MENA Bureau Representatives’ Meeting for North Africa, GCC, Israel and Yemen

Summary of Key Conclusions and Action Points

9-10 December - Tunis, Tunisia

1) Meeting objectives:
The MENA Director and senior management in the Bureau met with North Africa, GCC, Yemen and
Israel Representatives to take stock of achievements and results in the region, review strategic
priorities, and propose concrete actions and follow-up, in particular for 2020 Planning and Resource
Mobilization.

2) Regional Overview by the MENA Director

In North Africa, there has been almost one year of political protests in Algeria, newly-formed
Governments emerging in Tunisia and Mauritania, and anti-government protests arising in Egypt
within a deteriorating economic climate. In Libya, the highly volatile political and security situation
has affected humanitarian operations and driven ongoing internal displacement. In 2018, we saw a
major shift in the main trajectories of mixed population flows from North Africa to Europe. The
Western Mediterranean Route became more prominent than the Central Med Route – with Morocco
the most active point of departure. We also observed Tunisia become a more active starting point for
reaching Italy’s shores last year, with a slight peak observed this September where an increasing
percentage of third-country nationals have boarded boats. In parallel, there have been more new
arrivals to Tunisia from Libya as part of mixed population flows in 2019, though those are not
necessarily part of the same groups departing for Europe. With growing instability in the Sahel, it
remains to be seen what effects this may have on the North Africa sub-region and on the
proliferation of smuggling and trafficking networks.

Libyan territory has been contested by two main players, complicated by the growing presence of
foreign mercenaries. Tripoli has been at the core of rampant hostilities, with several incidents of
precision airstrikes conducted by unknown aircraft. The promise of a political solution has been
stalled several times, although there are ongoing preparations for an international summit in Berlin,
to reach agreement on a series of activities to end conflict. Sadly, we saw the harsh reality of
operating in a country with active conflict, when in August three UN staff were killed in Benghazi in
an attack of terrorism. This is a wake-up call to the UN to take extreme care and caution. The
humanitarian situation has only worsened in Libya, and UNHCR’s ability to operate has been further
constrained by a lack of international staff with visas to be on the ground. While great strides have
been made in finding solutions for highly vulnerable refugees and asylum-seekers, particularly
through the establishment of the Gathering and Departure Facility last December.

Yemen remains the worst humanitarian crisis worldwide for a fourth consecutive year. The country is
still very much divided, with civilians bearing the brunt of the conflict. The operating environment in
the north of Yemen has steadily deteriorated and is presently at an all-time low, with recent reports
of the detention and torture of an IOM international staff member. Despite working under such
challenging circumstances, UNHCR continues to assist its people of concern amidst unrelenting
hostilities. We have achieved a lot in Yemen, including assisting over 7 million people with cash
assistance since our cash programme was first initiated.

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GCC countries: the role and interest of GCC States in humanitarian action and multilateral
cooperation has increased exponentially in recent years and is expected to continue. In 2018, we saw
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Kuwait join the US $20 Million Club, with Saudi Arabia still a member
this year. Qatar has asserted itself as a prominent humanitarian player, particularly through the
contribution of private funds. The politicization of funds and expectations of high visibility feature
prominently on the GCC funding landscape, but we continue to navigate these challenges and forge
new partnerships. In this regard, we will expand on our unprecedented achievements in 2020 and
beyond in the sector of Islamic Philanthropy.

In Israel, since the Prime Minister reneged on the Israel-UNHCR solutions agreement last year, we
have not yet been able to revive the framework amidst numerous political obstacles. Meanwhile,
significant gaps remain between the needs of our PoCs and the resources that are available from the
government, UNHCR and NGOs.

3) Trends affecting mixed movement onward North Africa:

‘’The logic of containment is working’: North African countries are increasingly countries of
destination for migrants and refugees and no longer just countries of departure or transit. Mobility
arrangements between and among European and North African countries mean that we will have
larger populations in North Africa.

Access is an issue: Southern borders, hubs and crossing roads where refugees are moving are out of
reach for UNHCR and its partners.

Journeys are more complex: This is due to the mobility pattern of some of the populations of
concern. The new phenomenon of cross-border deportations adds a new layer of complexity. While
no country has a deportation policy per se, there has been an increase in deportations (for e.g. from
Algeria to Mali and Niger, and now to Morocco).

