c. When the suit is against the State- BEGOSA V.

CHAIRMAN 4/30/70;
Facts: Domingo B. Teoxon's Claim for Disability Pension: Domingo B. Teoxon
was a veteran who had suffered a permanent physical disability as a result of his
service in a recognized guerilla organization during the resistance movement
against the enemy. Due to his permanent incapacity to work, he filed a claim for
a disability pension under the Veterans' Bill of Rights, Republic Act No. 65.
Initially, Teoxon was awarded a monthly disability pension of only P25.00,
which he believed was insufficient based on the provisions of the Veterans' Bill
of Rights. Teoxon argued that he was entitled to a higher pension rate in
accordance with the statutory provisions. Specifically, he claimed that his
pension should have been granted at the rate of P50.00 per month starting from
May 10, 1955. Additionally, he contended that his pension should have been
increased to P100.00 per month, plus P10.00 per month for each of his
unmarried minor children below 18 years of age, from June 22, 1957, onward.
Teoxon's claim for a higher pension was based on the successive amendments
made to the Veterans' Bill of Rights. The relevant sections of the law provided
for different pension rates depending on the specific circumstances, including
the veteran's incapacity and the number of dependent minor children. The
respondents, who were members of the Board of Administrators of the
Philippine Veterans Administration, argued that Teoxon had not exhausted his
administrative remedies before resorting to a mandamus suit. They contended
that he should have pursued administrative channels to address his pension
issue.
Contention of a Suit Against the State: The respondents also asserted that
Teoxon's lawsuit effectively amounted to a suit against the government (the
State) and that such a suit could not proceed without the State's consent. In a
stipulation of facts dated October 13, 1965, it was agreed that Teoxon had
indeed sustained physical injuries while serving in the guerilla organization and
that his permanent physical disability resulted from these injuries.
Issues:
Whether Teoxon's right to a higher pension rate, as provided by the Veterans'
Bill of Rights, should prevail over the administrative rules and regulations
issued by the Philippine Veterans Administration.
Whether Teoxon was required to exhaust administrative remedies before
resorting to a mandamus suit.
Whether Teoxon's suit amounted to a suit against the State, which would require
the State's consent.
Court's Reasoning and Ruling:
The court held that Teoxon's legal right to a pension, as conferred by the
Veterans' Bill of Rights, should take precedence over the administrative rules
and regulations issued by the respondents. The court cited the principle that if
there is a repugnancy between a statute and administrative rules issued pursuant
to it, the statute prevails. The court emphasized that administrative agencies
cannot amend acts of Congress, and their rules must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law.
The court rejected the defense of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies,
noting that this issue had been considered and rejected in a previous decision
(Begosa v. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration). Therefore, Teoxon
was not required to exhaust administrative remedies before pursuing a
mandamus suit.
The court also rejected the argument that Teoxon's suit was a suit against the
State. The court referenced the previous Begosa decision, which had already
addressed and dismissed this argument.
Ruling: The court reversed the lower court's decision and granted Teoxon's
petition for mandamus. The respondents were ordered to pay Teoxon a pension
in accordance with the statutory provisions of the Veterans' Bill of Rights.
Teoxon was entitled to a higher pension rate than what had been initially
awarded to him. The court did not pronounce any costs in the case.
In summary, the court ruled in favor of Teoxon, emphasizing that his statutory
rights should prevail over administrative regulations, and rejected the arguments
of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and the suit being against the
State.
In the case of Domingo B. Teoxon versus Members of the Board of
Administrators, Philippine Veterans Administration, the court determined that
the suit is not against the State. The suit is against the specific respondents in
their official capacity, namely, the Members of the Board of Administrators of
the Philippine Veterans Administration. It is not considered a suit against the
State itself but rather a legal action directed at specific government officials
responsible for administering and implementing the Veterans' Bill of Rights.
WYLIE V. RARANG 5/28/92;
Facts:

1. Petitioner M. H. Wylie was the assistant administrative officer, and

petitioner Capt. James Williams was the commanding officer of the U.S.
Naval Base in Subic Bay, Olongapo City, in February 1978.
2. Private respondent Aurora I. Rarang worked as a merchandise control
guard in the office of the Provost Marshal.
3. Petitioner Wylie supervised the publication of the "Plan of the Day"
(POD) at the U.S. Naval Base, which featured announcements,
precautions, and matters of interest to military personnel.
4. The POD published an "action line inquiry" accusing merchandise
control inspectors of appropriating confiscated items and mentioned
"Auring," a reference to the private respondent.
5. The private respondent sued petitioners Wylie, Capt. James Williams, and
the U.S. Naval Base for defamation, seeking damages.

