Rapid Equipment Strategy Development Process - Online - Participant Manual - Rev 3.6.1-Cópia

Rapid Equipment Strategy
Development
Participant Manual
Version 3.6.1
Version Version
training@assetivity.com.au | www.assetivity.com.au
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
Document No: Version: 3.6.1 Issue Date: 18 May 2020
REVISION HISTORY
Date Version By Whom Revision Description

18 May 2020 3.6.1 HV Exercises removed from manual – online
training
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Contents
CONTENTS ........................................................................................................................... 1
INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................... 4
1.1 General Course Description ................................................................................... 4
1.2 Learning Objectives................................................................................................ 5
BACKGROUND................................................................................................................. 7
2.1 Why you may need better Equipment Maintenance Strategies ........................... 7
2.2 Where are the opportunities to improve your current maintenance program? 10
THE ORIGINS OF FMEA, RCM AND PMO ....................................................................... 13
3.1 FMEA – An Overview ........................................................................................... 13
3.2 RCM – An Overview ............................................................................................. 14
3.3 PM Optimisation - An Overview .......................................................................... 15
3.4 Similarities and Differences between RCM and PMO ......................................... 16
3.5 Which approach should you use? ........................................................................ 17
KEY UNDERLYING CONCEPTS ........................................................................................ 18
4.1 What Causes Equipment Failure? ........................................................................ 18
4.2 Who Can Help Prevent Equipment Failure? ........................................................ 19
4.3 Operating Context ............................................................................................... 19
4.4 Failure Patterns .................................................................................................... 20
THE RAPID EQUIPMENT STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS ...................................... 23
STEP 1 – DETERMINE SCOPE OF ANALYSIS ................................................................... 24
6.1 Objectives ............................................................................................................ 24
6.2 How Do We Select Systems for Analysis? ............................................................ 24
6.3 Define the Boundaries around the System .......................................................... 25
6.4 Other Options for selecting the scope of analysis ............................................... 25
Rapid Equipment Strategy Development | Version 3.6.1

6.5 Consequences of Failure within the System ........................................................ 25
6.6 Document this in a System Overview Document ................................................ 25
STEP 2 – IDENTIFY PRIMARY FUNCTIONS ..................................................................... 26
7.1 Objectives ............................................................................................................ 26
7.2 Identifying Functions ........................................................................................... 26
7.3 Functional Performance Standards ..................................................................... 26
STEP 3 – VERIFY EQUIPMENT CAPABILITY .................................................................... 27
8.1 Objectives ............................................................................................................ 27
8.2 Part 1 – Define the performance required from the equipment ........................ 27
8.3 Part 2 – Determine the design capabilities of the equipment............................. 28
8.4 Part 3 – Assess the impact of any gaps between desired and existing equipment
capability........................................................................................................................... 28
8.5 Part 4 – Make recommendations to address any significant gaps ...................... 29
© COPYRIGHT 2020 ASSETIVITY PTY LTD. 1

STEP 4 – IDENTIFY FAILURE MODES.............................................................................. 31
9.1 Objectives ............................................................................................................ 31
9.2 What is a Failure Mode? ...................................................................................... 31
9.3 The RCM approach to identifying Failure Modes ................................................ 32
9.4 Avoiding Analysis Paralysis .................................................................................. 35
9.5 Describing Failure Modes .................................................................................... 35
9.6 The PMO approach to identifying Failure Modes ................................................ 37
STEP 5 – ANALYSE FAILURE MODES, EFFECTS AND CONSEQUENCES ...................... 40
10.1 Objectives ............................................................................................................ 40
10.2 Why do We Need to Assess Failure Effects and Consequences? ........................ 40
10.3 Failure Effects and Consequences Defined.......................................................... 40
10.4 Describing Failure Effects..................................................................................... 40
10.5 The Impact on Operational Capability ................................................................. 41
10.6 Categories of Failure Consequences .................................................................... 41
STEP 6 – SELECT RECOMMENDED MAINTENANCE TASKS ....................................... 44
11.1 Objectives ............................................................................................................ 44
11.2 Assetivity Decision Matrix.................................................................................... 44
11.3 Assessing Task Effectiveness................................................................................ 45
11.4 Assessing Task Applicability ................................................................................. 47
STEP 7 – IDENTIFY ADDITIONAL IMPROVEMENT TASKS .......................................... 56
12.1 Objectives ............................................................................................................ 56
12.2 Types of One-Time Changes ................................................................................ 56
12.3 Caution is required... ........................................................................................... 56
12.4 Types of errors occurring in Maintenance ........................................................... 58
12.5 The three phases of human learning ................................................................... 58
STEP 8 – CONSOLIDATE SCHEDULES AND INTEGRATE WITH OPERATIONAL STRATEGIES
60
13.1 Objectives ............................................................................................................ 60
13.2 The Process for Consolidating Tasks .................................................................... 60
STEP 9 – GAIN APPROVAL ........................................................................................ 65 Rapid Equipment Strategy Development | Version 3.6.1
14.1 Objectives ............................................................................................................ 65
14.2 The Outputs of the Process so far... .................................................................... 65
14.3 Approving Implementation.................................................................................. 65
14.4 Ensuring Quality in the Review and Approval Process ........................................ 65
14.5 Ensuring Timely Review and Approval................................................................. 66
STEP 10 – IMPLEMENT RECOMMENDED ACTIONS .................................................. 67
15.1 Objectives ............................................................................................................ 67
15.2 Implementing the Outcomes of the Process ....................................................... 67
15.3 Identifying and Completing all Implementation Actions ..................................... 67
15.4 Preparing Work Instructions ................................................................................ 68
STEP 11 – TRACK SUCCESS ....................................................................................... 70
16.1 Objectives ............................................................................................................ 70

16.2 What were the Business Objectives of the PM Review process? ........................ 70
16.3 How will we measure whether these objectives have been achieved? .............. 70
16.4 To what extent have the recommendations been implemented? ...................... 71
16.5 What is the Continuous Improvement Process? ................................................. 71
NEXT STEPS – BEYOND RESD .................................................................................... 72
17.1 Objective .............................................................................................................. 72
17.2 The Journey to Operational Reliability ................................................................ 72
17.3 Apply Appropriate Failure Elimination and Life Extension techniques ............... 73
CONCLUSION............................................................................................................ 74
RAPID EQUIPMENT STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT DECISION DIAGRAM ...... 75

Introduction
Assetivity has developed a series of short training courses to assist individuals and organisations to
enhance their skills in Asset Management, Maintenance Management and Reliability Improvement.
Many of these courses are presented as public courses with training sessions scheduled in major
Australian capital cities at various time during the year. All these courses are able to be presented
inhouse for individual organisations and can be customised to meet specific organisational needs.
Many of you may be wondering why you should apply RCM (Reliability Centred Maintenance) or PMO
(Planned or Preventive Maintenance Optimisation) within your organisation. The short answer is that it
will better enable you and your organisation to capitalise on the equipment reliability and plant
capability by optimising the maintenance schedules applied to it. Your maintenance schedules will be
optimised and therefore more efficient, your overall system reliability will improve, unplanned
maintenance will decrease, productivity will improve and much more.
So look, listen, learn and be involved. Your involvement throughout this course is your first step to
being part of a team that will help you and your organisation to obtain the benefits of PMO and RCM.
During this course you will be guided through Assetivity’s Rapid Equipment Strategy Development
process. You will gain an understanding of the key concepts underpinning these steps, and how these
concepts can be applied in practice. These steps are:
1. Determine Scope of Analysis
2. Identify Primary Functions
3. Verify System Capability
4. Identify Failure Modes

5. Analyse Failure Causes, Effects and Consequences
6. Select Recommended Maintenance Tasks
7. Identify Additional Improvement Tasks
8. Consolidate Schedules and Integrate with Operational Strategies
9. Gain Approval
10. Implement Recommended Actions
11. Track Success
In concluding the course, we will discuss what happens after you have applied this 11 step process with
this new found knowledge.

The learning objectives for this course are as follows:
• Describe the benefits that can be gained through an effective PM program.

• Describe the principles of both RCM and PMO.
• Identify the steps involved in developing an equipment strategy.
• Contribute to each step, particularly:
o Applying RCM or PMO techniques as appropriate to the equipment,
o Identifying equipment functions and failure modes,
o Selecting recommended maintenance tasks, and
o Identifying additional improvement tasks.
Achievement of these learning objectives will equip you to function as a team member in an equipment
strategy development activity. We are confident that application of the equipment strategy
development process within your organisation will make a significant difference in the effectiveness of
your PM program and allow you to achieve better business results. These results can include
improvements in:
• Overall Equipment Effectiveness
• Equipment Availability
• Equipment Reliability,
• Cost performance
• Labour productivity, and
• Safety and Environmental performance.

Background
Here is a scenario that may or may not be similar to your situation; it certainly is seen commonly
throughout many organisations in Australia and overseas.
Many organisations will, from time-to-time, embark on a series of studies to improve efficiency or
effectiveness, reduce costs or overheads, increase production or improve some other business
performance measure. Let’s look at an all too common example of constructing a new facility.
• Senior Management establishes a team of highly motivated people to perform the

feasibility study. This team works hard and beavers away studiously, performing their
analysis and determining whether the project can be justified.
• After several attempts, and after needing to rework the figures on several occasions, they
determine (surprise, surprise) that the project is justified, and it is approved by the board.
An EPC (Engineer, Procure and Construct) contractor is engaged to perform the detailed
design, and construct and commission the plant.
• This EPC contractor is on a performance-based contract that rewards them for completing
the project on time and on budget. There are no rewards or penalties associated with
ensuring that the designed facility operates efficiently or effectively through its expected
life. Most of the staff at the EPC contractor have spent their entire careers in design
engineering. Few, if any, have ever operated or maintained a plant that they have
designed.
• As a result of this, the designers are not aware of, and often do not take into consideration
the need for:
o Good ergonomics during maintenance activities Rapid Equipment Strategy Development | Version 3.6.1
o Quick-change components
o Safe access to perform vibration analysis, to perform thickness testing and to take
oil samples
o Inspection hatches and other access points for inspections
o Instrumentation required in order to determine equipment condition
• It soon becomes apparent that the original capital estimate for the project was hopelessly
optimistic. So was the original project schedule.
• In addition, cost escalation means that the project is running well over budget. It is time to
cut costs and reduce scope.