Poor identification methodology: UNHCR struggles to identify persons of concern in mixed

movements due to (1) Access challenges (2) Challenges in working with small local communities, and
(3) Slow registration.

Limited assistance: only 5 to 20 per cent of PoC needs outside camps receive UNHCR assistance. This
leads to onward movement and to different forms of radicalization.

Key Conclusions and action points:

 Registration: UNHCR as a protection agency needs to improve registration. Unregistered PoCs

are vulnerable and are incentivized to seek secondary movement.
 Enhance communication with communities: UNHCR loses ground in communication with
communities despite good projects. UNHCR should communicate with people in the language
they understand.

4) Discussion with Sultan Athar Khan on Multilateral Diplomacy in the Current Politically
Complex and High-Risk Environment; and the Role of the UNHCR Representative

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Summary of the discussion: The UN system needs to be reinvigorated with diplomacy for peace as a
top priority. More needs to be done by UN member states to settle disputes through dialogue, in
consultation with, and with the support of the UN. In diplomatic engagements, cultural and political
arrogance need to be avoided and the style of communication needs to be used in a way that
respects countries’ cultures and sensitivities. Digital diplomacy is a tool that we need to carefully use
to advance our mandate.

5) Emergency 1: Libya
Libya remains a country of destination. There are 650,000 migrant workers, 40,000 UNHCR-
registered urban refugees and asylum-seekers, and 2,500 registered PoCs in detention. The
operational environment remains challenging. The armed conflict continues and, although nearly
50% of staff were granted visas, there is a restriction on the number of international UN staff in the
country. The weak political structure and power struggle within the MoI/ DCIM and the profitable
business model of detention centres complicates UNHCR advocacy efforts. There is a
disproportionate focus on detention centres (DCs) which has resulted in negative coping mechanisms
among urban refugees. The conflict has created punctual opportunities such as access to DCs and
building a trusting relationship with key ministries (MoI, MoFa and local governance). UNHCR enjoys
mutual cooperation with the UNCT and strong support from donors.

Key Conclusions and action points:

 Urban refugees and IDPs: UNHCR needs to shift the focus from DCs to urban refugees both in
terms of programme (cash) and durable solutions. Enhanced interventions in favour of IDPs are
also needed.
 Gathering and Departure Facility (GDF): we need to reassess our role in the GDF, which has
turned into an open detention centre and is no longer serving its original purpose. The operation
in Libya needs a new outlook and strategy for UNHCR engagement.
 Strengthen internal Communication: the Libya operation needs a consistent internal
communication strategy focusing on IDPs, refugees and asylum seekers.

6) Emergency 2: Yemen
Yemen remains the worst humanitarian crisis in the world, with 80 per cent of the population
needing some form of assistance. Fighting continues along 35 frontlines, across 10 out of 22
governorates. The operating environment is one of the least permissive in the world and
programmes are severely impacted by lack of access and funding. There are nearly 4 million IDPs,
1.28 million returnees and 277,000 refugees and asylum-seekers, with significant new arrivals
despite the dire conditions. UNHCR leads the protection, shelter and NFI clusters and ranks 5th in
terms of cash assistance.

On the political front, there has been modest progress following the Stockholm Agreement in
November 2018 with a significant reduction in airstrikes. The Riyadh agreement is being slowly
implemented amid reciprocal accusations among concerned parties. The Special Envoy opened up
back channels with the Houthis and the government in Oman, and it is believed that a peace deal is
imminent amid fears that the transition will deteriorate further. There is a breakdown in the UN
relationship with the de facto authorities in the north who are pursuing a state-sanctioned anti-UN
campaign. Moreover, there is strong indication of plans by MoFA/NACRA to repudiate registration of
asylum seekers, declaring them migrants, and forcing IOM to move them out. The relationship with
the government in the South is overall positive but UNHCR’s influence on the ground is limited and

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politicized. UNHCR standing in the international fora has been undermined, as donors believe that
UNHCR is not sufficiently acknowledging the enormity of the Yemen crisis.

