Toward the West: Iran, the Shah, and Two Revolutions

At the opening of the 1960’s, Mohammed Reza Shah addressed the people of Iran, and

announced his White Revolution. A set of wide-sweeping progressive reforms, the White

Revolution was intended to completely transform Iran from a backward, overly-religious and

nearly feudal society to a modern westernized nation resembling those in Western Europe.

These wide reforms and some of their unforeseen consequences would see a number of

complications arise throughout Iranian government, economy, and society in the following years.

Despite the shortcomings, the Shah’s Revolution indeed saw Iran and her people come to the

very brink of the westernism and modernity. However, almost fifteen years after the Shah’s

announcement, his country would be gripped by another revolution; one that would almost

completely undo so much of what had been achieved. A mullah would take the place of the

reforming Monarch, robbing the west of a faithful Cold War ally in the process. Mohammed

Reza himself would die in Egypt just after fleeing into exile. The new theocratic regime would

reverse most of the Shah’s reforms, and the White Revolution would ultimately be remembered

as a failure. This raises the question: How was it that a nation that was so rapidly progressing in

supposed favor of the common citizens could come to be engulfed in a regressive wave of

theocratic fervor in 1979? What forces ultimately brought down the Shah’s dream for a modern

Iran? And ultimately, did the White Revolution – and with it the State of Imperial Iran – have to

end so tragically?

The roots of Iran’s journey westward originated before Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was

made Shah, during the reign of his father Reza Pahlavi. Formerly a soldier and having served as

the Minister of War as well as the Prime Minister to Ahmad Shah Qajar, Reza had taken control
of the country with a coup in 1925, thus placing himself on the throne of Iran. Taking

inspirations from Kemal Ataturk’s modernizations in Turkey, it was during Reza Shah’s reign

that the foundations of the modern Iranian State – and likewise the reforms undertaken by his son

and heir – would be laid. “… Reza Shah initiated a number of social reforms. Although Reza

Shah never formulated a systematic blueprint for modernization—writing no major thesis,

delivering no grand speeches, and leaving behind no last testaments—he implemented reforms

that, however unsystematic, indicated that he was striving for an Iran which, on one hand, would

be free of clerical influence, foreign intrigue, nomadic uprisings, and ethnic differences; and, on

the other hand, would contain European-styled educational institutions, Westernized women

active outside the home, and modern economic structures with state factories, communication

networks, investment banks, and department stores. His long-range goal was to rebuild Iran in

the image of the West—or, at any rate, in his own image of the West.” (Abrahamian, p.140) It

was during this time in the interwar period that several modernizations and reforms began to take

place in Iran. Vast infrastructure projects like the Trans-Iranian Railway were completed and the

first airports constructed. The first public health and education systems were implemented, and

the first domestic banks instituted. However – in what would become a common theme in Iran’s

long road of reform – many of the Shah’s progressive policies also angered some of the more

traditional elements of Iranian society; most notably the Islamic clergymen and the religious

conservatives of the country, particularly in his more secularizing reforms. It is here that one

begins to notice a clear rift beginning to form between the Iranian state and the religious

elements of the population – two elements that would eventually come into conflict.

However, a series of events would transpire – both within Iran and abroad – which would

temporarily put a hold on the reform process within Iran while also fermenting the discontent
that would assist in the failure of the reforms to come. In 1941 – with the globe in the throes of

the Second World War – Reza Shah was forced to abdicate and left his son, Mohammad Reza, to

be made the new Shah. Though Mohammad Reza had worked a great deal under his father in

the latter years of his reign, the new Shah was still young and relatively inexperienced. This, in

combination with the effects of a partial occupation between the British and the Soviets, as well

as the increase of economic interests from abroad in Iran’s oil sector – most notably of the

British – resulted in power being far less centralized. As such, an era of political wrangling

between a number of different actors within the Iranian State ensued for the next decade. This

culminated in the tenure of Prime Minister Mossadegh, who in 1953 saw fit to nationalize Iran’s

oil industry, effectively cutting the British – who had a majority share in said industry – out of

the domestic oil market. What followed was a military coup backed jointly by the Americans

and the British, resulting in Mossadegh being forced out of office. Slowly, power began to

transition back towards the Shah. “Several factors contributed to his success in that endeavor.

