legislator, but as a citizen suit, since it is the citizens who will be directly injured and benefitted
in affording relief over the remedy sought.

2nd Issue:
The SC upheld the constitutionality of RA 9522.

First, RA 9522 did not delineate the territory the Philippines but is merely a statutory tool to demarcate the country’s maritime zone and
continental shelf under UNCLOS III. SC emphasized that UNCLOS III is not a mode of acquiring or losing a territory as provided under
the laws of nations. UNCLOS III is a multi-lateral treaty that is a result of a long-time negotiation to establish a uniform sea-use rights
over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the
baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves. In order to measure said
distances, it is a must for the state parties to have their archipelagic doctrines measured in accordance to the treaty—the role played by
RA 9522. The contention of the petitioner that RA 9522 resulted to the loss of 15,000 square nautical miles is devoid of merit. The truth
is, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of base points, increased the Philippines total maritime space of 145,216 square nautical miles.

Second, the classification of KGI and Scarborough Shoal as Regime of Islands is consistent with the Philippines’ sovereignty. Had RA
9522 enclosed the islands as part of the archipelago, the country will be violating UNCLOS III since it categorically stated that the
length of the baseline shall not exceed 125 nautical miles. So what the legislators did is to carefully analyze the situation: the country,
for decades, had been claiming sovereignty over KGI and Scarborough Shoal on one hand and on the other hand they had to consider
that these are located at non-appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago. So, the classification is in
accordance with the Philippines sovereignty and State’s responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS
III.

Third, the new base line introduced by RA 9522 is without prejudice with delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the
territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.
 5

And lastly, the UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are not incompatible with the Constitution’s delineation of internal waters. Petitioners contend
that RA 9522 transformed the internal waters of the Philippines to archipelagic waters hence subjecting these waters to the right of
innocent and sea lanes passages, exposing the Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards. The Court
emphasized that the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space
over it and the submarine areas underneath, regardless whether internal or archipelagic waters. However, sovereignty will not bar the
Philippines to comply with its obligation in maintaining freedom of navigation and the generally accepted principles of international law.
It can be either passed by legislator as a municipal law or in the absence thereof, it is deemed incorporated in the Philippines law since
the right of innocent passage is a customary international law, thus automatically incorporated thereto.

This does not mean that the states are placed in a lesser footing; it just signifies concession of archipelagic states in exchange for their
right to claim all waters inside the baseline. In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive
economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a
maritime delineation binds the international community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime
delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.

The Court expressed that it is within the Congress who has the prerogative to determine the passing of a law and not the Court.
Moreover, such enactment was necessary in order to comply with the UNCLOS III; otherwise, it shall backfire on the Philippines for its
territory shall be open to seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our
archipelago and it will weaken the country’s case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime space.

The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522,
allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’ maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is
therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our
national interest.
 6

PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION v. CIR, GR No. L-32052, 1975-07-25

Facts:

More specifically, it deals with the question of whether petitioner, the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, discharges
governmental and not proprietary functions.

The facts are undisputed. On December 20, 1966, claimants, now private respondents, filed with respondent Court a petition wherein
they alleged their employment relationship, the overtime services in excess of the regular eight hours a day rendered by them, and the
failure... to pay them overtime compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 444.

There was an answer filed by petitioner Philippine

Virginia Tobacco Administration denying the allegations and raising the special defenses of lack of a cause of action and lack of
jurisdiction.[... espondent Court issued an order sustaining the claims of private respondents for overtime services from December 23,
1963 up to the date the... decision was rendered on March 21, 1970, and directing petitioner to pay the same, minus what it had already
paid.[9] There was a motion for reconsideration, but respondent Court en banc denied the same.[10] Hence this petition... for certiorari.

Petitioner Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, as had been noted, would predicate its plea for the reversal of the order
complained of on the basic proposition that it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as... it is exercising governmental functions
and that it... is exempt from the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444.

Issues:

More specifically, it deals with the question of whether petitioner, the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, discharges
governmental and not proprietary functions.

Ruling:

The amendatory statute, Republic Act No.

4155,[14] renders even more evident its nature as a governmental agency. Its first section on the declaration of policy reads: "It is
declared to be the national policy, with respect to the local Virginia Tobacco industry, to encourage the... production of local Virginia
tobacco of the qualities needed and in quantities marketable in both domestic and foreign markets, to establish this industry on an
efficient and economic basis, and to create a climate conducive to local cigarette manufacture of the qualities... desired by the
consuming public, blending imported and native Virginia leaf tobacco to improve the quality of locally manufactured cigarettes."[15] The
objectives are set forth thus: "To attain this national policy the following objectives are hereby... adopted: 1. Financing; 2. Marketing;
3. The disposal of stocks of the Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA) and the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA) at
the best obtainable prices and conditions in order that a reinvigorated Virginia... tobacco industry may be established on a sound basis;
and 4. Improving the quality of locally manufactured cigarettes through blending of imported and native Virginia leaf tobacco; such
importation with corresponding exportation at a ratio of one kilo of imported to four... kilos of exported Virginia tobacco, purchased by
the importer-exporter from the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration."[1

"The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government...
quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was
called upon to enter optionally, and only 'because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private...
individual or group of individuals,' continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the
government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost
everywhere... else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Here of course this development
was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of
social... justice."

