SCIENCE AND PSEUDOSCIENCE:

POPPER AND LAKATOS

Imre Lakatos and Karl Popper are two of the most recognized philosophers of science in the
XXth century. They both wrote about the objectivity of science and how we can differentiate
between what is science and what is pseudoscience. This discussion is as old as the
philosophy of science is, so, maybe, I can't reach any new point in this essay, but at least I'll
try to reach my personal opinion in the best way I can. The first part of the essay is going to
be a little summary of the points of view of the two authors. Then, I’ll conclude both of them
and write my personal opinion.

On the one hand we have Imre Lakatos. Lakatos wrote about a new way of doing science.
Lakatos developed the idea of scientific research programs, which consist of sets of theories
and methods. According to Lakatos, science progresses through the modification and
expansion of these programs, which seek to resolve anomalies and improve the explanatory
capacity of the theory. Marxism, Freudianism, etc. are also research programmes. Imre
Lakatos differences between two types of research programmes: progressive ones and
degenerative ones. In a progressive research programme theory leads to the discovery of
novel facts and in a degenerative research programme theories are fabricated only in order to
accommodate known facts, for example: I have mentioned that marxism is an example of a
research programme, and that is because it is a degenerative research programme. Marxian
hypotheses were done after the events to protect the theory from the fact.

On the other hand we have Karl Popper. Karl Popper proposed falsifiability as a criterion for
demarcating between science and non-science. For Popper, a scientific theory must be
capable of being refuted by empirical evidence. In other words, a scientific claim must be
formulated in such a way that it is possible to prove if it can be false through experiments or
observations. This principle of falsifiability seeks to establish objectivity and verifiability in
science. Popper argued that scientific theories must be open to scrutiny and the possibility of
being refuted. If a theory cannot be falsified, if there is no way to prove that it is incorrect,
then, according to Popper, it is not scientific. This notion highlights the importance of
correctness and openness to change in science.
At this point we can say that these two men have so clear what can be considered science or
not. Lakatos wrote about the incapacity of pseudosciences to develop a research programme
that works. As he says: “All the research programmes I admire have one characteristic in
common. They all predict novel facts, facts which had been either undreamt of. or have
indeed been contradicted by previous or rival programmes.” (Lakatos, 1973, page 5). So if a
pseudoscientific theory is not able to confront anomalies, adjust, and generate new
predictions, according to Lakatos, it lacks the intrinsic vitality necessary to be considered
scientific. Popper wrote about theories that can not be refuted, they can`t be considered
scientific, like the ones that reinterpret evidence to fit any outcome.

Science as a whole should face judgment of veracity. I mean, not as if we don't believe what
they say, but that the scientific structure itself should ask itself how science should be done.
What are the steps to follow to build a theory? Is it possible that there will come a point
where a hypothesis can no longer advance? What is reasonable is that science has, as Lakatos
says, a social function in addition to research. The veracity of how it works, of whether we
can believe if what is said is really a scientific truth, is a social need.

I agree that scientific theory must be in constant contact with experiments that try to
destabilize and cast doubt on it. Socrates himself said that an unexamined life was not worth
living, because it has to be the same with science. Not only for science itself to progress,
which is important, but to know that what is going to reach us from those spheres is as
reliable and contrasted as possible. If science has responsibility towards citizens and the extra
human, there should be ethics that are responsible for determining what is correct in scientific
practice. The scientific circle has a power that needs control, not like a police, but something
that determines if what will reach citizens is science. That is the work to be done by
philosophers of science, and what Popper, Lakatos, Kuhn and others also dedicated
themselves to.

So, the difference between science and pseudoscience is the capacity of theories or
hypotheses to progress in this continuous examination that determines the veracity of what is
being proposed and the probability of failure of the proposal. It is necessary because it is truly
related with the truth and justice.

Jürgen Landa Fernández

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Lakatos, Imre. 1981 (1973). Introduction: Science and Pseudoscience. Philosophy in the
Open and in The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Philosophical Papers
Volume 1.