• Easy targets, and the first to be adopted include:
o Eliminating or reducing installed spare capacity
o Eliminating or reducing the budget for purchase of initial spare parts
o Eliminating or “fast tracking” the development of an initial PM program
o “Forgetting” to provide necessary manuals
o Omitting the preparation of “As Built” drawings
o Delaying the hiring of maintenance and/or operating personnel prior to

commissioning and start-up
o Reducing the amount of time and money spent on training Operating and
Maintenance personnel
• During commissioning, the capital budget has already been exhausted (this is a very
common occurrence). In addition, the Project Engineers are already starting to think ahead
to their next project. Everyone is keen to get commissioning over and done with as quickly
as possible, and since there was no agreed method for assessing Reliability, Availability,
Operability or Maintainability, Technical Acceptance is largely a superficial exercise. When
the equipment is handed over to Production and Maintenance, there is a long punch list of
outstanding items to be addressed including the development of the PM program.
• After handover...
o The equipment is operated inconsistently, inaccurately, and often outside its design
limitations.
o For “Warranty Purposes” the OEMs PM program is adopted – even when it is

known to be suboptimal. However, the required information has not been
adequately uploaded to the CMMS, and so it is not always followed.
o The PM program is inadequate, and equipment failures occur, but nobody has time
to review and update the PM program, or negotiate changes with OEMs.
o Due to the lack of proper Work Instructions and adequate training, there are
frequent workmanship issues, with regular on-the-job delays, and high levels of
rework.
o Because Production have not participated in, or agreed to, the equipment
maintenance strategies, and because of the short-term pressures to achieve
production targets, they do not release equipment so that vital PM can be
performed, despite the reliability issues.
• The problems continue...
o Because the equipment is not released for PM, equipment breakdowns, that
otherwise would have been prevented, start to occur.

o This consumes vital maintenance labour resources, which are already stretched thin
because of the start-up issues with the plant.
o Breakdowns start to take priority.
o PMs are not completed on time, or at all.
o This leads to more breakdowns ...
o Before you know it, you are entering the Equipment Reliability Death Spiral...
The Equipment Reliability Death Spiral
So where did your PM program start from?

The PM program was probably inappropriate from the start because: Rapid Equipment Strategy Development | Version 3.6.1
• It was developed in haste because the project allowed insufficient time and budget.
• It was over-reliant on OEM guidance as ‘gospel’ when the intended operating environment
was different from what the OEM had assumed.
• It was developed with minimal involvement from operators and maintainers (tradesmen)
who actually knew how the equipment was to be operated and maintained.
• Work instruction documentation was weak and did not provide sufficient detail to conduct
the task required.
Production was probably never able to release equipment or plant for PM to be conducted because:
• Operating targets were developed without allowing for maintenance downtime for PM.

• Production KPI’s drove postponement/cancellation of PM to meet short term production
targets.
• The production team was not committed to the PM program because they were not
involved in the development process and there was no ‘ownership’ associated with it.
And what has happened since start-up?

Even for long-established plants, the PM program is likely to be highly sub-optimal for some (or all) of
the following reasons:
• Knee-jerk reactions to equipment reliability problems have seen additional, useless or

inappropriate PM activities added with minimal or no proper investigation or justification.
• The plant has undergone several equipment modifications and changes to the operating
parameters and strategies, additional equipment has been added, or equipment has been
removed – all without properly considered changes to the PM program.
• Changes to spare parts suppliers and/or the specifications for spare parts used and installed
on equipment have resulted in more, or less, reliable parts, and therefore more, or less,
required maintenance – but the PM routines have not been adjusted to allow for this.
• Almost certainly, operating and maintenance staff have gained additional experience and
understanding of the way, and frequency, with which the equipment fails, but this
knowledge and experience has not been captured and used to update the PM program.
• Beyond the plant itself, there have been improvements in Condition Monitoring
Technologies since the original PM program was developed that have not been adopted.
• Changes in the external economy have changed demand for your products, or the costs
associated with equipment failures and subsequent change in the business impact of
equipment failures, but the cost justification of PM activities has not been re-evaluated in
light of these changes.
So, the question to ask is...

When were your PM strategies last updated?
Examples of opportunities to improve your PM program that exist in most organisations are listed
below:

• Ensuring the optimum task type is used. For example, a more cost-effective and lower risk
PM activity may be to conduct an on-line, Condition-Based task as opposed to an intrusive,
hard-time component replacement task.
• Ensuring tasks are performed at the optimal frequency i.e. not too often, and not too
infrequently. This is where practical advice from personnel involved in the equipment as
well as work order data/history will be useful.
• Delete tasks that do not effectively predict, prevent, or detect failures.
• Identify and eliminate duplication or triplication of tasks by different work groups.
• Capture and optimise ALL routine equipment care activities – not just those managed within
the CMMS.
• Ensure that Production Strategies and Schedules and Maintenance Strategies and Schedules
are compatible and aligned.
• Identify recurring failures, and either prevent them, through more effective PM, or
eliminate them altogether through redesign.
• Improve the quality and consistency of inspections through improved work instructions and
attempt to have these linked through some documentation management system within
your CMMS.
• Keep a record of the rationale behind each PM task to aid in continuous improvement. If
you continually refine the process you can make the spiral work in reverse. Optimisation is
a continuous improvement project; the first iteration will usually achieve the biggest gains
and future iterations will capitalise on latest data gathered and improved technology as it
becomes available.
The reality is that most organisations over-maintain their equipment, and that most of this over-
maintenance is, at best, a complete waste of time and money, and in other cases may even be
contributing to lower equipment availability and reliability. Applying a structured process, such as

RESD, typically leads to significant changes to the PM routines, and addresses all of the opportunities
listed above. Specifically:
• Tasks that add no value, that do not predict, prevent or mitigate against failure will be
deleted
• Value adding tasks, that predict, prevent or mitigate against failure will be added
• Sub-optimal tasks (frequency, wording, packaging, etc) will be optimised
As a result of this, typically, significant additional maintenance labour time is made available to
complete planned corrective work – before the work becomes urgent, and before the equipment has
broken down.
The results generally include:
• Lower maintenance costs, per unit of output

• Reduced unplanned production losses due to equipment failures,
• Increased plant availability
• Higher Overall Equipment Effectiveness
• Lower Safety and Environmental risks
Illustrative Maintenance Review Results
Illustrative Business Impact

The Origins of FMEA, RCM and PMO
FMEA has been around for a very long time. Before any documented format was developed, most
inventors and process experts would try to anticipate what could go wrong with a design or process
before it was developed. The trial and error alternative was both costly
and time consuming.
FMEA was adapted in the mid-sixties in the USA by NASA (National

Aeronautics and Space Administration) for the Apollo project.
Afterwards, this method was widely applied in aerospace and
aeronautical engineering. Most literary resources concerning this
method stem from the US Military Standard MIL-STD-1629A, which
focussed on FMEA in the design stage and was required as an approval
standard for all parts in military aerospace and aeronautical
applications.
Further use of the FMEA method continued in nuclear technology

then, in 1972, the Ford Company in America became the first
automotive company to attempt to integrate this method into its
quality assurance concept. Their efforts continued through the 70’s
and 80’s and spread to other industries.
The steps involved in an FMEA are:
Step Outputs
What are the Functions of the Asset? Equipment Functions
In what ways can it fail? Failure modes
What are the causes of failure? Failure causes
Information
What happens when each failure Failure Effects Collection
occurs?
FMEA became very popular and is still in wide use today as a “design for reliability” tool. However,
FMEA doesn’t answer all the questions we have when designing and building a sustainable and reliable
PM plan for our assets. We need more.
The next advance began in 1968, when work by Stanley Nowlan & Howard Heap of United Airlines led
to the addition of a structured decision-making approach to the FMEA process in order to develop
effective maintenance strategies. This approach has become known as “Reliability Centred
Maintenance” or RCM.

The objectives of using RCM are:
• To identify the most appropriate maintenance program for equipment
• To identify appropriate equipment design modifications to improve reliability
The methodology was originally intended to be used for new equipment while in the design phase.
The Origins of RCM and PMO
Nowlan and Heap’s research was driven by civil aviation and was originally documented in the aviation
industry Maintenance Steering Group guidelines (MSG1). Their research continued up to 1978,
resulting in a second civil aviation standard (MSG2) and a report to the US Department of Defence that

led to the adoption of the term RCM. Civil aviation has continued to update and refine the MSG
approach, whilst the military has pursued RCM. This has led to widespread adoption of RCM within
general industry, particularly following release of John Moubray’s book RCM II in 1989.
The RCM process is generally considered to consist of seven steps as follows:

Step Outputs
What are the Functions of the Asset? Equipment Functions
In what ways can it fail? Failure modes
What are the causes of failure? Failure causes
Information
What happens when each failure Failure Effects Collection
occurs?
Does each failure matter? Failure Consequences
What can be done to prevent each Preventive and Predictive
failure? Tasks Decision
What should be done if a failure
cannot be prevented through
Default Actions
Making
maintenance?
From the above table you will be able to see that the basic steps involved in an FMEA are incorporated
in the first four steps of the RCM methodology.
The Objectives of PM Optimisation (PMO) are:
• To identify the most appropriate maintenance program for equipment
• To identify appropriate equipment design modifications and other one-off improvements to

improve reliability
PMO was originally intended to be used for existing equipment where comprehensive PM programs are
already in place. It was derived from RCM and developed in response to concerns regarding the time
and effort involved in a “full” RCM analysis. PMO is sometimes referred to as:
• Reverse RCM
• Streamlined RCM
PMO came to prominence in the 1990s and continued to evolve through the early 2000s. The seven key Rapid Equipment Strategy Development | Version 3.6.1
elements of PMO are:

Step Outputs
What are the current PM’s being Current PM tasks
undertaken?
Information
What failure causes are these PMs Failure causes for current PM Collection
addressing? tasks
What equipment failures are currently Failure causes currently
being experienced? experienced
What are the functions of the Failure causes for additional
equipment (optional)? functions
Does each failure matter? Failure Consequences
What can be done to prevent each Preventive and Predictive Tasks
Decision
failure? Making
What should be done if a failure cannot Default Actions
be prevented through maintenance?
Notice that PMO does not use FMEA in its Information Collection phase. However, the Decision-Making
process for PMO is identical to that for RCM.
The Similarities between RCM and PMO include:
• Both processes aim to produce an optimal PM program.
• Both processes use traditional RCM decision logic. The second half of both processes is
essentially identical, using the same decision framework and RCM principles.
• Both approaches focus on the business consequences of equipment failure, as well as the
technical characteristics of those failures.
The Differences between RCM and PMO are mainly in the initial stages of the analysis.