It did cite Section 2 of the Act, but its very language leaves no doubt that "it shall apply to all persons employed in any industry or
occupation, whether public or private . xxx"[42] Nor are... private respondents included among the employees who are thereby barred
from enjoying the statutory benefits it cited Marcelo vs. Philippine National Red Cross[43] and Boy Scouts of the Philippines vs. Araos.

respondent Court must be sustained.

denying a motion for reconsideration are hereby affirmed.

 7

ACCFA v CUGCO G.R. No. L-21484. November 29, 1969.

Facts:

(ACCFA) was a government agency created under Republic Act No. 821, as amended. Its administrative machinery was reorganized
and its name changed to Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA) under the Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844). On the other
hand, the ACCFA Supervisors' Association (ASA) and the ACCFA Workers' Association (AWA), referred to as the Unions, are labor
organizations composed of the supervisors and the rank-and-file employees, respectively, in the ACCFA (now ACA).

On October 30, 1962 the Unions, together with its mother union, the Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices
(CUGCO), filed a complaint with the Court of Industrial Relations against the ACCFA for having allegedly committed acts of unfair labor
practice, namely: violation of the collective bargaining agreement in order to discourage the members of the Unions in the exercise of
their right to self-organization, discrimination against said members in the matter of promotions, and refusal to bargain.

The ACCFA moved to reconsider but was turned down in a resolution dated April 25, 1963 of the CIR en banc. Hence this appeal.

During the pendency of the case, the union filed a petition for certification election with the Court of Industrial Relations praying that
they be certified as the exclusive bargaining agents for the supervisors and rank-and-file employees, respectively, in the ACA.Trial court
agreed with this move.

However, the ACA filed for a stay of execution which the trial court granted.

Issue:

WON the CIR has jurisdiction to entertain the petition of the Unions for certification election given that the mother company (ACA) is
engaged in governmental functions

Held: The Unions are not entitled. Decision modified

Ratio:

Under Section 3 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code the ACA was established, among other governmental agencies, to extend credit
and similar assistance to agriculture.

According to the Land Reform Code, the administrative machinery of the ACCFA shall be reorganized to enable it to align
its activities with the requirements and objective of this Code and shall be known as the Agricultural Credit Administration. These
include powers non really accorded to non-government entities such as tax exemptions, registration of deeds, notarial services, and
prosecution of officials.

The power to audit the operations of farmers' cooperatives and otherwise inquire into their affairs, as given by Section 113, is in the
nature of the visitorial power of the sovereign, which only a government agency specially delegated to do so by the Congress may
legally exercise.

Moreover, the ACA was delegated under the Land Reform Project Administration , a government agency tasked t implement land
reform.

Moreover, the appointing authority for officials was the President himself.

The considerations set forth above militate quite strongly against the recognition of collective bargaining powers in the respondent
Unions within the context of Republic Act No. 875, and hence against the grant of their basic petition for certification election as proper
bargaining units. The ACA is a government office or agency engaged in governmental, not proprietary functions.

These functions may not be strictly what President Wilson described as "constituent" (as distinguished from "ministrant"), such as those
relating to the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime, those regulating property and property rights, those relating to the
administration of justice and the determination of political duties of citizens, and those relating to national defense and foreign relations.
Under this traditional classification, such constituent functions are exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to
 8

promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people — these letter functions being ministrant, he exercise of which is optional on
the part of the government.

The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government quite
unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called
upon to enter optionally, and only "because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or
group of individuals." continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must
undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times.

It was in furtherance of such policy that the Land Reform Code was enacted and the various agencies, the ACA among them,
established to carry out its purposes. There can be no dispute as to the fact that the land reform program contemplated in the said
Code is beyond the capabilities of any private enterprise to translate into reality. It is a purely governmental function, no less than, say,
the establishment and maintenance of public schools and public hospitals.

Given these, the respondent Unions are not entitled to the certification election sought in the Court below. Such certification is
admittedly for purposes of bargaining in behalf of the employees with respect to terms and conditions of employment, including the right
to strike as a coercive economic weapon, as in fact the said unions did strike in 1962 against the ACCFA.

This is contrary to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 875, which provides:

"SEC. 11. Prohibition Against Strike in the Government. — The terms and conditions of employment in the Government, including
any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof, are governed by law and it is declared to be the policy of this Act that employees
therein shall not strike for the purposes of securing changes or modification in their terms and conditions of employment. Such
employees may belong to any labor organization which does not impose the obligation to strike or to join in strike: Provided, However,
that this section shall apply only to employees employed in governmental functions of the Government including but not limited to
governmental corporations."
 9

Oposa vs Factoran

Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law: Intergenerational Responsibility

GR No. 101083; July 30 1993

FACTS:

A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation and generations yet unborn, and
represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the
defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They alleged that they have a clear and
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae.
Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and
succeeding generations.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of
the government.

