Intermediate Microeconomics 1st

Edition Mochrie Solutions Manual

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For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

Solutions Manual: Part V

Welfare
Summary answers to the ‘By yourself’ questions
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

Chapter 20

X20.1 Given that the endowments represent Liling’s and Maya’s total wealth, explain why the
expressions on the left-hand side of Expression 20.2 cannot both be positive.
Were both expressions positive, then there would be a move up and to the right in the
diagram. Liling would consume more carrots and more beans; and Maya would consume
less of both. So, assuming that preferences are well-behaved, Liling would be better off and
Maya would be worse off, meaning that Maya would not agree to the new division.

X20.2 Define the marginal rate of substitution for Liling and Maya at the endowment, E. Explain
how the difference in values means that trade is possible.
For both Liling and Maya, the marginal rates of substitution are the slopes of the tangents to
their indifference curves. We see that Maya’s indifference curve is steeper than Liling’s, so
that she is willing to give up more carrots than Liling to acquire a set quantity of additional
beans. Liling and Maya could agree to any exchange rate : MRSL > - > MRSM.

X20.3 In Figure 20.2, the endowment is at the lower-right corner of the lens. Under what
conditions would the endowment be at the upper-left corner of the lens? What would be
the outcome of trade in this case?
We now require Liling’s indifference curve to be steeper than Maya’s, so that MRSM > - >
MRSL.

X20.4 Use Expression 20.2 to obtain an expression for the relative price of broad beans (the rate
at which Maya gives up consumption of carrots in order to increase consumption of broad
beans).
The relative price will be the ratio of the increase in consumption of broad beans to the
bLT  bLE
increase in consumption of carrots. We obtain    T .
cL  cLE

X20.5 Suppose that at the division, E, Liling and Maya were to have the same marginal rate of
substitution. Sketch an Edgeworth box showing this outcome. What do you conclude
about the possibility of exchange?
In the Edgeworth box, we begin by drawing a straight downward-sloping line that will be the
common tangent. We then draw two curves, both downward-sloping, with the one above
the line convex, and the one below the line concave. We draw these lines so that each has a
single point of tangency between each curve and the line; and so that the point of tangency
is common to both curves.
We note that there is no area defined by the intersection between the curves, and so there
are no divisions of the endowment where both Liling and Maya are better off than at the
point of tangency. This implies that there is no possibility of trade between Liling and Maya.

X20.6 How likely do you consider it to be that Liling would accept the division of goods at F?
It is possible, but we note that Liling is no better off than at E, so that she has no strong
reason to agree to the new division.

X20.7 Explain why division G is Pareto efficient, and discuss whether or not you consider it likely
that it will be the outcome of exchange.
G is Pareto efficient since the indifference curves through this division share a common
tangent. At this division, Maya is no better off than at the initial endowment, E, so it is
unlikely that she would agree to the division.
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

X20.8 The contract curve is sometimes defined as the portion of the Pareto set between F and G.
Why might this be a useful definition? [Hint: Consider peoples’ willingness to agree to any
division of the endowment.]
Between F and G, both Liling and Maya are better off than at the endowment E. Since all
points on the contract curve share a common tangent, there is no possibility of further Pareto
improvements. It is therefore possible that Liling and Maya might agree to any of these
divisions, with neither being able to propose an alternative division in which both would be
better off.

X20.9 Suppose that Maya and Liling consider broad beans and carrots to be perfect
complements, with their preferences represented by the utility function, U: U(bi, ci) =
min(bi, ci). The total quantities of broad beans and carrots in their total endowment are
equal.
a) Explain why, in any division in which bL = cL, their indifference curves just touch.
We know that with both Liling and Maya treating the goods as perfect complements, their
preferences across divisions can be expressed by a set of L-shaped indifference curves. For
Liling, the vertices are on the line bL = cL. On this line, bM = b – bL = c – cL = cM, so that the
vertices of Maya’s indifference curves also lie on this line. At every point on the line, bL = cL,
any downward-sloping line is a common tangent to the indifference curves that meet at this
point.

b) Suppose instead that Liling grows carrots and Maya grows broad beans. Using a diagram,
show that if Maya can determine the division of the endowment, she can take all of Liling’s
carrots and offer no broad beans in return.
With Maya growing broad beans, but taking all of Liling’s carrots, Liling is no worse off than
at the initial division, so that the Pareto efficiency condition is met by trade.

c) Again, using the diagram, show that it is possible for Maya and Liling to trade to any
division for which cL = bL.
From parts a) and b), we see that the Pareto set is represented in the Edgeworth box by the
line, OLOM, running from the bottom left to the top right corners (that is from the origin of
Liling’s measurement to the origin of Maya’s measurement); and all divisions in the Pareto
set are feasible in the sense that neither Liling nor Maya would be worse off after trade than
before. The whole of the line is the contract curve.

X20.10 Now suppose that Maya and Liling consider carrots and broad beans to be perfect
substitutes. However, while Maya would substitute 1 kg of broad beans for 1 kg of carrots,
Liling would swap 2 kg of broad bean for 1 kg of carrots.
a) Draw an Edgeworth box showing indifference curves, given that they wish to divide 12 kg
of carrots and 20 kg of broad beans, and that Maya starts with all of the carrots, and Liling
with all of the broad beans. On your diagram, indicate the region within which they might
trade.
We draw the Edgeworth box, measuring the endowment of broad beans on the horizontal
axis and the endowment of carrots on the vertical axis, so that the dimensions of the box are
20x12. We denote the bottom-left hand corner as OL, from which Liling’s consumption is
measured; and the top-right corner as OM, from which Maya’s consumption is measured.
Then the initial endowment, E, is located at the bottom-right corner of the box. For Liling, the
indifference curve through point E has the equation bL + 2cL = 20, while for Maya, it has
equation bM + cM = 12.
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

Liling’s indifference curve is a line meeting the left-hand edge of the box, (0, 10), while
Maya’s is a line meeting the top edge of the box at (8, 12). We see that Maya’s indifference
curve is steeper than Liling’s, so that the feasible set for trade is the area between them.

b) Assume instead that their initial endowments are (bLE, cLE) = (12, 6) and (bME, cME) = (8, 6).
Draw another Edgeworth box, and mark on it this endowment, E. Sketch the indifference
curves through the endowment, and indicate the region within which trade might occur.
In this case, the initial endowment, E, is located at the point (bLE, cLE) = (12, 6). For Liling, the
indifference curve through point E has the equation bL + 2cL = 24, while for Maya, it has
equation bM + cM = 14.
Liling’s indifference curve is a line meeting the top of the box at (0, 12), while Maya’s is a line
meeting the top edge of the box at (6, 12). As before, Maya’s indifference curve is steeper
than Liling’s, so that the feasible set for trade is the area between them.

c) What is the range of terms of trade which Maya and Liling might agree?
The terms of trade will be such that both Maya and Liling are better off after trade. We
define the relative price, , as the opportunity cost of beans, defined so that MRSM >  > -
MRSL; or so that -0.5 >  > - 1.

d) Under what conditions might Liling end up with all of the carrots?
This will happen if the exchange line is steep enough so that it passes through the top edge of
the box.

X20.11 Suppose that Maya and Liling have preferences represented by the utility function,
U: Ubi , ci   bi 3 ci 3 . The initial endowment, E: (bLE, cLE) = (90, 0) and (bME, cME) = (30, 120).
1 2

Assume that they agree to trade 1 kg of carrots for 2 kg of broad beans.

a) What is the opportunity cost of 1 kg of broad beans?
The opportunity cost,  = –0.5.

b) Write down expressions for their marginal utility functions and their (common) marginal
rate of substitution, MRS.
We obtain marginal utilities by partially differentiating U with respect to the quantity of each
of the goods in the consumption bundle.

  ; and marginal utility of carrots, MU =

2
U ci
 13
3
So marginal utility of beans, MUB = bi bi C


1
U bi
 23
3
c i ci

The marginal rate of substitution is (minus 1 times) the ratio of marginal utilities; MRSi =
 
2
1 ci 3
MU B 3 bi ci
   .
MU C
 
1
2 bi 3 2 bi
3 ci

c) Show that MRS = –0.5 whenever b = c. What do you conclude about the composition of
the most preferred, affordable consumption bundle?
If MRSi = -0.5, then 2cbi  21 , so ci = bi. We note that when bi = ci, Liling and Maya have the
i

same marginal rate of substitution; and note that for the total endowment (b, c) = (120, 120),
then if bL = cL, bM = 120 – bL = 120 – cL = cM; so that the conditions for Pareto efficiency are
satisfied when bL = cL; and the Pareto set consists of all allocations (bL, cL): bL = cL.
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

d) Confirm that the division H: (bLH, cLH) = (30, 30) and (bMH, cMH) = (90, 90) is feasible, given
the terms of trade; and that Liling’s and Maya’s indifference curves through H both have
gradient  = –0.5.
To reach division H from the initial endowment, E, Liling gives up 60kg of beans, and acquires
30kg of carrots; Maya acquires 60kg of beans in exchange for 30kg of carrots. At division H,
the conditions for Pareto efficiency are satisfied, with beans being exchanged for carrots at
the agreed relative price.

e) Sketch an Edgeworth box showing the endowment point; the terms of trade line; the
indifference curves passing through the endowment point, E; and the indifference curves
passing through the final division, H.
In an Edgeworth box with dimensions 120x120, we measure the division of beans on the
horizontal axis, and division of carrots on the vertical, measuring the quantity available to
Liling of each from the bottom left corner. The initial endowment E: (90, 0) therefore lies on
the bottom edge of the box, three-quarters of the way from the left side to the right side of
the box. The terms of trade line starts from point E, and has slope -0.5, so that it passes
through point H(30, 30). At this final division, the indifference curves for Liling and Maya
(which are downward sloping and convex to their respective origins, approaching but never
touching the axes against which they are measured) both have gradient -0.5, so that the
terms of trade line forms a common tangent.

X20.12 In Figure 20.6, we suggest that Lukas and Michael will divide the endowment equally.
a) Confirm (from Expression 20.10) that Michael’s preferred bundle is half of the endowment
if the relative price,   bc .
We know that Michael’s optimal bundle bM*,cM *    c
2

, 2c . So with the relative price  = bc ,

the result follows. bM*,cM *  2 , 2

b c
 
b) Demonstrate that when the relative price,   bc , Lukas’s most preferred affordable
bundle, b*,c *  2 , 2 .
b c
 
c cL c
If the relative price  = b, then for Lukas, MRSL = bL
= b. Then cMb = bMc; and for the
c b  bL  bM
feasibility constraint to be satisfied, b bL + cL = c. Then cL = b
c b
c  2c ; and it is easy to
b
confirm that bL = 2 .

c) Explain why we can write Lukas’s problem as having two constraints:

bc 
1
c 1
max
b L ,c L
(bL cL)½: cL = b (b - bL) and [(b – bL)(c – cL)]½ = 2
2
. Form the Lagrangean, ,
required to solve the problem.
Lukas’s problem has the two constraints of affordability and feasibility. It has to be possible
for Lukas and Michael to trade to the equilibrium. Michael has to be willing to accept the
outcome of the trade, and so must be no worse off than at his optimum.
We write the Lagrangean,   bLcL   bc  bcL  cbL   
0.5
 bc
1
2
0.5

b  bL c  cL 0.5 .

d) By obtaining the first-order conditions, confirm that cL *  2 .

c

The first-order conditions for an optimum can be written as


bL  0 .5  
c L 0.5
bL   
c c
  c  0 .5  b  bLL 
0 .5
 0.
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016


c L  0 .5  
bL 0 .5
cL 
  b  0 .5  c  cLL 
bb 

0 .5
 0.


 bcbcL cbL  0.


 12 bc 0.5  b  bL c  cL 0.5  0.
We see from the last two expressions that (b – bL)c = bcL, so we can repeat the argument.
Since
c – cL =
c
b
b L , we can rewrite the last condition as 4bbL  b bL bc , so that 4(b – bL)bL = b2.
c
 
b
This simplifies to (b – 2bL)2 = 0, so that bL = 2 . The result then follows by substitution.

X20.13 Assume that Rachel’s maximization problem can be written as:

max
bR ,cR
U bR , cR   bR cR1  :  bRE  bR  cRE  cR  0
a) By forming the Lagrangean or otherwise, confirm that Rachel’s most preferred, affordable
1 
bundle (bR*, cR*) has the characteristic: bR *   c R * .
We write the Lagrangean, :  = bRcR1 -  + [(bRE – bR) + (cRE – cR)]
We obtain first-order conditions for the maximum:

b R
  cR 1  
bR
   0 ; 
c R
 1         0 ; and    bRE bR cRE cR 0
bR 
cR

Taking the first two, we see that 


     1     . The result follows immediately
cR 1  
bR
bR 
cR

from cross-multiplying terms.

b) Hence or otherwise, demonstrate that Rachel’s most preferred affordable bundle is

b R *, c R *  :
bR *, c R *     b R
E

cR E

, 1   b R
E
 cRE 
1
We write cR   bR , and since (bRE – bR) + (cRE – cR) = 0, we can write
1 b 
1 
 R

b  bRE
 R
 cRE ; and the result follows immediately.

c) Show that as the relative price, , increases, cR increases, but bR decreases.

By partial differentiation, we see that bR    c R2  0 , but that cR  1   bR E  0
E

d) Write an expression for cR* in terms of bR*. (This is the equation of Rachel’s price offer
curve.)
We see that it is possible to extract a common factor, bRE + cR from the expressions for bR*
1 
and cR*. This gives us cR* = 
bR * .

X20.14 Assume that Rachel continues to solve the problem in X20.13, but with the expenditure
share parameter, a  3 , and initial endowments (bRE, cRE) = (bSE, cSE) = (12, 12).
1

a) Obtain an expression for Rachel’s optimal consumption bundle in terms of the relative
price, .
We apply the expressions obtained from X20.13: bR *, c R *    bR E  c R , 1    bR E  c R E  .
E
  
Then bR*,cR *   12 ,
1
3
12

2
3
12  12 41 1 ,81   .
b) Show that if  > 0.5, Rachel will want to trade some of her broad beans for more carrots.
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

If  = ½, it is easy to confirm that (bR*, cR*) = (12, 12) = (bRE, cRE), so that Rachel can do no
better than by consuming her endowment. Given that bR* is decreasing in , and that cR* is
increasing in , it follows that if  > 0.5, then Rachel will give away some beans, and demand
more carrots.

c) Evaluate the expression in (a) for Rachel’s optimal consumption bundle for relative prices
 = 0.125, 0.25, 0.5, 1, 2, and 4. Are all of these choices feasible?
 0.125 0.25 0.5 1 2 4
bR* 36 20 12 8 6 5
cR* 9 10 12 16 24 40
We see that when the relative price,  = 2, cR* = 24, so that Rachel wishes to consume all of
the carrots. With cR* increasing in , this is the maximum possible value of the relative
price; for higher prices, the price offer curve will lie outside the box.
Although it is not shown in the table, we note that when  = 0.2, bR* = 24. In this case,
Rachel wishes to consume all of the beans in the endowment and, as before, with bR*
decreasing in , this is the minimum possible value of the relative price; for lower prices, the
price offer curve will lie outside the box.

d) Sketch Rachel’s price offer curve.

Plotting these points in an Edgeworth box with dimensions 24x24, we see that Rachel’s price
offer curve is downward sloping and convex to OR. It intersects the top edge of the box at
the division (bR, cR) = (6, 24), where MRS = -2, passes through the division (12, 12), and
intersects the right edge of the box at the division (24, 6), where MRS = -0.2.
X20.15 Repeat X20.14 but for Sonja, whose utility function we write as UbS , cS   bS 3 cS 3 .
2 1

We are able to write Sonja’s preferred division, given the relative price  as (bS*, cS*):
   
bS *, c S *   1    bR E  cR ,  bR E  c R E  , which with the given parameterization becomes
E

bS*,cS *  23 12  12 , 13 12  12 81 1 , 41  .

Replicating the table of preferred consumption bundles from X20.14:
 0.125 0.25 0.5 1 2 4
bS* 72 40 24 16 12 10
cS* 4.5 5 6 8 12 20
We note that it would not be feasible for the value of  to be very small: from the table, and
knowing that Sonja’s demand for beans in her preferred division, bS* is decreasing in the
relative price, , we require bS*  0.5. Although we have not shown this in the table, it is
straightforward to show that if  > 5, then cS* > 24, so that Sonja would then demand more
than the total endowment of carrots.

X20.16 Given the endowments and utility function in X20.14 and X20.15, confirm that at the
division J: (bRJ, cRJ) = (8, 16); (bsJ, csJ) = (16, 8) with relative price  = 1, Rachel and Sonja
maximize their utilities and both markets clear.
We see that by adding up the demands that both markets clear, the demand for both beans
and carrots equals the total endowment.

X20.17 Suppose that the relative price increases, so that  = 2. Find Rachel’s and Sonja’s most
preferred, feasible consumption bundles. Explain why these are not consistent with an
equilibrium division.
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

When  = 2, (bR*, cR*) = (6, 24); and (bS*, cS*) = (12, 12). The total demand for carrots is 36,
so that there is excess demand for them; and the total demand for beans is 18, so that there
is excess supply.

X20.18 Repeat X20.17, but with the relative price decreasing so that  = 0.5. Without carrying out
any further calculations, characterize the nature of the outcome for  = 0.5.
We have seen that when the relative price is above the market clearing price, there is excess
demand for carrots, and excess supply of beans. We therefore expect that for a relative price
less than the market clearing price, there will be excess supply of carrots and excess demand
for beans.
[Check: When  = 0.5, (bR*, cR*) = (12, 12); and (bS*, cS*) = (24, 6). The total demand for
carrots is 18, so that there is excess supply of them; and the total demand for beans is 36, so
that there is excess demand.]

