9-NAVARRO VS ERMITA (Art II Sec 25 Local Autonomy; Art VI Sec 5 Apportionment)

Art II Sec 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.

Art VI Sec 5 (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with
a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.

(Hi guys, to clarify, in Art VI Sec 5(3) it says that each province shall have at least one representative, however in the Local
Government Code, there are specific requirements on the creation of provinces, ie. Income, land area and populations. And if you
relate it to Sec 5(3) of Art VI, a province automatically becomes a legislative district having 1 representative. Thus, Dinagat Islands as a
province, is entitled to 1 representative. However, the issue is that Dinagal Islands did not qualify for the requirements set in the Local
Government Code but it was expressly exempted in the IRR of the LGC, the SC interpreted it to take into consideration the Local
Autonomy of the LGUs in fixing the conflict between the LGC and its IRR)

Facts: PGMA approved into law RA 9355 creating the province of Dinagat Islands. The petitioners filed before the Supreme Court
challenging the constitutionality of said law. On their second petition raising the same issue, the Supreme Court granted their petition
and declared RA 9355 unconstitutional for failure to comply with the requirements on population and land area in the creation of a
province under the Local Government Code.

The movant-intervenors/petitioners filed for an Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgement, praying to recall the judgement of
unconstitutionality of RA 9355 for the reason that the Comelec released a resolution that would affect them as local politicians of the
province since it is nearing election period.

ISSUE: Whether the provision in the IRR of the LGC exempting provinces with more than one islands from the land area requirement is
valid even though such exemption is absent in the LGC.

RULING: YES. In this case, the compelling concern is not only to afford the movants-intervenors the right to be heard since they would
be adversely affected by the judgment in this case despite not being original parties thereto, but also to arrive at the correct
interpretation of the provisions of the LGC with respect to the creation of local government units. In this manner, the thrust of the
Constitution with respect to local autonomy and of the LGC with respect to decentralization and the attainment of national goals, as
hereafter elucidated, will effectively be realized.

It must be borne in mind that the central policy considerations in the creation of local government units are economic viability, efficient
administration, and capability to deliver basic services to their constituents. The criteria prescribed by the LGC, i.e., income, population
and land area, are all designed to accomplish these results. In this light, Congress, in its collective wisdom, has debated on the relative
weight of each of these three criteria, placing emphasis on which of them should enjoy preferential consideration.

Without doubt, the primordial criterion in the creation of local government units, particularly of a province, is economic viability. This is
the clear intent of the framers of the LGC.

Consistent with the declared policy to provide local government units genuine and meaningful local autonomy, contiguity and minimum
land area requirements for prospective local government units should be liberally construed in order to achieve the desired results. The
strict interpretation adopted by the February 10, 2010 Decision could prove to be counter-productive, if not outright absurd, awkward,
and impractical. Picture an intended province that consists of several municipalities and component cities which, in themselves, also
consist of islands. The component cities and municipalities which consist of islands are exempt from the minimum land area
requirement, pursuant to Sections 450 and 442, respectively, of the LGC. Yet, the province would be made to comply with the minimum
land area criterion of 2,000 square kilometers, even if it consists of several islands. This would mean that Congress has opted to assign
a distinctive preference to create a province with contiguous land area over one composed of islands — and negate the greater
imperative of development of self-reliant communities, rural progress, and the delivery of basic services to the constituency. This
preferential option would prove more difficult and burdensome if the 2,000-square-kilometer territory of a province is scattered because
the islands are separated by bodies of water, as compared to one with a contiguous land mass.

Moreover, such a very restrictive construction could trench on the equal protection clause, as it actually defeats the purpose of local
autonomy and decentralization as enshrined in the Constitution. Hence, the land area requirement should be read together with
territorial contiguity.

10-NERI VS SENATE (Art VI Sec 21 Inquiries in Aid of Legislation; Art VII Sec 1 Executive Power; Privileges; Immunities)

Art VI Sec 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries
shall be respected.

Facts: Petitioner Romulo Neri, then Director General of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), was invited by the
respondent Senate Committees to attend their joint investigation on the alleged anomalies in the National Broadband Network (NBN)
Project. This project was contracted by the Philippine Government with the Chinese firm Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment
(ZTE), which involved the amount of US$329,481,290. When he testified before the Senate Committees, he disclosed that then
Commission on Elections Chairman Benjamin Abalos, brokering for ZTE, offered him P200 million in exchange for his approval of the
NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed
him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer,
invoking “executive privilege.” In particular, he refused to answer the questions on 1.) whether or not the President followed up the NBN
Project, 2.) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and 3.) whether or not she directed him to approve it.