ISSUE:

Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine
rainforests?”

HELD:

Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come. The Supreme Court ruled that they
can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf
of succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore
areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present
as well as the future generations.

Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a
balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same
time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
 10

SERRANO V. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES,INC.

By way of Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner assails the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals (CA).

FACTS:

Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA)-approved Contract of Employment with the following terms and conditions:

Duration of contract 12 months

Position Chief Officer

Basic monthly salary US$1,400.00

Hours of work 48.0 hours per week

Overtime US$700.00 per month

Vacation leave with pay 7.00 days per month

On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract for the position
of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be made
Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.

Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer. Hence, petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer
and was repatriated to the Philippines on May 26, 1998.

Petitioner’s employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March 19, 1998 up to March 19, 1999, but at the time of his
repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of
nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.

Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for constructive dismissal and for payment of his money
claims in the total amount of US$26,442.73.

The LA rendered a Decision dated July 15, 1999, declaring the dismissal of petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary benefits, to
wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the dismissal of the complainant (petitioner) by the
respondents in the above-entitled case was illegal and the respondents are hereby ordered to pay the complainant [petitioner], jointly
and severally, in Philippine Currency, based on the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of payment, the amount of EIGHT
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY U.S. DOLLARS (US $8,770.00), representing the complainant’s salary for three (3) months
of the unexpired portion of the aforesaid contract of employment.

The claims of the complainant for moral and exemplary damages are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

In awarding petitioner a lump-sum salary of US$8,770.00, the LA based his computation on the salary period of three months only —
rather than the entire unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of petitioner’s employment contract – applying the subject clause.
However, the LA applied the salary rate of US$2,590.00, consisting of petitioner’s “[b]asic salary, US$1,400.00/month +
US$700.00/month, fixed overtime pay, + US$490.00/month, vacation leave pay = US$2,590.00/compensation per month.”

Respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to question the finding of the LA that petitioner was
illegally dismissed.

The NLRC modified the LA Decision and corrected the LA’s computation of the lump-sum salary awarded to petitioner by reducing the
applicable salary rate from US$2,590.00 to US$1,400.00 because R.A. No. 8042 “does not provide for the award of overtime pay,
which should be proven to have been actually performed, and for vacation leave pay.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the constitutionality of the subject clause. The NLRC
denied the motion.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating the constitutional challenge against the subject clause. After initially
dismissing the petition on a technicality, the CA eventually gave due course to it, as directed by this Court in its Resolution
which granted the petition for certiorari,filed by petitioner.
 11

The CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate; however, the CA skirted the constitutional issue raised
by petitioner.

His Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioner brings his cause to this Court on the following grounds:

The Court of Appeals and the labor tribunals have decided the case in a way not in accord with applicable decision of the Supreme
Court involving similar issue of granting unto the migrant worker back wages equal to the unexpired portion of his contract of
employment instead of limiting it to three (3) months.

Even without considering the constitutional limitations [of] Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, the Court of Appeals gravely erred in law in
excluding from petitioner’s award the overtime pay and vacation pay provided in his contract since under the contract they form part of
his salary.

The Court now takes up the full merit of the petition mindful of the extreme importance of the constitutional question raised therein.

ISSUES:

Whether Section 10 (par 5) of RA 8042 is unconstitutional

Proper computation of the Lump-sum salary to be awarded to petitioner by reason of his illegal dismissal

Whether the overtime and leave pay should form part of the salary basis in the computation of his monetary award

The unanimous finding of the LA, NLRC and CA that the dismissal of petitioner was illegal is not disputed. Likewise not disputed is the
salary differential of US$45.00 awarded to petitioner in all three fora.

Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the lump-sum salary of petitioner at the monthly rate of US$1,400.00
covering the period of three months out of the unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract or a total of
US$4,200.00.

Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner contends that, in addition to the US$4,200.00 awarded by the NLRC and
the CA, he is entitled to US$21,182.23 more or a total of US$25,382.23, equivalent to his salaries for the entire nine months and 23
days left of his employment contract, computed at the monthly rate of US$2,590.00.31

Arguments of the Petitioner

For Antonio Serrano (petitioner), a Filipino seafarer, the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042,
violates the OFWs’ constitutional rights in that it impairs the terms of their contract, deprives them of equal protection and denies them
due process.

The Arguments of Respondents

Respondents contend that the constitutional issue should not be entertained, for this was belatedly interposed by petitioner in his
appeal before the CA, and not at the earliest opportunity, which was when he filed an appeal before the NLRC.40

The Arguments of the Solicitor General

The Solicitor General (OSG)41 points out that as R.A. No. 8042 took effect on July 15, 1995, its provisions could not have impaired
petitioner’s 1998 employment contract. Rather, R.A. No. 8042 having preceded petitioner’s contract, the provisions thereof are deemed
part of the minimum terms of petitioner’s employment, especially on the matter of money claims, as this was not stipulated upon by the
parties.