• RCM starts with a blank sheet of paper defining the functions, failures and failure causes.
• RCM is a zero-based methodology.
• PMO uses existing PM schedules and tasks (to identify the majority of failure causes),
utilising and building on existing knowledge and only reviewing functions if doubt exists as
to capabilities.
The potential Pitfalls with RCM include:
• As it is a zero-based process, RCM tends to be more time-consuming
• There can be a tendency when applying RCM to over analyse and produce too many
functions and too many failure causes.
• Because RCM analysis is time-consuming, often the focus is on performing the analysis,
rather than on implementing the outcomes.

The potential Pitfalls with PMO include:
• PMO ideally requires an existing PM program for the equipment (or essentially identical
equipment). If this does not exist, then PMO is very difficult, if not impossible, to perform.
• There is a risk with PMO that existing strategies are kept even though they add no value
because “we have always done it this way”.
• Another potential pitfall of PMO is that some failure modes and causes can get overlooked.
Most sources of failure data span relatively short periods. CMMS get updated about every
3-5 years. Often older history is lost and long-term failures (MTBF >5 years) get missed. If
the initial development of strategies missed something, a PMO review may also miss
something.
RCM tends to be more appropriate for brand new equipment, particularly where this equipment is
using new technology that does not exist elsewhere. This is where the baseline or blank sheet of paper
origins of RCM originate.
PMO tends to be more appropriate for existing equipment, particularly where an existing PM program
is in place and some operating and maintenance experience has been obtained. The use of the existing
PM programs and experience base lends itself to optimisation.

Key Underlying Concepts
In this section, we explore the key principles that underlie RCM and PMO-based equipment strategy
development. The most sensible place to begin is with an understanding of what causes failure.
All equipment will eventually fail for any of a variety of reasons:
• Normal Wear and Tear
• Overstressing equipment
o Operating outside design limits
▪ Deliberately
▪ By accident
• Incorrect assembly
o When equipment is new
o After maintenance
• Incorrect parts
o Incorrect specification
o Parts deteriorated/worn on installation
Maintenance is only capable of addressing some of the above failure causes – and is actually a cause in
itself. Consequently, more maintenance is NOT better, and we need to think carefully about when we
should intervene in the running of a machine.

Looking at the above list, it is clear that a wide variety of organisational roles can contribute to
equipment failure. As such, they must also be able to assist in preventing failure. A potential list might
look like that below:
• Maintainers
When
• Operators
developing • Control Room attendants
equipment • Condition Monitoring Technicians
strategies, we • NDT technicians Improving Reliability is a
typically focus • Lubricators/Greasers Team Effort
on the routine • Stores people
activities • Procurement personnel
performed by • Equipment Designers
• Managers
these people
For the purposes of developing PM tasks, we must look to those who are involved with the day to day
care and operation of the equipment as highlighted above. We must, however, also keep in mind that a
PM task may not be the only way – or the best way – to deal with a particular equipment failure.
Identical equipment, in a different operating context, can often require quite different Routine
Maintenance programs. Consider, for example, the exact same make and model of pump that is used in
four different operating contexts:
• The pump is installed on a wastewater treatment

facility. If it fails, raw sewage will overflow into a
natural wetlands area which is home to several rare Rapid Equipment Strategy Development | Version 3.6.1
species of turtle.
• The pump is the only feed water pump for a

manufacturing facility producing beer. When it
stops, the entire brewing process stops.
• The pump is the only emergency fire pump installed

on a mineral processing plant.
• The pump pumps water to a cooling tower at a power station. If it fails, there is another,
identical, installed standby pump which can take over its duty.
Would the PM program be the same in every situation?

It is highly likely that, for the first two scenarios, a fairly comprehensive Predictive and Preventive
Maintenance program would be in place for the pump. In the third scenario, however, our only PM
routine may be to test run the pump from time to time. Even if we have some Predictive and
Preventive maintenance tasks in place for this pump, it is likely that they would be performed far less
frequently than in the first two scenarios. And in the fourth scenario, we may even consider adopting a
“run to failure” strategy for the pump.
Why are these PM programs different? It is because the Operating Context in each case is different, and
therefore both the technical characteristics and business consequences of failure are also different.
Consider the PM program that the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) for the pump recommends.
What assumptions does it make regarding the operating context and consequences of failure for the
pump? Is this likely to apply in all cases? Does it apply in your situation? For this (as well as many other
reasons) we need to treat OEM maintenance recommendations with caution.
Historically, equipment was expected to follow a failure distribution similar to that shown below. The
failure rate (roughly equivalent to the Conditional Probability of Failure under specific assumptions)
would be roughly constant for most of the life and then increase rapidly after a certain age. That is, a
few items would suffer random failures throughout the life, but most could be reasonably expected to
operate for a certain period and then “wear out” soon after the end of this period.
The Traditional View of Equipment Failure
How would we avoid the majority of failures, therefore? The answer is to replace or overhaul the
equipment at some point shortly before it hits this “wear out” zone. Let’s examine this further by
reference to an example.

The Traditional View of Maintenance
Imagine, for a moment, that you are the Chief Engineer for a Civil Aviation Airline in the late 1950’s. You
have taken delivery of a brand-new civil aviation aircraft that uses brand new technology (such as jet or
turbine engines!). Your job is to determine the most appropriate Preventive Maintenance program for
this aircraft. You subscribe to the traditionally accepted view of equipment failure. How are you going
to work out at what age each component should be replaced or overhauled?
Now consider that in 1960:
• Civil Aviation Safety Statistics indicate that there are approximately 60 crashes every million
take-offs.
• Around half of these are due to equipment failure.
• The industry is about to introduce the largest passenger aircraft to date – the Boeing 747.
• The aviation regulators (the FAA) come to you and insist that the current situation is not
tolerable – you must reduce the number of crashes due to equipment failure.

What do you do?
It was this imperative that drove the work of Nowlan and Heap referred to above. Their research found
that there were 6 predominant failure patterns that applied to the range of systems/components
commonly found in civil aviation aircraft. These failure patterns are shown below.

Note that the probability of most failures does not increase with age
The results of the study generated a paradigm shift in the way we think about equipment failure. If
items do not wear out, we CANNOT prevent failure by replacing them at a set point. Indeed, in the
majority of cases (failure pattern F), fixed time replacement makes things worse! If we cannot prevent
equipment failures, then we must avoid or minimise the consequences of those failures either through:
• Predicting impending failures and replacing components in a planned manner at a time that
is convenient to operations (Condition-Based Maintenance or Condition Monitoring)
• Modifying the equipment in some way so that the equipment failure does not matter
(Redundancy, Protection)
The results of this paradigm shift were significant improvements in civil aviation safety performance,
accompanied by the bonus of reduced materials costs:
1960’s Today
Overall Safety 60 crashes/million take-offs <3 crashes/million take-offs

Equipment failure-related 30 crashes/million take-offs <0.5 crashes/million take-offs
crashes
Maintenance Materials Cost per $210 (1990) $103 (2006)

Airborne Hour

The Rapid Equipment Strategy Development
Process
We saw in the previous section that there were a number of key concepts underlying both RCM and
PMO:
• Solutions to equipment failures may take a wide variety of forms and PM is not necessarily
the best.
• Most equipment does not wear out, so traditional maintenance strategies are seldom
applicable.
• Where PM is appropriate, it should focus first on Condition-Based Maintenance.
If we are to obtain the benefits available from RCM and PMO, we must develop a process that captures
the above principles. Additionally, it must include the flexibility to apply either RCM or PMO
approaches as required for specific equipment. Lastly, it must do all of this within a business problem
solving framework, which forces early identification of business drivers for a maintenance review and a
closed loop process to ensure the required performance improvement has been delivered.
Within Assetivity, the process described above is known as Rapid Equipment Strategy Development.
This process is based on the SAE JA 1011 RCM standard and, as previously shown, consists of the
following 11 steps:
1. Determine Scope of Analysis
2. Identify Primary Functions
3. Verify System Capability
4. Identify Failure Modes

5. Analyse Failure Modes, Effects and Consequences
6. Select Recommended Maintenance Tasks
7. Identify Additional Improvement Tasks
8. Consolidate Schedules and Integrate with Operational Strategies
9. Gain Approval
10. Implement Recommended Actions
11. Track Success
We will spend most of the rest of the course working through these steps in detail.

Step 1 – Determine Scope of Analysis
The objectives of Step 1 of the Equipment Strategy Development process are to:
• Select systems for Analysis where Equipment Strategy Development will deliver significant
business benefits
• Ensure alignment and agreement regarding the scope of the improvement effort
• Ensure that we fully understand the business implications of equipment failure
• Provide a baseline against which the need for future revisions can be assessed
In order that you can select the appropriate systems or equipment for analysis we must first understand
the drivers for the business in total, and then align the objectives of the PM review process with those
business drivers.
• Maximise availability/uptime?
• Maximise throughput/performance?
• Reduce Operating Costs?
• Reduce Maintenance Costs?
• Reduce Operating Risks?
Then which systems are impeding current performance?
• Criticality
o Safety
o Environment
o Throughput (Bottlenecks/Constraints)
• Costs
At all times you should remain aware of opportunities to generate the greatest value possible for the
effort you input for common or similar assets. Take the example of Rail Ore Cars. By conducting the
analysis on one ore care, you may be able to apply this across many thousand other ore cars which are
identical. So, elevate the analysis on assets that fall into this category (many, or like assets) up the
priority order to gain the reliability and cost benefit sooner.

Where does the system start and stop? What do you want or need to include in your analysis?
• Process stream – e.g. which valve, chute or conveyor.
• Electrical systems – including transformers and motor control cabinets.
• Plant Air systems – are moisture traps included?
• Instrument Air systems.
• Hydraulic systems.
Each of these and many other types of systems will need to be considered before and possibly
throughout your analysis.
Other options exist to assist you in your selection of scope. These can include Equipment Shutdown
tasks only or tasks for one workgroup only. The choice is yours, however you must ensure you tailor it
to meet your needs and those of the facility whose maintenance program is being optimised.
As we’ve already seen, an understanding of the operating context and subsequent consequences of
failure is critical to establishing an appropriate maintenance program.
The consequences of failure within a specific system can vary widely from a Safety Impact to an
Environmental Impact to the Cost of Downtime. Additionally, there are often buffer stocks before and
after a process that can limit the consequences of shorter duration failures. If your system relies on
these, you must evaluate your plant’s ability to “catch up” after a failure has occurred and been
rectified.