Later on, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to petitioner, requiring him to appear and testify on 20
November 2007. However, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita sent a letter dated 15 November to the Committees requesting them to
dispense with Neri’s testimony on the ground of executive privilege. Ermita invoked the privilege on the ground that “the information
sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China,” and given the
confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to the President, Neri “cannot provide the Committee any further details of
these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.” Thus, on 20 November, Neri did not appear
before the respondent Committees.

ISSUE/S:

1. WON the three questions that petitioner Neri refused to answer were covered by executive privilege, making the arrest order
issued by the respondent Senate Committees void
2. WON the respondent committee could still compel the petitioner to testifiy in its inquiry in aid of legislation when the petitioner
invoked executive privilege

RULING:

1. YES. It must be stressed that the President’s claim of executive privilege is not merely founded on her generalized interest in
confidentiality. The Letter dated November 15, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita specified presidential communications
privilege in relation to diplomatic and economic relations with another sovereign nation as the bases for the claim. Thus, the
Letter stated:

The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China. Given the confidential nature in which this
information were conveyed to the President, he cannot provide the Committee any further details of these conversations,
without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.

Even in Senate v. Ermita, it was held that Congress must not require the Executive to state the reasons for the claim with such
particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect for a
coordinate and co-equal department.

It is easy to discern the danger that goes with the disclosure of the President’s communication with her advisor. The NBN
Project involves a foreign country as a party to the agreement. It was actually a product of the meeting of minds between
officials of the Philippines and China. Whatever the President says about the agreement - particularly while official negotiations
are ongoing - are matters which China will surely view with particular interest. There is danger in such kind of exposure. It
could adversely affect our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China. We reiterate the
importance of secrecy in matters involving foreign negotiations

Considering that the information sought through the three (3) questions subject of this Petition involves the President’s
dealings with a foreign nation, with more reason, this Court is wary of approving the view that Congress may peremptorily
inquire into not only official, documented acts of the President but even her confidential and informal discussions with her
close advisors on the pretext that said questions serve some vague legislative need. Regardless of who is in office, this Court
can easily foresee unwanted consequences of subjecting a Chief Executive to unrestricted congressional inquiries done with
increased frequency and great publicity. No Executive can effectively discharge constitutional functions in the face of intense
and unchecked legislative incursion into the core of the President’s decision-making process, which inevitably would involve
her conversations with a member of her Cabinet.

2. NO. This Court did not rule that the Senate has no power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation. There is nothing
in the assailed Decision that prohibits respondent Committees from inquiring into the NBN Project. They could continue the
investigation and even call petitioner Neri to testify again. He himself has repeatedly expressed his willingness to do so. Our
Decision merely excludes from the scope of respondents’ investigation the three (3) questions that elicit answers covered by
executive privilege and rules that petitioner cannot be compelled to appear before respondents to answer the said questions.

To reiterate, this Court recognizes respondent Committees’ power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation.
However, this Court cannot uphold the view that when a constitutionally guaranteed privilege or right is validly invoked by a
witness in the course of a legislative investigation, the legislative purpose of respondent Committees’ questions can be
sufficiently supported by the expedient of mentioning statutes and/or pending bills to which their inquiry as a whole may have
relevance. The jurisprudential test laid down by this Court in past decisions on executive privilege is that the presumption of
 privilege can only be overturned by a showing of compelling need for disclosure of the information covered by executive
privilege.

The failure of the counsel for respondent Committees to pinpoint the specific need for the information sought or how the
withholding of the information sought will hinder the accomplishment of their legislative purpose is very evident in the above
oral exchanges. Due to the failure of the respondent Committees to successfully discharge this burden, the presumption in
favor of confidentiality of presidential communication stands. The implication of the said presumption, like any other, is to
dispense with the burden of proof as to whether the disclosure will significantly impair the President’s performance of her
function. Needless to state this is assumed, by virtue of the presumption.

11-PASCUAL VS SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS (Art VI Sec 24 Bills Originating in the House of Representatives;
Appropriation of Public Revenue for Public Purpose; Sec 29 Fiscal Powers of Congress; Limitations; Special Funds; Art VIII
Sec 5 Powers of Supreme Court; Judicial Review Requisites-Standing-Taxpayer)

Art VI Sec 24. All appropriation, revenue, or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private
bills, shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

Art VI Sec 29(2). No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use,
benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system or religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister,
other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces,
or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.

Facts: Petitioner Wenceslao Pascual was the Governor of Rizal, filed a petition assailing the validity of R.A. 920 which contains an item
providing for an appropriation of P85,000.00 for the construction and repair of a feeder road in Pasig. The said law was passed in
Congress and approved by the President.