First was international, or more specifically U.S. intervention. […] The United States' fear of

Soviet intentions in Iran and the economic opportunities presented by a new oil agreement

increased U.S. interest in Iran. Perceiving the Shah as an archenemy of the communists, the

United States began its generous financial aid to the Iranian regime. […] In addition to

consolidating financial resources, the Shah resorted to repression to guarantee the stability of his

regime. In a very short time, the state's repressive apparatus became the most important

guarantor of the regime's survival. In 1957, the secret police, or SAVAK, was set up. […] Not

only did such U.S. aid add to the effectiveness and efficiency of this organization, it also added

to the resentment the Iranian public felt toward the United States.” While sowing the seeds of

American resentment in Iran, it is also apparent that the events following the removal of Prime
Minister Mossadegh also sowed seeds of resentment against the Shah, and properly created the

already forming gulf between elements of Iranian society and the state itself. As we will see, this

gulf would continue to widen until the fateful event in 1979.

When the White Revolution was implemented in 1963, there were only six major points

of reform. However, as the process continued, the reform program grew to encompass nineteen

key points of reform, most of which can be assorted categorically into economics, land, and

public welfare. Perhaps the most prominent was the land reforms that would be undertaken,

which included breaking up of the feudal land-owning estates, establishment and nationalization

of nature and forest reserves, and a nationalization of water sources. These reforms would prove

to be a forefront of the Revolution, as in the 1950’s half of Iran’s arable land was owned by only

150 families, with one landowner’s holdings equivalent to an area approximately the size of

Switzerland. (Shahbaz, p.18) The aim of the White Revolution in this sense would ultimately be

to break up these enormous land-owning estates while creating a new support base among the

poorer agrarian population. National health and education would be another key front of the

Revolution. This included the formation and expansion of national health and literacy corps, the

building and expansion of hospitals, schools, sanitation and electrical infrastructure, a system of

compulsory and free education, and free food programs for mothers and children. Then there are

the economic aspects of the Revolution which sought to modernize the Iranian economy. This

included the expansion of banking and industrial sectors, construction of roads and ports along

with an expansion of the Trans-Iranian Railway, privatization of non-essential government

enterprises, business regulation and price stabilization for food and consumer goods; all hand-in-

hand with benefits for laborers including industry and business profit sharing, minimum wage

raises, as well as the rights for workers to own shares in their respective places of work.
Accompanying these reforms were a number of other miscellaneous initiatives, including

measures to crack down on corruption within the government and the bureaucracy, as well as

extending the right of suffrage to women. Suffice to say, the reforms of the White Revolution

were some of the most all-encompassing reforms ever seen in any country of the contemporary

era. With a democratic referendum by the people affirming the desire for the reforms, the White

Revolution would commence with the goal of completely transforming Iran.

As the White Revolution took shape in the country, the face of Iran began to completely

change, so much so that the figures of growth are staggering. The land reforms in the

countryside saw the creation of over 1.5 million new landowners in the shape of small-scale

farmers. Furthermore, a vast improvement of oil and transport infrastructure caused oil revenues

to increase from $555 million to over $5 billion over the course of just ten years. These revenues

were poured into infrastructure projects like dams and power stations, railways, seaports, and

heavy industry. The country’s electrical output jumped from 0.5 billion kilowatt hours in 1963

to 15.5 billion kilowatt hours in 1977. Port capacity rose over 400 percent. The Trans-Iranian

Railway was extended, and over 500 miles of railway were constructed alongside 13,000 miles

of paved roadway. Heavy industry and mineral extraction increased majorly; Steel and

aluminum production rose almost ten-fold from 29,000 to 275,000 tons. Production of motor

vehicles skyrocketed from 7,000 units to 109,000 units. This increased heavy industrial capacity

also led to an increase in consumer goods, particularly in mass media products. The amount of

radios in the country doubled from 2 million to 4 million, and televisions from 120,000 to

1,700,000. (Abrahamian, p.428-431) The aforementioned figures are merely a highlight of the

direct result of the White Revolution. As such, these effects would have their own results further

afield in Iranian society.