X20.19 Continuing to use the endowments and utility functions in X20.14 and X20.15, suppose
that Rachel initially proposes  = 2.
a) Confirm that Sonja will not wish to trade, but that Rachel would wish to acquire Sonja’s
endowment of carrots.
This follows directly from calculations that we have completed already. Sonja demands her
initial endowment, while Rachel demands the bundle (bR, cR) = (6, 24), which includes the
total endowment of carrots.

b) Calculate the excess demand for carrots and the excess supply of broad beans.
Again, from previous calculations, we see that there is an excess demand for carrots, cR + cS -
24 = 12 and excess supply of beans, 24 – (bR + bS) = 6.

c) Repeat parts (a) and (b), assuming firstly that Sonja proposes a revised relative price,  =
1.5, and then that Rachel proposes a further revision,  = 1.25.
We present the results in a table, in which the first four columns show Rachel and Sonja’s
demands for beans and carrots, and the next two show the excess demand for beans and
carrots.
 bR* bS* cR* cS* bX cX bX + cX
2 6 12 24 12 -6 12 0
20 40
1.5 3 3
20 10 -4 6 0
1.25 7.2 14.4 18 9 -2.4 3 0
1 8 16 16 8 0 0 0
We note that as the relative price falls towards the market clearing price, there is a reduction
in the excess supply of beans and the excess demand for carrots.

X20.20 To prove some important results in general equilibrium theory, it is often convenient to
rely upon Walras’ Law: that the sum of values of excess demand across markets must be
equal to zero.
a) Confirm that Walras’ Law is satisfied in X20.19, so that at each relative price, the value of
the excess demand for carrots is also the value of the excess supply of broad beans.
This is straightforward: we multiply the excess demand for beans by the relative price, and
add the excess demand for carrots. In all cases in the table in X20.19, we see that this
condition is satisfied.
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

b) Given that Rachel and Sonja share a single feasibility constraint, use an Edgeworth box to
demonstrate that if the market for carrots clears, the market for broad beans must also
clear.
Suppose otherwise. Then it would be possible to draw an Edgeworth box, with dimensions
representing the endowment of beans and carrots, and Rachel’s share of the endowment in
any division measured from the bottom left corner (with the distance from the left edge
representing the quantity of beans, and the distance from the bottom the quantity of carrots
in her consumption bundle), with the feasibility constraint shown as a downward sloping
straight line, passing through the endowment. There are two points shown on the feasibility
constraint, one Rachel’s preferred division, and the other Sonja’s preferred division, where
the quantity of carrots available to Rachel would be the same in both, but the quantity of
beans would be different. This contradicts the assumption that the line has a negative
gradient, since as the quantity of beans increases, the quantity of carrots in the division must
decrease.

c) Show that if there is a Walrasian equilibrium, the division must also be Pareto-efficient.
Continuing to think about the Edgeworth box analysis, if there is a Walrasian equilibrium
then the indifference curves passing through that division share a common tangent, and so
there is no possibility of further, mutually beneficial trade for Rachel and Sonja: if Rachel
increases her utility, it will be at some cost to Sonja (and vice versa). This division is therefore
Pareto-efficient.

X20.21 Using the results of X20.16, explain why we can be certain that the Walrasian equilibrium
J1 will be achieved through an exchange that begins from any division on the line bR + cR =
24.
In X20.16, we have seen that it is possible to trade to the equilibrium division (bR*, cR*, bS*,
cS*) = (8, 16, 16, 8) from a single point on this line. It must therefore be possible to reach this
division from any point on this line.

X20.22 Assume that Rachel and Sonja have identical Cobb-Douglas preferences over consumption
bundles containing broad beans and carrots:
UbR ,cR   bR 3 cR 3 ; UbS ,cS   bS 3 cS 3
1 2 1 2

with a total of 24 kg of both goods in every division.

a) By partial differentiation, or otherwise, show that if Sonja has to meet a payoff target VS :
VS  (12), Rachel will propose a division in which bR = cR.
We write the Lagrangean, , for the constrained optimization as:
1 2

bR ,cR ,   bR 3 cR 3   24 bR  3 24 cR 3  12
1 2

Partially differentiating with respect to bR and cR, we obtain the first-order conditions:

     0 , so that      ; and
2 2 2 2
 cR  24 cR cR 24 bR
 13
3 3 3 3
bR bR 3 24 bR bR 24 cR

     0 , so that      . Then since the right hand side of these

1 1 1 1
 bR 2 24 bR bR 24 cR
 23
3 3 3 3
cR cR 3 24  cR cR 24 bR
expressions must be equal, (24 – cR)bR = cR(24 – bR), and bR = cR.

b) Confirm that whatever division Rachel proposes, with bR = cR, her marginal rate of
U R
b R
substitution,  U R   0.5 .
c R
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

For Rachel, marginal rate of substitution, MRS : MRS(bR, cR) =

 
2
U 1 cR 3
MU B 3 bR cR
 b R ; and so the result follows directly, given bR = cR.
MU C    
 
U 1
c R 2 bR 3 2 bR
3 cR

c) Hence confirm that if Sonja insists on receiving a payoff VS, she will just meet that target if
the initial endowment lies on the line bR  2 c R  36 .
We require Sonja to obtain payoff VS = 12, and confirm that where Rachel proposes the
1 2
division (bS, cS) = (24 – bR, 24 – cR) = (12, 12), Sonja obtains payoff VS = 12 3 .12 3 = 12; so Sonja
just meets her target. We also note that for Sonja, MRSS(12, 12) = -½, since she and Rachel
have the same utility function; so when they divide the allocation equally, Sonja is just able to
achieve her target payoff while Rachel maximizes her utility subject to that constraint.
In terms of an Edgeworth box with dimensions 24x24, reflecting the total endowment, and
with Rachel’s allocation of beans measured along the bottom edge from the left hand corner,
and her allocation of carrots measured along the left edge, we draw in the indifference
curves passing through the division K: (bR. cR; bS, cS) = (12, 12; 12, 12) as convex curves, which
have a common tangent at K, with gradient -0.5. We can therefore write the equation of the
tangent as (cR – 12) = -0.5(bR – 12), so that bR + 2cR = 36.

X20.23 Rachel and Sonja seek to maximize their utilities, which have the same form as in X20.22.
Suppose that Sonja has a utility target VS = 10. Rachel’s endowment ER = (18, 12); Sonja’s
endowment ES = (6, 12). Sketch a diagram showing (1) the initial endowment; (2) the
Pareto set; (3) the relative price at which they will trade; and (4) the indifference curves
(for Rachel only) at the initial endowment and after trade.
We draw here on what we have already found out about this situation in X20.22. Drawing
an Edgeworth box with dimensions 24x24, reflecting the total endowment, and with Rachel’s
allocation of beans measured along the bottom edge from the left hand corner, and her
allocation of carrots measured along the left edge, we denote the endowment E: (bRE, cRE; bSE,
cSE) = (18, 12; 6, 12) as a point ¾ of the distance from the left to the right edges and midway
between the top and the bottom edges. We know that from this endowment, given the
relative price  = -0.5, Rachel and Sonja will agree to trade to a division K1: (bR. cR; bS, cS)
where bR = cR and bS = cS, with Rachel giving up 2kg of beans for every 1kg of carrots that she
obtains from Sonja. This implies that Rachel will trade 4kg of beans for 2kg of Sonja’s
carrots; Sonja ends up with 10kg of beans and carrots, and Rachel ends up with 14kg of each.
Rachel ends up better off because she has a larger proportion (in terms of value) of the
endowment.

X20.24 Confirm that irrespective of her initial endowment, when Rachel’s price offer curve
intersects the Pareto set, bR = cR, her marginal rate of substitution, MRSR = -0.5.
This follows directly from the argument of X20.22b).

X20.25 What might be the policy implications of this capacity of an exchange economy to reach a
competitive equilibrium from any initial division of endowments?
This suggests that if we are concerned about the outcome, it is possible to cause some
variation in it by changing the initial endowment, rather than prices within the economy.
This suggests that lump-sum taxes might be preferable to proportional taxes based on
activity, which will change prices.

X20.26 Using Figure 20.12, confirm that compared with the competitive equilibrium, J*, Rachel
secures a larger share of the final division and so a higher utility when she is able to choose
the relative price *.
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

We note that Rachel’s indifference curve, ICRM intersects the Pareto set above and to the right
of the intersection of Sonja’s price offer curve, PS, with the Pareto set. The competitive
equilibrium would occur at the latter intersection, so Rachel must be better off when able to
choose the price.

X20.27 We can write Rachel’s problem formally as:

max

UR b b * bS S
E

,cS E ,  ,c  cS * bS E ,cS E ,  , 
wherebS *,cS * : bmax U  bS ,cS  : bS  cS  bS E  cS E
,c S S S

a) Set out Rachel’s problem for the now familiar case in which the endowment of 24 kg of
broad beans and 24 kg of carrots is divided equally between them, when Rachel’s utility
function UR bR ,cR   bR 3 cR 3 , and Sonja’s utility function US bS , cS   bS 3 c S 3 .
1 2 2 1

Sonja’s constraint can be simplified substantially in this case, since bSE = cSE = 12. She wishes
to maximize her utility subject to the constraint that bS + cS = 12(1 + ). We rewrite Rachel’s
problem as
max

UR 24 bS *  ,24 cS *  , wherebS*,cS * : bmax,c US  bS ,cS  : bS  cS  121   . S S

b) Solve Sonja’s maximization problem, defining her demands bS and cS in terms of the
relative price, . Note: you can use the expressions for demands obtained in Chapter 9, to
simplify calculations.
We write the Lagrangean, , for the constrained optimization as:
bS ,cS ,  bS 3 cS 3  121    bS  cS` 
2 1

Partially differentiating with respect to bS and cS, we obtain the first-order conditions:

  0 ,and    0 , so that        . From the latter

1 2 1 2
 cS  bS 2 cS 1 bS
 23  13
3 3 3 3
bS bS cS cS 3 bS 3 cS
equality, 2cS = bS.
In addition, in the last first-order condition,


 121   bS cS` 0 , substituting for
bS, 12(1 + ) = 3cS, so that we obtain bS *, c S *   8   , 41   .
1 


c) Hence, solve Rachel’s maximization problem, defining the relative price, M, so that Rachel
maximizes her utility.
From b), we are able to simplify Rachel’s problem further:
max

UR 82  ,45    . This
1


becomes
max
U 
 R
82   45    , and on differentiating, we obtain the first-order
1

1
3
2
3

condition:
dUR
d
  
 38 2 8 2  1
 23
45 
2
3
   45
 83 8 2  1
1
3  13
0 .
This simplifies to 1
2
45    82  1 , so that 5 -  = 42 - 2, and 42 -  - 5 = 0. Applying
1  81
the quadratic formula, we obtain   8
 1.25 .

d) Compare the outcome in parts (b) and (c) with the Walrasian equilibrium when prices are
set competitively, confirming that with Rachel able to set the relative price, it is now
higher, that Rachel’s share of the endowment (and so her payoff) has increased, but that
Sonja is worse off. Confirm that the monopoly outcome is not Pareto optimal.
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

From X20.16, we know that the competitive equilibrium division is J1: (bR*, cR*; bS*, cS*) =
(8, 16; 16, 8), with the competitive equilibrium price, * = 1. Here we see that Rachel
chooses a relative price  = 1.25, which is greater than in equilibrium. We do not perform all
of the calculations here, but substituting back into the solution of part b), we see that Sonja
chooses the bundle (bS, cS) = (14.4, 9), so that Rachel is able to consume the bundle (9.6, 15).
There is less trade than we would expect there to be in the Pareto efficient outcome, and we
see for Rachel MRS(9.6, 15)  1.25, so that the requirement MRSR = MRSS =  is not satisfied.

X20.28 Repeat X20.27, but replacing the utility functions and endowments:
a) Rachel: utility, UR bR ,cR  bR 3 cR 3 , endowment ER = (18, 12);
1 2

Sonja: utility, US bS ,c S   bS 3 c S 3 , endowment ES = (6, 12).

1 2

Sonja’s constraint can again be simplified, given the endowments. She wishes to maximize
her utility subject to the constraint that bS + cS = 6(2 + ). We rewrite Rachel’s problem as
24 bS *   24cS *   , wherebS *,cS * : bmax b 3 c 3 : bS  cS 62    .
1 2 1 2
max 3 3
 ,c S S
S S

We write the Lagrangean, , for Sonja’s constrained optimization as:

bS ,cS ,   bS 3 cS 3  62     bS  cS` 
1 2

Partially differentiating with respect to bS and cS, we obtain the first-order conditions:

   0 ,and    0, so that        . From the latter

2 1 2 1
 cS  bS 1 cS 2 bS
bS  13 bS
3
cS  23 cS
3
3 bS
3
3 cS
3

equality,
cS = 2bS.
In addition, in the last first-order condition,   6 2 bS cS`

  0 , substituting for c ,
S

6(2 + ) = 3bS, so that we obtain bS *,c S *   2 1  2 , 42    .   

We now return to Rachel’s problem, which we simplify as:

max

2421   24 42    ,
2

1
3
2
3

or
max

22  16 4  . On differentiating, we obtain the first-order condition:
4

1
3
2
3

dUR
d 
 342 22 4 
23
164
2
3  
 83 22 4 3 1643 0 .
1 1

This simplifies to 1
2
4   11  2 , so that 4 -  = 112 - 2, and 112 -  - 4 = 0. Applying

the quadratic formula, we obtain   1  22177  0.60 .

b) Rachel: utility, UR bR ,cR   bR 2 cR 2 , endowment ER = (24, 0);

1 1

Sonja: utility, US bS , cS   bS 2 c S 2 , endowment ES = (0, 24).

1 1

Sonja’s constraint can again be simplified, given the endowments. She wishes to maximize
her utility subject to the constraint that bS + cS = 24. Note that since Sonja has no
endowment of good B, the value of her endowment is constant, and does not depend on the
relative price that Rachel chooses. We rewrite Rachel’s problem as
24 bS *   24 cS *   , wherebS *,cS * : bmax
1 1 1 1
max

2 2 b 2 c 2 : bS  cS  24 .
,c S S
S S
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

We write the Lagrangean, , for Sonja’s constrained optimization as:

bS ,cS ,   bS 2 cS 2  24  bS  cS` 
1 1

Partially differentiating with respect to bS and cS, we obtain the first-order conditions:

   0 ,and    0, so that        . From the latter

1 1 1 1
cS bS 1 cS 1 bS

bS  12 bS
2 
cS  12 cS
2
2 bS
2
2 cS
2

equality,
cS = bS.

In addition, in the last first-order condition,   24bS cS`

0 , substituting for b , S

24 =2cS, so that we obtain bS *, c S *   12

 ,12 .  

We now return to Rachel’s problem, which we simplify as:

max

24  12 , or
12

1
2
1
2
max

 .
12 2  1
1
2

On differentiating, we obtain the first-order condition:

dUR
d  
 62 2 1
12
 1.5 26 10.5 0 . This is
a rather complicated expression, but we can show that it can only be evaluated for value of 
> 0.5, and that the derivative is decreasing in , but always positive, so that Rachel will set as
large a value as possible. As   , (bS*, cS*)  (0, 12). Rachel takes half of Sonja’s
endowment, offering as little as possible in return. Given the form of the utility functions,
and the extent of Rachel’s monopoly power, this should seem intuitively reasonable
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

Chapter 21

X21.1 Suppose Robinson has a diminishing marginal product of labour, while he requires an
increasing rate of compensation for his labour, on the basis that his preferences over
combinations of leisure time and fish are well behaved.
a) Sketch a diagram representing the total quantity of fish that Robinson can catch (as a
function of labour time); and (at least) three separate indifference curves representing
levels of preference over combinations of labour time and fish, one of which just touches
the total quantity curve.
Drawing a diagram with Robinson’s hours of work measured on the horizontal axis and the
number of fish that he catches measured on the vertical axis, we draw an upward-sloping
concave curve that starts from the origin. This output curve represents the total quantity of
fish that Robinson catches. We also draw three upward-sloping convex curves, which begin
from some point on the vertical axis, and one of which is drawn so that there is some point of
common tangency between this curve and the output curve. These convex curves are
effectively indifference curves, drawn on the basis that Robinson trades off effort against
catching fish.

b) Define the agreed wage w as the number of fish that Mr Crusoe gives Robinson per hour of
labour time. Assume that Mr Crusoe will also pay Robinson a retainer – a quantity of fish,
F0 = F(0), in addition to the wage paid for fishing. Sketch straight lines on your diagram
showing the minimum wage that Robinson must be offered to reach each of the three
indifference curves. Decide whether or not the implied production plans are feasible.
We assume here that Robinson is able to choose the number of hours of labour, L, that he
works. He receives total payment W = F0 + wL. For him to be able to reach any particular
indifference curve, we have to construct the payment so that there is a point of tangency
between the indifference curve and the value of the payment schedule.
For feasibility, F0 + wL  F(L), where F(L) is the quantity caught given effort. Each production
plan will be feasible if at the planned hours of effort, the number of fish caught is large
enough for him to reach the desired utility target.

c) On a separate diagram, show that the optimal outcome has the characteristics that:
i. the marginal rate of substitution of fish for labour time is equal to the marginal
product of labour time, and also the agreed exchange rate for fish for additional
effort (the wage);
This is essentially Figure 21.1. We draw a single payoff curve, which shares a
common tangent with the output curve. The slope of the common tangent is the
wage rate that Mr Crusoe offers.

ii. the total compensation which Mr Crusoe offers Robinson is the whole catch of fish;
We achieve this by Mr Crusoe making two transfers – a fixed rate transfer F0 plus the
transfer equal to the payment for the time spent working.

iii. Mr Crusoe maximizes profit by just breaking even; and

The number of fish that Mr Crusoe has to give Robinson will be equal to the number
caught. He cannot give Robinson fewer, or Robinson will reduce his effort.

iv. Robinson maximizes utility given the production constraint.

