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Copyright 1991
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FIRST PUBLISHED 1991
Revised and Reprinted 2000
Reprinted 2002
ISBN 978-008-003-1
Revised version 2012

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CONTENT PAGE

NOTE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR 1

THE CONCEPT OF AIR POWER IN

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 10

AIR POWER SINCE 1945. 12

CHARACTERISTICS OF AIR POWER 14

THE ROLES OF AIR POWER 18

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT 35

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AIR POWER

NOTES ON THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

INTRODUCTION

1. The purpose of these notes is to remind you of the general conduct

and events of campaigns, selected from the history's warfare and to
illustrate how the principles of war apply to some aspects of these
campaigns.

GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE HISTORICAL OBSERVANCE

AND NON OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF WAR

2. Inter-relation of Principles.Although, in these notes, each

principle is discussed separately, there is inevitably, a great deal of inter-
relation between them and it is seldom practical to discuss any one
principle in isolation because of the way in which it affects or is affected by
others.

3. Selected and Maintenance of the Aim. Any unsuccessful

operation automatically raises doubts as to whether the aim was
correctly selected. The aim may be affected by a number of factors, for
instance, political considerations or insufficiency of forces. An example
of faulty selection of the aim was Hitler's failure to have a precise
military aim when invading Russia. Example of successful maintenance
of the aim are provided by Allied bomber offensive against the transport
and oil targets in the part of the war, and students actions in Crete when
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he airlanded his troops under fire at Maleme.

4. Maintenance of Morale. Morale is a state of mind which can

be induced in a number of ways. The main factors affecting morale are
probably quality of leadership, success in battle leading to a reputation
for efficiency in battle, belief in the cause and the belief that the
hardships provided by Fighter Command in the battle of Britain. And 2
examples of low morale are instanced by the German U-boat crewin
1943 when they were suffered very heavy casualties for few sinking,
and the North Korean Army in October 1950.

5 Offensive Action.

“Defence may prevent defeat; only offensive action can

ensurevictory” (AP 1300).

The pattern of World War II is a good example of the application of the

principle of offensive action. Until the end of 1940 Britain was on the
defensive in the air. Early in 1941 Britain went over the offensive day by
day by means of fighter sweeps, although admittedly on a very limited
scale; but this was the first step in forcing the Germans on to the defensive
in the air. As the striking power of the British, and latter the Allied
bombing forces built up, the GAF was forced more and more on to the
defensive which resulted eventually in its becoming almost entirely a
fighter force. Furthermore, nearly 2 million men were tied up in anti-
aircraft defences. Even the threat of offensive action has a value out of
proportion to its cost, in that it can keep enemy troops engaged in securing
facilities and bases. No country can expect to win a war by purely
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defensive action. Any more than a boxer can expect to win a fight merely
by warding off blows. He must take the initiative and score points. Other
examples are MacAurthur's action in taking the offensive in Korea and
accepting the landing conditions at Inch'on and the German 'Blitzkreig'
into the Low Countries and France in May 1940.

6. Security.

"it is clear that if a nation's striking power were destroyed, or

gravely weakened at source, a successful offensive would be
impossible or seriously prejudiced. The first prerequisite for
offensive action is, therefore, that degree of security which will
enable our forces to operate effectively (AP 1300).

For the UK, National Security has always meant protection of the British
Isles, the security of sea and air communications' and in conjunction with
the latter, the security of overseas bases. The application of the principle of
security is not necessarily passive; moreover, it cannot be absolute and
must be related to the amount of risk that a nation or a commander is
prepared to take. Part of the art of war is to strike the right balance between
offensive action and security, and to allot the proper proportions of
resources to each. The introduction of strategic nuclear weapons underline
the importance of this aspect of military planning in peace since there will
be no time to re-allot resources after the outbreak of general nuclear war.
An example of defeat because of failure to observe this principle is the
failure of the British to operate in a secure base in the Norwegian
operation. Further examples of the application of the principle are
provided by the case of Russia, where Stalin managed to move his industry
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behind the Urals and to protect much of it from the German invasion, and
the Battle of the Atlantic which was fought from a secure base and to
ensure the continued security of the base.

7. Surprise. Surprise is the most powerful influence in war and its

moral effect is great. Examples of successful operations which might
well have failed without the advantages of surprise are numerous, and
include the German attack through the Ardennes in both 1940 and 1944.
We must also take positive steps to guard against being surprised
ourselves. The Germans failed to achieve surprise in Crete in 1941 and
similarly, the Allies forfeited the advantage of surprise for security in
the battle of Amhem when they failed to use coup de main parties to
capture the bridges at Zon, Nijrnegen and Amhem.

8. Concentration of Forces. The principle that effort must be

flittered away in penny packets has almost become a platitude.
Nevertheless its truth must be emphasized; forces must be concentrated at
the right time and place. This principle is easy to understand but can be
very difficult to apply. The agreement between the USA and Britain at
Quebec to concentrate on the defeat of Germany before Japan was one of
the supreme examples of a decision to apply the principle of concentration
of force. Concentration of force must not be confused with maintenance of
the aim. There will always be extraneous demands tending to dissipate the
available air effort and these must be resisted. In certain circumstances it
may be necessary to divert air effort from the main aim but this is not
necessarily a breach of the principle. For example, at Arnhem the British
were unable to concentrate adequate force because of limited airlift and
other priorities. Stalin understood this principle well, and frequently
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refused to attack the German until he had concentrated an overwhelming

force.