Issues:

1. Whether the petitioners are immune from suit because they were acting in
their official capacities.
2. Whether the U.S. Naval Base can be sued without its consent.
3. Whether the lower courts had jurisdiction over the case.

Court's Reasoning and Ruling:

1. The central issue in this case is the extent of "immunity from suit" of U.S.
Naval Base officials inside Philippine territory. The petitioners argued
that they should be immune from suit as they were acting in their official
capacities. However, the court held that this immunity does not cover
criminal or tortious acts committed in the course of official duty.
2. The principle of state immunity from suit means that a state cannot be
sued without its consent. While the United States enjoys this immunity, it
can be waived either expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be
through a statute, while implied consent may be in the form of a contract
or when the state itself commences litigation. In this case, the U.S. Naval
Base was not expressly or impliedly consenting to be sued.
3. The court clarified that the U.S. officials can be held personally
accountable for acts performed in connection with official duties if they
acted ultra vires (beyond their authority) or with bad faith. In this case,
the publication of the defamatory article was considered a personal
tortious act that exceeded their official duties.
The court found that the private respondent had been defamed, and the
petitioners were negligent in allowing the publication of the article without
deleting the defamatory content. Therefore, the petitioners were held personally
liable for the damages caused to the private respondent.

The court affirmed the decision of the appellate court, which awarded moral and
exemplary damages to the private respondent and denied the motion for
reconsideration.

In summary, the court ruled that U.S. Naval Base officials are not immune from
suit when they commit criminal or tortious acts in the course of their official
duties. The U.S. Naval Base can be sued without its consent, and the court has
jurisdiction over such cases when personal torts are involved. The petitioners
were held personally liable for defamation and damages to the private
respondent.

THE HOLY SEE V. HON, 12/17/94;

Facts: The dispute centers around a 6,000-square-meter parcel of land (Lot 5-A)
in Parañaque, Metro Manila, registered in the name of the Holy See. Lots 5-A,
5-B, and 5-D were sold to Ramon Licup through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr.,
who acted as an agent for the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to
Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. A conflict arose when squatters refused to
vacate the land, leading to disputes over who should be responsible for their
eviction. Adding to the complexity, the Holy See sold Lot 5-A to Tropicana
Properties and Development Corporation.

Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court,
alleging that the Holy See, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the Philippine Realty
Corporation (PRC), and Tropicana breached their agreement to sell the lots.
They demanded the annulment of the sale to Tropicana, reconveyance of the
lots, specific performance of the agreement to sell, and damages.

The Holy See filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that it enjoyed
sovereign immunity from suit. The trial court denied this motion, stating that the
Holy See had "shed off [its] sovereign immunity" by entering into the business
contract. The Holy See then sought reconsideration and requested a hearing to
establish factual allegations for its immunity defense.

The trial court deferred the resolution on the motion for reconsideration and
directed the Holy See to file its answer. The Holy See elevated the matter to a
higher court, petitioning for certiorari.

Issues and Court's Reasoning:

1. Procedural Issue: The court first addressed whether a petition for

certiorari under Rule 65 could be used to challenge the denial of a motion
to dismiss. The general rule is that such an order is not immediately
reviewable, but exceptions exist when the trial court has no alternative
but to dismiss the complaint. The court found that the case presented an
exception, as it was clear from the records that the trial court had to
consider the issue of sovereign immunity.
2. Intervention by the Department of Foreign Affairs: The Department of
Foreign Affairs sought to intervene, claiming a legal interest in the case
regarding diplomatic immunity. The court allowed the intervention since
the department's role is significant in foreign relations matters,
particularly concerning diplomatic immunity. The department adopted the
Holy See's arguments regarding sovereign immunity.
3. Sovereign Immunity: The primary issue in the case was whether the Holy
See enjoyed sovereign immunity from the lawsuit. The court explained
that sovereign immunity could be based on either the classical or absolute
 theory (complete immunity) or the newer or restrictive theory (limited
immunity). The restrictive theory recognizes immunity only for public
acts or acts jure imperii, not for private acts or acts jure gestionis.

The court discussed the difficulty in distinguishing between jure imperii and
jure gestionis and noted that some countries, like the United States, had passed
legislation defining commercial activities as acts jure gestionis.

In the Philippines, the court emphasized that the key question was whether the
foreign state engaged regularly in a business or trade. If not, the nature of the
particular act or transaction must be considered. In this case, the court found
that the Holy See acquired Lot 5-A as a donation for constructing the official
residence of the Papal Nuncio, a diplomatic mission-related activity. The
disposal of the property was also motivated by the presence of squatters, not for
profit. Therefore, the court concluded that the transactions were acts jure
imperii, and the Holy See was entitled to sovereign immunity.