This follows directly from the satisfaction of the first-order conditions.
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

X21.2 If the bakery and the creamery operate in perfectly competitive markets, why might they
decide not to use their founders’ endowments of labour and capital?
We have developed a standard model in which all firms in a perfectly competitive market are
the same size, at least in the long run. It would therefore be quite surprising were the
founders’ endowments to be appropriate to that scale of business. This merely relates to the
quantity of factors. If we were to allow for some degree of differentiation in factors, it might
be that other sources of capital and labour would be more efficient than the founders’
endowments.

X21.3 Suppose that Richard concludes that he could run the bakery more efficiently with less
capital and more labour, while Seth would prefer to hire more capital and less labour. How
might they be able to trade their endowments so that both firms can increase their
output?
This could be done through the bakery hiring Seth as a worker (on a part-time basis), or even
through the creamery seconding Seth to the bakery (from time to time). In the same way,
Seth might borrow money to finance the purchase of assets either directly from Richard, or
else the creamery might borrow the money from the bakery.

X21.4 Suppose that the bakery has a production function bKB ,LB   KB 3 LB 3 , while the creamery
1 2

has production function cKC ,LC   KC 3 LC 3 . Set out the firms’ production problems where
2 1

the total endowment, (K, L), is divided equally between them, and obtain the Pareto-
efficient outcomes.
For the bakery, the problem is to maximize b = KB 3 LB 3 :wK KB  K2 wL LB  2L  0 . The
1
   
2

: wK KC  K2  wL LC  2L  0 .
2 1
creamery’s problem is to maximize c = KC LC 3 3

Writing the Lagrangean for both of these problems separately, we have

(KB, LB, ) = KB 3 LB 3  wK K2  wL 2L  wK KB  wLLB  , from which we derive the first-order
1 2

  w 0 ; and
2

 13
LB 3
 
1
conditions: KB KB K

 LB  2
3
KB
LB
3
  w L  0 . Rewriting these conditions as

    , we see that wLLB = 2wKKB; and taking into account the third of the first-
2 1
LB KB
  3w1 K KB
3
 3w2 L LB
3

order conditions, 

wK K2  wL 2L  wK KB  wLLB   0 , we substitute to obtain
3wKKB  21 wKK wLL and 3w L LB  w K K  w L L .
We omit the calculations for the creamery, but they are very similar, and recalling that we
expect, with a Cobb-Douglas production function, that the factor shares of expenditure will
be proportional to indices in the production function, we obtain the result 3w K K C  w K K  w L L
and 3wLLC  2 wKK wLL .
1

Writing the value of the endowment as V = wKK + wLL, it follows that (KB, LB) =  v
6wK

, 3wv ; and
 
L

v
that (KC, LC) = 3wK
, 6wv . We note that we start off with both firms sharing the endowments
L

exactly equally, so that each firm’s endowments consist of half of the capital and half of the
labour; or of half of the total value of the assets in the endowment.

X21.5 Repeat X21.4, but replacing the production functions and endowments:
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

a) Bakery: production, bKB ,LB   KB 3 LB 3 ; endowment, EB = (18, 12);

1 2

Creamery: production, cKC ,LC   KC 3 LC 3 ; endowment, EC = (6, 12).

2 1

For the bakery, the problem is to maximize b = KB 3 LB 3 :wK KB  18 wL LB  12  0 . The
1 2

creamery’s problem is to maximize c = KC 3 LC 3 :wK KC 6 wL LC 12  0 .

2 1

The first-order conditions are essentially the same as in X21.4. We find that wLLB = 2wKKB; but
the feasibility constraint becomes wKKB + wLLB = 6(3wK + 2wL). Substituting for wLLB, we
obtain wKKB = 2(3wK + 2wL) and therefore wLLB = 4(3wK + 2wL).
Again, we do not do the calculations in detail, but note that the first-order conditions for the
creamery will be satisfied if 2wLLC = wKKC and wKKC + wLLC = 6(wK + 2wL). These conditions are
satisfied when wKKC = 4(wK + 2wL) and wLLC = 2(wK + 2wL).

b) Bakery: production, bKB ,LB   KB 2 LB 2 ; endowment, EB = (24, 0);

1 1

Creamery: production, cKC , LC   KC 2 LC 2 ; endowment, EC = (0, 24).

1 1

For the bakery, the problem is to maximize b = KB 2 LB 2 :wK KB  24 wLLB  0 . The creamery’s
1 1

problem is to maximize c = KC 2 LC 2 :wK KC wL LC  24 0 .

1 1

The first-order conditions are essentially the same as in X21.4. We find that wLLB = wKKB; but
the feasibility constraint becomes wKKB + wLLB = 24wK. Substituting for wLLB, we obtain KB =
12 and therefore wLLB = 12wK.
Again, we do not do the calculations in detail, but note that the first-order conditions for the
creamery will be satisfied if wLLC = wKKC and wKKC + wLLC = 24wL. These conditions are
satisfied when wKKC = 12wL and LC = 12.

 Richard and Seth, who have endowments (KR, LR) and (KS, LS) of capital and labour, form
two companies, a bakery and a creamery, which produce bread and cheese.
 The companies hire factors (KB, LB) and (KC, LC) at prices wK and wL, producing outputs
 1 1
 2
 1 1

2
b  K B 2  LB 2 and c  K C 2  LC 2 , which they sell at prices pB (= 1, so that bread is the
numeraire) and pc.
 Richard’s and Seth’s preferences over consumption bundles may be represented by the
bRcR bScS
payoffs: UR bR ,cR   and US bS ,cS   .
bR  cR bS  cS
 The companies seek to maximize their profits, given the production functions; and Richard
and Seth seek to maximize their utilities, given affordability constraints.

X21.6 We first consider production.

a) Write down an expression for the bakery’s profit, B.
 1 1

2
The bakery makes profits  B  KB 2  LB 2  wK KB  wLLB . With the numeraire, pB = 1, revenue
is simply the level of output.

b) By partially differentiating the expression for profit with respect to the factor inputs, KB
and LB, show that the first-order conditions for profit maximization can be rewritten:
 1 1
 1
pb KB 2  LB 2  KB 2wK  LB 2wL .
1

We have to partially differentiate the profit function with respect to capital and (separately)
with respect to labour, setting both partial derivatives to zero. This yields
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

 B
K B
1
 1 1

 K B  2 K B 2  LB 2  wK  0 and
 B
LB
1
 1 1

 LB  2 K B 2  LB 2  w L  0 . The result follows on
rearrangement of these expressions.

c) Hence, obtain the equivalent conditions, which hold when the creamery maximizes its
profits.
We do not complete the calculations, but by the symmetry of the situation that the firms
face, writing out the profit function, and obtaining first-order conditions for its maximization,
 1 1
we obtain pc KC 2  LC 2  KC 2 wK  LC 2 wL .  1 1

d) Show that the profit-maximizing conditions found in (b) and (c) imply that:
LB LC
i. the firms employ capital and labour so that KB  KC ;
We write the equalities wLLB½ = wKKB½ and wLLC½ = wKKC½, rewriting them as
1 1
w L LB 2 w L LC 2
1  1 1
. The result follows immediately.
wK KB 2 wK KC 2

LB
ii. writing the total endowments, LB + LC = L and KB + KC = K, KB  KL ;
L L L 1  t 
Say that LC = tLB. Then for the result of part i., KC = tKB. We write L
K
 K BB  KCC  LCB 1  t  ,
and the result follows.

wKwL
iii. wK  wL  pb  pc , so that prices of the two goods have to be equal.
We write KC½ =  L , and then substitute for K in the other first-order conditions
wL
wK C
1
2
C
½

obtained in c): p   1L  w L . Dividing through by the common factor L ,

1
wL 1
2
1
2 2
c wK C L C C

and writing the expression with pC as its subject, the result follows. We repeat the
exercise for the bakery.

e) Hence, confirm that both firms maximize their profits at any allocation for which (KB, LB) =
(K, L) and (KC, LC) = (1 – )(K, L). Sketch an Edgeworth box showing the allocations at
which both firms maximize their profits.
We have already shown above that profit maximization requires the firms to share the factor
inputs in the same proportion as they are in the endowment. Any division in which the
bakery obtains a fraction  of both inputs and the creamery a fraction (1 - ) of them is
consistent with firms achieving profit maximization, exchanging factor inputs to reach this
outcome.
We draw an Edgeworth box with dimensions equal to the endowments of capital and labour,
measuring the division of capital along the bottom edge and the division of labour along the
left edge, with the bakery’s labour represented by the distance from the left edge to the
division and the creamery’s by the distance from the division to the right edge, and likewise
representing the division of capital from the bottom edge for the bakery and from the top
edge for the creamery.
We then obtain the Pareto set as the upward diagonal in the box, with the gradient of the
isoquants that meet at this point equal to the common marginal rate of technical
KL 
1
substitution: MRTSB = MRTSC = 2
.

f) Given the condition that when maximizing profits both firms hire factors so that the value
of the marginal product equals the factor price, show that w K  1   KL 2 and w L  1   KL 2 .
1 1
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

b

KB
0.5
 LB0.5 
The marginal product of capital for the bakery, MPKB = KB KB0.5
. The value of the
K 
marginal product, VMPKB = pB MPKB = pB 
0.5
 LB 0.5 B
 . We require VMPK = wK, and pB = 1,
B

 K B 0.5

writing KB = K and LB = L,

K
B
0.5

KB
 LB0.5
0.5
  K 0.5

K
 L0.5
0.5
   L 0.5
, so that wK = 1 K 0.5 . The other equalities
B

between factor prices and endowments follow immediately.

X21.7 Continuing with the production process:

a) Rewrite the problem facing the bakery so that it maximizes profit subject to the constraint
of having a feasible production plan. Form the Lagrangean, .
The firm seeks to maximize its profits on the basis that it hires enough factor inputs to
produce its target output. We write its problem as
max
KB , LB

 B  pBb wK KB wLLB : b  KB0.5  LB0.5 , which gives us the Lagrangean, :  2

 b ,KB ,LB ,   pBb  wK KB wLLB  KB0.5  LB0.5  b .   2


b) By solving the first-order conditions for a maximum of , show that:
i. The multiplier,  = pb = 1.
We obtain the first-order conditions by partial differentiation with respect to all four
variables:
 b  pB    0



K B 
  w K  K B 0.5 K B 0.5  LB 0.5  0;  
LB 
  w L  LB  0.5 K B 0.5  LB 0.5  0 

 
 K B 0.5  LB 0.5  b  0
2

It follows that the multiplier  = pB;

ii. For both factors, the (value of the) marginal product is the factor price; and the
 .
1
wK LB
ratio of factor prices, wL  KB
2

Substituting for the multiplier, pKB KB LB wK , so that the value of the 0.5
 0.5 0.5

marginal product is the payment to the factor.
Concentrating on the middle pair of first-order conditions, we obtain the, by now,
familiar result: wKKB0.5 = wLLB0.5, so that the necessary result follows.

c) Similarly, obtain the first-order conditions associated with the profit-maximizing problem
for the creamery, showing that the multiplier equals the price, pc, and the ratio of factor

  . Hence confirm that

1 1
wK LC
1
K 2  L2
prices, wL  KC
2 LB
KB  KLCC  KL , so that the factor prices are wK  1
K2
1 1
K 2  L2
and wL  1 (and the final goods’ prices are pb = pc = 1).
L2
We omit the derivation of the first-order conditions, writing the relevant ones for these
calculations as wK KC
0.5
 
 KC 0.5 LC 0.5 and wLKC 0.5  KC 0.5  LC 0.5 . Equating the left  
  . We already know that   , and
1 1
wK LC wK LB
hand side of these expressions, we obtain wL  KC
2
wL
 KB
2

KB KC KB L KB KC
so LB
 LC
, or KC
 LB . As before, writing (KB, LB) = (K,  L), we obtain the result, LB
 LC
 KL .
C
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

Lastly, we see that for market clearing, we require wK KC  KC LC ; and we know
0.5
 0.5 0.5

that  = pB = pC = 1. Rearranging the expression so that wK is the subject, we obtain the result
K 0 . 5  L0 . 5 0 .5 0 .5
wK  0 .5
, and similarly w L  K 0.5 L
K L

X21.8 If the firms reach the allocation (KB, LB) = (K, L); (KC, LC) = (1 – )(K, L):
a) Show that MRTSB =   KL 2 = MRTSC; and explain why this ensures that every allocation at
1

which the firms maximize profits is also Pareto-efficient.

We know from X21.7 that MRTSB = 

b
K B

 
K B  0.5 K B 0.5  LB 0 .5 L 
   B 
0 .5
; and that
b
LB LB 
 0 .5 0 .5
K B  LB 
0 .5
 KB 
0.5
 
MRTSC =   LC  . It follows that if the bakery’s share of the endowment, (KB, LB) = (K, L),
 KC 
so that the creamery’s share (KC, LC) = (1 -)(K, L), then the marginal rate of technical
substitution is the same for both firms. We represent this property in an Edgeworth box by
drawing isoquants that share a common tangent. This means that there is no possibility of
either firm increasing its output without the other firm reducing its output, and so production
is Pareto efficient.

1 1
 L2
b) Confirm that for both businesses, VMPK  K
2
1 , and the marginal rate of transformation,
K2
MRT = 1. Interpret this result.
We define the value of the marginal product for each factor (for each firm) as the product of
the output price and the marginal product of the factor: so for the bakery, the value of the
marginal product of capital: VMPKB = pBMPKB. We have already established that pB = pC = 1,
and the result follows.
The marginal rate of transformation MRT =  ppb   1 . As production of bread increases,
c

production of cheese has to be reduced by the same amount. (This is not a general result,
but holds here because of our assumption of constant returns to scale in both production
functions.)

c) In an Edgeworth box, sketch the Pareto set, and the isoquants passing through the
allocation F: (KB, LB) = 13 K , L  and (KC, LC) = 23 K , L  .
In the Edgeworth box, we represent the endowment of capital by its length and the
endowment of labour by its height. At division, F, the bakery’s use of capital is represented by
the distance from the left edge of the box, and its use of labour by the height above the
bottom edge. In this case, the Pareto set is the upward diagonal. We draw the division, F, so
that it is one third of the distance from the bottom, left to the top, right corner of the box.

d) Show that at the allocation H: (KB, LB) =  K , L  and (KC, LC) = 1   K , L  , the bakery
 1 1

2
produces b =  K 2  L2 , while the creamery produces c = 1    K 2  L2  1 1
 2

This result follows directly from the homogeneity property of the production function.

Confirm that:
i. 
total output, b + c = K 2  L2 = y0;
1 1

2

This is simply the sum of the individual firm outputs in the case above. Note that with pB
= pC = 1, the total firm revenue will also be y0.
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

ii. the value of output, pbb + pcc, equals the cost of production, wKK + wLL;
0 .5 0 .5 0.5 0 .5
The cost of production C = wKK + wLL = K 0.5L K  K 0.5 L L = (K0.5 + L0.5)(K0.5 + L0.5)
K L
= (K0.5 + L0.5)2 = y0.

iii. both firms make zero profits.

Since the revenues and costs are equal, this follows immediately.

e) Sketch the production possibility frontier, illustrating on it point J', corresponding to input
allocation J.
In a diagram with output of bread measured on the horizontal axis and output of cheese
measured on the vertical axis, the production possibility frontier will, in this case, be a
straight line, with equation b + c = y0, so that MRT = -1. At the intersection with the vertical
axis, only cheese is produced; this is the equivalent of the bottom, left corner of the Pareto
set in the Edgeworth box. Similarly, at the intersection with the horizontal axis, only bread is
produced; this is the equivalent of the top, right corner of the Pareto set. For point J, a
proportion  of the distance from the bottom left corner of the diagonal in the Edgeworth
box, point J1 will also be a proportion  from the left hand edge of the production possibility
frontier.