9. Economy of Efforts.

"Economy of effort is closely associated with the principle of

concentration of force and it means that no more effort than is
absolutely necessary must be devoted to any one task". (AP
13000).

This does not necessarily mean the use of the smallest possible force at all
times. It may well be more economical in some situations to employ a
relatively large force to undertake a task quickly than a small force which,
although adequate, will take much longer. This may often apply to air
transport operations particularly in policing operations. Nuclear weapons
are the supreme example of economy of effort combined with
concentration of force. Economy of effort depends also on organization,
training and method. If large numbers of insurance sorties are necessary
because crews are inadequately trained, or aircraft reliability is poor, or
weapons delivery errors large, then the principle of economy of force is
not being applied. Conversely it should be our endeavor to make the
enemy dissipate his effort.

10. Flexibility.

“In general war there may not be sufficient time to exploit

flexibility to the full. “In limited war and it policing operations a
high degree of flexibility is desirable to meet changing situations
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and unexpected developments”.(AP 1300).

Flexibility of forces is essential to achieve economy of effort and

concentration of force. Mobility of force has always been of vital
importance. It is becoming increasingly important with the reduction in
size of the services. With the smaller forces we must be able to deploy
quickly to any part of the world and be ready to undertake any one of a
variety of operations. The NAF is becoming increasingly responsible for
the mobility and hence the flexibility', of the Army. Within their tactical
radius of action aircraft are inherently flexible in their ability to
concentrate in time and space; but cold war operations demand flexibility
in choice of weapons and this is becoming increasingly difficult for
modern aircraft. The tactical flexibility of aircraft was amply
demonstrated by Bomber command's ability to attack widely separated
targets on successive raids. Flexibility of mind is essential, especially at
the present time, when technical developments follow one another so
quickly. If the best use of scientific advance is to be made, the military
mind must absorb and understand quickly the implications of changes
caused by new inventions and technical advances. A classic example of the
dangers of ignoring this principle occurred in the Russian Campaign when
Hitler refused in 1944 to allow his army commanders on the Eastern front
to develop a sound defensive strategy and this probably did as much as
anything else shorten the war.

11. Co – operation. No single unit fight effectively in complete

isolation. Co – operation between people and units is necessary at all
levels, from the Prime Minster/ President level down to the ground
crew working together on aircraft. The consequences or lack of
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cooperation are well portrayed by sir John Slessor in his book “The
Central Blue” when he cites the lack of co-operation between Costal
Command and US Navy in the North Atlantic. The outstanding
examples of close operation proving dividends are very successful
operations of the German naval, and air forces in Norway in 1940, the
co – operations between the Red Army and the Red Air Force in the
Eastern front, and they very close support which the Luftwaffe gave to
the Panzer breakthrough in the Low Countries in 1940.

12. Administration

“Disregard of administrative detail has led to failure in the past and

is much likely to do so in the future, because of the increased
complexity of modern weapons and equipment. No operational
plan is likely to succeed unless great care is devoted to the
administrative arrangements of giving effects (AP 13000).

The administrative staff should be consulted and brought into picture at

the earliest stage of an operational planning and they should be informed
immediately of all proposed changes of plan. The commands must have a
clear understanding of the administrative factors which may affect his
activities. For example the rate at which POL could be supplied severely
restricted the German offensive in the Ardennes in 1944-45, and the
failure of almost all, tactical communications at Arnhem crippled
command and control in the critical early days of the battle. On the other
hand, the Allied -invasion of Sicily was a fair example of the use of this
principle finally, Stalin's build up of the Red Army after its initial defeats
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must be regarded as one of the finest example of how the sound and steady
build up of a logistic base with all its attendant administrative problems
contributed to one of the large an most successful land and air campaign of
WW2.

CONCLUSION

13. The principles of War are not a check list nor a code of laws.. They
are general principles, neglect of any one of which may they are general he
success of an operation.

THE CONCEPT OF AIR POWER IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

1. Balanced air power is a fundamental concept. It defines the Overall

capability of an Air Force, and hence like the aircraft itself needs attention
of design and development.

2. In the past the cost of aircraft weapons permitted the luxury of large
numbers In addition the relative low performance of the aircraft permitted
multi-role feasibility, where such aircraft as the Hunter and Sabre were
equally good in air defence and ground attack The present Cost of aircraft
is very high and is rising in proportion to the cost of oil. The developing
countries can no longer afford the luxury of numbers, and they need 10
carefully identify the threat, the means required to counter it and the air
power necessary to deter likely aggressors, in order to identify the
structure of the air forces they need.

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3. The developing countries only need tactical air forces because

support of the land forces is their primary requirement. From this would
grow the need for air defence to protect it's own vital areas and vital points
and to achieve a favourable air situation, counter air and interdiction as
well as indirect support of land forces. Tactical mobility to move the air
and Armed is required.

4. The structure of a balanced tactical air force will be govern

primarily by the threat. It would contain the elements of tactical air
support, deep strike, air defence, reconnaissance tactical transport
support, and armed helicopters in adequate strength.

AIR POWER SINCE 1945

1. Three Major factors have governed the use of air power since the
end of the Second World War. These are as follows:

a. Political upheaval.

b. Nuclear weapons.

c. Aircraft and missile development.

All 3 factors had their effect simultaneously bit* for the purpose of our
study we shall consider each separately.