4. Remedy for the Plaintiff: The court highlighted that private respondent
still had a legal remedy. It could ask the Philippine government, through
diplomatic channels, to espouse its claims against the Holy See. If the
government chose to do so, the claim would no longer be a private cause.

Based on these findings, the court granted the petition for certiorari, dismissing
the complaint against the Holy See.

In summary, this case involved a dispute over sovereign immunity and the
application of the restrictive theory of immunity. The court ultimately ruled in
favor of the Holy See, finding that its actions were governmental in nature and
thus protected by sovereign immunity. The court also allowed the Department
of Foreign Affairs to intervene, emphasizing the importance of the government's
role in matters of diplomatic immunity.

CALUB V. CA 4/27/00;
Facts:

1. In this case, the petitioners, Felipe Calub and Ricardo Valencia, were
officers of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) in Catbalogan, Samar.
 2. On January 28, 1992, the DENR apprehended two motor vehicles loaded
with illegally sourced lumber. These vehicles were owned by private
individuals and driven by Pio Gabon and Constancio Abuganda.
3. Constancio Abuganda and Pio Gabon, the drivers of the vehicles, failed
to present proper documents or licenses. The DENR seized and
impounded the vehicles and their load of lumber.
4. Criminal complaints were filed against Abuganda for violation of forestry
laws.
5. On January 31, 1992, Gabon and Abuganda forcibly took the impounded
vehicles from the custody of the DENR.
6. On February 11, 1992, one of the vehicles was apprehended again and
loaded with more illegally cut timber. Criminal complaints were filed
against Abuganda and others for the violation of forestry laws.
7. Subsequently, private respondents, Manuela Babalcon (vehicle owner)
and Constancio Abuganda (driver), filed a complaint for the recovery of
possession of the impounded vehicles with an application for replevin
against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Catbalogan.
The RTC granted the application for replevin and issued the
corresponding writ.
8. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the case, which was denied by the
RTC.
9. Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
with the Supreme Court, seeking to annul the RTC's orders.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the seized motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143, is
in custodia legis.
2. Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of
impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, is a suit against the
State.

Court's Reasoning and Ruling:

1. The Revised Forestry Code authorizes the DENR to seize all conveyances
used in the commission of an offense in violation of Section 78. Section
 78 penalizes the cutting, gathering, or collecting of timber or other forest
products without the necessary authority or legal documents.
2. The authority to seize conveyances used in such offenses is governed by
Sections 78-A and 89 of the Revised Forestry Code. These sections
provide for the administrative authority of the DENR to order
confiscation and the arrest of persons committing forestry offenses.
3. DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, implements these
provisions and outlines the procedure for confiscation and disposition of
conveyances used in the commission of forestry offenses.
4. The court determined that the subject vehicles were validly deemed in
custodia legis because they were seized in accordance with the law due to
violations of the Revised Forestry Code. Property in custodia legis cannot
be subject to a replevin suit and must be considered property lawfully
taken by virtue of legal process.
5. The court clarified that petitioners' failure to observe the procedure
outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, was
justifiable due to the circumstances of the case, including the immediate
removal of the vehicles by Gabon and Abuganda and the subsequent
filing of the replevin suit by private respondents.
6. On the issue of whether the complaint for the recovery of possession of
the impounded vehicles is a suit against the State, the court noted that the
actions of petitioners were performed in the discharge of their official
duties within the limits of their authority and without malice or bad faith.
7. As a result, a suit against the petitioners, who represent the DENR, is
considered a suit against the State and cannot proceed without the State's
consent.

Conclusion:

The court ruled in favor of the petitioners, finding that the seized motor vehicle
was in custodia legis, and the complaint for the recovery of possession of
impounded vehicles was a suit against the State. Therefore, the court annulled
the RTC's orders and directed the sheriff to take possession of the subject motor
vehicle for appropriate disposition by petitioners.
MINUCHER V. CA, 2/11/03;
Facts: Arthur Scalzo worked as an agent of the United States Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA). Scalzo was stationed in the Philippines with the mission of
conducting surveillance operations on suspected drug dealers and preventing the
distribution, possession, and use of prohibited drugs. His duties included
investigating individuals involved in drug trafficking.
Scalzo cooperated with Philippine law enforcement officials in carrying out
these activities. The case involves a legal dispute arising from actions Scalzo
took while performing his duties as a DEA agent in the Philippines. The
Philippines is a signatory to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, an
international treaty that governs the privileges and immunities of diplomats.
Issues:
Diplomatic Immunity: The primary issue was whether Arthur Scalzo was
entitled to diplomatic immunity under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations. Scalzo claimed that his role as a DEA agent conducting operations in
the Philippines made him immune from civil suits.
State Immunity from Suit: Another crucial issue was whether Scalzo, as an
agent of a foreign government (the United States), could claim state immunity
from suit in the Philippines. This issue addressed whether the suit against him
effectively amounted to a suit against the United States government.
Identity of the Parties: The court considered whether there was an identity of the
parties, subject matter, and causes of action in this case compared to a prior case
(G.R. No. 97765), which had some overlapping issues. This was relevant to the
doctrine of res judicata, which requires the same parties, subject matter, and
causes of action for a prior judgment to be conclusive.
Court's Reasoning and Ruling: The court ruled that Arthur Scalzo, as an agent of
the United States Drug Enforcement Agency operating in the Philippines, was
entitled to the defense of state immunity from suit. Consequently, the petition
was denied.
Diplomatic Immunity: The court acknowledged the well-established principle of
diplomatic immunity in international law. To enjoy diplomatic immunity, certain
conditions must be met, including a valid jurisdiction, a judgment on the merits,
and an identity of the parties, subject matter, and causes of action.
Scalzo claimed diplomatic immunity based on his role as a DEA agent
conducting surveillance operations in the Philippines. The court expressed
reservations about the authenticity and timing of the diplomatic notes presented
as evidence to support Scalzo's diplomatic immunity claim.
It emphasized the need for caution in granting diplomatic immunity and noted
that the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides immunity only to
"diplomatic agents." The court observed that Scalzo's activities included
cooperating with Philippine law enforcement officials, which may not fall
squarely within the definition of "diplomatic functions."
It suggested that Scalzo's claim of diplomatic immunity remained contentious.
Note--State Immunity from Suit: The court discussed the doctrine of state
immunity from suit, which generally protects foreign states and their agents
from being sued in the courts of another state. However, this immunity has
limitations, particularly when a government official is sued in their private and
personal capacity for actions taken beyond their authority or with malice.
Identity of the Parties:
The court noted that one of the issues submitted in this case was also raised in a
prior case (G.R. No. 97765), but the ruling in the prior case did not resolve that
issue with finality.
It highlighted that Scalzo had reserved his right to present evidence in support
of his claim of diplomatic immunity.
The court suggested that the issue of diplomatic immunity should not be
peremptorily dismissed and expressed doubts about the authenticity and timing
of the diplomatic notes presented as evidence.
Concept of the Suit Against the State: The court acknowledged that suing a
representative of a state is, in effect, suing the state itself.
It noted that the key consideration is whether the judgment against an official
would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award,
such as appropriating funds to pay damages.
The court ultimately ruled that Scalzo was entitled to the defense of state
immunity from suit because he was acting within the scope of his official duties
as a DEA agent, and there were indications of Philippine government consent to
his activities.
RP OF INDONESIA V. VINZON, 6/26/03;
In August 1995, the Republic of Indonesia, represented by Ambassador
Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Azhari Kasim, entered into a Maintenance
Agreement with James Vinzon, who was operating as Vinzon Trade and
Services. The Maintenance Agreement's purpose was to have Vinzon maintain
specific equipment at various Indonesian diplomatic premises, including the
Embassy Main Building, Embassy Annex Building, and the Wisma Duta, which
served as the official residence of Ambassador Soeratmin. The equipment
covered by the Maintenance Agreement included air conditioning units,
generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps. The
initial term of the agreement was four years, and it would renew automatically
unless canceled with a thirty-day written notice from either party.
Petitioners claimed that they had informed Vinzon before the agreement's
expiration that the renewal would be at the discretion of Minister Counsellor
Azhari Kasim, who took office in March 2000. According to the petitioners,
when Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed his position, he found Vinzon's
services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in the
Maintenance Agreement. Consequently, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the
agreement through a letter dated August 31, 2000. Petitioners also claimed to
have verbally informed Vinzon of their decision to terminate the agreement.
However, Vinzon contested this termination, alleging that it was arbitrary and
unlawful. He pointed to several circumstances that, in his view, contradicted the
petitioners' claim of dissatisfaction with his services:
In July 2000, Minister Counsellor Kasim had requested Vinzon to assign an
additional full-time worker to assist one of his other workers. In August 2000,
Minister Counsellor Kasim asked Vinzon to donate a prize for the Indonesian
Independence Day golf tournament, which Vinzon did. In a letter dated August
22, 2000, Ambassador Soeratmin thanked Vinzon for sponsoring a prize and
expressed hopes for continuing and strengthening their cordial relations.
Legal Issues: The primary legal issue in this case is whether the Republic of
Indonesia, as a foreign sovereign state, has sovereign immunity from suit in the
Philippines. This issue also extends to Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister
Counsellor Kasim, who claim diplomatic immunity.
Waiver of Sovereign Immunity: The question arises as to whether the provision
in the Maintenance Agreement, which states that legal actions arising from the
agreement shall be settled according to Philippine laws and in a specified
Philippine court, constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity.
Liability of Ambassador and Minister Counsellor: Another issue is whether
Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim can be sued and held