X21.9 Now consider the problem facing Richard and Seth.

a) Write down an expression for Seth’s utility, showing that he consumes the share of output
(of both goods, and so of total output) that Richard does not. [Note: In other words, write
down an expression for Seth’s utility, given that bR + bS = b; cR + cS = c; and b + c = K 2  L2  1 1

2

.]
It will be useful to remember that b = (K0.5 + L0.5)2 and that c= (1 - )(K0.5 + L0.5)2. Then Seth’s
consumption bundle, (bS, cS) = (b – bR, c – cR) = [(K0.5 + L0.5)2 – bR, (1 - )(K0.5 + L0.5)2 – cR].
  K 0 .5  L0 .5 2  b  .  1   K 0.5  L0 .5 2  b 
Seth’s utility is US: U S b S , c S   bb Sc cS    .
R   S 
 
S S K 0.5  L0.5 2  b R  c R

b) Assume that Seth meets a utility target uS(bS, cS) = uS0. Write down an expression for
Richard’s utility maximization problem.
Richard seeks to maximize utility subject to Seth’s utility target. We can write the problem as
max bRcR
bR , cR bR  cR
:UbS ,cS   uS 0 .

c) Calculate Richard’s marginal utilities, MUBR and MUCR, and his marginal rate of substitution,
MRSR. Repeat the calculations for Seth.
For Richard, the marginal utility of bread, MUBR =
UR
bR  bRcRcR  b bRccR 2 
R R
  . In the same
cR 2
bR  cR

  . The marginal
UR b bRcR bR 2
way, we obtain marginal utility of cheese, MUC = R
cR  bR RcR  b 
2 bR  cR
R  cR

rate of substitution, MRSR =  MUBR     . We omit the calculations but confirm that for
MU R
C
cR 2
bR

     . cS 2 c  cR 2
MUB ,S
Seth, the marginal rate of substitution, MRS =  S
MUC ,S bS b  bR

cR
d) Show that if the marginal rates of substitution are equal, then bR  bcSS  bc . Using the
argument developed previously, confirm that these conditions will be satisfied whenever
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

Richard consumes a proportion  of the output of each good, and Seth a proportion (1 –
). [Note: This means that (bR, cR) = (b, c), and (bS, cS) = (1 – )(b, c).]
c c c
For the marginal rates of substitution to be equal, bcRR  bSS  b  bRR . Cross multiplying and
expanding the brackets, bRc = cRb, and the result follows directly.

e) On the diagram showing the production possibility frontier, add an Edgeworth box which
has its upper right-hand vertex at J'. Within the Edgeworth box, show the Pareto-efficient
allocations that satisfy the conditions obtained in part (d).
With b = c, we draw an Edgeworth box with the top right corner of the box at the midpoint of
the production possibility frontier, so that the box represents the total outputs. We represent
the bakery’s output by the length of the box and the creamery’s output by its height. At any
division, H, within the box , Richard’s consumption of bread is represented by the distance
from the left edge of the box, and consumption of cheese by the height above the bottom
edge. The Pareto set will be the upward diagonal. We define two points on the Pareto set,
H1, which is one quarter of the distance from the bottom, left to the top, right corner of the
box; and H2, which is three quarters of the distance from the bottom, left to the top, right
corner. In both cases, Richard’s and Seth’s indifference curves meet at their intersection with
the Pareto set, and have a common tangent, which has gradient MRSR = MRSS = MRT = -1
(see below for calculations).

f) Calculate the common marginal rate of substitution for all allocations in the Pareto set.
Add indifference curves for Richard and Seth to your sketch, assuming that  = ½, so that
each consumes half of the output of both goods. Explain why the allocation of goods in
the Edgeworth box is not consistent with a general equilibrium.
For Richard, MRSR =  MUC ,R  
B ,R MU
        .
cR 2
bR
c 2
b
c 2
b

For Seth, MRSS =   

cS 2
bS

  11  cb 
2
 
c 2
b
. The marginal rate of substitution is the same
for both, as required for Pareto efficiency. We note that we require the common marginal
rates of substitution to be equal to the marginal rate of transformation.

pb
g) Show that the condition MRSR = MRSS = MRT = pc can only be satisfied when b = c =
1
2 K 1
2
1

2
 L2 . Sketch a new diagram showing the production possibility frontier; the
allocation H' for which b = c and the associated Edgeworth box; the Pareto set within the
box; the Walrasian equilibria when (i)  = ¼ and (ii)  = ¾; the indifference curves passing
through the equilibria; and the common tangents to the indifference curves at each
equilibrium. Demonstrate that the equilibrium conditions are indeed satisfied.
We have already shown that MRT = -1, so that MRSR = MRSS =   bc    1 . We obtain the
2

result that b = c. We have already described the Edgeworth box in part e). The equilibrium
conditions are all satisfied because on the Pareto set, the common marginal rate of
substitution equals the marginal rate of transformation.

X21.10 Consider the situation in X21.9 where  = ¾. Suppose that Richard agrees with Seth to a
reduction in the value of  to ½. They then share the total factor incomes equally.
a) Explain why we would not expect the product mix to change, so that the bakery and the
creamery would continue to hire the same quantity of factor inputs, and the combination
of outputs in the economy would remain unchanged.
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

We have demonstrated that Richard and Seth will always choose consumption bundles
containing the same proportions of bread and cheese, so that with these (CES) preferences,
market demands are independent of income shares.

b) Sketch a diagram showing: the production possibility frontier; the Edgeworth box and the
Pareto set; the allocations of final goods before and after the change in income shares; and
also the indifference curves passing through the Pareto-efficient allocations before and
after the income change.
We have already seen that in a diagram with the quantity of bread measured on the
horizontal axis, and the quantity of cheese measured on the vertical axis, that the production
possibility frontier has the equation b + c = (K0.5 + L0.5)2, which is a straight line with gradient -
1. We require that b = c = ½(K0.5 + L0.5)2, so that factors are allocated with production at the
midpoint of the line. Then, given preferences, whatever the share of factor incomes accruing
to Richard and Seth, they will both choose to buy equal quantities of bread and cheese, (so
that bR = cR and bS = cS; and of course markets clear so that bR + bS = b and cR + cS = c. Making
these choices, MRSR = MRSS = -1, so that their indifference curves through any Pareto-efficient
division of goods share a common tangent, which lies parallel to the production possibility
frontier. Before Richard transfers resources to Seth, the indifference curves meet three-
quarters of the way up the diagonal of the Edgeworth box; afterwards, they meet at the
midpoint of the diagonal (and indeed of the box).

X21.11 In X21.9, we obtained a linear production possibility frontier. Explain why we would
obtain a linear utility possibility frontier. Confirm that if factor inputs are not allocated so
that b = c, then even if production is efficient, the utility profile will lie in the interior of the
utility possibility set.
The main argument for obtaining a linear utility possibility frontier is that the utility functions
are homogeneous of degree 1. This means that if the division of goods is Pareto efficient,
then increasing Richard’s utility by some amount will be accompanied by an equally large
reduction in utility for Seth.
We note that if b  c, then the Pareto set for the consumption problem will still be the
diagonal of the Edgeworth box. However, if b < c, then the diagonal will be steeper and MRSR
= MRSS < -1; so the common marginal rate of substitution is less than the marginal rate of
transformation. By increasing production of bread (and reducing production of cheese), it is
possible to effect a Pareto improvement.

X21.12 Working with the utility possibility frontier in X21.11, calculate the most-preferred utility
profile for the social welfare functions, w, where (a) w(uR, uS) = min(uR, uS); (b) w(uR, uS) =
lnuR + lnuS; (c) w(uR, uS) = uR + 2uS; and (d) w(uR, uS) = uR¾uS¼.
We write the linear utility possibility frontier, uR + uS = v0. Then uS = v0 – uR.
a) If w(uR, uS) = min(uR, uS), then the social planner considers utilities to be perfect complements.
The planner’s objective is to maximize the lesser of uR and v0 – uR. So long as uR < v0 – uR,
then increasing uR, min(uR, uS) = uR, and this expression increases in uR.
The same is true when min(uR, uS) = uS; increasing uS increases social welfare.
As in previous examples, with this form of function, the welfare maximizing consumption
profile (uR*, uS*) = (½v0, ½v0); and in terms of resources, the social planner directs transfers so
that Richard and Seth share the factor income equally.
b) For this we simply require the usual first-order condition – that the marginal rate of
substitution for the social planner is equal to the marginal rate of transformation – to be
w
u
satisfied. This occurs when MRSP   R w   1 MRT . Given the utility function. w
uR
 u1R
uS
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

w
and u S
 u1 . We therefore require uR = uS, or a division of resources that allows Richard and
S

Seth to generate the same utility.

c) When w(uR, uS) = uR + 2uS, we have a planner who treats utilities as perfect substitutes;
however the planner also places greater weight on Seth’s utility than on Richard’s utility, and
so we observe that MRSP = -0.5 > -1 = MRT. The planner gives all the resources to Seth.
d) Again, we require the usual first-order condition – that the marginal rate of substitution for
the social planner is equal to the marginal rate of transformation – to be satisfied. This
w
u
occurs when MRSP   R w   1 MRT . Given the utility function, we obtain marginal
uS

  . Taking their ratio, we require u = 3u , or a

1
w uS
 34
4
utilities in terms of partial derivatives uR uR R S

division of resources that allows Richard to derive three times the utility of Seth.

X21.13 Using diagrams, explain why a social planner with a utility function such as (a) in X21.12
has a very strong commitment to egalitarianism.
We are already familiar with the representation of preferences where goods are perfect
complements. In a diagram with Richard’s utility, uR, measured on the horizontal axis and
Seth’s utility, uS, measured on the vertical axis, we draw indifference curves as L-shaped, with
the vertex of each indifference curve found on the line uR = uS. Drawing in a utility possibility
frontier, and placing the requirement that - < MRT < 0, so that the frontier is always
downward sloping, then increasing Richard’s utility, Seth’s utility must decrease and there
can only be one utility profile (uR*, uR*) where they both receive the same payoff. At this
point, the first-order condition, that there is a common tangent to the utility possibility
frontier and the social welfare function, is satisfied. Such a social planner will act to ensure
that there is equality of outcomes.

X21.14 Suppose that the social planner’s preferences are captured by form (b) of the social
welfare function in X21.12. Sketch the social welfare indifference curves, w = 1, 2 and 3.
What would you conclude about the slope of the utility possibility frontier on the line uR =
uS if the planner chooses the utility profile (uR*, uS*): uR* > uS*?
In a diagram with Richard’s utility, uR, measured on the horizontal axis and Seth’s utility, uS,
measured on the vertical axis, we see that the indifference curves are rectangular
w
hyperbolae, with the equation uS = eu . These curves will be smooth, convex, downward
R

sloping, and will approach the axes, but never cross them.
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

Chapter 22

X22.1 Assume that the value of an hour’s leisure to a typical commuter is £15. If 20,000 cars
enter a city during the period of excess demand, calculate the daily and annual costs of a
30-minute delay every day. What do you conclude about the size of the investment
needed to eliminate congestion?
We estimate the value of foregone leisure (per day) to be 15*0.5*20,000 = £150,000. We
estimate the value of removing congestion from the city during the rush-hour (250 days per
year, with a 10-year payback period) to be of the order of £375m. Given that, this is the
value of a relatively modest public infrastructure project (the construction cost of the
Øresund Bridge, linking Copenhagen and Malmö, was approximately DKK30bn, or about
£3bn, when it opened in 2000.)

X22.2 In the short-run analysis of production, we argue that the marginal product of labour will
be eventually diminishing, and this ensures that firms will not expand its use without limit.
Explain why, given our present assumptions, we might expect the farmer to be happy
always to have more beehives on the land. Criticize the argument. [Hint: Think of the
problem of commuting.]
We have made the assumption that the marginal product of labour will always be positive.
There is no cost to having beehives on the farm in the current specification of the model, but
this is not possible – apart from anything else, there is a risk of congestion, and presumably
also at very high densities, there would be concerns about safety.

X22.3 Show that there is a positive externality on production of honey from choice of orchard
size, T. Explain how this affects the choice of labour input, Lb, and the quantity of honey
 MP L
produced. Confirm that so long as we assume  T b > 0, the beekeeper would always
prefer a larger to a smaller orchard.
In Expression 22.6, differentiating the marginal product of labour, Lbb , with respect to
orchard size, T, we obtain   > 0, by assumption. Increasing T, the marginal product
 b
T Lb
increases; equilibrium is reached with a larger labour input, and the beekeeper benefits from
the orchard increasing in size.

X22.4 Consider the following situation. We write the short-term production function for the
farmer, A: A(Lf, b) = 50Lf0.5b0.25; the short-term production function for the beekeeper, b:
b(Lb) = 4Lb0.5; and the associated output of honey, h: h(b) = 125b. The price of apples, pa =
2, while the price of honey ph = 8. The farmer’s wage, wf = 10, and the beekeeper’s wage,
wb = 20.
a) Write down the farmer’s profit function. Partially differentiate the derivative with respect
to the labour input, Lf, and, by obtaining the first-order condition, show that the farmer
maximizes profits by working LfP = 25b½.
We obtain the profit f: f = paA - wfLf = 2[50Lf0.5b0.25] – 10Lf. Differentiating,
 f
L
 50 L f 0.5 b 0.25  10  0 if Lf0.5 = 5b0.25; and squaring both sides, we obtain the required
f

expression for the profit maximizing use of labour.

b) Write down the beekeeper’s profit function. Partially differentiate the derivative with
respect to the labour input, Lb, and, by obtaining the first-order condition, show that the
beekeeper maximizes profits by working LbP = 10,000.
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

We obtain the profit b: b = ph.h(b(Lb)) – wbLb = 8.125.[4Lb0.5] – 20Lb. Differentiating,

 b
L b
 2 ,000 Lb 0.5  20  0 if Lb0.5 = 100; and squaring both sides, we obtain the result.

c) Calculate the size of the beehives, the total outputs of apples and honey, and the total
revenues, costs and profits of both the farmer and the beekeeper.
We have found the following: Lb= 10,000; b = 4Lb0.5 = 400; Lf = 25b0.5 = 500; output of apples
Af = 50Lf0.5b0.25 = 250b0.5 = 5,000; output of honey, h = 125b = 50,000.
Revenue from sale of apples Rf = 2A = 10,000. Cost of production, Cf = 10Lf = 5,000, so profit
for farmer f = 5,000.
Revenue from sale of honey, Rb = 8h = 400,000. Cost of production Cb = 20Lb = 200,000, so
profit for beekeeper b = 200,000.

X22.5 Continue with the situation set out in X22.4.

a) Write down the social planner’s payoff function as the sum of the farmer’s and the
beekeeper’s profit functions. Partially differentiate the function with respect to the labour
inputs, Lf and Lb. Confirm that the optimal labour input for the farmer LfS = 25b0.5, and that
the socially optimal labour input for the beekeeper reflects both the optimal private use
plus the positive externality on the farmer’s production.
We write the social planner’s objective, S: S = 2(50Lf0.5b0.25) + 8(500Lb0.5) – 10Lf – 20Lb.
Note that b = 4Lb0.5. Partially differentiating with respect to Lf, L S  50 L f 0.5 b 0.25  10  0 ,
f

if Lf0.5 = 5b0.25; and squaring both sides of the expression, the result follows.
Partially differentiating the payoff, S, with respect to Lb, we obtain
 S
Lb
  
 12 50 L f 0.5 b 0.75 . 2Lb 0.5  2 ,000 Lb 0.5  20 . The first term in this partial derivative is the
effect of the externality.

b) Without attempting calculations, compare the socially optimal and the privately optimal
sizes of beehives. Discuss the impact of beehive size on the total outputs of apples and
honey, and the total revenues, costs and profits of both the farmer and the beekeeper.
The optimal size of the beehive increases because we take account of the indirect effect of
the beehives on apple production and profits. With a larger beehive, the farmer produces
more apples, and the beekeeper more honey.

X22.6 Discuss how the farmer might be able to encourage the beekeeper to increase the level of
output from the privately optimal to the socially optimal level.
Given the circumstances, we would expect the farmer not simply to allow the beekeeper to
place hives in the orchard, but to pay the beekeeper for providing the pollination service.

X22.7 Adapt Expressions 22.2 and 22.5, so that the farmer subsidizes the beekeeper’s wage at a
rate, sb. Find the new first-order condition, and the value of the subsidy, sb, that will lead
to the socially optimal outcome.
The farmer’s profit can now be written as f: f = pAA(Lf, b, T0) – wfLf – sbLb – rT0. The
beekeeper’s profit can be written as b: b = phh[b(Lb, T0)] - (wb - sb)Lb.
As before, the farmer’s profits are determined by both of the labour inputs, but through
making a payment to the beekeeper the farmer is able to affect the beekeeper’s choice of
labour input.
We obtain first-order conditions, by partially differentiating profits with respect to their own

labour input for both the farmer and the beekeeper:  L f  p A LA  w f  0 ; and
f f

 w b  sb   0 . Comparing this expression with expressions obtained in X22.5,

 b
L b
 ph bh Lbb
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

we conclude that if the farmer is able to pay the subsidy equal to the marginal benefit of the
externality, then the beekeeper will choose the socially optimal level of the externality.

X22.8 Sketch a diagram showing the situation facing a firm and the market in long-run
equilibrium where there is perfect competition with the long-run supply curve: (a)
perfectly flat; and (2) downward-sloping. Show how a change in demand conditions
affects the equilibrium in each case.
The analysis of firm and industry behaviour was presented in Chapter 14. We draw the
diagrams with two panels, the left-hand one illustrating firm decision making and the right-
hand one illustrating the market outcomes. Both panels have measures of revenue and cost
shown on the vertical axis, with firm output measured on the horizontal axis of the left panel
and market output on the horizontal axis of the right panel.
Beginning with the long-run supply curve being flat, we illustrate this in the right-hand panel
by a flat line, p = p0. In the left panel, we also draw in the line MR(qf) = AR(qf) = p0, showing
that the firm’s demand is perfectly elastic at this market price. In the left-hand panel, we
also draw in a U shaped average cost curve, which has its minimum at some output q0 where
the flat line,
MR(qf) = p, is tangent to the average cost curve. Then, drawing in a marginal cost curve
which intersects the average cost curve at its minimum, we see that the profit maximizing
condition MC = MR is satisfied when q = q0, and since AC(q0) = AR(q0), the firm makes zero
profits. We argued in Chapter 14 that the expansion of the market will be achieved through
entry, with firms remaining at the same scale as demand increases. We illustrate this in the
right-hand panel by sketching two curves representing market demand, noting that the
market price given by the intersection of market supply and market demand does not change
with demand conditions, so that profit maximizing firms maintain their output.
We largely replicate the analysis in the second diagram. Now, though as market demand
increases, the market price falls from p0 to p1. For the firm, this means that MR = AR = p1
after the increase in demand. We have seen that ACmin = p0 with constant returns to scale.
With increasing returns to scale, we require the firms in the market to use resources more
efficiently as the market size increases, so that the marginal cost curve for the firm in the left
hand changes, lying below the original marginal cost curve at all levels of output. It follows
that there will also be a new average cost curve, and we require that average cost curve to
have its minimum at some output q1 >q0, where, similarly to before, AC(q1) = AR(q1) and
MC(q1) = MR(q1), so that profit-maximizing firms make zero profits.

X22.9 One important element of cooperation in an industrial district is the emergence of

technical colleges, often funded with endowments by local businesses. Discuss their role
in enabling businesses to increase productivity.
Colleges enable workers to increase their skills, and through such training to increase their
productivity. The output of the firms hiring them will also increase. Yet since workers are
mobile, there is a positive externality associated with training workers within a firm, and so
collaboration can increase the level of training beyond the level associated with the private
solution.