 Given these astounding figures, it is little surprise that during the White Revolution,

several of the implemented policies had represented a resounding success in a number of

different areas. During this period, Iran’s gross national product grew at a yearly rate of 8

percent in 1962-1970, 14 percent in 1972-1973, and 30 percent in 1973-1974. The expanding

economy led to the creation and the steady growth of a middle class in Iran, one that was both

created by and contributed to the growth of Iran’s educational system, which grew almost three-

times. (Abrahamian, p.428) With the growing economy creating a wide demand for workers and

specialists alike, this new middle class slowly began to afford to educate their children, further

fueling the growing economy. This demand also led women to enter academic fields the

workforce in-masse a mere few years after the vote was first extended to them. Income per-

capita shot upward. With the massive economic growth more-than-apparent, the Shah’s regime

highlighted the fact that Iran was among the fastest growing economies in the world at the time.

The Shah’s government boasted these successes, pointing out in 1976 that the standards of living

in Iran would surpass the average living standards in Western Europe, and furthermore that at the

current rate of growth in the industrial sector, Iran would be among the top five industrial powers

in the world by the end of the century. (Abrahamian, p.430-431) Thus it would appear, out of a

poor and turbulent region of the world, a modern and westernized state was steadily coming into

form. However, despite the apparent successes, the Revolution did not deliver on all fronts.

The White Revolution did indeed have its failings. The most apparent were the massive

land reforms. Though the program had created a large swath of new land owners, these reforms

only managed to reach about half of the agrarian peasantry. Of those that it did reach, a

significant number of these new landowners didn’t receive enough arable land to feed

themselves, let alone sell what remained in order to make a proper living. Furthermore, despite
the growth of the health and education sector, child mortality rates remained high, even by

regional standards. Doctor-patient ratios and student-teacher ratios were also inadequate. In

addition, despite the overwhelming revamp in industry and infrastructure, a number of these

projects were poorly managed, in some cases lacking coordination with government ministries.

Some roads and rail links were not provided in places requiring them and vice-versa. On top of

all of this, the aims of the Shah’s government to crack down on corruption amounted to an ever-

present failure. This meant at times that significant portions of money set aside to pay for large

construction and modernization projects fell victim to the swollen and corrupt bureaucracy.

“Illustrative of the problems has been the 1973-78 five-year plan, which budgeted $4.5 billion to

agricultural development, about 8.5 percent of the total plan. But only 43 percent of the budgeted

amount was actually spent. Actual accomplishments were even more dismal. Among the

constraints were corruption, a lack of valid projects, bad management and inflation.” (Branigin)

Not only this, but while the White Revolution had sought to transform Iranian society and

economics, the government had stagnated, with a bloated bureaucracy and the Shah having

consolidated his power to near-dictatorial status. These failures – among several other factors –

fostered the growing resentment of the Iranian State. The Shah had hoped that his White

Revolution would create a new power base among those who benefitted from the reforms.

However, it would quickly become evident that the reforms – both in their failures as well as in

their successes – would create and rouse opponents from several points in Iranian society.

The great statesman Prince Klemens von Metternich once said that a state is most

vulnerable when it is reforming, and it would be safe to say that Iran slowly became the case

study of just such a dilemma in the latter stages of the White Revolution. The vast changes that

had swept the country united several otherwise opposed segments of the population against the
Iranian State. The most evident were the wealthy landowners. The Shah’s aim from the

beginning was in fact to break the hold of the landowning upper classes over the vast swathes of

land and populations that the wealthy landlords controlled. Their lands had been taken from

them and redistributed, however the landowners had also been reimbursed at government

expense for their losses. Thus, the upper classes were not as openly hostile to the Shah’s

government as other groups. Indeed, the most prevalent and vocal criticism of the Shah’s

revolution originated from the Shia Muslim clergymen; the mullahs. The conservative mullahs

had clashed with the Shah’s government on a number of occasions, both with Mohammed Reza

and his father before him. In this case, the mullahs had seen their own powers – both over the

faithful and within society at-large – slowly begin to dissipate. Furthermore, the clergy argued

that many of the reforms – particularly the liberation of women – were illegal in terms of Islamic

law.