liable in their private capacities for their alleged actions in terminating the
Maintenance Agreement.
Court's Reasoning and Ruling: The court recognized the principle of
sovereign immunity, grounded in international law, which holds that a state
cannot be sued without its consent. This principle is based on the principles of
independence and equality of states. The court emphasized that international
law principles, including reciprocity, comity, independence, and equality of
states, are part of the law in the Philippines. The court discussed the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity, which distinguishes between public acts (jure
imperii) and private acts (jure gestionis) of a sovereign state. Under this theory,
a state may enjoy immunity from suit in cases involving public acts but not in
cases involving private acts.
The court determined that the Republic of Indonesia was acting in pursuit of a
sovereign activity when it entered into the Maintenance Agreement with
Vinzon. The maintenance of embassy premises and equipment is an integral part
of the establishment and operation of a diplomatic mission, which is considered
a sovereign function. Therefore, the Republic of Indonesia was entitled to
sovereign immunity from suit in this case. The court held that the provision in
the Maintenance Agreement, stating that legal actions arising from the
agreement shall be settled according to Philippine laws and in a specified
Philippine court, did not constitute a clear and unequivocal waiver of sovereign
immunity. It explained that this provision could apply when the sovereign party
chooses to sue in local courts or otherwise waives its immunity but does not
automatically waive immunity.
Liability of Ambassador and Minister Counsellor: The court also ruled that
Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim could not be sued in
their private capacities for terminating the Maintenance Agreement because
their actions did not fall within the exceptions to diplomatic immunity as
defined in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
Conclusion: In conclusion, the court granted the petition, reversed the decision
of the Court of Appeals, and dismissed the complaint against the Republic of
Indonesia. The court upheld the principle of sovereign immunity in international
law and determined that the Republic of Indonesia was acting in pursuit of a
sovereign activity when entering into the Maintenance Agreement, entitling it to
immunity from suit. Additionally, Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister
Counsellor Kasim were immune from suit in their private capacities.
DOH V. PHIL 3/13/07;
Facts: Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the
manufacturing and supply of pharmaceutical products to government hospitals
in the Philippines. The then Secretary of Health, Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr.,
issued Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 27, Series of 1998. This A.O. outlined
guidelines and procedures for the accreditation of government suppliers for
pharmaceutical products. It was later amended by A.O. No. 10, Series of 2000,
which provided additional guidelines for the accreditation of drug suppliers.
A.O. No. 10 allowed Drug Manufacturers, Drug Traders, and Drug Importers to
apply for accreditation. Accreditation was to be done by the Central Office of
the Department of Health. A separate accreditation was required for drug
suppliers and their specific products. Only products accredited by the
Committee (Central Office-Department of Health) were allowed to be procured
by the DOH and other entities under its jurisdiction. Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc.
submitted a request to the DOH for the inclusion of additional items in its list of
accredited drug products. This request included the antibiotic "Penicillin G
Benzathine." In September 2000, the DOH, through petitioner Antonio M.
Lopez (chairperson of the pre-qualifications, bids, and awards committee),
issued an Invitation for Bids for the procurement of 1.2 million units vials of
Penicillin G Benzathine (Penicillin G Benzathine contract).
Despite not receiving a response from the DOH regarding its request for the
inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited products, Phil.
Pharmawealth, Inc. submitted a bid for the Penicillin G Benzathine contract. On
October 11, 2000, when the bids were opened, only two companies participated.
Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. submitted the lower bid at ₱82.24 per unit, compared
to Cathay/YSS Laboratories’ (YSS) bid of ₱95.00 per unit.
However, due to the non-accreditation of Phil. Pharmawealth's Penicillin G
Benzathine product, the contract was awarded to YSS Laboratories, Inc.
Pharmawealth, Inc. filed a complaint for injunction, mandamus, and damages
with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order. In the complaint, Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. sought
to:
Nullify the award of the Penicillin G Benzathine contract to YSS Laboratories,
Inc.
Direct the DOH and certain individuals to declare Phil. Pharmawealth as the
lowest complying responsible bidder for the Benzathine contract. In their
Comment, the defendants argued for the dismissal of the complaint, citing a
lack of merit. They asserted that government agencies have full discretion and
that the DOH had explicitly reserved the right to accept or reject any or all bids
without incurring liability to the bidders. The defendants filed a Manifestation
and Motion (motion to dismiss) seeking the outright dismissal of the complaint
based on the doctrine of state immunity. They also alleged that Phil.
Pharmawealth, Inc.'s representative was not duly authorized by its board of
directors to file the complaint. Trial Court's Decision denied the Motion to
Dismiss.
Issues: Whether the suit is against the state and thus subject to the doctrine of
state immunity. // Whether individual petitioners (DOH officials) can be held
liable for damages in their personal capacities.
Issue 1: Suit Against the State The court begins by addressing the question of
whether the suit is against the state, which would invoke the doctrine of state
immunity from suit. It concludes that the suit is primarily directed at
government officials in their official capacities, and it alleges grave abuse of
discretion on their part. Since the Constitution guarantees judicial review of acts
involving grave abuse of discretion, the officials should be the proper parties to
be sued. Moreover, the reliefs sought by the respondent include the nullification
of the contract award, which can only be enforced against the officials in their
official capacities as officials of the DOH. Therefore, the suit is not against the
state itself but against individual officials in their official capacities.
Issue 2: Individual Liability for Damages The court addresses the applicability
of the defense of state immunity from suit to the individual petitioners regarding
the claim for damages. It acknowledges that the rule prohibiting suits against
the state without its consent also applies to complaints against officials for acts
performed in their official capacities. However, this rule does not apply when
the public official is being sued in his personal capacity for unauthorized or
unlawful acts that harm the rights of others. In this case, the officials are sued in
their personal capacities for alleged illegal abuse of their official positions. The
court finds this permissible, as officers who exceed their legal authority cannot
hide behind sovereign immunity and must bear personal liability.
The court emphasizes that this ruling does not determine the actual liability of
the petitioners; it merely allows the case to proceed to trial where evidence can
be presented and their liability assessed.