X22.10 Confirm that for f > 0, average costs AC1(f) > AC0(f), and marginal costs MC1(f) > MC0(f).
This is quite straightforward, since h is increasing in C0 and h > 1. We write C1(f) = h[C0(f)].
Then the average cost, AC1(f) = C 1 f f   C 0 f f  = AC0(f); and the marginal cost MC1(f) =
dh
dC0
MC0  f  > MC0(f).
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

X22.11 To what extent is it reasonable to expect the owners of the power station to compensate
the owners of the fish farm for the loss of profits that might occur as a result of the power
station opening?
Your answer to this question is likely to depend upon the characterization of the problem that
you choose. If you consider that the fish farm has had access to clean water before the
power station was built, and that in effect it has a right to expect clean water, then it should
be able to demonstrate that the operation of the power station is detrimental to its activities,
and to that extent, it deserves compensation. Alternatively, if you consider that it is simply
accidental that the fish farm has had clean water, and that it has simply used the river water
because that is most convenient for it, then, while accepting that the operation of the power
station is detrimental to the fish farm’s activities, you might argue that if the fish farm wishes
for cleaner water, then it should pay the power station to reduce its pollution. Your answer
should therefore turn on the question of whether the fish farm has a right to clean water, or
whether the power station has an unrestricted right to use the water from the river.

X22.12 Define the social costs of power production as the sum of the direct costs, measured by
the power station’s cost function, C(w), where w is its output, and the costs experienced
by other businesses, S(w), which are directly attributable to pollution resulting from power
generation. Assume that the power station has entered into long-term wholesale
contracts, and so can sell any quantity of power at a constant price, pw. Explain how the
power station’s optimal output would differ were the power station required to provide
compensation for the loss suffered by other businesses.
In the private solution, the power station only considers its direct costs, C(w). We expect it to
dC
adopt the efficient production level, w0, chosen so that MC(w0) = dw = p(w0). In a socially
efficient solution, the power station considers both private and social costs, and so we define
the social cost, SC: SC(w) = C(w) + S(w). Then the efficient solution will occur at production
level w1, chosen so that MSC(w1) =
dC
 dS
dw dw = p(w1).

X22.13 Confirm that where the private solution is allowed to emerge, the power station makes
(economic) profits, but when the social optimum is imposed, it makes losses.
We draw the diagram so that output is measured on the horizontal axis and value measures
are shown on the vertical axis. We show the market clearing price as a flat line, on which for
any level of output, E, MR(E) = AR(E) = p. We show the marginal (private) cost as a U-shaped
curve, which starts from the vertical axis above p, cuts through the line MR = p, reaches a
minimum, and then increases intersecting the line MR(E) = p when E = E0*. This is the firm’s
profit maximizing output. For the firm to make profits, consider the two areas enclosed by
the marginal revenue curve and the marginal cost curve to the left of E = E0*. The area below
the marginal revenue curve must be larger than the one above the marginal revenue curve
(remember that when marginal cost is greater than marginal revenue, then increasing
production reduces profits).
For the case of social costs, we draw the marginal social cost curve so that it is also U shaped,
but lying above the marginal private cost curve. As drawn in Figure 22.3, where marginal
social cost is always greater than marginal revenue, the firm fails to make social profits.
More generally, we draw it so that it intersects the marginal revenue curve (twice), with the
profit maximizing output at E1*, where marginal cost is increasing. The firm makes (social)
losses if the area enclosed by the marginal cost and marginal revenue curves below the
marginal revenue curve is less than the area enclosed by the curves above the marginal
revenue curve.
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

X22.14 We have argued that power networks are likely to experience increasing returns to scale in
production. Adapting Figure 22.3, explain why this might increase the need to impose the
socially optimal outcome.
We draw the diagram so that output is measured on the horizontal axis and value measures
are shown on the horizontal axis. We continue to draw the marginal revenue and average
revenue curves as being the same flat line, so that for any level of output, E, MR(E) = AR(E) =
p. With increasing returns to scale, the marginal cost curve is always downward sloping.
Once it is below the marginal revenue curve, it remains below it for all higher levels of
output. This implies that the first-order condition for profit maximization can never be met
(and this is the basis for the argument that there would be a natural monopoly in this
market).
We can, though, create a marginal social cost curve that is eventually increasing, and argue
that the welfare maximizing level of output will be achieved where this intersects the
marginal revenue curve from below, at output E1*.

X22.15 We have assumed in this argument that there is no change in the market price, assuming
that the power station faces perfect competition. Consider the situation facing the
industry, and explain why this is unlikely. Indicate what you would expect to happen to
the market price and the quantity produced, taking into account the likely effects on the
market price and the quantity that each firm will produce.
Power generation has typically used technologies in which there are very substantial scale
economies, so that efficient power stations require substantial capital. This means that
across a large range of possible outputs, power generation businesses will experience
diminishing marginal costs, and they can expect to have substantial market power. We
therefore expect these firms’ marginal revenue functions to be decreasing in output, so that
when maximizing profit, they set price above marginal cost, and restrict output.

X22.16 Compare the marginal tax rate imposed when applying the Pigovian and the flat-rate tax.
The marginal tax rate under the Pigovian tax rate is the difference between the marginal
social cost and the marginal (private) cost at every level of output, and so both average and
marginal tax rates vary as the marginal rates change. The flat-rate tax will be set so that it
has the same effect as the Pigovian tax. It is set so that the quantity traded Q(t)clears the
market at price (including tax), so that the marginal social cost, MSC(Q(t)) = MSB(Q(t)), the
marginal social benefit. Note that where the Pigovian tax changes as market conditions
change, the flat-rate tax will need to be adjusted consciously by the government.

X22.17 Repeat the analysis of the imposition of a tax, assuming that the government applies an ad
valorem tax (that is, a tax that is a constant proportion of the value of sales). Explain why
the Pigovian tax will be an ad valorem tax when both the marginal private cost and the
marginal social cost functions are linear.
Our analysis is essentially the same as above. The ad valorem tax is proportional to the price
set, and so may need to be adjusted as market conditions change. In the case where
marginal private cost and marginal social cost are both linear in output though, their
difference, the marginal tax rate, will also be linear.

X22.18 Treating the government as a social planner, what concerns might it have about the effect
of a tax on a single good in general equilibrium? [Hint: Think of the condition that MRT =
MRS for all goods.]
The marginal rate of transformation (MRT) is represented for any output combination on the
production possibility frontier as the gradient of the tangent to that point on the frontier. In
a competitive equilibrium, MRT equals the ratio of the prices received by producers. The
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

marginal rate of substitution is the rate at which individual consumers substitute one good
for the other, maintaining constant utility. In a competitive equilibrium, MRS equals the ratio
of the prices paid by consumers. If a tax changes one price only, then MRT  MRS.

X22.19 Adapt Figure 22.5 to show the situation in which the combination of licence and fine fails
to reduce the externality to the optimal level.
The diagram is exactly the same except that at the level of output where the fine starts to be
imposed, the marginal (private) cost + fine will be less than the market price. The curve
labelled MCP + f therefore begins below the flat line, labelled Price, and intersects it to the
right of output E1*. This intersection will be the output, with firms willing to pay the fine, and
produce an output in excess of the maximum permitted level.

X22.20 Suppose that the government is able to require producers to pay a licence fee, without
which all production is illegal. Indicate on your diagram the size of the largest fee that the
government could persuade a power station to pay.
The largest amount will be the area bounded by the marginal private cost curve and the line
labelled ‘Price,’ which is effectively the marginal revenue curve. This is the producers’
surplus. Restricting output to E1*, the producers’ surplus would be the area between the
marginal private cost and marginal revenue curves, but to the left of the line E = E1*.

X22.21 Confirm that whether or not a licence fee is collected, the usual efficiency conditions for
general equilibrium cannot be satisfied when production is restricted. [Hint: Concentrate
on the values of the marginal products of input factors, assuming that businesses require
both capital and labour inputs.]
Factors of production tend to be more productive – that is, have a higher marginal product –
when the scale of production is restricted. So the value of the marginal product of factors in
industries where there is a production quota is likely to be higher, so that the factor and
output prices will be higher than where there are no restrictions. We conclude that there will
be inefficiencies in the resource allocation. The requirement for efficiency, that the marginal
rate of transformation is equal both to the ratio of factor prices and to individual consumers’
marginal rate of substitution, is no longer satisfied.

X22.22 Suppose that the government issues licences allowing firms to produce any output up to
the socially optimal output E1*, but with a fixed payment, irrespective of the scale of
output. Assume that the government sets the fee so that it captures the entire surplus of a
business operating at the maximum scale. Show that no business will wish to enter the
market and operate at a smaller scale. Discuss why the businesses already in the market
might be willing to accept such a restriction.
This is a different proposal from a per-unit, or ad valorem tax. It is intended to be a lump
sum tax, very similar to the proposal for licensing. The amount of the lump-sum tax is the
maximum producer surplus. Firms that do not produce at the level of output allowing them
to generate this will make losses; existing firms will make no profits, but will still be
economically viable.

X22.23 We continue to assume that the activities of a power station include pollution of the water
supply for all firms operating downstream. Instead of licensing power generation, the
government tolerates the production of the externality, here pollution. (It is still possible
to detect all unlicensed emissions costlessly; and the fines imposed for failure to obtain
licences in advance are large enough to ensure perfect compliance.) We also assume that
the licensing environment involves two elements. Power stations can either:
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

 undertake to pay the costs of pollution recovery directly, c = c1x + c2x2, where x is
the level of pollution; or else
 purchase a licence permitting the production of a specific number of units of
pollution, paying a fee f per unit.
All power stations generate pollution x = x1E, where E is the plant’s power output.
a) Write down an expression for the costs of: (i) recovering the externality; and (ii) paying the
licence fee in terms of the output of power.
The total abatement cost, C = c1x + c2x2; the marginal abatement MAC =
dC
dx
c1 2c2x . In
terms of the power output, since x = x1E, where E is the power output, MAC = c1  2c2 xE . The
1

dF
marginal fee, dx = f1.

b) Calculate the level of output, x*, above which a power station would prefer to pay the
fixed licence fee rather than the recovery costs.
The firm will choose to pay the fee when c1 + 2c2x > f1, or when x > x* = 21c2  f1  c1  .

c) Show that if process innovation leads to a reduction in the value of c2, the value of x* will
also increase.
Formally, we differentiate and confirm that cx*2 0 . Intuitively, we note simply that the form
of the expression for x* indicates that x* is inversely related to c2, so that any reduction in c2
leads to an increase in x*; and firms will tend to switch from paying the licence fee to paying
the recovery costs.

X22.24 We typically define the marginal abatement cost for a power station as being the rate of
change in the cost of reducing production of an externality with the level of output.
Assume that a power station is initially producing externality x0, but recovers a quantity, x,
and that its total abatement cost, c = c1x + c2x2.
a) Write down an expression for the marginal abatement cost.
The marginal abatement cost is as defined in X22.23: MAC(x) = c1 + 2c2x.

b) Sketch a diagram showing the marginal abatement cost (but show the unrecovered
component of the externality on the horizontal axis, so that the curve is downward-
sloping). Assume that the government charges a fee f for each unit of the externality that
is not recovered. Show the power company’s preferred level of recovery.
In a diagram, showing the unrecovered quantity of pollution on the horizontal axis and costs
on the vertical axis, the graph of the marginal abatement cost is a downward-sloping line
segment with gradient -2c2. It passes through the vertical axis at (0, c1 + 2c2x0), and extends
as far as
(x0, c1). Showing the government imposed cost, f, charged on non-recovered pollution, the
firm will pay the fee on the quantity (x0 – x*), defining x*: c1 + 2c2x* = f, as in X22.23.

c) Suppose that improvements in the recovery technology lead to a reduction in the value of
c2. Confirm that the power station will choose to increase the extent of recovery.
This is perhaps done most easily on a graph. The effect of the reduction in the marginal
abatement cost is seen as an anti-clockwise rotation of the MAC curve around (x0, c1). This
has the effect of shifting the intersection of the MAC curve and the line c = f to the left, so
that x*, the quantity recovered by the firm, increases.
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

d) Similarly, suppose that improvements in the production technology lead to a reduction in

the value of x1 at any level of output. Confirm that the power station will treat this as an
improvement in technology that reduces its marginal cost, and will therefore tend to
increase its output, while reducing production of the externality.
For the firm, taking into account the charging regime, profits depend upon output and the
extent of pollution, so  = (E, x). But we have defined pollution, x: x = x1E, a linear function
of output, E. A reduction in the value of x1 would mean a reduction in the level of pollution
for any level of output, and would reduce the costs imposed on the business. The firm
therefore increases its output, while reducing pollution.

e) For marginal social cost MCS = s1 + 2s2x, calculate the output at which the marginal
recovery cost and the marginal social cost are equal. Explain why this is likely to be an
economically efficient outcome.
Marginal social cost increases in the level of unrecovered pollution. When marginal social
cost equals marginal abatement cost, the benefit to society of further recovery is less than
the cost of the activity; the first- (and second-) order conditions for an optimum are satisfied.
With MCS = s1 + 2s2x and MAC = c1 + 2c2(x – x0), equating these expressions, x = s1 2cc122sc22x0 .
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

Chapter 23

X23.1 Discuss the extent to which the following are likely to be either non-excludable or non-
rivalrous in consumption:
a) Air (that is, the gases constituting the atmosphere of the earth).
This is neither excludable nor rivalrous: we all breathe (from birth), and in doing so do not
exhaust the atmosphere.

b) Water held in a reservoir for domestic and industrial usage.

Excludable and rivalrous: without a connection to the distribution system, access is
impossible (although it may be quite difficult to remove access once granted); and as
widespread droughts (e.g. in the South West of the USA) demonstrate, use by one group
reduces the ability of others to consume.

c) The road system surrounding a city; and the pavements of the city streets.
Non-excludable, but rivalrous: there is no charge for entry; and the discussion of congestion
in Chapter 22 confirms rivalry.

d) The public transport system (rail, buses, trams, etc.).

Excludable (in principle) and rivalrous: while on many systems, it is possible to board vehicles
without paying for a ticket, such behaviour is generally illegal. Again, the resource becomes
congested during periods of peak demand.

e) The benefits of an inoculation campaign for an infectious disease such as polio.

Non-excludable and non-rivalrous: Costs will be borne from public funds, and there is
generally a positive externality, in that sufficiently high levels of inoculation will reduce the
probability of infection to close to zero – in the case of polio, potentially globally.

f) The national defence and security services provided by the government.

Non-rivalrous and non-excludable: there have been legal challenges brought by pacifists to
the collection of taxes that might be used to fund defence expenditure; none has been
successful. All benefit from these services, and the benefit is enjoyed without private use of
the resource.

g) Global positioning by satellite technology.

Non-rivalrous and non-excludable: formally part of the national defence service of the United
States of America, it can be used without restriction anywhere on the surface of the earth
(see below for further discussion).

X23.2 What evidence is there that people’s WTP for the location identification services provided
by GPS is greater than zero?
People are willing to buy and rent devices that provide no other services; although these are
being subsumed by somewhat simpler services provided by smartphone.

X23.3 GPS was developed by the Department of Defense in the USA for its own purposes. Why
might we expect a government agency to have taken the lead in this project, rather than
relying on market-based institutions to provide the investment?
We might reasonably ask who, other than government, would wish to develop such a service.
In order for private provision to develop, there has to be a market for the service. Note that
smartphones often do not use GPS to provide mapping services, but rather rely on the
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

terrestrial network of local transmitters, so that such mapping services are bundled with their
other services.

X23.4 Consider a proposal to install streetlights in a small village. The proposal will go ahead if
the amount that each villager is willing to contribute to the fund meets the cost of
providing the lights. What difficulties might there be in relying only on voluntary
contributions to fund the scheme?
Anyone living in the village who does not provide any contribution cannot easily be denied
access to the service, which is neither rivalrous nor excludable.
n
X23.5 Confirm that if the sum of household valuations, V: V  ch  P , then the proposal to
h 1
install streetlights must fail.
n
When V  vh  P , then the total value of the service to the households is less than the price
h 1

of providing it. The sum of contributions, C  V; otherwise, there are people offering to pay
more than their WTP.

X23.6 Assume that vh = v, so that every household places the same value on the service, and that
the feasibility condition in X23.5 is satisfied. Confirm that there are two symmetric Nash
equilibria: (a) where ch = 0 for every household; and (b) where ch = c, and C = nc = P.
Discuss whether equilibrium (a) or equilibrium (b) seems more likely to occur.
We assume that all except one household has made its decision, with the other (n -1) having
adopted the Nash equilibrium strategy.
a) With n – 1 household having decided to make contribution ch = 0, household n can make
contribution cn: 0 < cn < v, and be worse off than when making contribution cn = 0; the
contribution is not sufficient on its own to provide the service, and the individual will not
meet the whole cost of provision. So cn = 0 is a best reply, and strategy ch = 0 supports a
symmetric Nash equilibrium.
P
b) With n – 1 household having decided to make contribution ch = c = n , household n can make
contribution cn = c, ensuring that supply is (just) fully funded. Offering more would not
increase access to the good, and so the household would be worse off offering cn > c than
when making contribution cn = c; and contribution cn < c would not be large enough to secure
the service. So cn = c is a best reply, and strategy ch = c supports a symmetric Nash
equilibrium.
We might consider that the equilibrium in a) will emerge if there is a low trust situation, while
the equilibrium in b) might emerge in a higher trust situation; we would analyse these
outcomes in terms similar to the Stag Hunt game, using mixed strategies in which the
expected payoff to contributing would equal (or exceed) the expected payoff to not
contributing.