The Court’s Ruling:

First Issue

Does the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on Labor as
protected sector?

The answer is in the affirmative.

Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees:

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the law.
 12

Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector, without distinction as to place of deployment, full
protection of their rights and welfare.

To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to economic security and parity: all
monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of similar category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in
equal degree; none should be denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like
circumstances.

Imbued with the same sense of “obligation to afford protection to labor,” the Court in the present case also employs the standard of
strict judicial scrutiny, for it perceives in the subject clause a suspect classification prejudicial to OFWs.

Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that
the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on OFWs

The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; and it is for that precise reason that the clause violates
not just petitioner’s right to equal protection, but also her right to substantive due process under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.

Second Issue

It is plain that prior to R.A. No. 8042, all OFWs, regardless of contract periods or the unexpired portions thereof, were treated alike in
terms of the computation of their monetary benefits in case of illegal dismissal. Their claims were subjected to a uniform rule of
computation: their basic salaries multiplied by the entire unexpired portion of their employment contracts.

The enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042 introduced a differentiated rule of computation of the money claims of illegally
dismissed OFWs based on their employment periods, in the process singling out one category whose contracts have an unexpired
portion of one year or more and subjecting them to the peculiar disadvantage of having their monetary awards limited to their salaries
for 3 months or for the unexpired portion thereof, whichever is less, but all the while sparing the other category from such prejudice,
simply because the latter’s unexpired contracts fall short of one year.

Prior to R.A. No. 8042, a uniform system of computation of the monetary awards of illegally dismissed OFWs was in place. This uniform
system was applicable even to local workers with fixed-term employment.

The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; and it is for that precise reason that the clause violates
not just petitioner’s right to equal protection, but also her right to substantive due process under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.

The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his salaries for the entire unexpired period of nine months and 23
days of his employment contract, pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.

Third Issue

Petitioner contends that his overtime and leave pay should form part of the salary basis in the computation of his monetary award,
because these are fixed benefits that have been stipulated into his contract.

Petitioner is mistaken.

The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include overtime and leave pay. For seafarers like petitioner, DOLE Department Order No.
33, series 1996, provides a Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers, in which salary is understood as the basic wage, exclusive of
overtime, leave pay and other bonuses; whereas overtime pay is compensation for all work “performed” in excess of the regular eight
hours, and holiday pay is compensation for any work “performed” on designated rest days and holidays.

In the same vein, the claim for the day’s leave pay for the unexpired portion of the contract is unwarranted since the same is given
during the actual service of the seamen.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition. The subject clause “or for three months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less” in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and the
December 8, 2004 Decision and April 1, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are MODIFIED to the effect that petitioner is
AWARDED his salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his employment contract consisting of nine months and 23 days computed at
the rate of US$1,400.00 per month.
 13

BASES CONVERSION v. COA, GR No. 178160, 2009-02-26

Facts:

Section 9 of RA No. 7227 states that the BCDA Board of Directors (Board) shall exercise the powers and functions of the BCDA.

Under Section 10, the functions of the Board include the determination of the organizational structure and the adoption of a
compensation and benefit scheme at least equivalent to that of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).

Section 10, the functions of the Board include the determination of the organizational structure and the adoption of a compensation and
benefit scheme at least equivalent to that of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). Accordingly, the Board determined the
organizational... structure of the BCDA and adopted a compensation and benefit scheme for its officials and employees.

On 20 December 1996, the Board adopted a new compensation and benefit scheme which included a P10,000 year-end benefit
granted to each contractual employee, regular permanent employee, and Board member

President Ramos approved the new compensation and... benefit scheme.

In 1999, the BSP gave a P30,000 year-end benefit to its officials and employees. In 2000, the BSP increased the year-end benefit from
P30,000 to P35,000. Pursuant to Section 10 of RA No. 7227 which states that the compensation and benefit scheme of the BCDA shall
be at least... equivalent to that of the BSP, the Board increased the year-end benefit of BCDA officials and employees from P10,000 to
P30,000.

Aside from the contractual employees, regular permanent employees, and Board members, the full-time consultants of the BCDA also
received the year-end benefit.

COA issued Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 2003-004[7] stating that the grant of year-end benefit to Board members was
contrary to Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Circular

COA, Legal and Adjudication Office-Corporate, disallowed the grant of year-end benefit to... the Board members and full-time
consultants... the COA affirmed the disallowance of the year-end benefit granted to the Board members and full-time consultants and
held that the presumption of good faith did not apply to them

The COA stated that:

2.2

Members of the Board of Directors of agencies are not salaried officials of the government. As non-salaried officials they are not entitled
to PERA, ADCOM, YEB and retirement benefits unless expressly provided by law.