2. Political Upheaval. Political upheaval has set the scene for a

continuous series of incidents ranging from minor disturbances to limited
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war .and the threat of general war. The threat of general war has been
contained by a policy of deterrence, but such factors as racial hatred, the
emergency of nations to independence and the influence of the major
power blocks have led to a succession of disturbances; some minor and
some very serious. Air power has played a substantial part in containing
these disturbances but often it has not been used to its full extent, either
because of political restrictions or because the need to fight for a
favourable air situation did not arise. Even so, the fact that many
belligerents possessed relatively modern- aircraft meant that the
Capability to obtain air superiority had to be demonstrated. The trend has
been to use air power for rapid reinforcement or deployment of security
forces both regionally and worldwide and to support them in battle.

3. Nuclear Weapons. The introduction of nuclear weapons gave

overwhelming advantage to offensive air power and led to strategic air
striking forces being chosen to implement the policy of defence through
deterrence. This was a major achievement in the application of air power.

4. Aircraft and missile Development. Scientific progress in military

aviation widened the scope for using air power. Jet propulsion not only
added to the power of the offensive but also was the key to greater mobility
both in the peacetime movement of armed forces and the rapid reaction of
air support to contain emergencies. Introduction of air-launched and
ground-launched missiles further extended the effectiveness of offensive
air power However, despite forecasts by some people that the need for
manned aircraft would decline the policy of retaining the ability to take
discretionary action, which is inherent in manned aircraft, has been duly
justified by the variety of occasions on which only manned aircraft could
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have been used. The operation of jet aircraft necessitated large expensive
airfields which were highly vulnerable. Moreover, operations become
increasingly necessary in areas where, for reasons of geography, airfields
were difficult to construct. Therefore, vertical and short take-off and
landing aircraft were developed, including the helicopter and fixed-wing
aircraft.

CHARACTERISTICS OF AIR POWER

1. From our studies so far the main characteristics of air power may
be deduced. The are worth special emphasis since the importance of these
qualities will In-come evident in later studies. The characteristics are as
follows:

a. Flexibility. Air power is inherently flexible. It has

been applied to almost every aspect of war and now dominates
most of them. Within their radius of action, aircraft can be
switched rapidly between widely separated diverse targets and
can fulfill a variety of roles both offensive and defensive actions.
For example, because the Israeli commanders could plan on
switching their aircraft from one front to another, in 1967, Israel
was able to concentrate superior strength against one opponent
and destroy him with pre-emptive attack before turning to attack
the other opponents. Even in 1973 when the Israelis were on the
defensive and found themselves engaged simultaneously on 2
fronts hundreds of miles apart they were able to use the
flexibility of air power to counter the Syrian and Egyptian
attacks both by switching aircraft from one role to another and
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by re-rolling.

b. Firepower. The ability to deliver massive destructive

power at long range and with little warning is of cardinal
importance in war Widely varying levels of destruction can be
inflicted or threatened because many different kinds of weapons
can be used and different degrees of concentration can be
achieved from airfields which may be widely separated
geographically. This characteristic is enhanced by the power of
nuclear weapons and emphasizes the value of air power-used in
the offensive role. The RAF's 1000-bomber raids during the
second World War represented in their day tremendous
concentrations of firepower and the Israeli Air Force's
concentration of firepower in a pre-emptive strike against
Egyptian air forces on the ground on 5 June 1967 effectively
won the war for Israel in the first 3 hours.

c. Mobility. The ability to deploy aircraft over long distances

at high speed also offers great advantages. A sudden threat can be
countered by rapid reinforcement by aircraft or by military forces
carried by aircraft. The duplication; of defence forces can thereby
be avoided and the result represents a more effective and
economical use of resources with consequent savings in defence
expenditure. Examples of the effective use of the mobility of air
power include the UK's deployment of Vulcan medium bombers to
Singapore during the period of confrontation with Indonesia and
more recently, the rapid deployment of harrier aircraft to Belize
which probably helped to deter an invasion of that territory.
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2. If these 3 characteristics of air power are to be exploited .to

maximum effect, there are 2 requirements which must be met:

a. Centralized Control. Past experience has shown that the

ability to concentrate aircraft at a decisive time and place can best
be achieved through centralized control, and that to decentralize
air effort invites duplication of effort, waste of resources and
confusion. This characteristic was the subject of much debate
before practical experience in war demonstrated its validity. This is
not to say, however, that control must invariably be exercised by
most superior headquarters. In the tactical operations, for instance,
the selection of actual targets within the overall priorities decided
by the superior formation must be delegated to those directly
concerned with the battle. Over-centralized control can itself lead
to inefficiency; it is effective control that matters. Thus, control of
air forces must be exercised at the highest level which can
effectively apply their effort.

b. Airfields. It is perhaps stating the obvious to say thai

aircraft require airfields. However, it is too often taken for granted
that this requirement will always be met. On many occasions the
flexibility and mobility of aircraft have been inhibited by lack of
forward airfields or base for maintenance, refueling and rearming.
Furthermore, modern aircraft require relatively large and
substantially constructed airfields and these are particularly
vulnerable to attack. The situation may be eased by the further
development of vertical lift or short take-off and landing aircraft,
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but there will always be a requirement for an adequate number of

strategically sited airfields, if we are to exploit the characteristics
of air power to maximum effect.

