Voidable Marriage
Also, it took cognizance of
MANUEL ALMELOR VS RTC & LEONIDA ALMELOR
The petitioner Manuel Almelor and the respondent were married in Manila Cathedral.
Their marriage begot 3 children. Both of them are medical practicioners, one an
anesthiologist (Manuel) and the other a pediatrician (Leonida). 11 years after their
marriage, Leonida filed to annul their marriage before the RTC of Las Piñas on the
ground that Manuel is psychologically incapacitated to perform marital obligations.
Leonida testified that she and Manuel met during their clerkship at San Lazaro
Hospital. They became sweethearts and eventually married each other. She averred
that Manuel’s kind demeanor did not last long and that he became harsh, especially
when disciplining their children, which caused their frequent fights. She complained
that Manuel has a lavish affection and deep attachment towards his mother which was
incomprehensible to Leonida. She also alleged that Manuel concealed his
homosexuality from her; that he was particularly close with his male colleagues; that
she once caught him having an indiscreet phone call with a male caller; that she found
pornographic homosexual materials in Manuel’s possession; and worse she saw him
kiss another man on the lips.
Leonida also presented the expert opinion of Dr del Fonso Garcia to prove the
psychological incapacity of Manuel. The doctor interviewed Leonida and her eldest
daughter.
Manuel, on the other hand, denied all accusations of Leonida. He countered that
Leonida was a very jealous woman which made him avoid the company of other
females to avoid misunderstandings with his wife. To corroborate his version, he
presented his brother to testify before the court.
The RTC granted the petition for annulment. The court declared their marriage null and
void from the beginning and ordered the dissolution of the regime of their properties.
Manuel filed for an appeal to the RTC but was denied. He now filed for the Annulment
of Judgement before the Court of Appeals but was unfortunately denied due to a wrong
remedy filed by petitioner.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in upholding the decision of the RTC as regards declaring
their marriage null and void on the grounds of psychological incapacity
RULING: Yes. Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the
allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at the
time of their marriage. The lower court considered the public perception of Manuel's
sexual preference without the corroboration of witnesses.
Manuel's peculiarities and interpreted it against his sexuality.
Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower court
cannot appreciate it as a ground to annul his marriage with Leonida. The law is clear -
a marriage may be annulled when the consent of either party was obtained by fraud,
such as concealment of homosexuality. Nowhere in the said decision was it proven by
preponderance of evidence that Manuel was a homosexual at the onset of his marriage
and that he deliberately hid such fact to his wife. It is the concealment of
homosexuality, and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the consent of the innocent
party. Such concealment presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud the other party in
giving consent to the marriage.
Consent is an essential requisite of a valid marriage. To be valid, it must be freely given
by both parties. An allegation of vitiated consent must be proven by preponderance of
evidence. The Family Code has enumerated an exclusive list of circumstances
constituting fraud. Homosexuality per se is not among those cited, but its concealment.
To reiterate, homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal separation. It is its
concealment that serves as a valid ground to annul a marriage. Concealment in this
case is not simply a blanket denial, but one that is constitutive of fraud. It is this
fundamental element that respondent failed to prove.
Verily, the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion, not only by solely taking
into account petitioner's homosexuality per se and not its concealment, but by declaring
the marriage void from its existence.
REPUBLIC VS. VILLACORTA
Melvin and Janufi met in 1996 when there were still studying at Southwestern
University, Cebu City. They became sweethearts but broke up. Janufi began dating
someone else. After months they reconciled.
After a while, Melvin learned that Janufi was pregnant. He was surprised and doubtful
because Janufi is already 1 month pregnant. Janufi assured him that the child was his.
Then, she gave birth to a baby girl, Mejan Dia, and they began living together. After 3
years, they finally got married.
They often quarrel during their marriage and oftentimes due to the paternity issue of
Mejan. Since the quarrel persisted, Melvin decided to take a DNA test; and the test
revealed that he is not the father of Mejan. Janufi said that she had no intention to fool
Melvin and admitted that she lied as to not hurt Melvin.
He filed for annulment before the RTC and granted the same. The OSG filed for an
appeal before the Court of Appeals but to no avail. Thus, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in dismissing the OSG’s appeal claiming that RTC erred in
annulling Melvin and Janufi’s marriage on the ground of fraud under Article 45(3) in
relation to Article 46(2) of the Family Code.
RULING: Yes. The Court agrees. The Republic argues that the RTC decision annulling
the marriage is not in accord with law and jurisprudence because the Family Code
expressly provides that a marriage may be annulled on the basis of fraud through
concealment only if "x x x at the time of the marriage, the wife was pregnant and she
concealed the fact that such pregnancy was by a man other than her husband." In the
case at bar, Mejan Dia was already almost three years old when Melvin and Janufi got
married on August 4, 2004. Evidently, Janufi was not pregnant at the time of her
marriage and Article 46(2) cannot apply.