The property over which the feeder road will be constructed is however owned by Sen. Jose Zulueta who was a member of the same
Senate that passed and approved the said R.A.. The property was to be donated to the local government, though the donation was
made a few months after the appropriation was included in RA 920. The petition alleged that the said planned feeder road would relieve
Sen. Zulueta the responsibility of improving the road which is inside a private subdivision.

ISSUE/S:

1. WON RA 920 is unconstitutional

2. WON the petitioner has legal standing

RULING:

1. YES. RA 920 is unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the subject appropriation was illegal because it appropriated public funds
for the improvement of private property. The right of the legislature to appropriate funds is correlative with its right to tax, and
under constitutional provisions against taxation except for public purposes. Taxing power must be exercised for public
purposes only.

The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether the statute is designed to promote the
public interest, as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals, although each advantage to individuals might
incidentally serve the public. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Pascual.

2. YES. The rule recognizing the right of taxpayers to assail the constitutionality of a legislation appropriating local or state public
funds has greater application in the Philippines than that adopted with respect to acts of Congress of the United States
appropriating federal funds.

The petitioner herein is not merely a taxpayer. The Province of Rizal, which he represents officially as its Provincial Governor,
is our most populated political subdivision, and, the taxpayers therein bear a substantial portion of the burden of taxation, in
the Philippines.

Hence, it is our considered opinion that the circumstances surrounding this case sufficiently justify petitioners’ action in
contesting the appropriation and donation in question; that this action should not have been dismissed by the lower court; and
that the writ of preliminary injunction should have been maintained.

12-BELGICA VS OCHOA (Art VI Sec 29 Fiscal Powers of Congress; Limitations; Special Funds)

Art VI Sec 29(3). All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for
such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be
transferred to the general funds of the government.
Facts: While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically associated with lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of Congress, the
present cases and the recent controversies on the matter have, however, shown that the term‘s usage has expanded to include certain
funds of the President such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.

On the one hand, the Malampaya Funds was created as a special fund under Section 880 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 910,81
issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) on March 22, 1976. In enacting the said law, Marcos recognized the need to
set up a special fund to help intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and
development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth. Due to the energy-related activities of the government in the
Malampaya natural gas field in Palawan, or the "Malampaya Deep Water Gas-to-Power Project",83 the special fund created under PD
910 has been currently labeled as Malampaya Funds

On the other hand, the Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV84 of PD 1869, or the Charter of the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). PD 1869 was similarly issued by Marcos on July 11, 1983. More than two (2) years
after, he amended PD 1869 and accordingly issued PD 1993 on October 31, 1985, amending Section 1287 of the former law. As it
stands, the Presidential Social Fund has been described as a special funding facility managed and administered by the Presidential
Management Staff through which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not funded under the
regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.

On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, Jose L. Gonzalez, Reuben M. Abante, Quintin Paredes San
Diego (Belgica, et al.), and Jose M. Villegas, Jr. (Villegas) filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The
Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated August 27, 2013 under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court (Belgica Petition), seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA
of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds
and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of
discretion.

(There is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund which allows the President to
determine the manner of its utilization. For reasons earlier stated,161 the Court shall delimit the use of such term to refer only to the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.)

ISSUE: Whether or not the phrases (a) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of
PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and (b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the
restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the
Philippines" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional
insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power.

RULING: In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay
down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for which the
Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for
any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the
law. That the subject phrase may be confined only to "energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government" under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word or phrase is to be construed to include – or be
restricted to – things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned, is belied by three (3) reasons:
first, the phrase "energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government" states a singular and
general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from which the general phrase "for such other
purposes" may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely energy development programs of the
government; and, third, the Executive department has, in fact, used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under the
subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents‘ own position that it is limited only to "energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government." Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed the completeness test since the policy of
energy development is clearly deducible from its text, the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" under the same provision of law should nonetheless be stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies independently unfettered
by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it
allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds "to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government," remains legally effective and subsisting. Truth be told, the declared unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase
is but an assurance that the Malampaya Funds would be used – as it should be used – only in accordance with the avowed
purpose and intention of PD 910.

Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the rules within which it operates
insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to appropriate funds intended by law for energy-related purposes only to other
purposes he may deem fit as well as other public funds under the broad classification of "priority infrastructure development projects," it
has once more transgressed the principle of non-delegability. The Court hereby declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL, while the funds
under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund shall remain therein to be utilized for their respective special purposes
not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.