3. To list characteristics of airpower without mentioning some ul the

factors which restrict its use would present an unbalanced view. For a
number of reasons air power cannot by itself decide .all military situations.
In most instances its use must be part of a wider strategy or must be
supplemented by action by other forces. The results of air attack are not
always lasting and can be regarded as effective only if the rate of
destruction is greater than the enemy's rate of recovery. Furthermore,
present conditions have imposed powerful restraints upon the use- of air
power. These restraints, though partly military, are mainly political. The
use of air power must be adequate to achieve the aim but must not be so
great as to cause escalation or undue political reaction-requirements
which are not always compatible.

THE ROLES OF AIR POWER

1. Having briefly traced the growth and characteristics of air power

there is a need to examine broadly the main roles in which it may be
applied. These are as follows:

2. a. Strategic strike/attack.
b. Air defence.
c. Maritime.
d. Air transport.
e. Air reconnaissance.
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f. Tactical Air Operations.

g. Air to air refuelling.

STRATIG1C STRIKE/ATTACK

2. Strategic strike/attack operations represent the long range use of

nuclear and conventional air power against targets both military and
civilian deep into enemy territory. Aircraft such as the B-52 (USAF) the
Vulcan (UK) and the Backfire (USSR) arc examples of aircraft used by the
Western Alliance and the Warsaw Pact for strategic purposes.

3. In the conventional context the success of such operations rely on:

a. Correctly selecting and maintaining the aim of the

offensive in order to avoid dissipating the strength of the force.

b. An offensive intelligence service to select targets whose

damage or destruction will have maximum effect on the enemy's
war capacity and resolve.

c. The maximum exploitation of scientific and technical

discoveries so as to keep ahead of the enemy.

d. Accurate navigation and bombing.

e. Choosing routes and tactics which will minimize the effect

of enemy defensive systems.

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4. At any level of conflict strategic forces form an effective offensive

and political tool since apart from the substantial firepower which they are
able to apply over long ranges, their very existence might persuade a
potential enemy that a particular course of action would expose him to an
unacceptable level of retaliation.

AIR DEFENCE

5. Defence against air attack is one of the primary functions of an air

force. No air defence system will provide a 100% effective insurance
against enemy attack. However, it may provide an adequate period of
warning during which forces on the ground may take protective measures,
disperse or themselves become airborne. It may also play a decisive part in
gaining air superiority without which land, sea and air forces might be
unable to operate effectively.

6. There are 2 aspects of air defence:

a. Active.Active air defence (on which these notes

concentrate) embraces all measures taken to prevent the enemy
from attacking his targets.

b. Passive. Passive air defence covers all measures taken to

minimize the physical results of attack such as the dispersal of
forces and the provision of hardened aircraft shelters.

7. The main components of an air defence system are:

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a. A control and reporting system (C and R), which must

provide adequate warning of the approach of aircraft and the
means to direct the defence. These may be both ground based
(radars) and airborne (AEW aircraft).

b. A weapons system to intercept and. Destroy attacking

enemy aircraft before they reach the point of weapons release and
as far as possible from the area being defended. Such weapons
would include light anti-aircraft guns (LAA), surface to air
missiles and fighter aircraft such as the MG 21 (Nigeria), F 14
Eagle (USAF) and Phanton (UK:).

c. A communication system lo link the components defence

and provide the means to alert and control the integrated system.

8. Interception from the ground is the normal method of operating

defensive fighter aircraft although combat air patrols (CAPs) may be
employed. CAPs entail the constant maintenance of aircraft in the air over
a particular area with the constant provision of reliefs. Therefore, they are
expensive of effort and are likely to result in too few fighters being
available to engage successfully the incoming enemy aircraft. In either
case air-to-air refuelling may be employed to extend fight aircraft
endurance using 'aircraft such as the KC 135 (USA), Victor K 2 (UK) and
YU-16 Badger (USSR).

9. The role of air to air refuelling is described later in these notes.

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MARITIME AIR QPERATIONS

10. The aim of maritime warfare is to control tea communication so

that they may be used for our own purpose whilst at the same time denying
them to the enemy. Maritime air operations may also be employed to
protect offshore and coastal economic interests. Such operations,
therefore, cover:

a. Surveillance.
b. Anti-submarine warfare (ASW).
c. Strike/attack operations.
d. Maritime air defence.
e. Mining.

11. Surveillance. Surveillance covers maritime air reconnaissance,

patrolling, shadowing, tracking and probing. Operations may range from
high level maritime radar reconnaissance (MRR) by NATO air force over
the North Sea, to offshore patrols by light aircraft in support of offshore
economic interests such as the protection used for his purpose may be as
disparate as the Vulcan B2 (MRR) on the one hand and the Puma
helicopter (anti-smuggling) on the other.

12. ASW. The modern submarine, particularly when nuclear

powered, poses a formidable problem. It can cruise submerged at high
speed for long periods which enables it to maintain contact with surface
forces and to attack without exposing itself. Radar detection of nuclear
submarines is, therefore, a rarity but their continuous noise makes sub -
surface detection possible. In comparison the modem diesel-electric
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submarine is virtually undetectable when submerged and operating on

batteries alone although when 'snorting' it makes a detectable noise and
offers a radar target. A skillfully conducted submarine offensive is,
therefore, a highly flexible threat which can be countered only by an
equally flexible and mobile force. Properly equipped aircraft such as
the Nimrod (UK) and TU-95 Bear D (USSR) are essential for this
purpose in order to:
a. Locate, track and destroy enemy submarines.

b. Restrict their mobility by denying them the use of the

surface.

c. Provide air support for friendly surface and sub-surface

forces.