In this regard, the OSG correctly argues that the concealed pregnancy, which vitiates
consent, must have existed at the time of the marriage. Justice Eduardo Caguioa
explains that "[t]he essence of the fraud in this case is the non-disclosure of the present
pregnancy of the wife x x x the pregnancy must exist at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, thus, if the wife had previous relations with other men and as a
consequence of which she became pregnant or bore a child previously, the
concealment thereof will not be a ground for annulling the marriage if at the time
the marriage was celebrated the wife was not pregnant." It is the concealment of
the fact of pregnancy by another man at the time of marriage that constitutes fraud as a
ground for annulment. "No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health,
rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for
the annulment of marriage."
ONG ENG KIAM VS LUCITA ONG
Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong (William) and Lucita G. Ong (Lucita) were
married on July 13, 1975 at the San Agustin Church in Manila. They have three
children: Kingston, Charleston, and Princeton who are now all of the age of majority.
On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation under Article 55 par.
(1) of the Family Code4 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch
41 alleging that her life with William was marked by physical violence, threats,
intimidation and grossly abusive conduct.
Lucita claimed that: soon after three years of marriage, she and William quarreled
almost every day, with physical violence being inflicted upon her. She claimed that he
would also hit their children with the buckle of his belt.
William for his part denied that he ever inflicted physical harm on his wife, used
insulting language against her, or whipped the children with the buckle of his belt.
The RTC rendered its Decision decreeing legal separation. William appealed to the CA
which affirmed in toto the RTC decision. The CA found that the testimonies for Lucita
were straightforward and credible and the ground for legal separation under Art. 55,
par. 1 of the Family Code, i.e., physical violence and grossly abusive conduct directed
against Lucita, were adequately proven. William filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied by the CA.
Hence, the petition. William argues that: the real motive of Lucita and her family in filing
the case is to wrest control and ownership of properties belonging to the conjugal
partnership. 20 years of their marriage, Lucita has not complained of any cruel
behavior on the part of William in relation to their marital and family life; William
expressed his willingness to receive respondent unconditionally however, it is Lucita
who abandoned the conjugal dwelling. He further claimed that the CA overlooked some
facts of the case which warrant an exception to the general rule that questions of fact
cannot be the subject for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The CA erred in
relying on the testimonies of Lucita her sister and their parents’ doctor Dr. ElinZano
since their testimonies are tainted with relationship and fraud and since Lucita
abandoned the family home she has also given a ground for legal separation and
therefore should NOT- be granted one pursuant to Art. 56 par. 4 of the family code –
Where both parties have given ground for legal separation
ISSUE: WON Lucita Ong should be granted a decree on legal separation
RULING: YES. The claim that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case is for her
family to take control of the conjugal properties is absurd. Lucita left because of her
husband’s repeated physical violence and grossly abusive conduct. That the physical
violence and grossly abusive conduct were brought to bear upon Lucita have been duly
established. He can derive no personal gain from pushing for the financial interests of
her family at the expense of her marriage of 20 years and the companionship of her
husband and children
The assessment of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses is given great
respect. Relationship alone is not enough to discredit and label a witness’ testimony as
biased and unworthy of credence. Witnesses Linda Lim and Dr. Elinzano gave detailed
and straightforward testimonies the court finds that their testimonies are not tainted
with bias.
Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the
family, a decree of legal separation should not be granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of
the Family Code which provides that legal separation shall be denied when both parties
have given ground for legal separation. The abandonment referred to by the Family
Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year. As it was
established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not constitute
abandonment contemplated by the said provision.
CARMEN LAPUZ SY VS EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO
Carmen and Eufemio were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically on
September 30, 1934. They had lived together as husband and wife until Eufemio
abandoned her in 1943. They had no child and they acquired properties during their
marriage. She discovered that her husband had been cohabiting with a Chinese
woman named Go Hiok. Thus, she prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal
separation and that Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal
partnership profits.
Eufemio filed a counter-claim for the declaration of nullity his marriage with Carmen on
the ground that he as a subsisting marriage with Go Hiok.
However, before the trial could be completed, Carmen died in a vehicular accident. The
counsel of Carmen duly notified the court of her death.
Eufemio moved to dismiss Carmen’s petition for legal separation on two grounds: (1)
the petition for legal separation was filed beyond the 1 year period provided for in
Article 102 of the Civil Code; (2) the death of Carmen abated the action for legal
separation.