DEUTSCHE V. CA, 4/15/09;

Facts: The case involves a labor dispute between private respondents
(employees) and GTZ, an entity tasked with implementing development
projects on behalf of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Philippines.
Private respondents filed a complaint against GTZ before a Labor Arbiter,
alleging illegal dismissal and seeking various labor-related claims.
GTZ moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting that it enjoys state immunity
from suit, considering its role as the implementing agency of the German
government.
Issues:Whether GTZ, as an implementing agency of the German government, is
entitled to state immunity from suit in the Philippines.
Whether the Labor Arbiter's decision should have been directly appealed to the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) or if a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals was the correct course of action.
Ruling: The court ruled against GTZ and denied its petition. It held that GTZ
failed to establish with satisfaction that it enjoys state immunity from suit in the
Philippines. Consequently, both the Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals
acted correctly when they refused to acknowledge GTZ's immunity from suit.
The court also found that GTZ's failure to appeal the Labor Arbiter's decision to
the NLRC and instead filing a petition for certiorari directly with the Court of
Appeals was not justified.
Court's Reasoning:
The concept of state immunity from suit: The court first addressed the
fundamental concept of state immunity from suit. It explained that, according to
Section 9, Article XVI of the Philippine Constitution, "the State may not be
sued without its consent." State immunity is extended not only to local states
but also to foreign states to avoid disrupting international relations.
Distinction between incorporated and unincorporated agencies: The court
emphasized that whether a government agency, like GTZ, can invoke state
immunity depends on whether it is incorporated or unincorporated. Incorporated
agencies often have their own charter, granting them a separate legal
personality. In contrast, unincorporated agencies are merged within the
government machinery.
The power to sue and be sued: The court cited previous jurisprudence stating
that an incorporated agency's suability is determined by its charter. If the charter
permits it to sue and be sued, it waives immunity from suit. This principle
applies regardless of whether the agency is performing governmental or
proprietary functions.
GTZ's legal personality: The court noted that GTZ is described as "the
implementing agency of the Federal Republic of Germany." However, it raised
questions about GTZ's legal nature, including whether it is incorporated or
unincorporated, and whether it has a legal personality independent of the
German government.
GTZ's federal ownership: The court referred to GTZ's official website, which
described GTZ as "federally owned" and a "federal enterprise" founded as a
"company under private law" in 1975.
Lack of evidence regarding immunity: The court highlighted that GTZ failed to
provide evidence regarding its immunity under German law. It pointed out that
the absence of such evidence led to uncertainty regarding GTZ's legal status.
Absence of certification from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA): The
court noted that GTZ had not secured a certification from the DFA, which is
typically required in cases involving state immunity. Such certification would
have provided a factual basis for GTZ's claim of immunity.
The role of the Solicitor General: The court observed that the Solicitor General
had endorsed GTZ's claim of immunity. However, it stressed that this
endorsement did not substitute for the DFA certification required in cases
involving foreign state immunity.
Concept of Suit Against the State:
The court explained that when determining whether a suit is against the state, it
is essential to consider the nature and legal personality of the entity being sued.
In this case, GTZ claimed to be "the implementing agency of the Government of
the Federal Republic of Germany." However, the court questioned whether GTZ
was incorporated or unincorporated and whether it had a legal personality
distinct from the German government.
Ultimately, the court ruled that GTZ had not provided sufficient evidence to
establish its immunity from suit, and it emphasized the importance of securing a
certification from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) in cases involving
foreign state immunity. The absence of such certification led to uncertainty
about GTZ's legal status and its entitlement to state immunity.