Key Conclusions and action points:

 Cluster capacity and field presence: cluster capacity should be strengthened and UNHCR
presence at the field level, particularly in the south should be expanded.
 Durable solutions: durable solutions for refugees, including through voluntary repatriation,
should be enhanced as a way to decompress the protection space.
 Additional funding is needed: Yemen is the least funded emergency in MENA. Funding from the
Gulf is unpredictable and unreliable, and private sector funding is strongly earmarked. Major
efforts and high-level visibility are needed to get donor attention.

7) Regional Protection Issues: Trends, Challenges and Opportunities

Registration in parts of the region is slow and refugee status determination of claimsclaims often
take up to a year to process. Resettlement quotas reflect the politics of sponsoring countries; in
2019, Syrians were allocated 20,000 spaces in contrast to 6,000 slots for non-Syrians. No significant
An increase in RST places is unlikely given the cut in US quota. Canada has also had a processing
moratorium as of late 2019, most likely linked to elections and domestic politics. While country
operations develop some excellent protection strategies, implementationexecution is not always
alignedequal, in particular in child protection and education. Operational response is poorly
implemented and/or articulated, or funds are simply unavailable. In the region, only Mauritania
made a commitment forto the Global Compact on Refugees. The IDP response in Yemen is extremely
underserved and the operation in Libya is overwhelmed due to limited accessresources. There is a
need to increase MPS posts to enhance capacity including meeting the increasing number of
mission requestsand travel to support country operations. This may be addressed in part by
creating regional staffing resources that cover groups of operations and are posted to sub-regions. In
the meantime, MPS will continue to support and undertake missions. Regionalization means
increasingly complex and demanding operational protection reporting procedures because of lack
of face-to-face engagement for bureaux with HQ. The funding situation in the region is driven by
politics. New models of fundraising that empower operations are creating opportunities for
enhancing protection resources. This extends to lobbying for durable solutions including enhanced
resettlement quotas. Interest and engagement must be created at the country level, where donors
are most desirous of information on protection from the points of delivery, of course with the
ongoing support of MPS. but HQ must lobby.

Key Conclusions and action points:

 UNHCR should manage states’ perceptions of its role in the region : UNHCR is seen as a primary
provider rather than supporting state processes. If this situation continues, states’ service
provision will decrease.
 Reduced staffing is impacting provision: Protection interventions require staffing. Country
offices should request increases and be more creative in staffing solutions. Long-serving national
staff are an underutilized resource that should be capitalized on, and MPS plans a number of
events in 2020 for Arabic speakers with a focus on national staff.exploited. Shifting smuggling
routes creates the need for staff to be moveable.
 Registration: Although MENA is far more advanced compared to other bureaus (MENA has 85%
of the registered population), efforts are needed to enhance registration tools. Registration is the
foundation of protection.

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 Follow-up: in early 2020, MPS will share reviews, recommendations and follow up with
operations based on a review of protection content of COPS and implementation plans along
with a compendium of recommendations from missions, audits and other sources.

8) Resource Mobilization in the GCC: Trends, Challenges and Opportunities

The GCC is in flux: KSA has seen a number of legal, social, and economic reforms (e.g. the king
issued a decree allowing foreigners to acquire nationality and opened visas-on-arrival to 32
nationalities), and has the potential for stable and regular contributions. On the foreign policy
front, there is a divergence between KSA and the UAE on Yemen, and there are signs of a
rapprochement between KSA and Qatar. Qatar has become the biggest donor over the last two
years, with the private sector playing a key role. Doha will become a future centre of activity with
the opening of a new UNHCR office. Funding from the UAE is diminishing and the country will
likely drop out of the $20M club. Funding from Kuwait is predictable, stable and the country
remains in the in $20M club.

Key Conclusions and action points:

 UAE: Despite indications of a withdrawal from sponsoring UN activities, partnerships must be

maintained. Advocacy opportunities such as the Expo 2020 pavilion should be seized.
 Kuwait: the Kuwaiti government should be encouraged to stay in the $20 M; unearmarked funds
should be increased; and sustainable multi-year funding should be pursued. The protection
strategy must focus on enhancing a protection space and finding a solution to statelessness, in
particular the complex and politicized Bedouin caseload.
 Funding: more planning is required. GCC offices are encouraged to focus on strategic external
relations and private sector fundraising partnerships. On funding in Yemen, the country
operation along with the GCC office and the bureau should develop a strategy to close the
funding gap. However, GCC donations should not mean lessening pressure on Western donors.
 Resource mobilization through Islamic finance : Zakat is gaining ground. In 2019, $42 M was
received mainly from zakat in the GCC. And there are plans to expand this effort to South East
Asia.