These consequences will need to be documented assuming a “typical worst case” scenario prior to
commencing a detailed analysis. Use your organisation’s corporate risk matrix to categorise
consequences.
A system overview document should be used to provide a description of the system being analysed
including a description of system boundaries or scope and the system’s current configuration. This
document should make appropriate references to drawings and manuals, noting current revision
numbers. It should also capture your analysis of the impact of equipment downtime and note any
assumptions made.

Step 2 – Identify Primary Functions
The objective of Step 2 is to define and quantify the primary function of the equipment.
Functions are the reason why we own the equipment – we want it to do something, even if it’s just to
look pretty! The primary function is the main reason we own it.
Consider the illustrated Tank and Pump system. What do we

want Pump A to do?
The Primary Function of Pump A is to pump at least 50kl/hr of

liquid into Tank 1
In addition to the primary function, there are generally several secondary functions. There is no need to
consider these, at this point in the process – but we will discuss Secondary Functions in more detail in
Step 4 of the RESD process.
Note that primary functions are identified at the equipment or system level only NOT at lower levels in
the hierarchy (e.g. at a component level).
All Functions should ideally have some form of performance standard associated with it. This
performance standard should be the minimum acceptable level of performance required by operations
in order to achieve their target levels of:
• Throughput.
• Safety. Rapid Equipment Strategy Development | Version 3.6.1
• Environmental Risk.
• Operating Efficiency/Costs.
In the illustrated system, the performance standard associated with the Primary Function of Pump A is
50kl/hr.

Step 3 – Verify Equipment Capability
The objectives of Step 3 are to:
• Define and quantify the desired level of performance required of the equipment.
• Compare this with the design capabilities of the equipment.
• Assess the impact of any gaps between desired and existing equipment capability.
• Make recommendations to address any significant gaps.
Consider the very simple pumping system we considered

earlier.
We noted that the Primary Function of Pump A is to pump

at least 50kl/hr of liquid into Tank 1.
However, to fully define the performance required of this

system, we also need to consider the operating context for the pump. This will include boundary
conditions and other factors such as:
• Inlet pressures
• Back Pressure
• Fluid Temperatures
• Ambient Temperatures Rapid Equipment Strategy Development | Version 3.6.1
• Contaminants
• Fluid Density/SG
• Viscosity
This information can be obtained from various sources such as:
• Operating practices
• Production Budgets
• Production targets
• Operators and OEM manuals and data packs

The key question in this step is – What is this Pump Capable of Doing? This information can be obtained
from sources such as:
• Manufacturer’s Specifications
• Design Intent
• Design Calculations
In almost all cases where equipment is chronically

unreliable it is because we are asking the equipment to
do more than it is capable of doing
Note that, for all equipment, there are two functional performance standards – Desired Performance
and Design Capability. As stated above, the relationship between these standards has significant
implications for the reliability of the equipment. There may also be additional complications associated
with Engineering Factors built into the design.
Desired Performance is set by the organisation and is the minimum acceptable level of performance
required by operations in order to achieve target levels of: Rapid Equipment Strategy Development | Version 3.6.1
• Throughput
• Safety
• Environmental Risk
• Operating Efficiency/Costs
Design Capability is set by designers and is the

maximum level of performance possible (in the long run)
while achieving target levels of:
• Reliability
• Availability

• Maintenance Costs
Engineering Factors built-in to the design may allow short-term, infrequent operation beyond the
Design Capability in some cases. This creates the upper limit of capability for the equipment, although
care must be taken that operation in this area does not become frequent or long-term.
As equipment is operated, the Current Capability will vary between full capability (as new, at or above
Design Capability) and no capability (failed, or below Desired Performance) based on the Design
Capability (including Engineering Factors), the Desired Performance and the operating context. The
primary purpose of maintenance is to support the organisation in achieving its goals by maximising the
amount of time the equipment spends above the Desired Performance standard in order to. This is
accomplished through a combination of Preventive, Predictive, Corrective and Breakdown maintenance
activities as discussed previously.
What if Design Capability exceeds Desired Performance?
In this case, it should be expected that equipment will meet or

exceed design levels of reliability and availability. The PM
program should focus on those tasks required in order to
ensure that equipment continues to meet desired levels of
performance.
What if Desired Performance exceeds Design Performance?
If the desired performance exceeds that of the original design

performance of the system the system may not meet design
levels of reliability and availability, and in extreme cases, may

not function at all.
However, in some cases, desired performance can significantly

exceed design performance with minimal impact on reliability
and availability.
We should never forget that the prime reason for doing maintenance is to support the overall objectives
of the organisation. In some cases, exceeding design capability may be a wise business decision if:
• Increased revenues and profits exceed the costs of additional downtime and maintenance

• The costs of increasing design capability exceed the benefits from improved reliability
Accordingly, if Desired Performance exceeds Design Performance then we should:
• Initiate a study into the costs and benefits of increasing Design Capability or reducing
Desired Performance
• Continue to develop the best equipment strategies that we can, given current Desired
Performance and Design Capability specifications

Step 4 – Identify Failure Modes
The objective of Step 4 is to identify all of the relevant failure modes that could affect the equipment.
A Failure Mode is a Cause of equipment failure. Causes and effects are part of an infinite continuum
that begs the questions “Where do we stop?”
Causes and Effects
We aim to describe failure modes to a level of detail that permits us to identify appropriate PM
activities. The level will be dictated by what we can achieve at the maintenance ‘coal face’.
There are two approaches to identifying Failure Modes – the RCM approach and the PMO approach:
The RCM Approach The PMO Approach

Identifying Functions
Cast your minds back to the Tank and Pump system
from Step 2 of the RESD process.
The Primary Function of Pump A is to pump at

least 50kl/hr of liquid into Tank 1 and this obviously
needs to be captured within our analysis.
Secondary Functions
In addition to the primary function, there are generally several secondary functions. These are
additional functional requirements that we have of the equipment given selection for use within a
particular operating context. The maintenance required to ensure continued functionality of these
secondary functions can sometimes be more important (and more costly) than the maintenance
required to assure functionality of the primary function. Secondary functions can be considered under
the following headings:
• Protection (This might also be considered a primary function of a protective device)
• Appearance
• Containment
• Contamination
• Controls & Measurements (This might also be considered a primary function of

instrumentation)
• Environmental
• Economy/Efficiency
•
Safety
Secondary Functions – Protection
Protective Functions are functions that are intended to minimise or reduce the consequences in the
event of another failure or abnormal event. Examples of protective functions include:
• To sound an alarm in the event of a fire.
• To provide emergency lighting in the event of a power failure.
• To trip the turbine in the event of an over speed.
In the event of a failure or abnormal event, Protective Devices normally act in one of the following ways
(with associated examples):
• Provide warning of failure or hazard.

o High level alarm, equipment start-up alarm.
• Stop equipment.
o Turbine over speed trip, interlocks.
• Take over from failed equipment.
o Emergency generator, standby equipment.
• Relieve Hazardous situations.
o Fire extinguisher or suppression equipment, pressure relief valve.
• Contain hazards.
o Automatic closing fire doors, machine guards.
Secondary Functions – Appearance
Secondary functions relating to appearance often relate to:
• A requirement to appear a certain colour.
o e.g. Handrails must be painted yellow; fire pipework must appear red.
Secondary Functions – Containment
Secondary functions relating to containment often require containment for safety or production
efficiency reasons:
• e.g. no spillage at conveyor transfer points.
• e.g. pipelines containing acid must not leak.
• e.g. waste gas extraction pipework must not leak.
Secondary Functions – Contamination

Secondary functions relating to contamination often apply in industries where product quality is vital
such as:
• No contamination of pharmaceuticals with machine oil while being packaged.
• No dust ingress at precision electronics manufacturing plant.
• No contamination of raw materials in a food manufacturing plant.
Secondary Functions – Controls/Measurements
Secondary functions relating to controls and measurements relate to:
• Controls that you require to adjust
o e.g. control over speed of motor vehicle
o e.g. control the operation of the turning indicators on a motor vehicle

• Measurements or readings that you require that provide indication of equipment
performance
o e.g. motor vehicle speedometer
o e.g. engine oil temperature gauge
Secondary Functions – Environmental
Environmental Secondary functions are those that are required in order to comply with environmental
standards and regulations
• e.g. emit dust at levels lower than the legal maximum
• e.g. ensure that cooling water discharge at a power station is less than required under
terms of environmental licence
Secondary Functions – Economy/Efficiency
Secondary functions relating to Economy/Efficiency are those that are required in order to meet
operational cost performance targets:
• e.g. fuel consumption for a public bus to be less than a specified limit
• e.g. turbine efficiency to be greater than the minimum level acceptable to operations
Secondary Functions – Safety
Secondary functions relating to Safety are those that are required in order to ensure that the equipment
can be operated safely, within a tolerable level of risk:
• e.g. provide adequate lighting of the road ahead in order to be able to see hazards when
driving at night
• e.g. to stop the vehicle within a specified distance from a specified speed when being
operated under normal conditions

Note that, in some cases what is considered a secondary function of a system might be considered as
the primary function of a sub-system. This fact is not significant, as long as all of the functions of the
system being analysed are adequately described.
The critical point to note about secondary functions is that, on occasions, these may be more important
than the primary functions in terms of the business consequences associated with their failure, and
failures associated with all functions need to be identified and managed.
Listing Functional Failures

Functional Failures are descriptions of the general way in which equipment fails to meet its intended
functions. In general, Functional Failures can be described when equipment either:
• Completely fails to provide the function

• Provides the function, but at a level of performance that does not meet our performance
standard
The Primary Function of Pump A is to pump at least 50kl/hr of fluid into Tank 1, therefore:
• The Functional Failures of Pump A are:
o Does not pump at all
o Pumps at <50kl/hr
If the function of a flow meter is to provide an indication of the flow rate with an accuracy of +/-5% then
the Functional Failures of the flow meter are:
• Does not indicate the flow rate
• Indicates flow rate with an accuracy outside the acceptable range
Identifying Failure Modes

As mentioned previously, a Failure Mode is a Cause of equipment failure.
• This is not a brainstorming exercise!
• Sources of Failure Modes
o Current PM program
o Failure History
o Other failures that are reasonably likely to occur
Both the RCM and PMO approach can generate huge numbers of potential failure modes, most of which

are unimportant from a PM perspective. Restrict the identification of failure modes to those that are
“reasonably likely” based on your knowledge of:
• Previous failure history
• The technical characteristics of the equipment
• The way the equipment is being operated
In later steps, we will need a concise description of the cause of each failure mode so we can determine
what to do about it. Typically, we use the phrase “due to” to achieve this. For example:
• Bolts come loose due to vibration
• Impeller fails due to normal wear

• Coupling fails due to misalignment
Considering again our pump example, one Functional Failure of Pump A is:
• Does not pump at all
Possible Failure Modes related to this Functional

Failure include:
• Pump bearings seize due to normal wear
• Pump shaft sheared due to fatigue
• Pump casing holed by rock
• etc, etc
Describing Failure Modes for Protective Functions

For Protective Functions, we typically do not describe the cause of failure, but rather the event at which
it becomes critical. For example:
• Circuit breaker fails to activate in the event of electrical overload
• Fire pump fails to start when required
• Emergency lighting fails to operate in the event of mains power failure
Exceptions to this rule are where:
• There is a dominant failure mode associated with a particular Protective Device which is
likely to be preventable with PM:
o e.g. Smoke detector fails due to flat battery
• We need to carefully consider alternatives because the task to check the operation of a
specific Protective Device is:

o Potentially hazardous,
o The primary reason for shutting down the equipment, or
o Could increase the risk of the failure occurring.
Describing Failures Not Related to Maintenance

Some failure modes are clearly unpreventable by PM – e.g. human errors. In such cases, if...
• the consequences of the failure are significant, and
• it is considered likely that the failure will recur;
Then...