The counsel moved to substitute Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz, which was
opposed by the counsel of Eufemio.
ISSUE: WON the death of the plaintiff before final decree in an action for legal
separation abate the action? If it does, will the abatement also apply if the action
involves property rights?
RULING: YES. An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the
bed-and-board separation of the spouses (there being no absolute divorce in this
jurisdiction) is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its
Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal
separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their
reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal
separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of
one party to the action causes the death of the action itself — actio personalis moritur
cum persona.
An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property
rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their
source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into
existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in
expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be
forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the
expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
PACETE VS CARRIAGA
Private respondent Concepcion was married to petitioner Enrico on 1938 in Cotabato.
They had a child named Consuelo. Enrico subsequently contracted a second marriage
with Clarita in Kidapawan on 1948. During the marriage Enrico acquired many
properties including large tracts of land, fishponds and several motor vehicles. He
places several pieces of properties either in his name and Clarita or in the names of his
children with Clarita and other “dummies”.
Concepcion filed before the court for the declaration of nullity of marriage between
Enrico and Clarita as well as for legal separation between her and Enrico.
Enrico and Clarita were served with summons however they filed for multiple
extensions until the last one was denied on the ground that the other extension had
already expired. Thereupon, Concepcion field a motion to declare the defendants in
default which the court granted. The court declared the legal separation between
Concepcion and Enrico and that the properties as they are conjugal properties, were
divided half and half between them. The court also declared the subsequent marriage
of Enrico and Clarita void ab initio. Hence, the petition.
ISSUE: WON the court committed a grave abuse of discretion in declaring the default
order
RULING: YES. In the case at bench, the default order unquestionably is not legally
sanctioned. The Civil Code provides:
Art. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts
or by confession of judgment.
In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting
attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no
collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care
that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further underscored
by the inclusion of the following provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. — If
the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to
answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a
collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the
State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.
The State is interested in the integrity of marriage as evidenced by the provisions of
law mentioned. There is no excuse for non-compliance with the procedures required by
statute.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED and the proceedings
below, including the Decision of 17 March 1980 appealed from, are NULLIFIED and
SET ASIDE.
BENJAMIN BUGAYONG VS LEONILA GINEZ
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy, was married to Leonila
Ginez in 1949 at Asingan, Pangasinan.
In July 1951, Benjamin began receiving letters informing him of alleged acts of infidelity
of his wife.
In August 1952, Benjamin went to Pangasinan and looked for his wife whom he met in
the house of one Mrs. Malalang, Leonila's godmother. She came along with him and
both proceeded to the house of Pedro, Benjamin's cousin, where they stayed and lived
for 1 night and 1 day as husband and wife. The next day they passed the night in their
house as husband and wife. On the second day, Benjamin tried to verify from his wife
the truth of the information he received that she had committed adultery but Leonila,
instead of answering his query, merely packed up and left, which he took as a
confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on her.
Benjamin then filed a case for legal separation. Leonila filed an answer vehemently
denying the averments of the complaint and setting up affirmative defenses. After
Benjamin testified, Leonila's counsel moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground of condonation.
The court of first instance of Pangasinan dismissed the petition for legal separation on
the grounds of condonation. The petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals.
Since the questions raised were questions of law, the CA forwarded the case to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: WON the adultery has been condoned by the husband
RULING: YES. The Civil Code provides:
ART. 100. The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided
there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where
both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot by either of them. Collusion
between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition.
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal
separation. A detailed examination of the testimony of the plaintiff-husband, clearly
shows that there was a condonation on the part of the husband for the supposed "acts
of infidelity amounting to adultery" committed by defendant-wife. Admitting for the sake
of argument that the infidelities amounting to adultery were committed by the
defendant, a reconciliation was effected between her and the plaintiff. The act of the
latter in persuading her to come along with him, and the fact that she went with him and
consented to be brought to the house of his cousin Pedro Bugayong and together they
slept there as husband and wife for one day and one night, and the further fact that in
the second night they again slept together in their house likewise as husband and wife
— all these facts have no other meaning in the opinion of this court than that a
reconciliation between them was effected and that there was a condonation of the wife
by the husband. The reconciliation occurred almost ten months after he came to know
of the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery. It has been held in a long line of decisions
of the various supreme courts of the different states of the U. S. that 'a single voluntary
act of sexual intercourse by the innocent spouse after discovery of the offense is
ordinarily sufficient to constitute condonation, especially as against the husband'. In the
lights of the facts testified to by the plaintiff-husband, of the legal provisions above
quoted, and of the various decisions above-cited, the inevitable conclusion is that there
is condonation.