G.R. No.

L-30773, [February 18, 1970]

Sta. Maria v. Lopez

FACTS:

As far back as February 11, 1969, the graduate and undergraduate students of the UP College of
Education presented to President Salvador P. Lopez a number of demands having a bearing on the
general academic program and the physical plant and services, with a cluster of special demands. In
response, President Lopez created a committee who met with Dean Sta. Maria in February and March
1969. The students felt that Dean Sta. Maria ignored some of their demands. On July 16, 1969, the
President of the UP Graduate Education Student Organization and her group submitted to President
Lopez a progress report on the students’ demands taken up with Sta. Maria since March 26, 1969. She
acknowledged that the dean had granted ten demands but deplored the fact that the dean had ignored
more important ones. She thus stated: “I appreciate the efforts of the Dean in acting on some of our
demands. However, the Dean has failed to take further action on the demands that have far reaching
implications for the students, faculty and the College as a whole”. The students threatened to boycott
their classes the next day, July 17. They proceeded with the boycott and refused to enter into a dialogue
unless Dean Sta. Maria was ousted first.

The boycott fever infected other colleges as the newly installed members of the UP Student Council
voted to support the education students’ strike. Which caused all academic activity in the university
come to a complete standstill. In the morning of July 28, the UP President called a meeting of the faculty
of the College of Education. Those present gave him a vote of confidence (40 in favor, 7 abstained) to
resolve the issue on hand as he sees fit.

Armed with the vote of confidence of the education faculty, on the same day, July 23, 1969, President
Lopez issued the transfer order herein challenged, Administrative Order 77. That order, addressed to
Dean Sta. Maria, reads:

“By special authority vested in me by the Board of Regents and pursuant to the Civil Service Law and the
University Code, you are hereby transferred from the College of Education to the Office of the President
as Special Assistant 8 with the rank of Dean, without reduction in salary, in the interest of the service.

This transfer involves your administrative position only and in no way affects your status as professor of
the University. This order shall take effect immediately.”

Simultaneously, President Lopez appointed ad interim Professor Nemesio R. Ceralde as “acting Dean of
the College of Education, without additional compensation, effective July 23, 1969”.

President Lopez was to explain in a press statement of July 23, 1969 that he “cannot permit the
continued disruption of the academic life of the institution”; that the transfer order was made “[i]n the
interest of the service” and “as an emergency measure” because the meetings with the faculty,
students, Sta. Maria and the UP President had “proved fruitless in the face of the refusal of the College
of Education students to discuss any further their demands unless and until Dean Sta. Maria resigns his
position”; and that, therefore, “the complete shut-down of classes in the Diliman campus has
compelled” him to “transfer Dean Sta. Maria to other duties”.
Having received the transfer order on the same day, July 23, Sta. Maria forthwith wrote a letter, which
he himself hand carried to President Lopez, requesting that” (a) a formal investigation be conducted by
the Board of Regents on the circumstances which led to the promulgation of the above order, and on
the basis thereof; and (b) said order be reconsidered and set aside for being manifestly unjust, unfair,
unconstitutional, and contrary to law, and, therefore, null and void.”

ISSUE:

A.) WON Dean Sta. Maria can be transferred without its consent.

B.) WON Dean Sta. Maria was actually demoted and not merely transferred.

C.) WON the lack of formal hearing violated her rights to due process.

HELD:

A.) NO. The rule that outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to security of tenure applies only to an
officer who is appointed — not merely assigned — to a particular station. Such a rule does not prescribe
a transfer carried out under a specific statute that empowers the head of an agency to periodically
reassign the employees and officers in order to improve the service of the agency. In the case at bar,
however, the appointment of the petitioner is that of “Dean, College of Education, University of the
Philippines”. He is not merely a dean “in the university”. His appointment is to a specific position; and,
more importantly, to a specific station.

B.) YES. A demotion, because: First, Deanship in a university is an academic position which requires
learning, ability and scholarship; is more exalted than that of a special assistant who merely assists the
President as the title indicates. The special assistant does not make authoritative decisions. Second. The
position of dean is a line position where the holder makes authoritative decisions in his own name and
responsibility. A special assistant does not rise above the level of staff position. Third. The position of
dean is created by law, the university charter, and cannot be abolished even by the Board of Regents.
That of special assistant, upon the other hand, is not so provided by law; it was a creation of the
university president.

C.) YES. Transfer could be but a ploy to cover dismissal, and dismissal cannot be justified on grounds of
expediency. Due process is associated with the sporting idea of fair play; it shuns oppression and
eschews unfair dealing; it obeys the dictates of justice and is ruled by reason. The Scriptures no less
remind us to hear before we condemn. Fidelity to this cardinal principle must have impelled Congress to
clarify the authority to transfer subordinate officers and employees, an authority so often misused and
abused to ride roughshod over hapless civil servants. As amended, the Civil Service Law provides that “if
the employee believes that there is no justification for the transfer, he may appeal his case . . . and
pending his appeal and decision thereon, his transfer shall be held in abeyance.”

Demonstrations and boycotts which are manifestations of such activism are constitutionally protected.
But there are limits. A fundamental precondition to the exercise of such rights, we perceive, is that the
activity should not impair the rights of others whose roots are as deep and as equally protected by iron-
clad guarantees. A high regard to a man’s dignity is the hallmark of our law. Emergency could not justify
disregard of constitutional rights. A fundamental charter is for all times and for all conditions.