• List the root cause of failure to a level that permits effective failure elimination through a
maintenance action.
Some examples of failures occurring for reasons other than PM include:
• Operator Error (overload, incorrect start sequence, etc)
• Maintenance Error (incorrect assembly, missed step, etc)
• Incorrect Parts (poor quality, wrong application, etc)
List Current PM Tasks

All existing tasks should be captured. Possible Sources of PM tasks include:
• CMMS/ERP/EAM system
o Ensure you identify tasks that may be attached at a different location in the
Equipment hierarchy (e.g. Condition Monitoring Tasks, Lubrication Tasks, NDT)
• Other Manual, Spreadsheet or Database systems
o e.g. Condition Monitoring Tasks, Lubrication Tasks, NDT
• Operator Checklists and Standard Operating Procedures Rapid Equipment Strategy Development | Version 3.6.1
• Informal “common” practice
Review Manufacturer Manuals

Manufacturer manuals often contain Maintenance recommendations
• What do manufacturers know that we may not know?
• What do we know that the manufacturers may not know?
Treat Manufacturer manuals with caution – they are a guide only.

Analyse Failure History
We should identify possible additional failure modes that are not being adequately predicted or
prevented by analysing failure history:
• Breakdown work orders
• Corrective work orders
For each work order, we should ideally identify the cause of the failure. Points to consider:
• How well does your formally recorded failure history identify failure causes?
• Does this mean we don’t know the causes of failure?
• Where is this information held?
Performing Pareto Analysis can assist with identifying the few failures that are deserving of the most
analysis:
Pump Failures
25
20
No of Work Orders
15
10
0
Worn impeller Worn throat bush Unknown Seal failure Bearing failure Broken shaft Motor failure
Failure Cause
Identify Protective Functions

If we follow the PMO process, it is possible that there are some failures that may have already occurred,
but which will not appear in our failure history. These are typically failures of protective devices which

are not “fail safe”, and for which we do not currently have PM tasks in place. Accordingly, we need to
ensure that we capture these in our analysis.
• Protective Functions – Functions that are intended to reduce the consequences in the
event of another failure or abnormal event
In the event of a failure or abnormal event, Protective Devices normally act in one of the following
ways:
• Provide warning of failure or hazard
• Stop equipment
• Take over from failed equipment
• Relieve Hazardous situations

• Contain hazards

Step 5 – Analyse Failure Modes, Effects and
Consequences
The objective of Step 5 is to define and categorise the effects and consequences of each failure mode.
For us to choose to perform a routine maintenance task, the task must meet two criteria:
• It must have technical applicability in that it is capable of successfully predicting, preventing

or detecting the failure; and
• It must have business effectiveness in that it successfully reduces either the likelihood or
the size of the business consequences (and by enough to offset the task cost!).
In order to assess candidate tasks against these criteria, we must first understand the technical
characteristics and business impact of each failure mode.
• Failure Effects
o A description of what happens if the failure occurs while the equipment is in

service.
• Failure Consequences

o A classification of the business impact of the failure based on the described failure
effects. Normally classified as:
▪ Hidden
▪ Safety
▪ Environmental
▪ Operational
▪ Non-Operational
We should describe failure effects in sufficient detail to permit the assessment of failure consequences.

This should include:
• How the failure becomes evident
• The impact on safety and the environment (if any)
• The impact on operational capability (if any)
• The nature of any secondary or consequential damage
• What is required to restore the functionality of the failed item
Often, the biggest impact on operational capability is determined by the amount of downtime
associated with the equipment. This can be difficult to define unless we can answer the following:
• When does downtime start?
• When does downtime end?
• What activities take place between these times?
• What other assumptions have we made that impact on our estimate of total downtime?
The consequences of failure are divided into four categories as shown below (drawn from top row the
SAE JA 1011 RCM decision diagram, which we will use later):
Hidden Failure Consequences

Defined as:
• Those failures where the loss of function, under normal circumstances, would not be Rapid Equipment Strategy Development | Version 3.6.1
detected
This definition most frequently applies to

protective devices which are not “fail-safe”.
A key issue, however, is what is meant by
“normal circumstances”? Consider our pump
system with a Standby Pump added:
• Is the loss of function of Pump B

hidden?
• What about the loss of function

of Pump C?

Which of these failures are Hidden Failures?
• Failure of a smoke detector in a meeting room?
• Failure of a burglar alarm so that it is not capable of detecting a burglar?
• Failure of the speedometer in your car?
• Failure of the brakes in your car?
• Failure of the parking brake in your car?
• Failure of the emergency brakes in a road-going truck?
Note that protective devices can often fail in two ways:
• Fails in such a way as not to provide the protection when it is needed
o E.g. conveyor trip wire does not stop conveyor when it is pulled (Hidden)
• Fails in such a way as to give a “false alarm” or spurious trip
o E.g. conveyor trips even when nobody pulled trip wire (Evident)
Be careful when assessing the consequences of failure of protective devices.
One Last Comment on Hidden Failures
Hidden failures have no noticeable effect until another event occurs. However, they do increase the
risk of more serious consequences if the equipment failure or other event that they are protecting us
from subsequently occurs. Ultimately, we only suffer the final consequences of a hidden failure if the
equipment failure or other event that they are protecting us from subsequently occurs. In other words,
there has to be more than one failure (or other independent event) occur before we suffer these
consequences. In other words, there must be multiple failures for the consequences of a hidden failure
to become apparent.
Safety and Environmental Consequences Rapid Equipment Strategy Development | Version 3.6.1
A failure has safety consequences if this failure creates an intolerable risk to personnel safety.
A failure has environmental consequences if this failure creates an intolerable risk of environmental
damage.
• How do we assess this risk?
• Who should assess this risk?

How do we assess risk? AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009
Risk Management – Principles & Guidelines Medium High High Extreme
Risk is the combination of the likelihood of the event

occurring and the impact if it were to occur.
Low Medium High Extreme
Likelihood
We should assess risk as if there were no PM task in
Low Medium High High
place to prevent the occurrence from happening.
This will ensure the overall significance of the risk is
understood and PM tasks to mitigate/control it are Low Low Medium Medium
given the correct level of importance.
Low Low Low Medium
Who should assess the level of risk?
Ideally, those who are likely to be exposed to the Impact

safety or environmental risks should be involved in
the risk assessment process, but:
• What about extremely high risks (e.g. multiple fatalities)?
• What if the impact of the event is likely to occur outside our boundaries?
Corporate guidelines should tell us what level of risk is tolerable and how to deal with risks that are
intolerable or have cross-divisional effects – use your Corporate Risk Matrix if one exists.
Operational Consequences
Operational consequences include:
• Lost Production
• Loss of Product Quality, Lost Recovery
• Increased Operating Costs
• Loss of Customer Service
What units of measure can we use to quantify the impact of these? Rapid Equipment Strategy Development | Version 3.6.1
Non-Operational Consequences
Failures have non-operational consequences if the only impact of the failure is the direct cost of the
repair. This can usually be expressed in dollar terms, using business rules.

Step 6 – Select Recommended Maintenance
Tasks
The objective of this step is to select the most appropriate routine maintenance task to deal with each
failure cause.
We use a structured approach to task selection, based on the SAE JA 1011 RCM standard:
Following the above structured approach will provide confidence that we have identified the most Rapid Equipment Strategy Development | Version 3.6.1
appropriate maintenance task to address each failure mode without undertaking unnecessary analysis
steps. In general, the preferred approach is “one failure mode, one PM task” to ensure clarity of
responsibility and prevent duplication. Note, however, that in some cases – particularly where a failure
mode has safety or environmental consequences – multiple tasks may be required to address the failure
mode satisfactorily.
Each task which is selected must satisfy the following criteria:
• Is the task APPLICABLE? From a technical perspective, does the task successfully predict,
prevent or detect the failure cause?
• Is the task EFFECTIVE? From a business perspective, does the task successfully address
the business impact of the failure cause?