X23.7 Confirm that there is an equilibrium in which for household n, cn = 0, but for all other
households, ch  n P 1 < v. Discuss the likelihood of being able to sustain such an
equilibrium.
We do this in two parts. Firstly, we note that for household n, given the strategy of the other
n – 1 households, the level of provision will not increase for any value of ch = 0, so that cn = 0
is the best reply to the other households’ strategy. Secondly, we note that for all of the other
n – 1 households, any contribution less than ch leads to the failure of supply; the household
cannot be better off. For contributions c > ch, the level of provision does not increase, so
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

again, the household cannot be better off. The proposed action profile is therefore a set of
consistent best replies, and so a Nash equilibrium.

X23.8 Suppose that Vishal and William live in houses at the end of a narrow track, 100m in
length. They have received an offer from a local contractor who is willing to pave and
widen the track as part of a development project, but Vishal and William have to meet the
cost of provision, which is £250 per metre. Assume that Vishal’s marginal willingness to
pay, MWTPV = £125/m; while for William, MWTPW = 250 – 1.25x, where x is the length of
paved road.
a) Sketch a diagram to show the marginal cost, the individual MWTP curves, and the market
MWTP curve. Indicate the economically efficient outcome, and confirm that this involves
paving the full length of the track.
On a diagram with the length of paved road, x, shown on the horizontal axis and measures of
cost and benefit on the vertical axis, we show the marginal cost as the horizontal line, MC =
250. Similarly, we show Vishal’s MWTP as the flat line MWTPV = 125. William’s MWTPW is a
downward sloping line segment, connecting (0, 250) on the vertical axis with (100, 125);
while the market MWTP, MWTPM = MWTPV + MWTPW. This will be a line, parallel to
William’s MWTPW curve, but connecting (0, 375) with (100, 250). Given that MWTPM(100) >
MC(100), the track will be built.

b) Suppose that the marginal cost of provision were to increase to £300/m. How would you
expect the efficient outcome to change?
With the increase in marginal cost, the standard first-order condition will apply, and the track
will run where MWTPM > MC, or where 375 – 1.25x > 300, or where x < 60. The contractor
leaves 40m of track unpaved.

c) Suppose instead that Vishal’s circumstances change and he has to use the track more
often. Now MWTPV = 250. If William knows this, how might his behaviour change?
William knows that MWTPV = MC. So he realizes that Vishal will be willing to pay for the
track to be paved. He may refuse to make any contribution, and still be able to use it.

X23.9 Given the problem in Expression 23.5:

a) Form the Lagrangean, and by partial differentiation with respect to R, SV and SW, obtain the
first-order conditions (FOCs), which must be satisfied in a Pareto-efficient outcome. [Hint:
Note that there will be two Lagrangean multipliers.]
We write the Lagrangean (R, SV, SW, , ) = UV(R, SV) + [UW(R, SW) - U0] + (m – pR - SV –
SW).
We obtain five first-order conditions, by partial differentiation with respect to each of the
variables:
 UV UW
R
 R
 R
 p  0 ; 
 SV

U V
SV
  0 ; 
SW

UW
SW
   0 ; UW(R, SW) - U0 = 0;
and m – pR - SV – SW = 0.

b) By expressing the multipliers in terms of the partial derivatives, confirm that for any
Pareto-efficient allocation, (R*, SV*, SW*):
U V  UW
R
U V  R
 UW p [23.6]
SV  SW
UV
. Then    UW  SV
UV UW
Given that R
 R
 p ; we can substitute for , since   UV
 SV UW
SW SW

; and on substituting for  and , and rearranging, the required result follows.
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

X23.10 Given quasi-linear preferences, as in Expression 23.7:

a) Write down expressions for the marginal utilities and the marginal rate of substitution for
both Vishal and William.
From Expression [23.7], partially differentiating UV, we obtain marginal utilities
uV uV
MUR,V = R , and MUS,V = S = 1. Similarly, partially differentiating UW, we obtain marginal
u u
utilities MUR,W = RW , and MUS,W = SW = 1.
The marginal rates of substitution are then (minus one times) the ratio of marginal utilities,
uV uW
uV uW
so that MRSV =  R
uV  R
. In the same way, MRSW =  R
uW  R
.
SV SW

b) Confirm that the marginal rate of substitution depends only on the level of provision of the
public good.
Since the marginal utility of the private good is constant, the level of its consumption does
not enter into the marginal rate of substitution.

X23.11 Suppose that there is only Vishal’s house at the end of the track, and that his utility
max 
function, UV = R. We now write his problem, R, SV
R  SV : pR SV  mV .

a) Confirm that the marginal rate of substitution, MRSV =  R1 . Hence sketch the


indifference curves UV = 1, 2 and 3. Confirm that when R = 1, MRS = –1 on all three

indifference curves.
u
From X23.10, we see that MRSV =  RV . Applying the formula to the expression for Vishal’s
utility, the result follows.
On a diagram with consumption of the public good on the horizontal axis and consumption of
the private good on the vertical axis, the indifference curve, R + SV = 1; or SV = 1 – Ra, begins
from the vertical axis at (0, 1), where the curve is vertical. It is downward sloping and
convex, and meets the horizontal axis at (1, 0), where it has gradient -1. The indifference
curve R + SV = 2; or SV = 2 – Ra, begins from the vertical axis at (0, 2), where the curve is
vertical. It is downward sloping and convex, and meets the horizontal axis at 2a ,0 . Lastly,  
1

the indifference curve,

R + SV = 3; or SV = 3 – Ra, begins from the vertical axis at (0, 3), where the curve is vertical. It
is downward sloping and convex, and meets the horizontal axis at 3a ,0 .   1

b) Show that if p =  = 0.5, and if mV > 0.5, Vishal’s most-preferred, affordable consumption
bundle, (R*, S*) = (1, mV – 0.5). On your diagram, sketch Vishal’s income expansion path.
max 0.5
We write Vishal’s problem as R , SV
R  SV : 0.5R  SV  mV . Then the condition

MRSV =  2R10.5 = ½ is satisfied when R = 1. The income expansion path begins from the origin,
runs along the horizontal axis, until R = 1, and is then the segment of that vertical line above
the axis.

X23.12 We return to the situation where Vishal and William share the access road, writing
William’s utility function, UW = R + SW.
a) On a diagram, sketch both Vishal’s and William’s marginal rate of substitution as the value
of R increases.
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

We know that the marginal rates of substitution MRSV = MRSW =  R1  . The marginal rate of


substitution increases as R increases; for R  0, MRS  -; while as R  , MRS  0

b) Confirm that both for Vishal and for William, the marginal rate of substitution does not
vary with the house sizes, SV and SW.
We have already confirmed this.

c) Apply and interpret the condition in Expression 23.6 in this case.

Since the marginal utility of consumption of the private goods is constant (and scaled to 1),
UV UV 2
we obtain p = R
 R = R1 
. The price of supply for the public good is set so that it is the
sum of consumers’ marginal utilities.

X23.13 Anya, Brinda and Claudia want to find the socially preferred outcome.
a) Suppose that they each have one vote, which they may cast for their own most-preferred
outcome. What will happen?
Each votes for their most-preferred outcome, and there is a tie.

b) Suppose that they agree to engage in successive comparisons of pairs of outcomes. Show
(i) that if x is compared with y, and then the more-preferred outcome is compared with z,
they will choose z; but (ii) that if y is compared with z, and then the more-preferred
outcome is compared with x, then x will be preferred.
In case (i), comparing x and y, x obtains 2 votes, while y obtains 1 vote. Then comparing z
and x, z obtains 2 votes and x obtains 1. So z is chosen.
In case (ii), comparing y and z, y obtains 2 votes, while z obtains 1 vote. Then comparing x
and y, x obtains 2 votes and y obtains 1. So x is chosen.

c) Show that it is possible using successive pairwise comparisons for y to be most preferred.
Suppose we first compare x and z. Then z obtains 2 votes, and x obtains 1 vote. We compare
y and z; and y obtains 2 votes, while z obtains 1. So y is chosen.

X23.14 Claudia decides that this situation is too complicated and leaves. Anya and Brinda now try
again, with each assigning three points to their most-preferred, two to their second-
ranked, and one to their least-preferred, outcomes.
a) Confirm that on this basis they will choose outcome y.
Anya scores the outcomes: x = 3, y = 2, z = 1, while Brinda ranks them y = 3, z = 2, and x = 1.
Adding together the scores, we obtain y = 5, x = 4 and z = 3, so they choose y.

b) Suppose instead that, before evaluating their preferences, they agree that since neither of
them ranks outcome z highest, they should exclude it. How would this affect their choice?
Anya scores the outcomes: x = 2, y = 1, z = 0, while Brinda ranks them y = 2, x = 1, and z = 0.
Adding together the scores, we obtain x = y = 3, so that they are undecided.

X23.15 Suppose that vX = 1,000. Confirm that Xavier is still pivotal, and that the social planner will
still require him to make a transfer, kX = 200.
We have vv = vW = 500, so that subtracting their contributions, each obtains a surplus of -100.
The planner will only proceed with the project if vX > 800, so that Xavier obtains a surplus of
greater than 200. By requiring a transfer of 200, Xavier gives up an amount equal to the loss
that the others suffer.
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

X23.16 Consider a case in which we have a public good for which total cost, C = 5,000, and with
five possible participants, i = 1, … , 5, benefiting from provision, with values v1 = 1,500, v2 =
1,200, v3 = 1,000, v4 = 700, and v5 still to be declared. The social planner announces that
the project requires initial contributions, ci = 1,000. Show that:
a) For 300 v5 < 600, completion is inefficient; and participants 4 and 5 are pivotal, and so
should transfer k4 + k5 = 700.
Completion is inefficient. The loss to participants 1 and 2 is still 700, and so the planner seeks
transfers totalling that amount from participants 4 and 5, who form a blocking coalition.

b) For 600 v5 < 800, completion is efficient: and participant 1 is pivotal, and so should
transfer k1 = 1,300 – v5.
For 600 v5 < 800, the project goes ahead. However, no subset of participants that excludes
participant 1 has a positive total surplus. Participant 1 is therefore pivotal, and pays transfer
equal to the loss experienced by participants 4 and 5, of 1,300 – v5.

c) For 800 v5 < 1,000, completion is efficient; and participants 1 and 2 are pivotal, and so
should transfer k1 + k2 = 1,300 – v5.
This is essentially the same argument as in b), but now participants 1 and 2 together ensure
that the project goes ahead, and the planner requires them to make a transfer equal to the
total loss suffered by participants 4 and 5.

d) For v5 < 300, the social planner will decide that completion of the project is inefficient;
participant 5 is pivotal, and so should make a transfer k5 = 700; and no participant is then
worse off than if the project had gone ahead.
The total cost C = 5000, so the planner requires vi  5,000, or that si  0. We note that
s1 = 500, s2 = 200, s3 = 0, s4 = -300; and s5 = v5 – 1000. Then si = v – 600. So the project is
5

inefficient when v5 < 600; but efficient when v5  600.

Now if v5 < 300, then only participant 5’s low valuation prevents the project going ahead and
the participant compensates those who lose out from cancellation.

X23.17 Suppose that a village is surrounded by common land of 1,500 hectares. The farmers in
the village use the common to graze cattle, achieving an output per hectare, C:
 y , y  0.5

C    0.5  3 y  2 y 2 , 0.5  y  1
0 , otherwise

where y is the stocking density (cattle per hectare). All cattle may be sold for price p =
1,200, and we assume that the marginal cost of production, c = 600y.
a) Show that the output per hectare, C is maximized at y* = 0.75. Sketch a graph of the
output per hectare. (Note that C = 0 if y = 0, or if y > 1.)
1 , y  0.5
Differentiating the output per hectare, dC  3  4 y , 0.5  y  1 . The first-order condition for a
dy
0 , otherwise
dC
maximum, that the derivative, dy = 0, is satisfied either when y = 0.75 or when y > 1;
however, we note that when y > 1, C = 0, whereas when y = 0.75, C = 0.625. (And we can also
2
check that the second-order condition, ddyC2  0 .)
In a diagram with the stocking density, y, measured on the horizontal axis, and the output per
hectare, C, on the vertical axis, the graph of the stocking density has three elements. In the
For use with Robert I. Mochrie, Intermediate Microeconomics, Palgrave, 2016

interval 0  y  0.5, the function is linear. The graph is a line segment with gradient 1,
starting at the origin and extending to (0.5, 0.5). The second section is a segment of a
parabola, passing through (0.5, 0.5), (0.75, 0.625) and (1, 0.5), with gradient 1 when y = 0.5
(so that the parabola has tangent C = y at (0.5, 0.5), and the curve is a smooth extension of
the line segment); reaching a maximum at y = 0.75, and with gradient -1 when y = 1. For y >
1 the graph runs along the horizontal axis; C = 0. Note that there is a discontinuity between
the second and the third segments.

b) If there is no management of the commons, farmers will continue to increase the number
of cattle so long as the revenue that they obtain from selling the cattle exceeds the
marginal cost. On your diagram, indicate what happens.
At stocking density, y, profit per hectare  = (1,200 – 600)C(y). But then differentiating profit,
with respect to the stocking density, we see that
d
dy
 600 dC
dy , and profit reaches a maximum
at y* = 0.75. Although the total profit falls for higher levels of stocking density, production
remains profitable until y = 1, at which point the grazing collapses.
In the diagram, we can relabel the vertical axis as profit.

c) If the commons are enclosed, so that a monopolist (a local landlord) is able to manage the
land to maximize profits, the stocking density will be chosen to maximize profit. Show that
this requires the landlord to maximize the stocking density.
The maximum output per hectare is reached with stocking density y* = 0.75.
Another random document with
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the four Incorporations of Leith (aggregate), £53, 16s. 7d.; the
Episcopal Clergy of Edinburgh, £8, 8s.; Magistrates of Haddington
(and collected by them), £28; Society of Periwigmakers in
Edinburgh, £24, 4s. 3d.; Inhabitants of Musselburgh, Inveresk, and
Fisherrow, £20; collected by Lady Grizel Cochrane, at Dumbarton,
£30; Colonel Charteris’s lady, £5, 7s. 6d.; collected by Lady Grizel
Cochrane, from sundry persons specified, £180.[487]
To do the government justice, the rebel 1716.
prisoners were treated mildly, not one of
them being done to death, though several were transported. An
attempt was made, two years later, by a commission of Oyer and
Terminer sent into Scotland, to bring a number of other Jacobite
delinquents to punishment. It sat at Perth, Dundee, and Kelso,
without being able to obtain true bills: only at Cupar was it so far
effective as to get bills against Lord George Murray, of the Athole
family; Sir James Sharpe, representative of the too famous
archbishop; Sir David Threipland of Fingask; and a son of Moir of
Stonywood; but it was to no purpose, for the trials of these
gentlemen were never proceeded with.[488]

Captain John Cayley (son of Cornelius Oct. 2.