In all such operations it is essential that forces are concentrated tactically

and that air effort is coordinated with other anti-submarine forces to
achieve the maximum effect.

13. Strike/Attack Operations. Maritime offensive air support

involves the provision of strike and attack missions by land or sea-based
aircraft against maritime targets. Targets could include fixed positions
much as coastal installations but primarily they will comprise hostile
naval units at sea. Strike/attack missions may be required at close or long
range, by day or night and in all weather conditions against wide variety of
targets from small, single ships to groups of large vessels capable of
mutual support and sophisticated air defence. Therefore, it is unlikely
except at closer ranges that aircraft such as the Buccaneers (RAF and RN),
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the A-7 (USN) and the Yak-36 Forger (USSR) will be able to operate in an
offensive role without assistance from aircraft capable of locating,
identifying and attacking enemy naval units.

14. Maritime Air Defence. Air defence of naval forces may be either
land-based or organic. In the case of land-based support, the distance from
the shore of friendly naval forces, the early warning cover available and
the number of aircraft allocated are factors likely to affect the use of air
defence fighters. Where transit distances are small a CAP may be possible
but, as hat already been observed, is costly of effort. Therefore, given the
inherent flexibility and mobility of air power the most effective use of
available resource can be made by retaining aircraft at a high state of
ground readiness. Where the naval force is so far from land that time on
task would not be possible, in-flight refuelling may be used to extend the
radius of action and endurance of fighters so allowing a CAP to be
mounted. Organic air defence may be provided by aircraft such as the
Phanton (RN) and the F-14 (USN) operating from fleet carriers or by
STOL/VTOL aircraft such as the AV-8A Harrier (USMC) and Yak - 36
Forger (USSR) operating from sea control ships and through deck
cruisers. Whereas the reaction time of such air defence is usually-much
quicker than that provided by land-based aircraft, it can prove to be too
costly an option for small navies and presents problems.

MINING

15. Mining operations are designed to deny the enemy the use of
predetermined area or, by forcing him to use certain areas, to hazard his
ships and submarines. Aircraft can lay mines very effectively as was
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demonstrated during the blockade of Haiphong harbor (North Vietnam).

The mine is an attractive weapon because it is relatively cheap and easy to
lay compared with the costly and time consuming measures required to
counter it.

AIR TRANSPORT

16. The concept of strategic mobility is based on the use of air transport
to deploy armed forces rapidly during times of tension. Air transport also
provides tactical mobility to fighting formations and permits the speedy
delivery of men and equipment to, and within operational areas. The
aircraft which may be used for these purposes are:
a. Fixed wing strategic transport (C-14 1 Starlifter (USAF);
VC-10 (RAF); TU-14 Cleat (USSR).

b. Fixed wing tactical transport (F 27 and C 130 (Nigeria);

AN-12 (USSR).

c. Support helicopter (Alouette Nigeria): Puma (RAF).

17. The advantages of air transport over surface means are:

a. Freedom of Communication. By its wider choice of

routes air transport may enjoy freedom of communication when
surface lines are blocked or non-existent.

b. Tactical Mobility. The tactical use of air transport

increases the mobility of forces in the field.
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c. High Speed. Air transport can deliver men and material

more quickly than other means. This capability may be vital in
preventing a minor problem from developing into something more
serious.

d. Flexibility. Aircraft can perform a wide variety of tasks

and can be switched fairly rapidly from one role to another.
However, there are limitations: Compared with surface transport, aircraft
carry only limited loads and careful planning is needed if optimum use is
to be made of available space and payload. Moreover however urgent the
air transport forces cannot function without a comparatively, sophisticated
ground organizations, covering such services a mobility, refueling,
ground and air communications, meteorology and navigational aids.
Additionally Aircraft require a favorable air situation in which to operate
and may be subject to the diplomatic vagaries of overflying rights. Poor
weather also affects its operations.

18. Strategic Air Transport Operations. Strategic air transport is

the carriage of men and material between the home base and overseas
areas or between one overseas areas and another, they include:

a. Scheduled services of the routine airline type of operation.

b. Special flights to meet a specific need as disaster relief and

civil aid operations.

c. Air logistic support involving the transport of men and

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material from main base to art airfield in an area of operations.

d. Aeromedical evacuation.

19. Tactical Air Transport Support Operations. Tactical air

transport support operations is the carriage of men and material within
an area of operation in support of a tactical plan. They include:

a. Airborne operations involving the movement of combat

forces and their logistic support into an objective area either by air
assault or by air landing. Air assault is that phase of an airborne
operation beginning with the delivery of the forces assault echelon
and ending with the consolidation of an initial airhead; thus the
troops would normally go into action once they had landed either
by parachute, by helicopter assault or by fixed wing assault
landing. They may be used to establish a force which can
subsequently develop operations against an enemy, to deliver
follow-up forces after a successful assault or to redeploy forces.

b. Air logistic support covering air supply movement, of

personnel, evacuation of casualties and prisoners of war and the
recovery of equipment.

c. Special missions involving clandestine operations such as

the delivery and recovery of agents and patrols and psychological
operations such as leaflet dropping and voice broadcasts.

d. Aeromedicdl evacuation.
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AIR RECONNAISSANCE