Clearly, as stated above, the members and ex-officio members of the Board of Directors are not entitled to YEB, they being not salaried
officials of the government. The same goes with full time consultants wherein no employer-employee relationships exist between...
them and the BCDA. Thus, the whole amount paid to them totaling P342,000 is properly disallowed in audit.

Issues:

First, the BCDA claims that the Board can grant the year-end benefit to its members and full-time consultants because, under Section
10 of RA No. 7227, the functions of the Board include the adoption of a compensation and benefit scheme.

Second, the BCDA claims that the Board members and full-time consultants should be granted the year-end benefit because the
granting of year-end benefit is consistent with Sections 5 and 18, Article II of the Constitution. Sections 5 and 18 state:

Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare
are essential for the enjoyment by all people of the blessings of democracy.

Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.

Ruling:

The Court is not impressed. The Board's power to adopt a compensation and benefit scheme is not unlimited. Section 9 of RA No. 7227
states that Board members are entitled to a per diem

Section 9 specifies that Board members shall receive a per diem for every board meeting; limits the amount of per diem to not more
than P5,000; and limits the total amount of per diem for one month to not more than four meetings.

Since full-time consultants are not salaried employees of BCDA, they are not entitled to the year-end benefit which is a "personnel
benefit granted in addition to salaries" and which is "paid only when the basic salary is also paid."

The Court is not impressed. Article II of the Constitution is entitled Declaration of Principles and State Policies. By its very title, Article II
is a statement of general ideological principles and policies. It is not a source of enforceable rights.[23]
 14

In Tondo Medical Center Employees Association v. Court of Appeals,[24] the Court held that Sections 5 and 18, Article II of the
Constitution are not self-executing provisions... s.

Principles:

the specification of compensation and limitation of the amount of compensation in a statute indicate that Board members are entitled
only to the per diem authorized by law and no other.

BUREAU OF FISHERIES AND AQUATIC RESOURCES (BFAR) EMPLOYEES UNION v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 169815,
Aug. 13, 2008, 562 SCRA 134

Facts: The Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Employees Union requested for a Food Basket Allowance (FBA), with justifying
the request on the high cost of living, and also relying on the Employees Suggestions and Incentive Awards System, which: “includes
the granting of incentives that will help employees overcome present economic difficulties, boost their morale, and further commitment
and dedication to public service.” On post-audit, however, the Commission on Audit – Legal and Adjudication Office (COA-LAO)
disallowed the grant of the FBA ruling that it had no legal basis and violated the General Appropriations Act of 1999. The BFAR moved
for reconsideration and prayed for the lifting of the disallowance, arguing that the grant would enhance the welfare and productivity of
the employees. COA-LAO denied the motion. The petitioner appealed to the COA-LAO but denied the decision, and likewise denied the
motion for reconsideration.

Issue: Whether or not the approval of the DA Undersecretary can authorize the release of the FBA. Whether or not the disallowance is
unconstitutional as it contravened the fundamental principle of the State enshrined under Sections 9 and 10, Article II of the 1987
Constitution.

Ruling: The petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Commission on Audit – Legal and Adjudication Office dated April 8,
2005 and August 5, 2005, respectively, in LAO-N-2005-119, are AFFIRMED.

Reason: Section 4.5 of Budget Circular No. 16, all agencies are prohibited from granting “[…] any other form of incentives/allowances
except those authorized via Administrative Order by the Office of the President.” In this case, no Administrative Order has been issued,
therefore the claim has no merit. Further, State principles and policies enumerated in Article II of the 1987 Constitution are the
disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but
guidelines for legislation.“
 15

Government of the Philippine Islands vs Monte de Piedad

G.R. No. 9959

35 PH 728, 751-753

December 13, 1916

Petitioner: Government of the Philippine Islands, represented by Executive Treasurer

Respondent: El Monte de Piedad Y Caja de Ajorras de Manila

FACTS: On June 3, 1863, a devastating earthquake in the Philippines took place. The Spanish dominions provided $400,000 aid as
received by the National Treasury as relief of the victims of the earthquake. The government used the money as such but $80,000 was
left untouched and was thus invested to Monte de Piedad bank, which was in turn invested as jewelries, equivalent to the same
amount.

In June 1983, the Department of Finance called upon the same bank to return the $80,000 deposited from before. The Monte de
Piedad declined to comply with this order on the ground that the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and not the Department of
Finance had the right to order the reimbursement because the Philippine government is not the affected party. On account of various
petitions of the persons, the Philippine Islands brought a suit against Monte de Piedad for a recovery of the $80,000 together with
interest, for the benefit of those persons and their heirs. Respondent refuse to provide the money, hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is authorized to file a reimbursement of the money of the people deposited in
respondent bank.

HELD: The Court held that the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint/reimbursement against respondent bank in
accordance to the Doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government is the sole protector of the rights of the people thus, it holds an inherent
supreme power to enforce laws which promote public interest. The government has the right to "take back" the money intended fro
people. The government has the right to enforce all charities of public nature, by virtue of its general superintending authority over the
public interests, where no other person is entrusted with it.