In practice, technical applicability is a necessary condition for business effectiveness and must therefore
be considered first. The assessment of business effectiveness, however, follows directly from the failure
consequences identified previously and will therefore be addressed first for teaching purposes.
In order to determine whether a task is effective, we must assess the business impact of a failure mode
both:
• Without the PM task in place, and
• After the PM task is in place.
The task has effectiveness if, through prediction, prevention or detection, it will successfully addresses
the consequences of failure.
Hidden Failure Consequences

As established earlier, hidden failures have no direct
consequences, but they do increase the risk of more serious
consequences if the equipment failure or other event that
they are protecting us from subsequently occurs. In other
words, there is no business impact unless we suffer multiple
failures.
Therefore, a PM task required to address Hidden Failures is

Effective if:
It reduces the risk associated with the multiple

failure to tolerable levels
The way to assess this is by using an appropriate risk matrix. The impact of the multiple failure is
generally easy to assess – it is the impact of the original failure if there were no protective device in
place. In addition, PM tasks generally change the likelihood but not the impact of failures, so the

question is:
• How do we determine the likelihood of the multiple failure?
Determining the likelihood of a multiple failure
If we take our pump system and assume perfect sensing, perfect switching and independent failures, we
can calculate the likelihood of the multiple failure in a given period through the following formula:
PrMF = PrTED x PrTIVE
Where PrTED = the probability of failure of the protected

equipment; and
PrTIVE = the probability of failure of the

protective device

Further, when the failure distribution follows Failure Pattern E (and sometimes in other cases) we can
approximate the above probabilities using the following:
PrX = 1 / MTBFX
Where PrX = the probability of failure of device x in one unit of the time that MTBF is expressed in.
This allows us to calculate an approximation of the probability of the multiple failure. As a simple
example, the probability of failure of our pumping system in a given year with no failure finding is
calculated as follows:
If the MTBF of Pump B is 2 years,

PrTED = 1/2 = 0.5 or 50% in each year
If the MTBF of Pump C is 5 years,

PrTIVE = 1/5 = 0.2 or 20% in each year
PrMF = PrTED x PrTIVE
PrMF = 0.5 x 0.2 = 0.1 or 10% in each year
For a given PM task, the Effectiveness is assessed by comparing the risk before and after application of
the task. The acceptability criteria will depend on whether the hidden failure exposes
safety/environmental or operational/non-operational consequences – see below for details.
Note that, in general, it is very difficult to obtain sufficiently accurate data to estimate MTBF for the
current PM program. It is even more difficult to estimate MTBF for an alternative PM program and
assessment of business effectiveness therefore often relies on “expert judgement”. This is explored
further below as part of the assessment of Applicability for Failure Finding tasks.
Safety and Environmental Consequences

A failure has safety consequences if this failure creates an intolerable risk to personnel safety. A failure
has environmental consequences if this failure creates an intolerable risk of environmental damage.
Therefore, a PM task to address Safety and Environmental Consequences is Effective if: Rapid Equipment Strategy Development | Version 3.6.1
It reduces the risk associated with the failure at a cost that is “Reasonably Practical” given
the extent of the reduction
The risk is assessed using a risk matrix, as with hidden failures. Again, applying a PM task changes the
likelihood but the impact of the failure remains unchanged. If the risk after applying PM is reduced and
the cost is “reasonably practical” for the level of reduction, then the PM task is effective.
Two further points:
• The standard for safety/environmental risks is usually ALARP (As Low As Reasonably
Practical), so just reducing the risk to a tolerable level may not be sufficient. Multiple tasks
may be required to achieve ALARP, with each assessed as part of an overall package.

• Maintenance action is generally considered “administrative” in the hierarchy of hazard
controls and is therefore BELOW elimination, substitution and isolation. As such, these
options must also be considered and applied if possible.
Overall, the package of PM tasks selected MUST reduce the risk to a tolerable level. If this cannot be
achieved, the equipment must be redesigned, or acceptance of the risk must be elevated in accordance
with the organisation’s risk management processes.
Operational Consequences
Operational consequences can include:
• Lost Production
• Loss of Product Quality
• Increased Operating Costs
• Loss of Customer Service
You will note that these are all financial in nature. A PM task to address Operational Consequences is
therefore Effective if:
The cost of doing the task is less than the cost of the operational and repair costs
associated with the failure
Non-Operational Consequences
Failures will have non-operational consequences if the only impact of the failure is the direct cost of the
repair. This impact is also financial in nature and therefore a PM task to address Non-Operational
Consequences is Effective if:
The cost of doing the task is less than the cost of repairing the consequential damage
associated with the failure
Note that we may also need to consider the cost of consequential damage when assessing the

effectiveness of failures with Operational Consequences. Consequential damage may include damage
to other parts or components incurred during the repair, potential safety or environmental damages
etc.
In order to determine whether a task is applicable, we must consider the technical nature of the task,
and the technical characteristics of the failure which we are trying to predict,
prevent, or detect.
Routine PM Task Types
• On condition
• Fixed Interval, including:

o Scheduled Restoration
o Scheduled Replacement
• Failure Finding Tasks
Historically, the first PM tasks were fixed interval tasks, so let us consider them first.
Fixed Interval Tasks

Scheduled Restoration Tasks
A routine task which “restores the capability of an item at or before a specified interval (age limit),
regardless of its condition at the time, to a level that provides a tolerable probability of survival to the
end of another specified interval” (SAE JA 1011, emphasis added)
Scheduled Replacement Tasks
A routine task which “entails discarding an item at or before a specified interval (age limit), regardless
of its condition at the time” and replacing it with a new component. (SAE JA 1011, emphasis added)
Scheduled Restoration or Replacement Task Selection
These are applicable only when:
• The conditional probability of failure starts to rapidly increase after a specified age
• Most items will survive until that age
• We can state with some degree of certainty what that age is
This corresponds to failure patterns A, B and C, which relate to items that are likely to be:
• Fairly simple, with a single, dominant failure cause
• This failure cause is likely to be either:
o Erosion (wear)
o Corrosion Rapid Equipment Strategy Development | Version 3.6.1
o Fatigue
o Another form of time-based decay
Scheduled Restoration or Replacement Task Frequency
The frequency of a Scheduled Restoration or Scheduled Replacement Task is determined by the “life” of
the component, or the age at which the conditional probability of failure starts to increase rapidly.
Note that task Intervals are not necessarily based just on calendar time. Other units may also be used
include machine hours run, kilometres travelled, cycles completed etc.

Nowlan and Heap found that the probability of most failures (almost 90%) did not increase with age, so
fixed interval tasks are not applicable in most cases. However, if the consequences of the failure are
significant, what can we do about these? One possible answer is the application of Condition
Monitoring techniques.
Condition-Based Maintenance Tasks

Most items give us some warning that they are about to fail:
A potential failure is a clearly identifiable condition that indicates a failure mode is about to occur, or is
in the process of occurring. We can generate a curve showing the relationship between the age of an
item and its resistance to failure, which is known as a P-F Curve.

The P-F Curve

The P-F Interval
For each potential failure and associated measuring/monitoring technique, we can define a unique
interval between the first possible point of detection and the functional failure. This is known as the P-F
Interval.
Condition Monitoring Task Frequency
The frequency of Condition Monitoring tasks must be less than the shortest likely P-F Interval. It must
also be sufficiently shorter than the PF interval to permit effective action to avoid the consequences of
the failure. The frequency of a Condition Monitoring Task is therefore determined by:
• The P-F interval, and
• The amount of time required to permit effective action to avoid the consequences of the
failure.
Condition Monitoring Task Selection
Condition Monitoring Tasks are applicable only when:

• There is a clearly defined potential failure condition
• The P-F interval can be reasonably well defined
• The task can be done at a frequency which permits effective action to avoid the
consequences of the failure
Condition Monitoring Techniques
• Human Senses (use with caution)
o Look, Listen, Touch (caution – burn danger), Taste (be even more cautious -
poisoning), Smell (caustic burns)
• Statistical Process Control techniques (Run charts)
• Equipment Performance Monitoring
o Temperatures, Pressures, Flow Rates etc.
• Specialised Condition Monitoring Technologies
o Vibration Analysis
o Thermography
o Oil Analysis
o Etc.
The Advantages of Condition Monitoring
• Allows the equipment to tell you when it needs to be repaired
• Maximises the life of parts and materials
• Can be applied to any failure cause, regardless of failure pattern, as long as there is some
warning of failure
• Often can be done with the equipment on-line Rapid Equipment Strategy Development | Version 3.6.1
• Often can be done without the need for intrusive maintenance activity
• Often much cheaper than fixed interval replacements or overhauls
The Disadvantages of Condition Monitoring
• May require more flexibility in labour resource levels
• Coordination of equipment shutdowns for corrective maintenance is more difficult –

possible requiring more plant or module shutdowns
• Can only be applied where potential failure conditions can be identified – some items fail
without warning
• For some failure causes, may not be cost-effective

Failure Finding Tasks
• Only apply to Hidden Failures
• Involve inspecting or testing a protective device or system in order to determine whether it

has failed
How would you test...
• A smoke detector
• A float switch on a high-level alarm
• An over-temperature alarm on a gearbox
• A hold-back device on a conveyor
• A turbine over-speed trip
• An Uninterruptable Power Supply (UPS)
• A Rupture Disc
• An Electrical Fuse
• An Emergency Flare
Ideally, we want to test the entire system or device. But we must also consider the consequences if the
protective device does not operate as expected when we test it – we don’t want to cause the exact
failure that the protective device is there to protect us against! And we should also recognise that some
protective devices cannot be tested at all, because testing them actually destroys them.
Failure Finding Task Selection
Failure Finding Tasks are applicable only when:

• It is possible to test the device without destroying it
• It is possible to test most or all of the device or system
• Performing the test does not significantly increase the risk of inducing the multiple failure
we are seeking to avoid
How often should we perform Failure Finding Tasks?
We need to reduce the risk of the multiple failure to tolerable levels. Failure Finding will not change the
impact of the multiple failure, but it can reduce its likelihood.

The Probability of Multiple Failures without Failure Finding
The Probability of Multiple Failures with Failure Finding
The longer the Failure Finding Interval, the greater the risk the multiple failure will occur. Rapid Equipment Strategy Development | Version 3.6.1
We can calculate the level of risk using some statistical approximations and the following formula:
PrMF = PrTED x PrTIVE x ½ x FFI
where PrMF = the probability of the multiple failure
PrTED = the probability of failure of the protected equipment
PrTIVE = the probability of failure of the protective device
FFI = Failure Finding Interval
If we make the following assumptions:

PrTED = (1/MTBFTED), and
PrTIVE = (1/MTBFTIVE),
where MTBFTED = the Mean Time Between Failures of the protected equipment
MTBFTIVE = the Mean Time Between Failures of the protective device
Then:
PrMF = (1/MTBFTED) x (1/MTBFTIVE) x ½ x FFI
Alternatively, we can calculate FFI for a given PrMF:
FFI = 2 x MTBFTED x MTBFTIVE x PrMF
These formulae only apply for single protective devices. We can also calculate the level of risk for more
complex systems, but these calculations are outside the scope of this course. These situations include:
• Redundant protection (e.g. two pressure relief valves)
• Complex multi-level systems (e.g. fire protection systems with smoke alarms, sprinkler
systems, alarms and a communication system to the fire brigade)
• Where there is a risk that doing a failure finding task may induce the multiple failure
Failure Finding Task Selection
In general, the data is usually insufficient or of inadequate quality to support direct calculation of an FFI
and it is necessary to resort to expert judgement. In such cases, the frequency of a Failure Finding Task
is determined by the following principles:
• The higher the impact of the multiple failure the more frequent the task, and
• The higher the reliability of the protected equipment the less frequent the task, and
• The higher the reliability of the protective device the less frequent the task.