SHELL V. JALOS, 9/8/10;

Background: In December 1990, Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. (Shell)
entered into a Service Contract (Service Contract 38) with the Republic of the
Philippines. The contract aimed at exploring and extracting petroleum resources
in northwestern Palawan. Two years later, Shell discovered natural gas reserves
in the Camago-Malampaya area. This discovery led to the development of the
Malampaya Natural Gas Project. As part of the project, Shell constructed and
installed a 504-kilometer-long pipeline. The pipeline spanned a considerable
distance, including a crossing of the Oriental Mindoro Sea.
Complaint by Fishermen: On May 19, 2003, a group of individuals, led by
Efren Jalos, along with 75 other fishermen (referred to as "Jalos, et al."), filed a
complaint for damages against Shell. They alleged that their livelihood was
severely affected by the construction and operation of Shell's natural gas
pipeline. According to Jalos, et al., the construction and operation of the
pipeline had a detrimental impact on their fishing activities. They claimed that
the pipeline caused a significant decline in their fish catch. As a result of the fish
decline, the average net income of the fishermen per month fell dramatically,
from a high of ₱4,848.00 to just ₱573.00.
Jalos, et al. argued that the pipeline had a negative effect on biogenically hard-
structured communities, such as coral reefs, and caused stress to marine life in
the Mindoro Sea. They asserted that the operation of the pipeline had driven fish
away from coastal waters, forcing fishermen to travel longer distances and
spend more time at sea to catch fish. Shell contended that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the action because it was a "pollution case" governed by
Republic Act 3931, as amended by Presidential Decree 984 (Pollution Control
Law). Under these statutes, the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) had
primary jurisdiction over pollution cases and related damages. Shell claimed
that it could not be sued without the State's consent, asserting that it was serving
merely as an agent of the Philippine government under Service Contract 38.
Issues Presented: Whether the complaint is a pollution case within the primary
jurisdiction of the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB).
Whether the complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action against Shell.
Whether the suit is against the State and barred by the doctrine of state
immunity.
Court's Rulings and Reasoning:
1. Pollution Case and Jurisdiction: The Court found that the complaint, though
not using the term "pollution," alleged that Shell's pipeline produced emissions
that drove fish away, affecting marine life. This constitutes "pollution" under the
Pollution Control Law. The Pollution Control Law defines pollution as any
alteration of the properties of water that is harmful to public health, safety, or
welfare. The stress to marine life claimed by the fishermen falls under this
definition. The Court ruled that the specialized knowledge and expertise needed
to determine pollution-related matters rested with the PAB. Thus, Jalos, et al.
had an administrative recourse before filing their complaint in the regular
courts. Failure to allege that they had first approached the PAB meant that
they failed to state a cause of action in the RTC, justifying the dismissal of
their action.
2. Sufficiency of Cause of Action: The Court disagreed with Shell's argument
that the complaint failed to specify an actionable wrong or particular act. It held
that all elements of a cause of action were present: the fishermen's right to use
marine resources, Shell's duty not to impair that right, and the alleged disruption
of marine life and income. While the complaint lacked scientific detail, it was
not a ground for dismissal. The test for sufficiency is whether the complaint
alleges facts that, if true, would justify the relief sought. The construction and
operation of the pipeline, as alleged, could be a wrongful act and a basis for the
fishermen's cause of action.
3. State Immunity: The Court ruled that Shell was not an agent of the Philippine
government but a service contractor for the development of natural gas reserves.
It did not represent the government in transacting business with third parties.
An agent represents and binds another, while Shell's primary obligation was to
develop and manage petroleum operations on behalf of the State.
As Shell was not an agent of the State, it was not immune from suit, and the
complaint could proceed against it.
The contract between Shell and the government recognized the possibility of
suits against Shell, indicating the government's acknowledgment of Shell's
suability.
Conclusion: The Court granted Shell's petition and reversed the Court of
Appeals' decision. It ordered the dismissal of the fishermen's complaint without
prejudice to its refiling with the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB). The Court
emphasized the need for pollution-related matters to be addressed by the PAB,
given its expertise and jurisdiction in such cases. Courts could not take
cognizance of the complaint until the PAB had made a determination.
PTRI V. CA, 10/9/19
In February 2012, E.A. Ramirez Construction entered into a contract with PTRI.
The contract's purpose was to rehabilitate PTRI's electrical facilities,
specifically those in its main building and three pilot plants. In the complaint
filed by E.A. Ramirez Construction in February 2013, it alleged that it had been
awarded the contract and was issued a notice to proceed on February 28, 2012.
The dispute began when a PTRI consultant named Diaz allegedly demanded a
payment of P500,000 (Philippine pesos) from E.A. Ramirez Construction,
claiming it was for "the boys" who would make the project easier to complete.
E.A. Ramirez Construction refused to comply with this demand.
E.A. Ramirez Construction further claimed that, after this incident, it
encountered difficulties in completing the project. They cited numerous changes
and instructions provided by Diaz, which they argued caused delays and
challenges in the project's execution. PTRI ultimately terminated the contract by
sending E.A. Ramirez Construction a Notice of Termination dated May 29,
2012. E.A. Ramirez Construction believed that PTRI acted in bad faith by
terminating the contract. In response to these disputes, E.A. Ramirez
Construction filed a Complaint in February 2013 in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Taguig City, docketed as Civil Case No. 73790-TG. In this Complaint,
E.A. Ramirez Construction sought damages and claimed that PTRI and its
employees were jointly and solidarily liable.