Beyond this, however, a fair amount of discontent came from a somewhat unlikely

source; the growing Iranian middle class. Though this faction had been grown and enriched as a

direct result of the Shah’s reforms, it was an unexpected consequence of those same reforms that

saw the middle class begin to turn against the Shah. This segment of the population was

educated, making up almost the entirety of the intelligentsia in the country. Many had the means

to consume western products and media, as well as even travel abroad to the west. There existed

within the middle class at large and in the intelligentsia in particular a growing resentment

toward the near-dictatorial rule of the Shah’s government. The government itself had deemed

the intelligentsia a threat, and there existed many intellectuals who had been imprisoned or

brutalized by SAVAK; the aforementioned secret police whose creation had been assisted by the

American CIA. With the shortcomings of the reforms themselves compounded with a lack of
progress made toward a democratic regime in Iran, the middle class gradually became a hotbed

for the ghosts of Mossadegh’s government which had been deposed in 1953. (Milani, p.62) With

the gulf between these elements of the Iranian society and the state laid clear, and the opponents

of the Shah’s government properly arrayed against the Iranian State, the situation was

unsustainable. With the Shah himself aging and – unbeknownst to the public – becoming

increasingly ill, it would only take a single spark to light a ravenous and uncontrollable fire.

By the closing of 1977, the situation in Iran was at boiling point. Repression by the

SAVAK against the several elements of the population, dissatisfaction with the result of the

reforms, and the power of the state having been largely invested in the hands of the ailing Shah

himself, it only took a single event to touch off a situation that would’ve been untenable for the

regime. This took the form of a news article published in January of 1978 against a prolific

Islamic cleric and political opposition leader, Ruhollah Khomeini. As a result, a protest in the

holy city of Qom turned violent, and between two and 70 protesters were killed in the ensuing

crackdown. This touched off a wave of protests and riots throughout 1978 that would fan the

flame of resentment into a raging inferno. Though initial encounters between the army and the

protestors had been violent, the Shah forbade his forces from continuing to fire on the

demonstrators. Ailing and not wishing to provoke a revolution himself, the Shah was worried

for the succession itself. “…The Shah, who was terminally ill with cancer—a fact well

concealed from the public—was probably worried about a succession crisis. The Shah's actual

power and the control he exerted over the society far exceeded his legal authority pursuant to the

1906 Constitution. On his demise, there would have been a power vacuum, which his young and

inexperienced son could not have filled effectively.” (Siavoshi, p.152) However the violence

soon spiraled out of control: The rift between Irainian society at-large having reached its climax.
Throughout 1978, strikes, demonstrations, and riots continued throughout Iran. With the country

paralyzed, the army disallowed from retaliating against the protestors, and the Shah’s health

failing, the demonstrations intensified. The governmental situation was untenable, with large

swathes of the population out on the street enraged by the early violence and emboldened by the

Army’s lack of action in the latter stages. By the end of the year, the Imperial Family had taken

the decision to leave the country; supposedly for the purpose of seeking treatment for the Shah’s

advancing cancer, but a decision almost certainly influenced by the turbulent internal situation.

On the morning of the 16th of January, 1979, the Shah and his family flew from Tehran

westward, never to return.

In the Shah’s absence, the revolution would give way to dominance by the Islamists and

the Mullahs – Chief among them Ruhollah Khomeini, having returned from exile to lead the

revolution, and eventually the Islamic Republic that he would help create. The Shah himself

would never see his country again, dying in exile with a small bag of Iranian soil laid beneath his

bed. Mohammad Reza’s death came only year after his flight from the country that he had

striven to see emerge into modernity. He would not live to see what Khomeini and the mullahs

would do to Iran. Stripping away so many of the progressive reforms implemented during the

White Revolution, Iranian society would regress under a government that would come to be far

more repressive than the Shah’s regime ever was. In the end, such a tragedy is eerily reminiscent

of Imperial Russia and Alexander II: An ancient and backward country attempting to reform

from above by a strongman, only for it all to slowly collapse on itself. In such a case, the

tragedy is not in the nature of the leader or his government; he is far from perfect, and his

government is hardly benevolent. However, the tragedy lies in what was accomplished, what

was lost, and, indeed, what could have been: For it all was lost to the dark abyss of revolution.
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