Ensuring Consistent Maintenance Quality
In order to ensure that maintenance tasks are performed with high quality and consistency, tasks must
be adequately and clearly described. In particular, for Condition Monitoring and Failure Finding Tasks,
the task description should include:
• The method to be used to perform the task – e.g.:
o Visually inspect the guard for corrosion
o Measure the temperature at point X using an infrared gun
• How to tell whether the item passes or fails the inspection or test – e.g.:
o Thickness must be >3mm
o Temperature must be < 50 degrees C
• What action should be taken in if the item fails the inspection or test – e.g.:
o Raise work request/notification
o Shutdown equipment immediately and notify supervisor
We will discuss the role of work instructions further in the next section when we talk about human
error.

Step 7 – Identify Additional Improvement Tasks
The objective of this step is to identify any other actions that should be recommended from the PM
review and review of failure history. These could relate to one-time changes that:
• Reduce the risks of failures that are not preventable, predictable or detectable, but where
the current level of risk is not tolerable
• Permanently eliminate the cause of failure
• Permit the quicker and safer completion of routine maintenance tasks
• Modifications to Equipment Design
• Changes to Operating Practices or Procedures
• Changes to Maintenance Repair procedures
• Changes to Maintenance and/or Operator Training
• Changes to Spare Parts Specifications
• Changes to Spare Parts holding levels
• etc...
• This is not a comprehensive design process.
• All changes require full consideration through a formal “management of change” process in Rapid Equipment Strategy Development | Version 3.6.1
order to ensure that all the implications of a change are considered.
• The group should not spend large quantities of time identifying one-time changes – only
identify those that are likely to give a rapid return for effort.
• The output of this step is recommendations for further, more detailed investigation through
the appropriate channels.
• Be extremely cautious when recommending equipment redesign. Typically, less than 10%
of outcomes from root cause analysis relate to genuine design issues. Changing the design
may add additional failure modes whose management may create additional problems
greater than those that currently exist. Living with current limitations is sometimes the best
choice.

Nowlan and Heap identified that most items failed prematurely:
Possible causes:
• Human Error
• System Error
• Design Error
• Parts Error
Types of Causes:
Human Error is Inevitable
• Who here has never made a mistake?

• There are numerous physiological and psychological characteristics that contribute to
human error – and these are held by all people, not just an error-prone few.
• Recognition failures
• Losing our place in a sequence of

actions
• The “time-gap” experience
• Forgetting the intention to do

something
• Omissions following interruptions
• Terminating a job before all the

actions are complete
• Branching errors
• Overshoot errors
• Misapplying a good rule
• Applying a bad rule
• Knowledge based errors
• Violations – routine, thrill-seeking and situational
• Rule-Based
o Unfamiliar with routine task
o Need guidance/procedures to follow
• Skill-based
o Can do task “on auto-pilot”
• Knowledge-based

o Think carefully through new or novel problem for which no procedure exists
Actions can be taken in several areas in order to reduce the risk of maintenance error
• Person Measures
o Awareness training
o Encourage mental rehearsal of tasks
o Control distractions
o Avoid place-losing errors
• Team Measures
o Teamwork and Communication training
• Workplace/Task Measures
o Ensure personnel perform tasks only when appropriately qualified and skilled
o Proactively manage fatigue
o Assign tasks appropriately
o Ensure equipment and tasks are properly designed
o Enforce good housekeeping standards
o Ensure Spare Parts and Tools are managed well
o Write, and Use, Effective Maintenance Work Instructions
o Actions can be taken in several areas in order to reduce the risk of maintenance
error
• Organisational Measures

o Put in place effective processes for analysing, and learning from, past failures
o Put in place proactive processes for assessing the risk of future maintenance errors

Step 8 – Consolidate Schedules and Integrate
with Operational Strategies
The objective of this step is to take all of the individual tasks that have been developed in the previous
steps, and group them for execution in such a way that:
• Minimises the impact of the PM program on planned downtime
• Integrates planned downtime for operational reasons with planned downtime for
maintenance
• Maximises the overall reliability and uptime of the plant (planned and unplanned)
• Maximises the efficiency of the labour performing the PM tasks
• Identify any operating windows of opportunity
• Group and Sort Tasks by Equipment Shutdown Status, Trade Type, Task Frequency and
Equipment
• Identify the Schedule Interval and Schedule Cycle
• Deal with Outliers
• Critically review the shortest interval Shutdown tasks
• Identify and resolve constraints

• Package and Sequence Tasks
• Level Workloads
Identifying Windows of Opportunity

Operating windows of opportunity may exist due to:
• Scheduled operating breaks (e.g. aisle cleaning, copper boil descale etc)
• Unscheduled operating breaks
These may be identified through:
• Consultation with Production Schedulers/Planners
• Analysis of previous operating windows

Where appropriate, it may be advisable to align Maintenance Shutdowns with these windows of
opportunity. In some instances, it may be possible to alter the timing of Operating Shutdowns to better
align with Maintenance requirements.
Grouping and Sorting Tasks

PM Tasks should be sorted and/or filtered by:
• Equipment Shutdown Status – i.e. to do the task:
o Equipment must be running
o Equipment must be shutdown
o Entire Production must be shutdown
o Equipment must be running in test mode
• Trade Type
• Task Frequency
• Equipment
For a given:
• Shutdown Status
• Trade Type, and
• Task Frequency
We are looking for a logical group of tasks that:
• Represent a “reasonable” chunk of work – i.e. typically between 2 and 8 hours
• That logically belong together because they are either:
o
Geographically in the same area,
o Require the same skills, and/or
o Require the same tools or equipment
Identifying the Schedule Cycle and Schedule Interval

Schedule Interval
• The increment of time (or other unit) between the performance of individual schedules
Schedule Cycle
• The time (or other unit) to complete all the schedules

Dealing with Outliers
Ideally, Maintenance Schedules should all be performed at whole multiples of the Schedule Interval
• E.g. 2 weeks, 4 weeks, 6 weeks, 8 weeks etc.
What do we do if there is one task, or a small number of tasks that are to be performed at a non-whole
multiple of the Schedule Interval?
• E.g. 7 weeks
Options for dealing with outliers include:
• Creating a special schedule for this task
• Reducing the task interval to the next schedule interval (e.g. from 7 weeks to 6 weeks)
• Increasing the task interval to the next schedule interval (e.g. from 7 weeks to 8 weeks). Rapid Equipment Strategy Development | Version 3.6.1
This should only be done after considering the risks associated with extending the interval.
The most appropriate selection will depend on:
• The cost of doing the task
o On its own
o In conjunction with other tasks
• The risks of failure associated with increasing task interval
Critically reviewing shortest interval Shutdown Tasks

The shortest interval tasks that require equipment shutdowns will normally determine the interval
between routine planned equipment shutdowns

These tasks should be critically reviewed in order to determine whether alternative tasks or actions may
be selected which may permit the interval between routine planned shutdowns to be extended
Options that may be considered could include:
• Using an alternative inspection technique which has a longer PF interval
• Using an alternative inspection technique or failure-finding technique which may permit the
inspection or test to be performed with the equipment running
• Selecting a Fixed Interval task, with a longer interval, to replace a Condition Monitoring Task
• Modifying components which are subject to Fixed Interval tasks so that component life is
increased
• Modifying components so that the need for the PM task is eliminated entirely
• Modifying equipment and/or the process, so that the process can run with the equipment
shutdown
These actions require considerable time and should be noted and then discussed and actioned later
outside this forum.
Identifying and Resolving Constraints

Constraints may exist which may impact on the organisation’s capability to deliver the ideal, optimal PM
program. These could include:
• Limitations on the availability of labour (in-house and contract labour)
• Stockpile/Work in Process limitations that constrain the length of shutdowns before total
plant throughput is impacted
• Availability of specialist tools or equipment
• Limitations due to capability to provide safe access/workspace

These should be identified, and where possible resolved outside the meeting room
Where these constraints cannot be resolved, they must be taken into account when packaging tasks
Packaging and Sequencing Tasks

Identify any tasks, at the same frequency, that may have special or differing requirements (e.g. some
tasks may require the electrical power to be disconnected – others may require it to be connected).
Ensure these are in separate work packages.
Identify and resolve contradictory tasks in the same schedule (e.g. “check oil level and top up if
required” every 250 hrs, and “drain and replace oil” every 1000 hrs)
Sequence the tasks in an order that permits them to be done with maximum efficiency.
Identify and resolve potential conflicts between work packages (e.g. welding directly overhead another
PM activity).

Estimate Labour and Downtime requirements
Once tasks have been packaged and sequenced, it is possible to:
• Estimate the labour requirements for each work package:
o Number of people
o Trade types
o Number of labour hours
• Estimate the total downtime required for planned maintenance
This can be documented to assist with the approval process
Levelling Workloads
Sometimes it is useful to adjust PM schedules to avoid large variations in PM workload and downtime
across the Schedule Cycle
100
80
Workload 60
(Labour Hours)
40
20
0
250 hrs 500 hrs 750 Hrs 1000 1250 1500 1750 2000
Hrs hrs Hrs Hrs Hrs
This can be done by performing some of the longer interval work as part of shorter interval activities
100

80
Workload 60
(Labour Hours)
40
20
0
250 hrs 500 hrs 750 Hrs 1000 1250 1500 1750 2000
Hrs hrs Hrs Hrs Hrs

Step 9 – Gain Approval
The objectives of this step are:
• To gain the necessary approvals for implementation of the recommended actions
• To identify and obtain the necessary funding and resources for implementation of the
recommendations
Recommendations for:
• Changes to routine Maintenance activities
• Changes to Operating inspections
• Increased detail in Work instructions
• Changes to Maintenance Repair procedures
• Changes to Operating procedures
• Improved/additional training
• Modifications to equipment
• Etc.
What are the implications of these changes?
What resources are required to implement these changes?
Who needs to authorise their implementation? Rapid Equipment Strategy Development | Version 3.6.1
Who has the authority to approve all of the proposed implementation actions?
Who has the financial authority to approve all of the necessary expenditure and/or release the
resources required to perform the work?
We suggest that this be the “asset owner” – someone with overall responsibility for performance of the
assets within the scope of the analysis.
In order to ensure that the review and approval process is performed with high quality:

• What does the Approver (or his delegate) need to know?
o Equipment/System knowledge?
o Knowledge of RCM principles?
o Knowledge of the PM Review/Development Process?
• Is there a need for a Q&A session with the review team?
How much time does the Asset Owner (or his delegate) need in order to review the recommendations
from the process properly?
Where are they likely to find this time?
Tips for speeding the approval process:
• The Review Team should give a brief presentation on the key outputs and
recommendations from the process – highlighting the most significant/contentious changes
• Plan and Schedule these presentations and approvals well in advance
• Set a time for a final joint Q&A session between the Asset Owner and the team to resolve
outstanding issues