9. Highlights of the Discussion with the High Commissioner and the Deputy High
Commissioner
The High Commissioner (HC) and the Deputy High Commissioner (DHC) held a videoconference with
participants in the Representatives meeting. The HC advised that although Syria will remain a
pressing issue, the Bureau needs to be equally focused on all parts of its geography. The Sahel crisis
in conjunction with side effects of the Libya situation will be a primary focus of tension for the UN.
UNHCR needs to be well equipped across the bureaux. In view of this, the role of the Special Envoy
for the Mediterranean is key to allow for a comprehensive understanding of the relationship
between West Africa, North Africa and Europe. The HC announced plans for a Sahel trip that might
include Mauritania.
The Representative in Mauritania highlighted the strong role of the World Bank (WB) within the
country. While WB engagement is welcome, there are concerns that the attention of development
will result in a quick withdrawal of humanitarian assistance. There is also a need to discuss UNHCR
engagement with Mauritania in its new role as the president of the G7.

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The Chief of Mission in Libya noted the need for expanding solutions beyond Europe and Libya,
including the need to find RST spots in other countries. Given that refugees in detention are mostly
the product of massive human rights violations (e.g. Eritreans), the CoM suggested engaging in
discussions with OHCHR regarding triggering factors. He also suggested engagement with the ILO and
the Ministry of Labour to integrate refugees and asylum seekers into the job market.
OIC in Yemen briefed the HC on the office’s difficulties in finding solutions in this hostile
environment, particularly in the North, where there is a difficult relationship with the authorities. In a
situation where food and health are the primary focus, UNHCR’s position in interagency fora is
undermined and its work marginalized. This has funding implications as donors prioritize WFP, WHO
and UNICEF.
The Representative in Egypt briefed on the important regional role played by Egypt. Domestically,
Egypt started drafting a national asylum system 6 years ago that will be announced in the GRF. The
operation’s budget diminished when asylum seekers increased, thus increasing vulnerability. This
means that people will try to find other ways to cope, and risk falling into the hands of smugglers.
Egypt is the first RST operation worldwide and the operation has received 100 per cent OL funding,
which demonstrates the confidence and trust of donors, as well as the possibility of acquiring
additional funding.
The regional representative to the GCC briefed on changes taking place in GCC, including legal,
economic and social reforms in KSA; the divergence between SA and the UAE on Yemen and
rapprochement between KSA and Qatar. He noted that the Saudis are looking forward to the HC’s
visit. In terms of funding, there is a $140 M hallmark – slightly less than 2018 due to the drop in
funding from the UAE for unknown reason. On Yemen funding, there is a need for a more proactive
approach where all concerned colleagues convene and come up with a strategy.
The High Commissioner emphasized that Libya will continue to be a priority for the Bureau and the
organization due to its uniqueness and politically high profile. Libya will need to be linked more
clearly with the Sahel as well as upstream countries such as Sudan and Egypt. The bureau and
operation need to look closely at a tripartite strategy advanced by the African Union that will likely
affect Libya. The HC also expressed readiness to follow-up with the ILO to see how they can support
the UNHCR office in Libya, noting that engagement with the ILO is a potentially good and useful
partnership. On the Sahrawi situation, the HC advised to continue damage control echoing advice
from the SG. On Yemen, the HC announced the impending arrival of a new Representative and
acknowledged that the HC and SET did not sufficiently reflect on Yemen. The HC promised that the
SET will work with the operation and the Bureau to devise a new strategy to address Yemen’s
many challenges.
On resource mobilisation, the Deputy High Commissioner requested a calendar dedicated to
outlining where and when efforts should be focused. The HC’s mission to the Gulf should focus on
amplifying efforts with governments that currently support UNHCR.
Key Conclusions and action points:

 Funding for Yemen: the Bureau, the Yemen office and the GCC regional office to work with the
SET on a new strategy for Yemen in early 2020.
 Possible HC mission to Mauritania: The Representative in Mauritania is to discuss potential HC
mission with the Director of RBWA.

