on the em ptiness of the inner subject, etc.

There, (1) the first

of the em ptinesses, subdivided into twenty, is the em ptiness
of the inner subject based on the nature of the inner subject
— the [six] eye, etc., [sense-fields] being, [as the Long Sutra
says], neither unm oved nor destroyed. (2) The em ptiness of
the outer object is based on the nature of [the six] form , etc.,
[sense-fields] being like that [neither unmoved nor de­
stroyed], (3) The em ptiness of subject and object is based on
the inner and outer sense-fields being like that. There the
inner sense-fields bring in the physical sense faculties, the
outer sense-fields bring in the physical sense objects, and
the inner and outer bring in the supports (adhisthana) [i.e.,
the ordinary physical ear, the ordinary physical eye, etc.,] of
the sense faculties. They are inner because they are appro­
priated by mind, and outer because they are not, [from
am ong the twelve sense-fields,] included am ongst the sense
faculties. These three em ptinesses are on the level of belief-
based performance.
(4) All dharm as are em pty. H ence the em ptiness of
em ptiness is the em ptiness even of the em ptiness that is the
nature of the know ledge that has inner em ptiness, etc., for
objective support. The bare know ledge that all dharm as are
em pty is the em ptiness of all dharm as. H ence there is an
em ptiness of em ptiness as well, because the conceptual­
ization of a grasper is elim inated from that. It is on the path
of preparation. (5) The great em ptiness is the em ptiness of
the ten directions because it is a great pervasiveness. It is on
the first level in the om nipresent sense.53 (6) The em ptiness
of ultim ate reality is because the ultim ate, nirvana, that is
just a mere separation, is devoid of anything that is, in and
of itself, nirvana. It is on the second level in the tip sense.
(7) The em ptiness of the conditioned is because the form
realm , etc., are em pty of the three realm s (the conditioned).
This is because, in the final outcom e, they have no own-
being because there is a possible antidote to them. It is on
the third level in the outflow 's tip sense. (8) The uncondi­
tioned is free from production, destruction, or any other
w ay of being. The em ptiness of that is the em ptiness of the
unconditioned, because in the unproduced there is nothing
to indicate an opposite of production, etc. This is on the
fourth level in the ungraspable sense. (9) The em ptiness of
w hat transcends lim its, in the sense of what goes beyond
extrem es, is because a lim it is em pty of limit. Limit means
part (bhaga). Here, betw een the extrem es of nihilism and
eternalism there is nothing w ith its ow n-being which you
can posit as a ground for separating these two parts. This is
on the fifth level in the undifferentiated-continuum s sense.
(10) The em ptiness of before and after [96] is because the
beginning, m iddle, and end are em pty of those. This is
because the beginning, m iddle, and end, etc., knitted to­
gether in the true nature of dharm as, are com pletely w ith­
out any lim it. It is on the sixth level in the being-neither-
defiled-nor-pure sense. (11) Repudiation is marked by
repudiating, spurning, and abandoning. Nonrepudiation
is the opposite because it is em pty of that. The em ptiness
of nonrepudiation is because there is nothing to indicate
spurning, etc., in the repudiated, because it is what you
have stopped doing. It is on the seventh level in the non-
diverse sense.
(12) The essential nature [of all things] (prakrti) is what
is not m ade up (akrta) [in m editation] by noble beings,
because it is em pty of that. The em ptiness of the essential
nature is because it is not conditioned (sam skrta) or uncondi­
tioned (asam skrta), and hence does not undergo change, and
is not changeless. (13) The em ptiness of all dharmas is
because dharm as are em pty of dharm as. This is because
all dharm as in the final outcom e have no ow n-being, be­
cause the heaps of conditioned [dharmas] and uncondi­
tioned [em ptinesses] are dependent on each other. These
two em ptinesses provide a foundation, where nothing is
lacking and nothing added, for sovereignty over both
nonconceptuality and purification of the [Buddha]field.
They are at the result level that is subdivided [into the levels
from the eighth to tenth] in term s of preparations for [the
final] penetration [to perfect enlightenm ent]. These two are
on the eighth level.
(14) The em ptiness of a m ark is because form, etc., that
is m arked as "easily breakable, seeable," etc., are empty of
those marks, because the location of the m ark, w hether gen­
eral or particular, is representation only. (15) The em ptiness
of the unfindable, in the sense that past, etc., dharm as are
unfindable because based on any one time such as the past
they change positions with each other, is because tim es are
representation only, [m erely projected] onto things. These
two em ptinesses provide the foundation for sovereignty'
over know ledge and are on the ninth level. [It too is a sub­
division of the result level], just like [the eighth].
(16) Let a bhaua ("th e thing that exists") be som ething
that exists as a mere concordant collection. Then the em pti­
ness that is the non-existence of ow n-being is because a
connection [a coherent collection of dharmas] is em pty of a
dharm a existing through a connection. This is because such
a dharm a has no ow n-being, because it is a dependent origi­
nation. (17) The thing that exists is marked by the five grasp­
ing skandhas. The em ptiness of the thing that exists is
because it is em pty of that, based on the consideration that
a skandha is a heap, and since a heap has no essential core
(apadartha) there can be no sign of the thing that exists
m arked by grasping. These two em ptinesses provide the
foundation for sovereignty over action and are, as before, on
the tenth level.
(18) The emptiness of non-existing thing is because non­
existing, unconditioned space, etc., is em pty of that [space,
etc.], because it is a [mere] representation [projected onto]
actual non-obstructing, etc., dharm as. (19) The em ptiness of
ow n-being is because ow n-being, nam ely em ptiness, is not»
m ade by the know ledge and insight of noble beings, be­
cause know ledge and insight illum inate reality, [i.e., the ab­
sence of any ow n-being] as it is in fact. (20) [Large Sutra 198]
says, "This is the true nature of dharm as, w hich rem ains
w hether the Tathagatas are produced or not produced."
Thus, the em ptiness of other being is because [that true
nature of dharm as] is em pty of som e other agent. This is
based on the consid eration that personal activity is simply a
contradiction in term s w hen [everything is] governed by
em ptiness. K now that these three em ptinesses (i) provide a
foundation for the elim ination of cankerous obscuration
and its residual im pressions, (ii) provide a foundation for
the elim ination of obscuration to know ing and its residual
im pressions, and (iii) is the self-originated state, respec­
tive! v. They are at the Buddha level. [97]
Arvo V im uktisena says:

You must explain this section (of the Ornament] that is

missing the sequence of sections [found m the Long Sutra]
hem this direction [of the emptinesses]. [Qualm]: [Sections
in the Long Sutra] describe a bare emptiness in order to refute
others, and have no ordered sequence of realizations ai all.
You have ro explain that the topic of these sections is just
that, and that it is not primarilv the [knowledge equipment]
topic or the [Ornament] treatise. [Response]: In that case you
end up without an aim, because there would be no division
oi emptiness into the known and yet-to-be-known.

W hat does this nonconceptual know ledge take as ob­

jective support? Som e say it takes em ptiness, others that it
takes the em ptiness of ow n-being of all dharm as as objective
support. And just this [latter position] is logical.
in suchness, any know ledge will alw ays take the em p­
tiness of the ow n-being of all dharm as as objective support,
like, for exam ple, in a dream , w here the objective support is
the em ptiness of the ow n-being of the horses, etc., [that ap­
pear but are not there in fact]. The nonconceptual mind that
is the topic und er discussion is know ledge as well. [This
produces the follow ing syllogism : The subject, the non­
conceptual m ind discussed in this section of Sutra through
the discussion of em ptiness, is essentially one, as objective
support, (sahopalam bha) w ith the em ptiness that it knows.
 The reason: "because em ptiness, the ow n-being of all;
dharm as, is its objective support."] This is a sva-bhavn-hetu.54
T h e reason is not unproved because, [as Dharm aldrti]
says:5r’[Knowledge of em ptiness and em p tin ess are not
different because they are definitely a single essence.] ''You
cannot establish that direct perception w ith ou t [a sim ulta-;
neous] objective support sees the object.' The reason does
not contradict w hat it seeks to prove because it is alw avs the
case (sa-paksa), [i.e., the em ptiness of the ow n-being of all
dharm as— the objective support— is alw ays know ledge].
[The reason] is not indefinite yanaikantika) either because an
absolute ow n-being of all dharm as [that w ould be the objec­
tive support, but absolutely different from w hat know s it]
will be refuted later.
Quabn: Then the objective support would not exist,
like, for example, two m oons, etc. Sim ilarly, this em ptiness
of the ow n-being of all dharm as— the objective support—
would not exist either. Hence you would be forced to accept
a state of existence of all dharm as [because the em ptiness of
them would not exist]. [Response]: This is not a problem .
Let non-being, the denial extrem e, be designated D evadatta.
Let ow n-being, the superim position extrem e, be designated
Yajnadatta. W hen the killer of Devadatta [i.e , Yajnadatta]
has been killed by his own em ptiness he [D evadatta] will
not reappear.
Objection: How can there be an objective support that
is unreal in suchness, and yet, on the covering level, be m its
final state as a particular object [of experience]. Jt is a contra­
diction. [Response]: Do not say such things.
W'here you take the position that em ptiness is the ob­
jective support/*1the consequence is that know ledge has the
absence of ow n-being in its range (g ocara) [w hen the absence
of ow n-being is, in fact, bevond the range of know ledge],
and that em ptiness is a conditioned thing. This is because
know ledge and its em ptiness, as things that exist (bhava) or
things that do not exist, would be different or not different
from each other, respectively.