20. The function of air reconnaissance is obtain accurate and timely

intelligence about an enemy or potential enemy. The information
obtained can vary from that required for long term defence planning to
immediate observation which could determine the outcome of a battle.
Therefore, air reconnaissance is divided into 2 broad categories:

a. Strategic Reconnaissance. Strategic Reconnaissance

provides information about an enemy's or potential enemy's
overall military capability such as the main disposition of his
defence and his scientific and industrial development. Space
satellites and aircraft such as the (SR-17A USA) and TU-20 Bear
(USSRO may be used for this purpose.

b. Tactical Reconnaissance. Tactical reconnaissance

provides information about military and other targets within
defined areas of operations. Aircraft such as Jaguar (UK) and
MIG-21 Fishbed H(USSR) are used in this role.
21. The methods of air reconnaissance currently in use are:

a. Visual.

b. Photography.

c. Radar.

e. Infra-red line scan using equipment capable of translating

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infra-red heat emissions from ground into a recognizable picture.

f. Satellite

TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS

22. Tactical air operations range from 'showing the flag' with a small
formation of aircraft to heavy attacks on targets remote from the battle area
In all but the simplest military operations tactical air operations will be
conducted in conjunction with ground forces. Tactical air forces are
capable of operating throughout the whole spectrum of warfare and of
operating a variety of tasks in both conventional and nuclear operations.
In the conduct of such operations the following principles apply:

a. The land, sea and air commanders must work as a team.

b. Air forces must be controlled at the highest level which can

effectively apply their effort.

c. At each level of command the land or sea commander

should deal with only one air commander and vice versa.

23. Tactical air operations consists of the following:

a. Counter-Air Operations. Counter air operations are

designed to gain and maintain a favourable air situation in order
that the conduct of sea, land and air operations may be prosecuted
with the minimum level of distribution from enemy air power.
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Such operations may be offensive or defensive. Offensive action

includes strike/attack operations by both bomber and ground
attack aircraft against enemy airfield ballistic missile and SAM
sites, AA guns, units of the C and R system and supporting
installations. Air defence the main means of achieving a
favourable air situation which is to carry the offensive to the
enemy.

b. Air Reconnaissance.Tactical air reconnaissance is the

means of providing the army and, in certain cases, the navy with
information concerning the location or detailed identification of
enemy forces.

c. Interdiction. Interdiction covers those operations aimed

at destroying or neutralizing the enemies military potential before
it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces and at
such a distance from friendly forces that detailed integration with
those forces is not required. In this context the enemy's military
potential includes those forces not engage in close combat, his
supplies and the means by which such forces and supplies are
moved forward. Apart from the obvious advantage of reducing an
enemy's potential, before it can be brought to bear against friendly
forces, it is usually more economical to attack troops and supplies
when they are massed or when they form line targets on lines of
communication than when they an. dispersed on the battlefield.

d. Close Air Support. Close air support operations are

those which are so close to friendly forces that detailed integration
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of each air mission with the fire and movement those forces
required. Close air support provides quick result and raises the
morale of friendly troops who see it, but its effects are local and
short-lived; the less direct and less obvious form of offensive
support will often be of greater value.

e. Tactical Air Transport Support. Tactical air transport

provides a high degree of mobility for ground forces and their
logistic support and can b used for air borne operations, air logistic
support special missions and aeromedical evacuation.

AIR TO AIR REFUELLING (AAR)

24. By refueling in flight aircraft can take on fuel when and where it is
needed thereby not only extending range and endurance but also
increasing weapon load and payload. Broadly, there are 2 methods of
taking in fuel. The one used by the RAF USN and the air forces of the
Soviet Union, France and Israel is termed 'probe and drogue' and requires
the receiving pilot to link with a drogue-stabilized coupling trailed from
the tanker. The method favoured by the USAF is the flying boom and
employs an hydraulic telescopic boom equipped with a nozzle and fitted
into the rear fuselage. The boom can be 'flown-by a crew member and
manoeuvred onto the receiving aircraft's fuel coupling by the use of small
ailerons.

25. AAR operations may be carried out both strategically and

tactically. Strategically, aircraft such as the KC 1 35 (USAF), Victor K2
(RAF) and TU-16 Badger (USSR) may be used to provide other aircraft
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either the range to deploy rapidly to and between areas of operations.

Tactically, air defence, strike/attack or reconnaissance aircraft engaging in
air operations against the enemy may be supported by tanker to increase
their range and firepower and to provide them with greater tactical
freedom. Such support may be provided both by long range AAR aircraft
such as those already described or by smaller aircraft using the 'buddie
buddie' system (for example. Phantom to Phantom (USN) or Huc-caneer
to Buccaneer (RN). In either case the success of AAR operations relics on
centralized control, standard procedures and joint planning.

CONCLUSION

26. The study of air power in all its forms is a complex subject. These
notes do not more than introduce students briefly to its development,
characteristics and employment. Throughout the coins students will be
able to deepen then knowledge and understanding of the subject and will
be encouraged to develop and advance new concepts for the future.
Therefore they would do well from outset to reflect on the words of
General Arnold (ex-Chief of Staff USAF) who, in his report to the
Secretary of War at the end of World War II said:

"National safely may be endangered by an air force whose

doctrines and techniques are tied solely to the equipment and
processes of the moment. Present equipment is but a: step in
progress, and any air force which does not keep its doctrines
ahead of its equipment and its visions far into the future can
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only delude the nation Into a false sense of security”

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

1. The primary need for close air support is the support for the army
and navy. For the air forces to effectively carry out this function properly
there are 2 areas that must be treated fairly and are:

a. Area operations.

b. Air operations.