Appellate court decision was affirmed. Petition was thereby GRANTED. The Court ordered that respondent bank return the amount to
the rightful heirs with interest in gold or coin in Philippine peso.
 16

Cabanas v Pilapil Digest

Facts:

1. Florentino Pilapil insured himself and indicated his child to be his sole beneficiary. He likewise indicated that if he dies while the child
is still a minor, the proceeds shall be administered by his brother Francisco. Florentino died when the child was only ten years old
hence, Francisco took charge of Florentino’s benefits for the child. Meanwhile, the mother of the child Melchora Cabañas filed
a complaint seeking the delivery of the sum of money in her favor and allow herself to be the child’s trustee. Francisco asserted the
terms of the insurance policy and contended that as a private contract its terms and obligations must be binding only to the parties and
intended beneficiaries.

ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of “parens patriae” to the terms of the insurance policy?

YES.

The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic social unit, and that whenever any member thereof such as in
the case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest be affected then the judiciary if a litigation has been filed should resolve according
to the best interest of that person.

The uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be the mother as she was the immediate relative of the minor child and it is assumed
that the mother shows more care towards the child than an uncle.

It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is called upon
whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest. It may happen, family relations
may press their respective claims. It would be more in consonance not only with the natural order of things but the tradition of the
country for a parent to be preferred. it could have been different if the conflict were between father and mother. Such is not the case at
all. It is a mother asserting priority. Certainly the judiciary as the instrumentality of the State in its role of parens patriae, cannot remain
insensible to the validity of her plea.
 17

Soriano vs. La Guardia

G.R. No. 164785. April 29, 2009

Facts:

On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made obscene
remarks against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L.
Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above
broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular
host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.

Issue:

Whether or not Soriano’s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan” part of the religious discourse and within the protection of
Section 5, Art.III.
Held:

No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse effect of petitioner’s utterances on the
viewers’ fundamental rights as well as petitioner’s clear violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him
from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months. Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioner’s suspension was an
undue curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons given
above (re the paramount of viewers rights, the public trusteeship character of a broadcaster’s role and the power of the State to
regulate broadcast media), a requirement that indecent language be avoided has its primary effect on the form, rather than the content,
of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language.
 18

JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ, et al. v. RONALD PAUL S. GARCIA, in his capacity as City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City

594 SCRA 648, (2009)

The requirement that the private handwritten instrument be signed by the acknowledging parent must be strictly complied with it the
same is the lone evidence to prove filiation.

Jenie dela Cruz and Dominique Aquino lived together as husband and wife. Two months after Dominique‘s death, Jenie gave birth to a
child. Jenie applied for registration of the child‘s birth, using Dominique‘s surname Aquino, with the Office of the City Civil Registrar.
She attached to the Affidavits a document entitled ―”AUTOBIOGRAPHY” – a handwritten document by Dominique which states that he
and Jenie ―”fell in love with each other, then we became good couples. And as of now she is pregnant and for that we live together in
our house now.”

The City Civil Registrar denied Jenie‘s application, holding that the child cannot use the surname of his father because he was born out
of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth. Jenie filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, which dismissed the
complaint on the ground that the autobiography was unsigned and it does not contain any express recognition of paternity.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Autobiography, a private unsigned handwritten document, can be considered as a recognition of paternity

HELD:

Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state that the private handwritten instrument acknowledging
the child‘s paternity must be signed by the putative father. This provision must, however, be read in conjunction with related provisions
of the Family Code which require that recognition by the father must bear his signature.

That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must affix his signature thereon is clearly implied in
Article 176 of the Family Code. Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O. No. 1, Series of 2004, merely articulated such requirement; it did not
―unduly expand‖ the import of Article 176 as claimed by petitioners.

In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that Dominique‘s Autobiography, though unsigned by him,
substantially satisfies the requirement of the law.

First, Dominique died about two months prior to the child‘s birth. Second, the relevant matters in the Autobiography, unquestionably
handwritten by Dominique, correspond to the facts culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie proffered. Third, Jenie‘s testimony is
corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominique‘s father Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother Joseph Butch
Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of the questioned recognition of the child. These circumstances
indicating Dominique‘s paternity of the child give life to his statements in his Autobiography that ―”JENIE DELA CRUZ is ―MY WIFE”
as ―”WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER “and ―”NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER.”

In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted statements in Dominique‘s Autobiography have been made and written by
him. Taken together with the other relevant facts extant herein – that Dominique, during his lifetime, and Jenie were living together as
common-law spouses for several months in 2005 at his parents‘ house in Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal; she was pregnant
when Dominique died on September 4, 2005; and about two months after his death, Jenie gave birth to the child – they sufficiently
establish that the child of Jenie is Dominique‘s.

In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the
signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or
illegitimate child is made:

1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance
with the requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and

2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of
filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other
evidence.

Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the ―”paramount consideration” in resolving questions affecting him. Article 3(1)
of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic.
 19

Co Kim Cham vs Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon

G.R. No. L-5 September 17, 1945

Facts:

Respondent Judge refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceedings in petitioner’s civil case on the ground that the
proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial
proceedings and judgments of the court of the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the
Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation, and that, furthermore, the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an
enabling law granting such authority.

Issues:

1. Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the court existing in the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the
Republic of the Philippines were good and valid and remained so even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the
United States and Filipino forces;

2. Whether the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief of the United States
Army, in which he declared “that all laws, regulations and processes of any of the government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control,” has
invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the said courts; and

3. If the said judicial acts and proceedings have not been invalidated by said proclamation, whether the present courts of the
Commonwealth, which were the same court existing prior to, and continued during, the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines,
may continue those proceedings pending in said courts at the time the Philippines were reoccupied and liberated by the United States
and Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth of the Philippines were reestablished in the Islands.

Ruling:

1. YES. It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial
departments of a de facto government are good and valid. The question to be determined is whether or not the governments
established in these Islands under the names of the Philippine Executive Commission and Republic of the Philippines during the
Japanese military occupation or regime were de facto governments. If they were, the judicial acts and proceedings of those
governments remain good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces.

2. NO. The proclamation of General MacArthur of October 23, 1944, which declared that “all laws, regulations and processes of any
other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void without legal effect in areas of the Philippines
free of enemy occupation and control,” has not invalidated the judicial acts and proceedings, which are not a political complexion, of the
courts of justice in the Philippines that were continued by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines
during the Japanese military occupation, and that said judicial acts and proceedings were good and valid before and now good and
valid after the reoccupation of liberation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces.

3. YES. It is a legal maxim, that excepting that of a political nature, “Law once established continues until changed by the some
competent legislative power. It is not changed merely by change of sovereignty.” (Joseph H. Beale, Cases on Conflict of Laws, III,
Summary Section 9, citing Commonwealth vs. Chapman, 13 Met., 68.) As the same author says, in his Treatise on the Conflict on Laws
(Cambridge, 1916, Section 131): “There can no break or interregnum in law. From the time the law comes into existence with the first-
felt corporateness of a primitive people it must last until the final disappearance of human society. Once created, it persists until a
change take place, and when changed it continues in such changed condition until the next change, and so forever. Conquest or
colonization is impotent to bring law to an end; in spite of change of constitution, the law continues unchanged until the new sovereign
by legislative acts creates a change.”

It is, therefore, obvious that the present courts have jurisdiction to continue, to final judgment, the proceedings in cases, not of political
complexion, pending therein at the time of the restoration of the Commonwealth Government.
 20

Burgos vs. Chief of Staff

Burgos vs. Chief of Staff

G.R. No. L-64261, December 26, 1984, 133 SCRA 800

FACTS:

On December 7, 1982, respondent judge issued two [2] search warrants to "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers.

During the search, the office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing,
publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged
to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.

Petitioners pray to nullify the search warrants in question.

Respondent:

Respondents contend that petitioners should have filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them before impugning
the validity of the same before this Court.Respondents also assail the petition on the ground of laches (failure or negligence for an
unreasonable and unexplained len…

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. PRES. AQUINO

GR NO. 73748, May 22, 1986

FACTS:

President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 on February 25, 1986 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking
power. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by
stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New
Armed Forces of the Philippines."

Petitioners alleged that the Aquino government is illegal because it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD:

Yes.

The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the
judge.

The Supreme Court further held that:

The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country;

It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and

The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.
 21

Laurel vs Misa
G.R. No. L-409 January 30, 1947
Facts:
Petitioner Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus, asserting that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and
comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the
Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the
correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands
upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic.

Issue:
Whether or not enemy occupation has the effect of suspending the allegiance of a Filipino citizen during the period of said occupation

Ruling:
NO. A citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance, which consists in the
obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or sovereign.
As decided by the court in cases, the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their
legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government
or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier.

Adoption of the petitioner’s theory of suspended allegiance would lead to disastrous consequences for small and weak nations or
states, and would be repugnant to the laws of humanity and requirements of public conscience, for it would allow invaders to legally
recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of the occupied territory to fight against their own government without the latter incurring the risk
of being prosecuted for treason, and even compel those who are not aid them in their military operation against the resisting enemy
forces in order to completely subdue and conquer the whole nation, and thus deprive them all of their own independence or sovereignty
— such theory would sanction the action of invaders in forcing the people of a free and sovereign country to be a party in the nefarious
task of depriving themselves of their own freedom and independence and repressing the exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in
other words, to commit a political suicide.