Step 10 – Implement Recommended Actions
The objective of this step is:
• To perform all of the activities required in order to implement the outcomes of the analysis
Effective Management of Change is essential
• Documentation changes:
o CMMS records
o Operating/Maintenance Procedures
o Work Instructions

o Drawings
o Bills of Materials
o Spare Parts min/max levels
• People issues
o Training
o Communication
A detailed implementation plan should be developed
This plan should identify:

• All the implementation activities required
• Who is responsible for completing each activity?
• The time/cost/effort required to complete each activity
• The timing for completion of each activity
• All affected stakeholders should be consulted/involved
• Priorities need to be balanced against the other activities that key personnel will be
involved in
• The plan needs to be assessed for “reasonableness”
• A plan without monitoring and follow-up has no value
• Who is responsible for ensuring that all the identified activities are completed on time?
• Who is responsible for reassigning priorities as these changes?
• What is the process for monitoring and reporting progress and taking corrective actions as
required?
• The hardest part of this process is actually implementing the outcomes
• Effective project management is essential!
One of the most critical implementation steps is preparing Maintenance Work Instructions and
Operator Inspection Sheets. In particular, Work Instructions which involve inspections or tests should
include:
• Precise method to be used to perform the inspection, including tools required (if applicable)
e.g.
o Visually inspect bolts for corrosion Rapid Equipment Strategy Development | Version 3.6.1
o Check bearing temperature using Infrared gun
• The Pass/Fail criteria for the inspection e.g.
o No visible signs of pitting
o Bearing temperature less than 65 degrees C
• What action must be taken if the pass criteria is not met e.g.
o Raise Work Request
o Shutdown equipment immediately and notify supervisor

Other Characteristics of a Good Work Instruction
• Work instructions are written with the person who is going to read the instruction in mind
• Group complex work instructions into phases, with each phase consisting of many, related
tasks
• Are written clearly, and use simple and consistent language
• Focus on the key risks that may prevent the job from being performed safely and to the
required quality standard
• Are written in the first person, not the third, and use the active voice, not the passive
• Are written in both upper and lower case, not upper case only
• Make appropriate use of pictures and graphics
• Incorporate adequate independent inspections at key points in the instruction
• Incorporate appropriate, conspicuous reminders in order to ensure that critical steps are
not omitted

Step 11 – Track Success
The objectives of this step are:
• To monitor the extent to which the recommended changes have been successfully
implemented
• To monitor the effectiveness of the changes made in achieving the business improvement
objectives for the PM review process
• To identify and address any issues that may arise from this monitoring process
What were the business drivers?
• Maximise availability/uptime?
• Maximise throughput/performance?
• Reduce Operating Costs?
• Reduce Maintenance Costs?
• Reduce Operating Risks?
• Need to establish KPIs – e.g.
o Overall Plant Availability
o Maintenance Costs/Tonne
• For each KPI, we need to establish a baseline performance level against which to compare
performance – e.g. last 12 months average
• We should also establish a target or desired level of performance
• These should be established as early as possible in the review process

How will we measure whether:
• Routine PMs are established in the CMMS?
• The extent to which these are being delivered in full and on time?
• Operator Inspection checksheets are in place and being used?
• Whether operator inspections are being effectively performed?
• Corrective actions resulting from PM and operator inspections are being completed in an
appropriate time frame?
To ensure a continuous improvement process is in place you must decide:
• Who will monitor these measures?
• How will variances from targets be identified and addressed?
• Who “owns” the effectiveness of the PM program?
• PM Development and Improvement is a never-ending process due to:
o Changes in business context/demands on equipment
o Modifications and improvements to the equipment
o Improvements in Condition Monitoring technologies
o Improvements in our knowledge and understanding of the equipment and how it

fails

Next Steps – Beyond RESD
The objective of this is to:
• Identify the possible strategic direction and next steps, once optimal PM programs are in
place
After Fundamental Stability has been achieved...
• Focus on eliminating those things that cause failures and on extending the life of critical
components
• Perform Pareto Analysis to identify those items of equipment or components that are Rapid Equipment Strategy Development | Version 3.6.1
having the greatest impact on your business in terms of:
o Downtime
o Throughput
o Costs
o Safety
o Etc

• Use Root Cause Analysis to identify the causes of failures and eliminate them
• Improve the Precision with which:
o Equipment is operated
o Equipment is maintained
o Spare parts and external repair quality is specified
• Trial or select components and equipment that maximise reliability and minimise total
lifecycle costs
• Improve the Design/Specification/Procurement process for new equipment in order to

minimise total lifecycle costs

Conclusion
Congratulations on completing this course.
For further information or assistance please contact us at:
Perth Office
PO Box 31
Burswood WA 6100
Phone: +61 8 9474 4044
Melbourne Office
Phone: +61 3 8676 0774
Brisbane Office
PO Box 10856, Brisbane
Queensland 4000
Phone: +61 7 3606 1600
Email: assetivity@assetivity.com.au
Web: www.assetivity.com.au

Rapid Equipment Strategy
Development Decision Diagram

76
© COPYRIGHT 2020 ASSETIVITY PTY LTD.

Rapid Equipment Strategy Development Decision Diagram
Hidden Safety/Environment Operational Non-Operational

Does the f ailure create an intolerable risk to Does the f ailure lead to Does the f ailure only lead to the direct cost
Will the f ailure be detected under normal Yes personnel saf ety? of the repair (including consequential or
Reduced production Output? secondary damage)?
circumstances? OR No No
OR
lead to an intolerable environmental
risk? Reduced product quality?
OR
Increased operating costs?
No Yes Yes Yes

Condition Monitoring Condition Monitoring Condition Monitoring Condition Monitoring
Is there some warning Does this task reduce Is there some warning Does this task reduce Is there some warning Is the cost of doing Is there some warning Is the cost of doing
that the failure is the risk of the multiple that the failure is the risk of the failure that the failure is the task less than the that the failure is the task less than the
about to occur? What failure to tolerable about to occur? Is it to tolerable levels? about to occur? Is it cost of the operational about to occur? Is it cost of the additional
is it? Is it long enough levels? long enough to be of long enough to be of and additional repair long enough to be of repair costs
to be of use? use? use? costs associated with use? associated with the
the failure? failure?
No No No No
Fixed Interval Fixed Interval Fixed Interval Fixed Interval

Does the conditional Does this task reduce Does the conditional Does this task reduce Does the conditional Is the cost of doing Does the conditional Is the cost of doing
probability of failure the risk of the multiple probability of failure the risk of the failure probability of failure the task less than the probability of failure the task less than the
increase with age? failure to tolerable increase with age? to tolerable levels? increase with age? cost of the operational increase with age? cost of the additional
Do we know, with levels? Do we know, with Do we know, with and additional repair Do we know, with repair costs
certainty, when this certainty, when this certainty, when this costs associated with certainty, when this associated with the
probability starts to probability starts to probability starts to the failure? probability starts to failure?
rapidly increase? rapidly increase? rapidly increase? rapidly increase?
No No No No
Failure Finding Modification Modification Modification

Can we test the Does this task reduce Will a modification to An modification must Will a modification to Can the modification Will a modification to Can the modification
device or system as a the risk of the multiple the equipment, an be implemented in the equipment, an be financially justified the equipment, an be financially justified
whole without failure to tolerable operating procedure order to reduce the operating procedure within current operating procedure within current
increasing the risk of levels? or parameter, or a probability of the or parameter, or a corporate guidelines? or parameter, or a corporate guidelines?
the multiple failure? maintenance failure to tolerable maintenance maintenance
procedure significantly levels. procedure significantly procedure significantly
No reduce the risk of reduce the risk of reduce the risk of
failure? failure? failure?
Modification No No
Will a modification to
the equipment, an
Can the modification
be financially justified
No PM No PM
operating procedure within current
or parameter, or a corporate guidelines?
maintenance
procedure significantly
reduce the risk of
failure?

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Rapid Equipment Strategy

Document No: Version: 3.6.1 Issue Date: 18 May 2020

Date Version By Whom Revision Description

COPYRIGHT & DISCLAIMER

Published in Australia by Assetivity Pty Ltd.

ACN: 092 112 288 | ABN: 32 092 112 288

PERTH – MELBOURNE - BRISBANE | 1300 ASSETI (1300 277 384) | assetivity@assetivity.com.au

Rapid Equipment Strategy Development | Version 3.6.1

© COPYRIGHT 2020 ASSETIVITY PTY LTD. 1

© COPYRIGHT 2020 ASSETIVITY PTY LTD. 2

Rapid Equipment Strategy Development | Version 3.6.1

© COPYRIGHT 2020 ASSETIVITY PTY LTD. 3

1. Determine Scope of Analysis

2. Identify Primary Functions

3. Verify System Capability

4. Identify Failure Modes

Rapid Equipment Strategy Development | Version 3.6.1

6. Select Recommended Maintenance Tasks

7. Identify Additional Improvement Tasks

8. Consolidate Schedules and Integrate with Operational Strategies

10. Implement Recommended Actions

11. Track Success

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• Describe the benefits that can be gained through an effective PM program.

• Overall Equipment Effectiveness

• Labour productivity, and

• Safety and Environmental performance.

Rapid Equipment Strategy Development | Version 3.6.1

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• Senior Management establishes a team of highly motivated people to perform the

o Inspection hatches and other access points for inspections

o Instrumentation required in order to determine equipment condition

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o Eliminating or reducing installed spare capacity

o Eliminating or reducing the budget for purchase of initial spare parts

o Eliminating or “fast tracking” the development of an initial PM program

o “Forgetting” to provide necessary manuals

o Omitting the preparation of “As Built” drawings

o Delaying the hiring of maintenance and/or operating personnel prior to

o For “Warranty Purposes” the OEMs PM program is adopted – even when it is

• The problems continue...

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o Breakdowns start to take priority.

o PMs are not completed on time, or at all.

o This leads to more breakdowns ...

The Equipment Reliability Death Spiral

So where did your PM program start from?

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And what has happened since start-up?

• Knee-jerk reactions to equipment reliability problems have seen additional, useless or

So, the question to ask is...

When were your PM strategies last updated?

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• Delete tasks that do not effectively predict, prevent, or detect failures.

• Identify and eliminate duplication or triplication of tasks by different work groups.

Rapid Equipment Strategy Development | Version 3.6.1

• Sub-optimal tasks (frequency, wording, packaging, etc) will be optimised