Cayley of the city of York), one of the
commissioners of his majesty’s customs, was a conspicuous member
of that little corps of English officials whom the new arrangements
following on the Union had sent down to Scotland. He was a vain gay
young man, pursuing the bent of his irregular passions with little
prudence or discretion. Amongst his acquaintance in Edinburgh was
a pretty young married woman—the daughter of Colonel Charles
Straiton, well known as a highly trusted agent of the Jacobite party—
the wife of John M‘Farlane, Writer to the Signet, who appears to
have at one time been man of business to Lord Lovat. Cayley had
made himself notedly intimate with Mr and Mrs M‘Farlane, often
entertained them at his country-house, and was said to have made
some valuable presents to the lady. To what extent there was truth in
the scandals which connected the names of Commissioner Cayley
and Mrs M‘Farlane, we do not know; but it is understood that Cayley,
on one occasion, spoke of the lady in terms which, whether founded
in truth or otherwise, infinitely more condemned himself. Perhaps
drink made him rash; perhaps vanity made him assume a triumph
which was altogether imaginary; perhaps he desired to realise some
wild plan of his inflamed brain, and brought on his punishment in
self-defence. There were all sorts of theories on the subject, and little
positively known to give any of them much superiority over another
in point of plausibility. A gentleman,[489] writing from Edinburgh the
second day after, says: ‘I can hardly offer you anything but matter of
fact, which was—that upon Tuesday last he 1716.
came to her lodging after three o’clock,
where he had often been at tea and cards: she did not appear till she
had changed all her clothes to her very smock. Then she came into a
sort of drawing-room, and from that conveyed him into her own
bedchamber. After some conversation there, she left him in it; went
out to a closet which lay at some distance from the chamber; [thence]
she brought in a pair of charged pistols belonging to Mr Cayley
himself, which Mr M‘Farland, her husband, had borrowed from him
some days before, when he was about to ride to the country. What
further expressions there were on either side I know not; but she
fired one pistol, which only made a slight wound on the shackle-bone
of his left hand, and slanted down through the floor—which I saw.
The other she fired in aslant on his right breast, so as the bullet
pierced his heart, and stuck about his left shoulder-blade behind. She
went into the closet, [and] laid by the pistols, he having presently
fallen dead on the floor. She locked the door of her room upon the
dead body, [and] sent a servant for her husband, who was in a
change-house with company, being about four afternoon. He came,
and gave her what money he had in the house, and conducted her
away; and after he had absented himself for about a day, he
appeared, and afterwards declared before the Lords of Justiciary he
knew nothing about it till she sent for him.... I saw his corps after he
was cereclothed, and saw his blood where he lay on the floor for
twenty-four hours after he died, just as he fell, so as it was a difficulty
to straight him.’[490]
Miss Margaret Swinton, a grand-aunt of Sir Walter Scott, used to
relate to him and other listeners to her fireside-tales,[491] that, when
she was a little girl, being left at home at Swinton House by herself
one Sunday, indisposed, while all the rest of the family were at
church, she was drawn by curiosity into the dining-room, and there
saw a beautiful female, whom she took for ‘an enchanted queen,’
pouring out tea at a table. The lady seemed equally surprised as
herself, but presently recovering self-possession, addressed the little
intruder kindly, in particular desiring her to speak first to her mother
by herself of what she had seen. Margaret looked for a moment out
of the window, and, when she turned about, the enchanted queen
was gone! On the return of the family, she spoke to her mother of the
vision, was praised for her discretion, and desired to keep the matter
from all other persons—an injunction she 1716.
strictly followed. The stranger was Mrs
M‘Farlane, who, being a relative of the family, had here received a
temporary shelter after the slaughter of Captain Cayley. She had
vanished from Margaret Swinton’s sight through a panel-door into a
closet which had been arranged for her concealment. The family
always admired the sagacity shewn in asking Margaret to speak to
her mother of what she had seen, but to speak to her alone in the
first instance, as thus the child’s feelings found a safe vent. It will be
remembered that Scott has introduced the incident as part of his
fiction of Peveril of the Peak.
In the ensuing February, criminal letters were raised against Mrs
M‘Farlane by the Lord Advocate, Sir David Dalrymple, and the father
and brother of the deceased, reciting that ‘John Cayley having, on the
2d of October last, come to the house of John M‘Farlane in order to
make a civil visit, she did then and there shoot a pistol at John
Cayley, and thereby mortally wounded him.’ Not appearing to stand
her trial, she was declared outlaw.[492] Sir Walter Scott states it as
certain, that she was afterwards enabled to return to Edinburgh,
where she lived and died;[493] but I must own that some good
evidence would be required to substantiate such a statement.
The romantic nature of the incident, and the fact of the sufferer
being an Englishman, caused the story of Mrs M‘Farlane to be famed
beyond the bounds of Scotland. Pope, writing about the time to Lady
Mary Wortley Montagu, breaks out thus: ‘Let them say I am
romantic; so is every one said to be that either admires a fine thing or
does one. On my conscience, as the world goes, ’tis hardly worth
anybody’s while to do one for the honour of it. Glory, the only pay of
generous actions, is now as ill-paid as other just debts; and neither
Mrs Macfarland for immolating her lover, nor you for returning to
your lord, must ever hope to be compared to Lucretia or Portia.’[494]
 A newspaper which enjoyed a temporary Oct. 20.
[495]
existence in Edinburgh —each number
consisting of five small leaves—is vociferous with the celebrations of
the anniversary of King George’s coronation in Edinburgh, Glasgow,
Aberdeen, Perth, and other Scottish towns. Ten days later, it
proclaims with equal vehemence the 1716.
rejoicings in the same places in honour of
the birthday of the Prince of Wales. Paradings and firings of
musketry by the troops, drinkings of loyal toasts from covered tables
at the Cross, bonfires, ringings of bells, form the chief
demonstrations. And it is notable that in Dundee, Brechin, and
Aberdeen, which we know to have been in those days full of
Jacobites, the symptoms of loyalty to Hanover are by many degrees
the most ostentatious, there being the more need of course for the
friends of the reigning house to exert themselves. In Dundee (where
in reality the Jacobites were probably two to one), ‘everybody looked
cheerful, and vied who should outdo other in rejoicing, except some
few of our Jacobite neighbours, who, being like owls, loved darkness;
but care will be taken that they spared not their money by being
singular.’
Loyalty is altogether a paradox, appearances with it being usually
in the inverse ratio of its actual existence, and the actuality in the
inverse ratio of the deserving. No monarch ever enjoyed so much of
it as Charles I. Since the days of his sons, when the bulk of the people
of Scotland felt themselves under a civil and ecclesiastical tyranny,
the demonstrations at market-crosses on royal birthdays had not
been so violent as now, when a new family, about whom nobody
cared or could care, occupied the throne. Nor did these again become
equally loud till the time of George III., when Wilkes prosecutions,
losses of American colonies, and unjustifiable wars with French
reformers, made loyalty again a needful article, and king’s-health-
drinkings in the highest degree desirable. On the other hand, when
rulers are truly worthy of a faithful affection on the part of their
people—as in our happy age—one never hears the word loyalty
mentioned.
All through the reign of the first George and a great part of that of
his successor, the newspaper estimate of human character seems to
have had but one element—the attachment of the individual to ‘our
present happy establishment in church and state.’ At the end of every
paragraph announcing a choice of magistrates in Scotland, it is
pointedly stated that they are all friends of the Hanover succession.
Such things are, of course, simply the measure of the extent of hatred
and indifferency with which the happy establishment and dynasty
were regarded, as well as of the danger in which it was the fate of
both to exist, from the eagerness of many to get them destroyed.
The same newspaper, while telling us of such grave things as
Scottish nobles and gentlemen waiting in the Tower and in Carlisle
Castle for death or for life, as an incensed 1716.
government might please to dictate, gives us
other notices, reminding us of the affecting truism breathed from
every sheet of the kind in our own day, that all the affairs of human
life, the serious, the comic, the important, the trivial, are constantly
going on shoulder to shoulder together. We glance from a hard-
wrung pardon for a dozen rebels, or an account of the execution of
Sergeant Ainslie, hung over the wall of Edinburgh Castle for an
attempt to render the fortress up to the Jacobites—to the let of the
lands of Biggarshiels, which ‘sow above eighty bolls of oats,’ and have
a good ‘sheepgang’ besides—or to David Sibbald’s vessel, the Anne of
Kirkcaldy, which now lies in Leith harbour for the benefit of all who
wish to transport themselves or their goods to London, and is to sail
with all expedition—or to the fact that yesterday the Duke of
Hamilton left Edinburgh for his country-seat, attended by a retinue
of gentlemen—or to an announcement of Allan Ramsay’s
forthcoming poem of the Morning Interview—for all these things
come jostling along together in one month. Nor may the following
quaint advertisement be overlooked:
‘A young gentlewoman, lately come from London, cuts hair
extremely well, dresses in the newest fashion, has the newest
fashioned patterns for beads, ruffles, &c., and mends lace very fine,
and does all sort of plain work; also teaches young gentlewomen to
work, and young women for their work. She does all manner of
quilting and stitching. All the ladies that come to her on Monday and
Thursday, have their hair cut for sixpence; at any other time, as
reasonably as any in town; and dresses the beads on wires cheaper
than any one. She lodges in the Luckenbooths, over against the
Tolbooth, at one Mr Palmer’s, a periwig-maker, up one pair of
stairs.’[496]

Since the Revolution, there had been a constant and eager

pressure towards commerce and manufactures as a means of saving
the nation from the wretched poverty with which it was afflicted. But
as yet there had been scarcely the slightest movement towards the
improvement of another great branch of the national economy—
namely, the culture of the ground. The country was unenclosed;
cultivation was only in patches near houses; farm establishments
were clusters of hovels; the rural people, among whom the
distinction of master and servant was little 1716.
marked, lived in the most wretched
manner. A large part of rent was paid in produce and by services. Old
systems of husbandry reigned without disturbance. Little had yet
been done to facilitate communications in the country by roads, as
indeed little was required, for all goods were carried on horseback.
The first notable attempt at planting was by Thomas, sixth Earl of
Haddington, about the time of the Union. From a love of common
country sports, this young nobleman was called away by his wife, a
sister of the first Earl of Hopetoun, who desired to see him engaged
in planting, for which she had somehow acquired a taste. The
domain they had to work upon was a tract of low ground
surrounding their mansion of Tyninghame, composing part of the
coast of the Firth of Forth between North Berwick and Dunbar. Their
first experiment was upon a tract of about three hundred acres,
where it was believed that no trees could grow on account of the sea-
air. To the marvel of all, Lord Haddington included, the Binning
Wood, as it was called, soon became a beautiful sylvan domain, as it
continues to this day. To pursue his lordship’s own recital: ‘I now
took pleasure in planting and improving; but, because I did not like
the husbandry practised in this country, I got some farmers from
Dorsetshire. This made me divide my ground; but, as I knew the
coldness of the climate, and the bad effects the winds had, I made
stripes of planting between every enclosure, some forty, fifty, or sixty
feet broad, as I thought best.... From these Englishmen we came to
the knowledge of sowing and the management of grass-seeds. After
making the enclosures, a piece of ground that carried nothing but
furze was planted; and my wife, seeing the unexpected success of her
former projects, went on to another.... There was a warren of four
hundred acres, vastly sandy [near the mouth of the Tyne]. A
gentleman who had lived some time at Hamburg, one day walking
with her, said that he had seen fine trees growing upon such a soil.
She took the hint, and planted about sixty or seventy acres of warren.
All who saw it at the time thought that labour and trees were thrown
away; but to their amazement, they saw them prosper as well as in
the best grounds. The whole field was dead sand, with scarce any
grass on it; nor was it only so poor on the surface, but continued so
some yards down.’[497] Such was the origin of the famous
Tyninghame Woods, which now present eight hundred acres of the
finest timber in the country. By means of 1716.
his Dorsetshire farmers, too, Lord
Haddington became the introducer of the practice of sowing clover
and other grass-seeds.
Another early improver of the surface was Sir Archibald Grant of
Monymusk (second baronet of the title), whose merits, moreover, are
the more remarkable, as his operations took place in a remote part of
the north. ‘In my early days,’ says he, ‘soon after the Union,
husbandry and manufactures were in low esteem. Turnips [raised] in
fields for cattle by the Earl of Rothes and very few others, were
wondered at. Wheat was almost confined to East Lothian. Enclosures
were few, and planting very little; no repair of roads, all bad, and
very few wheel-carriages. In 1720, I could not, in chariot, get my wife
from Aberdeen to Monymusk. Colonel Middleton [was] the first who
used carts or wagons there; and he and I [were] the first benorth Tay
who had hay, except very little at Gordon Castle. Mr Lockhart of
Carnwath, author of Memoirs, [was] the first that attempted raising
or feeding cattle to size.’[498]
‘By the indulgence of a very worthy father,’ says Sir Archibald, ‘I
was allowed [in] 1716, though then very young, to begin to enclose
and plant, and provide and prepare nurseries. At that time there was
not one acre upon the whole estate enclosed, nor any timber upon it
but a few elm, sycamore, and ash, about a small kitchen-garden
adjoining to the house [a very common arrangement about old
Scotch country mansion-houses], and some straggling trees at some
of the farmyards, with a small copsewood, not enclosed and
dwarfish, and browsed by sheep and cattle. All the farms [were] ill-
disposed and mixed, different persons having alternate ridges; not
one wheel-carriage on the estate, nor indeed any one road that would
allow it; and the rent about £600 sterling per annum, [when] grain
and services [were] converted into money. The house was an old
castle, with battlements and six different roofs of various heights and
directions, confusedly and inconveniently combined, and all rotten,
with two wings more modern of two stories only, the half of the
windows of the higher rising above the roofs; with granaries, stables,
and houses for all cattle and the vermin attending them close
adjoining; and with the heath and muir reaching in angles or gushets
to the gate, and much heath near. What land was in culture belonged
to the farms, by which their cattle and dung 1716.
were always at the door. The whole land
[was] raised and uneven, and full of stones, many of them very large,
of a hard iron quality, and all the ridges crooked in shape of an S, and
very high, and full of noxious weeds, and poor, being worn out by
culture, without proper manure or tillage. Much of the land and muir
near the house [was] poor and boggy; the rivulet that runs before the
house in pits and shallow streams, often varying channel, with banks
always ragged and broken. The people [were] poor, ignorant, and
slothful, and ingrained enemies to planting, enclosing, or any
improvements or cleanness; no keeping of sheep or cattle, or roads,
but four months, when oats and bear (which was the only sorts of
their grain) was on ground. The farmhouses, and even corn-mills,
and manse and school, [were] all poor, dirty huts, [occasionally]
pulled in pieces for manure, or [which] fell of themselves almost each
alternate year.’[499]
By Sir Archibald’s exertions, Monymusk became in due time a
beautiful domain, well cultivated and productive, checkered with fine
woods, in which are now some of the largest trees to be seen in that
part of Scotland.
There is reason to believe that the very first person who was
effective in introducing any agricultural improvements into Scotland
was an English lady. It was in 1706—the year before the Union—that
Elizabeth Mordaunt, daughter of the famous Earl of Peterborough,
married the eldest son of the Duke of Gordon, and came to reside in
Scotland. A spark of her father’s enterprising genius made her desire
to see her adopted country put on a better aspect, and she took some
trouble to effect the object, by bringing down to some of her father-
in-law’s estates English ploughs, with men to work them, and who
were acquainted with the business of fallowing—heretofore utterly
unknown in Scotland. Her ladyship instructed the people of her
neighbourhood in the proper way of making hay, of which they were
previously ignorant; and set an example in the planting of muirs and
the laying out of gardens. Urged by her counsels, during the first
twenty years of her residence in Scotland, two Morayland
proprietors, Sir Robert Gordon of Gordonston, and a gentleman
named Dunbar, and one Ross-shire laird, Sir William Gordon of
Invergordon, set about the draining and planting of their estates, and
the introduction of improved modes of culture, including the sowing
of French grasses.[500] It is rather 1716.
remarkable that Scotland should have
received her first impulse towards agricultural improvements from
England, which we have in recent times seen, as it were, sitting at her
feet as a pupil in all the various particulars of a superior rural
economy.

We are informed that, after the close of Nov.

the Rebellion, owing to the number of
people cast loose thereby from all the ordinary social bonds, ‘thefts,
robberies, rapines, and depredations became so common [in the
Highlands and their borders], that they began to be looked upon as
neither shameful nor dishonourable, and people of a station
somewhat above the vulgar, did sometimes countenance, encourage,
nay, head gangs of banditti in those detestable villanies.’ The tenants
of great landlords who had joined the Whig cause were particularly
liable to despoliation, and to this extent the system bore the
character of a kind of guerilla warfare. Such a landlord was the Duke
of Montrose, whose lands lying chiefly in the western parts of Perth,
Stirling, and Dumbarton shires, were peculiarly exposed to this kind
of rapine. His Grace, moreover, had so acted towards Rob Roy, as to
create in that personage a deep sense of injury, which the Highland
moral code called for being wreaked out in every available method.
Rob had now constituted himself the head of the broken men of his
district, and having great sagacity and address, he was by no means a
despicable enemy.
At the date noted, the duke’s factor, Mr Graham of Killearn, came
in the usual routine, to collect his Grace’s Martinmas rents at a place
called Chapel-eroch, about half-way between Buchanan House and
the village of Drymen. The farmers were gathered together, and had
paid in about two hundred and sixty pounds, when Rob Roy, with
twenty followers, descended upon the spot from the hills of
Buchanan. Having planted his people about the house, he coolly
entered, took Mr Graham prisoner, and possessed himself of the
money that had been collected, as well as the account-books, telling
the factor that he would answer for all to the duke, as soon as his
Grace should pay him three thousand four hundred merks, being the
amount of what he professed himself to have been wronged of by the
havoc committed by the duke upon his house at Craigrostan, and
subsequently by the burning of his house at 1716.
Auchinchisallen by the government troops.
Mr Graham was permitted to write to the duke, stating the case, and
telling that he was to remain a prisoner till his Grace should comply
with Rob’s demands, with ‘hard usage if any party are sent after him.’
Mr Graham was marched about by Rob Roy from place to place,
‘under a very uneasy kind of restraint,’ for a week, when at length the
outlaw, considering that he could not mend matters, but might only
provoke more hostility by keeping his prisoner any longer, liberated
him with his books and papers, but without the money.
Part of the duke’s rents being paid in kind, there were girnels or
grain stores near Chapel-eroch, into which the farmers of the district
used to render their quotas of victual, according to custom.
‘Whenever Rob and his followers were pressed with want, a party
was detached to execute an order of their commanders, for taking as
much victual out of these girnels as was necessary for them at the
time.’ In this district, ‘the value of the thefts and depredations
committed upon some lands were equal to the yearly rent of the
lands, and the persons of small heritors were taken, carried off, and
detained prisoners till they redeemed themselves for a sum of
money, especially if they had at elections for parliament voted for the
government man.’[501]
 The duke got his farmers armed, and was preparing for an inroad
on the freebooter’s quarters, when, in an unguarded moment, they
were beset by a party of Macgregors under Rob’s nephew, Gregor
Macgregor of Glengyle, and turned adrift without any of their
military accoutrements. The duke renewed the effort with better
success, for, marching into Balquhidder with some of his people, he
took Rob Roy prisoner. But here good-fortune and native craft
befriended the outlaw. Being carried along on horseback, bound by a
belt to the man who had him in charge, he contrived so to work on
the man’s feelings as to induce him to slip the bond, as they were
crossing a river, when, diving under the stream, he easily made his
escape. Sir Walter Scott heard this story recited by the grandson of
Rob’s friend, and worked it up with his usual skill in the novel
bearing the outlaw’s name.
While these operations were going on, the commissioners on the
Forfeited Estates were coolly reckoning up the little patrimony of
Rob Roy as part of the public spoil of the 1716.
late rebellion. It is felt as a strange and
uncouth association that Steele, of Tatler and Spectator memory—
kind-hearted, thoughtless Dicky Steele—should have been one of the
persons who administered in the affairs of the cateran of
Craigrostan. In the final report of the commissioners, we have the
pitiful account of the public gains from the ruin of poor Rob,
Inversnaid being described as of the yearly value of £53, 16s. 8½d.,
and the total realised from it of purchase-money and interest, £958,
10s. There is all possible reason to believe, that it would have been a
much more advantageous as well as humane arrangement for the
public, to allow these twelve miles of Highland mountains to remain
in the hands of their former owner.