Jurisdictional and Immunity Issues: PTRI and its employees, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion to Dismiss. They raised
several key legal issues: They asserted state immunity from suit, arguing that
PTRI, as a government agency, could not be sued without the consent of the
state. They contended that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case and that the
dispute should be referred to the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission
(CIAC) based on specific provisions in the contract. They argued that the
contract had provisions referring to Republic Act No. 9285 (the Alternative
Dispute Resolution Act of 2004) and its implementing rules, which also
mandated arbitration for construction disputes.

Issues:

1. Whether PTRI and its employees are immune from suit.

2. Whether the RTC has jurisdiction to hear the case or if it should be
referred to CIAC.

Court's Ruling and Reasoning:

State Immunity from Suit:

 The Court held that PTRI, as a government agency, is generally immune

from suit. However, this immunity can be waived expressly or impliedly.
 In this case, the Court found that PTRI had impliedly consented to be
sued by entering into a contract with E.A. Ramirez. The subject contract
contained an arbitration clause, and PTRI agreed to resolve disputes
through arbitration, indicating its consent to be subjected to suit in this
context.
  Therefore, PTRI's immunity from suit did not apply in this case.

Jurisdiction of CIAC:

 The Court affirmed that the CIAC has original and exclusive jurisdiction
over disputes arising from construction contracts, whether before or after
the completion of the contract.
 The subject contract clearly incorporated an arbitration clause and
specified that disputes within the competence of the CIAC would be
referred to it.
 While the subject contract also contained a provision specifying that legal
actions should be filed in the proper courts of Taguig City, this provision
did not affect CIAC's jurisdiction because the CIAC and the RTC were
not considered courts of equal jurisdiction in this context.
 Therefore, the CIAC had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
construction dispute between E.A. Ramirez and PTRI.

Conclusion:

 The Court ruled that PTRI and its employees are not immune from suit in
this case due to their implied consent through the contract.
 The Court affirmed that the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the case,
and the dispute should have been referred to CIAC based on the contract's
arbitration clause.
 The decision of the Court of Appeals to dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction was upheld.

This case demonstrates the importance of carefully reviewing contractual

provisions and understanding their implications, especially when it comes to
jurisdiction and dispute resolution mechanisms. In this instance, the presence of
an arbitration clause led to the CIAC having exclusive jurisdiction over the
construction dispute.