AREA OPERATIONS

2. Area Operations consist of series of integrated and co-ordinated

military actions within a specified operational area under a single
commander. They are best described according to the medium in which
each is conducted i.e.:

a. Land Operations.- Which are designed to defend or to

seize and occupy land areas. In some cases, the location and
.destruction of enemy fighting units rather than the long term
occupation of large land areas, may characterize a land operation
i.e. the secessionists air planes flying all the way from the war
affected zones to bomb Kaduna. However, Land operation cannot
be viewed as independent of air operations. The interaction
between air land operations is direct, and mission priorities must
be viewed in terms of an integrated Air Land Battle.
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b. Sea Operations. - Land based air forces may be

employed in concert with, or act independently of sister naval units
to serve and maintain sea lines of communication and to deny the
use of the sea to the enemy. The next and most important phase is
the Air Operations.

AIR OPERATIONS

3. The capabilities of tactical air forces increase the range of options

from which national leadership may choose an appropriate response to
each enemy challenge and significantly increase the number of available
threshold below the level of general war. The speed, range, and versatility
of tactical air forces provide a capability to destroy enemy targets swiftly
and effectively throughout the entire spectrum of warfare, making these
forces particularly useful in demonstrating national intent at the outset of a
crises. Of course, there is no doubt that early employment of tactical air
forces as a show of force or in a combat application will enhance the
potential for deterring further enemy actions.

4. However, when faced with an enemy offensive air threat, the first
priority mission of tactical airforce is to secure friendly forces from air
attack. At the same time, engaged surface forces must be provided close
air support at a level commensurate with the pace of their operations and
the pressure exerted by the enemy ground forces.

5. Combat tasks for Tactical Air Forces. Tactical air forces are
equipped and trained to conduct five major categories of combat
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operations, they are: Counter Air, Air Interdiction, Close Air Support, Air
Reconnaissance and Tactical Airlift. Although many factors combine to
obtain to ordain the priority and emphasis which may be placed on any one
category during area operations, (but) the inherent flexibility and
versatility of tactical air power permits its adictation to any or all of he
tasks required by the situation.

6. Counter Air Operations which are to gain and maintain air

superiority by destroying or neutralizing an enemy's offensive and
defensive air capability – can be classified under:

a. Offensive Counter Air Operations, that are conducted

throughout enemy territory to seek out and destroy aircraft in the
.in or on the ground, missile and anti-aircraft artillery sites, air
bases, air control systems, fuel stores, and other elements which
constitute or support the enemy air order of battle. These
operations are the most effective means for achieving air
superiority and are essential to gaining air supremacy.

b. The Defensive Counter Air Operations are generally

reactive to enemy initiatives. Air Defence Operations involve
destroying enemy air vehicles attempting to penetrate friendly air
space thereby preventing enemy air forces from effectively
interfering with friendly surface and air operations. Regardless of
the scale of the counter, air task, however, it is vital that both
defensive and offensive operations are integrated by Air Force
Component Commanders (AFCC).

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7. Air Interdiction Operations are conducted to destroy, neutralize or

delay enemy ground or naval forces before they can be brought to bear
against friendly forces. These operations also restrict the combat
capability of enemy forces by disrupting their lines of communications
and by destroying the supplies that sustain an effective level of enemy
activity. It goes without saying that the unified commander usually the
army commander initiates the Interdiction programme by issuing
directives outlining the broad plan of operations. These directives would
describe the general area to be interdicted, the degree of neutralization to
be achieved, the time the effects are desired, and the relative priority of the
tasks. Based on the unified commander's guidance, the AFCC as the
commander with primary responsibility for interdiction of Lands areas,
will determine the categories of targets to be struck and will prepare and
execute the necessary plans for the air interdiction campaign. However,
those portions of the air interdiction campaign which will have a direct
effect upon surface operations must be coordinated with the appropriate
surface commander.

8. Usually an interdiction campaign is against he enemy's transport

system concentration points, and stock piled supplies. The geography of
the area of operations, together with the enemy capabilities and the
friendly objective will determine the interjection pattern. It is worth
nothing here that an air interjection campaign must be sustained so that the
enemy is not allowed to recuperate from the effects of air attack.
However, the scale of operations will generally be the greatest in the early
stages of the programme, followed by a reduction in operation to that
required to maintain the objective.

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APPUCATIONJDFJCEOSE AIR SUPPORT

9. These applications are conducted in close integration with the fire

and manouvre of surface forces. They provide a dimension of fire power
that contributes to and allows exploitation of break through operations,
blunts enemy assaults, and augments and complements the fire power of
surface weapons. In land warfare, a basic objective of offensive tactical air
operations, including close air support, is to limit the enemy's capability to
directly engage friendly forces in close combat, in which case, if close
combat does occur, then close air support can provide timely and precise
fire power against engaged hostile forces.

10. To be effective, however, Close Air Support must be responsible to

the ground commander's request for air support. The key to
responsiveness is centralized control of air resources combined with
decentralized execution, By decentralizing execution authority, rapid
response and adjustment to local conditions is achieved.