9) Update on the Global Refugee Forum:

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An update on the GRF was shared with Representatives. The update focused on internal MENA
preparations and key messages, as well as MENA participation and engagement. It was announced
that 10 ministers, including 5 Ministers of Foreign Affair were attending from the region. It was
agreed that momentum in favour of UNHCR objectives will be sought around and during the GRF.

10) Brief country updates:

Mauritania: there are 57,000 refugees of whom 3,400 are in urban settings. Other than the
developing situation in the Sahel, the context is overall positive. The government is generally tolerant
of refugees, especially those of Arab origin. The WB has been driving the country and will be
investing in regions hosting refugees. The involvement of development actors is however leading
donors to scale down on funding.
Israel: refugees live in a context where the state is determined to maintain its Jewish character.
Refugees can stay but cannot be granted permanent residence. The government deliberately
employs harsh measures against foreigners which has resulted in the departure of 70,000 Eritreans
and Somalis. UNHCR has not been able to have a meaningful dialogue at the policy level with the
government due to the ongoing government crisis with the PM under investigation.
Morocco has become a departure point to Europe with the main points of departure on the
Mediterranean coast. UNHCR does not have access to the South. There are tentative departures
from the south to Sardinia, but they are dangerous, controlled and secured. Arrivals are mostly from
Algeria while the rest enter through Casablanca airport. The operation is only 9 per cent funded –
USD 2.6 M is needed. Challenges include the absence of national asylum law, difficulties identifying
individuals in need of international protection; and increasing registration of up to 500 per month.
Despite mass arrests, UNHCR documents are recognized by the authorities and PoCs are released
upon showing UNHCR documents. There is a whole society approach in the GCR spirit as a
mechanism of cooperation. National consultation is focused on protection and assistance to
recommend an action plan that was presented to the IMF focusing on economic and social inclusion.
Tunisia is both a transit and destination country. As of end November 2019, there are 3,117
refugees; 1,100 pending registration and approximately 1, 000 pending RSD. The operation has well-
established coordination mechanisms in the context of mixed movements, in particular with national
and local authorities. The asylum space is overall maintained in spite of the high number of new
arrivals (124% increase since January 2019) and weak capacity to address these flows. A large and
effective capacity building programme is in place towards a de facto national asylum system. The OL
is 77% funded for 2020. Challenges include political uncertainties, deteriorating socio-economic
conditions and security concerns in addition to the absence of state capacity and instruments to
continuously receive, absorb, and integrate new arrivals.
Algeria continues to be marked by political instability and ongoing protests. A national asylum and
protection framework is still notably lacking. The Algerian Government is displeased with the slow
appointment of a Special Envoy following the departure of Horst Kohler in 2019. Algeria faces
challenges and constraints in the management of mixed flows, with no reception centres, facilities or
services for asylum-seekers and refugees in the country and no or very limited protection-sensitive
measures in place. Access outside Algiers province represents a major constraint. Authorities
continue to maintain a restrictive security strategy towards urban refugees and asylum seekers,
including an strong reliance on arrest and deportation to Niger and Mali. RST increased in Canada,

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the USA, and Norway. Technical support is needed for fleet management; a mission from supply was
requested in this regard.

11) Regionalization/Decentralization:

The Change Team held a videoconference with participants and briefed on the new Resource
Allocation Framework. The presentation covered: (1) delegation of authorities and processes for
managing resources during implementation; (2) transitional arrangements for 2020-2021 biennium;
and (3) mechanisms for resource planning and management for 2022-onward. The comprehensive
PPT presentation is annexed to this report.

12) Communication

MENA spokesperson gave an overview of MENA communication in the past year and provided an
outlook of the communications landscape for 2020. Communications strategies and tools were also
discussed, especially regarding the performance of the Social Media platforms.

Key Conclusions and action points:

 Global AND MENA Communication needs to be improved: UNHCR communication was
assessed to be poor. Highly skilled PI staff need to be recruited and more reflection needs to go
into impactful and engaging communication.
 PI staff should be empowered: information needs to be shared with PI colleagues for them to be
able to produce informed and valuable outputs.
 Role of celebrities: Attaching media to celebrities and people who have followers and charm get
more engagement.

UNHCR MENA
December 2019

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