INMATES OF THE NEW BILIBID PRISON: ROXAS ET AL. V. LEILA M.

DE LIMA (AS DOJ

SECRETARY) AND MANUEL A. ROXAS II (AS DILG SECRETARY), GR NO. 212719, 25 JUNE 2019

FACTS

On May 2013, Benigno Simeon Aquino III signed into law RA 10592 amending rules on the good conduct
and time allowance (GCTA) of prisoners modifying Articles 29, 94, 97, 98, and 99 of the RPC. Modifications
include not just offenders from acquiring the privilege of the grant but also the ACCUSED. The amendment
also created the Management, Screening and Evaluation Committee (MSEC) who shall screen applications
for GCTA, TASTM, and STAL which was previously under the Classification Board.

Salient modifications are as follows (underscored):

Art. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment – both offenders and accused who
have undergone detention voluntarily after being informed of the privilege of the GCTA grant may enjoy its benefit.
Acknowledgment and compliance must be in writing and assisted by counsel WON offender/accused agrees. Computation
of preventive imprisonment count shall commence from the period of actual detention.

Recidivists and those summoned for execution of sentence but failed to voluntarily surrender (evasion) are EXEMPTED
from the benefits of the GCTA.

Art. 94. Partial extinction of criminal liability applicable in: (1) conditional pardon; (2) commutation of sentence; (3)
GCTA cases while culprit is undergoing preventive imprisonment or serving sentence.

Art. 97. Credit given as ratio deduction in allowance for good conduct.

Art. 98. Special time allowance (STAL) – commutation of 1/5 of sentence for those escapees from prison who took
advantage and escaped but voluntarily submitted themselves back within 48hrs after calamity.

Art. 99. Who grants time allowances: Director of Bureau of Correction, Chief of BJMP, and/or Warden of a
provincial/district/municipal/city jail.

DOJ Secretary De Lima and DILG Secretary Roxas II jointly passed the IRR on March 2014. Petitioners
assailed the validity of the IRR since Sec. 4 of the IRR provides for the prospective application of the GCTA,
the time allowance for study, teaching and mentoring (TASTM), and special time allowance for loyalty
(STAL) violative of Art. 22 of the RPC (re: retroactive effect of penal laws if favorable for the accused).

TWO separate cases were filed.

GR 212719 (Roxas et al.)

On June 2014, Bilibid inmates Roxas et al. filed for a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for
Issuance of Preliminary Injunction against respondents De Lima and Roxas II questioning the validity of
Sec. 4 of the IRR as contrary to Art. 22 of the RPC on the supposed retroactive effect of penal laws. They
claim:
1. They are a proper party to the case. Such petition is a class suit which benefits them and all
inmates.
2. There is an actual case because the creation of the MSEC should not modify the due process
clause of the Constitution with regard the retroactive effect of penal laws favorable to the
accused.

On July 2014, Atty. Saguisag Sr. filed an addition in intervention that legislative intent behind the
amendment does not intend that it be of prospective application. Court granted and resolved intervention
on July 2014 requiring respondents to comment.

On October 2014, FLAG representatives Atty. Montinola et al. filed an addition in intervention that Section
4 of the IRR is contrary to the equal protection clause of the Constitution; submitting that it discriminates
without reasonable basis.
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) made a consolidated comment to the petitions of Bilibid inmates Roxas
et al., and petitions-in-intervention of Atty. Saguisag Sr. and Atty. Montinola et al.

GR 214637 (Edago et al.)

Bilibid inmates Edago et al. filed for a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition against De Lima and Roxas II
on October 2014 for issues:
1. SEC. 4 SHOULD BE VOID AND ILLEGAL AS CONTRARY TO RA 10592: (1) the amendment
does not intend prospective application; (2) Sec. 4 of the IRR is contrary to Art. 22 of the RPC; (3)
Sec. 4 of the IRR contravenes public policy and does not submit to the intent of the Congress when
it enacted the amendment.
2. SEC. 4 IS PATENTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (1) violates the Equal Protection Clause; (2)
violates substantive due process.

ISSUE AND DECISION: Should Sec. 4 of the IRR of RA 10592 providing for the prospective
application of the amendment sustain?

Court granted the petition of the inmates.

Four judicial requisites for constitutional questions:
1. (Actual case or controversy) There is an actual case or controversy – there is contrariety of rights of parties subject
to legal controversy; must be a full-blown and live controversy, not merely moot. Court’s role must not be as mere
advisory, but to actually decide on the case to its finality.
2. (Locus standi) Constitutional questions raised by proper party – one who sustained an injury or is an immediate
danger of sustaining an injury (there is no actual injury yet).
3. Question raised at earliest possible opportunity – must be raised at the pleading to be taken up in the trial for
decision.
4. Constitutional question is necessary to the settlement of the case.

Actual case or controversy

On Edago et al., respondents allege that there is no actual issue or controversy which shall make the case
justiciable: (1) MSEC has not been established; (2) prisoners did not apply for revised credit, thus are not
aggrieved parties; (3) the records received by the prisoners computing for their supposed GCTA were
neither certified nor signed by the BUCOR Director.

Court disagreed. In Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Aguire, the theory that people should wait for the implementing
evil to befall upon them before they could question acts that are illegal and unconstitutional is reversed. By
mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, it has automatically ripened
into a judicial controversy without need for any overt act.

Legal standing/locus standi

Court finds that the petitioners are proper parties. They are prisoners who may be aggrieved by the
discriminatory and unlawful effect of Sec. 4 of the IRR.

Appropriateness of legal remedy

Respondents alleged that the legal remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition against the petitions-in-intervention
are not proper since it only applies against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. The IRR is an administrative issuance made in exercise of their rule-making or quasi-judicial
functions.

Court disagrees. Certiorari and Prohibition are proper remedies for any question of constitutionality of laws
and acts of the legislative and executive officers.

Hierarchy of courts
Respondents argue that it is the RTC that should have jurisdiction over the case pursuant to BP 129 which
provides that actions for declaratory relief against administrative issuances incapable of pecuniary
estimation is under exclusive jurisdiction of RTC.

Court negates. The action to elevate the case to the Supreme Court is an exemption since the matter issue
is an exceptional and compelling circumstance (i.e., cases of national interest and of serious implication,
those of transcendental importance and first impression).

It is violative of substantive due process:

Art. 22 of the RPC is a penal law and not a procedural law. The retroactive effect is embraced in the
amorphism: favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigendi (penal laws which are favorable to the accused
are given retroactive effect) inspired by sentiments of humanity, conscience, and good law.

PETITION is GRANTED. Section 4, Rule 1 of RA 10592 is DECLARED INVALID; decision is

IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.