Change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of
treason committed during the Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the same government and the same sovereign people,
for Article XVIII of our Constitution provides that “The government established by this constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth
of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine
independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines.”
 22

WILLIAM F. PERALTA v. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, GR No. L-49, 1945-11-12

Facts:

Petitioner-defendant, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of Manila charged with the supervision and control of the production,
procurement and distribution of goods and other necessaries... was prosecuted for the crime of robbery

He was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment, which he commenced... to serve on August 21, 1944, by the Court of Special
and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction

The petition for habeas corpus is based on the ground that the Court of Special and Executive Criminal Jurisdiction created by
Ordinance No. 7 "was a political instrumentality of the military forces of the Japanese Imperial Army, the aims and purposes of... which
are repugnant to those aims and political purposes of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, as well as those of the United States of
America, and therefore, null and void... that the petitioner herein is being punished by a law created to serve... the political purpose
of the Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines, and "that the penalties provided for are much (more) severe than the
penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code."... he City Fisc

The City Fiscal of Manila... submits that the petition for habeas corpus be denied on the following grounds: That the Court of Special
and Exclusive Criminal

Jurisdiction and the Acts, Ordinances and Executive Orders, creating it are not of a political complexion, for said Court was created,
and the crimes and offenses placed under its jurisdiction were penalized heavily, in response to an urgent... necessity, according to
the preamble of Ordinance No. 7; that the right to appeal in a criminal case is not a constitutional right; and that the summary procedure
established in said Ordinance No. 7 is not violative of the provision of Article III, section 1 (18) of the

Constitution of the Commonwealth, to the effect that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself, nor of the provision
of section 1 (1) of the same Article that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without... due process of law.

Issues:

The questions which we have to resolve in the present case in the light of the law of nations are, first, the validity of the creation of
the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, and of the ... summary procedure adopted for that court; secondly,
the validity of the sentence which imposes upon the petitioner the penalty of life imprisonment during the Japanese military occupation;
and thirdly, if they were then valid, the effect on... said punitive sentence of the reoccupation of the Philippines and the restoration
therein of the Commonwealth Government.

Ruling:

"The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and organized as a sovereign state independent from any other
government by the Filipino people, was, in truth and reality, a government established by the belligerent occupant or the

Japanese forces of occupation. It was of the same character as the Philippine Executive Commission, and the ultimate source of its
authority was the same the Japanese military authority and government. As General MacArthur stated in his proclamation... of
October 23, 1944, a portion of which has been already quoted, 'under enemy duress, a so-called government styled as the
"Republic of the Philippines" was established on October 14, 1943, based upon neither the free expression of the... peoples' will nor
the sanction of the Government of the United States.' Japan had no legal power to grant independence to the Philippines or transfer
the sovereignty of the United States to, or recognize the latent sovereignty of, the Filipino people,... before its military occupation and
possession of the Islands had matured into an absolute and permanent dominion or sovereignty by a treaty of peace or other means
recognized in the law of nations."

(1) As to the validity of the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction by Ordinance No. 7, the only factor to
be considered is the authority of the legislative power which promulgated said law or ordinance. It is... well established
in International Law that "The criminal jurisdiction established by the invader in the occupied territory finds its source neither in the
laws of the conquering or conquered state, it is drawn entirely from the law martial as denned in the... usages of nations. The authority
thus derived can be asserted either through special tribunals, whose authority and procedure is defined in the military code of the
conquering state, or through the ordinary courts and authorities of the... occupied district."

A belligerent "occupant may where necessary, set up military courts instead of the ordinary courts; and in case, and in so far as, he
admits the administration of justice by the ordinary courts, he may nevertheless,... so far as is necessary for military purposes, or for
the maintenance of public order and safety, temporarily alter the laws, especially the Criminal Law, on the basis of which justice is
administered as well as the laws regarding... procedure." (Oppenheim'si International Law, Vol. II, sixth edition, 1944, p. 349.)

It is, therefore, evident that the sentence rendered by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction against the petitioner,
imposing upon him the penalty of life imprisonment, was good and valid, since it was within the admitted power or... competence of the
belligerent occupant to promulgate the law penalizing the crime of which petitioner was convicted.

In view of all the foregoing, the writ of habeas corpus prayed for is hereby granted and it is ordered that the petitioner be released
forthwith, without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
 23

ALCANTARA V DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

Alcantara v Director of Prisons

Facts: This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and for the release of the petitioner on the ground that the latter is
unlawfully imprisoned and restrained of his liberty by the respondent Director of Prison in the provincial jail at Vigan, Ilocos Sur for the
crimes of illegal discharge of firearms and slight physical injuries. Petitioner now questions the validity of the decision of the Court of
Appeals of Northern Luzon, on the sole ground that said court was only a creation of the so-called Republic of the Philippines during the
Japanese military occupation of the Islands and has no jurisdiction to hear cases;

Issues: Are the courts created on the birth Republic of the Philippines and/or during the time of Japanese occupancy have the
legitimacy to hear cases

Held: In the said case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, only political complexion cases are exempted from any liability
just right after the war. Obviously, the sentence which petitioner is now serving has no political complexion. He was charged with and
convicted of an offense punishable under the municipal law of the Commonwealth, the Revised Penal Code