Guide to Part D:

Proof Theory and Constructive

Mathematics
with the cooperation of
A. TROELSTRA
D . l . SMORYNSKI
The Incompleteness Theorems 82 1
D.2. SCHWICHTENBERG
Proof theory : Some applications of cur-elimination 867
D.3. STATMAN
Herbrand’s Theorem and Gentzen’s notion of a direct proof 897
D.4. FEFERMAN
Theories offinite type related to mathematical practice 913
D.5. TROELSTRA
Aspects of constructive mathematics 973
D.6. FOURMAN
The logic of topoi 1053
D.7. BARENDREGT
The type free lambda calculus 1091
D.8. PARISand HARRINGTON
A mathematical incompleteness in Peano arithmetic 1133

The mathematician constructs proofs. T h e proof-theorist considers

proofs themselves as mathematical objects and studies them with the tools
of modern mathematics.
Proof theory began with Hilbert’s Program. Hilbert’s idea was to exploit
the concrete, finitistic nature of proofs to provide a simple foundation for
mathematics. Godel’s Incompleteness Theorems dealt the program a
staggering blow. These theorems are among the most basic in logic and are
discussed in Smorynski’s introductory chapter.
It was much harder to make a reasonable selection of topics from proof
theory than from the other parts of logic because the subject is going in
many different directions. W e attempted to select topics which illustrate
the parts of proof theory which are well developed and are relevant to
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other parts of logic and mathematics. Reading the chapters that resulted
one sees certain threads which run through them and seem to be central
concerns of present-day proof theory. We mention two.
One of the most important threads holding proof theory together is the
question: What more do we know about a m e statement when we learn
that it is provable in a particular theory, or has a proof in some normal
form? Another is t h e search for relationships between mathematical and
proof-theoretic principles. Both of these aspects of proof theory are
beautifully illustrated in Schwichtenberg’s chapter. He shows the reader
how Gentzen’s method of cut-elimination can be used for a wide variety of
such studies.
The first thread mentioned above is central to Statman’s chapter. H e
presents a case study of what more one can learn from a direct proof of a
theorem in a formal equation calculus than one learns from an indirect
proof.
Feferman’s chapter looks at some formal theories of higher-type
mathematical objects, functions on natural numbers, sets of such functions,
etc. These theories must, by Godel’s Theorem, be incomplete but empirical
evidence shows that they embody natural mathematical principles and are
strong enough to carry out large portions of mathematics. Feferman studies
the above questions as well as the relative strength of the various theories
by means of independence results.
Troelstra’s chapter discusses constructive notions of proof. Consider, for
example, a proof of cp v q!J (“cp or G”). A classical mathematician accepts a
proof of cp v t,b even when the proof does not tell him which of the two is
actually true. (Take cp v 1cp for example.) The constructivist demands
more. For him a proof of cp v t,b must contain either a proof of cp or a proof
of q!J and he must be able to tell which. Beyond such simplicities, however,
lie highly problematic matters. The study of constructive proofs gives rise
to several competing, and mutually incompatible, views of constructive
mat hematics, intuitionism being one of the best known.
Fourman’s chapter discusses t h e relationship between intuitionism and
the notion of topos from category theory. The Kock-Reyes chapter
(Chapter A.8) gave the category-theorist’s view of parts of logic. Here we
get t h e logicians view of parts of category theory. The Barendregt chapter
discusses recent progress in the old search for a coherent theory of
self-applicable functions.
The Handbook comes to a dramatic close with the Paris-Harrington
chapter which discusses a true statement of finite combinatorics which is
not provable in Peano arithmetic.