Wonder-seekers were at this time regaled 1717. Jan.

with a brochure stating how Mr John
Gardner, minister near Elgin, fell into a trance, and lay as dead for
two days, in the sight of many; and how, being put into a coffin, and
carried to his parish church in order to be buried, he was heard at the
last moment to make a noise in the coffin; which being opened, he
was found alive, ‘to the astonishment of all present.’ Being then
carried home, and put into a warm bed, he in a little time coming to
himself, ‘related many strange things which he had seen in the other
world.’ In the same publication was a sermon which the worthy man
had preached after his recovery.

Mr Gordon of Ellon, a rich merchant of Apr. 29.

Edinburgh, lived in a villa to the north of
the city, with a family composed of a wife, two sons, and a daughter,
the children being all of tender age.[502] He had for a tutor to his two
boys a licentiate of the church, named Robert Irvine, who was
considered of respectable attainments, but remarked for a somewhat
melancholic disposition. A gloomy view of predestination, derived
from a work by Flavel, had taken hold of Irvine’s mind, which,
perhaps, had some native infirmity, ready to be acted upon by
external circumstances to dismal results.
The tutor, having cast eyes of affection upon a servant-girl in his
employer’s house, was tempted, one day, to take some liberties with
her, which were observed and reported by 1717.
his two pupils. He was reprimanded by Mr
Gordon for this breach of decorum, which, on an apology from him,
was forgiven. The incident sunk into the man’s sensitive nature, and
he brooded upon it till it assumed proportions beyond the reality,
and raised in his heart an insane thirst for revenge. For three days
did the wretch revolve the idea of cutting off Mr Gordon’s three
children, and on the day here noted he found an opportunity of
partially accomplishing his morbid desire. It was Sunday, and Mr
and Mrs Gordon went to spend the latter part of the day with a friend
in the city, taking their little daughter along with them. Irvine, left
with the two boys, took them out for a walk along the then broomy
slope where St Andrew Square and York Place are now situated. The
children ran about gathering flowers and pursuing butterflies, while
this fiend-transformed man sat whetting a knife wherewith to cut
short their days. Calling the two boys to him, he upbraided them with
their informing upon him, and told them that they must suffer for it.
They ran off, but he easily overtook and seized them. Then keeping
one down upon the grass with his knee, he cut the other’s throat;
after which he despatched in like manner the remaining one.
The insane nature of the action was shewn by its being committed
in daylight in an open place, exposed to the view of multitudes who
might chance to look that way from the adjacent city. A gentleman,
enjoying his evening walk upon the Castle Hill, did obtain a tolerably
perfect view of the incident, and immediately gave an alarm. Irvine,
who had already attempted to cut his own throat, but unsuccessfully,
ran from his pursuers to the Water of Leith, thinking to drown
himself there; but he was taken, and brought in a cart to prison, and
there chained down to the floor, as if he had been a wild beast.
There was a summary process of law for murderers taken as he
was with the red hand. It was only necessary to bring him next day
before the judge of the district, and have sentence passed upon him.
In this case, the judge was the Baron Bailie of Broughton, a hamlet
now overwhelmed in the spreading streets of the New Town of
Edinburgh, but whose court-house existed so lately as 1827.[503] Till
the abolition of heritable jurisdictions in 1747, the bailie of the Baron
of Broughton could arraign a criminal 1717.
before a jury of his own people, and do the
highest judgment upon him. Irvine was tried by the bailie upon the
30th of April, and received sentence of death. During the brief
interval before execution, which was but a day, the unhappy wretch
was addressed by several clergymen on the heinousness of his crime,
and the need of repentance, and, after a time, he began to exhibit
signs of contrition. The bloody clothes of the poor children being
then exhibited before him, he broke out in tears and groans, as if a
new light was shed upon his mind, and he had been able to see his
offence in its true character. He then sent a message to the bereaved
parents, beseeching their Christian forgiveness to a dying man; and
this they very kindly gave.
Irvine was next day hanged at Greenside, having first had his
hands hacked off, and stuck upon the gibbet by the knife with which
he had committed the murder. His body was thrown into a
neighbouring quarry-hole.[504]

Occurred this day at Edinburgh a June 10.

thunder-storm, attended with such
remarkable effects, that an account of it was published on a
broadside. It was little, perhaps, that it frightened the people off the
streets, caused the garrison at the Castle to look well to the powder-
magazine, and killed a man and a woman at Lasswade. What
attracted particular attention was the fate of a tavern company at
Canonmills, where two barbers from the Lawnmarket had come to
celebrate the Pretender’s birthday over a bottle of ale. They had just
drunk to the health of their assumed monarch—one of the company
had remarked with a curse how the bells were not rung or the Castle
guns fired on ‘the king’s’ birthday—when a great thunder-clap broke
over the house. ‘The people on earth,’ cried one of the party, ‘will not
adore their king; but you hear the Almighty is complimenting him
with a volley from heaven.’ At that moment came a second stroke,
which instantaneously killed one of the barbers and a woman, and
scorched a gentleman so severely that he died in a few hours. The
rest of the company, being amazed, sent to Edinburgh for doctors to
take blood of the gentleman; but the doctors told them they could do
no good. They tried to let blood of him, but found none. ‘Their bodies
were as soft as wool.’
‘There is none more blind than them that 1717.
will not see: these men may see, if they
wilfully will not shut their eyes, that Providence many times hath
blasted their enterprises.... These men were contending for that
which did not concern them; they were drinking, cursing, and
passing reflections—which in all probability hath offended the King
of Heaven to throw down his thunder, &c., a warning to all
blasphemers, drunkards, swearers, licentious livers, and others.’[505]
It is a little awkward for this theory, that among the killed was but
one of the Jacobite barbers, the other and equally guilty one
escaping.

The capture of the fugitate Rob Roy June.

seeming now an object worthy of the regard
of the Duke of Athole, a negotiation took place between them, which
ended in Rob being taken into custody of a strong party at Logierait,
the place where his Grace usually exercised his justiciary functions,
and where his prison accordingly was situated. The outlaw felt he
had been deceived, but it did not appear that he could help himself.
Meanwhile, the duke sent intelligence of the capture of Rob to
Edinburgh, desiring a company of troops to be sent to receive him.
Ultimately, however, the duke countermanded the military, finding
he could send a sufficiently strong party of his own people to hand
over the outlaw to justice.
While preparations were making for his transmission to the
Lowlands, Rob entertained his guards with whisky, and easily gained
their confidence. One day, when they were all very hearty, he made a
business to go to the door to deliver a letter for his wife to a man who
was waiting for it, and to whom he pretended he had some private
instructions to give. One of the guard languidly accompanied him, as
it were for form’s sake, having no fear of his breaking off. Macgregor
was thus allowed to lounge about outside for a few minutes, till at
last getting near his horse, he suddenly mounted, and was off to
Stirlingshire like the wind.[506]
To have set two dukes upon thief-catching within a twelvemonth
or so, and escaped out of the clutches of both, was certainly a curious
fate for a Highland cateran, partisan 1717.
warrior, or whatever name he may be called
by.

Sir Richard Steele appears not to have Nov.

attended the business of the Forfeited
Estates Commission in Edinburgh during the year 1716, but given his
time, as usual, to literary and political pursuits in London, and to a
project in which he had become concerned for bringing fish ‘alive
and in good health’ to the metropolis. It was reported that he would
get no pay for the first year, as having performed no duty; but those
who raised this rumour must have had a very wrong notion of the
way that public affairs were then administered. He tells his wife, May
22, 1717, in one of those most amorous of marital letters of his which
Leigh Hunt has praised so much, that ‘five hundred pounds for the
time the commission was in Scotland is already ordered me.’ It is
strange to reflect that payment of coach-horses, which he, as a man
of study, rarely used, and condemned as vain superfluities, was
among the things on which was spent the property wrung out of the
vitals of the poor Scotch Jacobites.
When the second year’s session of the commissioners was about to
commence in September 1717, Sir Harry Houghton appears to have
proposed that Steele should go at the first, in which case the baronet
proposed to relieve him in November; in case he did not go now, he
would have to go in November, and stay till the end of January. He
dallied on in London, only scheming about his journey, which, it
must be admitted, was not an easy one in 1717. He informs his wife:
‘I alter the manner of taking my journey every time I think of it. My
present disposition is to borrow what they call a post-chaise of the
Duke of Roxburgh [Secretary of State for Scotland]. It is drawn by
one horse, runs on two wheels, and is led by a servant riding by. This
rider and leader is to be Mr Willmot, formerly a carrier, who answers
for managing on a road to perfection, by keeping tracks, and the like.’
Next it was: ‘I may possibly join with two or three gentlemen, and
hire a coach for ourselves.’ On the 30th of September, he tells Lady
Steele: ‘The commission in Scotland stands still for want of me at
Edinburgh. It is necessary there should be four there, and there are
now but two; three others halt on the road, and will not go forward
till I have passed by York. I have therefore taken places in the York
coach for Monday next.’ On the 20th of October: ‘After many
resolutions and irresolutions concerning my way of going, I go, God
willing, to-morrow morning, by the 1717.
Wakefield coach, on my way to York and
Edinburgh.’ And now he did go, for his next letter is dated on the 23d
from Stamford, to which place two days’ coaching had brought him.
An odd but very characteristic circumstance connected with
Steele’s first journey to Scotland was, that he took a French master
with him, in order that the long idle days and evenings of travelling
might be turned to some account in his acquisition of that language,
which he believed would be useful to him on his return. ‘He lies in
the same room with me; and the loquacity which is usual at his age,
and inseparable from his nation, at once contributes to my purpose,
and makes him very agreeable.’
Steele was in Edinburgh on the 5th of November, and we know
that about the 9th he set out on his return to London, because on the
11th he writes to his wife from Ayton on the third day of his journey,
one (a Sunday) having been spent in inaction on the road. ‘I hope,’
says he, ‘God willing, to be at London, Saturday come se’ennight:’
that is to say, the journey was to take a fortnight. In accordance with
this view of the matter, we find him writing on Friday the 15th from
Pearce Bridge, in the county of Durham, ‘with my limbs much better
than usual after my seven days’ journey from Edinburgh towards
London.’ He tells on this occasion: ‘You cannot imagine the civilities
and honours I had done me there, and [I] never lay better, ate or
drank better, or conversed with men of better sense, than there.’[507]
Brief as his visit had been, he was evidently pleased with the men
he met with in the Scottish capital. All besides officials must have felt
that he came about a business of malign aspect towards their
country; but his name was an illustrious one in British literature, he
was personally good-natured, and they could separate the great
essayist from the Whig partisan and servant of the ministry. Allan
Ramsay would be delighted to see him in his shop ‘opposite to
Niddry’s Wynd head.’ Thomson, then a youth at college, would steal
a respectful look at him as he stood amongst his friends at the Cross.
From ‘Alexander Pennecuik, gentleman,’ a bard little known to fame,
he received a set of complimentary verses,[508] ending thus:
‘Scotia....
Grief more than age hath furrowèd her brow,
She sobs her sorrows, yet she smiles on you;
Tears from her crystal lambics do distil,
With throbbing breast she dreads th’ approaching ill,
Yet still she loves you, though you come to kill,
In midst of fears and wounds, which she doth feel,
Kisses the hurting hand, smiles on the wounding Steele.’

Sir Richard spent part of the summer of 1718.

1718 in Edinburgh, in attendance upon the
business of the commission. We find him taking a furnished house
for the half-year beginning on the 15th of May (the Whitsunday term
in Scotland), from Mr James Anderson, the editor of the Diplomata
Scotiæ. But on the 29th July he had not come to take possession:
neither could he say when he would arrive, till his ‘great affair’ was
finished. He promised immediately thereupon to take his horses for
Scotland, ‘though I do not bring my coach, by reason of my wife’s
inability to go with me.’ ‘I shall,’ he adds, ‘want the four-horse stable
for my saddle-horses.’
He appears to have taken the same house for the same period in
1719, and to have revisited Scotland in the same manner in 1720,
when he occupied the house of Mr William Scott, professor of Greek
in the Edinburgh University.[509] There is a letter to him from Mr
James Anderson in February 1721, thanking him for the interest he
had taken in forwarding a scheme of the writer, to induce the
government to purchase his collection of historical books. Steele was
again residing in Edinburgh in October 1721, when we find him in
friendly intercourse with Mr Anderson. ‘Just before I received yours,’
he says on one occasion, ‘I sent a written message to Mr
Montgomery, advising that I designed the coach [Steele’s own
carriage?] should go to your house, to take in your galaxy, and
afterwards call for his star:’ pleasant allusions these probably to
some party of pleasure in which the female members of Mr
Anderson’s and Mr Montgomery’s families were to be concerned. In
the ensuing month, he writes to Mr Anderson from the York
Buildings Office in London, regarding an application he had had
from a poor woman named Margaret Gow. He could not help her
with her petition; but he sent a small bill representing money of his
own for her relief. ‘This trifle,’ he says, ‘in her housewifely hands, will
make cheerful her numerous family at Collingtown.’[510]
These are meagre particulars regarding Steele’s visits to Scotland,
but at least serviceable in illustrating his 1718.
noted kind-heartedness.
‘Kind Richy Spec, the friend of a’ distressed,’

as he is called by Allan Ramsay, who doubtless made his personal

acquaintance at this time.
There is a traditionary anecdote of Steele’s visits to Scotland,
which has enough of truth-likeness to be entitled to preservation. It
is stated that, in one of his journeys northward, soon after he had
crossed the Border, near Annan, he observed a shepherd resting on a
hillside and reading a book. He and his companions rode up, and one
of them asked the man what he was reading. It proved to be the
Bible. ‘And what do you learn from this book?’ asked Sir Richard. ‘I
learn from it the way to heaven.’ ‘Very well,’ replied the knight, ‘we
are desirous of going to the same place, and wish you would shew us
the way.’ Then the shepherd, turning about, pointed to a tall and
conspicuous object on an eminence at some miles’ distance, and
said: ‘Weel, gentlemen, ye maun just gang by that tower.’ The party,
surprised and amused, demanded to know how the tower was called.
The shepherd answered: ‘It is the Tower of Repentance.’
It was so in verity. Some centuries ago, a Border cavalier, in a fit of
remorse, had built a tower, to which he gave the name of
Repentance. It lies near Hoddam House, in the parish of
Cummertrees, rendered by its eminent situation a conspicuous
object to all the country round.
We are informed by Richard Shiels that Steele, while in Scotland,
had interviews with a considerable number of the Presbyterian
clergy, with the view of inducing them to agree to a union of the
Presbyterian and Episcopal churches—a ‘devout imagination,’ which
one would have thought a very few such interviews would have been
required to dispel. He was particularly struck with the singular and
original character of James Hart, one of the ministers of Edinburgh,
who is universally admitted to have been an excellent man, as he was
a most attractive preacher. That strange enthusiast, Mrs Elizabeth
West, speaks of a discourse she once heard from him on a passage in
Canticles: ‘The king hath brought me into his chambers; we will be
glad,’ where he held forth, she says, ‘on the sweet fellowship Christ
and believers have together.’ ‘Oh,’ she adds, ‘but this was a soul-
refreshing sermon to me!’ What had most impressed the English
moralist was the contrast between the good-humour and
benevolence of Hart in his private 1718.
character, and the severe style in which he
launched forth in the pulpit on the subject of human nature, and on
the frightful punishments awaiting the great mass of mankind in
another state of existence. Steele called him on this account ‘the
Hangman of the Gospel.’[511]
The only other recollection of Steele in Edinburgh which has ever
come under the notice of the author, represents him,
characteristically, as assembling all the eccentric-looking mendicants
of the Scottish capital in a tavern in Lady Stair’s Close, and there
pleasing the whimsical taste of himself and one or two friends by
witnessing their happiness in the enjoyment of an abundant feast,
and observing all their various humours and oddities. Shiels also
relates this circumstance, and adds that Steele afterwards confessed
he had drunk in enough of native drollery to compose a comedy.
 Lord Grange tells us, in his Diary, of a 1717. Nov.
woman in humble life, residing in the
Potterrow in Edinburgh, who had religious experiences reminding us
of those of St Theresa and Antonia Bourignon, but consonant with
orthodox Presbyterianism. Being taken, along with Mr Logan, the
minister of Culross, to see her at ‘Lady Aytoun’s, at the back of the
College,’ he found her a woman between thirty and forty. At the
communion in Leith, a month ago, she had striven to dwell upon the
thought of Christ, and came to have ‘clear uptakings of his
sufferings.’ She saw him on the cross, and his deserted sepulchre, ‘as
plainly as if she had been actually present when these things
happened, though there was not any visible representation thereof
made to her bodily eyes. She also got liberty to speak to him, and ask
several questions at him, to which she got answers, as if one had
spoken to her audibly, though there was no audible voice.’ Lord
Grange admits that all this was apt to look like enthusiasm or
delusion; but ‘far be it from me to say it is delusion.’ Being once at a
communion in Kirkcaldy, ‘it was born in upon her—“Arise and eat,
for thou hast a journey to make, a Jordan to pass through.”’ In
passing across the Firth of Forth that afternoon, she was upset into
the water, but sustained till a boat came to her rescue.
The pious judge seems to have desired much to keep up
acquaintance with Jean Brown—for such was her name—and he
went several times to see her at her little shop; but the place was so
much crowded with ‘children and people 1717.
coming in to buy such things as she sells,’
that his wish was frustrated. ‘Afterwards,’ he tells us, ‘I employed her
husband [a shoemaker] to make some little things for me, mostly to
give them business, and that I might thereby get opportunity now
and then to talk with such as, I hope, are acquainted with the ways of
God.’

Immediately after the Union, the shrewd- 1718.

witted people of Glasgow saw the
opportunity which was afforded them of making a profitable trade
with the American colonies. They had as yet no vessels of their own,
and little means of purchasing cargoes; but diligence, frugality, and
patience made up for all deficiencies. There is scarcely anything in