11. The allocation of air resources to close air support operations is

made by the unified commander in consultation with his component
commanders. Usually, preplanned missions represent the most
economical use of assets, but to provide a contingency reaction capability,
a proportion of sorties must also be allotted for immediate requests. In any
case, and in the event of emergency situations, aircraft may be diverted to
Close Air Support tasks from other missions through TAP commander's
Tactical Air Control System (TACS). The attainment of effective close air
support requires close co-ordination between the air and surface
commanders in planning and conducting operations. Close Air Support
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missions must be closely integrated with the movement of surface forces,

and this is accomplished through parallel air and ground forces control
system which extend through all echelons of command. These systems
provide the communications necessary for processing requests for air
support, and for integrating tactical support into the ground forces
operations.

12. In addition to control elements, liaison personnel are exchanged to

provide advice on capabilities, assist in planning, and coordinate support
requirements. The personnel and equipment for this control system are
provided by the (TACS).

13. However, to prevent inadvertent strikes against friendly forces,

Close Air Support missions are controlled by forward air controllers
(FACS). The FACS provide targets area control from either a ground or
air borne location and ensures both direct coordination with the surface
unit being supported and target acquisition by the strike forces. Under
night or adverse weather conditions, an air support radar team (ASRT)
may provide final mission control.

14. While elaborating on Close Air Support it should be clear that once
launched, pre-planned and immediate close air support missions are
controlled in the same manner as any air request during combat. Control
Reporting Center (CRC), Control Reporting Post (CRP), or FACP directs
the FAC that establishes contact with the aircraft and verbally directs the
aircraft to the target. If radar is not available, the aircraft proceeds to
designated grid coordinates or prominent land-marks for the FAC to
establish communications.
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15. However, control of strike aircraft from the control point to the
target or to weapons release is normally accomplished by a FAC or Air
Support Radar Team (ASRT)-. When visual delivery is not possible and
the target has been accurately located, an ASRT or a FAC may direct the
strike using radar or other ground-based electronic guidance. Voice
vectoring, terrain reference, ordnance marking, electronic or electro-optic
means, or the combination of these are other methods are readily available
for the FACS to employ in assisting Close Air Support pilots to acquire
targets.

16. Depending on the situation, the FAC may operate on the ground or
from an airborne vehicle. An airborne FAC has the advantage of being
able to acquire targets more easily, and he can control strikes with greater
precision, especially when his aircraft equipped with observation and
target marking systems. There is need, however, for the FAC to have direct
communication with the supported unit, TACP and attacking aircraft in
order to integrate and coordinate the strike with the fire and movement of
the ground force.

17. Usually an AF FAC will be available to control Close Air Support

"CAS" missions. However, to ensure that urgent or emergency
requirements for "CAS" are satisfied when a FAC is not available,
procedures and responsible will have to be established by the AFCC and
the Army component commander. Albeit, only in an emergency will an
individual who is not a qualified FAC mark or identify targets for attacking
aircraft and, in such case, the ground force commander concerned must
assume responsibility for troop safety.
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18. Where a "CAS" mission has been approved, and it is known that no
FAC will be available to direct the attack, an artillery or mortal forward
observer (FO) may mark or otherwise identify the target for the attacking
aircraft. This will require prior notification of the affected (FO) so that he
can position himself for the impending mission. The fighters/Support
Helicopter (SH), should receive an air briefing on the target from either the
DASC or a TACP and should be briefed to contact the FO. The FO should,
when contacted, by the fighters/SH, give the target description and
coordinates and information as to the proximity of friendly forces. The FO
will either point out the target through map: or terrain references or will
cause the target to be marked by using appropriate artillery or mortar
projectiles.

19. However, if the FO has no ground - air communications he should

establish contact with the appropriate TACP or DASC duty officer via
ground communications so the TACP or DASC may relays his
information to the fighters. If no FO is available, any qualified officer
member of the battalion, using ground-air communications or relaying
through a TACP or DASC, may be used to assist in locating the target for
air support mission.
20. Safety and ordinance delivery effectiveness can be seriously
degraded in the absence of a qualified FAC. As in all cases of tactical air
support, the final decision concerning the delivery of ordinance are the
prerogatives of the flight commander.

21. Other elements employed in Air Tactical Support are:

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a. Tactical Air Reconnaissance Operation - an integrated

system of aerial data collection and subsequent processing,
interpreting and distribution of derived intelligence concerning the
enemy and his environment. It's singular characteristics 'is tactical
responsiveness, sand it employs airborne collection devices
ranging from aircrew eyes to the most advanced senior devices.
The procedures for requesting tactical air reconnaissance by the
ground forces are however essentially the same as those for close
air support. Albeit, such request are categorized as preplanned or
immediate.

b. Tactical Airlift Operations is the immediate and responsive

air movement and1 delivery of combat troops and supplies directly
into objective areas through air landing, extraction, air drop or
other delivery techniques and the air logistical support of all
theatre forces, including those engaged in combat operation to
meet specific theatre objectives and requirement. In addition to
this, the tactical airlift, mission will encompass the follow basic
tasks:

(1) Deployment/redeployment of combat forces and

supplies within and between contiguous command areas in
theatre operation.

(2) Air logistic support operations within a theatre to

meet specific objective and requirements of forces
assigned to the unified commander.

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(3) Airlift employment operation to deliver and recover

personnel and supplies to, within, and from combat zone as
requirements demand. Deliveries may be made through air
landing airdrop, extraction, or other delivery techniques.

(4) Aeromedical evacuation within the theatre of

operations, the combat zone, and forward area as necessary
for interface with both surface forces and strategic
aeromedical evacuation systems.

(5) Support of special operations within aircraft

capability

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